UNION CLUB
SOPHIA.

Private

12 Sep. 1908

My dear Buxton

I hasten to reply to your letter received tonight — all the more as I am not sure whether I do not owe you a letter already —

As regards Bulgarian decoration I hardly know what to advise — On the whole I should be inclined

perhaps to suggest a little delay in accepting them - The success of the Y. Turks movement is far from assured and the Committee may have to revive all its energy in Macedonia in the near future. If so, it would perhaps be best if its members were free from any appearance of obligation - Of course the obligation is only in appearance: personally I do not consider that accepting a decoration involves any

obligation whatever: otherwise I never would have accepted one. I cannot see why, if Westlake accepts me, you should refuse. In case the decorations are accepted it would be best, I think, to avoid publication of the fact in the newspapers, as the Greeks would make great capital out of it: their newspapers have no sense of dignity or shame and glory in personal attacks.

I wish I could be more

optimistic as regards the Young Turks. They have certainly done miracles and may of course do more. But the enormous difficulties in their way are only beginning to show themselves. But even if they fail, it is certain that the condition of the Christians in Macedonia can never be quite as bad as before.

I have stayed here for the last 6 weeks in deference to the wishes of my chiefs, but of course it would have been much more interesting in Salonika. I hope the B.C. will not think of relaxing its vigilance for some time to come. Yours very sincerely

J. D. Bourchier

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J. D. Bourchier

the Young Turks and sincerely as I wish them success I doubt whether they are going on the right tack; I rather think Prince Sabah-ed-Din and the "Liberals" with their programme of decentralization and more or less of autonomous government for the various nationalities have a better conception of what is needed.

The deadlock in the negotiations between Turks and Bulgarians continues

– I fear diplomacy – especially our diplomacy – has made a sad tangle of the business, but the principal danger to peace lies on the side of the Servians and Montenegrins

Let me know what you think – With best wishes for the New Year

Yours very sincerely

J. D. Bourchier

Forgive blots: I am experimenting with a new copying machine – rather unsuccessfully, I fear!

Return

British School
Athens
June 7 1909.

1a

1909

My dear Buxton

I was very glad to receive yours of the 28th May last night: it has followed me about the world.

For the moment there is a "truce of God" in Macedonia but both Bulgarians and Greeks are keeping up the cadres of their bands and

I fear a revival of the conflict. Fortunately the Greeks are at present absorbed by the Cretan Question and we are approaching the quiet season, so I do not anticipate any trouble for the present. I shall be at Salonika in a few weeks and shall "report progress" to the Times.

I hope to be in London about June 30 and shall be most happy to speak

at the Annual Meeting

if it comes off a little

after that date — but all

my movements as you know

depend on events —

If the Balkan Committee

possesses any influence with the

Young Turks I trust it will

advise them to moderate their

bellicose ardour about Crete

and to accept an arrangement

on "business" lines. ~~about Crete~~

— there will be no peace with

the Greeks. till this has been brought about — the situation at Constantinople and in Turkey generally is more precarious than most of the London papers are willing to admit — and the Greeks of the Empire may cause much trouble if the question is not settled.

For the moment I am deep in archaeology — Yes, I shall be delighted to pay you a visit — perhaps some week end if it is convenient to you.

Evans passed through here the other day and came to lunch with me

Yours very truly

D. G. Hogarth

I wish you all success in your campaign, but I am not enthusiastic over some features of the Budget.

Grand Hotel

Athens

11 Dec. 1909.

Young Turks

My dear Buxton

Your of the 23 Oct, which I was very glad to receive, only reached me a few days ago, having been addressed to Sofia, where it seems to have lain dormant several weeks!

I have been here since the end of September, enlightening

the Times with regard to the Young Greek movement which is more or less an understudy of the Young Turk one – Everything, as at Constantinople, is really in the hands of the army and in both cases it is difficult to predict the future. One thing is certain – that neither Greece nor Turkey can be regenerate in a few months or years, or even in a generation – Greece, at least, is fairly homogeneous, but the question of nationalities in Turkey,

which the Young Turks are not approaching in the right way, will prove an insuperable obstacle to the realization of their programme. They must change their policy or they will fail. At present they are imitating the ways of their cousins, the Magyars, in their government of Macedonia, trying to Turcize everything and everyone. It is too late in the day for such a policy and it is useless to put back the clock. The suppression of the Bulgarian

clubs is a great mistake - it only drives discontent below the surface and renders it more dangerous. The treatment of the Albanian movement has also been very unfortunate, as will be seen presently. As things are, a Turco-Bulgarian alliance is impossible.

I have made peace with my employers after extracting from them a declaration that their conduct last year was "not justified by the circumstances". They are very civil now, but my confidence in them is shaken. They lost their heads once and may do so again!

Yours very sincerely

D. D. Bourchier.

Grand Hotel

Athens

April 22, 1911

3

My dear Buxton

I think the time has come to draw the attention of the Balkan Committee to what is taking place in Albania. I trust the Committee has not

abandoned its old standpoint and that it will raise its voice once more on behalf of the suffering population. The silence maintained in England last year was to a large extent the cause of the present trouble. No protest was made against the inhuman treatment of the Albanians

and the Turks were thus encouraged in their vindictive proceedings. The result was the flight of Thousands of Albanians into Montenegro and it was only to be expected that the refugees would endeavour to avenge their wrongs in the spring. Turgut Pasha has now proclaimed his intention of reverting to the methods of last year, so we know what to expect.

The Committee protested strongly against the barbarities of 1903, and I cannot believe that similar proceedings will now be acquiesced in —

I expect to leave next week for Cettigne and Albania. I doubt if I shall be in London next summer, but if I come I will keep my promise to address the Committee. Letters addressed to the New University Club will always find me — Hoping you are well & ever yours

D. D. Bonsechier

Anon. Chronicle. etc. JDB says Publish anon

A B C Code 5me ED.

The
BRITISH COMMERCIAL BUREAU
SALONICA (Turkey)

Established for the encouragement of Anglo-Ottoman Commerce | Fondé pour l'encouragement du commerce Anglo-Ottoman

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BRITISH POST OFFICE, SALONICA (Turkey)

Business conducted in English, French, Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian and Hispano-Yiddish.

Salonica, 26th April 1911. 191

Dear Mr. Bourchier,

I have not written you lately because there has been very little of startling importance.

Geary, British Vice Consul, is now down from Monastir, having made the trip across to Uskub and taking the train from that point. I learn from him that the dissensions in the ranks of the Committee at Monastir st still continue. In this connection it is interesting to report that some 14 days ago Hadji Adil Bey, the Secretary of the Committee, denied to me that there was any disagreement of any description. I do not think the details of sufficient interest to report, but it is, of course well to know that the trouble up there still continues, and that all this while the chief permanent official of the Committee strenuously denies its existence. It helps one to know how much to believe of what these fellows say. The Dissentients are, generally speaking, those members of the Committee who are not touching the backsheesh. They are as usual, putting a plea for purity in the administration, in the forefront of their campaign.

While the Christians in the Monastir and Uskub districts are still disarmed, the Turks remain in possession of their weapons, and are now beginning to carry them about quite openly. The Administration of the Courts of Justice shows no improvement, and there are general complaints by Turks as well as Christians. Corruption

exists, but it is naturally not carried out so openly as before. It seems that the Turks are very much favoured at the expense of the Christians.

In the district of Florina, a Turkish band has been formed whose purpose seems to be the removing of the old Greek and Bulgarian Comitadji Leaders, and any other individual whose presence in the district is considered undesirable. In the intervals between assassinations, they occupy themselves with robbery and plunder. It would seem that a matter of some 20 old Macedonian leaders have been assassinated by means of this band, and other agencies which apparently work to this end. There is nothing else of importance to report from this district.

I do not think I have yet reported to you the information which has reached me concerning the negotiations of the Standard Oil Co., for the erection of storage tanks in this town. It is interesting because it gives us some idea of the extent to which bribery still exists. Considerable difficulties have been thrown in the way of granting the necessary concessions, both by the Government and the Municipality. The necessary land for the works has already been purchased from the State, and has been bought at a very much higher than the market price by reason of the refusal of the Company to countenance any "private arrangements". I learn that, by means of a Turkish banker, the information was conveyed to the agent of the Standard Oil Co., that a little backsheesh would help matters along very considerably. I believe the amounts suggested were T£400 to the Defterdar, Fadil Bey (brother of Dr. Niazim) and a like sum to the President of the Municipality, Tewfik Bey. As I have said, these

bribes were refused, with the result that the price of the land was r run up from 65 to I think, 115 piastres the pic, and increase of some T£5000. Since that time, one difficulty after another has been placed in the way of the Company, and they have not yet received permission to erect their works.

There is a general indication over the whole of Macedonia that day by day, the country is becoming more and more unsettled, as assassinations are on the increase, bands are forming, and brigands are becoming more and more ~~desperate~~ fearless.

On the 14th inst., our local Authoratives were informed by a Jew that, at the house of another Jew, were staying 2 armed Bulgarians. The police searched the house, caught the Bulgarians, and discovered two bombs. It is impossible to get any actual authoritative details, but I understand from a good source that these men have admitted that their intention was to blow up the Turkish post office.

The young Turks tell me that they are convinced that the Bulgarians have decided to organize a series of atrocities in Macedonia, with the idea of provoking the intervention of Europe, and regard this as the first attempt.

Consul Crawford

W H Crawford Smith

Grand Hotel
Athens
3 April 1912

Dear Mr Symond,

I have been compelled ~~&~~ pressure of work to delay for a few days in replying to your letter of the 14 March.

I have written to my agents at Sofia and Salonika requesting them to send you well authenticated information with regard to

the acts of the Turkish officials or of others who act with their connivance - I will also endeavour to get from some trustworthy information there - It is very difficult even for those on the spot to obtain first hand information, as the victims are generally afraid to relate their experience. There seems to be no end to the illegalities and arbitrary acts perpetrated by the

authorities during the elections which are now going on. Several journals have been confiscated, their editors or contributors intimidated or expelled from the country, martial law, permanently maintained at Constantinople, has been proclaimed in other towns, the right of public meeting has been suppressed and some of the leaders of the opposition subjected to personal

violence - I hear the peasants in some places refused to vote and in others voted under compulsion - The result will of course be a great victory for the Committee of Union and Progress - This however does not matter much, so far as the subject races are concerned, as no Turkish party will ever grant them equality - The dominant minority will continue to

maintain its position & force as in the past, and no improvement in the situation is to be expected except through the direct interference of Europe –

I will now reply briefly to the three questions you have put to me –

(1) I do not think there is any likelihood of joint action of all the Powers on behalf of the subject races so long as Germany continues to pursue

the Realpolitik as hitherto –
That policy precludes all
sympathy with the oppressed
and all indignation against
injustice and wrong. Germany
aims at (1) using the Turkish
military power against Russia
& creating a diversion in the
Caucasus which would compel
Russia to weaken her army
on her western frontier (2)
at obtaining commercial concessions,
orders for military material,

etc. and establishing her own position in Asia Minor (3) at employing the Turks as a scourge for the Southern Slavs and as a means for hindering the realization of Serb and Bulgar unity - ~~(2) an~~ (1) and (3) represent also the policy of Austria, but Austria cannot afford to be left out in case of any reforming programme being undertaken by the Western Powers and Russia - She

will therefore probably associate herself with any action which the Western Powers and Russia may take on behalf of the Macedonian and Albanian populations. This brings me to your second question.

(2) The revival of the Reval programme or of some other scheme of direct European intervention is hardly possible at present owing to the necessity for Italian cooperation, which is precluded.

by the war. But it should certainly be kept in view as the only means by which an amelioration of the condition of the subject races can be ~~to~~ brought about <u>without</u> <u>war</u>. Briefly speaking, there are only two solutions of the question — "autonomy or anatomy". "Anatomy" i.e., the partition of European Turkey, can only be brought about by war. It would be the best and most legitimate solution provided it is carried out

in accordance with the principle of nationalities, the Slav and Greek populations being absorbed by the kindred free states and the Albanians becoming independent. But it may take another form (division of the Peninsula by certain Great Powers) which would only prolong the evils. We must therefore fall back on autonomy. And the only way in which autonomy can be attained pacifically is by the gradual intervention

of the Powers in the administration of Macedonia – Once their officers are installed there again they can proceed to the gradual establishment of local autonomous institutions and supervise their development – If the Powers intervene, as seems probable in the end, to put a stop to the war I hope some arrangement for a renewal of the control will be included in their conditions –

(8) From the above you will see that I regard Macedonian autonomy as prospectively within the sphere of practical politics. Unhappily the prospect of its early realization has been retarded & the retrograde step taken & the Powers in withdrawing their functionaries from the country. The real motive for this step is to be found in the rivalry for commercial and political influence at Constantinople and & more particularly in our eagerness to oust German

influence there. As to the removal of the Turkish troops, this no doubt will ultimately become necessary, but it would have to be effected gradually. Lord Lansdowne kept this object in view by protesting against the unwarrantable military expenditure in the Macedonian vilayets. He would have far more cause for protest now, but his policy has been dropped by his successor and our

Foreign Office seems now to take comparatively little interest in the welfare of the subject races. Military expenditure has enormously increased, and as taxation is more ~~rigorous~~ rigorously collected, the peasantry are made to pay more heavily than before for the army which keeps them in subjection.

I must now close: kindly excuse great haste

and believe me

Yours very truly

J. d. Bourchier

P. S. You are free to make any use of this letter, but kindly refrain from publishing my name or the names of my agents.

J. B.

Very not done

Constantinople
14.Dec /12

Dear Bourchier

Just a line to tell you that there is some reason to suppose that an atrocities campaign is being worked up by the combined efforts of Turks and Austrians seconded by the Jewish Press .The Jeune Turc is raking up the whole of the Salonika business over and over again. It is all chewing the same cud .

This is obviously meant to trouble London . It seems to me that we must reply to keep the Balkan end up. Till now I have said nothing of the persistent reports current among members of the medical body here of stolen property ,rings with feminine ear lobes attached etc.found upon choleraic patients ,of the undoubted massacres by troops at Aloplu near Lulé Burgas and Kavakli,of the cruelties committed near the Dardanelles by Kurd and Laz soldiers on the Greek victims of the recent earthquake ,of the wholesale slaughter of Greeks at Serfidjé.

No one has denied that the Christian irregulars have committed great cruelties in certain places ,but the Bulgarians cannot be blamed for having employed these auxiliaries when the Turks set them the example and I have not heard that the Balkan regular forces have misbehaved to any great extent .

There have been painful cases of misconduct by the Turkish regulars .This we know here and you know better but I feel bound to call your attention to this in the present letter a copy of which I am sending to Mr Steed. It would be regrettable if the attitude of the British Public were influenced by stories of which I believe Hilmi Pasha to be one of the principal disseminators .

With my best congratulations on a success in which you have shared

Yours very sincerely

Philip Marsh

Cb

X p.6

Union Club

~~Sofia~~

Writing from Sofia

20 Apr. 1913

he expressed the views

137

My dear Buxton

I greatly regretted missing the last meeting of the Balkan Committee - I was much pressed during the last few days of my stay in London and unfortunately forgot to inscribe the hour of the meeting in my note-book - with the result

that I forgot everything!

I am horrified at the state of feeling I find here and at Belgrade. At Belgrade they are more demonstrative — here "still waters run deep" the Servians cynically say they will not keep their treaty with Bulgaria because "the balance of power must be preserved in the Peninsula". The Bulgarians are very indignant and say

they will give them a "taste of the bayonet" – There is of course an end of all treaties if they are to be broken in this way. The truth is that the Servian officers finding themselves in possession at Monastir etc. don't see why they should go out and regard treaties as waste paper.

At Belgrade they coolly talk of a Serbo-Greek attack on Bulgaria though under the treaties of alliance both Servia & Greece are bound to Bulgaria for terms of years. I do not think it

possible that Venizelos, who is a man of high principle, would ever consent to such treachery, but he may soon be turned out by the chauvinists at Athens. The only remedy for the situation ~~in fin~~ is arbitration in some form or other — another campaign would be a scandal and a disgrace.

In great haste

Yours very truly

J. D. Bourchier

The F.O. people seem to be very jealous — they told some of the Delegates not to give me any information. Is it not delightful?

Private and without prejudice

Hotel Bulgaria,
Sofia,
20 March 1914

My dear Buxton

My agent here Stamatoff, whom you know, is in great trouble caused by a man named Frater, who came here last August on behalf of the Balkan Committee. Frater brought a card from you, and as I was just leaving for England, I asked Stamatoff to look after him and to do what-

Gy a deal?

fool

he could for him. Unfortunately Stamatoff backed three cheques for him - total amount £400.10.0. These have been dishonoured in London and the bank here which paid them, the "Sofia Bank" (Sofiiska Banka) is coming down on Stamatoff for the money. Meantime Fraler has disappeared - his friend, Dr O'Leary, who also came for the Committee, has written to J's brother-in-law in London who replies that he cannot find him -

If you or anyone in the Committee can intervene with Fraters' relatives and induce them to undertake to pay the amount of the cheques to the Sofia Bank it would be a great relief to all of us here and would avert a scandal – An official of the Bank called on me here today and I promised I would write to you as chairman of the Committee – Of course the Committee, as I told him,

has no responsibility, but you or some member of the Committee may know Fraters' relatives and be able to get the matter settled. Poor Stamatoff has no assets and the Bank will gain little by prosecuting him. I have asked them to give him at least a little time. It will be bad for us all if difficulties are raised here in future in regard to the cashing of English cheques.

So sorry to worry you.

Ever such yours

D. A. Bonvalier

Frater gave the address Hampden Club
Hampden Road N.W.

10

21 Aug 1914

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS,
c/o "OXBRIDGE ST. JAMES LONDON."
TELEPHONE REGENT 2530.
3 LINES.

New University Club,
St James's Street, S.W.

My dear Buxton

As you have invited suggestions, I think you might ask Grey whether in view of reports regarding the oppression of the subjugated races in Macedonia he will publish the despatches of ~~the Consuls or Vice Consuls~~

H. M's Consular officers at Uskub, Monastir and Salonika? If he declines (as he will no doubt) ask him for the result of the enquiries which he promised to make in regard to the treatment of the populations – in reply, I think, to you or to Aubrey Herbert –

Let us try!

I hope the B. C. will secure some copies of the Carnegie Commission Report.

I hear the French edition (already out in Paris) is being brought out for the Greeks. I don't guarantee the truth of this rumour, but it is just ~~like~~ what the Greeks would do —

The whole affair has been terribly bungled, I fear.

Will you kindly give him an introduction to Wallis, whom you are

met at lunch the other day would gladly act as a member or associate of the Balkan Committee – He has done a splendid work in Bulgaria and has received an autograph letter of thanks from Queen Eleonore. His address is:– Ashton Lodge, Christchurch Road, Reading

Ever yours

D. D. Bourchier

Do you know H.N. Wallis of the Society of Friends? He has done a splendid work for the refugees here. I am sending him a card for you. JHB

Hôtel de Bulgarie
Sofia
7 March 1914

My dear Buxton

I was delighted to see in a Bulgarian paper some days ago that the Balkan Committee passed a resolution on the subject of civil and religious liberty in the Balkans (the Times seems to have ignored the proceedings)

This is a question of immense

importance and the claim of the Greeks for "guarantees" in Southern Albania furnishes a good opportunity for bringing it forward. [It is only a mockery to abolish Turkish rule in the Balkans if it is to be succeeded by what is a worse tyranny in many ways]. Hundreds of refugees are still coming into this country from Macedonia, especially from the portion now governed by the Greeks. That alone is a bad sign, and the fact that the greater number of the refugees are

women, children and old men speaks for itself — the men have been simply wiped out by order. There are also refugees in smaller numbers from the Rumanian Dobrudja (i.e. the recently acquired territory) where civil rights are refused to the population. I have lately been in Thrace and have seen a number of the refugees, whose tale is a sad one. Sister Augustine writes to me from Salonika about the Bulgarian prisoners and refugees there — also a melancholy story. I cannot publish anything, as the Times will not hear of "atrocities" — the old "conspiracy of silence" in

Hashell hardly agrees in all

favour of the Turks is now renewed in favour of the Greeks, who seem to have completely captured the principal London papers – even the reviews won't accept anything against them – it seems [that the influence of our Court is all powerful in their favour, and Constantine's butcheries have never been revealed –]

I hope you and the B. Committee will keep up an agitation on behalf of the oppressed nationalities. The rights of "minorities" are guaranteed by the Berlin Treaty – now we have a majority in Macedonia. When does the Carnegie Report come out?

I hope still to keep in contact with you and the Committee: the Balkans still need earnest attention –

How are you? Ever yours D D Buxton

Mind you see the next number of the Quarterly – published 22nd inst.

Please write him re Frater + Prey + notice

Hotel de Bulgarie
Sofia
8 April 1914

My dear Buxton

Very many thanks for your kind invitation to your wedding. I should have been delighted to come to it, but alas, I see little prospect of my being in London at the time. I am sending you a present which I think will interest you and your fiancée – two shells from the battlefield (empty, of course!) converted into vases and adorned with allegorical representations of the first and second wars – in the

second Bulgaria is surrounded by her five enemies depicted as various animals. // I hope the Macedonian address will reach you before the wedding – I fear the present will not.

I am very glad you extracted that answer from Grey – the F.O. made a declaration to a Turkish deputation some 2 months ago stating that we have not yet given our sanction to the Treaty of Bucarest but that it depends on the pledges we receive as regards the rights of the subject peoples. He should be reminded of this. At present Macedonia under the Greeks and Servians is – if one can believe even a small part of what the refugees

say – ~~is~~ a perfect hell – The interference in religious and scholastic matters is infinitely worse than under the Turks – the Greeks especially are blackmailing the wretched peasants by extorting money from them under every conceivable pretext. Don't quote my name, as I am still accredited to Athens, but if you would like details I can send them to you – the released prisoners and refugees supply them in abundance – (Cave)

As to Frater, I did not suggest for a moment that you or the Balkan Committee should pay for him – neither do I think that the Times or I need do so. But it is important that pressure should be put upon his relations to refund the money – All

we Englishmen who live or go about in these countries are interested in maintaining the prestige of a British cheque - I have often wondered how mine have been taken without any formal introduction, but it is certainly very convenient to be able to draw money when one wants it - I am writing also to Boyle - I hope you will see Dr O'Leary, who has just gone to London - he is thought highly of here. he told me Fraters relations are well off -

Many thanks for the reference to Hilton Young - I know his people for more than 30 years and have been to their place several times, but am not sure that I have met him - I am writing to him today -

Wishing you all luck

Yours ever D.D. Bourchier

Copy

27th March, 1914.

My dear Bourchier,

Many thanks for your congratulations. They are very welcome from you.

I am glad the local Press congratulates. The Wedding is on April 30th in London.

About Frater, will it not be dangerous if it is thought that any such signature purporting to represent an English Fund will be honoured? It seems an extraordinary thing for your Secretary to do, no doubt in the goodness of his heart! The man Frater was certainly a mistake, and gave us a great deal of trouble. The money was evidently not used for relief, so would it not be better to let things proceed? Frater spent £750 of our money and rendered no account. I don't see any special duty to the Bank as it was foolish to honour anything except from yourself or its

correspondent bankers in London. Don't you on reflection think that payment would form an awkward precedent. Stamatoff had no influence with the Bank, except as representing you. But you yourself would never have backed Frater's cheque.

TELEPHONE,
62 KENSINGTON.

2, PRINCES GATE.
S.W.

23rd March, 1914.

My dear Bourchier,

Many thanks for your congratulations. They are very welcome from you.

I am glad the local Press congratulates. The Wedding is on April 30th in London.

About Frater. We must avoid discredit to British Funds, but will it not be dangerous if it is thought that any signature purporting to represent an English Fund will be honoured. It seems an extraordinary thing for your Secretary to do, no doubt in goodness of his heart. The man Frater was certainly a mistake and gave us a great deal of trouble. If you think the money was used for real relief, our funds ought to pay, but as it was evidently not, would it not be better to let things proceed and then recoup your Secretary for anything that he looses? I don't see any special

TELEPHONE,
62 KENSINGTON.

2, PRINCES GATE,
S.W.

duty to the Bank, unless you urge it, as it was foolish to honournanything except from yourself or its correspondent Bankers in London. If you on reflection think this will not form an awkward presedent and should be cleared up, then no doubt I ought to find the money myself, as I chose Frater, believing in his friend O'Lairie.

Could you send me a letter in the Daily News? It will be still your address Princes Gate?

3

Grand Hôtel du Boulevard,
~~Lucian Bertola~~ - Bucarest

Nov 20 1915

My dear Buxton

It was with the greatest regret that I read in the Times which has just arrived the sad news of your father's death - I shall always retain the memory of his unvarying kindness and his hospitality - I hope you will convey to your mother my deep sympathy with her

great loss and that you and your brothers will accept the same from me —

It seems now the fashion to overwhelm the Bulgarians with reproaches, but I am glad to see that you have had the courage to say a word on their behalf — I gather this from a telegram in the Times inserted under a rather spiteful ~~heady~~ heading: I suspect your letter was refused by them? Is this so?

The simple fact is that the bulk of the nation sympathizes with us, but Ferdinand and his immediate advisers came to the conclusion (after the Russian reverses in Poland and Courland) that Germany was going to win, and that if they were not with her they would lose Macedonia. The miserable blunders of our diplomacy no doubt confirmed this impression. It is unfair to blame them if they really believed (as seems to be the case) that the fate of Macedonia

depended on their decision —

I believe the Bulgarians would have been disposed to come over to us once they had secured Macedonia — hitherto at least they have been averse to the idea of marching with the Germans to Constantinople — but the useless bombardment of Dedeagatch and the conflicts with our troops in Macedonia may have altered their feelings —

I am wholly averse to the Salonika expedition on military as well as political grounds and fear it will end in disaster — Several competent military critics are of the same opinion —

Yours ever

J. D. Bourchier

Confidential.

MEMORANDUM sent by

~~Letter from~~ J.D.Bourchier (Balkan Correspondent of the "Times")

to N. Buxton.

Bucarest.

Jan. 1916.

There are many indications that both Turkey and Bulgaria are already weary of the war. In neither case should these symptoms be neglected. In the case of Turkey, however, there is no probability of any change of policy unless the ruling clique, which maintains itself in power with the aid of Germany, can be overthrown. This could only be effected by a military pronunciamento. A popular outbreak might indeed occur should the present scarcity at Constantinople develop into famine, but it would be ruthlessly suppressed: precautions have already been taken by the extermination of the Ammenian and Greek elements while the Moslem element lacks initiative and would submit without complaint to the direst privation. The chances of a movement in the army seem slight; The Young Turks have banished or otherwise eliminated the malcontents in the corps of officers; supplies for the troops will be forthcoming from Bulgaria, which is already sending cereals to Germany, while their spirits have been raised by highly coloured reports of the check inflicted on our troops in Mesopotamia, the withdrawal from Anzac and the retreat of the allies to Salonika. The prospects of a military coup may therefore be left out of consideration notwithstanding the growing discord between the Turkish and German officers. It is true that events in Turkey often belie all expectations; a crisis might be brought about should Germany prepare to send an army to Constantinople, but, for the present at least, this seems improbable. The claims of Russia to Con-

stantinople form a permanent barrier to a separate arrangement between the Entente and Turkey; these claims will become more prominent should Russia succeed in her present offensive in Bukovina and Galicia: should she fail, the Young Turks will be encouraged to persist in their present policy. Whatever may happen there is no prospective opening for negotiation - which in any case, would be impossible until the prestige of our arms has been restored.

On the other hand, the possibility of detaching Bulgaria from the Central Powers and Turkey is at least worth serious consideration. It must always be remembered that Bulgaria took up arms with the sole object of recovering Macedonia, which has been guaranteed to her by her treaty with Serbia and taken from her by the Treaty of Bucarest. No other motive would have induced either the people or the army to carry out the programme laid down for them by King Ferdinand and his ministers. Other considerations may have been present in the minds of the King and his advisers, but the nation thought of nothing but Macedonia. Unquestionably, the bulk of the community would have preferred to effect the liberation of the kindred race with the aid of Russia and the Western Powers, and so widely spread was this feeling that the Government did not dare to convoke the Sobranye at the usual time (towards the end of October) and even entered upon the war without consulting the national representatives. Had it done so it would have experienced a parliamentary defeat. By maintaining martial law and a rigorous press censorship while encouraging an active German propaganda and winking at a liberal distribution of German gold among the politicians and the Macedonians, the party in power succeeded in stifling the voice of the country

and in spreading the belief that Macedonia could only be rescued with the aid of the Central Powers. At the same time Germanophil officers were installed in the Ministry of War and in the higher commands of the army, from which the partisans of the Entente were ejected. Notwithstanding all the precautions of the Government, it was evident, after the decree of mobilization had been issued, that the peasant-soldiers had by no means abandoned their traditional veneration for Russia and that they came to the colours without enthusiasm. They were ready and even eager to fight with Serbia for Macedonia, but they were reluctant to appear in arms against Russia or against Great Britain which has always held the next place to Russia in the affections of the people. Anyone who had witnessed the mobilisation of 1912 could not fail to be struck by the contrast which now presented itself in the demeanor of the reservists. But they were consoled in some measure by the assurance that Macedonia had been promised to Bulgaria by the Entente Powers and that they would be allowed to return to their homes once the liberation of their kinsmen had been accomplished.

It seems necessary to recall these circumstances in order to make the present situation clear. Once in presence of the enemy, the troops fought well and their successes tended to mitigate the antagonism of the Russophil opposition parties and to win a temporary popularity for the King and the Government. The Sobranye, convoked at the very latest date allowed by the law, ceased to be refractory, and all the supplies demanded by the Government have been voted. It remains to be seen how these funds are to be provided and how long the political armistice will hold good.

The bill for the conquest of Macedonia has yet to be settled and the country, already exhausted by the wars of

1912 and 1913, cannot pay it without foreign financial aid. Up to the present, Germany has acted as paymaster, but, with penniless Turkey also on her hands, she must presently limit her largesses both to the State and to individuals. Bulgaria is now expected to provide cereals both for Germany and Turkey, and a considerable amount of gold has come into the country, but the price of foodstuffs is rising enormously and the Government will soon be compelled to prohibit the export of corn. The price of other commodities, such as leather, metals of various kinds, etc., has been doubled or trebled and Bulgaria cannot supply herself from the newly-conquered regions, which have been literally stripped bare by the Germans and Austrians.

A serious economic crisis seems therefore inevitable and the attendant discontent will increase pari passu with the decline of the enthusiasm kindled by the Macedonian campaign. A hungry people will cease to regard the Germans and Austrians as heaven-sent benefactors and the question will arise how to get rid of them and how to put an end to the war. The arrogance and tactless conduct of the Germans, who treat the Bulgarians as inferiors, has already begun to render their presence irksome to a people which, at best, regards the presence of foreigners in their midst with many misgivings.

There is no longer any reason why Bulgaria should either tolerate the Germans or continue the war. With the annexation of Macedonia her object in taking up arms has been achieved. She has no conceivable inducement to shed her blood for the advancement of German schemes regarding Constantinople and Asia Minor, which, if realized, would reduce her to the humiliating position of a corridor State. She has no motive for continuing the fight except the fear that

the triumph of the Entente Powers would entail the loss of Macedonia and the restoration of alien rule in that country. Could she be assured against such a result, her loyalty to her present allies, which rests on no basis of sentiment, kinship or religion, would be rapidly undermined. Her national aims now reduce themselves to the recovery of a portion of the Dobrodja, to the acquisition of Kavala as a commercial outlet and to the restoration of the Enos-Media line guaranteed to her by Europe. With regard to the Dobroja, Rumania is ready to make concessions should Bulgaria change her policy. Kavala can only be obtained with the acquiescence of the maritime Powers. The Enos-Media line will never be conceded by Germany, which, many Bulgarians suspect, has made a secret compact with the Ports for the restitution of the Maritza valley to Turkey.

These simple considerations are obvious enough to most Bulgarians, and the logical and inevitable consequence must be the growth of a tendency to abandon the Central Powers and to seek a rapprochement with the Entente. The first symptoms of the change will probably take the form of an agitation for peace, and this to judge from past experience may be expected to originate in the army. The season for the spring sowing is near at hand, and the peasant soldiers will begin to ask why they are being kept from their fields now that Macedonia has been won? If their discontent does not take an active form in the spring it will probably do so in the summer as in 1913, when, at the approach of the harvest, it confronted the Government with the choice of a general disbandment or an immediate incursion into Macedonia. To-day Macedonia has been won, so the demand will be for peace alone - unless, indeed, the Western

Powers again invade that country with the intention, real or supposed, of re-establishing Serbian rule. There is certainly a strong desire, both in the army and the country, to regain Adrianople and Thrace, which were won at such a heavy cost and were afterwards filched by Turkey, but Germany interposes her veto, which will be supported by her friends in high places; their attitude will tend to provoke a reaction towards the Entente Powers, without whose aid the complete realization of the national programme cannot be attained.

That a reaction will take place at first in favour of peace and afterwards in favour of the Entente Powers seems practically certain, but whether these Powers will know how to profit by it is hard to foresee. From the first they underestimated the important place of Bulgaria in the world conflict, while Germany gauged it accurately. Even now the defection of Bulgaria from the Central Powers would spell the ruin of Germany's ambition in Asia and Africa and would give the signal for the adhesion of Rumania and Greece to the Entente. Such a volte face can at present be only reckoned as a possibility, for the present holders of power who have compromised the future in regard to Russia will not readily relax their grasp. But it would at least be advisable for the Entente Powers to let the situation ripen and to abstain from unnecessary and gratuitous provocations. "Punitive" measures devoid of any military importance can only have an exasperating effect like the German bombardment of the east coast of England.

Private

To R C Hall Esq

Bucarest

10 Jan. 1916

My dear Buxton

I was very glad to receive this morning your letter and most interesting memorandum.

You will see from the enclosed, which was written in the main before your letter arrived, that I am in agreement with you

on all points – That there will be a great reaction in Bulgaria is certain, but whether it will result in a definite change of policy it is hard to say. I have misgivings in regard to the German military occupation of the country, which is being extended daily and may

eventually effect the virtual enslavement of the country. The economic situation is very grave and prices have risen enormously: this I know from private letters. It is whispered here that a plot to murder King F and the Germanophil ministers was hatched here by Russophil Bulgarians and Russian agents.

I hope you will do all you can to induce our newspapers to control their violent language which only does harm to ourselves in the present state of things and is as injurious to our interests as "punctive" bombardments. But for the Varna attack the Russians might have eventually come to Bulgaria as friends. The situation requires to be carefully watched: if you or your brother or both would come out here no doubt it would have a good effect. I must close in haste — Ever yours D.D. Bourchier

Copy of a letter from J.D.Bourchier.

British Legation
Jassy

13th Feb.1917

"... In reply to your question re the proposed Anglo-Bulgarian rapprochement, I do not know all that happened last July, but it is a fact that about the middle of the month Radoslavoff told Derussi, the Rumanian Minister at Sofia, that Bulgaria was preparing to go over to the Entente & that Hadji-misheff at the Hague was in communication with the British Government. He suggested that Rumania's good offices would be welcome in bringing about the change. Derussi thereupon came to Bucarest, but Bratianu was not responsive & sent him back with a message to the effect that Rumania would not attack Bulgaria, but that she could not prevent an army of 200,000 Russians from marching through her territory to attack her neighbour & that she advised Bulgaria to think twice over what she was about to do. He held out the hope, however, that at some future time Rumania might act as a go-between for Bulgaria & the Entente. This message produced a depressing effect at Sofia where it was supposed Rumania would have been glad to relieve herself of danger on her southern frontier in order to direct all her forces against Transylvania. Subsequently, as you know, Rumania at first refrained from declaring war on Bulgaria & Bulgaria did likewise for 4 days till compelled to take action by the Germans.

Before Derussi left Sofia Radoslavoff told him frankly that Bulgaria did not want to be governed by the Germans.

We threw away Bulgaria in 1915 when she was quite prepared to take our side. Bax Ironside & scruples in London about disturbing the Serbians in Macedonia brought about that result. I think she may still be brought over, but the extreme Serbophils in London seem determined to prevent that, as Serbia wants Bulgarian territory in the final settlement. I see amazing proposals put forward in lectures delivered under the auspices of the Fight for Right movement. What is it? ...."

'18

La Rive
Castlecomer
Co Kilkenny
Oct 22 1918

My dear Buxton

I telegraphed to you today suggesting that the memo should be sent direct to the proper quarter (I exclude General Smuts, but you know best) in my name with signatures in support. I heard some days ago that "negotiations"

are going on with Pashitch
Venizelos and T. Doneseo who
all flew to London on the
news of the Bulgarian collapse
"Where the carcase is ....."
I greatly fear that pledges
may now be given to these
people which may tie our hands
at the Peace Congress. And if
we are to have the League of
Nations & and so it will be
indeed deplorable if the
power of united Europe is to
be employed in maintaining an
unjust and antinational settlement

made up in wartime to suit the exigencies of the moment. I hope a question will be asked in the House putting in a caveat against any pledges. I am sure Venizelos is as reasonable as the Athens patriots will permit and Pashitch is also inclined to be moderate, but Prince Alexander and the militarists (and assassins who still are round the Court) will largely dominate the situation. No territorial delimitation should be thought of till the question of national

distribution has been carefully and scientifically studied prior to the Congress. The Greeks and Serbians have not the remotest idea of leaving us (as Chéradame threatens) as they need our support at the Congress. The voice of America must be heard in this matter.

By "mendacity" I conclude you refer to the innumerable lies published by the partisan "war-time" writers at the prompting of their patrons. Is it proposed to expose these in a memorandum? The Censor will not allow a word to be published. If there is to be a Commission for the investigation of Bulgarian atrocities

as the Greeks demand, the Carnegie Commission Report ought to be unearthed and circulated in order to reveal the provocation. It seems impossible to get it — two booksellers have failed for me. I heard that the Greeks bought up and destroyed all the copies. Some revelations of the Greek intrigues would be piquant. I suppose you know how they tried to get Marlboro' House to demand my removal from the Balkans! Their last effort is quite delightful — Arthur Bourchier the actor, an old friend

since Etn days, tells me that some little time ago the Greeks offered him £1,500 and all expenses if he would go to the Balkans and write political telegrams - he replied that he knew nothing of Balkan politics, on this they said "Never mind, all the writing will be done for you" Is it not delightful? You need not keep this secret!

Yours Ever

D. d. Bourchier

17 a

Oct 14 1918

LA RIVE,
CASTLECOMER,
Co. KILKENNY.

My dear Buxton

I enclose the revised memorandum: it is now "up to date". I am sending it to Colne Collage – this I fear will involve the loss of a day, but I don't know your address in town – I am posting it to the House of Commons

If you or any of your friends feel reluctance as regards the Euro-Media suggestion

a note to that effect
might be appended with
the signatures. But I
1) think the suggestion will have
weight with the War Cabinet,
even if Turkey should have
"come in" before the memorandum
reaches it: in any case
the offer would please the
2) Bulgarians — as an earnest
of our intention to give them

back Adrianople which they won with such sacrifices — and would strengthen Malenoff's hand. It would be not only right but politic to do something to relieve the distress in Bulgaria, which is partly due to German rapacity —

I hope you and all those who desire justice in the Balkans will now do something to check the flood of mendacity which will still run riot when some protest is made.

The traducers have had their day: for the last 3 years they have said and written what they pleased about the Bulgarian enemy, but now they can be brought to order and "shown up" for endeavouring to alienate a nation which has placed itself at our disposal. I expect they will soon be made to feel that they have overshot the mark and that the public is sick of them.

But I suppose a great campaign is going on now with Pashich Take Jonesco and the Greek Commercial delegation all together in London! Yours Ever

D. D. Bourchier

19

La Rive
Castlecomer
Co Kilkenny

Oct 25
1918

My dear Buxton

Enclosed is your letter referring to mendacity: can Macedonia be meant?

I send you confidentially copy of a letter I have written to Lord Bryce: don't tell him I have seen it! The points with regard to premature pledges and premature

inquiry into atrocities
might perhaps be added
as a postscript to the
memorandum.

I see the Times makes the
most of the treatment of the
Servian prisoners. I am
disposed to give a writing to
the press, as I am informed by an Editor
that the Censor forbids any suggestion
of coöperation with Bulgaria
and says that anything against
Bulgaria is permissible.

Yours Ever

J. D. Bourchier

Mont urging apt using B
Lose help apt T. perhaps helping f
to return

La Rive
Castlecomer
Co Kilkenny
Sep. 30 1918

× before news of peace.

My dear Buxton

I enclose the memorandum as it was written before the Bulgarian × overtures: it is now of course out of date but the considerations it advances are as important as ever. I have added a rather hastily written postscript dealing with the actual situation so far as we know it. Let me know what you think ought to be done: if it is necessary to rewrite the whole document I will do it. But time is of great importance now and those of us who feel that we should not

X go beyond | peace? Get them to fight?

let slip the the great opportunity which now presents itself should make strenuous exertions and approach responsible quarters immediately. I have written several letters and telegrams including a long one to the Times which probably may be docked or even suppressed in toto. I have no doubt that if we now deal with the Bulgars in the right way we can bring them to our side but the negotiations will apparently be conducted at Salonika under the influence of Greek and Serbian militaires who will try to spoil everything. The offer of the Euro-Media line would probably determine the attitude of Bulgaria. Do let me know what you think and what you are doing. Ever yours D.D. Rowchie

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744

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THE FATE OF MACEDONIA

By

JAMES D. BOURCHIER, M.A., F.R.G.S.

THE FATE OF MACEDONIA

By

JAMES D. BOURCHIER, M.A., F.R.G.S.

ON the 10th August, 1913, Rumania, Serbia, and Greece, having previously defeated Bulgaria with the aid of Turkey, imposed upon that Power the Treaty of Bucarest, under which Serbia and Greece, in accordance with a secret compact already concluded, divided Macedonia; Greece further laid hands on Western Thrace, while Rumania appropriated a fertile tract of territory in the Southern Dobrodja hitherto belonging to Bulgaria and inhabited by Turks and Bulgars. In all the regions annexed by the three Powers a process of extermination of the Bulgar element was carried out; this process had been inaugurated in Macedonia and Thrace by the Serbians and Greeks in the winter of 1912, while the Bulgarians were still their allies and were fighting with the Turks in Eastern Thrace, and in order to gain time for its continuance and to increase the exhaustion of Bulgaria those Powers protracted the negotiations with Turkey in London in the spring of 1913 to such an extent that Sir Edward Grey was compelled to suggest the withdrawal of their delegates.

The Treaty of Bucarest has never been recognised by the Great Powers, and its provisions, as well as those of the various secret compacts which ignore the rights of nationalities, such as the agreement between Greece and Serbia for the division of Albania, the Treaty of April 26, 1915, between Italy and the Allied Powers, disposing of the Adriatic coastland and depriving Albania of the frontier accorded to her by Europe in January, 1913, and certain provisions of the Treaty of August 18, 1916, between Rumania and the Allies, are practically null and void in view of the decision of the Allies, announced in December, 1916, to adhere to the principle of nationalities. That principle is now virtually the law of Europe, and arrangements which reject it will doubtless themselves be rejected by the Congress unless they are previously renounced by those who made them.

It is alleged in a number of publications, appearing for the most part since 1913, the date of the partition of the country, that Macedonia is not a Bulgarian land. A great effort has been made to justify the act of rapacity committed at Bucarest. But the controversial literature on the subject, especially that which has appeared since the outbreak of the war, is of little value. The Greek claim is based on the Turkish

theocratic system, under which all Christians who acknowledge the Greek Patriarch belong to the Roum millet or Roman (neo-Greek) nation; those who belong to the Bulgarian Church, though not differing on any point of doctrine, are declared to be schismatics and beyond the pale of Orthodox Christianity; they have been formally excommunicated by the Greek Patriarch. About 300,000 Bulgarians, fearing the consequences of excommunication in the world to come, or influenced by other considerations, still adhere to the Patriarchate. These Bulgarians have hitherto been described by the Greeks as "Bulgarophone Greeks," but since the partition of Macedonia they are styled "Slavophone Greeks," in order to disguise the fact that they speak Bulgarian.

Similarly, in what is now Serbian Macedonia the Bulgarian population has been discovered by Serbian *savants* to be a nondescript or floating "Macedonian" race, which the Serbians can legitimately assimilate, inasmuch as it is devoid of nationality. The conscientious and impartial travellers who visited Macedonia before the era of controversy knew nothing of this mysterious element, and generally believed the bulk of the rural population to be Bulgarian. Ami Boué, Cyprien Robert, Lejean, Tozer, Mackenzie and Irby, Hahn, Jireček, and many others are practically unanimous in regard to this. Many of these writers make no mention of any Serbian element in Macedonia. The ethnographic maps which several of them drew up concur in showing the preponderance of the Bulgarian element. This unanimity Professor Cvijić, the principal champion of the Serbian cause, explains by assuming that the map of Ami Boué was copied by the subsequent writers! The Serbians have changed their standpoint with regard to Macedonia so often that expediency would seem to be their only guide. Before 1878, when Austria occupied Bosnia, and their legitimate aspirations in that direction received a check, they made no claim to Macedonia. Vuk Karadjich, one of their highest literary authorities, writing in the second decade of the last century, makes no mention of Macedonia in his enumeration of the countries in which Serbian is spoken, and instances a number of Macedonian ballads in his description of the characteristics of the Bulgarian language. In 1861 a volume of "Bulgarian popular songs," collected in Macedonia, was published at Agram at the expense of Bishop Strossmayer, the Croatian patriot. Various Serbian writers previously to 1878 admitted the Bulgarian character of the Macedonian population. Thus, in a treatise issued at Belgrade in 1870 ("The Eastern Question and Serbia"), the rural population of the country is described as "purely Bulgarian."

After 1878 there came a change. Austria, having occupied Bosnia,

encouraged the Serbians to hope for compensation in Macedonia,* and chauvinistic writers began to apply the name "Old Serbia," hitherto restricted to the region north of the Shar Mountains, to all Macedonia, and to declare that the population of that country was and had always been Serbian. It was now explained that the name "Bulgarian," by which the people called themselves, possessed no ethnic significance, being derived from the Latin *vulgaris*, meaning a "low fellow, a boor."† The Serbs of Macedonia, it was further alleged, adopted the humiliating designation through fear of the Turks, to whom the Serbians were obnoxious owing to their valiant and rebellious character.

More recently a new theory has been propounded. The contention that the Macedonian Slavs are Serbians has been given up, and we are now told that they are a nondescript race without nationality. They are simply "Macedonians." The discovery is opportune and ingenious, for, while the Bulgarian character of the population is still denied, the partition of the country with Greece is facilitated and condoned by the new doctrine. For if the Macedonians are Serbs, as was previously contended, it would be difficult to justify the division of their land and the transfer of a portion of it to Greece. The Greeks naturally concur in the new doctrine, though not many years ago some of their principal writers asserted that the population was originally Greek, but that at some time in the Middle Ages, not precisely specified, it adopted the Bulgarian language for reasons which are not explained. Greek and Serbian propagandist maps now issued in London assign definite limits to the nondescript race, of which the world knew nothing till the last few years.

If the population of Macedonia is neither Serb, Bulgar, nor Greek, the obvious solution of the question would be found in the creation of an autonomous State. The nondescript "Macedonians" would have a right to govern themselves and to refuse absorption into any of the neighbouring States. But the Serbians and Greeks have always refused to hear of such a solution. They raise the objection that if Macedonia received autonomy she would soon follow the example of Eastern Roumelia and proclaim union with Bulgaria. The objection is, of course, fatal to their own claims, but they justify it on the ground that Bulgaria, if augmented by the annexation of Macedonia, would become too strong. Even that consideration now loses weight, as Serbia and Greece will soon receive an immense expansion which will put each of them beyond the reach of Bulgarian competition. On the other hand, Bulgaria, anxious to maintain the

* A secret treaty promising Austrian support for Serbian claims was concluded in 1882 and resumed in 1889.

† The Bulgarians, it is fair to state, have never pretended that "Servian" is derived from *servus*.

integrity of the kindred race and aware of its national sentiment, has always desired Macedonian autonomy. In order to assure this she has been willing to postpone or even to forgo annexation. We are reminded of the mother who preferred to resign her claims to her child rather than to see it cut in twain by order of King Solomon.

Macedonian autonomy would probably be only a temporary solution, but it would be infinitely better than a confirmation of the unnatural arrangement of the Bucarest Treaty. It would be necessary that the country should be policed for several years by a neutral Power—America for preference—in view of the intrigues and even the encroachments to which it would be exposed on the part of its neighbours. If the inestimable boon of protection were accorded to them together with the right to speak their own language, to worship in their own churches, and to send their children to their own schools the Bulgarian peasants of Macedonia would care little under what form of government they lived. Among the upper classes a considerable number of persons would prefer autonomy in view of the prospect of a political or commercial career which would be opened up to them at Salonika. That town would naturally become the capital of the new autonomous State. It is now the commercial capital of Macedonia, and its prosperity, as well as that of the interior, depends on the maintenance of unrestricted communication between the two. Its population is cosmopolitan, being mainly Jewish and Turkish; the Greek element, previously comparatively insignificant, has been increased since the town has fallen into Greek hands, while the Bulgarian, which formerly numbered some 12,000 souls, has been literally exterminated.

If Salonika, however, must remain Greek, Macedonia should be provided with another maritime outlet at Kavala. This port is also the natural outlet of Western Thrace and Bulgaria, and cannot be separated from those regions without serious detriment to its own prosperity and to that of the back-country. This has more than once been admitted by M. Venizelos. The Greek element does not form a majority in either of these seaports. The retention of both of them by Greece would be a manifest injustice, especially as Greece, having an abundance of other ports and having no prospect of possessing the back-country will have no special motive—or, indeed, no motive at all—to work for their development.

No person who possesses an adequate first-hand knowledge of the Macedonian rural population can entertain a doubt as to its Bulgarian character. "The peasantry of Macedonia," writes Lady Grogan in 1918, "believe themselves to be Bulgarians; they are Bulgarians in type, customs, language, dress, and tradition. That they were Bul-

garians was never questioned by travellers who described and mapped the country before the era of national propaganda began. It was as Bulgarians that they rose against the Turks in 1913-14, and they paid for their assertion of nationality by severe punishment and prolonged persecution. It was as Bulgarians that they suffered at the hands of the Greek bands in the following years. There is no record of any Serbian or Greek rising in Macedonia against the Turks."*

The high linguistic authorities who have studied the various dialects of the Slav-speaking population declare them to be all Bulgarian, and Weigand, one of the highest, observes dryly that "the politicians cannot alter the fact." The men sometimes speak also Turkish, which, till recently, was the official language, or Greek, which is the language of commerce, but in the home—and when it dares—the family speaks Bulgarian.

If, therefore, the Bulgarian Macedonians are to be handed over to alien rule, despite the solemn declarations of British and American statesmen with regard to the principles of nationality, despite the practically unanimous testimony of impartial travellers and scholars of high authority, despite the equally important verdict of those who possess a first-hand knowledge of the rural population, and despite the expression of their national consciousness revealed in a series of desperate outbreaks and consecrated with their blood, they are at least entitled to know on what grounds they are to be delivered to the tender mercies of their bitterest enemies and subjected to a domination in many respects worse than that of the Turks. For the Turks at least refrained from interfering with their language, their religion, their schools, and their ancient customs and usages, but their new masters respect none of these things. "Don't talk Bulgarian"—*μὴ φωνασέτε Βουλγαρικά*—shouted the Greek officers in 1912 to the wretched peasants who spoke the only language they knew; the officers had been taught by their professors and journalists that the Macedonians were Greeks, and their fury at hearing them speak the execrated tongue of their enemies (and allies) was boundless. The Macedonian Bulgars are a virile, hard-working, and intelligent race, and there can be no doubt that civilised opinion, if the facts were only known, would be revolted at the idea of placing them under alien and hostile rule. But the real issue has been misrepresented by partisan literature, especially since the outbreak of the war, and is still misrepresented with a view to influencing the decision of the Peace Congress in favour of the predatory programme of the Treaty of

* Lady Grogan, who speaks both Bulgarian and Serbian, spent a year in Macedonia engaged in relief work (1903-4). Latterly she has worked for four years for the Serbian Relief Fund.

Bucarest. It is even proposed to exaggerate the injustice of 1913 by further encroachments on the unity of the Bulgarian race.

With this object in view attempts are made to keep alive the passions engendered by the war, and a loud demand is set up for the "punishment" of Bulgaria, who is declared to have "forfeited" her right to Macedonia. The proposed penalty will in reality be paid by the Macedonian peasants, who will be separated from their kindred and exposed to a ruthless process of denationalisation. What have they done to deserve such a fate? The Treaty of Bucarest is frankly based on the old-world principle *spolia victoribus* and belongs to an epoch when whole regions and their populations were treated as goods and chattels. If that principle is to receive endorsement at the Congress, the proposed League of Nations can never become a reality, and the era of universal peace will recede into the distant future.

J. D. BOURCHIER.

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Memorial Notes.

Bourchier.

Bourchier's was a temperament which most men would have supposed to be designed for study, he was impelled by certain moral qualities to a life of action. It therefore seems more appropriate to narrate the events in his life that one knows, than to attempt an estimate of his character, impossible though it is to separate his political activities from reflections on his personality.

I first heard of Bourchier when I visited Athens soon after the Turco-Greek War. His name was in every British mouth and from the stories I heard of his reckless exploits, his weird insistence on taking a bath, even during military operations, and a hundred other peculiarities, I pictured a man who made a speciality of advertising himself by oddities and who enjoyed a conspicuous pose.

Rather unattracted by this mental picture, I met him for the first time many months later and at once found, to my surprise, that he represented rather the type described in the Elizabethean couplet:

"Although a lion in the field,
A lamb at home, thou shalt him find."

He was then the "Times" correspondent for the Balkan States in general, but spent most of his time at Sofia, and it was there that his characteristic life was led. Others have seen more of him in Europe; it fell to me, perhaps more than any other of his friends, to see the life which was most characteristic of him. He occupied two small rooms in the Bulgarie Hotel, where he was attended by his favourite peasant, Ivan, a herculean figure in native dress, ~~who~~ the latter, though Mayor of his village, regarded himself as the most honoured of all Bulgarians in being allowed to be Bourchier's valet. Among his other duties was the charge of the two ponies which these picturesque companions daily rode in the public park.

The furniture consisted largely of gifts from peasants, and nothing causedits owner more pride than the portrait of himself in Bulgarian costume which his admirers had presented. It might be said that the only article of luxury was his piano, and this he might be heard playing, after the fashion of Mr. Arthur Balfour, in the small hours of the night. He could not adapt himself to customary time-tables. He began his

day with lunch at the resort of diplomats, the Union Club; in the afternoon he rode. He then wrote his telegrams when everyone else was dining, and he dined towards mid-night.

In those days he regarded the Balkans as terribly dull, in comparison with the times of Stambuloff, when, especially during the regime of Lascelles, Nicholson, or Harding, at the British Legation, some stirring episode occurred daily. But the unfortunate populations which had been replaced under the Turkish yoke in 1878 were constantly in his mind, and when they had recovered sufficient strength to create the internal organisation which began operations in 1902, the event was regarded by him not as a mere piece of journalistic copy, but as the first episode in the redress of what he regarded as a gigantic crime. He had never forgotton Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, by which the Powers bound themselves to protect the Macedonians, and his unremitting energy was given to ~~procure that vindication.~~ secure its fulfilment. When the rising of 1903, with its barbarous repression, occurred, it was through his descriptions in the columns of the "Times" that the event assumed high importance in Gt. Britain. He appealed to every possible sympathiser to take up the case, and eagerly co-operated with those who, like the Balkan Committee, attempted to urge our Govern-

ment to the discharge of its duties. It was then that he began to utilise his annual visits to England as occasions for propagandist work. Regardless of his own interests he frequently spoke in public for instance, at the Balkan Committee's meetings. Never perhaps, before or since, has a newspaper correspondent exercised such a wide influence on public opinion in favour of a cause which might otherwise have taken a humbler place.

In a letter ~~to me~~ dated April 22nd., 1911 from Athens, he wrote:-

> "I think the time has come to draw the attention of the Balkan Committee to what is taking place in Albania. I trust the Committee has not abandoned its old standpoint and that it will raise its voice once more on behalf of the suffering population. The silence maintained in England last year was to a large extent the cause of the present trouble. No protest was made against the inhuman treatment of the Albanians, and the Turks were thus encouraged in their vindictive proceedings. The result was the flight of thousands of Albanians into Montenegro."

His continued interest in propaganda was shown in a letter written in March 1914 from Sofia, when he wrote:-

"I was delighted to see in a Bulgarian paper some days ago that the Balkan Committee passed a resolution on the subject of civil and religious liberty in the Balkans (the Times seems to have ignored the proceedings). This is a question of immense importance and the claim of the Greeks for "guarantees" in Southern Albanian furnishes a good opportunity for bringing it forward. It is only a mockery to abolish Turkish rule in the Balkans if it is to be succeeded by what is a worse tyranny in many ways. Hundreds of refugees are still coming into this country (Bulgaria) from Macedonia, especially from the portion now governed by the Greeks - that alone is a bad sign, and the fact that the greater number of the refugees are women, children and old men speaks for itself - the men have been simply wiped out by order. There are also refugees in smaller numbers from the Rumanian Dobrudja (the recently acquired territory) where civil rights are refused to the Population. I have lately been in Thrace and have seen a number of the refugees, whose tale is a sad one. Sister Augustine writes to me from Salonika about Bulgarian prisoners and refugees - also a melancholy

story - The old conspiracy of silence in favour of the Turks is now renewed in favour of the Greeks, who seem to have completely captured the principal London papers - even the reviews won't accept anything against them.

I hope you and the Balkan Committee will keep up an agitation in favour of the oppressed nationalities."

Nor was he content with writing and speaking. He threw himself, like any relief agent, into the work of visiting refugees and personally aiding the sufferers. The International Commission with its gendarmerie officers would have been little known to the world without him, and their failure to prevent what were known in the Constantinople Embassies as the 'Butchers bills', were unremittingly dragged into public notice by his pen.

Five years of farcical international inspection ended in the Young Turk revolution, and the withdrawal by Sir Edward Grey, together with other foreign Ministers, of such restraints as existed. The only hope of progress seemed then to lie in offering to the Young Turks such British support as might have led them to see that their success depended on decent administration.

But Bourchier's mind was too objective to place any reliance either on Turkish reform or the philanthropy of the British Foreign Office.

Writing from Athens, 11th. Dec. 1909, he said -

"One thing is certain - that neither Greece nor Turkey can be regenerated in a few months or years, or even in a generation - Greece at least is fairly homogeneous, but the question of nationalities in Turkey, which the Young Turks are not approaching in the right way, will prove an insuperable obstacle to the realisation of their programme. They must change their policy or they will fail. At present they are imitating the ways of their cousins, the Magyars, in their Government of Macedonia, trying to turcize everything and everyone. It is too late in the day for such a policy and it is useless to put back the clock. The suppression of the Bulgarian clubs is a great mistake - it only drives discontent below the surface and renders it more dangerous. The treatment of the Albanian movement has also been very unfortunate, as will be seen presently. As things are, a Turco-Bulgarian Alliance is impossible."

Young Turkey was not long in justifying his sceptical objectivity, and it became clear to him

that no solution lay that way. He was not one to tolerate inaction, and having seen the failure of the Great Powers, he turned to the Small.

The early part of 1912 he spent in bringing into accord the three Balkan Governments concerned.

Writing to me from Athens in 1912, he says:-

> "The Greco-Bulgarian Entente is going on well and offers perhaps the only safeguard against the policy of Ottomanisation which no doubt will be revived if the Committee of Union and Progress triumphs at the elections, I had lately long conversations with the Patriarch and the Exarch, both are convinced of the necessity for co-operation in order to save the privileges of the subject populations. The Balkan Committee would do well to urge this on both Greeks and Bulgars. The revival of European control is desirable, if only as an antidote to Austro-Russian condominium, but that (the control) can hardly be mooted till the war comes to an end."

~~The result was~~ The first Balkan war broke out soon afterwards.

The success of that experiment depended on Press support for the States which were to replace the Turkish

Empire, and no one who remembers the prestige which our traditions gave to Turkey in military and naval circles can fail to realise that some powerful influence was present to turn the sympathies of the British conservative mind to a new cause. That powerful influence was mainly Bourchier's pen. The sad sequel of disunion which led to the second Balkan war left him cast down but not despairing.

Writing from Sofia he expressed the following views (20th. April 1913.)

"I am horrified by the state of feeling I find here and at Belgrade. At Belgrade they are more demonstrative;here,"still waters run deep". The Servians cynically say they will not keep their treaty with Bulgaria because "the balance of power must be preserved in the Peninsula." The Bulgarians are very indignant and say they will give them a "taste of the bayonet". There is of course an end of all treaties if they are to be broken in this way, the truth is that the Servian officers finding themselves in possession at Monastir etc. don't see why they should go out and regard treaties as waste paper.

At Belgrave they coolly talk of a Serbo-Greek attack on Bulgaria though under the treaties of

alliance both Servia and Greece are bound to Bulgaria for terms of years. I do not think it possible that Venizelos, who is a man of high principle, would ever consent to such treachery, but he may soon be turned out by the Chauvinists at Athens. The only remedy for the situation is arbitration is some form or other; another campaign would be a scandal and a disgrace.

In great haste,

Yours very sincerely,

J.D. BOURCHIER."

The Second Balkan War ending with the Treaty of Bucarest destroyed all his hopes but he ~~He~~ continued to remind the world that peace cannot be based on injustice.

At the Annual Meeting of the Balkan Committee in July 1914, Lord Bryce appealed to the Balkan States to revise the Treaty of Bucarest. Mr. Bourchier followed and said - that since he had last addressed the Committee

"a deplorable situation had been created in the Balkans. At the beginning of last year, when the delegates of the victorious Balkan States were assembled in London, there were good grounds for hoping that they would contrive to make an equitable division of the conquered territories in accordance with the principle of nationalities. The Young Turk

pronunciamiento at Constantinople followed, the war was protracted and unhappy disputes arose among the Allies. The blame for the internecine war that followed must not be laid on one State alone; those who repudiated their engagements and offered provocation in various ways were at least as culpable as those who first drew the sword. The Treaty of Bucharest followed, an arrangement imposed by force and marked by a complete disregard of the distribution of races and even of commercial and economic considerations. That Treaty, which had now been in existence nearly a year, had been productive of an incalculable amount of misery among the subjugated peoples, accompanied by migrations en masse. It had been followed, not by peace and tranquillity, but by feverish military preparations, involving an enormous outlay and violent efforts on the part of those who had appropriated the greater portion of the spoil to assimilate their new subjects by forcible methods. These methods, applied, as a rule, by undisciplined local officials, would only perpetuate racial enmities, exhaust the young States financially, and lead to another war."

On 28th. July 1914, he wrote -

"As to the Treaty of Bucharest, it is the fons et origo malorum and so long as it stands there

will never be peace in the Balkans. In my opinion it is even worse than the Treaty of Berlin. We may not be prepared to insist on its revision now, but revision must and will come. The Servians and Greeks will never assimilate the other races by the methods they are now pursuing and even if they changed those methods it is not to be desired that they should dominate other races. But there is no prospect of their making any real change and the odious tyranny will continue until its cause is removed. The Eastern Question itself is simply the mischief resulting from alien government."

When the cataclysm of August, 1914, came, his mind turned to the possibility of effecting at one blow the solution of the Balkan tangle and the re-inforcement of the forces of the Allies. The story of the way in which that solution was neglected need not be repeated here. It must be remembered that among the cards which the Allies had in their hands for securing the obviously indispensable aid of Bulgaria was the prestige which Gt. Britain possessed in Bulgaria through Bourchier's amazing popularity in that country. His attitude may best be given in his own words.

In a letter dated Xmas Day 1914, he writes -

"The main point is that we must bring Rumania and Bulgaria into line in order to finish the Eastern campaign. The Rumanian advance into Transylvania and the Banat would not only cut the communications of the Austrians (should they invade Servia again) but would afford such protection to the Russian left that the Russians could concentrate all their forces for an advance to the N. West - to Berlin. - It would practically decide the result of the Eastern campaign and perhaps that of the whole war. The Germans would be compelled to weaken their Western front to such a degree that the Allies could advance to the Rhine and beyond it. At the worst, the Rumanian advance would greatly shorten the campaign, saving thousands of lives and millions of money. They say they can put 500,000 men - let us say 450,000 - into the field. But Bulgaria blocks the way. I am compassing heaven and earth to bring about a rapprochement and things are going better every day. The Rumanians still say they will not stir unless Bulgaria takes simultaneous action, ~~in Macedonia.~~ In order to bring this about we should put the utmost pressure on Servia to permit a

pacific Bulgarian occupation of Western Macedonia up to the line agreed upon in 1912 - this is what the Government here wants - the country has had too much of war. The Bulgarians would of course receive a mandate from the Entente: this would preclude Greek interference. If the Servians prove obstinate (they will not if the Powers are firm) they should be told that we shall give the mandate in any case. It is not a moment for trifling when great issues are at stake. But I fear the Russians will continue to wobble as heretofore. Once Rumano-Bulgarian parallel action is arranged we should give financial aid to both States. The first step for Rumania to take is to give Bulgaria something in hand - Dobritch and Baltchik for instance. Bulgaria would close with this - without prejudice to her future case before the Congress. As to the Servians, it is so obviously their interest to do anything to hasten the victory of the Entente that no resistance on their part should be tolerated. It would be otherwise if we asked them to surrender genuinely Servian territory, but these regions they spontaneously recognised as Bulgarian in 1912. It seems to me the Powers might hasten matters if they would definitely offer to Servia in case of

victory Bosnia, $\frac{3}{4}$ of Herzegovina and (say) 4 Dalmatian ports - Gravosa, Metkovitch, Spalato and Sebenico - possibly even Zara, but there are difficulties regarding the more Catholic portion of Dalmatia.

It is too soon to tell the Bulgarians to "help the Servians." That has been the Russian blunder. In going into Macedonia they will directly help themselves (in two senses) - that is what they understand - and indirectly the Servians, Rumanians and us. When Rumania and Bulgaria take action, Italy will probably do likewise. It is also too soon to talk of reviving the Balkan Alliance. That cannot be done until the Treaty of Bucarest has been abrogated.

Yours ever,

J.D. BOURCHIER."

He outlined a scheme for enlisting Bulgaria's neutrality or support in the following Memorandum - (January 1915, Bucarest).

(1) The Governments of the Entente declare that they will support the claims of Servia to Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina and to a territory comprising one or more ports on the Adriatic litoral.

(2) That they will support the claims of Montenegro to Southern Hertzegovina and the districts of Cattaro, Badua and Spizza (Southern Dalmatia).

(3) That they will support the claim of Bulgaria to the portion of Macedonia indicated by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 in case Bulgaria maintains a friendly neutrality towards Servia and Greece during the present war.

(4) That they will support the claim of Bulgaria to the portion of the Dobrudja indicated by the protocol of St. Petersburg in case she maintains a friendly neutrality towards Rumania in the event of Rumania's taking up arms in alliance with the Entente.

(5) That they will guarantee to Bulgaria the restoration of the territory in Thrace accorded to her by the Treaty of London (Enos-Midia line) in case she takes up arms on behalf of the Entente in the event of a war with Turkey.

(6) That they will support the claims of Rumania to Transylvania and Bukowina if, in concert with the Entente, she proceeds without delay to occupy those countries.

TO BULGARIA:-

(1) In case Bulgaria maintains a friendly neutrality during the war the Entente Powers undertake to support her claims to the portion of Macedonia indicated by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912. (Servia obtaining an accession of territory elsewhere.)

(2) In the event of Turkey declaring war they will undertake to restore to Bulgaria the territory in Thrace indicated by the Treaty of London (Enos-Midia line) in case Bulgaria immediately makes war on Turkey.

(3) In case Rumania eventually acquires Transylvania they will support the claim of Bulgaria to the frontier indicated by the protocol of St. Petersburg.

TO RUMANIA:-

In case Rumania takes immediate action by invading Transylvania and Bukowina, her forces acting in concert with those of Russia, the Entente Powers undertake to support her claims to the possession of those provinces and to employ all means in their power to assure to her the friendly neutrality of Bulgaria."

When Bulgaria continued the War on the side of the Central Powers, Bourchier was very grieved. But he expressly excepted the Bulgarian people from blame. Writing to me on November 20th, 1915, from Bucarest he said:-

"The simple fact is that the bulk of the nation sympathises with us, but Ferdinand and his immediate advisers came to the conclusion (after the Russian reverses in Poland and Courland) that Germany was going to win and that if they were not with her they would lose Macedonia.

The miserable blunders of our diplomacy no doubt confirmed this impression. It is unfair to blame them if they really believed (as seems to be the case) that the fate of the Macedonia depended on their decision.

I believe the Bulgarians would have been disposed to come over to us once they had secured Macedonia - hitherto at least they have been averse to the idea of marching with the Germans to Constantinople - but the useless bombardment of Dedeagatch and the conflicts with our troops in Macedonia may have altered their feelings. I am wholly averse to the Salonika expedition on military as well as political grounds and fear it will end in disaster. Several competent military critics are of the same opinion.

Yours ever,

(Sgd) J.D. BOURCHIER."

As the War went on, Bourchier always cherished the hope that Bulgaria would detach herself from her Allies and make a separate peace.

"That there will be a great reactionary Bulgaria," he wrote on 10th January, 1916, from Bucarest, "is certain, but whether it will result in a definite change of policy it is hard to say. I have misgivings in regard to the German military occupation of the country, which is being extended daily and may eventually effect the virtual enslavement of the country. The economic situation is very grave and prices have risen enormously. This I know from private letters. It is whispered here that a plot to murder King F. and the Germanophil Ministers was hatched here by Russophil Bulgarians and Russian agents.

I hope you will do all you can to induce our newspapers to control their violent language which only does harm to ourselves in the present state of things and is as injurious to our interests as "punitive" bombardments. But for the Varna attack the Russians might have eventually come to Bulgaria as friends. The situation requires to be carefully watched; if you or your brother or both would come out here, no doubt it would have a good effect.

I must close in haste,

Ever yours,

(Sgd) J.D. BOURCHIER."

The following Memorandum which Bourchier sent me in January 1916 from Bucarest is a strikingly well-reasoned case for detaching Bulgaria:

Memorandum by J.D. Bourchier (Balkan Correspondent of the "Times".)

Bukharest,
Jan. 1916.

"There are many indications that both Turkey and Bulgaria are already weary of the war. In neither case should these symptoms be neglected. In the case of Turkey, however, there is no probability of any change of policy unless the ruling clique, which maintains itself in power with the aid of Germany, can be overthrown. This could only be effected by a military pronunciamento. A popular outbreak might indeed occur should the present scarcity at Constantinople develop into famine, but it would be ruthlessly suppressed: precautions have already been taken by the extermination of the Armenian and Greek elements while the Moslem element lacks initiative and would submit without complaint to the direst privation. The chances of a movement in the army seem slight; the Young Turks have banished or otherwise eliminated the malcontents in the corps of officers; supplies for the troops will be forthcoming from Bulgaria, which is already sending cereals to Germany, while their spirits have been raised by highly coloured reports of the check inflicted on our troops in Mesopotamia, the withdrawal from Anzac and the retreat of the allies to Salonika. The prospects of a

military coup may therefore be left out of consideration notwithstanding the growing discord between the Turkish and German officers. It is true that events in Turkey often belie all expectations; a crisis might be brought about should Germany prepare to send an army to Constantinople, but, for the present at least, this seems improbable. The claims of Russia to Constantinople form a permanent barrier to a separate arrangement between the Entente and Turkey; these claims will become more prominent should Russia succeed in her present offensive in Bukovina and Galicia; should she fail, the Young Turks will be encouraged to persist in their present policy. Whatever may happen there is no prospective opening for negotiation - which in any case, would be impossible until the prestige of our arms has been restored.

On the other hand, the possibility of detaching Bulgaria from the Central Powers and Turkey is at least worth serious consideration. It must always be remembered that Bulgaria took up arms with the sole object of recovering Macedonia, which had been guaranteed to her by her treaty with Serbia and taken from her by the Treaty of Bucarest. No other motive would have induced either the people or the army to carry out the programme laid down for them by King Ferdinand and his ministers. Other considerations may have been present in the minds of the King and his advisers, but the nation thought of nothing but Macedonia. Unquestionably, the bulk of the

community would have preferred to effect the liberation of the kindred race with the aid of Russia and the Western Powers, and so widely spread was this feeling that the Government did not dare to convoke the Sobranye at the usual time (towards the end of October) and even entered upon the war without consulting the national representatives. Had it done so it would have experienced a parliamentary defeat. By maintaining martial law and a rigorous press censorship while encouraging an active German propaganda and winking at a liberal distribution of German gold among the politicians and the Macedonians, the party in power succeeded in stifling the voice of the country and in spreading the belief that Macedonia could only be rescued with the aid of the Central Powers. At the same time Germanophil officers were installed in the Ministry of War and in the higher commands of the army, from which the partisans of the Entente were ejected. Notwithstanding all the precautions of the Government, it was evident, after the decree of mobilisation had been issued, that the peasant-soldiers had by no means abandoned their traditional veneration for Russia and that they came to the colours without enthusiasm. They were ready and even eager to fight with Serbia for Macedonia, but they were reluctant to appear in arms against Russia or against Great Britain which has always held the next place to Russia in the affections of the people.

Anyone who had witnessed the mobilisation of 1912 could not

fail to be struck by the contrast which now presented itself in the demeanour of the reservists. But they were consoled in some measure by the assurance that Macedonia had been promised to Bulgaria by the Entente Powers and that they would be allowed to return to their homes once the liberation of their kinsmen had been accomplished.

It seems necessary to recall these circumstances in order to make the present situation clear. Once in presence of the enemy, the troops fought well and their successes tended to mitigate the antagonism of the Russophil opposition parties and to win a temporary popularity for the King and the Government. The Sobranye, convoked at the very latest date allowed by the law, ceased to be refractory, and all the supplies demanded by the Government have been voted. It remains to be seen how these funds are to be provided and how long the political armistice will hold good.

The bill for the conquest of Macedonia has yet to be settled and the country, already exhausted by the wars of 1912 and 1913, cannot pay it without foreign financial aid. Up to the present, Germany has acted as paymaster, but, with penniless Turkey also on her hands, she must presently limit her largesses both to the State and to individuals. Bulgaria is now expected to provide cereals both for Germany and Turkey, and a considerable amount of gold has come into the country, but the price of foodstuffs is rising enormously and the Government will soon be compelled

to prohibit the export of corn. The price of other commodities, such as leather, metals of various kinds, etc., has been doubled or trebled and Bulgaria cannot supply herself from the newly-conquered regions, which have been literally stripped bare by the Germans and Austrians.

A serious economic crisis seems therefore inevitable and the attendant discontent will increase pari passu with the decline of the enthusiasm kindled by the Macedonian campaign. A hungry people will cease to regard the Germans and Austrians as heaven-sent benefactors, and the question will arise how to get rid of them and how to put an end to the war. The arrogance and tactless conduct of the Germans, who treat the Bulgarians as inferiors, has already begun to render their presence irksome to a people which, at best, regards the presence of foreigners in their midst with many misgivings.

There is no longer any reason why Bulgaria should either tolerate the Germans or continue the war. With the annexation of Macedonia her object in taking up arms has been achieved. She has no conceivable inducement to shed her blood for the advancement of German schemes regarding Constantinople and Asia Minor, which, if realised, would reduce her to the humiliating position of a corridor State. She has no motive for continuing the fight except the fear that the triumph of the Entente Powers would entail the loss of Macedonia and the

restoration of alien rule in that country. Could she be assured against such a result, her loyalty to her present allies, which rests on no basis of sentiment, kinship or religion, would be rapidly undermined. Her national aims now reduce themselves to the recovery of a portion of the Dobrodja, to the acquisition of Kavala as a commercial outlet and to the restoration of the Enos-Media line guaranteed to her by Europe. With regard to the Dobrodja, Rumania is ready to make concessions should Bulgaria change her policy. Kavala can only be obtained with the acquiescence of the maritime Powers. The Enos-Media line will never be conceded by Germany, which, many Bulgarians suspect, has made a secret compact with the Porte for the restitution of the Maritza valley to Turkey.

These simple considerations are obvious enough to most Bulgarians, and the logical and inevitable consequence must be the growth of a tendency to abandon the Central Powers and to seek a rapprochement with the Entente. The first symptoms of the change will probably take the form of an agitation for peace, and this to judge from past experience may be expected to originate in the army. The season for the spring sowing is near at hand, and the peasant soldiers will begin to ask why they are being kept from their fields now that Macedonia has been won? If their discontent does not take an active form in the spring it will probably do so in the summer as in 1913, when, at the approach of the harvest, it confronted the Government with

the choice of a general disbandment or an immediate incursion into Macedonia. Today Macedonia has been won, so the demand will be for peace alone - unless, indeed, the Western Powers against invade that country with the intention, real or supposed, of re-establishing Serbian rule. There is certainly a strong desire, both in the army and the country, to regain Adrianople and Thrace, which were won at a heavy cost and were afterwards filched by Turkey, but Germany interposes her veto, which will be supported by her friends in high places; their attitude will tend to provoke a reaction towards the Entente Powers, without whose aid the complete realisation of the national progamme cannot be attained.

That a reaction will take place at first in favour of peace and afterwards in favour of the Entente Powers seems practically certain, but whether these Powers will know how to profit by it it is hard to foresee. From the first they underestimated the important place of Bulgaria in the world conflict, while Germany gauged it accurately. Even now the defection of Bulgaria from the Central Powers would spell the ruin of Germany's ambition in Asia and Africa and would give the signal for the adhesion of Rumania and Greece to the Entente. Such a volte face can at present be only reckoned as a possibility, for the present holders of power who have compromised the future in regard to Russia will not readily relax their grasp. But it would at least be advisable for the Entente Powers to let the situation ripen

and to abstain from unnecessary and gratuitous provocations. "Punitive" measures devoid of any military importance can only have an exasperating effect like the German bombardment of the east coast of England."

When Bulgaria collapsed and was the first to fall out of the fight, Bourchier's main thought was to forestall influences which were opposed to a just peace. Writing on October 22nd, 1918 -

"I greatly fear that pledges may now be given to these people (Yugo-Slavia, Greece and Rumania) which may tie our hands at the Peace Conference. And if we are to have the League of Nations by and bye, it will be indeed deplorable if the power of united Europe is to be employed in maintaining an unjust and anti-national settlement made up in war time to suit the exigencies of the moment. No territorial delimitation should be thought of till the question of national distribution has been carefully and scientifically studied prior to the Congress."

One more opportunity occurred to make a stable settlement, and, in spite of failing health and official discouragement, Bourchier threw himself into the effort to see that reason and justice were followed at the Paris Conference. I found him there in August, 1919, and he would not budge from his post until the last. He pursued a forlorn hope through many wearisome and,

to him, solitary months. He failed. The settlement of Neuilly continued in an aggravated form the evil legacy of the Treaty of Bucarest. Had he lived, against that settlement, his efforts would be strenuously directed.

II.

The narration of his deeds illustrates the fact that in him there were two sides which only in the rarest cases find themselves combined together; the active political outlook which must in most cases absorb the energy of a politician; the serene altruism of a personality more likely to be found in one who never touched politics.

I do not refer to the oddities which were the delight of his friends; a chapter might be written on his self-effacement, his absent-mindedness, his habit of losing everything except the notes for his political telegrams, his apparent use of extreme deafness to increase the quantity of official knowledge which he acquired. His friends (and also his enemies) would love to tell how at a dance he had been known to comment to his partner on the absence of Mrs Smith or Mrs Jones, ignoring the fact that he was addressing the lady herself. Nothing daunted by his inability to hear what his guests were saying, he would give large dinner parties (at which he often arrived late), and would entertain vast crowds to tea at the Harrow and Eton Match. It is indeed a fact that his desire to live and feel like an active young man inspired him at the age of 70 to dye his hair.

But it is rather of his moral qualities than of his peculiarities of style that an account should be given if any true estimate of the man is to be recorded. He was endowed with a very gracious manner, and this was not a manner only, but an indication of a temperament extraordinarily benevolent in various ways. Benevolence is not often both individual and general; some men are personally kind, and others are more given to diffused humanitarianism. Bourchier was both. He appeared incapable of an angry word or, indeed, of criticism either of persons or of classes. Otherwise to the last he displayed an extraordinary distaste for criticising individuals, and on one occasion when I have known him to deprecate an appointment on moral grounds, he did so with the utmost reluctance. Few could have found so little pleasure in fault-finding.

I cannot recollect his discoursing on the weak points of any section except perhaps at a moment when, as an Irish Protestant, he would timidly and regrettably dwell on the defects of the Roman Church.

The rare occasions when he reluctantly embarked on criticism brought to light another of his little personal oddities. It would lead him to make the quaintest plaintive sounds of which probably his deafness left him unaware.

This unusual benevolence he combined with sympathetic action for those who suffered.

He possessed a very high sense of justice, and was roused to action not merely by barbarities but, for instance, on behalf of some village where he chanced to ride and where he found that the use of land was being interfered with by the authorities. Not even his enthusiasm for Bulgaria would prevent him from forcing the case upon the government. He might be said to combine the abnegation of the saint with the confidence of the man of the world, for his self-effacement left unweakened the self-respect which compelled him to fight his battle when the "Times" wished to remove him. For 30 years he remained in close contact with the crimes and weaknesses which would have made most men cynical, and he was objective enough to be uninfluenced by any of the illusions of the idealist.

Qualities of this rare kind, contrary to common experience, earned for him in social life a respect which was unaffected by his inability to hear or control a conversation, and in the Balkans gave him a prestige which was unquestionably unique.

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just lately the Moslem bands, acting under orders from the Young Turks, have been on their good behaviour in view of the approaching elections. The elections and British criticism combined have led to a show of conciliation on the part of the C.U.P. and to the despatch of a commission of "reforms" which Robert-

Very flattering!

Graves has been induced to accompany — I doubt whether he will be allowed to see much, but his presence will be useful to the Y. Ts pour faire foi, as the French say, as the good intentions of the Commission. The elections, of course, will be even a greater farce than the last ones, as the C.U.P. has all the local functionaries at command, and the

gerrymandering of the constituencies is going on apace. Even so, the Liberty party is confident of success, but we shall see.

The Greco-Bulgarian Entente is going on well and offers perhaps the only safeguard against the policy of Ottomanism which no doubt will be revived if the CUP triumphs at the elections. I had lately long conversations with the

8

Patriarch and the Exarch — both are convinced of the necessity for cooperation in order to save the privileges of the subject populations. The Balkan Committee would do well to urge this on both Greeks and Bulgars. The revival of European control is desirable, if only as an antidote to Austro-Russian condominium, but this (the control) can hardly be mooted till the war comes to an end.

I leave for Crete tomorrow, but the above address will find me for some weeks to come.

Yours very sincerely J. D. Bourchier

Conjectural and proposals.

16

Memorandum by

~~Letter from~~ J. D. Bourchier (Balkan Correspondent of the "Times

~~to N. Buxton.~~ Bukharest,
Jan. 1916.

There are many indications that both Turkey and Bulgaria are already weary of the war. In neither case should these symptoms be neglected. In the case of Turkey, however, there is no probability of any change of policy unless the ruling clique, which maintains itself in power with the aid of Germany, can be overthrown. This could only be effected by a military pronunciamento. A popular outbreak might indeed occur should the present scarcity at Constantinople develop into famine, but it would be ruthlessly suppressed: precautions have already been taken by the extermination of the Armenian and Greek elements while the Moslem element lacks initiative and would submit without complaint to the first privation. The chances of a movement in the army seem slight; The Young Turks have banished or otherwise eliminated the malcontents in the corps of officers; supplies for the troops will be forthcoming from Bulgaria, which is already sending cereals to Germany, while their spirits have been raised by highly coloured reports of the check inflicted on our troops in Mesopotamia, the withdrawal from Anzac and the retreat of the allies to Salonika. The prospects of a military coup may therefore be left out of consideration notwithstanding the growing discord between the Turkish and German officers. It is true that events in Turkey often belie all expectations; a crisis might be brought about should Germany prepare to send an army to Constaninople, but, for the present at least, this seems improbable. The claims of Russia to Constantinople form a permanent barrier to a separate arrangement between the Entente and Turkey; these claims will become more prominent should Russia succeed in her present offensive in Bukovina and Galicia: should she fail, the Young Turks will be encouraged to persist in their present policy. Whatever may happen there is no prospective opening for negotiation - which

gy vice versa

in any case, would be impossible until the prestige of our arms has been restored.

On the other hand, the possibility of detaching Bulgaria from the Central Powers and Turkey is at least worth serious consideration. It must always be remembered that Bulgaria took up arms with the sole object of recovering Macedonia, which had been guaranteed to her by her treaty with Serbia and taken from her by the Treaty of Bucarest. No other motive would have induced either the people or the army to carry out the programme laid down for them by King Ferdinand and his ministers. Other considerations may have been present in the minds of the King and his advisers, but the nation thought of nothing but Macedonia. Unquestionably, the bulk of the community would have preferred to effect the liberation of the kindred race with the aid of Russia and the Western Powers, and so widely spread was this feeling that the Government did not dare to convoke the Sobranye at the usual time (towards the end of October) and even entered upon the war without consulting the national representatives. Had it done so it would have experienced a parliamentary defeat. By maintaining martial law and a rigorous press censorship while encouraging an active German propaganda and winking at a liberal distribution of German gold among the politicians and the Macedonians, the party in power succeeded in stifling the voice of the country and in spreading the belief that Macedonia could only be rescued with the aid of the Central Powers. At the same time Germanophil officers were installed in the Ministry of War and in the higher commands of the army, from which the partisans of the Entente were ejected. Notwithstanding all the precautions of the Government, it was evident, after the decree of mobilization had been issued, that the peasant-soldiers had by no means abandoned their traditional veneration for Russia and

that they came to the colours without enthusiasm. They were ready and even eager to fight with Serbia for Macedonia, but they were reluctant to appear in arms against Russia or against Great Britain which has always held the next place to Russia in the affections of the people. Anyone who had witnessed the mobilisation of 1912 could not fail to be struck by the contrast which now presented itself in the demeanor of the reservists. But they were consoled in some measure by the assurance that Macedonia had been promised to Bulgaria by the Entente Powers and that they would be allowed to return to their homes once the liberation of their kinsmen had been accomplished.

It seems necessary to recall these circumstances in order to make the present situation clear. Once in presence of the enemy, the troops fought well and their successes tended to mitigate the antagonism of the Russophil opposition parties and to win a temporary popularity for the King and the Government. The Sobranye, convoked at the very latest date allowed by the law, ceased to be refractory, and all the supplies demanded by the Government have been voted. It remains to be seen how these funds are to be provided and how long the political armistice will hold good.

The bill for the conquest of Macedonia has yet to be settled and the country, already exhausted by the wars of 1912 and 1913, cannot pay it without foreign financial aid. Up to the present, Germany has acted as paymaster, but, with penniless Turkey also on her hands, she must presently limit her largesses both to the State and to individuals. Bulgaria is now expected to provide cereals both for Germany and Turkey, and a considerable amount of gold has come into the country, but the price of foodstuffs is rising enormously and the Government will soon be compelled to prohibit the export of corn. The price of other commodities, such as

leather, metals of various kinds, etc., has been doubled or trebled and Bulgaria cannot supply herself from the newly-conquered regions, which have been literally stripped bare by the Germans and Austrians.

A serious economic crisis seems therefore inevitable and the attendant discontent will increase pari passu with the decline of the enthusiasm kindled by the Macedonian campaign. A hungry people will cease to regard the Germans and Austrians as heaven-sent benefactors and the question will arise how to get rid of them and how to put an end to the war. The arrogance and tactless conduct of the Germans, who treat the Bulgarians as inferiors, has already begun to render their presence irksome to a people which, at best, regards the presence of foreigners in their midst with many misgivings.

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her policy. Kavala can only be obtained with the acquiescence of the maritime Powers. The Enos-Media line will never be conceded by Germany, which, many Bulgarians suspect, has made a secret compact with the Porte for the restitution of the Maritza valley to Turkey.

These simple considerations are obvious enough to most Bulgarians, and the logical and inevitable consequence must be the growth of a tendency to abandon the Central Powers and to seek a rapprochement with the Entente. The first symptoms of the change will probably take the form of an agitation for peace, and this to judge from past experience may be expected to originate in the army. The season for the spring ~~sowin~~ sowing is near at hand, and the peasant soldiers will begin to ask why they are being kept from their fields now that Macedonia has been won? If their discontent does not take an active form in the spring it will probably do so in the summer as in 1913, when, at the approach of the harvest, it confronted the Government with the choice of a general disbandment or an immediate incursion into Macedonia. To-day Macedonia has been won, so the demand will be for peace alone - unless, indeed, the Western Powers again invade that country with the intention, real or supposed, of re-establishing Serbian rule. There is certainly a strong desire, both in the army and the country, to regain Adrianople and Thrace, which were won at such a heavy cost and were afterwards filched by Turkey, but Germany interposes her veto, which will be supported by her friends in high places; their attitude will tend to provoke a reaction towards the Entente Powers, without whose aid the complete realization of the national programme cannot be attained.

Ferdy? or Simeon?

That a reaction will take place at first in favour of peace and afterwards in favour of the Entente Powers seems practically certain, but whether these Powers will know how to

profit by it it is hard to foresee. From the first they underestimated the important place of Bulgaria in the world conflict, while Germany gauged it accurately. Even now the defection of Bulgaria from the Central Powers would spell the ruin of Germany's ambition in Asia and Africa and would give the signal for the adhesion of Rumania and Greece* to the Entente. Such a volte face can at present be only reckoned as a possibility, for the present holders of power who have compromised the future in regard to Russia will not readily relax their grasp. But it would at least be advisable for the Entente Powers to let the situation ripen and to abstain from unnecessary and gratuitous provocations. "Punitive" measures devoid of any military importance can only have an exasperating effect like the German bombardment of the east coast of England.

* If B gets Kavala?

Letter from J. D. Bourchier (Balkan Correspondent of the "Times"

to N. Buxton. Bukharest, Jan. 1916.

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The bill for the conquest of Macedonia has yet to be settled and the country, already exhausted by the wars of 1912 and 1913, cannot pay it without foreign financial aid. Up to the present, Germany has acted as paymaster, but, with penniless Turkey also on her hands, she must presently limit her largesses both to the State and to individuals. Bulgaria is now expected to provide cereals both for Germany and Turkey, and a considerable amount of gold has come into the country, but the price of foodstuffs is rising enormously and the Government will soon be compelled to prohibit the export of corn. The price of other commodities, such as

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There is no longer any reason why Bulgaria should either tolerate the Germans or continue the war. With the annexation of Macedonia her object in taking up arms has been achieved. She has no conceivable inducement to shed her blood for the advancement of German schemes regarding Constantinople and Asia Minor, which, if realized, would reduce her to the humiliating position of a corridor State. She has no motive for continuing the fight except the fear that the triumph of the Entente Powers would entail the loss of Macedonia and the restoration of alien rule in that country. Could she be assured against such a result, her loyalty to her present allies, which rests on no basis of sentiment, kinship or religion, would be rapidly undermined. Her national aims now reduce themselves to the recovery of a portion of the Dobrodja, to the acquisition of Kavala as a commercial outlet and to the restoration of the Enos-Media line guaranteed to her by Europe. With regard to the Dobroja, Rumania is ready to make concessions should Bulgaria change

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Write to JDB.

Have you will against
never to as to enforce
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have hoisted the flag
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attack on T

Memorial Notes.

Bourchier.

Bourchier's was a temperament apparently designed for reflection but forced throughout the best part of his life to action. It therefore seems more appropriate to narrate the events in his life that one knows than to attempt an estimate of his character, impossible though it is to separate his political activities from reflections on his personality.

I first heard of Bourchier when I visited Athens soon after the Turco-Greek War. Although two years had passed, his name was in every British mouth and from the stories I heard of his reckless exploits, his weird insistence on bathing at every stage of military operations, and a hundred other peculiarities, I pictured a man who made a speciality of advertising himself by oddities and enjoyed a conspicuous pose.

Rather unattracted by this mental picture I met him for the first time many months later and at once found, to my surprise, that he represented rather the type described in the Elizabethean couplet :

"Although a lion in the field,
A lamb at home,
Thou shalt him find."

He was then the "Times" correspondent for the Balkan States in general, but spent most of his time at Sofia, and it was there that his characteristic life was led. Others have seen more of him in Europe; it fell to me to see perhaps more than any other of his friends of the life which was most characteristic of him. He occupied two small rooms in the Bulgaria Hotel, where he was attended by his favourite peasant, Ivan, a herculean figure in native dress, who, though Mayor of his village, regarded himself as the most honoured of all Bulgarians in being allowed to be Bourchier's valet. Among his other duties was the charge of the two ponies which these picturesque companions daily rode in the public park. The furniture consisted largely of gifts from peasants, and nothing caused its owner more pride than the portrait of himself in Bulgarian costume which his admirers had presented. It might be said that the only article of luxury was his piano, and this he might be heard playing after the fashion of Mr. Arthur Balfour in the small hours of the night. He could not

adapt himself to customary time-tables. He began his day with lunch at the resort of diplomats, the Union Club; in the afternoon he rode. He then wrote his telegrams when everyone else was dining, and he dined towards mid-night.

In those days he regarded the Balkans as terribly dull, in comparison with the times of Stambuloff, when especially during the regime of Lascelles, Nicholson, and Harding at the British Legation some stirring episode occurred daily. But the unfortunate populations which had been replaced under the Turkish yoke in 1878 were constantly in his mind, and when they had recovered sufficient strength to create the internal organisation which began operations in 1902, it was not to him a mere piece of news for journalism, but the first episode in the redress of what he regarded as a gigantic crime. He had never forgotten Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, by which the Powers bound themselves to protect the Macedonians, and his unremitting energy was given to promote that vindication. When the rising of 1903, with its cruel and barbarous campaign occurred, it was through him in the columns of the "Times" that the

event assumed high importance in Gt. Britain. He called upon every possible sympathiser who might take up the case and combated the others of those who, like the Balkan Committee, attempted to thwart our Government in the discharge of its duties. It was then that he began to make his annual visits to England into occasions for propagandist work, and, regardless of his own interests, spoke, for instance, at the Balkan Committee's meetings. Never perhaps, before or since, has a newspaper correspondent exercised such a wide influence on public opinion in favour of a course which might otherwise have taken a humbler place. Nor was he content with writing and speaking. He threw himself, like any relief agent, into the work of visiting refugees and personally aiding the sufferers. The Internal Commission with its gendarmerie officers would have been little known to the world without him, and their failure to prevent what were known in the Constantinopole Embassies as the 'Butchers' bills', were unremittingly dragged into public notice by his pen.

Five years of farcical internal inspection ended in the Young Turk revolution, and the withdrawal by Sir Edward Grey, together with other foreign Ministers, of such restraints as existed. There was nothing for it but to offer to the Young Turks such British support as might have led them to see that their hope lay in decent administration, but Bourchier's mind was too objective to place its hopes either in Turkish reform or the philanthropy of the British Foreign Office. Young Turkey was not long in justifying his sceptical objectivity, and it became clear to him that no solution lay that way. He was not one to tolerate inaction, and having seen the failure of the great Powers, he turned to the small.

The early part of 1912 he spent in bringing into accord the three Balkan Governments concerned, and the result was the first Balkan war.

Quote letter.

The success of that experiment depended on a good press for the States which were to replace the Turkish Empire, and no one who remembers the prestige which our traditions gave to Turkey in military and naval circles can but realise that some powerful influence was present to turn the sympathies of the British conservative mind to a new cause. That powerful influence was mainly Bourchier's pen. The sad sequel of disunion in the second Balkan war left him cast down but not despairing, and he continued to remind the world that peace cannot be based on injustice.

When the cataclysm of August, 1914, came, his mind turned to the possibility of effecting at once the solution of the Balkan tangle and the re-enforcement of the forces of the Allies. The story of the way in which that solution was neglected need not be repeated here. It must be remembered that among the cards which

the Allies had in their hands for securing the obviously indispensable aid of Bulgaria was the prestige which Gt. Britain possessed in Bulgaria through Bourchier's amazing popularity in that country. His attitude may best be given in his own words

quote letters.

One more opportunity occurred to make a stable settlement, and, in spite of failing health and official discouragement, Bourchier threw himself into the effort to see that reason and justice were followed at the Paris Conference. I found him there in August, 1919, and he would not budge from his post until the last. He pursued a forlorn hope through many wearisome and, to him, solitary months.

The narration of his deeds is quite inadequate, because when one thinks of him it is impossible to separate the political from the personal. There were in him two sides which are in the rarest cases combined together with the practical political objective outlook which must in most cases absorb the energy of a politician; there was a personality more likely to be found in one who never touched politics. I do not refer to the oddities which were the delight of his friends; a chapter might be written on his self-effacement, his absent-mindedness, his habit of losing everything except the notes for his political telegrams, his apparent use of extreme difficulties to increase the quantity of official knowledge which he acquired. His friends, and also his enemies would love to tell how at a dance he had been known to comment to his partner on the absence of Mrs. Smith or Jones, ignoring the fact that he was addressing the lady herself. Nothing daunted by his inability to hear what his guests were saying, he would give dinner parties at which he arrived late, and would entertain to tea at the Harrow and Eton Match vast crowds. It is indeed a fact that his

desire to be an active young man inspired him at the age of 70 to dye his hair.

But it is of his ethical genius that much must be stated if any true estimate of the man is to be recorded. He was endowed with a very gracious manner, and this was not a manner only, but was an indication of a temperament extraordinarily benevolent in various ways; some men are personally kind, and others are more given to general humanitarianism. Bourchier appeared incapable of an angry word or, indeed, of criticism of persons as well as classes. I cannot recollect his discoursing on the weak points of any section, with the one exception that doubtless, as an Irish Protestant, he would timidly and regrettably dwell on the defects of the Roman Church. His criticism brought to light another of his little personal oddities. It would lead him to the quaintest plaintive sounds of which doubtless his defects made him unaware in a large degree. He combined this personal kindness with sympathetic action for those who

suffered (quote "Times" letter)

He had in the highest degree a sense of justice, not merely against barbarities but, for instance, on behalf of some village where he chanced to ride and where he found that the use of land was being interfered with by the authorities, not even his enthusiasm for the Bulgars would prevent him from forcing their case upon the government. He might be said to combine the saint with the man of the world, yet his self-effacement left untouched the self-respect which perhaps in Pauline phrase compelled him to fight his battle when the "Times" wished to remove him. He was in touch for 30 years with the crimes and weaknesses which commonly inspire cynicism, and he was objective enough to be uninfluenced by any of the terms of the idealist. He saw things exactly as they were, yet to the last he displayed an extraordinary distaste for criticising individuals, and on one occasion when I have known him to deprecate an appointment on moral

grounds, he did so with the utmost reluctance. Few could have found so little pleasure in fault-finding.

It was qualities of this rare kind which, contrary to common experience, gave him in social life a respect for his personality which was unaffected by his inability to hear or control a conversation, and gave him also a prestige in the Balkans which was unquestionably unique.

2

Sofia, le Xmas Day 1914

My dear Buxton

On receiving your post-card today I telegraphed to you to Athens advising you to go to London. I think you are much needed there now. With the knowledge and experience you have gained you ought to be able to give the Government much valuable information. The main point is that we must bring Rumania and Bulgaria into line in order to finish the Eastern campaign. The Rumanian advance into Transylvania and the Banat would not only cut the communications of the Austrians (should they invade Servia again) but would afford such protection to the Russian left that the Russians could concentrate all their forces for an advance to the N. West — to Berlin. It would practically decide the result of the Eastern campaign and perhaps that of the whole war. The Germans would be compelled to weaken their Western front

to such a degree that the allies could advance to the Rhine and beyond it. At the worst, the Rumanian advance would greatly shorten the campaign, saving thousands of lives and millions of money. They say they can put 500,000 men - let us say 450,000 - into the field. But Bulgaria blocks the way. I am composing heaven and earth to bring about a rapprochement and things are going better every day. The Rumanians still say they will not stir unless Bulgaria takes simultaneous action in Macedonia. In order to bring this about we should put the utmost pressure on Servia to permit a pacific Bulgarian occupation of Western Macedonia up to the line agreed upon in 1912 - this is what the Government here wants - the country has had too much of war. The Bulgarians would of course receive a mandate from the Entente: this would preclude Greek interference. If the Servians prove obstinate (they will not if the Powers are firm) they should be told that we shall give the mandate in any case. It is not a moment for trifling when great issues are at stake. But I fear the Russians will continue to wobble as heretofore. Once Rumano-Bulgarian parallel action is arranged we should give financial aid to both states. The first step for Rumania to take is to give Bulgaria something in hand - Dobritch and Baltchik for instance. Bulgaria would close with this - without prejudice to her future case before the Congress. As to the Servians it is so

RESTAURANT FRANÇAIS
EXCELLENTE CAVE

POSTE, TELEGRAPHE
COIFFEUR À LA MAISON
AUTO-GARAGE

TELEGRAMM-ADRESSE
BULGARIE HÔTEL-
SOFIA.

TELEPHON:
N° 218 - 953.

V. ROZANKOVSKI I URIS ZAGREB

MAISON PREMIER
ORDRE
CHAUFFAGE CENTRAL
LUMIÈRE ÉLÉCTRIQUE

CHAMBRES À PARTIR
DE FR 4.

BAINS ET DOUCHES
DANS CHAQUE ETAGE

APPARTEMENTS

SALLE DE LECTURE
FUMOIR

SAFE.

Grand Hôtel Bulgarie Sofia

en face du Palais Royal.

Sofia, le .....

obviously their interest to do anything to hasten the victory of the Entente that no resistance on their part should be tolerated. It would be otherwise if we asked them to surrender genuinely Servian territory, but these regions they spontaneously recognized as Bulgarian in 1912. It seems to me the Powers might hasten matters if they would definitely offer to Servia in case of victory Bosnia, 3/4 of Herzegovina and (say) 4 Dalmatian ports - Gravosa Metkovich Spalato and Sebenico - possibly even Zara, but there are difficulties regarding the more Catholic portion of Dalmatia.

Of course you will let it be known how we are handicapped diplomatically both here and at Bucarest - here there is nothing but mutual dislike and suspicion, and you had to contend against unseen forces. It occurs to me that Robert Gram might be exceedingly useful here now: he knows the Balkans at his fingers' end and the Bulgarians like him. At present he is en disponibilité, I believe. His long knowledge of Macedonia would be especially valuable. I don't know whether the rules of the Service would prevent his being temporarily appointed here, say, as Consul-General. Anyhow there is ample precedent for a special mission - e.g. Lord Salisbury at Constantinople before the last Russo-Turkish war. I have heard Lord E. Fitzmaurice suggested, but I don't suppose he would come -

Your visit has been very valuable -

RESTAURANT FRANÇAIS
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

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It is too soon to tell the Bulgarians to "help the Servians". That has been the Russian blunder. In going into Macedonia they will directly help themselves (in two senses) – that is what they understand – and indirectly the Servians Rumanians and us. When Rumania and Bulgaria take action Italy will probably do likewise. It is also too soon to talk of reviving the Balkan alliance. That cannot be done until the Treaty of Bucarest has been abrogated –

Yours ever

D. D. Bourchier

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

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Sofia le

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