Notes

from the

Lectures of Sir Wm. Hamilton

on

Metaphysics.

Jno. J. Murray

Edinburgh University

1854-55.

Intimation & Exercise

Tomorrow. Monday (Prizes & Vacation Studies) Wednesday. Ross & Lardine. Censors.

Alexander Dawson	a	1	2	b		3	4	D	E	5	6	7	8	9 10 11
Baldwin Fralick	a	1	2	b	C	3	4	d		5		6	7	8 9 10 11
Ewen Macaulay		1	2	b		(3)	D	3	4	e	5	6	7	8 9
George Thomson	a	1	2	b	C	3	4	d	E	5	6	7	8	9 10
George A. Yeomans	b	1	2	b	c	3	D	4		5	e	6	7	8 9 10
John L. Cameron (a)		1		b	c	2	3		4	5	6			
John B. Noel	b		1	2	b	c	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Henry Edmison	a	1	2	b	C	3	4	D	e	5	6	7	8	9 10
Robert Lardine	b	1	2	b	c	3	D	4	e	5	6	7	8	9 10
Thomas Ferguson		1	2	b	(c)	d	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Wm. R. Bain		1	2	b	C	3	4	D	5	6	7	8		

~~(Alexander Dawson)~~	1							
+ Alex. Hunter	1	2	3	4	5			
+ Charles Cameron	1	2	3	4	5	6		
+ Donald Ross	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 9
~~+ John K. W. Morine~~	1							
+ John ~~G. Pictou~~ Gordon	1	2	3	4	5			
+ John D. Robertson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 9
~~Joshua Mazier~~								
+ J. F. Harkness	1							
+ Thos. Hart	1	2	3	4	5	6		
+ John Gordon								

Subjects of Essays

1. Is it possible to explain the moral phen^a of our Conc^ness as originating in the desire of our own happiness or of the happiness of others?
2. On the origin of our belief in the uniformity of nature.
3. Are there sufficient data to warrant our belief in the existence of latent modifications of mind?

(On N° 2 of Hume's Inquiry Conc. the Hum. Underst. Sect. 7. 'On the idea of necessary connection', 8. 'Of Lib. & Necess.', 10. 'Of Miracles'. On the Treatise of Hum. Nature, Part III. 'Of Inf. & Probability'. Dr. Brown's Essay on Cause & Effect, of wh a resume in Lect. 5–8, 'On the Objects of Physical Inquiry'. Also in Chalmers' Nat. Theol. & Evid.)

Lecture I.

What is Philosophy?

You are now, Gentlemen, about to enter a course of philosophical discipline. Before proceeding, therefore, to the consideration of the special object of our course, it will be necessary to present you with a general notion of what philosophy is. But in affording you this information, it is evident several difficulties present themselves. The definition of phy is the result of a lofty generalization of particulars, of which you either are, or are supposed to be, ignorant. You cannot, therefore, be at present made adequately to understand the nature of the studies in question, since these studies are themselves intended for this purpose. ~~But~~ Although,

however, you cannot avail yourselves of a knowledge of the nature of phy, it is desirable that you should have some notion of what phy is. Now, as in the order of nature, belief always precedes knl., you must at present believe hypothetically, that is, take upon trust: this, however, only that you may not hereafter be under the necessity of taking any condition on trust. In the order of nature the child must believe in order to learn; and even the primary facts of intelligence would not be original, were they revealed to us under any other form than that of necessary belief.[x] But this is not peculiar to phy, for almost every science makes the same demand. In pursuing our plan, therefore, of giving some general notion of what phy is, we propose to answer, (1.) What is the meaning of the name? (2.) What is the meaning of the thing?

I. First, then, etymologically considered, phy. is a term of Greek origin, being compounded of φιλος and σοφια. The history of the word is involved in considerable obscurity. Cicero, on the authority of Heraclides, says that it was first assumed and applied by Pythagoras. The circumstances of its application he relates as follows: It happened when Pythagoras was at ~~Sicyon~~ Phylos, that Leon, the chief of the Phylians, was exceedingly charmed by his ingenuity and eloquence as he discoursed on various topics; and asked in what art he pre-

x Non enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed intelligo ut credam. Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelligit. —Anselm, Prosol. 1. De fide trin. 2.

art he principally excelled. Pythagoras replied that he professed no art, but was merely a sher. Leon, struck with the novelty of the term, asked Pythagoras, who were shers and wherein they differed from other men? Pythagoras replied that, as in the public games, whilst some are contending for glory, and others buying and selling for gain, there is always a third party who attend merely as spectators; so in human life, amidst the various characters of men, there is always a select number who, despising all other pursuits, assiduously apply themselves to the observation and study of nature: these, added he, are the persons whom I call shers. Pythagoras was a native of Samos, who flourished about 560 B.C., about 150 before Plato: the statement, therefore, that the term phly was in use at so early a period is improbable. It rests, you will see, wholly upon the authority of Heraclides, who is generally regarded as being from a untrustworthy authority. It is by no means impossible, however, that it could have been then in use, for we find it in Herod. I. 30. But it is far more probable that the term was first adopted by Socrates; who was, at least, the first to generalize the expression, in order, as was natural, to distinguish his own sect or school from the Sophists — σοφιστάς.

The term phly, it must be remarked,

was at first assumed in modesty to intimate that those who had made most advance in Phil. should consider themselves rather as "lovers of wisdom" than as "wise men." It soon, however, lost its original meaning, and was borne with as much ostentation and vanity as if it had ~~exclusive~~ implied an exclusive right to the possession of wisdom. Phy was soon loaded with opprobrious appellations. It is called by Seneca, Nomen invidiosum; and Epictetus counselled his disciples not to assume the title of phers. Campbell, "Address to the Rainbow," says:

"I ask not proud philosophy,
To tell me what thou art."

II. What is the thing signified by the name? It would be tedious and perplexing to enumerate the various definitions that have been given of phy. These have been as numerous as the authors who have written upon it. E.g. it has been defined "the science of things human and divine;" — "the science of things possible in as much as they are possible;" — "the relations of sensible and abstract truths;" "the science of the original form of the Ego a mental self;" — &c. &c. But all these definitions — (Sir. Wm H. gives a long list) — are either partial and consequently imperfect, thus excluding what they ought to comprehend; or vague and unsatisfactory, supplying no

preliminary information, and only to be understood after a Pnl. has been acquired of that which they profess to explain. The fact probably is that a single proposition cannot include all that Phy. comprehends.

Phy. is not to be looked at from one point of view. In relation to man as a cognitive and thinking being it is <u>theoretical</u>; in relation to man as a moral agent it is <u>practical</u>; and sometimes it may be viewed as comprehending both theory and practice. Again, it may be viewed <u>objectively</u> as a complement of truths; or <u>subjectively</u> as a habit or quality of the mind knowing. In these circumstances I shall not attempt to give a definition of phy, but only endeavour to ~~give~~ make you ~~as precise~~ understand it as precisely as the imprecise nature of the object permits. As a matter of history I may mention that in Greek phy there are six divisions. The first and second define it from its object-matter, (materia circa quam;) the third and fourth from its end — that for which it is; the fifth from its relative preeminence; the sixth from its etymology. The first defines it to be the Pnl. of things existent as existent, — γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ᾗ ὄντα. 2° The Pnl. of things divine and human. 3° (Plato) Meditation of death. μελέτη θανάτου. 4° Resemblance to the Deity. 5° The art of arts, and science of sciences, (Arist.); 6° The love of wisdom.

A seventh was added, that philosophy, is the Medicine of the Soul; and even an eighth is given in the expression

*1. As all phy is a knl, the highest problem of phy &c. 2. As phy is knl of causes & the mind is the principal constituent or cause of knl, phy must above all objects of knl study mind wh knows.

All phy is knl, but not all knl phy. Phy ∴, a kind of knl, how distinguished from other knl? All knl = consc^ness (of self & not self.)

Knl of the facts given in consc^ness is historical or empirical. Obs. on empiric. οἱ ἐμπειρικοί & ~~δογματικοί~~ ἐμβαδικοί opposed to οἱ δογματικοί who made use both of experience & reasoning.

Still Empirical is necessary, for experiential is not in use & experimental denotes merely one kind of experience, when fact has been brot about by voluntary arrangement.

τὸ ὅτι = ἡ γνῶσις ὅτι ἐστί = scio rem esse = (later) quod res sit (& even quia res sit (schoolmen. Anselm.) = knl of the fact.

τὸ διότι = knl of cause or reason, why or how. Cannot but think a cause & knl of a phen^n felt to be inadequate till we have reached ~~&~~ its cause. Illustr. of a rainbow

Phy, as convertible with science, = knl of effects as depending on causes, & ∴ tends ~~to~~ first causes & ultimately ~~to~~ the One First Cause.

But all knl relative, possible only as far as we have faculties of knowing, + the highest problem of phy is ~~to~~ investigate the ~~the~~ conditions under wh knl is possible. Phy = science of mind.

Term phy misapplied in this country (Britain.)

Absolute Objective Utility of Phy.

Abs. Value properly a good (αγαθον) ~~that~~ wh is valuable in itself. ~~τα καθ' αυτ~~ Relative Value properly the useful (ωφελιμον.) Τα αγαθα = τα καθ' αυτα διωκομενα. και αγαπωμενα. Τα ωφελιμα = τα δια ταυτα.

Of Goods or abs. ends only two for man:

1. Pftion & 2. Happiness wh, from pleasure being always concomitant of pfn (unimpeded & unconstrained activity) always coincide.

Absolute utility may also be called General, Relative may be called Special or Particular. Fish more important & its overlook ∴ more dangerous.

Absolute utility either Subjective or Objective.

Objective utility of Phy derived ~~from its being devoted to mind~~

I. From its turning our studies to mind, wh is the noblest object of knl. Sir Thos's motto from Phavorinus, back to Chilo. Pope's "the proper study &c." Sir Thos Browne.

II. From the fact, to illustrate wh this lecture is specially devoted, that it is only through mind that we can rise to knl of God. Inference of God's existence grounded on a certain class of phen demanding a Divine Cause for their explanation. This class of phen are found

1. Not in phen of matter, wh, if taken by themselves, wd rather afford the opposite conclusion, but

2. In phen of mind, taken in connection with wh the phen of matter do afford a theistic conclusion.

For what kind of a cause constitutes a Deity?

Notion of a God contained

1. Neither in that of an Omnipotent First Cause alone, for in the belief of that theists & atheists are agreed,

2. Nor in that of an intelligent & moral creator, for unless original & omnipotent a higher cause wd require to be postulated for him. Is that higher cause not intelligence, then atheism follows. So if intelligence, then theism.

Conditions ∴ of the proof of Deity are

1. That intelligence stands first in abs. order of existence, i.e that final preceded efficient causes.

2. That the universe is governed by moral laws.

What are the characteristic contrasts of material & mental phen.? ?

The former are subjected to immutable laws, & man's bodily organisation connects him with these. But his organs are his, not himself. He is conac. of faculties not subjected to rigid necessity of nature: in unconditional law of duty he recognises liberty, & hence struggle between physical necessity & moral freedom, flesh & sp., wh is distinctive character of humanity.

1. First condition of proof of Deity drawn from psychology. It is only in so far as we discover priority of intelligence in our experience, that we are warranted in affirming its absolute priority. Psych. materialism logical atheism. Nullus in Microcosmo sp., nullus in Macrocosmo Deus (Dr. Henry More.)

2. Second condition also drawn from psychology & of more importance. First satisfies speculative curiosity: second our heart. — Here again only by proving reality of our own

moral nature do we establish moral nature of God & of the world's government. This given only in psychology.

Sir Wm. tests proof of liberty always on consc.ness of Duty.

Phy operates in 3 ways in assuring us of moral freedom.

1. Though conviction is natural, an examination of the mind is required to give it clearness & scientific certainty.

2. Phy alone obviates the difficulty presented by the causal judgment.

3. Study of mind necessary to counteract ~~twofold~~ influence of study of matter wh is twofold.

α. It diverts mind from phen.a of moral freedom & disqualifies it for appreciating their import.

b. It habituates the mind to contemplation only of mechanical necessity.

α. Thus it is disposed to disbelieve freedom

β. Love of unity determines him to rejection of hypothesis of free intelligence, when he finds constantly in his studies a rigid necessity. Not so strongly felt in the infancy of science.

Plato. Kant. Jacobi.

Method of Phy.

Only One method in phy & all different (so-called) methods are merely applications, more or less perf, of this one method.

What is method? A rational progress, i.e. progress towards an end.

Phical method ∴ progress towards end of phy.

End of phy twofold:

1. Discovery of causes. Knl of cause only possible as ex-tracted out of effect. E.g. a neutral salt. Decomposed into an acid & an alkali (& the force wh brot them into union.) This termed Analysis. But analysis is only a mean to an end — to a recomposition, synthesis.

These, though commonly ~~separated~~ (regarded as separate methods, are merely two elements of one method.

Each equally essential to complete the other. But ~~&~~ analysis is valuable in itself, as the synthesis may at any time be added. A synthesis however without analysis is ab initio null.

2. Reduction of multiplicity of knl to unity. Every thl com-plex, but our faculties are so limited that we can comprehend only simple conjunctions. ~~E.g. a tree~~. E.g.

(a) With regard to one individual object, a tree.

(b.) A multiplicity of objects. To comprehend that we must find one in many — that in wh differing objects agree. Induction. E.g. Gravitation.

But in induction there is not mere analysis. Something is added to the analysis. From Some we cannot infer all.

What is inserted? That nature is uniform in her operations. E.g. Inductive syllogism with regard to Gravitation. Which is merely an observation of many particulars converted into one universal law.

Questions for Examination.

—a—

1. To whom does common tradition, ~~to~~ whom does Hum. ascribe the first adoption of the name phr ?
2. What kind of Mil does Hum. distinguish from phical Mil, ~~&~~ by what does he distinguish phical Mil from that other kind & ~~why is phy~~ (on what ground does he apply 'phy' esp. to the Mil of mind ?)
3. What is the absolute, what the relative, what the absolute subjective, what the absolute objective utility of phy ?
4. What two processes go to constitute the complete & ady method of phy ?
5. What are the three classes under wh all the phen^a of mind may be comprehended, & what are the three sciences into wh phy (the science of mind) may be divided ?
6. What is the phical ~~sense meaning~~ usage of the terms subject & subjective, object & objective ?
7. From what are the terms 'Ethics' & 'Morals' derived, & what is the objech: matter of the science wh they denote ?
8. What are the two meanings wh the term 'law' is employed to denote, & in wh of these is it employed in Ethics ?
9. To which element in an action is its moral quality attached ?
10. What are the theories of Hedonism, Eudemonism & Utilitarian-ism, as these terms were limited in the lectures ?
11. Who ascribed the moral phen^a of conscness to an internal sense ?
12. How does Dr. Adam Smith explain the origin of our notions of (1.) approbation & (2.) merit, ~~when~~ with reference (1.) to ourselves, (2.) to others ?

* So strongly stated. See Plato's Politicus, p. 258, quoted by Ed.

Divisions of Phy

Are phers agreed in their divisions of phy? They differ as much in this as in their definition of it. The most famous divisions i.e., those founded on a principle, are alone to be noticed.

The same limitation of our faculties, wh constrains us to seek unity in our knl, renders expedient & even necessary the division of phy, that by considering its constituent parts separately we may the better comprehend the constituted whole.

The most ancient & universally recognised division is into Theoretical & Practical phy.

1. In Theoretical (speculative or contemplative) phy scimus ut sciamus.

2. In Practical scimus ut operemur.

Engl. language deficient in expressions for this distinction. πρακτικος expressed by active, wh might to comprehend θεωρητικος as well.

E.g. Intellectual (speculative) & active powers of mind.

Practical moreover has many collateral significations wh render it in some respects unfit to supply the want.

The division first explicitly enounced by Arist. & the attempts of the later Platonists to carry it up to Plato or even to Pythagoras are unworthy of refutation.+ But after being promulgated it was soon generally adopted.

The division however is unsound. For

1. Phy, as phy, is theoretical only, has to do with nothing beyond knl, with no applic. of knl to practice.

2. In another point of view all phy is practical, has to do with Knl not as a mere inert possession, but as an act.

The principal difference of opinion among the ancients regarded the relation of Logic to phy.

Is it a mere instrument or a department also of phy?

Art & Science ~~which is the distinction between them~~ wh has been ~~work~~ explained in no other book?

Not convertible with the distinction between practical & theoretical phy, though often supposed to be so. E.g. by Whately.

If this were the case, the distinction wd be easy; for the same branch of Knl wd be ~~science~~ an art in respect of its practical application, wh wd be a science in respect of the theory wh that practical application supposes.

But this is not the case. We cannot say the art of ethics, politics, theology &c., though these are practical sciences. We speak however of the art of logic, rhetoric, grammar.

Historical origin of the distinction. Through the scholastic (= Aristotelic) phy, wh formed the exclusive phy of Europe during the middle ages, the term Art, like many others, came into modern European languages.

Πραξις (generically) = πραξις (specifically) & ποιησις.

Art = ποιησις = εξις ποιητικη μετα λογου.

Ethics, politics &c. propose πραξις as their end & are ∴ not arts.

Logic, rhetoric, grammar propose some εργον (a syllogism, oration, oral expression of thot.) They are ∴ τεχναι.

The distinction is not above criticism & is not vindicated, but merely explained here.

It is moreover merely a distinction in phy. Mechanical operations were not considered. In them ∴ art is applied both to productive & unproductive operations. Rope-dancing, as well as Rope-making is an art.

Bacon was the first after the revival of letters to distribute the sciences & phy. ~~The latter into~~ All human knl into ~~Poetry~~ History, Poetry & Phy. The last into that wh is conversant about 1. God, 2. Nature, 3. Man.

Questions for Examination.

1. What is the doctrine of Reid & Stewart with regard to consness? Is it the common doctrine among phers?

2. How does H. explain attention? & what 3 kinds or degrees of ~~all~~ attention does he recognise?

3. What are the 3 laws wh must be observed in order to the legitimate application of the testimony of consness?

4. What is Natural, what Hypothetical Dualism? What are the two forms of the latter?

5. Who was the most distinguished Natural Dualist of modern times, & by what phr was he supposed to be a Cosmothetic Idealist?

6. What is the phen on connected with our acquired habits, to explain wh H. postulates latent modifications of mind?

7. From what is the name of Logic derived, & what is the ambiguity of its etymological meaning?

8. What is the faculty with the formal laws of wh Logic is conversant & what are the three functions of that faculty wh determine the threefold division of Logic?

9. What is a categorematic, what a syncategorematic word?

10. What is a concrete, an abstract, a singular, a common term?

11. What is the extension, what the comprehension of a term, & what is the law of their relation?

1. What are the faculties into wh H. distributes the cognitive power of the mind?

2. What are the two hypotheses of mediate perception & wh of these alone had Reid conceived?

3. What is Dr. Brown's charge against Reid's acct of the theories of perception?

3. What division was there in the Cartesian school with regard to the Descartes' theory of perception?

4. What abusive signification did Reid give to im: mediate knl.?

5. To what class of mental phen^a do sensation & perception severally belong & what is the law of their relation?

6. Into what classes are propositions divided as regards (a) their substance, (b.) quality, (c.) quantity, (d.) both quality & quantity.

7. What do the symbols A E I O severally represent?

8. What are the only two kinds of logical opposition ~~& by~~ in terms & in propositions, & by what are these two kinds distinguished?

9. By what rule is the quantity of the predicate determined?

10. Convert the following propositions & state by wh of the 3 modes each is converted:

(a.) All men are responsible

(b.) No ~~men~~ beasts are responsible

(c.) Some men are cruel

(d.) Some men are not cruel.

1. What are the two objections against ~~the~~ Nat. Realism wh have been founded ~~on the~~ severally on the nature of ~~the~~ an act of ~~Perception~~ Knowledge & on the nature of mind & matter?

2. What ancient Greek philosopher first ~~the~~ held that the four senses of Sight, Hearing, Taste & Smell are only modifications of Touch? (What was the opinion of Democritus with regard to the senses of ~~Touch~~ Sight &c.?)

3. What sense ~~is~~ must be recognised besides the five of the vulgar division & what are the sensations ~~included~~ referred to it?

4. What does H. hold regarding the connection between the sense of sight & the notion of extension?

5. Who ~~was~~ the author & what is the doctrine of the New Theory of Vision?

6. What are the Major, Minor & Middle Terms, the Major & Minor Premisses & Conclusion of a Syllogism?

7. What are the two important Rules regarding the distribution of Terms of a Syllogism?

8. What are the Rules regarding ~~the~~ particular & negative premisses?

9. What is the Mood of a Syllogism, & how many moods are numerically, how many logically possible?

10. Why are the following moods impossible, viz. EOO, AIO, AOE, AOA?

1. What is the criterion of a priori truths? By whom was it first recognised, by whom first fully applied?

2. What was Locke's doctrine with regard to a priori truths, & to what was his doctrine logically reduced by the French phrs?

(3. ~~How~~ What is the distinction between Retention, Reproduction & Representation?)

3. By what principle does H. explain the phen.a of Retention?

4. Into what law does H. generalise the subordinate laws of association, & by what previous phrs was the general law recognised?

5. What defect ~~has~~ is there ~~been~~ in the analysis of the phen.a of Reproduction by most psychologists?

6. What is the figure of a syllogism? How many figures are there & what is their difference?

7. Why is AEE impossible in the first figure, AAI in the second?

8. What kind of conclusions must be drawn in the second & third figures, & why these alone?

9. What is the meaning of the symbolic letters in dIsamIs & fElAptOn?

10. To what mood of what fig. does the following syllogism belong, & to what mood of the first fig. may it be reduced & how?

No sponges have the power of locomotion,
But sponges are animals;
∴ Some animals have not the power of locomotion.

1. Why is IAI impossible in the second fig., EAE in the third?

2. Why ~~does the~~ must the major premise in the first fig. be universal & the minor affirmative?

3. Throw into Barbara the following argt.: The only Absolute that exists must be the ego + the nonego, for it is the only Absolute that we know.

4. What is the mnemonic line for the second fig. & the meaning of its symbolic letters?

5. In what mood of what fig. is the following argt. drawn; to what mood of the first fig. may it be reduced & how?

The Ornithorynchus Paradoxus lays eggs,

And it ~~has~~ is a quadruped;

∴ Some quadrupeds lay eggs.

6. Throw into Cesare the following argt. & reduce it to the first figure: ~~No necessary notions, like those of~~ The notions of space, time & cause, being necessary, cannot be the products of experience.

7. What is the procedure in the modus ponens & in the modus tollens of conditional syllogisms severally?

8. What are the two fallacious modes of procedure in conditional syllogisms?

9. How are conditional syllogisms converted?

10. Convert the following syllogism from the modus ponens into the modus tollens:

If I cannot know the pleasure of benevolence ~~till I am~~ without being first benevolent,

I cannot be benevolent merely for pleasure;

But I cannot know &c.;

∴ I cannot be &c.

1. Why is I A I impossible in the first figure?
2. Why can negative conclusions alone be drawn in the second fig.?
3. " particular " " " " third "?
4. What is the meaning of the symbolic letters in Disamis, Felapton, Bokardo?
5. Resolve into ~~sylls~~ Camestres the following arg.: The causal connection cannot ~~be known in~~ ~~exists in~~ perception, for it cannot be traced in the outer world.
6. Reduce the above ~~to th~~ from Camestres to the first fig.
7. Reduce from the modus ponens ~~tollens~~ to the modus tollens ~~ponens~~ the following conditional syll.:

If the causal judgment results from the Law of the Conditional, it is illegitimate to postulate ~~make~~ it an original principle;
But it does result &c
∴ It is illegitimate to &c.

8. What is the distinction between logical, semi-logical & non-logical fallacies?
9. What is the fallacy of inferring the falsehood of the conclusion from the falsehood of the premises & to what fallacy in conditional syllogisms does it correspond?
10. What is the fallacy of inferring ~~the truth~~ of the premises from that of the conclusion & to what fallacy in conditional syllogisms does it correspond?

1. What is the relation of the subject to the predicate in these two propositions (a) "Milk is white; (b) Milk is a liquid?

2. What two kinds of reasoning, Inductive & Deductive, have been generally overlooked, & what is their distinction?

3. From what two sources (causes) may necessity of thot arise?

4. Explain the Law of the Conditioned in relation to space & time, both as maxima & minima.

5. Shew how H. deduces the mental Law of Causality from the Law of the Conditioned.

6. Why are the semi-logical classed among the logical fallacies, but distinguished from the purely logical?

7. What are the Fallacia Figurae Dictionis, the Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum & the Fallacia Amphiboliae

8. What is intrinsic, what extrinsic ambiguity?

9. Does the Fallacy of Division & Composition arise from intrinsic or extrinsic ambiguity?

10. Is the following argt. fallacious, & if so, why?

What a man troweth is not eternal & unchangeable;
Truth is what a man troweth;
∴ Truth is not eternal & unchangeable

[In order to understand the division of our course, a preliminary view of the different departments of phys. is required. Lib. H.]

Psychology.

Lecture VIII.

Division of the course, and explication of philosophical terms.

We now come to the peculiar business of the course. All Sc. and phy. are divided into two classes; according as they are conversant, 1° about Matter, 2° about Mind. With the first we have to do at present only in so far as it can throw light on the latter. The following scheme will lay before the various departments, into which the phy. of mind divides itself:

Mind or Consciousness.

- I. Facts. Phenomenology. Empirical Psychology.
  - 1. Cognitions.
  - 2. Feelings.
  - 3. Conations (Will and Desire.)
- II. Laws. – Nomology. Rational Psychology.
  - 1. Cognitions = Logic
  - 2. Feelings = Phys. of Facts (Aesthetics)
  - 3. Conative powers
    - Moral Phys.
    - Political Phys.
- III. Results. – Ontology. Being of God. – Immortality

{4} This head divides itself into 3 parts, for we have a psych. (1.) of the Cognitions; (2.) of the feelings, (~~as pleasure & pain~~ the various modifications of pleasure & pain;) and (3.) of the Conative or appetitive faculties as will and desire.

(a.) Instead of these words through which I have drawn my plan, we should have something to this effect: ~~Th~~ We have no science for the Nomology of the Cognitive faculties in general, (which should be called 'Gnosiology' or 'Gnostology') but for the Understanding we have Logic, or as it would be better denominated, 'Dianoetics;' for Logic is

But to explain: all phy. is in answer to three questions: 1° What are the facts? 2° What are the laws which regulate these? 3° What results or inferences, not immediately obvious, do these warrant us in drawing? Phy. is, therefore, threefold:

I. If we consider the mind merely with the view of observing its phenomena, we have one mental sc. or department of mental sc. wh. may be styled phenomenology. Commonly called empirical psych.; we shall call it phenomenal psych. [A.]

II. If not merely to ~~discover~~ discover phen. but universal laws by wh. the phena. are governed, we have a sc. wh. we shall call Nomology or Nomological psych. This divides as the former, whose departments have each a sc. conversant about its laws. 1° ~~The Nom. of our cognitions is generically the Understanding, specifically Logic~~ (a.), for Logic is nothing but the sc. of the laws of thought in relation to the end wh. our faculties have in view. Universal Grammar or phsical Grammar might also come under this head. 2° No name in our language for this sc., denominated phy. of taste, and, especially on continent, Aesthetics. Neither unobjectionable. Αἰσθησις = our "feeling" = either feeling in generally, or that of touch in particular. But the term has been so long used for this purpose as to have become naturalized. 3° Nom. of con. powers is practical phy. in general. Considering man as an individual it is called ethics; as a member of a family, Economics; of a whole society, politics.

III. Consists in the deduction of results or inferences. Facts may be such as not only to be objects of knl. in themselves, but also as grounds for inferring truths out of themselves. Though we can have only a relative knl. of mind & matter, still by inference and analogy we may rise above the mere facts wh. experience gives. Thus if the existence of God and Immort. ~~can be~~ are not given as phena., but if known phena. can be explained

only on the hypothesis of God and Immort., we are warranted in inferring them. – This department is styled Ontology, or Metaph. proper.

You will observe that I have omitted in this the celebrated division of phy. into pract. & specul. and confined practical phy. to one branch of Nomological psych. In point of fact I object to this division, 1° Because as phy. has to do only with speculation, whatever goes beyond that, transcends phy. This is done if we divide phy. according to its end being either specul. or practical. 2° It actually would not divide phy. for all phy. is practical, is valuable only in as far as it holds practice to be its ultimate end.

General division of the course: Nothing to do with practical phy. – that is confined to Moral phy. chair; but there is none of the other departments of wh. we may not treat. Commence with Mental phy. strictly so called; then Logic; then Ontology.

Definition: "Psych. or the phy. of the human mind, strictly so denominated, is the sc. that is conversant about the phena. or modifications or states of the mind, or conscious subject, or soul, or spirit, or self, or Ego."

Why these various expressions? Because as they are of frequent occurrence I mean to explain them.

I. Psychology. Why use an Hellenic, and not phy. of the mind, sc. of the mind, &c.? 1° Because phy. & almost all its branches are denominated by Greek terms in our language; and why not this, the greatest of all? 2° The term is now commonly used for this purpose; has the authority of Campbell, Beattie, Coleridge, Sir J. Mackintosh, who justly censures Dr. Brown for his introducing the phrase "physiology of the mind." 3° For perspicuity and to prevent circumlocution and consequent tedium, we should

(a.) Seelenlehre. I. C. M. (from Seele = ψυχη & Lehre = λογος.)

(b.) Psychology, however, was never so ~~denominated~~ used, & is entirely free from such associations. Therefore his objections cannot apply to it.

use one term rather than a plurality, wh. is inimicous of a definition. But 4° if a circumlocution be tolerated when used substantively, what shall we say when we wish to employ it adjectively? How can we express a psychological fact, law, coniecity &c.? Even the Germans who have a term of their own (a) to ~~express~~ denominate this &c., because it has not a corresponding adjective, have adopted the term psychology. But what shall we say of Dr. Brown's phrase, and such words as the "physics of the soul", and "intellectual physics." Plainly objectionable, because the terms "nature – natura – φυσις" are confined in common use to the material universe. — D. Stewart objects to spirit and pneumatology; and justly, because these terms apply equally to God, Angels, men; and, therefore, from the theologic= al ideas associated with them are inappropriately employed in phy. for the human mind. For the same reason he objects to psych. but it must be remembered that all the terms em= ployed to denominate the soul & its faculties are taken from material objects. ψυχη, spiritus, anima and animus from ανεμος, Ghost (Old Engl. = spirit) = Germ. Geist, all come from words orig= inally signifying "air." Compare such words as "Sapientia, sagacitas, (Fr.) pensar, Attentio, apprehensio, Conceptio, &c.

Hist. of term. Arist. wrote a work περι ψυχης, but the combination of ψυχη & λογος is modern. We first find it in a work of Otto Casmann, published in 1594. He is the author of the term anthropology, on which he wrote a work in two parts: 1° Psychology. 2° Somatology. But probably he is indebted for the term to his master, Rodolphus Goclenius, who in the same year published a work under the same title. Its use soon became general

[(a) See this whole subject discussed in "Discussions," p. 608. Where also the authorities for the statement of the recognition of this truth "by every sphere of every school."] I.C.M.

throughout Germany; it was introduced into France by Wolf, & familiarized by Ch^s Beaumont.

II. Phenomena, modes, &c. The explanation of these other terms of our definition will be best understood by an exposition of the (a) great axiom, that all our knowledge is relative. In this proposition the term "relative" is opposed to the term absolute. Therefore to say that all our knowledge is relative is to assert that we know and can know nothing absolutely, i.e. in & for itself, without relation to our faculties. To illustrate: all our knl. is either of matter or of mind. Now what is matter? It must be the name of something either known or unknown. In so far as it is known it means that which appears under the form of extension, &c. It is the ~~common~~ name for a series or aggregate or complement of certain phena manifested in co-existence. But as they appear only in ~~its~~ conjunction we are compelled by our constitution to think them conjoined in & by something: as phena, we cannot think them ~~the~~ phena of nothing, but as properties of something extended, &c. But this something, absolutely in itself, i.e. considered apart from its phena, is to us as zero: it is only in its relational or phenal existence, that it is cognizable by us, or conceivable. And it is only by a law of our nature, wh. compells us to think something absolute & unknown as the basis of that wh. is known, that ~~this~~ something obtains a kind of incomprehensible existence. This in wh. these ~~phena~~ appearing qualities are supposed to inhere, is called their subject, substance or substratum. To the subject of the phena of extension, &c. the name of "matter" or material substance is usually given. — The same remarks may be applied to mind. (I do not repeat. J. C. M.)

Thus mind & matter, as known & knowable,

(a.) Therefore the Unitarian has a right to require the Dualist to prove that the two series of phena are incompatible with one substance. 'Neganti incumbit probatio.' [See Discussions, pp. 95.96. J.C.M.]

[Sir Wm. remarks that of man we might say what Virgil said of Aeneas:

Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet."]

(b.) previous to Reid.

(c.) [See 'Discussions' p. 14. J.C.M.]

are only two different series of phena; as unknown & unknowable, they are the two substances in wh. these are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is an inference ~~too is an infer-ence~~ we are compelled to make from the existence of the known phena; and the difference of the two substances is only an inference from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phena to co-in-~~coexi-sten~~ here in one. (a.)

This is a truth in the admission of wh. phers have been singularly harmonious; so that the praise lavished on Reid, as having first expounded the principle, is wholly unmerited. Indeed, I am ~~hardly~~ aware of no phil. who has not proceeded on the assumption of the principle, of few, almost none, who have not explicitly announced it; and it is only since Reid's death that some German phers have obtained celebrity for their attempt to establish phy. upon an immediate knl. of the absolute. Aristotle says of matter, that it is ἄγνωστος καθ' ἑαυτήν, and that mind is not known directly, but only indirectly in knowing other things. He defines soul to be the principle by wh. we live, move, perceive & understand. St. Austin says, (b.) materiam cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci. Again: (c.) mens se cognoscit cognoscendo se vivere, se intelligere, se meminisse, se velle, cogitare, scire, judicare.

So far, then, phers are agreed. It does not follow, however, from the above principle that all relative existence is relative to us, that all that can be known even by limited intelligence is actually cognizable by us. We must, therefore, more precisely limit the sphere of our knl. by adding that all that we know is known only under the special conditions of

[(a) On this object see Brown's 9th Ecl. p. 53, col. b.] J. C. M.

our faculties. On this also philos. are singularly harmonious in opinion. Protagoras: Παντων χρηματων μετρον ανθρωπος. To the same effect Boethius, Bacon, Paul and Condillac. His principles divides itself into two branches: It is implical to conclude, 1° that the properties of existence are equal in number only to our faculties of apprehending them; 2° that the properties known are known in their native purity, without addition or modification from our organs of sense or capacities of intelligence.

I. It is evident that nothing exists for us except in so far as known to us, and that nothing is known to us except certain properties or modes of existence which are relative or analogous to our faculties. Beyond these we know and can assert the reality of nothing. But if on the one hand we are ~~only~~ entitled to assert as actual existence only what we know; on the other hand, we are not warranted in ~~infer-ring as~~ denying as positively existing what we do not know. Sir Wm. illustrates this by supposing a polygon, of which though only two or three sides were seen by us, it would be manifestly absurd to deny that there were others. Again, suppose a column with inscriptions on its four sides each in different language; as a travellr reading the inscription in his own language would be rash in concluding that the column was significant only in so far as it was known to him, so should we be in inferring that there are no other modes of being than those cognizable by our faculties. Sir Wm. then quoted that passage from one of Voltaire's phical romances which will be found in Brown's 7th lecture. (a.)

II. But more important than this is the other consideration that what we know is known ~~only~~ not as it actually is, but as it seems

to us to be. It is of the highest importance to know that our knowledge is not only relative, but made up of several constituents, which it is the great business of phy. to analyse ~~into~~ & discriminate from each other, & to determine whence each is derived. But perception the object is not in immediate relation to the mind, but to the organ; & may not be in immediate relation to the organ even, but make its impression on it through ~~the an~~ some intervening medium. If we do not take ~~these~~ into ~~consideration~~ account what these contribute to, or modify our knowl. of any ~~organ~~ object, our knl. of that obj. may be erroneous. E.g. I see a book. Suppose my perception equal no. 12, & be made up of 3 parts, 4 contributed by the obj., 4 by the intervening medium & 4 by the organ. If we do not analyse the contributions, & take into account how they modify our knl. of the obj. it is evident they may be a source of error. — This is true not only of perception, but of our cognitive ~~all our~~ faculties in general, & some of the higher problems of phy. arise in the attempt to determine the relative shares ~~of~~ contributed to our knl. by the subj. knowing & the obj. known. Materialism & Idealism are but failures in the attempt to maintain the equilibrium.

All our knl. then is relative: 1° Because existence is not cognizable absolutely, but only in ~~to~~ its modes or phenomena; 2° Because these phenom can be known only as they stand in certain relations to our faculties of knowing; 3° Because these modes are made known to the mind only under certain modifications determined by the faculties themselves.

Sir Wm. then proceeded to explain the other terms of his def.

[I do not go over what Sir Wm. said about these terms, as I had found the substance of his explanations, scattered "passim" over Reid's works. I have only ~~noted those places~~ given references to those places which I could remember. J. C. M.]

finition, and (B.) those which denote the relative & known, (C.) the absolute & unknown (D.)

(A.) 1. Subject. [See note * Diss. on Reid, p. 806. b. J.C.M.]

2. Substance. [See

3. Conscious Subject. 1. What is it to be conscious? [See article on the "Phy. of Perception," "Discussions", pp. 46, 47. Also a promised Diss. to be appended to Reid, viz. Note H. (see Reid, p. 223, note *).] J.C.M.]

2. Subject. [On subject and subjective, object and objective, wh. contains all that Sir Wm. said in his lecture, see Diss. on Reid, p. 806, b. note *]

4. Mind. (Etymology obscure.) = subject of internal phena of wh. we are conscious.

5. Self, Ego. Proved that the "Ego" cannot be the material constitution, nor any part or organ of it, quoting in illustration from the 1st Alcibiades of Plato, various other phers, and a well known passage from the first Arbuthnot. [On use of "Ego", see Reid. p. 100 note * b. J.C.M.]

(B.) 1. Mode.

2. Modification

3. State. (See Reid, p. 85, a, note *.)

4. Quality

5. Attribute

6. Property

7. Accident

8. Phenomenon

(a.) "So true is the saying of Cullen: — 'There are more false facts current in the world than false theories.' So true is the saying of Hamlet: — 'There are more things in heaven & earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your phily.'" Discussions, p. 612.

Sir Wm. illustrated the violation of this condition by two incidents in the history of the Royal Society, one of wh. is well-known. The other he had from a friend of Lord Morton.

(b.) For illustration: see Sir William's argument that the hypoth. of representative perception "fulfils none of the conditions of a legitimate hypoth." Discussions, pp. 61–66.

(A.) 4. Faculty (from old Latin 'facul' = 'facilis') = 'facultas' (quasi facilitas) more properly applied to the active powers.

5. Capacity, to the passive affections, of the mind

After explaining the terms of his definition, Sir Wm. proceeded the explication of others, which are of frequent occurrence in philosophical discussions.

1. Hypothesis. (Explanation the same as that usually given.) Conditions of a legitimate hypothesis:

1st It must be ascertained that the phena to be accounted for be found actually to exist (a.)

2nd That the phena can be accounted for no otherwise than by a hypothesis. —— But supposing a hypothesis to be necessary, how are we to distinguish between good & bad, probable & improbable hypotheses? The comparative excellence of a hypoth. can be ~~accurately~~ determined, 1° by its involving nothing contradictory either internally or externally, i.e. between the parts of wh. it is composed, or between these & other established facts; 2° in proportion as it more or less completely explains the phena in question; 3° in so far as it is all-sufficient, i.e. independent on any subsidiary hypoth. (b.)

2. Theory. On the common use of this term, especially Reid's, ~~Sir Wm.~~ as convertible with hypoth., Sir Wm. made some strictures. Theory and theoretical are properly used in opposition to practice & practical. See Reid, p. 97, b, note *; also 511, note *

3. Power. For Sir William's remarks on this subject, being his strictures on Reid's erroneous criticism of Locke, see Reid, p. 519, a, note *

(A) 6. Disposition (διάθεσις) is a natural,

7. Habit (ἕξις) an acquired, tendency to act.

8. Act, Operation and energy are nearly convertible. Ennemoser here explain the distinction between actual & potential existence.

1° Actual existence (τὸ ἐν ἐνέργειᾳ, ἐν ἐντελέχειᾳ, in esse) = what is now

2° Potential existence (τὸ ἐν δυνάμει, in posse) = what is not at this, but may

be, at any other time. Power, faculty, capacity, disposition, habit denote existence in posse, act, operation, energy, and function (in its proper signification) denote existence in esse. (see Reid, p. 515, a, note *)

Lecture IX.

I now proceed to a distribution of the mental phena. Shall not give you at present a history or criticism of the various classifications which have been proposed; at the present stage of your course you could not be supposed to understand their rationale. In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental phena, we find that they all comprise one essential element, are all possible only under one necessary condition. I, i.e. my mind, cannot exist in any determinate state without my knowing that it does so. In consciousness alone all mental states have their phenal existence, & without it they no longer have such existence.

Yet consciousness is simple, and always resembles itself. Thus there are not different kinds of consciousness, though there are different kinds of mental modes, of which we are conscious. Of every classification of the mental phena, therefore, all the members must be within or under consciousness. Conse-

quently, Consc. must be regarded as comprehensive of, and coextensive with, all the phena of the thinking subject. It must not be degraded to the rank of a particular class.

Taking again a survey of the mental phena, they are seen to divide themselves into three great classes, the phena, 1° of knowledge; 2° of feeling; 3° of will and desire.

The Eng. language does not afford us terms to distinguish all these. No difficulty with regard to the first. In the second the phena of pleasure and pain can be expressed only by "feeling", which is ambiguous. But the deficiency is most observable in the third; where we cannot find a term to express what is common both to will and desire; i.e. the nisus, the tendency towards the realization of their end. The "phena of tendency" would be ambiguous; so of "doing." "Appetency" objectionable; because ~~both~~ appetentia ~~and appetitus are~~ almost = "desire". So ὀρεξις. "Phena of activity" also objectionable. [Why, see Reid, p. 511, notes.] In German alone can I find ~~fit~~ words to express this idea properly. Perhaps the "phena of exertion" is the best term. (exero = put forth.) Mr. Baynes suggested "Conation" to me.

I do not propose this division as original. First promulgated by Kant, it was soon universally adopted in Germany. Yet it appears to be wholly unknown to psychologists in this country.

It was considered by the Germans as so obvious to require proof; yet a few words in explanation may not be out of place. It is evident that every ~~of~~ mental phenon is ~~and~~ either an act of Knl. or only possible through an act of Knl. Some phers have, therefore, ~~imagined~~ regarded the faculty of Knl. as the ~~only~~ fundamental power of mind, from wh. all the others are deriv-

ative. To this the answer is easy. Though our feelings and cognitions are only as they are known to be; yet in these modifications of mind, there is a phenom., which, being never involved in, could never be evolved out of ~~our~~ Knl. The faculty of Knl. is certainly the first in order, inasmuch as it is the "conditio sine quâ non" of the others, ~~and~~ We can conceive of a being possessed only of ~~a~~ Knl. ~~of his own existence~~ & yet devoid of feeling or appetency. We can further conceive of a being possessed of Knl. & feeling, yet incapable of desire and ~~[illegible]~~ volition. Yet we cannot conceive ~~a~~ the existence of a voluntary activity without feeling, for it can only be determined through a pain or pleasure, through an estimate of the relative worth of objects. Thus the order of the division is determined by the relative constitution of its members.

It is not, therefore, to be supposed that in distinguishing our cognitions, feelings & appetencies these phena are possible independently of each other. In physical systems they stand apart in books & chaps.; in nature they are not. It is only by a scientific abstraction that they can be analysed. Each of these resolves itself into various subdivisions, but at present we shall confine ourselves to the phena of cognition.

Consciousness.

It would only confuse you to give a detail of the opinions of others on this subject. It is best first to gain clear notions on it, & then you will easily understand in what respect the opinions of others on this point are erroneous.

Reid & Stewart have given no special account of Consc. The former, indeed, promised to do so in I.P. Essay I. Cap. 7. but he only gives an incidental notice of it in Essay V. Cap. 1. We can only, therefore, gather the opinions of these others from incidental notices throughout their works.

Consc. cannot be defined; and the attempt to define it has been the cause of great obscurity with regard to it. The reason of this is obvious. Itself is the root of all Rnl., the source of all comprehensibility & illustration. There is nothing simpler by wh. it can be comprehended. To suppose that it can be to suppose another consc. by wh. we are conscious of the mode in wh. the first consc. is possible. Brown called it a "feeling;" but what is a feeling? — something of wh. we are conscious. To define consc. by feeling, therefore, is to define the same by the same. The same may be said of the definition of it as a "Rnl" or "belief." — Consc. cannot be brought under any genus, therefore it cannot be defined.

But still consc. may be phlically analysed. This is effected by observing the phena of its acts, & from a comparison of them evolving the universal conditions under wh. alone all consc. is possible. Before proceeding to this, let us see what kind of rnl consc. is. I cannot know, feel, &c. without know=

ing that I know, feel, &c.; if I did not know that I know, feel, &c. I would not know, feel, &c. "Now, this Knl. which I, the subject, have of these modifications of my being, and through wh. ~~modifications~~ Knl. alone these modif. are possible, is what we call Consc." Consc. thus implies three things: (1.) a subject knowing; (2) a known modif. of that subject; (3.) a Knl. ~~of the~~ by the subject of the modif.

Consc. & Knl. thus involve each other. The one implicitly expresses what the other implicitly contains. Why, then, employ terms to express ~~tah~~ notions that are identical? The answer is easy. Realities may be inseparable, but as objects of Knl. it may be necessary to consider them apart. Notions likewise may reciprocally imply each other & be inseparable even in thought; yet for the purposes of Science it may be convenient to distinguish them by different terms, & consider them in their relation or correlation to each other. — E.g. a triangle cannot be considered as separate from its parts, nor these parts (viz. sides & angles) from each other. — The ~~term~~ ancient Greek phly. had no distinctive term to denote Consc. & it was only as its ~~a~~ advance began to be felt that it was introduced.

Before proceeding further, it may be fit for to notice certain conditions of consc. which have never been called in question.

1° Consc. is an <u>actual</u>, not a <u>potential</u>, <u>Knl.</u>

2° Consc. is an <u>immediate</u>, not a <u>mediate</u>, <u>Knl.</u> (I also hold, against Reid & his school, that all immediate Knl. is Cons.)

3° Consc. supposes a <u>contrast</u> and <u>discrimination</u>, viz. (a) between the Ego and Non-Ego; and (b.) ~~between~~ I one mental state ~~& another~~ from all others; ~~&~~ & (c.) of one external object from others.

[Dr. Brown is wrong asserting that in the systems of Fichte most generally prevalent Consc. has been regarded as a particular faculty; though right with regard to this part of the island. H.]

4° Consc. involves a judgment, since discrimination is but a negative judgment. Judgment is the simplest act of the Mind, & involved in every other.

5° Consc. involves Memory, for discrimination & comparison is impossible without it.

So far these, with a few exceptions unworthy of notice, may be said to be agreed. We now enter disputed territory. And the first thesis I shall attempt to establish is, that Our Consciousness is coextensive with Our Knl.; wh. is tantamount to the assertion that it is coextensive with Our Cognitive faculties: and this is convertible with the expression that Consciousness is not a special faculty, but that all our several faculties are only modifications of Consciousness.

Reid and Stewart have held the opposite, that consc. is a special faculty, co-ordinate with Our other faculties of intelligence. As this doctrine affects the very cardinal point of phy, & Reid's error ~~overturns~~ is opposed to the principal features of his phy, I shall proceed to shew you that his opinion is untenable. The two following passages from Reid contain the principal positions of this doctrine: viz. (1.) I. P. Essay I. Cap. 1st (p. 222, b.) and (2) Essay VI. Cap 5th (p. 442, b.) To Consc. is here granted a Knl. of all the phena of Mind, & therefore a Knl. of our Cognitive acts. Knowing these operations it must know their objects; and therefore either Consc. is not a special faculty, or we have two faculties conversant about the same objects, wh. is absurd. Reid ~~attempts~~ tries to escape from this dilemma, by attributing to Consc. a Cognizance of our mental operations to the exclusion of their objects. But

is this possible? Can I know that I know, without knowing what I know? Let us see; ~~I cannot~~ the rel. of relatives is one & the same. I cannot know one term of a relation without knowing the other. Now, rel. in general is the relation between a subject knowing and an object known; & each cognitive operation exists only in relation to a particular object, wh. calls it into existence & determines the character of that existence. We cannot, therefore, be conscious of an act without being conscious of the object to wh. it is relative.

As consc. has been particularly distinguished from our ~~other~~ cognitive faculties (by Reid & Stewart) & especially from Imagination, Memory, Perception and Attention, it will be proper in discussing this subject to take up these several faculties, & shew that the doctrine of these phers in regard to them is untenable.

I. Imagination is peculiarly fitted to evidence this error. [See Reid's doctrine, I. P. Essay IV. Cap. 1st.] He admits that the object of ~~perception~~ imagination is in the mind. Now, can there be a modification of mind of which we are not conscious? But further: Reid says that ~~the~~ we are conscious of the act of imagining, but not of its object; of the conception of a centaur, but not of a centaur conceived. But these are one and the same. We cannot, therefore, be conscious of the one & not of the other.

II. Memory. [See Reid's doctrine, I. P. Essay III. Cap. 1st, and 6th.] Reid makes memory an immediate rel. of the past; & if the object of memory be past, it is beyond the sphere of consc. But to assert an immediate rel. of the

past is a contradiction. There are two conditions of immediate Knl. 1° The object, to be known immediately, must be known in itself; and hence 2° to be known in itself, it must be known as actually existing. — Now, immediate Knl. is conceivable only of the now-existent; but the past can be known only as not now-existent. An immediate Knl. of the past is, therefore, impossible. — But further: every act of Knl., since it exists only in as much as it now exists, can be cognizant only of a now-existing object. Either, therefore, we must refuse to memory an immediate Knl. of the past, or grant only a mediate Knl. of it, viz. in & through a present object. The latter is the correct view; for in memory we know only a mental representation of a past object — that object, as past, not being itself known, but only believed to have been.

III. Perception. Reid has many merits as a speculator, but the only merit which he arrogates to himself and which has been most generally accorded to him by others, is that he was the first of modern others, who by his doctrine of immediate perception vindicated the irresistible conviction of mankind against the conclusions of others. But he has not carried his doctrine to its legitimate consequences, & has confused it by his erroneous analysis of consc. We shall show that his distinction of perception and consc. as co-ordinate faculties, which are ~~generally~~ respectively conversant exclusively either about not-self or self, is untenable; & that his attributing to consc. a Knl. of the operation of perception to the exclusion of its objects is contradictory of his

doctrine of perception.

1° The Rel. of opposites is one & the same. Therefore we cannot know self without knowing not-self. To know that a thing is not-self is the same as the Rel. that it is not a modification of self, & vice versâ. But how on Reid's hypothesis could we know them? — ~~not by perception~~ since he holds that the faculty cognizant of the one is not cognizant of the other. — But, again, how could we know them as contrasted? — Not by perception, according to Reid; nor by consc. But we do know them as such; and we can know them only in as much as we have a faculty of knowing them. There must, therefore, be a faculty coextensive with Reid's consc. & perception. What is this but that consc. of mind & matter which we set out with denying?

2° Reid's assertion that we are conscious of the act of perception, but not of the object, involves two absurdities: (1.) that we know that of which we are not conscious of knowing. ~~But~~ as we know only in as much as we are conscious that we know, we cannot know an object without being conscious of the object as known. (2.) An act of Rel. is only possible in relation to an object; that object at once determines the existence & specifies the character of the existence of the intellectual energy. An act, therefore, can be known only in relation to its object, & Reid's perception is proved impossible. E.g. I see an inkstand. How can I be conscious that this is a <u>perception</u>, that it is a perception of <u>sight</u>, that it is the perception of an inkstand, un=

[(A) See Dis. on Reid, Note C. and Discussions, Art. on the Phy. of perception. J.C.M.]

less I be conscious of the inkstand? ~~It may~~ Annihilate the inkstand, & you annihilate the perception of it; annihilate the consc. of the inkstand, & you annihilate the consc., the condition of the operation. — It may seem strange to say that we are conscious of an inkstand; but it is only in consequence of the prevalence of the theory of perception which Reid discovered.

3° Some of these self-contradictions might be avoided by adopting Brown's view of Reid's doctrine of perception; for wh. indeed, a strong case might easily be made out. But I am satisfied that it is incorrect; otherwise his refutation of scepticism is a complete failure; his whole play is one mighty blunder. (A.)

IV. Attention. Notice these errors. See Reid I.P. Essay II. Chap. 3, and VI. 1. In the first of these quotations he distinguishes Attention & Reflection, in the second he makes them convertible. He is wholly wrong in his strictures on Locke. — Mr. Stewart has committed three historical blunders: 1° Reid was not the first who remarked that "Attention to objects of consc. is properly called reflection, & that to objects of sense, observation. 2° Locke's employment of the term reflection to psychological application, was not original. It was so used 1500 years before his time. 3° Many writers on Psychology before Stewart, particularly treated of attention.

The main question comes to be considered, Is Attention a faculty distinct from Consc.? In Reid's opinion see I.P. Essay I. Chap. 5. He has rightly stated attention to be a voluntary act, &

this might have led him to see that it is not distinct from Conse., but merely Conse. modified by will (or desire,) subordinate to a certain law of ~~our~~ intelligence, the law namely, that the intension of our Pwl. is in the inverse ratio to its extension.

[When Reid and Stewart say that attention is a voluntary act, we are not to understand that it is always an act of free-will; for I apprehend that we may be frequently determined to an act of attention by desire. Attention may be said to be of three kinds: 1. A mere vital and irresistible act. 2. An act which, though determined by a desire, may yet be resisted by our will. 3. An act determined by deliberate volition. To the first the name attention has been denied, & given to the other two degrees, although by Reid only to the last.]

I must here take up the question whether the mind can ~~be conscious of more than~~ attend to, i.e. (if our analysis be correct,) be conscious of, more than one thing at a time? — Here, again, I am sorry to differ from Stewart. His first illustration, which is drawn from a concert of music, easily shows that his opinion may be reduced to the impossible. 1° If we hear a variety of sounds only, as he says, in succession, in perceiving harmony we ~~can~~ must have a minimum of time for each minimum of sound. With this each minimum of sound must perish; and, therefore, many minima of sound which we cannot attend to must be lost, or be to us as zero. But no concert ever reached, far less surpassed, our capacities. 2° How on this doctrine could we perceive the harmony of a concert? — If it be true, we must while conscious of a present minimum of sound, remember a past. But this past sound remembered is as much an object to the

mind as the present sound of which we are conscious. Therefore in order to perceive harmony we must attend to two objects at a time. — His second illustration from the phenomena of vision shows also the impossibility of his doctrine. For if we can attend only to a minimum of space at ~~it is evident~~ at once, & can attend to nothing else at the same moment, it is evident we could as little perceive these minima of space as related, as we could perceive harmony in the former instance.

Locke and Brown have also held this doctrine. It is strange that Locke thought that if the mind could attend to two things at a time, it could not be immaterial, while Aristotle deduced from this fact its immateriality. His argument is this: If the mind be material, when affected by opposites at the same time, one part must be affected by one opposite, another by another. But the part which perceived the one, (black,) could not know that this was the opposite of the other, (white,) any more than one man can know that what he perceives is different from what another man perceives. But the mind does know things as opposite, relative & different; and it cannot know them if it be material: therefore it is not material.

This doctrine is evidently absurd, since, as we have shown, in every act of conscn. there is implied judgment and discrimination, & these imply two things to be judged of or discriminated; therefore in every act of consc. we must be conscious of at least two objects.

The further question has created discussion, How many objects can the mind attend to at once? You can

test my statement by experiment, but I think you will find that with more than six objects before the mind we get confused. Sir Wm

[~~Sir~~ then proceeded to prove that conc. is the only, or at least the prominent mean of comparing a Pnl. of the mental phena. Here in two lectures he gave an elaborate refutation of Phrenology from certain investigations which he undertook to test the fundamental facts of that hypothesis, which he found by these investigations to be the very reverse of truth, & disproved by an almost superfluous induction. He found, 1° That the ~~brain~~ cerebellum of the female is not in any species of animals smaller than that of the male; 2° in all animals the cerebellum is developed long previous to puberty; 3° Castration does not reduce the proportion of the cerebellum to the brain proper; 4° the ~~developement~~ proportion of the cerebellum to the brain proper is not in proportion to the phrenological function attributed to it; 5° the cerebellum is not more developed at breeding season than at any other time; ~~in female animals, while~~ 6° in female animals, while

And many such failures are there in phrenology. "One of its fundamental positions is that the ~~cerebellum~~ human brain is at the greatest at forty years of age. By an immense induction I have found that the brain is at its fullest size in man at seven years of age."]

Authority and Certainty of Consciousness.

Having shown that there is no other mean of comprehending a Phil. of Mind & its modifica., but Conc. I now proceed to consider the authority & certainty of this instrument. Now phy, inasmuch as it affirms its own possibility, affirms the veracity of Conc. Consequently to maintain its own possibility, it must authenticate the truth of Conc. That accordingly no phers denies, as it were suicidal on his part to do so; and even the Sceptic can only attempt to shew that it is at variance with itself & therefore fallacious. But as phy is only an evolution of the facts of Conc. every system is true only as it fairly & fully expounds what, & what only, Conc. reveals. But it may be objected that this revelation must be very obscure, this criterion very uncertain, since phers, equally appeal to it in support of opinions the most contradictory. — See substance of answer to this, Diss on Reid, Note A, sect. 1, p. 746. Ed.] (J.C.M.) We must see whether there are any rules by ~~conditions of the~~ which we must be regulated in appealing to the testimony of Conc., & if we find that phers have despised or neglected these, we remove the reproach from ~~phy~~ the instrument & attach it to those blundering workmen who have not known how to apply it. I shall attempt, therefore, the enumeration of those general laws, by which we must be regulated: if I fail, I can plead that none have before attempted the task, & that what I mean to give is ~~a~~ ~~mere~~ rather an outline of a train

of Reasoning than a finished Argument.— There are in all, then, three General laws:

1. That no fact be assumed to be a fact of Conse. but what is ultimate & simple.— The law of Consimony.

2. That the whole facts of Conse. be taken without reservation or hesitation, whether given as constituent or as regulative datoo. — The law of Integrity.

3. That nothing but the facts of Conse. be taken; or if inferences of Reasoning be admitted, they at least should be recognized as legitimate, only as deduced from and as subordinate to the immediate data of Conse.; & that every position contradictory of these be rejected as illegitimate. — The law of Harmony.

I. 1° Every mental phenon may, of Conse, be called a fact of Conse.; but as we distinguish Conse. from other mental states which are but modifics. of it, so we distinguish special & derivative phenon, from primary & universal., styling the latter the facts of Conse. as being more pre-eminently worthy of the name. Arriving at an element of thought beyond which we cannot go, we have a fact of Conse. & this in different views we call either primary or ultimate. This character of ultimate priority involves also 2° their necessity, 3° their reality (τὸ ὅτι is what we know of a fact of Conse., not τὸ διότι.) — Sir Wm. then proceeded to distinguish between the ~~actual~~ reality & veracity of a fact of Conse. See Diss. on Reid Note A, near commencement. Now, as doubt with regard to the facts of Conse. as actually given is impossible, we shall throw these out of account.

II. This law is too evident to require discussion. Its neglect would, of course, leave phy incomplete. We shall illustrate it & the third together.

III. Though the veracity of conc. cannot be denied, yet we shall find that phers have often overlooked its testimony & established systems in direct hostility to the primary data of intelligence. — Sir Wm. took his illustrations from Psych phy; for which see Disc. near close of Art. on "Phy of perception".

I shall now take up those facts of conc. which lie at the root of phy, & show that there are always as various theories as there are modes of mutilating the facts. I shall commence with the fact of the duality of conc. The following scheme will exhibit the various phical systems which have their origin in this fact.

The Duality of Consciousness.

- A. Those who accept the fact in its integrity = Natural Realists or Natural Dualists.
- B. Those who do not accept the fact in its integrity
  - I. Those who totally reject the fact = Nihilists.
  - II. Those who partially reject the fact.
    - 1. Hypothetical Realists, or Hypothetical Dualists, or Cosmothetic Idealists. These, as the assume the impossibility of immediate intercourse between mind & matter, in their attempts to account for that intercourse have given rise to four theories.
      - a. The system of Divine Assistance & Occasional Causes.
      - b. Of pre-established Harmony.
      - c. Of a plastic medium.
      - d. Of physical influence.
    - 2. Unitarians or Monists.
      - (a.) Those who admit the fact, but deny its opposition, maintaining absolute identity of substance
        - (a) Idealists
        - B. Materialists
      - (b.) Those who reject the fact

The second General fact of Consc. to wh. ~~I now~~ I now proceed is the activity and passivity of Mind. As in Nature, so in Mind, there is nothing purely active or purely passive. It is because the Deity is ~~to~~ purely active that he is to us incomprehensible. Any state of Mind in which activity preponderates is called active, & one in wh. passivity preponderates passive. Many arduous problems connected with this fact. I shall here confine myself to the question, Is the Mind always consciously active? — Not convertible with the ~~ques~~ question, Have we always a remembrance of our consc.? — wh. must be answered in the negative. Must confine ourselves to those states of Mind in which observation is possible: (e.g. it is impossible in fainting and epilepsy:) such as sleep, somnambulism, &c.

Sir Wm. then proceeded to discuss the question, Is the mind consciously active in sleep? — & after stating some experiments of his own, gave a long quotation from M. Jouffroy, the result of whose observations was to prove

1° That in sleep the senses are torpid, but the mind awake;

2° That certain of our senses continue to transmit to the mind the imperfect sensations received;

3° That the mind judges of these sensations, & it is according as it judges them to be or not be worthy of attention that it does or does not awaken the senses.

4° That the mind wakens the senses, sometimes because the sensations disquiet it, being unusual; at other times because they admonish it, as being indicative of the time when it ought to do so;

5° That the mind only awakens the senses by its own activity.

— " —

There is another question of still more prominent interest, whether the mind possesses energies, & is the subject of modifics. of wh. we are unconscious.

Division of the Mental Faculties.

Having now considered consc. as a general condition of thought & source of phy. I now proceed to consider its special modifics. Before this, however, let me premise some peculiar difficulties that attend the study of mind. 1° The great first source of difficulty is the fact, that the observing subject & observed object are the same. Whence it is that the mental energy instead of being concentrated, is divided into two divergent directions.

2° Whereas in the study of external nature the helps of companionship is obtained, he who would study the internal world must isolate himself in the solitude of his own thought; which to the most social of all animals is extremely difficult.

3° Not as in physical science, in mental phy the student must make his own observations. He must take nothing upon authority; testimony can furnish him with no facts.

4° In the study of mind, its phena are not arrested by our observation. They are in a ceaseless flow, & the very act of reflecting upon them changes the mental state. They can only, therefore, be studied in memory, wh. affords a lower vivacity & precision.

5° In perception the different qualities of objects are easily discriminated; whereas the phena. of intel. feeling, desire are often seen almost insensibly to glide into each other

5° The phena of Consc. are not placed side by side in space, but hang "in rows on the thread of time," & swiftly pass away into oblivion.

7° Reflection on our internal modifics. is not accompanied with that pleasure wh. ~~attends the study~~ we experience from the impression of external objects. It is not till an advanced period of life that we attain that higher gratific. wh. accompanies reflection.

But phy has also peculiar facilities. With the exception of language it is dependent on no external condition.

In speaking of faculties & capacities, you are not to consider them as entities ~~such~~ really distinct from the thinking principle or from each other, as the brain & organs. — Among others, Dr. Brown has reproached phers with holding this opinion — than wh. no reproach can be more unjust, no mistake more flagrant. What is the proper view of these powers? — The mind can exert different actions & be affected by different passions wh. are not wholly dissimilar, wh. are at once like & unlike. Those that are like we assort together in thought & bestow upon them a common name. These are few & simple. But actions & passion are effects & modifics. Every effect supposes a cause, every modific. a subject. When we say, therefore, that the mind exerts an energy, we say that it is the cause or subject of a modific. And we arrange the mental actions & passions into groups to wh. we give a common name, & are thus entitled to say, that the mind can exert a certain class of energies, & is capable of being modi-

fied by a certain class of passions. These various faculties will be the result of various views that are taken of the mental phena; & each phical system is only a different view of the mind's phena

Now we must not (1.) overrate the value of system, because it is not the end first in the order of time, nor prominent in the scale of importance; nor (2.) undervalue system, for the end of phy is the detection of unity.

That the above was the opinion of the ancient phers with regard to the mental faculties, I could adduce a multitude of passages to prove. In the middle ages the question divided the schools. 1° St. Thomas held the faculties to be distinct not only from each other, but from the mind; 2° Henry of Ghent that they were distinct from each other, but not from the essence of the soul; 3° Scotus & Occam & all the Nominalists held them to be not really, but only formally distinguishable. Modern phers have made no explicit declaration of this opinion, but have evidently assumed it tacitly; & the Aristotelic view of the soul as "all in whole, & all in every part" must be in justice presumptively attributed to every phler of mind.

The phena of mind are never presented to us undecomposed & simple; & the aim of the psychologist is to analyse them by abstraction into those ultimate qualities wh., in their apposition, constitute the concrete elements of actual thought. And what does

such an analysis suppose? — Manifestly these ~~Organic~~ conditions: 1° that no phenon be assumed as elementary which can be resolved into simpler principles; 2° that no element or phenon be overlooked; 3° that no imaginary element be interpolated. These rules, however, have been almost always disregarded.

You will now be prepared for the distribution of the cognitive faculties which I have adopted & which is different from that of every psychologist with whom I am acquainted

- Cognition.
  - A. Subordinate Faculties.
    - I. Acquisitive, Receptive or Presentative.
      - 1. Self-Consciousness or Internal Perception.
      - 2. External Perception or Perception (simply)
    - II. Conservative or Retentive = Memory (strictly so called.)
    - III. Reproductive.
      - 1. Spontaneous Suggestion or simply Suggestion.
      - 2. Reminiscence or Recollection.
    - IV. Representative = Imagination or Fantasy.
  - B. Higher Faculties.
    - V. Elaborative = Thought (strictly so called.) διανοια, discursus, Verstand.
    - VI. Regulative or Legislative = Intellect proper. Reason, νους, mens, Vernunft, Common Sense.

External Perception.

As the first & most important of these faculties, — as that the analysis of which affects the solution of nearly every problem of any moment in phy. Sir Wm. commenced with it. As his opinions of this point are now in print, I shall not do more than give a mere statement in their order of the different subjects which were treated of under this head.

Sir Wm. began with a history of the theories of perception held by different phers, (1.) exposing the errors of Reid, correcting his misrepresentations of other phers, & (2.) ~~correcting~~ defending Reid from Brown's misrepresentations & attack. 1° Reid wrong in his statements. 2° But Brown has not had the fortune to stumble upon one of his ~~phers~~ errors. 3° Reid was a Natural Realist.

The distinction between <u>Sensation</u> and <u>Perception</u>, of the primary, secundo-primary & secondary qualities of matter, — which were next discussed in order, — are with the preceding parts of his doctrine of perception published.

I now come to the discussion of the ~~grounds on which~~ the relative merits of the doctrines of Natural & Hypothetical Realism. It is admitted by all philosophers that

we are compelled to believe that the objects which we immediately perceive are the real objects without us. (For authorities, see Diss. Phy. of Common Sense, §I.) Now in rejecting this deliverance of our consciousness philos required 1° to give sufficient reasons for doing so; & 2° to substitute a legitimate hypothesis. The discussion of this question, therefore, naturally divides itself into two parts.

I. Of the reasons which have made philos reject the testimony of conse. in this deliverance I have been able to collect in all five.

1° Cognition is an immanent act of mind. But ~~Suppose~~ a cognition of anything out of the mind were a transient act. Now as action implies existence, to suppose that the mind acts out of itself were to suppose that it exists out of itself — which is absurd. — This is the highest ground on which representt. may be defended; & though not explicitly announced is often implicitly ~~contained~~ supposed in the arguments of representationists. Now, it might be sufficient to answer that it is illegitimate to reject the fact because we are unable to explain its possibility. Ultimate it is inexplicable. But 1° on the same principle there cannot be any overt act of volition, nor any agency or causation. And consequently 2° representation is impossible. For the material reality must act on the mind in order to produce a representation: & thus these philos deny to the immaterial principle that transient act which they ~~deny to~~ maintain in the case of the material reality.

2° Mind & matter are separated from each other by the whole diameter of being. This is the argument of Nonis which Reid confesses his inability to understand. [See Hamilton's note, p. 300. wh. perhaps more than any other shews his immense erudition.]

3° The mind can know immediately only that to which it is immediately present. But as external objects can never ~~go out~~ come into the mind, nor the mind go out to them, such presence is impossible. This is apparently the only reason known to Reid & Stewart. Now in opposition ~~it has been maintained~~

(a.) It has been denied that the external reality can ~~not~~ itself come into the mind. This absurd position has been actually maintained by John Sergeant. I know the external object, he argues. Therefore it is in my act of Knl.: & as this act is in the understanding, the object is also in the understanding. Locke cannot be blamed for pronouncing this unintelligible.

(b.) It has been maintained by Empedocles, Plato, ~~Lord Monboddo~~ the Stoics, Euclid, &c. that the mind does go out to the external reality. This opinion has been carried to absurdity by Lord Monboddo. According to him the mind acts where its object is; so that in memory or imagination it may perceive objects distant from the body both in time & space.

(c.) It has been maintained by Reid & Stewart that, though the mind is not immediately present with the object, it ~~may~~ has an immediate Knl. of it through the agency of God. Against this there are these objections: (a.) It is a

mere hypothesis; (β.) It assumes an occult principle; it is mystical: (γ.) Perception is not on this principle intuitive.

(d.) Sir Wm. without attempting to explain this difficulty, rendered it intelligible ~~by how~~ (α.) by his doctrine that our sentient organism, as such, is part of the Ego; (β.) by accurately limiting the immediate object of perception to ~~that~~ which is in immediate contact with the organ of sense.

4° The objection of Hume will be found in Reid, Essay II. Chap. 4, p. 299. It arises from a misconception as to the ~~two~~ ~~nature~~ immediate object of visual perception.

5° It has been maintained by Fichte that the mind can only represent to itself external objects, because the will tends to external objects; & these objects cannot come into the mind.— But (α.) this argument assumes that the object to which the will tends must lie within the mind itself: the whole arg. ∴ is a simple assumption. But (β.) the arg. takes no acct. of the difference between those cognitions wh. lie at the root of energies of will & all other kinds of Phil. Will aims at the future & consequently the cognitions connected with it cannot be immediate, as we can have only a mediate Phil. of things not present.

II. Sir William's proof that the hypoth. of Representation violates all the conditions of a legitimate hypoth. is published in his "Disc." & Diss.

Several other questions connected with this faculty come now to be considered.

I. Is our Rnl. of external objects at first a general notion of complex wholes, or a particular Rnl. of the smallest parts to wh. sense is competent? — The latter alternative has been adopted by Mr. Stewart as the result of his doctrine that the mind can attend but to one thing at a time. It is refuted triumphantly by such illustrations as these. I can call up an image of a friend's countenance as a whole, yet may be unable to describe any of its particular features as the colour of the eyes, &c. And if I saw a portrait of him, I could pronounce it unlike (if it were so,) without being able to tell in what particular respect. It is well shown by a common illustration among the schoolmen. I see an object at a distance, but cannot tell whether it is an animal or not. As it approaches I perceive that it is an animal, though unable to tell of what species. It comes nearer & I discover that it is a horse; & when it comes within a short distance I recognize it as Bucephalus.

Sir Wm. was very severe on Locke & maintained that he had copied (?) the most important points of his phy. from those French phers. who for him were neglected by their Countrymen.

Self-Consciousness.

As ~~space &~~ time & space ~~were~~ are necessary conditions of external perception, so time & self are necessary conditions of self-conse. But it has been argued that if space be a necessary form of thought the mind itself must be extended. "This is a mere phrical crotchet." It assumes that the qualities of the body thinking must be similar to the body thinkn: & that consequently in order to think extension it is necessary to exist extended. Now, though the mind is not absolutely unlimited in its power of thinking space, yet ~~on the above principle~~ it conceives space as ~~far~~ ~~be~~ infinitely beyond the range of experience, wh. could not be on the above principle.

The facts wh. self-conse reveals may be regarded in two lights: 1. We may merely observe, compare & generalize them into classes; or 2. We may critically analyse them & discover their characteristics of universality & necessity. This latter process is, of conse, confined to the facts obtained by the former: for all necessity is to us subjective.

Self-conse. corresponds with Locke's reflection. Here Sir Wm. maintained against Stewart that Condillac had represented Locke's phy. fairly enough & had only carried it to its legitimate consequences.

The Conservative Faculty.

Without this faculty we should lose our Phil. as fast as we got it. And it shows the dependence of all our facs. upon one another that, as acquisition were useless without retention, so were retention without reproduction & representation.

Though mutually dependent on each other for their exercise, the faculties of retention, reprod. & repres. are perfectly distinct, governed by different laws & existing in different degrees in different individuals. But this distinction is not observable in common language; & accordingly we find that in those terms wh. are employed to denote them, though each contains one idea more prominently than any other, yet there is always some other more or less blended with it. Thus in the term "Memory" retention is the prominent idea, in wh. however is involved also the ideas of reproduction & repres. In "recollection", again, the phen.on of reprod. is the leading idea: & so on with others. — I shall, therefore, employ Memory to denote the faculty & phen.on of conservation. (That this was its proper use in Eng. proved by a long list of authorities Ancient & Modern.)

Memory, being the condition of reprod., is rather a capacity than a faculty, if the latter term be limited to <u>active</u> powers.

Sir Wm. here referred to some of the similes wh. had been employed to illustrate this faculty & thought that of Gassendi the happiest, who compares the mind in this act to a piece of paper or cloth wh. ~~wh~~ after having been folded easily returns to the folds again.

I. I presume the fact of retention is admitted. That our Pnl. still exists when out of Consc. must be admitted unless its resuscitation be otherwise explained. Now Avicenna supposes a radiation of divine light by wh. the recollected fact is awakened in the Intellect. But this evidently admits the fact of conservation. Consequently he must admit a faculty of conserv., i.e. Memory.

II. But can this fact be explained? I think it can, & that by the mind's own power of self-activity. When the mind is excited to any act, that act continues to affect our Consc. so long as it is not modified by some other. Now this act is an energy of the active power of the indivisible ego. Consequently a part of the ego must be annihilated if this possession is to be removed. The difficulty, therefore, is not how we retain, but how we ever forget, our Pnl., for the latter seems to suppose that it vanishes. — This difficulty, however, is explained by the theory of latent modes of mind. For as numerous objects crowd in upon the mind's notice those wh. formerly attracted its ~~notice~~ attention, in consequence of the mind's limited power of attention, become gradually obscured, till at last they fade entirely from Consc. & remain in latency until resuscitated by some of the laws of Association.

The results of this theory are

1° Retention or Memory belongs not merely to the energies of the Cognitive faculties, but extends to all the

three primary classes of the mental phen.a

2° The attempts to explain memory by physiological hyp.es are as unnecessary as they are untenable. No other faculty, ~~dep~~ indeed, depends more on corporeal conditions than does memory. Particular diseases of the brain often produce forgetfulness with regard to facts, places, &c.; often thus a patient loses a whole stock of kn.l. while he retains others, loses one language & retains another. But these facts give no ground for the hyp. of permanent impressions on the brain or any such. For while ~~the~~ our doctrine makes them evidently superfluous, ~~yet~~ they betray an ignorance of the laws of the thinking subject wh. though dependent to some extent on bodily relations, still ever preserves its self-activity.

There is no mental power in wh. such differences exist in different individuals as in memory. Lin Wm. quoted from Muretus the story of a young man possessed of so wonderful a memory that he could with ease repeat 30,000 words after having once heard them; also an actual case in wh. the young man gave a specimen of his power before Muretus.

Lin Wm. then refuted by facts the opinion that the great development of memory is incompatible with great intellectual power, & that wh. maintains that it is essential to it.

The Reproductive Faculty.

The term Reprod. is not good, as it does not properly distinguish this from the representative faculty. Perhaps "Resuscitative" might serve the purpose better.

The phen.on of Reprod. is one of the most wonderful in our mental constitution, & at the same time one in the explanation of wh. phly has been most successful. Aristotle indeed has left almost as complete an analysis of the laws wh. regulate the reprod. of our mental states as has yet been been accomplished. For the history of speculation on this point & for Sir William's own theory see his Diss. appended to Reid.

The Representative Faculty.

Others have referred Imag. to two faculties, the reproductive & productive or creative. Stewart calls the latter "Conception". Wrongly 1° because a separate faculty need not be postulated, 2° because the term signifies taking up in bundles, & applies to our notion of a class. Imagination can easily be explained thus. There is first Reproduction; but this is not all. We can analyze & combine again the thoughts thus given. This is the work of the Comparative faculty. Only in this complex process the repres. is most conspicuous, for 1° it gives the materials on wh. the compar. faculty operates, & 2° the results of our elaboration should be realized in a vivid act of representation.

While Imagination is perhaps the best term that can be used to express this process, we must take care not to limit it, as common language sometimes does, to the repres. of objects of sense, & even to those of sight. Repres. ~~extends to~~ includes plical abstraction equally with poetical imagination; & in this point of view it may be doubted whether Aristotle or Homer had the strongest Imagination. There are many kinds of Imagination: there is the imagination 1° of abstraction, 2° of wit, 3° of reasoning, 4° of feeling, 5° of volition, 6° of the passions, & 7° of the poet. But Imag. is spoken of more frequently with reference to the objects of sense than to those of comparison,

although the two kinds are in fact frequently combined.

Viewing repres. in subordination to the auxiliary faculties of reprod. & elaboration, we may distinguish three principal ways in wh. Imag. presents ideas: 1° the natural order, 2° the logical order, 3° the poetical order. Sir Wm. had some fine remarks on these, especially on the danger of indulging in Revery.

In conclusion: the organs employed in the repres. of sensible objects seem to be none other than those on wh. the original impressions were made. Experience proves that Imag. depends on no particular portion of the brain; but that if the extra-cranial portion of any organ cannot be destroyed without Imag. being weakened. E.g. persons have been found who have lost their sight ~~who~~ no longer repres. or dream of visible objects. But in such cases it has been found that the disorganization extended not merely to the eye but to that part of the brain wh. was the internal instrument of this sense, i.e. the optic nerve. Yet if this be not destroyed Imag. remains perfect. These facts would lead us to conclude that there are as many organs of Imag. as there are of perception. And if we observe in the process of Imag. we shall find that we are distinctly conscious of the play of nerves & muscles.

The Elaborative Faculty.

The operation of this faculty supposes two terms & results in a judgment, i.e. in the affirmation or negation of one of the terms of the other. Now, as Consc. always involves a judgment, (viz. that the determinate something of wh. we are Consc. exists,) every act of mind involves a judgment. ~~The~~ Consc. is thus primarily an affirmation, or negation of existence. But inasmuch as we are Consc. of a determinate something & can only so be Consc. by distinguishing it from something different, Consc. & consequently judgment may be said to involve ~~Memory~~ recollection: & thus all the powers of acquisition, recollection & comparison are seen to be mutually dependent on each other.

Now in ~~contrast~~ opposition to the faulty analysis by phrenologists of this faculty I shall prove 1° that comparison is involved in every, the simplest, act of thl.; 2° that our factitiously simple or complex notions, our abstractions or generalized notions, are only so many products of comparison; 3° that judgment; 4° that reasoning, are identical with comparison.

The first or simplest act of this faculty is the judgment of exist. ~~We~~ We cannot perform the simplest act of thought without thinking the object of our thought to exist. But as the affirmation of

exist. is the negation of non-exist. The first & simplest act of Comparison is the discrimination of ex. from non-ex. But in Consc. there is given a duality of ex. & while we affirm ~~ation~~ ex. both ~~of the~~ objects of perception & of self-consc. we also affirm that ex. in difference, in contrast. The second act of Comparison is thus the discrimination of the ego from the non-ego. The third act of Comp. is the recognition of multiplicity in the phen.a of the two worlds, & the affirmation of similarity or dissimilarity. The fourth is the act ~~judgment that these phen.a co-inhere in or Recognition~~ grouping together of these phen.a according to their resemblance or dissimilarity & assigning them to different subjects. The fifth is the affirmation or negation of the relation of these phen.a as cause & effect. But lastly how is this infinity of phen.a to be reduced to the finitude of mind? This process I shall show is also an act of Comparison.

I. And firstly with regard to complex or collective notions; such as an army, a forest, a town &c. (wh. are not to be confounded with the notions of "Army," &c.) — Now the repetition of the same object implies comparison — & this is just what is done in the formation of collective notions. But language must be brought to our assistance. For as the mind can attend only to about five or

six objects at a time, what can it do when the objects ex=
ceed that no.? The mind then forms them into groups
of tens, hundreds, &c. wh. become all so many factitious
units; & is thus enabled to form notions, wh. would
otherwise be impossible.

II. But secondly I go on to consider the pro=
cess in wh. decomposition forms a part. This may be either
1° poetical, i.e. for mere pleasure; or 2° scientific,
i.e. with a view to the interest of science.

Now in the case of the senses abstraction is
necessary, for as we are presented with five vari=
eties of qualities, they should all be confounded
together if we did not attend to one more than
another. Nor is it different in the case of the intel=
lect; for since man's comprehension is so limited
that he grasps but one object at a time if the object
be possessed of interest, is it not natural that
his ~~whole attention~~ should abstract his attention
from all the rest ~~to the local~~ & fix it exclusively
on that wh. interests him. Now in the process
of generalization we just ~~abstract those qualities~~
concentrate our attention on those qualities in
wh. the objects before us agree, & abstracting
these & considering them apart from their dif=
ferences we give a name to our notion of that
circumstance in wh. they agree.

This ~~brings~~ is to the controversy between the
Conceptualists & the Nominalists, in discuss=

ing wh. I shall 1° state the arguments of the Nominalists, 2° those of the Conceptualists, & 3° I shall show you that the whole contest is a mere logomachy.

Sir Wm. having stated the two theories & refuted Conceptualism in that very objectionable form in wh. it had been maintained by Locke (on wh. see Brown) took up & received the modif. of it wh. had been proposed by Dr. Brown. (see a summary of Brown's arg. lect. p. 303, a) Now in the first place Brown asserts that Nominalists deny in the process any "feeling" of the resemblance of objects. This, however, is false, & Sir Wm. disproved the assertion by quotations from the writings of all great Nominalists, Hobbes Leviathan, chap. IV. Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles of Human Knl. & Minute Phr. Dial. 7th. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Book I. sect. 7. Smith on Formation of Lang. (p. 509, Bohn's Ed.) so Campbell & Stewart.

Further Dr. B. maintains that the "feeling" of the resemblance of objects is general. How he could maintain this I am at a loss to conjecture. Every hypothesis I can make appears too absurd.

1° Could it be because it is a relation? — Then every ~~relation~~ cognition of relation is general: wh. however, neither he nor any other phr will maintain.

2° Could he maintain that the particular relation of similarity makes the feeling general? — Surely not: the feeling of similarity produced by the presentation of two different eggs successively is not more general than

the feeling produced by the successive presentation of the same egg. If the one be general, so must the other. And further if the feeling of similarity be general, why not also that of contrariety?

3° Neither could it be maintained that the feeling of resemblance is general, because in general we have a capacity of feeling resemblance; else for the same reason every mental act would be general.

4° There is only one other supposition remaining viz. that ~~the representation of~~ notions of the Understanding & the representations of the phantacy have been confounded. The whole of Dr. Brown's misconception would have been obviated if this distinction had been drawn between these; & certainly things so different should be distinguished by diff.t names.

I proceed to a curious question wh. has divided phers, Does lang. originate in general appellations or in proper names? The latter alternative has been adopted by Vives, Locke, Condillac, Brown, Smith & others. For a statement of the doctrine & the arguments wh. have been ~~used~~ employed to establish it, see Smith on Form. of Lang. first paragraph. Locke's Essay, Book III. Chap. 3. Sect. 7. also Brown's remarks p. 306.

Holding the opposite view we find many distinguished phers especially among the Schoolmen; in modern times Campanella & Leibnitz.

Either of these two opposite doctrines would be

held established were we unacquainted with the arguments for the other. But there is an opinion intermediate between these wh. appears to me nearer the truth. It is that our first notions are neither of the distinctly general nor of the definitely particular; but that all our Knl. is at first vague, & that it is by an after process of generalization that we arrive at clear notions of the general, & by specification & individualization that we obtain a definite Knl. of species & individuals. This was the doctrine of Aristotle, Scaliger, & seems to have been maintained by Mr. Stewart.

Sir Wm. then proceeded to explain the manifestation of this faculty of comparison with the acts of judgment & reasoning; but did not dwell long on this, as it is more particularly connected with the subject of the other course. The principal point worth noticing was his distinction between the kinds of reasoning wh. has never been drawn by any other previous, according as the whole is one of comprehension or extension; & this distinction applies both to deductive & inductive arguments.

The Regulative Faculty.

The criterion wh. distinguishes the notions derived from this faculty from those that are the result of experience, viz. their necessity & consequent universality, was first explicitly announced by Leibnitz. This, however, does not detract from the originality of Reid, who arrived at this truth independently of Leibnitz. It has been most successfully employed by Kant in the critical analysis of our ideas. Sir Wm. then proceeded to a statement of his doctrine, wh. is published in the appendix to his Discussions.

The Second Class of mental phen.a — the feelings

After dealing with a few preliminary matters, — defending their title to be ranked as a distinct class of mental powers, shewing in what relation they stand to the other two classes of mental powers, the Cognitions on the one hand & the Conations on the other, — Sir Wm. proceeded to a statement of his theory of pleasure & pain.

Prop. I. Man lives only as he lives as an intelligent & sensitive being, & he lives as an intelligent & sensitive being only as he consciously energises. Human existence is only a more general expression for human life, & human life is only a more general expression for the sum of the energies in wh. that life is realized, & through wh. it is manifested in conc. In a word, life

is Consc. energy & Consc. energy is life.

Prop. II. Human lx., human life, human energy is not unlimited, but is determined to a certain no. of modes through wh. alone it can be manifested. These diff.t modes of action are in diff.t relations called powers, faculties, capacities, dispositions & habits.

Prop. III. Man, as he consciously exists, is the subject of pleasure & pain — & these of various kinds: but as he only consciously exists in & through the exertion of ~~these~~ certain determinate powers, it is only through the exertion of these powers that he becomes the subject of pleasure & pain, each power being in itself the faculty of a specific energy & the capacity of an appropriate pleasure or pain as the concomitant of that energy.

Prop. IV. The energy of each power of consc. lx. having as its reflex or concomitant an appropriate pleasure or pain, & no pleasure or pain being competent to man except as the concomitant of some determinate energy of life — the important question arises, What is the general law under wh. these contrary phen.a arise in all their special manifestations?

Prop. V. The answer to the question here proposed is — The more perfect, the more pleasurable, the energy; the more imperfect, the more painful.

Prop. VI. The perfection of an energy is twofold: 1° By relation to the power of wh. it is an energy; & 2° by relation to the object about wh. it is conversant. — The former ~~may be~~ affords its subjective, the latter its objective, condition.

Prop. VII. By relation to its power, an energy is perfect when it is tantamount to the full, & no more than the full, complement of spontaneous force wh. the power is capable of exerting; an energy is imperfect ~~when~~ either when the power is restrained from putting forth the full amount of its force wh. it would otherwise do, or when it is stimulated to put forth a greater amount of force than it wd. otherwise tend to do.

The amount or quantum of an energy is twofold: 1° Intensive, 2° Protensive; the former expressing the degree, the latter the duration of the exerted energy. These are always in the inverse ratio of each other. — When we do not limit our consideration to the simple powers, we have a third kind of quantity, viz. the extensive. A state is said to possess a greater amount of extensive quantity in proportion as the power is the complement of a greater no. of co-operating powers.

Prop. VIII. By relation to the object, (by object is here denoted any cause by wh. power is determined to activity,) by relation to the object about wh. it is conversant, and energy is perfect when the object is of such a character as to afford its power the conditions requisite for it to spring into full spontaneous energy; imperfect when the object is of such a character as either on the one hand to stimulate its power to a degree beyond the maximum of free location, or on the other hand to thwart its tendency towards its natural limit.

Prop. IX. Pleasure is thus the result of certain harmonious relations, of certain agreements; pain, on the contrary, is the result of certain inharmonious relations, of certain disagreements. The pleasurable is, therefore, not inappropriately called the agreeable, the painful the disagreeable: and in conformity to this doctrine pleasure & pain may be thus defined: "Pleasure is a reflex of a spontaneous or unimpeded location of a power of whose energies we are conscious." "Pain is a reflex of the overstrained or repressed location of such a power."

On this doctrine 1° pleasure & pain are twofold inasmuch as each is either positive & absolute or negative & relative; & 2° pain is of two kinds, (a.) that wh. accompanies the repression of the spontaneous energy of a power, & (b.) that wh. is conjoined with its

efforts when stimulated to ~~an~~ over-activity.

From this doctrine it follows

1° That as the powers in an individual are strong either by nature or by habit, the pleasure attending their exercise will be proportionally intense & enduring. This being the case the individual will be disposed to exert the more vigorous powers, as their energies will afford him the largest complement of purest pleasure. "Habit sua quemque voluptas."

2° As the exercise of a power is the only mean by wh. it is invigorated, but at the same time as this exercise until perfect elicits a feeling imperfect, & consequently painful or at least of mixed pleasure; it follows that those faculties wh. stand most in need of cultivation are precisely those wh. are least likely to receive it, while those wh. are already more fully developed are precisely those wh. present the strongest inducements for still further invigoration.

History of the Various Theories of Pleasure & Pain.

Sir Wm. proceeded to give a history of the ~~the~~ various theories wh. had been maintained by phers. 1° because there is no work in wh. such a historical review has been attempted, but 2° principally for the purpose of shewing that all the diff.t theories are united in the one wh. he proposed. These all come under two great classes, at the head of wh. severally stand Plato & Aristotle. Plato's doctrine wh. will be found in the Philebus & Book IX of the Republic, with occasional notices in other parts of his writings, is to the following effect:

Pleasure is nothing absolute, nothing positive; it is a mere relation to, & negation of, pain. Pain is the root, the condition, the antecedent, of pleasure; & pleasure is only the restoration of the feeling subject from a state contrary to nature, to a state conformable to nature. Pleasure is the mere replenishing of a vacuum, the mere satisfying of a want.

Aristotle, on the other hand, after proving that Plato's theory applies only to the pleasures of sense, & that not even to those of the higher senses, & by no means to those of intellect, establishes a theory analogous to that of Sir Wm., defining pleasure to be "the concomitant of unimpeded energy whether of a natural power or an acquired habit."

We may consider the feelings 1° as causes, 2° as effects

A. As causes of the opposite phen.a of pleasure & pain & the states of mingled pleasure & pain. Here we have to consider the general conditions wh. determine in a feeling one or other of these counter qualities. These are four.

I. According as the object is new or unexpected. This is novelty, & the principle under wh. novelty determines a high energy & pleasure is either 1° subjective, inasmuch as the mind is determined to act either from inaction or from a diff.t mode of action, or 2° objective, inasmuch as a new object affords gratification to the faculty of Ind.

II. In proportion as the object stands in the relation of contrast. Contrast operates in two ways: producing either 1° a real intensity of feeling, or 2° an apparent & relative intensity.

III. The relation of harmony or discord.

III. The association of other interesting circumstances, for it is evident that the amount of free energy elicited by an object singly is small in ~~proportion~~ when compared with the amount of energy wh. may be elicited by a train of associated representations.

'The author of the Kr. d. R. V. in aiming at allaying finally the conflict not only of phs, but of phy, knew no other plan than that of determining the exact point of controversy in an all: comprehensive question: 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' In the course of this inquiry it will be shewn, that this question, in its highest abstraction, is not other than this: 'How comes the absolute ego to go beyond itself & directly oppose to itself a non: ego?' It was quite natural that this question, so long as it was not presented in its highest abstraction, as also its answer, was necessarily mis: understood.' ~~Schelling~~ Schelling then goes on to say that Rein: hold, in his Theorie d. Vorstellungsvermögens, by making the empirical ego the principle of phy, 'reached the last stage of abstraction, on wh it was necessary to stand, before we could come to that wh is higher than all abstraction.' Vom Ich als Prin: cip d. Phil. § 5, Anmerk.

'The synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point on wh must be fixed all use of the understanding, even the whole of Logic & , after it, Transcendental phy. This faculty is in fact the understanding itself' Kant's Kr. d. r. V. p. 124, note.

'Connection however does not lie in the objects & cannot be borrowed from them, it may be, through perception & taken up by that means first of all into the understanding, but is an act of the under: standing alone, wh is nothing else than the faculty of connecting a priori & bringing the manifold ~~of~~ (elements) of given presentations under the unity of apperception, wh principle is the highest in all human knl. p. 125.

x If you wish to breathe yr soul with its crowning certainty, you must ~~y~~ begin at the most elementary inquiry ~~will~~ at wh all soul must start; you must find out the immovable basis on wh all must rest. You may shrink from going down into the dark abyss of doubt to grope yr way towards a resting place: but if you refuse, you will find that you are standing on the inflated wind-bag of mere traditional opinions, wh ~~is ready to collapse~~ terrifies you constantly by the fear of its collapsing before every piercing inquiry. If you bravely go down, you may be sure to reach at last that Rock of the Ages, planted on wh you will be able to face without fear the darkest shadow of doubt that issues from the surrounding Immensity, or the outstretching Eternity.

§ 1. Phy is really, as it is etymologically the love of wisdom.

§ 2. Wisdom (σοφία) is really, as it is etymologically knl, strictly so called.

Phy ∴ is the love of knl, strictly so called, & why? Because it leads us up to the questions wh in nature of things, tho' not of time, precede all other knl, 1. What is knl? & as the result of the first answer to the first, 2. What is existence? 1. Gnoseology (not Epistemology & why not?) 2. Ontology.

Gnoseology.

What is knl? is the quest. wh this science has to answer. Phy, as this science wh takes you back to the first principles of all things, necessarily reaches its end only when it comes to the primeval quest., before wh no quest. can be conceived, ~~& that is the q~~ Now what is that quest? Suppose you give up everything you have previously believed, take nothing for granted, ~~wh~~ tear down the entire building in wh yr thoughts have hitherto been housed, what is the point ~~wh~~ you are forced to select as that on wh the first foundation stone of a new & firmly: built structure is to be rested? Do you hesitate to go thus far? There is no choice for you, if you have taken the first step. The same phy, love of knl, wh drove you from one belief insufficiently examined ~~necessarily~~ demands imperatively that you sh.d abandon a second, a third, all; the ~~ness~~ necessities of speculation are inexorable, when they have once brought you under their resistless impulse. In the process then of rejecting ~~all~~ as uncertain all that you before supposed you had known, what is the limit to wh at last yr doubts must come? You come at last to the concl., that you know nothing, that you doubt everything. But do you know that you know nothing, doubt everything? When that is asked, you see that you have arrived at the end of your doubting, at a point where yr doubting, denying of yr knl must stop. For you have found out that you know something, & even if you know nothing; for you

"So little do we know what we're about in
this world, I doubt if doubt itself be doubting"
(Don Juan, Canto 9, st. 17)

know this one thing at least, that you know nothing. This there is removed a difficulty wh you may possibly have felt in the way of my statement, that the earliest quest. of all wh you can go back to, What is Mind? It has been announced by all philos. writers from Dugd. & Sir W. Ham., that the first quest. wh we require to answer in all investigations is, whether the thing wh we are about to investigate really exists or not. Now, you may have supposed that I had overlooked the quest., whether the nature & laws of Mind, wh we are about to investigate really exists, whether there is such a thing at all. You will see however that I overlooked this quest. not unwittingly, but because I knew that it was an impossible quest. inasmuch as it either answered or contradicted itself. I shall suppose one of you proposing to me the doubt, whether there is such a thing as Mind, whether we can know anything at all. I reply to yr proposal, 'Do you know that you doubt? If you do, then you know something, there is Mind. If you do not, you contradict yourself; for you said that you doubted, & you must have known that you doubted when you said so. Or, if you did not know, yr doubt has annihilated itself.' The question, whether Mind is, is ∴ impossible, destroys itself. Our Mind may not represent reality, may be a delusion; but that we know or are conscs. is a fact from wh we may start; & the earliest quest wh we can possibly ask is ∴, as I have said, not Is Mind, but What is Mind?

But there is another point of view from wh the philos. importance of this quest. may be seen. It not only brings to the ultimate basis of all science, it affords us the means of detecting & correcting any error wh may have crept into science by transgressing the laws of Mind. The full meaning of this remark you may not altogether appreciate at present, but the more thoroughly you inquire into the nature of Mind & observe the conditions under wh alone it can be realised, you will

x Cf. Also Kants Kr. d. r. V., p. 225. 'If then ~~we learn~~ by this critical inquiry

grow the more cautious, the more truthloving in the adoption of all yr beliefs. Every one who is honest must acknl that he has too often rashly hastened to conclusions without sufficient inquiry. Not in important scientific matters merely, but far more in ordinary subjects. Foolish assertions, ungenerous thts & statements. Then in higher matters. Theolical errors of present day. Importance in consequence of clearly "redding the marches" between the possible ~~but~~ & impossible in knl, the actual & the merely hypoth. Cannot be better illustrated than by Locke. Origin of his great work ~~here~~ in Esp. to Reader. "Were it fit to trouble thee with the hist. of this essay, I sh'd tell thee that five or six friends, meeting at my chamber & discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming ~~to~~ any nearer a resolution of those doubts wh perplexed us, it came into my tht that we took a wrong course & that, before we sh ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities & see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company who all readily assented; & thereupon it was agreed that this sh'd be our first inquiry. Some hasty & undigested tht on a subject I had never before considered, wh I set down aft our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse wh, having been then begun by chance, was continued by intreaty, written by incoherent parcels &, after long intervals, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted, & at last, in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brt into that order thou now seest it." X

× The inadequacy of the most inadequate systems of phy to be traced to the fact of their never having clearly put this great, the real problem they had to solve, at the outset. Hence also, not contradictions of phical systems with themselves, but with each other. The problem has been seen differently by different phers, each is ~~taking~~ working at a different problem. (Ferrier's Inst. Introd. § 15, but esp. 16.)

First quest. of all in Gnoseology: What is Knl? Observe the meaning of this quest. What is really asked? Important that you sh^d put it to yourselves; for two reasons: ~~It is a quest. seldom put clearly even by phers. The answer moreover will determine whether whole system is false or true.~~ 1. For ~~failing to~~ putting the quest. clearly will alone save yr phy from inadequacy & confusd. 2. The ~~monstrous~~ Minotaur of unphical error, the monstrous Bitty & ~~Bruta~~ Reason & British Unreason, into whose winding recesses we have been wilfd by custom, claims ~~to~~ as all as his victims; this quest, if once we see its clear face, may be the beautiful Ariadne who shall give us the clue ~~to~~ thrid the dark mazes of ~~the~~ labyrinth back into the open sunshine of ~~Tr~~ truth. ~~But the~~ Important that you put this quest once distinctly before you, because 2. to have it once clearly in view is tantamount to having reached an answer to it. You may by heedlessness lose sight of it again, but you may also by heedfulness keep sight of it. Now ~~it~~ in order that you may see clearly the quest. wh is really asked & distinguish from others wh are not asked, esp. from one wh you may be apt to suppose is the one wh is asked, I cannot do better than quote the following passage from Plato's Theaetetus. 'What is Knl?' asks Socrates of Theaet. 'Knl', answers Th., consists of geometry & such other matters as we have been now talking about.' 'You have answered,' returns Socrates, 'most generously, indeed most munificently, I may say quite like a prince. Being asked for a single thing, you have given me I know not how many things; & that, Th., is what I call acting nobly towards an old ignoramus like me.' Th. is thrown somewhat aback & Socrates proceeds to explain ~~himself~~. 'You have rather missed,' says he, 'the point of my quest. I did not ask you what things there is a Knl of, but what Knl itself is.' You must now see the rock on wh Th. foundered, to

wh ∴ you are warned to steer clear, if you wd reach the point to wh we are bound. You have nothing to do with the objects of Knl or with the kinds of Knl, into what sciences they shd be distributed. Only with Knl itself. The quest. answered in

§ 1. Knl is the connection of that wh calls itself 'I' with that wh it calls 'Not-I'.

A definition of Knl, in the strict sense of a definition, is impossible. A definition is in strictness a partic. kind of Knl, & ∴ Knl in itself, wh includes definition as well as all other kinds of Knl under it, cannot be bro.t under definition. Knl is the genus in wh the species def. is to be ranked & you cannot include the larger class ~~under~~ in the smaller. Accordingly you are not to look upon the above proposition as in strictness a definition. If it need be accurately described at all, it may be called not a def., but an explication of Knl into its constituent elements. This substitute for definition is what we are obliged to resort to in other sciences besides phy. When you come to the ultimate facts wh form the data from wh a science must start, you have then no higher facts under wh these may be classed & you are reduced to the necessity of merely explicating or resolving them into their elements. ~~These elements being the elements not truly more elementary~~ In that case what I have called elements are not truly more elementary than the facts of wh they are the analysis, since they presuppose those facts as much as the facts presuppose them. E.g. the simplest def.s of geometry are not strictly def.s. 'A point is that wh has position, but not magnitude.' Position & Magnitude are not more elementary ideas than that of a point. When you have the one, you have the other also. The same may said with regard to def.s of line, straight line. ~~etc~~ 'A straight line is the shortest way ~~between two points~~ from one point to any other.' The shortest

line between two points is certainly identical with a straight line between them, but wh of the two explains the other, wh is more elementary, may be questioned. When I have an idea of a straight line, I don't define it to my thought as the shortest line between two points. The more probable order is that, when I think of the shortest line between two points, I explain to myself as a straight line. The same difficulty may be shewn in finding what can strictly be called a def. of such a simple idea as that of a right angle. But ~~this will~~ the examples I have adduced are sufficient to illustrate the ~~necessity of~~ impossibility of furnishing a strict def. of the highest fact with wh phy has to deal, the fact of Knl. The meaning of every term employed in the first proposition of the Gnoseology presupposes Knl far more truly than Knl presupposes ~~them~~ it. This prop. is ∴ a def. of Knl only in the same sense in wh the ~~defs~~ of the simplest ideas in geometry are such. These express only a certain necessary coincidence of some fact with the fact wh they profess to define, the necessary coincidence; e.g., ~~of the fact, that two equal angles formed by one straight meeting another~~ of two equal angles formed by one straight line meeting another straight line with the fact that these two angles are right angles. In like manner it is a necessary law that all Knl is the connection of that wh knows itself as 'I' & of that wh it knows as 'Not-I;' in other words, in all Knl there are two elements, a subjective & an objective, Knl of self & Knl of notself. Consequently the task of phy must be to investigate these two elements or constituents of Knl; the entire end of phy, primarily of Gnoseology, ultimately of Ontology, is accomplished in the accurate ~~discovery of~~ discrimination of what is ~~x~~ contributed by the subject, what by the object in the act of Knl. This has been more

or less distinctly recognized as the aim of speculation from its very beginning, & all the failures & all the confusion of different phical systems have arisen from their not having set this aim clearly before them. In more recent times however this aim has been been apprehended as it never was before. ~~It~~ Sir W. Ham. but expresses the general tendency of the highest efforts of modern phy, when he says: "The distinction of self & notself involves the whole science of mind; for this science is nothing more than a determination of of the subjective & objective in themselves & in their mutual relations." Disc. p. 5, note. Lect. I. 161. We may have occasion to estimate the success with wh Sir W. & other phers have sot to determine with scientific accuracy the relation of the two terms in this distinction. The fact, that the determination of this distinction has been so clearly apprehended in recent times, may perhaps be an evidence that we are nearing the accomplishment of the task of phy.

§ 2. Though the objective element of knl, in its general character, must be taken acct of by phy, yet ~~that wh~~ the subjective is that with wh ~~alone~~ phy alone & peculiarly has to do, the objective matter affording ~~only~~ for the other sciences.

The various objects presented in knl are those about wh ~~phy~~ the various sciences are conversant, astronomy, philology &c. Phy draws away from these objects to attend to knl itself. In doing so what is the prominent fact that presents itself to the attention? It is not the presence of the objects of knl. These are prominent in other inquiries. But when the inquiry arises, What is knl?

it is a new element that arrests our attention & the nature of wh demands investigation. That factor of our knl wh is always present whatever else may be present is the one wh peculiarly claims to be the object of Gnoseology, the science of knl. Now this factor, I have said, is self. I cannot know without knowing that it is I who know, & not some one else. Consequently I must always be present in every knl. Things cannot be known by me, all I am known along with them. This it is that makes them knowable. ~~[illegible]~~: When the meaning of the first personal pronoun is rigidly determined the secret of Gnoseology is unveiled. Speaking of the abuse of the words subject & object Sir W. Ham. says: "The subject of knl is exclusively the Ego or conse. mind. Subject & subjective, considered in themselves, are little liable to equivocation. But on the other hand the object of knl is not necessarily a phen^on of the Non-ego, for the phen^a of the Ego itself constitute as tentable, though not so cautious & prominent, objects of cognition, as the phen^a of the Non-ego." (Reid p. 808, note.) I am sorry that I am compelled humbly to differ from Sir W. on this point. The terms by wh the subjective element in knl is denominated appear to me extremely liable to equivocation & even to be used in an equivocal sense in this very passage by Sir W. himself. If the subject is exclusively the Ego, how can ~~phen^a of~~ the Ego become by any modification not the subject, but the object? how can I ever become not I, or that wh is not I become merely a modification of me?

Let me ask you then to stop with all seriousness at this quest. as involving in it the fate of yr phy. Think the meaning

of I. What do you mean when you use the first personal pronoun? ~~Do you~~ think yourself in yr pure selfhood. Say 'I am I', I am nothing else. ~~I am wholly & essentially separated from all others.~~ Repeat that to yourself over & over again till you are never able to lose the consciness of the infinite mystery, the inexplicable meaning of calling yourself 'I.'

With the ability to call yourself 'I' begins properly yr existence as an intelligent being. It is an interesting quest., though I do not intend entering on it at present, when self consciness begins. There is one fact wh has been referred to & wh you must all have noticed, wh may throw some light on this quest. Children, when they begin to speak, don't use the first or the second personal pronoun, but only the third, when speaking of themselves, as well as when addressing persons ~~present~~ present. 'Baby, Tommy, Alice, &c. wishes so & so.' When the chd first uses the first, says I, may perhps be the birth of self consciness. At what time this usually takes place I have myself never sufficiently observed to be able to state with any certainty. I shd think it seldom happens before two years. But there is a remarkable instance in wh it wd seem ~~also~~ to have been much earlier. The only person whom I remember to have recorded his first act of self consciness is Jean Paul Richter. Never shall I forget that internal event, till now related to no mortal, wherein I witnessed the birth of my self consciness, of wh I can still give the place & the time. One forenoon I was standing, a very young chd, in the outer door & looking forward at the stack of the fuel wood, when all at once the internal vision, 'I am an I', came like a flash from heaven before me & in gleaming light

ever afterwards continued: then had my Ego ~~for the first time~~ seen itself for the first time & for ever. Deceptions of memory are scarcely conceivable here; for in regard to an event occurring ~~in the~~ altogether in the veiled Holy of Holies of Man, & whose novelty alone has given permanence to such very day recollections accompanying it, no posterior description from another party wd have mingled itself with accompanying circumstances at all. I regret that I have not been able to find a reference to this fine passage; so that I mt have stated articulately the date of the occurrence wh it relates. ~~It wd seem, from~~ The fact that little Richter was standing at the door when the consc^ness flashed upon him implies, I shd think, that he was at the very least about two years old, & seems to confirm the opinion I have hazarded as to the earliest period when self consc^ness begins. But I am unable to explain this passage in his history, in its connection with another wh ~~took~~ must have taken place at an earlier period & at wh, since his memory reached back to it, he must have been self consc. Far-reaching recollections from the years of childhood ~~poor~~ gladden & even elevate ~~unfathomable~~ unstable man, who seeks in this ~~[illegible]~~ fluctuating existence everywhere to find something to wh he may cling, more than the memory of later crises of his life; & this esp for two reasons: 1st because by this recollection he thinks to press back nearer to the gates of his life wh are guarded by Night & by Spirits, & because 2dly he hopes in the equal power of an early consc^ness to find ~~and~~ something like independence on the despicable little human body. I rejoice that I am able still to ~~record in minute~~ bring up a fading little recollection from my twelfth, or at the latest my fourteenth month like the first

spiral snowdrop from the dark soil of childhd. I remember that a poor scholar was very fond of me & I of him, & that he always carried me in his arms, wh is pleasanter than at a later period by the hand, & that he used to give me milk in a large dark room. His distant darkling image & his love hovered over me down through later years. Unhappily I do no longer know his name; but since it mt be possible that he was still alive above sixty years of age & that ~~[illegible]~~ being widely read these pages mt come before him & he mt then remember their little author, whom he has carried & kissed — O that this were to take place & he shd write or that he the older shd come to me now the old man. This little morning star of earliest memory stood tolerably clear still in boyhood near the horizon of its heavens, but ever faded more, the higher the daylight of life rose; & now I properly remember only this with clearness, that I remembered all more clearly before. Vol. 16. pp. 15, 16

~~This is certainly the earliest recollection from childh~~ I certainly do not remember having anywhere met with a case in wh the memory reached back so far into early childhd. I leave you to estimate for yourselves the weight to be attached to it in determining the period at wh we generally become conscs of our selfhood. For after all the quest. as to the date of the birth of this consc^ness is a matter of secondary importance. That wh we have to deal with is the fact of selfconsc^ness, whatever may be the time of its dawn; & the its infinite meaning in our nature as constituting us what we are as intelligent beings may be regarded as making it worthy of form:

ing the chief lesson wh is to be learned in our earthly life. Supp :
we shd consider it not merely a poetical fancy, but a physical
truth as well, wh has been beautifully uttered by the greatest of living poets in one of the
odes of 'In Memoriam':

'The babe new to earth & sky,
What time his slender hand is pressed
Beat the circle of the breast,
Has never thot that 'this is I':

But as he grows he gathers much
And learns the use of 'I' & 'me'
~~And~~ And finds 'I am not what I see
And other than the things I touch.'

So sounds he to a separate mind
From whence clear memory may begin
As through the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined.

This use may lie in blood & breath,
Wh else were fruitless of their due,
Had man to learn himself anew
Beyond the second birth of Death.' 44.

one of her courtiers, Von Tronje Hagen, to avenge her on Sigfried. Hagen, who represents in the poem the spirit of cold-blooded, calculating prudence & cunning, immediately sets about the accomplishment of his queen's charge. ~~&~~ Now it chanced that, as the heel of Achilles had been left untouched by the waters of the Styx, so a spot on Sigfried's back had been covered by a leaf wh kept the blood of the dragon in wh he bathed from imparting to it invulnerability. This spot he obtained a hul of from Crimhild under the pretence that he wished to be able to protect her husband, but he made use of his hul on the earliest opportunity during a hunt to inflict a mortal wound. The immediate effects of the death of Sigfried I need not stay to relate. Suppose 13 years passed away; Etzel, King of the Huns, sends then to ask the hand of the widowed ~~queen~~ Crimhild. At first she will hear of no proposal wh wd seem to imply that she had forgotten ~~her first hero~~ Sigfried; but it is suggested to her that ~~the~~ her second husband mt be the means of enabling her to avenge her first. She 'aeternum servans sub pectore vulnus' sees a gleam of hope in this suggestion & goes with Etzel's ambassadors into Hungary. Her plans of revenge are formed in course of time & with a view to carry them out she persuades her husband to invite her brothers to his land. Notwithstanding the efforts of Hagen to dissuade them, the princes of Burgundy accept Etzel's invitation & set out with 1000 followers. Interesting episodes, had we had time, mt have been noticed ~~as they~~

X

in the course of the poem, but there is one in the journey of the Burgundians wh. ch.d not be passed over. Hagen sets out & is impressed all along with the presentiment that their journey will have a fearful issue. As they cross the ~~Rhine~~ Danube they meet certain Mermen whom he questions with regard to the probable result of their expedition:

Outspake the wild Merwoman, I tell thee 'twill arrive,
That of all your gallant host No man shall be left alive
Except King Gunther's chaplain, As we full well do know;
He only home returning To the Rhineland back shall go.

Hagen attempts to make the prophecy untrue by casting the chaplain overboard as they are crossing the river, but the chaplain reached the home shore & returned to Worms. From this point a certain fearful grandeur gathers round the actions & the character of Hagen, the awful daring of utter desperation, as well also as of utter devotion to his friends. I regret that I cannot carry you through the details of the closing scene of this old drama, & yet it is perhaps artistically the most fit, certainly the grandest part of the whole. 'Strangely', says Carlyle, 'has the old singer in these his loose melodies, modulated the wild narrative into a poetic whole with what we mt call true art, ~~but~~ were it not rather an instinct of genius still more unerring. A fateful gloom now hangs over the fortunes of the Nib. wh deepens & deepens as they march onwards to the judgment bar ~~that~~ till all are engulphed in utter night.' The queen does not allow the feast of welcome to even to begin in peace & before long, unable to wreak her vengeance

to a distant land to see Gunther, wooing a ~~rather~~ remarkable maiden the winning of whom for himself he proposes to Sigfried as the condition of his obtaining Crimhild. The maiden queen of the castle of Isenstein whom Gunther will have for a wife is remarkable not less for her strength than for her beauty; & the man who will ~~wood~~ her must test his fitness to be her husband by hurling the lance with her, by putting the stone & leaping after it. If he beat her clearly in each of these three exercises, she became his wife; if he failed, he had the ~~rather~~ unpleasant alternative of losing his head. I shall leave you to imagine the devices wh Sigfried contrived to conquer queen Brunhild, ~~the Val-kyr~~ so as at the same time, with the aid of his invisible-making Tarnkappe, to delude her into the idea that she had been overcome by Gunther. Suffice it to say that the wayward & hitherto ~~so~~ inconquerable Valkyr humbly consented to return with them to Worms & become the bride of Gunther. But unfortunately Gunther's troubles were not over, for on the evening of his wedding he found himself ~~in his bedroom in the unroyal predicament of being helplessly suspended by his queen~~ in the shockingly unroyal predicament of being bound hand & foot by his queen's girdle & helplessly suspended by a nail in the wall of his bedroom. Sigfried requires to be brot in again to the assistance of ~~Gunther~~ his brother-in-law, & unhappily the true secret of the athletic queen's defeat is told by Sigfried to his wife. A quarrel afterwards breaks out between the two ladies on the relative merits of their husbands & the only way in wh Crimhild can silence Brunhild is by letting out the fatal secret. The insult of course can never be forgotten, & Brunhild finds

* A similar legend to that of Atalanta & Brunhild occurs in the story "How Sir travelled through the world," Grimm's Kinder u. Hausmärchen.

on Hagen alone, all are embroiled in a battle of extermination. At last the Nib. are all slain but Hagen & Gunther, who are delivered over to Crimhild bound. 'Where is the treasure of the Nib.?' demands Crimhild of Hagen. 'I have sworn that none shall know while any of your brothers lives', replies Hagen. 'I bring it to an end' & she orders her brother's head to be cut off. 'Thou hast according to thy will; of the Hoard none knows but God & I; from thee it shall forever be hid.' She kills him by her own hand with his own sword, & she herself is in her turn slain by one Hildebrand ~~who~~ out of indignation at the woe she has wrought. ~~While her husband, who had no anticipation of what has happened & does not understand it, looks on in existing.~~ — In these few sentences I have given you no conception of the tragical effect of these closing scenes as they are detailed in the poem itself. All descriptions of battles that I have ever read seem but the accts of mere boyish ~~games~~ sham fights after this. The ~~sustained~~ horror ~~of the Saga~~ wh grows on the reader as the ~~end~~ long cherished hate of Crimhild works onward to the climax of its ~~consummation~~ gratification, the sustained horror ~~of~~ with wh the fearful consummation is wrought out, the straightforward simplicity of the poet shrinking from no details, impart to this tale a sublimity wh in its own kind will, I believe, be sought in vain elsewhere. Of other features of the poem I may take occasion to speak at another time. Meanwhile you will admit that the poet has fulfilled the design with wh he set out: 'Of joyances & lightsides, of weeping & of woe, of noble heroes fighting, he has let us wonders know.'

has wrested in hot fight from the dwarf Alberich a cap by wh he can make himself invisible & has bathed in the blood of a dragon that he slew so as to render himself invulnerable. He has heard of the beauty of the Rhenish maiden. In vain do his father Siegemund & his mother Sieglind endeavour to persuade him against trusting himself to the Burgundians. The queen & her maidens must sit sewing night & day to fit out Sigfried & his suite of twelve. The hero sets out & arrives at the court of Gunther, the brother of the fair Crimhild; but a year required to pass before he was allowed to see her for whom he had come. Crimhild had sadly forgotten her earlier resolution on the first view she obtained of Sigfried from her window, & some time after when she heard of his exploits in battle along with her brother against a Danish king, 'her light complexion flushed, & her fair face grew rose-red, because the love-worthy hero was happily escaped from the danger of battle.' At last however the occasion of a great tournament is taken advantage of to introduce the young prince of the Nib. to the beautiful princess of Burgundy. On the appointed morning all come out to see the display of arms, but foremost of all, at least to Sigfried, there came beside her mother with a hundred body guards & many a noble maiden in her train Crimhild 'like the glow of the morning from troubled clouds'; & 'as the light moon stands before the stars & its sheen so clear goes over the clouds, even so stood she now before many fair women, whereat the heart of the hero was cheered.' It wd take too long to narrate all the events that took place at Gunther's court before he gave his sister to Sigfried. We must let ourselves be taken away

Remarks on the Nib. Lay. Simplicity. Everything told in the most natural manner. No straining, esp. none after images. I noticed almost the only image, Kimhild's appearance typified 'like the morning glow among troubled clouds' & 'as the light moon stands before the stars & its sheen so clear goes over the clouds, even so stood she now before many fair women.' Contrast with Greek &c. Figurative language. How it arises, is imposed upon early efforts to express tho't. Person communes more immediately with nature & ∴ personifies. Myths. Fascination of the mythicising view of nature. Explanation of the regret expressed in Schiller's 'Götter Griechenlands' without supposing it to be anti: Xtn. Wordsworth & his influence. But the fact cannot be doubted, that the entrance of Xtnity entirely abolished this way of looking at nature

'The oracles are dumb,
No voice or hideous hum
Runs through the arched roof in words deceiving;
Apollo from his shrine
Can no more divine,
With hollow shriek the steep of Delphos leaving.
No nightly trance or breathed spell
Inspires the pale-eyed priest from the prophetic cell.

The lonely mountains o'er
And the resounding shore
A voice of weeping heard & loud lament;
From haunted spring & dale,
Edged with poplar pale

x Or the origin of the Arcadian 'connecting the Lycaeus with Arcadia' see Strabo p. 340.

dreams from wh one mt already bode the life that was coming to her. She dreamt that she had brot up a falcon & had kept it ~~for many a day~~ long till one day two eagles swept down upon it & carried it off from before her eyes. She dream ~~wh~~ she ~~relat~~ tells in trouble to her mother who interprets it thus: 'The falcon that thou fearest is a noble husband. May God protect him, else he is soon undone!' ~~The~~ Young maiden starts: ~~at the mention of a husband~~

Why speak to me of husband, Dear mother mine?

& declares that she will keep herself free from all trouble in that quarter by resolving to have nothing to do with the love of heroes, but to retain her maidenly beauty till her death. The wiser mother warns her that such a statement comes from inexperience; but in the modest utterance of the simple girl we hear a dim foreboding of the fate wh is coming upon her & wh she wd seek to avoid were it possible.

Destiny however is stronger than a maiden's coyness or a woman's resolutions. Marriages are made in heaven, not by earthly choice; & though Crimhild struggled long agst love, she too much yield to the all-conquering God. For it seems that, as she has been growing up into all womanly beauty on the upper Rhine, she has been only prepared for becoming the bride of a hero who has been growing up for her into all manly nobleness far away to the North in the land of the Nib. Where these Nib. dwelt or who they were it wd be vain now to inquire. Their land is the land of nebulae, of mists & cloud; & these mists & clouds no man may remove. But wherever the land be, it has been conquered by ~~there was~~ a hero named Sig-fried, who has won from the dim Nib. a treasure wh is uncountable,

The parting genius is with sighing sent:
With flower-inwoven tresses torn
The nymphs in twilight shades of tangled thickets mourn.

In consecrated earth
And on the holy hearth
The Lars & Lemures moan with midnight plaint;
In urns & altars round
A drear & dying sound
Affrights the Flamens at their service quaint,
And the chill marble seems to sweat
While each peculiar power foregoes his wonted seat.

Peor & Baalim
Forsake their temples dim
With that thrice-battered God of Palestine,
And mooned Ashtaroth,
Heaven's queen & mother both,
Now sits not girt with tapers

x x x x

Nor is Osiris seen
In Memphian grove or green,
Trampling the unshowered grass with lowings loud;
Nor can he be at rest
Within his sacred chest,
Naught but profoundest hell can be his shroud;
In vain from timbrelled anthems dark
The sable-stoled sorcerers bear his worshipped ark.

of the tale is intimated in its opening lns.:

There are in ancient story Wonders many told
Of heroes in great glory ~~With~~ Of courage strong & bold;
Of joyances & lightides, Of weeping & of woe,
Of noble warriors striving Mote ye now wonders know.

Immediately after this opening in the second lns. you are introduced at once to the joyance & the woe of the song. The scene in wh the earlier part of the story is transacted lies around the city of Worms on the Rhine, wh, as has been remarked, 'ought, if we had a sight imagination, to be as venerable to us moderns as any Thebes or Troy was to the ancients. Whether founded by the gods or not, it is of quite unknown antiquity & has witnessed the most wonderful things. Within authentic times the Romans were there, &, if tradition may be credited, Attila also; it was the seat of the Austrasian Kings, the frequent residence of Charlemagne himself; innumerable festivals, lightides, & tournaments & imperial diets were held in it, of wh latter one at least, that where Luther appeared in 1521, will be forever remembered by all mankind. Nor is Worms more famous in history than, as indeed we may see here, it is in romance, whereof many monuments & vestiges remain to this day.' (Carlyle) But if Worms ought to carry us back to Troy, ~~the~~ we may well be reminded of the heroine in the 'tale of Troy divine' by the lady to whom the tale of the Nib. first introduces us in Worms

A sight noble maiden Did grow in Burgundy
That in all lands of earth Naught fairer mote there be;
Crimhild of Worms the light She was a fairest wife,
For the wh must warriors A many lose their life.

Over the cradled of the beautiful Crimhild there hovered gentle

He flees from Inda's land
The dreaded Infant's hand,
The rays of Bethlehem blind his dusky eyes;
Nor all the gods beside
Longer dare abide,
Nor Typhon hinge ending in scaly twine:
Our Babe, to shew His Godhead true,
Can in his swaddling bands control the damned crew.

So when the sun in bed,
Curtained with cloudy red,
Pillows his chin upon an orient wave,
The flocking shadows pale
Troop to the infernal jail,
Each fettered ghost slips to his several grave,
And the yellow-skirted fays
Fly after the night-steeds, leaving their moon-loved maze.
Cf. with this the chorus in Hellas, p. 317.

2. Outer simplicity. In the general plan on wh composition is constructed.

Energy.
Carlyle's Cromwell II. p. 178. 'Charge of the Light Brigade'.

as songs recovered from ancient times, although the ~~ge~~ more accurate acquaintance with highland hills & glens & burns, with highland mists & moonlights, wh has been acquired by means of steamers & railways & comfortable hotels, has taught us that the ~~tone~~ peculiar, seemingly unnatural tone of the Ossianic poems is more ~~suitable~~ in harmony with such scenery than wd otherwise be supposed, yet it must be acknowledged that we can scarcely now find a trace of the interest manifested in the multiplied editions & translations & in the numerous critical works for & agst the authenticity of the poems, wh appeared on their first publication by Macpherson. That the interest in the relic of old Germany ~~shown~~ shd have grown as the interest ~~of~~ in that of the Scottish Gaels decreased is certainly remarkable, & must make you somewhat curious to know the character of a production wh ~~shd~~ has attracted so much profound & enthusiastic study. I will ∴ endeavour now to ~~In making you acquainted with this poem~~ give you as adequate a conception of this poem as I can within the limits of a brief lecture in the hope that my acct of it may induce you to seek a fuller acquaintance with it either in the original or in a translation. (Translated by Wm. Nanson Lettsom. Lond. Wms. & Norgate. 10/6).

With regard to the general character of the poem it is eminently tragic. The tragedy indeed is not unmitigated, does not overshadow the whole story ~~poem~~ as in the dramatic works of the Greeks. More truly, though ~~less~~ more superficially picturing life, wh is but mingled sorrow & joy, the poet of the Nib. details with a most innocent cheerfulness the passing ~~scenes~~ pleasures on wh his story touches in spite of the gloom wh the mournful plot throws over the whole. ~~But this~~ This chequered character

seem to have cared little about the life & thot & feelings of their immediate forefathers. Till ~~1757~~ Bodmer's publication of the Hohenemser MS. in 1757 ∴ this national poem may be said to have been unknown to the Germans; but this publication soon drew a very general attention to the discovered treasure & it wd now be impossible to no the editions in the original, in modernised versions & in foreign translations, as well as the works of a critical & expository nature wh it has called into existence, while at the same time you can scarcely open the catalogue of lectures for any session in a German university, without coming upon one course at least to be delivered on the Song of the Nib. or on subjects akin to it. ~~AR~~ The first complete edition of the poem was published a few years after Bodmer's partial edition by another Swiss named C. H. Müller; & Müller's work is memorable as having called from the Great Fred. ~~the~~ a letter wh is still preserved in the library at Zurich, "You have by far too favourable an opinion of these things. In my judgment they aren't worth a shot of powder & I wd not tolerate them in my library, I wd cast them out." Fred. the Great however, it is to be remembered, was a personal friend of Voltaire & ∴ an entire slave to French taste. We find accordingly that his opinion was far from being that of his people; ~~A~~ the fondness for the Nib. Lay & the interest in it seem to be still undiminished. In this, whether our Gaelic friends regret it or not, the fate of the old German epic ~~has~~ contrasts very strikingly with that of the ~~popular~~ old Scottish poems wh are attached to the name of Ossian. Although there seems to be a slowly growing revolt agt the Johnsonian unmitigated condemnation of Macpherson ~~as~~ on the charge of attempting to pass compositions of his own upon the world

d. Hebr. Poesie) works among the old ballads. These bring Teutonic nations closer; language liker, esp. (as Sir W. Scott notices) German & Scotch. E.g. in Herder's Version of Sir P. Spens. This fact made the study of early Teutonic literature of every dialect at once more easy & more fascinating; & the old ~~product~~ libraries of Germany, Scandinavia & Britain were ransacked & the memories of the people were plied in order to recover, as far as was possible, the tales & the songs in wh their fathers had delighted. Any handbook of the history of literature will make you better acquainted than I can make you with the ~~nature~~ character & extent of the discoveries in wh these researches resulted. It is to one of these discoveries in German literature that I wish now to limit your attention.

I have already mentioned ~~to~~ you that the school of Gottsched, ~~in Ger~~ wh represented French taste in Germany, formedy an opponent in a critic of the name of Bodmer. Bodmer, a prof. in Zürich, Switzerl. was not a man of the most original power & is ∴ to be regarded ~~not as~~ as the representative rather than as the creator of the new movement in literature wh he defended. Caught however by the spirit of that movement he seems to have been attracted towards the productions of more simple times, & having discovered, in the castle of Count Von Emo, Hohenemo in the country of the Grisons, two MSS containing what is known now as the Song of the Nibelungen, he gave to the world one of these embodying the second part of the song under the title of Chrimhilds Revenge. In the 16th cent. indeed an Austrian scholar named Wolfgang Lazius knew this old poem & used it in his Hist. of the Migrations of Races; but during the 16th & 17th cents generally this old ~~ep~~ national epic was unknown to the Germans: & in fact the most of the European peoples

Recapitulation. In Germany, I have said, this tendency was more strongly & more widely at work than in any other country. The previous dearth of a truly natural & national literature among the Germans had been longer of longer duration than in Britain. So strikingly indeed did the condition of modern German literature contrast with that of England, that Goethe said, had he been born an Englishman, he ch.d have found almost nothing left for him to contribute to the literature of his country. Accordingly the revival of letters in Germany towards the latter part of last cent. was in large measure brot. about & indicated by a more devoted study of English literature in preference to that of France. Shakspeare was raised into the idol of the new German school & it became a criterion of orthodoxy among them to back him agt. the French dramatists. It is impossible for us to conceive the effect produced by the discovery of the treasures of Engl. literature & esp. of the Shakspearian dramas. Emancipation from forms. Genius est. its most natural outlet, regardless of the restraints even of cultivated taste. Stormful struggling after a new, natural, national type. Strom u. Drang period. Going back upon the simplicity of the past. Already Greek & Roman classical style had been wrought up into German, esp. by Lessing. Now they go back upon their own past, live into it, try to feel what it was when present. The mediaeval, romantic period became object of attraction. Beginning in Götz v. Berlichingen, wh. gave impulse to Sir W. Scott. Romantic school seek to connect the ideal forms of poetry with the actual forms of life. Manifested in the major & minor morals of private & social life, in phy., theology, science & general literature in all its branches. Herder (Geist

x "Had I been born an Englishman & had all those numerous masterpieces been brot. before me in all their power at my first dawn of youthful consc^ness, they wd. have overpowered me & I shd not have known what to do. I cd. not have gone on with the same lightheartedness, but shd. have had to bethink myself & look about for a long time to find a new outlet." Eckerm. Conv. I. 114.

x See Goethe's speech at Strasburg.

of these was the Mins. of Scot. Border published by Sir W. Scott, in 1802 – 3. The studies of Sir Walter made him fitter than any man of his time for the task of recovering & editing intelligibly the ballads of his native country, & his labours in this respect, as well as in general, have done more than those of any other man to teach men to look back on the past as on what had once been present & as in fact still present to the imagination in a literature wh we may well love to study & strive to imitate. But ~~nowhere~~ it was not only in Engl. literature that such discoveries were made & such tendencies set agoing. There was not a nation of Europe wh did not receive some of the impulse, & in Germany it was ~~more~~ more remarkable, wider & deeper in its results than anywhere else. I have not time today to make you acquainted with this memorable movement among the Germans. Next week I may take occasion to give you some acct of it, as well as of the great German epic, the ~~most~~ discovery of wh may be regarded as perhaps the most valuable result of the inquiries that were instituted into the old literature of the European nations. Engl. & Scotch ballads spoken of already. Reproduction of old literature in the Scott's poems, Waverley Novels, Tieck's Romances & in the Imitators of the Ballads. (Lady Clare, p. 238.) Reproduction of the Old Arthurian legends (Mort d'Arthur. Sir Launcelot & Guinevere. Idylls of the King.)

Reproduction of old Indian legends. Only, as far as I know, by Longfellow. Legend of Mondamin, p. 39.

2 The "Minstrelsy" published for the first time 43 ballads, according to Motherwell.
See Lockhart's Advertisement to the "Minstrelsy", pp. v-vi.

a Schelling, a Hegel, a Cousin, a Hamilton, ~~it was~~ the discovery & vindication of that eternal element were recognised as the true end of poetry. It is impossible even to indicate all the ~~changes~~ results wh these new tendencies brot about in the general literature of every nation. There is one result however wh it is ~~of importance~~ for us esp. to notice here & wh, like most other results of the agencies at work in human history, must itself be regarded as not without some influence in originating & increasing these agencies. For if the study of the simple & ~~natur~~ unartificial literature of early times is in one sense to be viewed as having been brot about by a return to simpler & more natural modes of general thot & life, scarcely anything can be pointed out wh contributed so largely to that return itself ~~than~~ as those very modes of thot & life with wh men became acquainted in the study of early literature.[1] ~~The~~ One of the first evidences[2] of this awakened fondness for the literature of earlier days was afforded by the Reliques of Engl. Poetry published in 1761 by Dr. Percy, afterwards the Bishop of Dromore in Ireland. There were many features of this work, such as the ~~too~~ liberty it took ~~of~~ in polishing the text of the ballads, wh rendered it very faulty as an edition of old Engl. poetry; but these combined with editor's introduction only made it the more successful in drawing attention to the neglected literary treasures wh it brot into notice. Since then numerous collections of British ballad poetry have been made on both sides of the Tweed. The most famous

2 It is but fair however to Addison to remember his sympathising critique of the "Chevy Chase". In fact is not his quarrel with Pope to be explained from a profounder difference between the two men than is commonly supposed?

1. They had no predecessors to imitate or avoid imitating

x Fettered by certain prescriptions regarding figures of speech, by laws of composition & versification wh were regarded as inviolable in order to pfl literary work, nothing cd ~~teach~~ emancipate men so entirely from this thraldom, nothing cd teach them so thoroughly that the sp. must create a form for itself, but cannot be created by mere forms than the discovery of a poetry distinguished only by an inner beauty wh bst its readiest utterance without regard to regularity of outward structure in itself. The sp with wh one thus turns to a people's first poetry & wh is also created or intensified by its study is nowhere more finely expressed than in the Introd. to Hiawatha.

spread widely & rapidly over the whole of Europe. It is impossible for us to see down into the deepest causes that work in the production of such changes in the tendencies of human life, & the wisest are often led ludicrously astray when too daring in their surmises. It is enough for us ∴ to know the fact & the character of this change wh came over European literature towards the close of last cent. without caring to inquire into the causes by wh it was originated or carried on.

Now the fact of such a change is not to be questioned, but its character deserves to be more nearly examined. As the hollow formality wh it displaced was not limited to any one sphere of human activity, but ignored the basis of everything that is noble in all, so the reaction towards ~~a more truthful earnestness of~~ nature & truth took an unlimited range. The lives of men ~~set~~ strove after harmony with a more etherial & more lasting principle of action than the passing mode of etiquette. Even in the extravagancies growing out of the first attempt to return to such simple manners as nature teaches there was manifested a more earnest direction of human ~~life~~ activity, & it was certainly in any case gratifying that Lord Chesterfield's Letters to his Son had come to be no longer regarded as a ~~superior~~ better guide to a fit life than John Bunyan's Pilgrims Progress. Philosophers again no longer tried to chase away the eternal element in human knl, in all human sphere, but under the influence of a Kant, a Fichte

x How soon felt in England (1763) see Colman's (the elder) ~~edition~~ Prologue to his edition with alterations of Philaster, Dyce's Beaum. & Fletch., I. p. 203. But cf. note two pages forward on Addison's critique of the "Chevy Chase". Note also the Collection in 1723, ~~mad~~ mentioned by Scott, Introd. to "Minstrelsy", p. 38. On the whole subject consult this Introd., from p. 36. Note Collins' Ode to Home on the Sup: erstitions of the Highlands (Scotland rather), esp. last verse. (This must have been written about the close of 1749. Mem. of Collins, by Mrs Thomas, p. xxvi).

The morning precious. Beauty was awake:
Why were not ye awake? But ye were dead
To things ye wot not of, were closely wed
To musty laws lined out with wretched rule
And compass vile; so that ye taught a school
Of dolts to smooth, inlay & clip & fit,
Till like the certain wands of Jacob's wit
Their souls tallied. Easy was the task;
A thousand handicraftsmen wore ~~the~~ mask
Of poesy. Ill-fated, impious race!
That blasphemed ~~the~~ great Lyrist to his face
And did not know it; no, they went about,
Holding a poor, decrepit standard out,
Marked with most flimsy mottoes & in large
The name of one Boileau. (Keats, p. 229.)

~~It was undoubtedly~~ Though this tendency, so happily pictured in these words of Keats, was at work throughout ~~the~~ whole of Europe, yet it was undoubtedly associated most closely with Boileau & other ~~&~~ writers & critics of France, & accordingly in other countries ~~the~~ authors who represented the tendency were recognized as belonging ~~to~~ the French school. This was esp. the case in Germany where the stereotyped regularity of the French found a champion in a critic ~~of the~~ of the name of Gottsched, ~~who was~~ opposed by a school, headed by Bodmer, who ~~wished~~ endeavoured ~~to~~ to emancipate literature from the thraldom of stiff forms into the freedom of nature. This antagonistic tendency grew in strength &

himself is impelled to throw in consequence of the impressions made upon him from without. & Goodness fared not a whit better; the grand old piety of the 16th & 17th cents. became an inconceivability & its language utterly unintelligible. For holiness, even for pure morality men thot themselves infinitely wiser than their fathers in setting up etiquette as a superior rule of life. The disastrous effects upon the aesthetic faculties were similar. Beauty was no longer regarded as a divine Idea illuminating with its heavenly light all the phen^a of the universe. Not of heavenly, but of earthly birth, the ch^d of our sensuous nature, instead of moulding by its transforming power the tho^ts of men, itself was forced to ~~f~~ don the dress of fashionable modes of tho^t, & all higher ~~composition~~ literary efforts, even poetry itself was tho^t to be explained as the more or less strict observance of certain rules of composition or versification.

'Cd all this be forgotten? Yes, a schism,
Nurtured by foppery & barbarism,
Made Greek Apollo blush for this his land.
Men were tho^t wise who cd not understand
His glories: with a puling infant's force
They ~~staggered~~ swaggered about upon a rocking horse
Said tho^t it Pegasus. Ah! dismal-fooled.
The winds of heaven blew, the ocean rolled
Its gathering waves — ye felt it not. The blue
Bared its eternal bosom, & the dew
Of summer night collected still ~~to~~ make

Naivetè — Niebelungenlied.

~~Naivetè to be met esp. in the literature of a nation's childhd.~~ I have already referred ~~to~~ some illustrations of this feature of the early literature of different peoples. You are ~~& some latest~~ acquainted undoubtedly with ~~the~~ ~~some~~ of the first productions of England & ~~Scotch~~ Scotland, ~~& I~~. I have more than once taken occasion to ~~to~~ introduce a few specimens of them to exhibit their aptitude as means of various forms of aesthetic culture. It is scarcely above 3 quarters of a cent. since the European nations became conscs. that they possessed an early literature of such value as we now know it to be. Undoubtedly this consciousness arose from the deeper & more loving look with wh they began to turn to the past in general & ~~&~~ to that past esp. ~~to with~~ wh they as separate nations were linked as the grown up man to what he was when a chd. During last cent. human life everywhere & in every sphere over wh it extends was ~~corrupted by~~ rendered hollow by a shallow empiricism, wh sought to sap the eternal foundation of truth & beauty & goodness. ~~Their~~ Phrs ~~that~~ that they explained all the mysteries of the inner world as mere sensations or products of sensations, ~~thought they explained~~ entered the innermost shrine of the temple of man's Nature & found there not the imperishable Ego, but merely an evanescent imaginary unity among sensations, & thus made truth not what an Eternal Mind troweth, but what ~~to~~ each man by

lik ~~by~~ with the two former strooks, these three French boots given in upon the back of other: besides that, if lines were ~~drawn~~ imagined drawn from the hand that livered them to the places wh were marked by them, they wd represent a rght isosceles triangle with a perpendicular from the top angle cutting the basis in the middle' Think ofte that of 'When Percy wi' the Douglas met &c.'

The highest attainment in this style of simplicity is naivete. We cannot express the idea in Engl. That childlike simplicity wh makes us feel superior to the writer in certain respects, but unable to master his inimitable style. The early literature of every nation the best illustration. Nibelungenlied abounds in it. Not so frequent in the ~~Iliad~~ Hom. poems, tho' there also. In Our ballads & songs. Original form of Annie Laurie. Only two stzs., first the same as in modern version.

She's backit like the peacock,
She's breistit like the swan,
She's jimp about the middle,
Her waist ye weel micht span;
Her waist ye weel micht span,
And she has a rollin ee, &c.

See also the song, 'O gin my love were &c.' Border Minst. 3, 313. Imitations in modern writing. Remember warning agt affectation of simplicity, by wh simplicity is perhps more utterly lost than by any other means. Miles Standish. But again in Hiawatha the naivete is occasionally exquisite. ~~So in the Gretchen of Faust~~ (Strained p 151). But Hiawatha's ~~Departure~~ Wooing, p. 74.

unavoidably have felt the intensity of feeling beginning to give way before the close. Blair's story of man who threw aside books with 'punctum admirationis.' Carlyle.

Finished forms of speech of wh we are apt to grow too fond. Review. These not all, but only specimens. ~~Noticed some in Essay~~.

III. Simplicity in the discourse as a whole. Remind again that simplicity is merely a carrying out of perspicuity. 1. Inner, 2. Outer simplicity.

1. Simplicity in the general tone of thot & sentiment running throughout the whole. This simplicity is utterly lost when there is any straining after a style of thot & illustration wh does not come naturally as the fittest ~~channel~~ form for what we intend to say. The strained sentiment & conceits of the spasmodic school. E.g. A. Smith's 'Bridegroom Sea' contrasted with (Il. 2, 210)

'ὡς ὅτε κύμα κατ. θαλ.

Αἰγιαλῷ μεγάλῳ βρεμέται, ὅμαρ ἀγεῖ δέ τε κόντος.'

So Smith's 'Sun dying like a cloven king &c.' John Keats can scarcely be said to have ever reached naturalness & simplicity. Contrast Endymion, pp. 5, 6 with Tennyson's Gardener's Daughter, pp. 135. The most flagrant violation of this kind of simplicity was Euphuism[2]. Contrast Urquhart's 'Jewel' ~~with fight of Percy & Douglas in Ballad of Otterbourne~~. ~~Highest attainment in this style of simplicity is nonsense~~ "His sight foot did beat the cadence of the blows that pierced the belly of this Italian, whose heart & throat being

[2] Cf. Sir Percie Shafton's speeches in the 'Monastery' & the parodies of it in 'Love's Labour Lost.' See also Ben Johnson's "Every Man in his own Humour"

[x] At Mantua he encountered an Italian gentleman who had rendered himself formidable by slaying ~~the~~ three antagonists recently before. After many skilful passes Crichton lost the struggle to this issue.

to fall ~~upon~~ unpleasantly upon the reader or hearer much more readily. In writing or speaking on relig. matters the tendency to extravagant use of these figures is much stronger, because there are a grandeur & importance in them ~~wh~~ the sense of wh cannot be well uttered in the feeble language at the command of an unskilful writer or speaker, & he is driven in consequence to overburden ~~his~~ all he says with strong figures of speech without considering ~~how far they are~~ the propriety with wh they are introduced. Every one must be conscious of the truth of this statement who has taken the trouble to look into any religious work written by a person who had taken little ~~would~~ pains to cultivate his style; & if any one doubts the truth of the statement, let him take the trouble of looking into any such work & he may verify for himself what has been said. When expressing any strong excitement, any outburst of resistless passion, nothing is more natural than that the expression sh^d take the form of exclamation. "And the king was much moved & went up to the chamber over the gate & wept; & as he went, thus he said: O my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom. Wd God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son." There is nothing in this utterance of David but exclamation, & yet every one feels it to be inimitably natural. Had such exclamations however been prolonged into a speech of several sentences, we sh^d

will see that in every case, in order to be natural, it must be the expression of strong feeling, whether the feeling be of a serious or of a sportive character. Now as we cannot retain any ~~intense~~ feeling intensely strong for a long time, the prolonged use of interrogations must necessarily soon be felt as unnatural, the mind after a while unavoidably falling back into that more equable condition ~~in wh~~ with wh impassioned ~~fors~~ figures of speech are felt to be out of harmony. I cd not give specimens of this fault without making quotations wh wd be tiresomely long, inasmuch as it is only the long continuance of the interrogatives wh makes them at last fall upon the taste. But the necessity of watchfully guarding agt it mt be enforced by shewing how it has weakened the writing of some ~~admirable~~ authors admirable for their style. Maurice. The warning however ought evidently to come home ~~above~~ most peculiarly to young writers, as they are proverbially guilty of endeavouring, when force of thot & depth of sentiment begin to leave them, to make up for their loss by rigour of language; & from the ~~of~~ essays wh have been given to me, I cannot say that the members of this class are free from any tendency ~~in this~~ towards such a defect.)

7. Exclamation. The same remark may be made with equal force regarding the introduction of this figure. It is indeed more entirely limited to the language of passion than interrogation & is ∴ much ~~some~~ apt

demneth? It is Xt that died, yea rather that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Xt? Shall tribulation or distress or persecution or famine or nakedness or peril or sword?' You can easily see how utterly the force of these sentences wd be eviscerated, were they ~~thus~~ changed into the form of direct affirmation. —— Not in earnest argt alone, but also in impassioned appeal. The prophets abound in illustrations. Ezek. 18, 21–25. 'If the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed & keep all my statutes & do that wh is lawful & right, he shall surely live, he shall not die. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked shd die, saith the Ld God, & not that he shd turn from his wickedness & live? But ~~if the~~ when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness & committeth iniquity & doeth according to all the abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath trespassed & in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die. Yet ye say, The way of the Ld is not equal. Hear now, O house of Israel, are not my ways equal? are not your ways unequal?... Cast away ~~yr~~ from you all yr transgressions & make you a new heart & a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?'

I have thus illustrated how the interrogative form of address may be introduced with effect. You

sentiments than cd be conveyed by a simple affirmation. ~~It may be adopted~~ Instead ~~of saying~~, e.g. ~~that~~ of saying to a person that he does not believe some incredible fact, we ask him, 'Do you believe that such & such is the case?' In playfully twitting any one also or in the indulgence of any witticism we very naturally fall into the interrogative form of speech. Consequently this fig. is not confined to serious compositions; the very lacces of humour may find its readiest vent in this style. Thackeray. But most commonly it is an earnest logic or a passionate appeal wh runs into this form. As an example of ~~logic taking this form~~ argt expressing itself in interrogation take speech of Antony:

'He hath brt many captives home to Rome,
Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill:
Did this in Caesar seem ambitious?'

How poor to have said, 'This did not seem so.'

'You all did see that on the Lupercal
I thrice presented him the kingly crown
Wh he did thrice refuse: Was this ambition?'

How poor, 'This was not ambition.' Paul's writings, distinguished for earnest reasoning, full of examples of the most felicitous introduction of this fig. e.g. Rom. 8, 30 – 35. 'What shall we say then to these things? If God be for us, who can be agt us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things? Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that con-

Confined myself to poetry, but also introduced into prose. To some extent, among modern writers, it characterises Macaulay. But it is most peculiar to Dr. Johnson. See Whately's Rhet. p. 199. Even in Dr. Johnson it is carried to a fault, & the tedium wh he complains here in Prior is the very same unpleasant feeling produced by the continual recurrence of the same construction.

2. Antithesis. This construction may also be found in its fullest development & most frequent use in Heb., & arose from the same fondness for a rhythm of thot wh produced the parallelism of their poetry. Its effect too very similar. A thot is brot out into stronger relief by being placed in contrast just as it is made clearer by correspondence; & the craving for more pfb kind being thus gratified a pleasurable feeling is the result. Form of Proverbs. Wit. In Pens[3] (or Land) & in other forms: 'There thou, great Anna, whom 3 realms obey,
Dost sometimes counsel take & sometimes tea.'

Epigrams, it has often been remarked, take their point from the happy effect of antithesis. E.g. as a serious one Dr. Doddridge's 'Live while you live &c.' Again in the following the effect depends on the contrast between what we expect & what we read: 'I do not love thee, Dr. Fell &c.' But this startling the mind cannot bear long. It grows tired even of wit & in serious composition it becomes intolerable. Dr. Young.

2. Interrogation. This fig. arises from a turn wh we very naturally give to our sentences even in ordinary conversation, when we wish to a stronger emphasis to the expression of our

'Solomon' is the work to wh he (Prior) intrusted the protection of his name, & wh he expected succeeding ages to regard with veneration. His affection was natural; it had undoubtedly been written with great labour, & who is willing to think that he has been labouring in vain? He had infused into it much thot & much thot; had often polished it to elegance, often dignified it with splendour & sometimes heightened it to sublimity; he perceived in it many excellencies & did not discover that it wanted that without wh all others are of small avail, the power of engaging attention & alluring curiosity. Tediousness is the most fatal of all faults: negligencies or errors are single & local, but tediousness pervades the whole; other faults are censured & forgotten, but the power of tediousness propagates itself. ~~He that is~~ ..... Unhappily this pernicious failure is that wh an author is least able to discover..... Perhaps no man ever thot a line superfluous when he first wrote it or contracted his work till the ebullitions of invention had subsided.

As with my hat upon my head
I walked along the Strand,
I there did meet another man
With his hat in his hand.

Veni Banbury, O profanum,
Ubi vidi Puritanum
Velem facientem furem
Qua Sabbatho etiam murem.
(Wh is however better in Engl.)

3 Tom Hood's poems, e.g. Ben Battle

Now that I have fallen upon the mention of Poe, it may be well, lest I may not have another opportunity, to refer in a few sentences to his character as an Engl. author. All his writings are more or less revelations of himself. His tales all seem to float in an atmosphere of horror such as their writer unhappily must be supposed to have breathed continually. Sometimes indeed there is a more playful 'Adventure of one Hans Pfaal' & 'Gold Beetle'; but generally they carry you, with that resistless fascination with wh we are rivetted by a well-written picture of anything horrible, through scenes of unnaturally frightful & mysterious murders, through the throes of a descent into the Maelstrom, of an act of premature burial, of the revelations of a galvanised mummy, of haunted houses, & through other scenes wh manifest the same strange taste in their choice as subjects of stories. Remark in 'Tale of the Black Cat.' Its bearing on his life. Want of faith in the gospel. Unnecessary in illustration to go over the details of his life. Born at Baltimore in 1811 of one of the Old Virginian families, he was early left an orphan, adopted, went to England, returned in 1822, sent to Richmond Academy & afterwards to University of Charlottesville. Course of dissipation, interrupted only by the brief marriage life, till he died in the Hospital at Baltimore 7th Oct. 1849. All his poems are the outgushings of such a life. Hopelessness of 'Peace in Paradise' As in his most finished poem, 'The Raven.' Observe in it the parallelism of wh I speak.

Now though parallelism is the peculiar rhythm of the poetry of a different language & of a different people from our own, it may be & has in fact been introduced with happy effect into Engl. & esp. into Engl. poetry. ~~Man~~ Tennyson often adds a peculiar charm to his Poes by adopting the Hebraic rhythm. E.g. in Maud V. 1. (p. 1157)

A voice by the cedar tree &c.

~~Poet~~ In nothing perhaps that he has written is it so effectively introduced as in the celebrated Garden Song. XXII. 1. 2. 3. 8. 9. 10. 11. However no ~~Engl~~ poet in our language seems to have been so fond of the beauty resulting from this parallelising of Poes as E. A. Poe. One cannot open the few poems he has written at any place without finding instances of this & all his most successful efforts in versification derive their most prominent charm from this structure. E.g. in 'Eulalie'

'I dwelt alone
In a world of moan
And my soul was a stagnant tide
Till the fair & gentle Eulalie became my blushing bride,
Till the yellow-haired young Eulalie became my smiling bride.'

Again in 'Annabel Lee'

'I was a chd & she was a chd
In this Kdm by the sea,
But we loved with a love that was more than love,
I & my Annabel Lee,
With a love that the winged Seraphs of heaven
Coveted her & me.'

~~Then Poes. 6 & 7.~~

From Ulalume:

The skies they were ashen & sober,
The leaves they were crisped & sere —
The leaves they were withering & sere;
It was night in the lonesome October
Of my most immemorial year;
It was hard by the dim lake of Auber,
In the misty mid region of Weir —
It was down by the ~~dark~~ dank tarn of Auber,
In the ghoul-haunted woodland of Weir.

bearing in it certain correspondencies of thot, necessarily brings the other into clearer view & the mind being thus assisted to a more perfect act of intellect is raised into a feeling of pleasure. Those of you who have not yet studied Heb. poetry scientifically may not be aware that the beauty of wh you are conscs. in its construction arises almost entirely from this. In the poetry of the Hebs we find no structure wh can with any propriety be called versification, & the whole rhythm wh it possesses is a rhythm of thot expressed in a parallelism of sentences. E.g. Ψ 24

'The earth is the Ld's & the fulness thereof,
The world & they that dwell therein;
For He hath founded it upon the seas
And established it upon the floods.
Who shall ascend into the hill of the Ld?
Or who shall stand in His holy place?
He who hath clean hands & a pure heart,
Who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity
Nor sworn deceitfully.
He shall receive the blessing from the Ld
And righteousness from the God of his salvation.'

Sometimes this parallelism is carried out more elaborately even into single words. E.g. Ψ 1.

'Blessed is the man ~~that walketh not in the counsel~~
that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly,
Nor standeth in the way of sinners,
Nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful.'

~~II~~. Simplicity in the construction of sentences. Carry out perspicuity. Avoid (a.) long, (b.) involved sentences,

(c.) the affectation of any mannerism. This is a fault most frequently gathered from.

(α) Imitation of any style wh, though natural enough in its originator, generally becomes travestied in imitators. Euphuism. Johnsonianism. Hamiltonianism. Carlyleism. Any foreign turns of sentences, whether Latinisms or Germanisms. Even the affectation of simplicity itself.

β. But the fault often arises from too great fondness for any form of construction wh may have ~~then~~ suggested itself as expressive without having been previously cultivated by any particular author. Every young writer forming his style must be conscious of this temptation. But to guard agt it you ought to take into consideration that by running to death any happy construction, however expressive it might have been if sparingly used, it necessarily loses its force. I cannot particularise forms of expression of course; but these may be suggested by illustration (1) ~~antithesis (2) parallelism~~ Parallelism (Macaulay & Dr. Young). (2) parallelism (Taken from Hebrew poetry of wh it is the distinguishing characteristic, but often unnaturally introduced into English. Johnson. (3) Interrogation (Mauriice. Observed in some of yr essays. (4) Exclamation ~~only~~ effectual only when feelings are raised to a high pitch & as we cannot long sustain ourselves at such a height, when too much indulged becomes offensive.

δ. ~~Dictiona~~. Parallelism is that form of construction in wh the clauses of our sentences are made with certain correspondences to each other. The effect of this is very happy when it is not overdone. Any ~~thought~~ clause when thus put in alongside of another &

I. Simplicity in the choice of words. Like other qualities, this follows from perspicuity. Choose always the word wh ~~most literally~~ will make yr thot most clear to the person addressed & it will be the simplest. As a general rule take a Saxon word in preference to another when it expresses yr meaning with sufficient clearness. How is this command of Saxon to be reached? Besides philological study of English, read the authors most distinguished for the pure Saxon of their style. ~~Engl. Vers. of S. Bunyan. Kingsley (Sermon on Lt. child)~~ & observe the necessary want of simplicity & consequently of clearness in a style that is Latinised. (I don't speak of phla or scientific works for phlcs or scientific men). Milton. Johnson (in his dictionary, Network = anything reticulated or decussated with interstices between the points of intersection.) See Addison's paper in Spect. (165) on the introduction of French ~~phrases~~ words & phrases during the war. In contrast with these Engl. Vers. of Bible.+ Bunyan. Kingsley's Sermons (Lt. child). Tennyson's Idylls (esp., but also some of his other poems. The Lullaby in Sea dreams.) * But to cultivate simplicity of language, as also to cultivate ~~other~~ the simplicity of all kinds, nothing so valuable as the study of our early poetry, esp. our ballads.

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* Cant. 2, 8 – 13. The voice of my beloved! Behold he cometh leaping upon the mountains, skipping upon the hills; he looketh in at the window, shewing himself through the lattice. My beloved spake & said unto me, "Rise up, my love, my fair one & come away. For lo, the winter is past, the rain is over & gone, the flowers appear on the earth, the time of the singing of birds is come & the voice of the turtle is heard in our land. The fig tree putteth forth her green figs & the vines with the tender grapes give a good smell. Arise, my love, my fair one & come away."

Coffins stood round like open presses
That shamed the dead in their last dresses;
And by some devilish cantrip sleight
Each in his cauld hand held a light,
By wha heroic Tam was able
To note upon the haly table
A murderer's banes in gibbet airns,
Twa span-long wee unchristened bairns,
A thief new-cutted frae a rope,
Wi' his last gasp his gash did gape;
Five tomahawks wi' blood red-rusted,
Five scimitars wi' murder crusted,
A garter wha a babe had strangled,
A knife a father's throat had mangled,
Whom his ain son o' life bereft,
The gray hairs still stuck to the heft;
Wi' mair o' horrible & awfu'
Wha e'en to name would be unlawfu'?

Defer this

Rule. Exception, when our case is very strong & there is but one strong argt on our side, it is often advantageous to bring it at once, & then to adduce any subsidiary considerations wh may serve to confirm the impression, always taking care that they don't destroy it. This is esp. the case when there is nothing but the one strong argt. E.g. Swift's sermon.

IV. Peroration or Concl. is of much essential importance. For in spoken discourses, & of these principally have I been speaking, the whole effect depends upon the last impression wh is made. In whatever way ∴ you close, ~~take care~~ ask to leave strongly in the minds of those you address the impression you have been endeavouring to convey throughout the whole discourse. One good way is to sum up. Another to make the last, strongest appeal. And the great rule is to close at the right moment, neither too soon nor too late. This peculiarly worthy of consideration by extempore speakers. 'The lying minister.'

Gone over the absolutely essential requisites of composition. The great law of perspicuity or clearness.

Now proceed to indicate certain laws wh may be deduced from this primal law as conditions of good composition. And the first I wd notice is that of simplicity, in another point of view naturalness.

Simplicity.

~~This that collision~~ This quality to be considered in reference to all the different elements of a discourse: words, sentences, divisions & entire construction

to be met with at the bar. But in sermons also (very happily introduced. See Robertson's on 'Jacob's Wrestling', I. 41. (or II. 322 - 324). In cases where the narration is introduced the aim ought to be to present the facts as they really happened, stripped of any misinterpretations wh may have been put upon them or any misapprehensions wh might naturally arise concerning them. By this means when the question discussed is one of facts or the truth to be explained is to associated with historical events that it may be brot out clearly by their narration, then the narration is necessarily an enforcement of the proposition maintained. In like manner when the explanation does not take the form of a narration, all the considerations wh are adduced, all the illustrations wh are employed become necessarily an enforcement of our position. Now you may feel inclined to ask whether there are any rules by wh you may be guided in this part of a discourse, such have been suggested with regard to the exordium & the division. A general rule at least there is, worthy of being observed; but before stating it I may mention that this part of a discourse has by some been separated into four parts, viz. narrative, explication, argumentative & pathetic. These are certainly four distinct elements wh go to constitute this portion of a discourse, but they cannot be separated in reality; & the general rule wh I am about to state applies to them all alike. Many rules wh can only burden the memory are sometimes laid down here, but the only one wh I have ever cared or in fact been able to remember is the following, that the discourse shd always advance to weightier points, 'ut augeatur semper et increscat oratio.' Remarks — illustrations — arguments — appeals, all alike to be guided by this

than is common. —— Very skilful specimens in Julius Caesar, speeches of both Brutus & Antony. —— Berkeley's "3 Dial.", the opening scene. —— I do not wish to burden yr memory with too many rules. Yr will find a nr deduced from the general rule I have stated in all most works on rhetoric. Remember the general rule & the particular will be observed.

II. Statement &, if required in the statement, division. Only if required in order to clear a statement. Worthy of memory in writing sermons. Division not an absolute necessity, but only relative, i.e. with a view & clear proposition. Overlook of this leads to utterly unnecessary divisions wh only defeat end of necessary division. Necessary division is recognised only by discovery that division is necessary, i.e. necessitated by the thot contained in the statement, logically necessitated. Then it is a logical ~~necess~~ division. Rules of logical division:

1. Adequate. Must exhaust parts of the whole. Otherwise law of perspicuity violated. Subject not clearly, incompletely stated. E.g., in first Exc. Disp. 'Mortem non esse malum': Alternatives of ~~sensibility~~ insensibility (painlessness) & ~~happ~~ happiness. But 3d altern.

2. Parts distinct, must exclude each other. Otherwise the division is said to be cross. E.g. ~~Wayland's Moral Philosophy II. 3.~~ Men into Europeans, Americans, Africans &c., but not into European, Afr American, Canadians, British. Also in Wayland's Moral Ph. II. 3.

III. Explanation & enforcement. These two together, for tho' distinguishable, they are scarcely separable. In explaining we enforce. Some distinguish narration from explanation, but it is evidently only a kind of explanation, a kind determined by the discourse referring to a historical question, a quest. of facts. The kind of explanation i. peculiarly

Composition

~~Syntax as the science of~~ the arrangement of discourse. The one great law to guide you is the law of perspicuity. Every rule must be a mere corollary of this. Each individual word ought be chosen, ought be arranged in its relative position to the others, ~~ought to~~ in a sentence, & all the sentences & paragraphs ought be arranged in reference to each other & to the whole work with a view to perspicuity. Now as words are the coincident in reference to clauses, clauses to ~~paragraphs~~ sentences, sentences to minor parts of a discourse, so these parts in reference to whole. Rhetoricians too elaborate in their divisions of these parts. The following essential: 1. Introd., 2. Statement & division of subject, 3. Explanation & enforcement, 4. Concl.

I. Introd. must be consid., i.e. you must consider the great., how the subject is to be introduced. You may have no formal exordium, you may begin abruptly, such as once 'in medias res,' but introduce you must. Introd. merely the manner in wh a subject is first of all brought before yr hearers or readers. Now having in view to lay yr whole subject before them in such a way that they may understand & receive it, it ought be introduced in such a manner as may be best fitted ~~for~~ to impress favourably, & everything ought be avoided likely to produce an opposite impression. This is not so difficult when subject is not known or when hearer or reader is either indifferent or already favourable. But great skill required where the introd. requires to remove an unfavourable impression. Paul at Athens, position &c. acc. to Engl. Version, 'Men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious.' Read on & you find it the most oratorically fft of all his speeches. Has he then made a blunder at the outset? Look at the original. Δεισιδαιμονεστερους. 'In all things I perceive you more religious

+ As in a case of sentences unity necessary, so in case of an entire work the general rule is that it sh.d be a unity. Ars — violation (tho' in some respects not so) 'Lisias'. Cf. the opening of 'Ars Poetica'. Unity often lost by introductions going too far back. 'Nickerbocker's Hist. of New York'. 'Nec reditum Diomedis ab interitu Meleagri,
Nec geminos bellum Trojanum orditur ab ovo.' } Ars Poet. 146-7.

more complex, & so on. Is there any rule or rules to guide? Perhaps no abs. rules. One will put into one sentence a complex aggregate of thts. wh another wd break up into 2 or 3.* But as a general rule in order to perspicuity

1. Short sentences are to be preferred. Less danger of obscurity. But of course even short sentences may be less perspicuous than some long ones, the clauses of wh are skilfully arranged. Therefore

2. In all, esp. in long sentences care must be taken to arrange the clauses so that the mind can easily pass from one to another without losing their connection with each other or with the whole sentence. As a ridiculous example of how misunderstanding may happen even in short sentences, when I was at Heidelberg the following advertisement met the eye at hotels & other public places: 'Herr Wolf recommends his quiet donkeys to the ladies & gentlemen with red saddles.'†

3. With regard to punctuation, wh is a help to the mere words, its fault is its infrequency. The ancients had no points & although they are an advantage, they shd be employed only when absolutely necessary to indicate the tht. Very much neglected. Some writers punctuate in a most slovenly way, others leave it entirely to the printer. Adopt some logical system, adhere to it in all that you write & you will find it becoming easy & natural to you. A logical system, i.e. a system wh punctuates acc. to the thought. While using points sparingly, avoid the slovenly practice of throwing dashes. Watch & I believe you will observe that you generally resort to them when you are at a loss & don't know wh of the recognised points to use. Unfortunate that it has become so common even with good writers.* There are but six or at most seven points: , ; : . (.....) !? Perspicuity by accuracy & still the last mt be dispensed with. Macaulay's Hist. is a model, punctuated by Lord Jeffrey.

+ except the one general, never to be violated rule, that each sentence be a unity in itself, form a complete whole (like a sonnet.) As there a Oneness (i.e. precision of sense) in the thot embodied in each word & each clause, so in each sentence & of course also in each larger division of a work.

* & the same person will change the length of his sentences according X to the nature of his subject & aim.

X See Prof. Gibson's pamphlet, p. 75. 'In regard to many of the statements of this lengthened paper, given in to the Committee on the 23d. of June, carried away without a single attestation & returned I know not when, & first seen by me on the 30th July, & not containing his essays, of the first of wh I have no copy & the Committee have declined to give me one, I must leave them to contempt & the contradiction of the well-conducted students, with this remark that if the Committee had themselves believed them, & still believe them, notwithstanding my flat denials, they have dealt very leniently with me, since they have assumed the power of judgment upon the case at all, & not declaring at once & without reservation, what seems to me & be the tendency of their minute, that I am utterly unfit for the office I hold.'

+ Cf. "Modern Engl. Lit.: Its Blemishes & Defects," pp. 151 - 153.

3 Cf. ditto, pp. 143 & foll.

the word through all the usages by wh it has been modified in its history till you get at the usage with wh its history began, i.e. the fact or truth (τὸ ἔτυμον) wh it was first employed to denote. Perhaps you may at times feel annoyed ~~by my forcing you~~ at being forced back so continually to the etymology of a word, ~~when we have required~~ in order to determine its meaning with ~~the~~ exactness ~~demanded for its philosophical use~~; but I believe, the more you reflect on it, you will only deem it one of yr most valuable acquisitions, if you have attained the habit of thus carefully analyzing yr words before you use them & of employing them only with the accurate conception of their meaning wh you ~~obtain~~ have reached by this analysis. Besides, the independent interest & importance of philology: 1. Comparative philology in relation to comparative ethnology, mythology & physiology; 2. Philology as a means of understanding all hist., its men & its events. 3. of appreciating the classics & esp. (for the theol.) the N.

3. ~~Lex~~ Syntax = Science of arrangement of words ~~into lex tences~~. What is a sentence? A complex thot. containing a No. of simple thoughts. A genus to wh clauses are species, wh may have subordinate species under them, & words are individuals. The first step in the process of learning being the analytic, the parts of a sentence are taught first. The chd learns letters, ~~puts them into words~~ & arrange them so as to make them expressive of something, ~~& form~~ words (orthography). Then to arrange words ~~into clauses or sentences~~ so as to express something

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× Like compositio (?) if properly treats of arrangement of words generally; of individual words into clauses, of clauses of words into a sentence, of sentences into a paragraph, of paragraphs into a section, of sections into a chapter, of chapters into a book, of books into a complete work. Usually however limited to arrangement words into sentences. Now &c.

3. Science of sentences.

I passionately entreat thee, till thy tho't have silently matured itself, till thou have other than mad & mad: making noises to emit: hold thy tongue (thou hast it as holding) till some meaning lie behind to set it wagging. + Consider the significance of Silence: it is boundless, never by meditating to be exhausted; unspeakably profitable to thee! Leave that chaotic hubbub wherein thy own soul runs to waste, to confused suicidal dislocation & stupor: out of silence comes thy strength. "Speech is silvern, silence is golden; Speech is human, Silence is divine." Essays, 3, 66. ×

II. Clearness of words or language. Tho't itself being clear, the medium through it is revealed sh'd also be clear. Words in themselves & in their arrangement so luminous, so transparent as to let the tho't shine through without being seen themselves. × ~~To what science are we to look for this? The science of language is Grammar~~ Do you hesitate to go back to this elementary ~~sh'd~~ science as if it were a retrograde movement in yr studies? You will find it necessary. Some of the rules of grammar will come upon you with a new force long after you have ~~may~~ reached the most complete culture in composition. As in truth the rising to a higher stage in any department of yr studies is valuable only as enabling you to look with a wider & keener vision on the stages already past. Grammar divided into 4 subordinate sciences: 1. Orthography; 2. Etym.; 3. Syntax; 4. Prosody (perhaps worth treating as science of rhythm in general).

1. Orthography treats of arrangement of letters in words = correct writing = spelling. Is it too much of a schoolboy's task to require the attention of gentlemen? Neglect unpardonable.

2. Etymology = science of the reality (τὸ ἐτυμον) embodied in & symbolised by words. Method of etymological science to trace

× Once for all I may say, it is necessary to go back, at least to the higher, quest.s in Grammar.

Many words ending in l & several others don't commonly adhere to the following rule. There is also some inconstancy in dropping one l from final ll when the syllable loses the accent.

[Rule: Monosyllables & words accented on the last syllable, ending with a single consonant ~~before~~ preceded by a single vowel, double that consonant before an additional syllable beginning with a vowel; but when a diphthong or double vowel, ~~the cons~~ or the accent is not on the last syllable, the consonant is not doubled.]

1. Science of letters. Not treated here as far as relates to Grammar. But ~~and~~ there are certain quest.s even in Orthography of wh Rhet. must take acc.t, esp. in this age of new theories & innovations in spelling, Honor &c. ~~Rhet~~ Chymist or Chemist, enquire, connexion &c. Reveling, Reveled &c.]

2. Science of words.

2. Writing for private use, when it may be made the means of clear thot. Leav: these two cases out of consideration it is a universal rule that in order to give a composition perspicuity, it be written not for the sake of writing, but for the sake of communicating some truth wh was clear to the writer's own mind, & wh he felt a necessity laid upon him to communicate. If you have no clear truth or fact wh you feel it incumbent on you to communicate to those with whom you are brot into contact, if you have nothing but untruths or half-truths, & wh you are uncertain as to the duty of uttering, keep yr tongue & yr pen unmoved, do the work wh yr hands find to do silently as nature does her work & you will gather round you a ~~an~~ hidden glory, wh wd have gone off in mere babbling but will shine into the unseen quarter where it will be estimated at its ~~to~~ true worth. ~~For it has been truly said that "speech is silver, but silence is golden."~~

"To him that will well consider it," says Carlyle, "idle speaking is precisely the beginning of all Hollowness, Halfness, Infidelity (want of Faithfulness); the genial atmosphere in wh rank weeds of every kind attain the mastery over noble fruits in man's life & utterly choke them out: one of the most crying maladies of these days & to be testified agt. & in all ways to the uttermost withstood." Wise, of a wisdom far beyond our shallow depth was that old precept: Watch thy tongue; out of it are the issues of life! Man is properly an incarnated word: the word that he speaks is the man himself. Were eyes put into our head that we mt see; or only that we mt fancy & plausibly pretend we had seen? Was the tongue suspended there, that it mt tell truly what we had seen & make man the soul's brother of man; or only that it mt utter vain sounds, jargon, cant: confusing & to divide man, as by enchanted walls of Darkness, from ~~brother~~ union with man? Thou who wearest that cunning, heaven-made organ, a Tongue, think well of this. Speak not,

x "Let your silence be great, or speak only what is necessary, & in few words." Σιωπὴ τὸ πολὺ ἔστω, ἢ λαλείσθω τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ δι' ὀλίγων (Epict., Ench., 33)

x

Notes on Rhetoric.

First requisite of all in uttering oneself is perspicuity (clearness). In order to this 2 conditions must be fulfilled:

1. Clearness of thought;
2. Clearness of words.

I. Of the first I say nothing in particular at present. Will be considered under Logic. ~~I may only say in general that the chief condition of clearness in of thought is~~ I ~~wd~~ only remind you ~~in general~~ that clearness of thot is essential & remind you at the same time in general what clearness of thot implies. To aim at clearness of thot is to aim at ~~clearness of~~ accurate thot. Now all phy you have been taught, is the love of accurate thot. The method ∴ wh you have ascertained to be the ~~phil~~ method of ~~pursuing~~ cultivating phy must be the method of cultivating clearness of thot. What is that method? A combination of analysis & synthesis. In seeking ∴ clearness of thot on any subject you must first analyse it into its details in order to ~~reach~~ comprehend it clearly as a whole. Thus understand importance of the recommendation to sketch ~~a~~ yr plan of treating a subject before you commence. But if so, what further does this imply? It implies that ~~you the thinking out a subject shd not be merely a means to enable you to write on it, but that~~ you shd never think out a subject because you wish to write on it, but that in every case in wh you write you shd write only when & only because you have thot out the subject thoroughly beforehand. Of course this remark is made only with reference to yr writing for the purpose for wh alone all writing shd be undertaken, the communication of truth to others. Two cases not considered: 1. Prescribed exercises, though, to avoid the danger of inducing to think out a subject merely to be able to write on it, I have allowed you to choose yr subject;