a/b/16

Ld Percy Private

Many thanks for yr letter. I am very glad to think that we are in essential accord about European control. It is a horrid state of things, till we get it & I want to see the heads of the rival cutthroats knocked together by a strong authority. Control seems to me very desirable on another ground - viz that the trade will be very much improved by the establishment of order, without being injured by the high duties natural to a military occupation. The Bosnian trade was worth keeping. ~~Control of also~~ Also I do think a Russian Kavalla will be very expensive

I control will avoid that.

What I meant about "agitation" was that ~~it may without it~~ diplomacy may make use of it, for Lansdowne has often alluded to it, to strengthen his exhortations.

As to unverified stories, I am glad you did not refer to the Balkan Committee. If we are caught lying, I shd like to be convicted.

~~Observation (of the Times)~~

1/Bryce

37a

Lord Bryce to Mr Noel Buxton

British Embassy, Washington March 14 1909

My ~~dear~~ Noel,

~~There seems to be no reason why the Memorandum you enclose, which I return, should not be sent~~ to E Grey I agree with the idea, and see no objection unless the one that the old Turks might be still more suspicious of the Young Turks if the latter were trained in England, yet this did not prevent Abdul Hamid from sending officers to Germany to be trained.

Of course the Germans may be jealous, but them they received Turks before and sent their men to Turkey to train Turks there. So they are not entitled to complain. But tho I think the F.O. and other Departments would do well to give all facilities, and might let you tell your Turkish friends that facilities will b given, still it will be better that the request should come form them and that they should appear as the moving spirit in the matter.

Whetr the Embassy has been against the Young Turks I dont know. Pwrhaps from old hatred they mah have leant to the idea of "authority" even in the eprson of that old wrtech. But the F.O. has been for the Young Turks all along, and behaved very well, so far at least as I cn judge from the telegrams. I hear that Sir W Whittall also was good, and gave shelter to Young Turk generals when they were in danger. The Bulgarians have shewn good sense; and the good relations between them and the Armenians and the Young Turks are the best features of the situation. ~~There are some clerical errors in the Memorandum which will need correcting bef re you send it~~. I would rather the Y T came to England than went to Egypt , but Cromer ought to know best.

Yours always,

JAMes Bryce

11

~~To Grey 1909~~

The Maintenance of the New Regime in Turkey

36a

The problems of financial or other material help, in connection with the relations of Great Britain and Turkey, are such as public opinion is not called on to deal with at present in any direct way; but the chief of all the methods by which Turkey may be assisted is not material, but psychological, and those who are in touch with Turkish affairs, may venture to express their views upon it.

In discussing this question, European residents in Turkey base their hopes and fears, not on material factors, but on the character and training of the Turks.

The problem is one which those most familiar with the Turks are best qualified to speak, and on which we should regard of the highest value the views of the chief dragomans of the embassy and the other members of the permanent staff.

Europeans who know the Turks are on the whole doubtful as to the permamence of the new regime. The English are biassed towards optimism, because the friendship of England and Turkey, which they all desire, can only last as long as public order in Turkey is maintained, and thus in turn depends on the continued energy and power of the reforming elements. Yet in spite of their bias there is a widespread fear that the notorious reluctance of the Turkish mind to persist in any reforming effort will assert itself as it always has hitherto .

Without such novel persistence there will be no diligent reorganisation of public services, and in particular the police force will remain inefficient. Then, in course of time, religious or racial fanaticism reappearing in the ordinary course, will express themselves in traditional habits of violence, and, meeting with no juster or more effective arm of the law than before, will lead to such excesses as must make an Anglo-Turkish entente again impossible.

Helim Pasha has shown that he is alive to this cardinal fact, when he spoke of removing by education, superstitions which make men of different race and religion regard each other as enemies. If then, England can in any way help to keep the governing classes of Turkey in a progressive mood, the effort will amply repay itself, from the point of view of interest as well as humanity.

Special Commissioners It might be very attractive to the Turkish authorities if they were allowed to send members of their Civil service to study the working of Government Departments in England. A number of such students have already been accomodated in the Treasury at Paris. To arrange with the officials in the Departmets, to give the necessary attention, would no doubt involve difficulty; but however great the trouble involved, the cost amd the risk are not to

be compared with thoseof financial and warlike help, and may even be more profitable,

The Turks might probably think that Finance, where Frenchmen are already atvwork, shpuld be left to French influence, but the Board of Trade , the Local Government Board, the Post office, and the Home Office, might put them in the way of seeing much that they wish to learn. But further they need to instruct men, as the Japanese trained theirs, in municipal work and government. H.M.G might obtain the consent of the L.C.C. to show its work and offer the attention of its officials. Many members and ex-members of the L.C.C (doubtless including Mr Mackinnon Wood) would be keenly interested.

STUDENTS With regard to students, there is much to say against sending them too freely to Europe, but some will nop doubt be so sent and England would suit them best in many ways. H.M.G might obtain special terms for Turks from some of the Great Hospitals, or again from certain Universities. It might even arrange for introductions to financial houses, such as were privately obtained by the Japanese.

Egypt Perhaps the greatest serviee possible would be the offer to attach Turks to public departments in Egypt. I am allowed by Lord Cromer to state that subject to the opinion of Sir E Gorst, heesees no objection whatever to his proposal. In education police and public works the Turks would find object lessons more appropriate than in any other country.

C OBJECTIONS

It may be urged that diplomacy is not concerned with the internal affairs of another state, and that in supporting an internal movement the danger arises of taking sides. But an exception to ordinary principles has always been made in the case of Turkey. Notoriously has recent policy been one of actual interference of a drastic kind, but in former days a vigorous policy of galvanisation was pursued, notably by Canning: and further there has been no hdding of the fact that English support is for the civilising parties in Turkey, and for them alone. It already assmes the desire for progress ve education. Again, the policy proposed has already been adopted by France and Germany. ~~Secondly~~

Secondly, it might appear inferfering. This is merely a matter of tact, such as Sir G Lowther already applies. Again, it is no more than the national sequence to the avowed policy of Great Britain which is one of support to Turkey conditional on its being reformed. It follows also upon the Grand Vizier's utterances on education ,and on the requests for advice of the Government and the Committee of Union and Progress addressed to the Embassy, as also to the Balkan Committee.
It is not more but less than the policy of Canning, who concerned himself with the purely local interests of the Turks, after the manner of an Australian Governor.

Finally if it be urged that Turks may well remain under the influence of France, it is only necessary to refer to Lord Cromer's

/ Lord Cromer's

opinion (v his book on Egypt) of the politco-educational (apart from the moral) influence of French thought to show that for the sake of the new regime in Turkey, English influence is worth an effort.

Such an offer of assistance would have two efects. It would actually help towards better training. Secondly, which is more important, it would immediately exercise a stimulating influence on the Turksih mind, which is highly sentinmental, subject to moods, and specially sensitive to English feeling. Such remarks as the following are common "Let England do what she likes with us" A great responsibility and and a great opportunity are evident. They are not difficult to use. The neglect of them might be long and bitterly neglected.

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

Private
Mr. Peterson

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON.

November 25, 1908.

My Dear Noel

Have you any recent information of a trustworthy kind about what is passing in Bulgaria and Macedonia? I am afraid that the Bulgarians may have been surprised by British action and may not have understood fully that it has been dictated not by any want of sympathy with them but entirely by our feeling that the reforming party in Turkey ought to have a chance, and that an opportunity, which has never before arisen in history, for a reconcilement of Christians and Mussulmans on the basis of good feeling and equality ought not to be lost but turned to the best account in view of the future.

Have you reason to think that this misconception prevails in Bulgaria? If so, could it be removed?

It is not possible for me (for reasons which you will understand) to take any action, as I should have done had I been a private person at home in England. But it occurs

to me to consider whether you might not get the Balkanians to abbreviate our position, because they will trust you. I believe you are aware that our sympathies with them has not declined. It is important, both politically. that they should realize this. Perhaps you may think that you had better not do this unless after previous communication with the F.O. : or perhaps you may have done it already. Anyhow you can think the matter over. No letter from you has yet reached me in England & I gather that the two letters I wrote you equally failed to reach you. It was unfortunate. However we are agreed as to policy. Never did I expect to be backing Turks: but the course you have taken & that the Govt. have taken seems under these changed conditions the perfectly right. Always truly yours

James Bryce

November 25 08 British Embassy, Washington

My dear Noel,

Have you any recent information of a trustworthy kind about what is passing in Bulgaria and Macedonia? I am afraid that the Bulgarians may have been surpirsed by British action and mau not have understood fully that it has been dictated not by any want of sympathy with them but entirely by our feeling that the reform -ing Party in Turkey ought to have a chance, and that an opportunity, which has never before arisen in history, for a reconcilement of Christians and Mussulmans on the nasis of good feeling and equality ought not to be lost but turned to the best account in view of the future.

Have you reason to think that this misconception prevails in Bulgaria? If so, could it be removed? It is not possible for me (for reasons which you will understand) to take any action, as I should have a done had I been a private prson in England. But it occurs to me to consider whether you might not get the B Bulgarians to appreciate our position, because they will trust you and believe your assurances that our sympathy with them has not declined. It is important politically that they should realise this. Perhaps you may think that you had better not do this unless after previous communication with the F.O. or perhaps you may have done it already. Anyhow you can think the matter over. We are agreed as to policy. Never did I expect to be supporting Turks: but the course you have taken and that the Government have taken seems under these changedconditions to be perfectly right. Always truly yours, James Bryce.

Bryce

3, Buckingham Gate,
S.W.
February 7th. 1915.

My dear Noel,

Thank you for your lucid and statesmanlike exposé of the Balkan situation which you and Charlie have sent me. I agree with it almost entirely; indeed it represents pretty much what conversations with the Serbian and Bulgarian Ministers have brought me to. You are altogether right in holding that Bulgaria is entitled to have precise terms, that she ought to have Central Macedonia and probably Kavalla also, that Serbia would almost certainly acquiesce if she were at the same time promised Bosnia and Herzogovina and part of Dalmatia with access to the sea (with those she could probably before long get Croatia also) and that similarly Greece must be promised Smyrna and all the islands that Italy can be persuaded not to press for. We might even think of dangling Cyprus before her which is of very little use to us.

But I should make it a condition that Bulgaria join the Allies actively in which case she ought to have Adrianople also and the whole coast of the Marmora.

All the States are now bluffing and will continue to bluff till a positive statement is made by the Allies. They ought to be told that if they do not accept this they may get nothing. Roumania, of course, will have Transylvania - a great prize for her.

My fear is that the F.O. are not fully alive to the supreme importance of settling this. Perhaps, however, they anticipate difficulties from Russia. If the scheme goes through, we or France, ought to send a strong force to Salonica to attack Austria from the Danube in conjunction with Roumania and Serbia. We must talk over this. If you are every day at the House of Commons, I will come and see you there. I want to tell you also what is in the wind about Armenia. The Armenians, besides having sent many volunteers to help Russia, want to land a volunteer force in Cilicia and raise the mountaineers of Zeitun and Aintab, but they want first to be assured that Russia will be friendly and would like some promise of an autonomous province under Russian protection. I have talked to the F.O. about this, who are friendly enough but non-committal, and I have not pressed it further, regarding the Balkan question as more urgent.

The best chance of shortening the war seems to be in throwing the whole Balkan States at once - say in the

end of March - against Austria and the way to stiffen and hearten them will be to send a British or French force. I have said nothing about Albania because I do not understand it, nor what precisely are the respective claims of Italy and Greece, but Albania ought to be left independent of any Slav control. And what accession of territory is Montenegro to have?

Have you found the F.O. receptive of your ideas?

Yours always,

(Signed) BRYCE.

a3

Letter from Lord Bryce

July 1915

3, Buckingham Gate,
S. W.

My dear Noel,

Thank you for the lucid and statemanlike expose of the Balkan situation which you and Charlie have sent me. I agree with it almost entirely ; indeed it represents pretty much what conversations with the Serbian and Bulgarian Ministers have brought me to. You are altogether right in holding that Bulgaria is entitled to have precise terms, that she ought to have Central Macedonia and probably Kavalla also, that Serbia would almost certainly acquiesce if she were at the same time promised Bosnia and Herzogovina and part of Dalmatia with access to the sea (with these she could probably before long get Croatia also) and that similarly Greece must be promised Smyrna and all the islands that Italy can be persuaded not to press for. We might even think of dangling Cyprus before her which is of very little use to us.

But I should make it a condition that Bulgaria join the Allies actively in which case she ought to have Adrianople also and the whole coast of the Marmora.

All the States are now bluffing and will continue to bluff till a positive statement is made by the Allies. They ought to be told that if they do not accept this they may get nothing. Roumania of course will have Transylcania - a great prize for her.

My fear is that the F.O. are not fully alive to the supreme importance of settling this. Perhaps, however, they anticipate difficulties from Russia. If the scheme goes through, we or France, ought

to send a strong force to Salonica to attack Austria from the Danube in conjunction with Roumania and Serbia. We must talk over this. If you are every day at the House of Commons I will come and see you there. I want to tell you also what is in the wind about Armenia. The Armenians, besides having sent many volunteers to help Russia, want to land a volunteer force in Cilicia and raise the mountaineers of Zeitun and Aintab, but they want first to be assured that Russia will be friendly and would like some promise of an autonomous province under Russian protection. I have talked to the F.O. about this, who are friendly enough but non-committal and I have not pressed it further, regarding the Balkan question as more urgent.

The best chance of shortening the war seems to be in throwing the whole Balkan States at once - say in the end of March - against Austria and the way to stiffen and hearten them will be to send a British or French force. I have said nothing about Albania because I do not understand it, nor what precisely are the respective claims of Italy and Greece, but Albania ought to be left independent of any Slav control. And what accession of territory is Montenegro to have?

Have you found the F.O. receptive of your ideas?

Yours always,

Bryce.

House of Lords,
July 13, 1915.

My dear Noel,

Please consider this. Tho' it is marked private he is your friend and will be glad you should see it. Impossible for me to approach the "Times;" but as you know Wickham Steed, you might possibly think of telling him how valuable Bourchier is without hinting that he has written to me or to you.

Or can you suggest any other course?

Yours always,
(Sgd.) BRYCE.

Nov: 30th.

My dear Noel,

You may like to see this. Please return it. Is there anything we can usefully say to him? Things look pretty dark.

Yours always,

(Signed) BRYCE.

Nov: 30th.

My dear Noel,

You may like to see this. Please return it. Is there anything we can usefully say to him? Things look pretty dark.

Yours always,

(Signed) BRYCE.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

London,

New York, July 10th, 1916.

Dear Mr. President:-

I should not venture to address you but Mr. Charles Crane has suggested to me that it would be appropriate to do so, and allows me to mention his name.

It would have been a great pleasure to present in person the letter which Lord Bryce gave me, all the more because I feel that the Near Eastern questions, on which hewhas good enough to call me an authority, are unlikely to be settled on a national or permanent basis unless the influence of the United States is exerted in the settlement.

Though I came to America for work in connection with Armenian relief, it had been of absorbing interest to discuss the larger questions arising out of the war, and as it was impossible to see you, I am very glad to hear from Colonel House that he forwarded to you some of the information which I was able to furnish.

May I take the opportunity of expressing the admiration with which we English liberals, especially those of us who have sustained heavy personal losses through the war, welcome the speech delivered to the League to Enforce Peace on May 28th. Its insistence on the need of a League, and on the right of Nationality have brought opinion in England much nearer to the advocating mediation.

Believe me,

Yours very respectfully,

3, Buckingham Gate,
S.W.

1st August, 1916.

My dear Nock

I have read your notes with very great interest. Do you want the copy back, or may I keep it for further reflection?

It lets in light upon some points that were rather dark, and reveals some curious misconceptions which these Americans, who I take it belong mostly, or altogether to the Presidential Party, ~~some~~ seem to entertain.

I gather from other sources that, though they would like to mediate, they realise there is no chance at present. There will not be till the Germans are in a much more chastened frame of mind.

I would say more but have not time. I am going to Scotland on Thursday morning, but may possibly be able to be at the House of Lords to-morrow, Wednesday, from 4.30 till 5.30, but cannot be sure because very busy. If you could look in on the chance that I am able to get there, we could talk, but as the matter is not urgent it might stand over till Parliament meets in September or October. I am all for having U. S. mediation rather than any other, but have conveyed to our Democratic friends in U. S. that the time is not ripe. We could not make peace on a status quo ante basis. Always yours Bryce

3, Buckingham Gate,

S.W.I.

Ist. August, 1916.

My dear Noel,

I have read your notes with very great interest. Do you want the copy back, or may I keep it for further reflection?

It lets in light upon some points that were rather dark, and reveals some curious misconceptions which these Americans, who I take it belong mostly, or altogether to the Presidential Party, seem to entertain.

I gather from other sources that, though they would like to mediate, they realise there is no chance at present. There will not be till the Germans are in a much more chastened frame of mind.

I would say more but have not time. I am going to Scotland on Thursday morning, but may possibly be able to be at the House of Lords to-morrow, Wednesday, from 4.30 till 5.30, but cannot be sure because very busy. If you could look in on the chance that I am able to get there, we could talk, but as the matter is not

urgent it might stand over till Parliament meets in September or October.

I am all for having U.S. meditation rather than any other, but have conveyed to my democratic friends in U.S. that the time is not ripe. We could not make peace on a status quo ante basis.

Always yours,

(Sgd.) BRYCE.

Gask House
Auchterarder
N.B

Aug 8/16

~~KINNORDY~~
~~KIRRIEMUIR N.B.~~

My Dear Noel

Thank you
letting me see S. F.
Peabody's letter. I have
so much respect for him
that I have written the
enclosed. Will you please
forward it to him as I have
not his address by me
here?

Neither he nor the Evening
Post seems to understand
that what we feel is that
nothing but Defeat can
discredit in the German mind
that association of War with the
present & partners which has
become the curse of Germany.
Till it is discredited, she will
be under the further militar
yoke. and a 'peace' will be
only a truce.

I am glad you found E. Grey
round on the question of a plan
for permanent peace after
the War. He had better make
a speech to that effect some
time soon. Then we might
launch our peace scheme
which has been kept back
waiting for a favourable mo-
ment. At present I fear it
would receive no attention

Col. House writes home
a letter I will show you

when we meet, not that it contains anything novel.

The Republicans ought to follow suit & commit themselves to a ~~like~~ scheme such as Wilson approved — which is that of the (Taft) League, & ours.

Yours always

Bryce

? To use?

August 8 1916

My dear Noel

Thank you letting me see G.F Peabody's letter. I have so much respect for him that I have written the enclosed. Will you please forward it to him as I have not his adress by me here.

Neither he nor the Evening Post seems to understand that what we feel is that nothing but Defeat can discredit in the German mind that association of War with national prosperity and greatness which has become the curse of Germany. Till it is discredited, she will be under the Junker military yoke, and a "peace" will be only a truce.

I am glad you found E Grey sound on the question of a plan for permanent peace after the War. He had better make a speech to tht effect some time soon. Then we might launch our peace scheme which has been kept back waiting for a favourable moment. At present I fear it would receive no attention. Co House wrote to me a letter I will show you when we meet, not that it contains naything novel. The republicans ought to follow suit and commit themselves to a scheme such as Wilson approved - which is that of the Taft league and ours.

Bryce

August 8 1916

My dear Noel

Thank you letting me see G.F Peabody's letter. I have so much respect for him that I have written the enclosed. Will you please forward it to him as I have not his adress by me here.

Neither he nor the Evening Post seems to understand that what we feel is [that nothing but Defeat can discredit in the German mind that association of War with national prosperity and greatness which has become the curse of Germany.] Till it is discredited, she wil be under the Junker military yoke, and a "peace" will be only a truce.

I am glad you found E Grey sound on the question of a plan for permanent peace after the War. He had better make a speech to tht effect some time soon. Then we might launch our peace scheme which has been kept back waiting for a favourable moment. At present I fear it would receive no attention. Co House wrote to me a letter I will show you when we meet, not that it contains naything novel.
The republicans ought to follow suit and commit themselves to a scheme such as Wilson approved - which is that of the Taft league and ours.

Bryce

To Lord Bryce?
Enclosing letter?
No!

17 St. Mary's Road
Cromer

Dear Mr. Buxton.

Oct 9: 1916.

I am afraid that comparatively few people in this district have taken much notice of Lord Bryce's speech at Birmingham - It was not fully reported even in the editions of the Daily News & Daily Chronicle which reach us here and the Eastern Daily Press had a scanty report of the speech. I should like to see a full report myself as it is on a matter which must become increasingly urgent - and one moreover about which public opinion is almost ready to be moved in favour of its basic ideas. In this respect it is not like talking Peace. As one meets people who have been out to the Front one is struck with the force of the utter horror now attaching to war & I believe the British public is ready to be educated in favour of a movement which will make it difficult for any civilised nation in future to resort to the arbitrament of war. But the movement must be dispassionate with any proposals in respect to terms of peace being considered at present and I am only afraid that it is going to be left to the pacifists to advocate Lord Bryce's proposals in which case public opinion ~~at first~~ will be difficult to move in their favour what would be easy now would under such conditions be difficult later on.

TELEGRAMS
"BURLINGTON," FOLKESTONE.
TELEPHONE 33.
VISITORS TELEPHONE 413.

Oct. 22. 1916.

THE BURLINGTON,
FOLKESTONE.

My dear Noel

It is not clear to me whether your Note is your own or represents the views of some group or section; nor whether what it means is that the President of the U. S. should sketch out terms which he thinks offer the best basis for settlement so as to start the process of bargaining between the hostile parties. Assuming this last to be your meaning, I doubt

whether it is worth trying.

1. Public opinion here & in France would resent an American outline of terms. The mere offer of mediation it need not resent. But what business (it would be said) has a neutral to tell us what should content us?

2. I do not think progress would be made in this way, unless the Americans went so far as to suggest terms that would even be almost what we should demand.

3. I cannot believe that the Germans are yet prepared to concede what we think essential. For instance, I myself

would never make peace (unless
of course I despaired of success) till
Belgium had been fully compensated
& the Young Turks utterly smashed.
Nor should I give Germany any
sphere at all in the East where
her influence has been utterly
damnable. Africa is another
affair: she might keep some-
-thing there without any harm.
It is much to be hoped that
Wilson will not touch the matter
at present, nor at all unless
we become convinced that decisive
victory is impossible. Though
it seems to be coming no nearer
we may still believe that it

will come, probably within 12 months.

We are living mostly in the country, but I hope to be in town from time to time. With kind remembrances to your wife from us both,

I am

Very sincerely yours

Bryce

March 17th 1917

My dear Sir,

Thank you for the invitation you send me to the Meeting next Monday. I regret that I cannot have the pleasure of accepting it as I am already engaged that evening.

The suggestions of our American friends that an effort ought to be made, as soon as the present war has ended & a treaty of peace concluded, to create some machinery calculated to prevent the recurrence of such frightful calamities as the world is now suffering, deserve the most attentive & sympathetic consideration.

The idea has already been welcomed by some of our foremost statesmen, including Mr Asquith, Viscount Grey, & Mr Arthur Balfour. It ought to be brought to the knowledge & attention of the people: & I can hardly doubt that when it is understood, they will see in it the best prospect that offers for preventing future wars & reducing the terrible burden of naval & military armaments.

The scheme of the American League to Enforce Peace is one pf the most promising of those that have been proposed for the attainment of the important end desired. It has the great merit of not attempting too much at once: & if a strong sentiment be manifested in its favour here as well as in America, we may well hope that it will commend itself to our Allies also.

I am
Faithfully yours

Bryce

Oct 22 1916

My dear Noel

It is not clear to me whether your note is your own or represents the view of some group or section; nor whether what it means is that the President of the U.S should sketch out terms which he thinks offer th best basis for settlement so as to start the process of bargaining between the hostile parties. Assuming this last to be your meaning I doubt whether it is worth trying:
1. Public opinion here and in France would resent an American outline of terms. The mere offer of mediation it need not resent. But what business (it would be said) has a neutral to tell us what should content us?
2. I do not think progress would be made in this way, unless the Americans went so far as to suggest terms that would be almost what we should demand

[3.[I cannot believe that the Germans are yet prepared to concede what we think essential.] For instance, I myself would never make peace (unless of course I despaired of success) till Belgium had been fully compensated and the Young Turks utterly smashed.] Nor should I give Germany any sphere at all in the East where her influence has been utterly damnable. Africa is another affair; she might keep something there without any harm.

Oh! What a diehard! TE

It is much to be hoped that Wilson will not touch the matter at present, nor at all unless we become convinced that decisive victory is impossible. Tough it seems to be coming no nearer we may still believe that it will come, probably within 12 months.

We are living mostly in the country but I hope to be in town from time to time. With kind remembrances to your wife from us both.

Bryce.

March 17th 1917

My dear Sir.

Thank you for the invitation you send me to the Meeting next Monday. I regret that I cannot have the pleasure of accepting it as I am already engaged that evening.

The suggestions of our American friends that an effort ought to be made, as soon as the present war has ended & a treaty of peace concluded, to create some machinery calculated to prevent the recurrence of such frightful calamities as the world is now suffering, deserve the most attentive & sympathetic consideration.

The idea has already been welcomed by some of our foremost statesmen, including Mr Asquith, Viscount Grey, & Mr Arthur Balfour. It ought to be brought to the knowledge & attention of the people: & I can hardly doubt that when it is understood, they will see in it the best prospect that offers for preventing future wars & reducing the terrible burden of naval & military armaments.

The scheme of the American League to Enforce Peace is one of the most promising of those that have been proposed for the attainment of the important end desired. It has the great merit of not attempting too much at once: & if a strong sentiment be manifested in its favour here as well as in America, we may well hope that it will commend itself to our Allies also.

I am

Faithfully yours

Bryce

Jan 19/18

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

My Dear Noel

Your wife has told you how delighted we are to hear that all has gone well & that you are the father of a healthy boy and we think I dare not maintain the credit of your family. How I wish your Father & Mother could have lived to welcome him!

I trust your wife is continuing to make a good recovery

As touching the Allies
Note. You might have gone
further & doubted the wisdom
of any declaration of Neutrality
ever: for the only result is
to confirm the dogged & perverse
resistance of Germany & Austria
whose leaders will feel they
must fight to the death rather
than submit. Even additional
items of defeat & humiliation
counts. However that is over
now, we are in for a long

war still. // I hope you
& your brother Charley & his friends
the allies
who have been assisting us
their hand are happy
at last // Is this the dawning
of the Triumvirate or of A.I.B.
himself? // Fortunately they
have not mentioned the handing
over of Constantinople to Russia
a horrible report has come
of the sea Hemisphere of the remain
ing Armenian refugees dispersed
among the Euphrates
always yours Bryce

Hindleap,
Forest Row,
Sussex.
Jan. 19, 1917.

My dear Noel,

My wife has told you how delighted we are to hear that all has gone well and that you are the father of a healthy boy, who will, I doubt not, maintain the credit of your family. How I wish your Father and Mother could have lived to welcome him!

I trust your wife is continuing to make a good recovery.

As touching the Allies' Note, you might have gone further and doubted the wisdom of any declaration of specific aims; for the only result is to confirm the dogged and ferocious resistance of Germany and Austria, whose peoples will feel they must fight to the death rather than submit. Every additional item of defeat and humiliation counts. However, that is over now, we are in for a long war still.

I hope your brother Charlie and his friends, who have been asking the Allies to show their hand, are happy at last.

Is this the doing of the Triumvirate or of A.J.B. himself?

Fortunately, they have not mentioned the handing over of Constantinople to Russia. A horrible report has come of the sufferings of the remaining Armenian refugees dispersed along the Euphrates.

Always yours,

(Sgd.) BRYCE.

(re letters)

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

Oct. 11. 1922.

My dear Noel

I have your letter this morning. I am not in London at present & do not expect to return until the latter part of November. There is plenty to do here in the way of going through papers & letters & I have some work to finish. When I come back I shall hope to see you & Lucy. I do not feel that I can write

& the paper about the terrible position of today, & I fear that no statement from me about my husband's opinion would have any effect. It would be disconsidered at once. I am sometimes almost thankful that he is not here today to see the present condition of the Near East, the return of the Turk, the callous indifference of all the Allies to any sense of pity or of honour & the levity of the British Government in face of the position since the Armistice. It is the utter ruin of all that he worked for during 40 years, & he is at least spared that blow. I have not forgotten your wish & have a photograph & I will send one presently. Believe me

sincerely yours
E. Marion Blyth.

Dear Mr Bryce (of which you were formerly the distinguished President
(on behalf of the B.C. or desire) to add
[I am desired by the B.C. &c.] [I am desired]
the expression of our pleasure and satisfaction to
the many manifestations you are receiving on the occasion
of your appointment to the H. M. Ambassador to the
United States. That satisfaction is only marred by a
very real regret that the high duties of your new
office will involve your absence from this country.
We can never be unmindful of your lifelong efforts
& work in the interests of the subject races
oppressed by the domination of the Porte both in
Europe and Asia. In the crisis of 1878 you were
one of the Gladstone's principal allies, and in the
more recent despotism of Macedonia in 93, you
were the leader [illegible] the efforts made in this country
both to alleviate suffering and to eradicate the root
of evil. The former task was discharged by the
Macedonian Relief Fund [illegible] of which you [illegible] to the work
& which you gave your [illegible] assistance. The latter
The second task, with which the Balkan Committee concerns
itself, is still unfortunately unaccomplished. But we hope
and believe that something has been done to bring it
nearer fulfilment, and we are convinced that it is
in a greater measure due to your efforts that there exists
to-day in England an informed opinion on the Macedonian
question, and that the English policy is known at
home and abroad to aim at the liberation of the

European races of Turkey from their present servitude. And we especially welcome the fact ~~you~~ that as the diplomatic representative of this country in the United States you will ~~have~~ doubtless be able to ~~you~~ do much to further a policy which is approved not ~~only~~ by H. M. present Government but by all parties in the State.

With every expression of gratitude and goodwill,

(Ws) remain

Your ~~Excellency~~ sincerely

~~Dear Mr. [illegible]~~

~~I am also [illegible] Mr. [illegible] Cavis~~

9 Bryce.
letter of 21 Sept taken out:-
accepting
(memorandum
for Reports)

HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY

Oct 16/02

My dear Buxton

Many thanks & I have
sent the 1 proof & Bosnia &
Macedonia this afternoon. Is
Sebil to be? No
Can one find an accommod
ation in Macedonia & all tolerable
in Athens Athens Thessaly Salonika.
Ordered Monastir Kallandelen Prizrend Yenijeh
where I presume there is a
only private choir monastries
fair hotel?

Do the Turks Thessaly & Miscellan.

as the way of getting about by railway? i.e. do they confiscate books & pamphlets or bother about passports?

Is it possible to get across by carriage from Bosnia to Belgrade - Salonika line? or is the country too disturbed? Now I suppose dangerous

Is there any chance of your going out to those regions yourself this autumn?

Can one find people who speak French or German along the railway lines? By Spruce, Coombs, Farmers

Long interrogatory. Yours sincerely

James Bryce

Private

April 11.

Dear Mr Burton

Many thanks for your letter.

It does not seem to me that there is any essential difference between your views & mine!!

I agree that all sections of the population (workers as well as Christian Democ 'reformers') and I also agree that

this country should exert
its influence continuously
& earnestly in favour of some effective
application - which of course
involves European control
& supervision. [I do not
perhaps attach the value
which you do to "agitation"

in this country - It is not I
think required by a British
government and among the
past history it excites the
maximum of suspicion &
resentment in the mind of the
Turks] But that is merely
my private opinion and

I do not quarrel with those
who take a different
view. It is a question of
means not of ends.

As to "unprincipled" scenes
of massacre & outrage. I
must decline to recognize
a "press" report as
constituting "verification".

The Times to-day

alleged "torture of the inhabitants by the Turkish troops engaged in domiciliary visits".

I have been unable to discover the slightest foundation for the allegation, and whatever faults the Turks have they are not as a rule addicted to torture like

Miss Oriental Peebles,

If it is really desired to test the limits of such reports it seems to me that the obvious course is to refer them to an Officers for investigation before giving

public currency to the

House of Commons Library,
July 16, 1902.

My dear Buxton,

My wife and I have some idea of going to Bosnia and Macedonia this autumn. Is Sept. too hot?

Can one find any accommodation in Macedonia at all tolerable in other places than Salonika, where I presume there is a fair hotel?

Do the Turks throw difficulties in the way of getting about by railway? i.e., do they confiscate books and pamphlets or bother about passports?

Is it possible to get across by carriage from Bosnia to the Belgrade-Salonika line? or is the country too disturbed?

Is there any chance of your going out to those regions yourself this autumn?

Can one find people who speak French or German along the railway lines?

Forgive this long interrogatory.

Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) JAMES BRYCE.

Aug. 31/03

My dear Buxton

Your letter has just reached me. It may be doubted whether a meeting would do good now: people cannot be got together before October, & public attention will then be absorbed by the Protection controversy: nor is it easy to see what specific action we can press for beyond the creation of British

influence to make the Turk
comply with the Demands of
Austria & Russia, which he will
have to do when those Demands
are made (and which I trust
the Ministry are doing already)
and to press Austria and Russia
to take more decided action. This
is really what is wanted. We
could not accomplish much alone:
but perhaps France, if appealed
to, would join in such pressure.

[I am however clear of opinion that it would be a good thing for this Committee to prepare and issue a Statement of the facts beginning with the Treaty of San Stefano & dwelling upon its responsibilities.] If you are in London I shall be very glad to talk to you about this. I hope to be back there in about ten days time from now. Letters

Sept 10.

to "Hindleap, Forest Row, Sussex" will always find me. Very truly yours

James Bryce

[If you like to send me the draft of the proposed Letter & manifesto I will go through it. It will be better to direct all criticism to the vital facts & the responsibility of Britain & the need of clearing out the Turk once for all rather than to "justifying" the insurrection, for that would involve a controversy: whereas without it the case is irresistible for drastic measures]

Private

Feb 15 '03

My dear Buxton

I have talked

the matter over with Lord

E. Fitzmaurice, & we both

feel that it is most important,

& that such a Committee

should be [formed for the sake of

awakening and preserving public

interest and of supplying accurate

information & just views to a too

ignorant public].

We also think however that the Committee will be more likely to be accepted if it does not proclaim too definitely & limited its views at this stage. Be that as it may, we also feel that it would be unwise for either of us to be known as members of a Committee drawing a policy already settled and proclaimed. We both hold as strongly as possible that the removal

of Turkish rule from Macedonia is the only satisfactory & final solution [I personally want to see Turkish rule removed out of existence altogether, in Asia as well as in Europe, & the sooner the better.] But if we were to proclaim these views as members of the Committee we might embarrass our Parliamentary colleagues, & that is none important] might embarrass any Ministry of which

we might become members. A Liberal
Ministry may come into existence within
the next few months. So this is a practical
consideration. We think therefore
that either we had better not join the
Committee, or else that the Museum.
and aims of the Committee ought to
be the present to
be considered to obtaining & diffusing in-
formation and views, exciting interest in
the subject and advocating measures
calculated to secure peace, & put an end
to oppression abroad & cruelty at home, without
directly challenging any of the Powers
with which a Liberal Government might
have to deal. Personally, as I have
said, I go all the lengths of the programme
you have sent me — perhaps further: but
we are bound to think of our possible colleagues.

Yours ever truly James Bryce

Send Statement for press.
Polish advice re above & write to V.P. &c.

July 6/03

Dear Mr. Buxton

Absence in
Scotland & pressure of work
have prevented me from
sooner obliging to your letter.
I entirely agree that a Com-
mittee to watch the pro-
gress of events in Macedonia

& the Turkish East generally
is needed. Do you propose to
make its existence publicly
known? If so, I would suggest
a somewhat more tentative
& guarded programme than
that on the printed form for
Land. With the contents of

that Circular I agree, esp. as
to the need of getting rid of the Turks.
And I think it was well conceived
& expressed. But at this stage
it is well to be cautious in enunciating
a programme; so I suggest in pencil
some alterations which will not
impair the force of the appeal but
possibly prevent some apprehension
and avoid some difficult points.

Personally I am quite ready to accept the Presidency of the Committee as you are kind enough to offer it to me; but perhaps I ought to consult one or two of my Colleagues here before doing so – ? will think of this.

I hear that Mr. Bamford the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian who has been in Macedonia is now in England: would it not be well to see him? Who is your proposed Secretary?

Yours very truly
James Bryce

Oct 20/03

54, Portland Place.
W.

My Dear Buxton

The Statement you have sent me seems very good & unexceptionable on the side of prudence. I have suggested a few slight changes & additions in expression & return it as I gather you want to proceed before the Session ends.

It will be valuable to
have Lord L. Fitzmaurice
& Jr mill Sketchley and
Mr. Brailsford & Mr. Miller
the author of a book on the
Balkan countries, & Jr
might invite Mr. L.
Villari of 68 Upper

Gloucester Place, N.W., a
bright young Italian publicist
(son of the historian) who
has written well on Bosnia

Yours very truly
James Bryce



Published

(6)

May 26/05

Dear Mr. Buxton

Besides the other reasons I have for desiring your success at Whitby there is this special one, that you have for years past devoted yourself in the most energetic and unselfish way to the advocacy of the

cause of the Christian inhabi-
tants of Macedonia who have
so long groaned under Turkish
oppression. We are how done
so much as you have to bring
their sufferings before the
British people, and to obtain
help for the women and
children whose husbands

and fathers have been massacred
We need more men in the House
of Commons who understand
Eastern affairs, and your ac-
cession to the ranks of Liberal
ism in it would be a great
gain for the cause of humanity
and freedom
On these other great issues now

before the Country, such as
Free Trade and Temperance
Reform, you will, I know
be among the tried and stan-
chest champions of liberal
principles, and I heartily trust
you will achieve a Victory for
those principles in Yorkshire.
Never was there a time when such
a Victory could mean more
for the best interests of the Country.

Yours very truly

James Bryce

Africa - what encourage
Lands. but
Europe won't act without stimulus.
Strange that peasant dg. offer lands.
Ld L offers agit.

March 29/05

Dear Mr Balfour

Many thanks for your letter
I shall read "the Balkan
Question" with great interest
As regards my own speech
I do not think I ever said that
Rebellion was encouraged by British

Sympathy, but by Speeches which implied that Gt Britain was prepared to initiate or support the particular Solutions favoured by the Agitators in Macedonia. None is more anxious than I am to see thorough administrative reforms introduced not only into

European but also with Asiatic Turkey, and long before I took office I expressed that view in print and sketched the kind of reform, wh seemed to me desirable. The changes which are now being introduced in the 4 vilayets are no doubt gradual - but I see no reason

why they should ~~be depreciated~~
on that account and I have
no doubt whatever, from accounts we reach us
already produced an appreciable
change for the better.
In my humble judgment much
bloodshed & suffering would have
been spared if Europe had from the first
dealt with the problem of
misgovernment in the Near East
on its present lines, & my own
brief visit to Macedonia convinced

HOUSE OF COMMONS

me that the population feared
the contagion even more than
any ~~Turkish oppression~~ misgovernment by
Turkish officials.
against the terrors of the
former they have no resource
- against the latter they have
already a partial & I hope
eventually will have complete
securities.] But the very

fact that the interests &
aims of the revolutionaries
are not those of the population
makes it probable that
the success of administrative
Reform will be Exasperating
to those whose ~~aggrandizement~~ greed is

political change - and who
are prepared to
~~to~~ sacrifice any number
of innocent lives in order to
save it. I am only
anxious that in that policy
they should have no encouragement
from English orators who
mean well but do not

themselves run any risk of

from a massacre.']

Yours truly

Perry

P.S.

For the reasons already stated, it seems to me better tactics to modify, or omit, the first two paragraphs of the manifesto - I should substitute a statement of the recent events & present position, calling attention to the shocking miseries of the Country but also to the dangers to European peace if some steps are not taken - & noting the ignorance that prevails in Eng. land on the subject.

Chief Secretary's Lodge,
Phœnix Park,
Dublin.

Jan 27/06

My dear Noel

We are terribly disappointed and vexed at the result in your Division. I hear that the Labour people behaved badly, and indeed, how ever complete may seem the Liberal victory, the emergence of a party which has caused

the loss of so many seats is

matter for anxiety. I trust

you will very soon find some

other seat, and are less

laborious than Whitby would

have proved. It is remarkable

that the seats taken

were have proved most difficult.

cull to hold. Allan

Brighton gone. Lyells and

just saved. Barkston left

also gone. (Portland Place)

We return to London on

Wednesday. I shall hope to

see you my dear Miss

always truly yours

James Bryce

June 2/03.

54, Portland Place.
W.

My dear Buxton

This is indeed
a "crowning mercy". Delighted
as I am for the Liberal cause,
& for the Macedonian cause, I
am even more so on your own
account, in respect of the example
you have shewn of unselfish
work. Always sincerely yours

James Bryce

Private.

House of Commons,
Dec. 20, 1906.

My dear Noel,

It is true; and one of my regrets in going is that I shall not be in England to be able, if need be, to render any help, should Balkan affairs become highly critical. However, it may be that in the way of diplomacy there may still be opportunities in which I can be of service: and you may be sure I shall watch all that passes with the hope of being able to do anything properly in my power.

I wish anybody were going on a special mission to pull things straight in the East: I should in any event have been too pronounced in my anti-Turkism. But nothing will happen till there is a change of Sultans, and that seems not very distant.

I trust to see you when we return from Ireland to which I go on Saturday for a week or ten days, possibly a little more. You will, I hope, keep me from time to time informed of what happens in the East, and what your Committee does. We don't expect to leave for Washington before Feb. 10. You must come and see us there.

Ever yours,
(Sgd.) JAMES BRYCE.

Private

Dec. 20/06

My dear Noel

It is true, I am
very upset in going is that I
shall not be in England to be able
if need be to render any help
should Balkan affairs become
hopeful critical. However it
may be that in the way of diplo-
macy there may still be opportuni-
ties in which I can be of
service: & you may be sure

I shall watch all that
passes with the hope of
being able to do anything pro-
per in my power -

I wish anybody were going as
a special mission to pull things
straight in the East: I should in
any event have been too humane-
ed in my Anti-Turkism - But
nothing will happen till there
is a change of Sultans - & that
seems not very distant.

I must see you when we return from Ireland to which I go on Saturday for a week or ten days. possibly a little more. You will. I hope, keep me from time to time informed of what happens in the East, & what your Committee does. We don't expect Home for Work. until before Feb. 10. You must come see us there

Ever yours

James Bryce

1906

Jan 12/07

Feb 2 Feb

My dear Noel

The 'Pilgrims'

and the Anglo American Assoc'n
at this time I understand come
to an agreement to join in entertaining me before I leave for
the U. S., & as it appeared that
this turned partly on the grounds of
the public value of declarations
regarding English & American
friendship, & as it would be quite

outside politics. This being so,
I don't think there could well be
another & a more political dinner;
and as I said when we talked,
the difficulty of getting M.P.s just
before Parlt. meets wd. be very
great. My heartiest thanks to you.
I have had a talk with E. Grey on
the Balkans: quite reassuring: & I
must try & have another

always yours
James Bryce

Irish Office,
Old Queen St., S.W. 1.
Jan. 12, 1907.

My dear Noel,

The "Pilgrims" and the Anglo-American Association have, I understand, come to an agreement to join in entertaining me before I leave for the U.S., and as it appeared that they pressed for this on the grounds of the public value of declarations regarding English and American friendship, and as it would be quite outside politics. This being so, I don't think there could well be another and a more political dinner; and as I said when we talked, the difficulty of getting M.P.s just before Parliament meets would be very great. My heartiest thanks to you.

I have had a talk with E. Grey as to Balkans quite reassuring: and I trust to have another.

Always yours,
(Sgd.) JAMES BRYCE.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

Oct. 4/08

My dear Noel

You have no.
both advices from Macedonia &
Bulgaria as to what is happening
there - If you can tell me any
thing more than what the
newspapers give, I should much
like to hear it. Perhaps you have
seen Lady Grogan, whom I am
much pained.

Glad as one might be to see

2 days before declar[n]!

Bulgaria technically inde-
pendent, one doubts whether
this is a good time to raise fur-
ther complications - The great
thing for the moment seems to be
to take advantage of the revolution
in Turkey & avoid whatever could
help Abdul Hamid to recover
his power by setting Turks against
Christians. Dr. Washburn is with whom I have
had long talks, ~~it~~ is quite hopeful,

Not recognizing the difficulties which confront a Turkish Parliament.

I was much disappointed to have missed seeing you in London, & think that one of the letters I sent to what was given me as your address must have missed you. Very sincerely yours

James Bryce

British Embassy,

~~Washington.~~

October 4th., 1908.

~~My~~ dear Noel,

You have probably advices from Macedonia and Bulgaria as to what is passing there. If you can tell me anything more than what the newspapers give, I should much like to hear it. Perhaps you have seenLady Grogan, whom I unfortunately missed.

Glad as one might be to see Bulgaria technically independent, one doubts whether this is a good time to raise further complications. The great thing for the moment seems to be to take advantage of the revolution in Turkey and avoid whatever could help Abdul Hamid to recover his power by setting Turks against Christians. Dr. Washburn with whom I have had long talks is quite hopeful tho' recognising the difficulties which confront a Turkish Parliament.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) ~~JAMES~~ BRYCE.

90

British Embassy Washington Oct 4 08

My dear Neel,

You have probably advices from Macedonia amd Bulgaria as to what is passing there. If you can tell me anything more than what the newspapers give, I should much like to hear it. Perhaps you have seen Lady Grggan, whom I unfortunately missed.

Glad as one might be to see Bulgaria technically independent, one doubts whether this is a good time to raise further complications. The great thing for the moment seems to be to take advantage of the revolution in Turkey and avoid whatever could help Abdul Hamid to recover his power by setting Turks against Christians. Dr Washburn with whom I have had long talks is quite hopeful tho recognising the difficulties which confront a Turkish Parliament.

Very sincerely yours,

James Bryce

British Embassy,
Washington.

November 25th. 1908.

My dear Noel,

Have you any recent information of a trustworthy kind about what is passing in Bulgaria and Macedonia? I am afraid that the Bulgarians may have been surprised by British action and may not have understood fully that it has been dictated not by any want of sympathy with them but entirely by our feeling that the reforming Party in Turkey ought to have a chance, and that an opportunity, which has never before arisen in history, for a reconcilement of Christians and Mussulmans on the basis of good feeling and equality ought not to be lost but turned to the best account in view of the future.

Have you reason to think that this misconception prevails in Bulgaria? If so, could it be removed? It is not possible for me (for reasons which you will understand) to take any action, as I should have done had I been a private person in England. But it occurs to me to consider whether you might not get the Bulgarians to appreciate our position, because they will trust you and believe your assurances that our sympathy with them has not declined. It is important politically that they should

realise this. Perhaps you may think that you had better not do this unless after previous communication with the F.O. or perhaps you may have done it already. Anyhow you can think the matter over. We are agreed as to policy. Never did I expect to be supporting Turks: but the course you have taken and that the Government have taken seems under these changed conditions to be perfectly right.

Always truly yours,

(Sgd.) JAMES BRYCE.

Lord Bryce to Mr Noel Buxton

Copied

British Embassy, Washington March I4 I909

My dear Noel,

There seems to be no reason why the Memorandum you enclose, which I return, should not be sent to E Grey I agree with the idea, and see no objection unless the one that the old Turks might be still more suspicious of the Young Turks if the latter were trained in England, yet this did not prevent Abdul Hamid from sending officers to Germany to be trained.

Of course the Germans may be jealous, but them they received Turks before and sent their men to Turkey to train Turks there. So they are not entitled to complain. But tho I think the F.O. and other Departments would do well to give all facilities, and might let you tell your Turkish friends that facilities will b given, still it will be better that the request should come form them and that they should appear as the moving spirit in the matter.

Whetr the Embassy has been against the Young Turks I dont know. Pwrhaps from old hatred they mah have leant to the idea of "authority" even in the eprson of that old wrtech. But the F.O. has been for the Young Turks all along, and behaved very well, so far at least as I cn judge from the telegrams. I hear that Sir W Whittall also was good, and gave shelter to Young Turk generals when they were in danger. The Bulgarians have shewn good sense; and the good relations between them and the Armenians and the Young Turks are the best features of the situation. There are some clerical errors in the Memorandum which will need correcting before you send it. I would rather the Y T came to England than went to Egypt , but Cromer ought to know best.

Yours always,

JAMes Bryce

British Embassy,
Washington.
March 14th. 1909.

My dear Noel,

There seems to be no reason why the Memorandum you enclose, which I return, should not be sent to E. Grey. I agree with the idea, and see no objection unless the one that the old Turks might be still more suspicious of the young Turks if the latter were trained in England, yet this did not prevent Abdul Hamid from sending officers to Germany to be trained.

Of course, the Germans may be jealous, but then they received Turks before and sent their men to Turkey to train Turks there. So they are not entitled to complain. But tho' I think the F.O. and other Departments would do well to give all facilities, and might let you tell your Turkish friends that facilities will be given, still it will be better that the request should come from them and that they should appear as the moving spirit in the matter.

Whether the Embassy has been against the young Turks I don't know. Perhaps from old hatred they may have leaned to the idea of "authority" even in the person of that old wretch. But the F.O. has been for the young

Turks all along, and behaved very well, so far at least as I can judge from the telegrams. I hear that Sir W. Whittall also was good, and gave shelter to young Turk generals when they were in danger. The Bulgarians have shewn good sense; and the good relations between them and the Armenians and the young Turks are the best features of the situation. There are some clerical errors in the Memorandum which will need correcting before you send it. I would rather the Y.T. came to England than went to Egypt, but Cromer ought to know best.

Yours always,

(Sgd.) JAMES BRYCE.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON,

APRIL 16, 1909.

Send CRB. to 4 Tr

My dear Noel

I am writing about Mr. Pearse as you suggest, and agree with you that he ought to have the distinction and that this is a good time for conferring it

The position of things in Turkey is hard to understand, and I cannot help fearing that those military conflicts which we always apprehended - that is the real drawback to a military revolution - are now beginning. I wish you would explain to me what the real facts of the position are. Should Bulgaria cut in, the position would be horribly complicated, and the danger of a European War might again loom up. I hope you will discourage the Bulgarian Government from any action of that kind. They had much better remain quiet at present.

As at present advised I do not expect to be in England this year. These things are distressing: and produce an unfortunate impression abroad. People here ask "What has come over Old England that she has got like so jumpy?"

Make your Father and Mother and Mother in particular is not in a state to cause anxiety. Ever yours

James Bryce

Purely Private

Extract from letter of Mr. James Bryce to Sir Arthur Evans (dated British Embassy Washington, Dec. 30 1912 :/:—

'Is it not extraordinary that a large part of the public opinion of Western Europe & even of Greece & England which has no excuse for ignorance of its horrible misgovernment & cruelties of the Turks should still give its support to them.' The situation seems to me still pretty cloudy and one is half tempted to wish that there had been no armistice but that the Bulgarians had pressed on till they stood before the gates of Constantinople - Skodra and Adrianople having been seized. . . . A united expression of opinion on the part of the British public, without distinction of party,

(1) That the Turks should be allowed to retain nothing in
Europe but Constantinople, that he should lose all
(2) the islands of the Aegean and that his Asiatic
Government should be put under some sort of guaran-
(3) tee which would insure a tolerable precondition for
a Christian population would I am sure immensely
strengthen the hands of our Government in its negotia-
tions and declings & have its due effect in Europe. I do
not know whether this is possible though I gather
that the Conservatives are no longer taking the Turk
under their wing in the way they did in 1876-80'

Evans
Thomas?

Jan 1/63

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

My dear Buxton

Thank

you very much for your

New Year greetings, and

accept my wife's and my

own best wishes for a

happy New Year for Lady

Victoria Yourself. We

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON.

we rejoiced to hear that
you have Noel back again
safe and sound. To me (who
have been interested in the
freedom and welfare of the
Eastern Christians ever since
1876 when I first travelled
in Turkey and saw how
they were suffering at the

hands of their cruel and
tyrannical rulers) it has
been a great pleasure to see
such an earnest and courageous
and spirit as Kossuth throws
himself into the work of trying
to secure aid and protection
and sympathy from England
for them. He is worthily maintaining

the traditions of your family.

The time of our return to Eng-
land is still uncertain. because
Edwd. Grey has asked me to stop on
a little to try to get this trouble
of the Panama Canal Tolls
pied up. But probably
we may hope to be back among
our friends early in Spring.

With our united warm
regards to Lady Victoria
always sincerely yours
James Bryce

I think Penn will be all right.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

Dec 14/09

My dear Noel

There seems to be no reason why the memo and memo for enclose, wh. I return, shd. not be sent to E. Grey. I agree with the idea. As to see no objection unless the one that the old Turks might be still more suspicious of the Young Turks if the latter

were trained in England, yes
this did not prevent Abdul
Hamid from sending officers
to Germany to be trained.

Of course the Germans were
so jealous, but then they
received Turks before & sent
their men to Turkey to train
Turks there. So they are not
entitled to complain. But

tho' I think the F.O. & our
other Departments would do
well to give all facilities,
& might let you tell your Turk
ish friends that facilities will be
given. Still it will be better
that the request should
come from them & that they
should appear as the moving
party in the matter

Whether the Embassy has been against the Young Turks I don't know. Perhaps from old habit they may have leant to the side of "authority" even in the person of that old wretch. But the F.O. has been for the Young Turks all along, & behaved very well, so far at least as I can judge from the telegrams. I hear that Sir W. Whitall also was good, & gave Talaat & Young Turk generals when they were in danger. The Bulgarians have shown great good sense; & the good relations between them & the Americans & the Y.-Turks are the best feature of the situation. There are some clerical errors in the Memorandum which will need correcting before you send it. I would rather the Y.T. came to England than went to Egypt, but Cromer ought to know best. Yours always

James Bryce

PRIVATE.

British Embassy,
Washington.

November 1st. 1912.

My dear Noel,

These victories are most cheering and encourage the hope that it will not be possible even for Austria to attempt to prevent the deliverance from direct Turkish rule of the lands between Rhodope and the Aegean. Should ~~they~~ She or the Powers taken together, insist on letting the Turks stay in Constantinople, that need not surpriseus, for its possession is a matter of such political importance to the whole Eastern world that to allow it to go to any one country might raise controversies of perilous import, and I fancy that both Bulgarians and Greeks would feel this and acquiesce in letting it stay where it is.

I am still quite in the dark as to what has been passing during the last momentous fortnight between the Powers, for the telegrams in my possession don't come down so far. But in any case one hopes that the public opinion of France and Russia would be opposed to any attempt by Austria to restore the status quo ante. The Bulgarians have justified the high opinion we had formed of their fighting quality and the other three peoples seem

to have done well. It is to be hoped that they will all show their wisdom in the negotiations that will come now, comparable to their valour in the field.

Always yours,

(Sgd.) JAMES BRYCE.

Private

Nov 1/12

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

My dear Noel

These victories are most cheering and encourage the hope that it will not be possible even for Austria to attempt to prevent the deliverance from Turkish rule of the lands between Rumania & the Aegean. I shared the

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

a the Powers between together
insist of letting the Turks
stay in Constantinople. That
need not surprise us, for its
homogenium is a matter of such
political importance to the
whole Eastern world that to
attempt to ~~assign~~ to any one country
might raise controversies of
serious importance; and I fancy
that both Bulgarians & Greeks

would feel this and acquiesce
in letting it stay where it is

I am still quite in the dark
as to what has been passing
during the last momentous
fortnight between the Powers,
for the telegrams in my hands
even did come down so far.
But in any case we believe
that this bubble Spain and
France & Russia would be
pleased to any attempt to

Austria to realise the obvious
fact. The Bulgarians
have justified the high opinion
we had formed of their fighting
qualities & the other three Peoples
seem to have done well. It is
to be hoped that this will show all them
wisdom in the negotiations
that will come now we can hear
about to their valour in the field

Always yours
James Bryce

Nov. 24/13

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

My dear Noel

Very glad to know you are safe back again. I greatly desire to hear what you ascertained as to the present condition of Armenia. I shall be in London from the 4th to the 13th of Nov. in case you happen to be there on any of those days.

Ambassadorial

As touching Russian visitation, we may have to come to that ultimately, no doubt. But it is a desperate resort. To be avoided as long as possible. Because Russia's policy is to get rid of American nationality altogether. She has treated her own American subjects very badly, especially in educational matters. If all the Americans were under

her vassals, the best test for a rejuvenescence of America as a nation would be even worse than it is. My own hope has always been that Slavs would come in due time a sort of principality for the Americans, who are now more calculated than any other race of restoring peace. How under I Pe Western Asia & building up a type of indigenous civility after there. Absorption into the Russian Empire, absolutistic

and Pan Slavic as her policy
now is, would probably destroy
their hearts for ever.

Grey is rather sanguine as to
the possibilities of getting Germany
& Russia to agree to a scheme which
might secure better government,
& he seems to think the Turks
more amenable than ever before.

Of course one cannot put trust
in their promises. But I should say
this before calling in Russia: &
I should deprecate the latter course.

Are you going to Paris for the Ca
mencement gathering which they tell me is to come off there. Always yours

James Bryce

June 21/14

My Dear Noel

B[illegible] meeting Jones has just
reached me. I will consider
carefully its suggestion. If any
good can be done, the abstention
it ought not to be lost, but I am
rather ignorant of all that has
passed since 5 Sept. 1913 (especially
ignorant as to Albania. Aubrey
Herbert has been with me about it.
I advised him to communicate with
Balkan Committee) Any how
headed you better defer the meeting
for fortnight till a bit later? The

cise of War or Peace between the Greeks & Turks will be settled within a fortnight. The former seem to expect war.

The reports in here of what Jean Gennadius said about the Persian Contract are inaccurate. We shall be able shortly to tell exactly what case was made. This is very important matter.

Yours always
Bryce

I have not finished reading your "America" but like it very much indeed

Cavendish
VP

Jul 13/14

3, Buckingham Gate,
S.W.

My dear Noel,

Very sorry
that I can't lunch with
you, but I had asked a guest
& much as he comes from Syria
& I cannot but him off.
~~Please tell me when the~~
~~meeting is. Was it Wed. at~~
~~2.45? I have remembered~~
~~a notice~~ Symonds has just
sent me a notice.
Symonds has sent me a

copy of the draft Report.?

I suggest that you should avoid at this juncture, assuming that the Turks are going now to behave as badly as Abdul Hamid did. They are bad enough, but it is better to give them a chance of not repeating his cruelties, & I gather they have not been latterly so bad in Armenia, whilst as to Europe, the

Rev!

Serbs & Greeks are just as bad as the Turks themselves

So suggest that in line 7 from the end you omit the words "lawless domination" and substitute "either to misgovernment ~~to misgovernment~~ or to the raids of lawless tribes"

As respects the revolution suggesting an appeal to the Balkan States to hold a Conference, I should not

advise it. For there is no
chance that they will do so - Your
object will be equally at
tained if you debate the
present state of things &c &c.
clare that some effort on the
part of three States to bring
their subjects better & more to
an understanding on the subject
is greatly to be desired.

Always Yours
Bryce.

July 16/14

3, Buckingham Gate,
S.W.

My Dear Noel

I find to my regret that we have invited some Australian friends to lunch on the 22nd so I cannot come to lunch with you then. Where is Fitzmaurice living? I should greatly like to have a talk with him before he leaves London

The Times report, as usual,
of the meeting pretends omits
the one thing you & me all.
desired to have reported, the
condemnation of the Aggression
of minorities and the warnings
of what must follow. which
you & Evans & Bonnchier & I
joined in giving. A hit! Perhaps
& Bonnchier
you can arrange Real thing?

Some channels there ex.
hereafter of the Committees'
feeling can reach the
Quarter where you wished
they might do good. Yes

Yours always
Bryce

Who was the reporter who
took it as M.S.? Bonchier
wished to have it.

Oct. 16/14

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

My dear Sir Fowell

We are grieved & shocked to hear of this detestable attack upon Noel & Charles, & earnestly trust that their wounds are not serious. It would be most kind if you or one of your family would send me a line to say what

Your accounts of your two
sons are. We are so much
attached to them. and
have formed such hopes for
them that we shall feel
distress and anxiety till we
know that you are
Victoria's maid are easy.
with our united love

sympathies to her and you in
this trouble. I am
Very sincerely yours
Bryce

Hindleap,
Forest Row,
Sussex.
Oct. 16, 1914.

My dear Sir Powell,

We are grieved and shocked to hear of this detestable attack upon Noel and Charles, and earnestly trust that their wounds are not serious. It would be most kind if you, or one of your family, would send me a line to say what your accounts of your two sons are. We are so much attached to them, and have formed such hopes for them that we shall feel distress and anxiety till we know that your own and Lady Victoria's mind are easy.

With our united deep sympathy for her and you in this trouble,

I am,
Very sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) BRYCE.

Jan 11/15

Balkan diffy?

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

My dear Noel

We hear you are safe back: & hope it is true. Welcome.

You & Charles came near being martyrs 'Twas in a good cause: but we had rather have you living than the memory of you with halos.

When will you come down to see us & tell us all about your own adventures & the present attitude of the four States. Servia seems to be the key of the position. If she makes the necessary concessions to Bulgaria, the latter can hardly

refuse to join. Then Rumania will jump upon Austria. Trouble brewing in Italy — this time is doubtful — & the naval blow to Germany will be a presaged defeat. I have had some talks with the F. O. = they are not very hopeful at present = & I wonder if they have done all they can to induce Russia to put on further pressure.

American volunteers are ready to come across from America if Russia will encourage them.

Come along next week will suit us
better for you to come down here & to stay the
night if possible: & if your wife will
come too, so much the better. Or
if you like to come on Thursday of this
week, do so. I can put Friday because
my wife has to be in London that
night. I trust both your wife & you
are well. Ever yours Bryce

Teak

Huidcot Forest Row
Sussex

~~Corrievarkie,~~
~~Dalwhinnie, N.B.~~

TELEGRAMS 10 MILES.

Sept. 5th/15

My Dear Noel

Your letter has just reached me here in Scotland. It seems to me better that I should write on your behalf, so I have not sent your letter, but written myself to Crewe, who is charge at F. O. in Grey's absence, telling him you are entitled at the discharge of F. O. if any are

can be made of your services,
and explaining that you have
the full confidence of the Bul-
garian leaders. [It seems to
me Doubtful if the F. O. will wish
to see you - you know what their
traditions are, & how they dislike
like what they regard as interference
& insist that our official channels
only.] I have experienced that

myself often enough in time
past.

The chances with Bulgaria are
at present slender. Opportunities
once lost seldom recur. Six
months ago we might have had
them by taking a firm line with
Servia & Greece. How much this
is our own fault, how much that
of France one can't yet judge

The news from Armenia grows worse & worse. The whole Christian subject race is being exterminated. I write to the American Govt. but I fear they can do nothing. Our aim must now be to save the remnants which has fled to Tiflis where they are in dire need. I have urged Miss Robinson who is working the Relief Fund to issue a fresh appeal for funds. Can you suggest good names who would sign it? Would your brother? Can you get any eminent & well known persons to do so? Always yours

Bryce

Miss Robinson's address is
35 A Elsham Road
Kensington W.

Copy of

Letter from Lord Bryce.

3. Buckingham Gate, S.W.

Feb. 7th 1915.

My dear Noel,

Thank you for the lucid and statesmanlike expose of the Balkan situation which you and Charlie have sent me. I agree with it almost entirely; indeed it represents pretty much what conversations with the Serbian and Bulgarian Ministers have brought me to. You are altogether right in holding that Bulgaria is entitled to have precise terms, that she ought to have Central Macedonia and probably Kavalla also, that Serbia would almost certainly acquiesce if she were at the same time promised Bosnia and Herzogovina and part of Dalmatia with access to the sea (with these she could probably before long get Croatia also) and that similarly Greece must be promised Smyrna and all the islands that Italy can be persuaded not to press for. We might even think of dangling Cyprus before her which is of very little use to us.

But I should make it a condition that Bulgaria join the Allies actively in which case she ought to have Adrianople also and the whole coast of the Marmora.

All the States are now bluffing and will continue to

bluff till a positive statement is made by the Allies. They ought to be told that if they do not accept this they will get nothing. Roumania of course will have Translcania - a great prize for her.

My fear is that the F.O. are not fully alive to the supreme importance of settling this. Perhaps, however, they anticipate difficulties from Russia. If the scheme goes through, we or France, ought to send a strong force to Salonica to attack Austria from the Danube in conjunction with Roumania and Serbia. We must talk over this.

If you are every day at the House of Commons I will come and see you there. I want to tell you also what is in the wind about Armenia. The Armenians, besides having sent many volunteers to help Russia, want to land a volunteer force in Cilicia and raise the mountaineers of Zeitun and Aintab, but they want first to be assured that Russia will be friendly and would like some promise of an autonomous province under Russian protection. I have talked to the F.O. about this, who are friendly enough but non-commital and I have not pressed it further, regarding the Balkan question as more urgent.

The best chance of shortening the war seems to be in throwing the whole Balkan States at once - say in the end of March - against Austria and the way to stiffen and hearten them will be to send a British or French

force. I have said nothing about Albania because I do not understand it, nor what precisely are the respective claims of Italy and Greece, but Albania ought to be left independent of any Slav control. And what accession of territory is Montenegro to have? Have you found the F.O. receptive of your ideas?

Yours always,

(signed) Bryce.

4 copies of the passage marked red in letter from Lord Bryce 7/7

3, Buckingham Gate,
S.W.

Feb. 7. 1915

My dear Noel

Thanks for the lucid & statesmanlike exposé of the Balkan situation which you & Charlie have sent me. I agree with it almost entirely: — indeed it represents pretty much what conversations with the Serbian & Bulgarian Ministers have brought me to. You are

altogether right in holding that Bulgaria is entitled to have precise terms, that she ought to have Central Macedonia & probably Kavalla also, that Serbia would almost certainly acquiesce if she were at the same time promised Bosnia & Herzegovina & part of Dalmatia with access to the sea (with these she could probably before long get Croatia also) & that similarly Greece must be promised

Smyrna & all the islands
that Italy can be persuaded
not to press for. We might
even think of dangling Cyprus
before her which is of very
little use to us.
But I should make it a
condition that Bulgaria
join the Allies actively
in which case she ought
to have Adrianople also
& the whole coast of the
Marmora. (sic
all the States are now
bluffing & will continue
to bluff till a positive

statement is made by the Allies
they ought to be told that if they
do not accept this they may
get nothing. Roumania of-
course will have Transylvania
a great prize for her.
My fear is that the F. O. are
not fully alive to the supreme
importance of getting this. Per-
haps, however, they anticipate
difficulties from Russia. If
the scheme goes through, we or
France ought to send a strong
force to Salonica to attack
Austria from the Danube
in conjunction with Roumania
& Serbia. We must talk over
this. If you are every day at

1915

the House of Commons I will come & see you there. I want to tell you also what is in the wind about Armenia. The Armenians, besides having sent many volunteers to help Russia, want to land armed in France?
a volunteer force in Cilicia & raise the mountaineers of Zeitun & Aintab, but they want first to be assured that Russia will be friendly & would like some promise But don't tell Russia.

of an autonomous province
under Russian protection.
I have talked to the F. O. about
this, who are friendly enough
but non-committal &
I have not pressed it further
regarding the Balkan question
as more urgent.
The best chance of shortening
the war seems to lie in
throwing the whole Balkan
States at once - say in the
end of March - against Austria
& the way to stiffen & hearten them
will be to send a British or French
force. I have said nothing

about Albania because I do not understand it, nor what precisely are the respective claims of Italy & Greece; but Albania ought to be left independent of any Slav control. (i.e. Italy must have it.) Am not certain of territory in Monte. negro to have?

Have you found the F.O. receive your ideas? Let us.

Yours always

Bryce

12

Mar. 29/15.

~~54 Portland Place.~~
S W.

My dear Noel

I have had another talk with E. Grey about Bulgaria, & think it may be worth while to tell the Bulgarian Minister that if his people want to get Macedonia by joining the Allies they had better look sharp & make an overture to us. If they do, I gather all will go well, but the

F. O. thinks from afterwards,
say Bulgaria left the world
left Servia, & from beginning with
Servia left the latter should be
rescued & disembarked before there
was any certainty that Bul-
garia would join the Allies

But before I say anything
to the Minister here I should like
to know if you have heard
anything intent to alter the

situation, & know how things stand at this moment at Sofia.

Of course Bulgaria will not break till she is beaten & sure we are going to win.

Yours always

Bryce

S. W.

Mar. 29, 1915.

My dear Noel,

I have had another talk with E. Grey about Bulgaria, and think it may be worth while to tell the Bulgarian Minister that if his people want to get Macedonia by joining the Allies, they had better look sharp and make an overture to us. If they do, I gather all will go well, but the F. O. shrinks from approaching Bulgaria lest she should tell Servia, and from beginning with Serbia lest the latter should be vexed and disheartened before there was any certainty that Bulgaria would join the Allies.

But before I say anything to the Minister here, I should like to know if you have heard anything lately to alter the situation, or know how things stand at this moment at Sofia.

Of course Bulgaria will not speak till she is pretty sure we are going to win.

Yours always,

(Sgd.) BRYCE.

Mischief
Perhaps with T & R delay.
Very resign.

Aug. 14/15.

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

My dear Noel

There was
hardly time in our hurried
interview — I had to hurry
back to my Committee im-
mediately after a hasty lunch-
to ask you if you are writing
to Mischief to tell him that
the further he can get his
Government to go in the
way of making positive

proposals. The more likely is he to get into effective touch with the F. O. The line Grey has always taken with me is that if he made an offer, Bulgaria would have. both delay acceptance, but would tell Servia (& perhaps Greece also) & thus the position

would be worsened. There's
not much in this, I may
mind, for a fretful enemy
at Sofia could draw. But
Sania or worthless deputies
committals till it was clear
she meant business. But
this seems to be the F. O
attitude, so Mischeff should
go as far as the use of
offers as he can. The

Kavalla matter ought to cause
no serious obstacle after what
Venizelos has done. Read a
good article in yesterday's Manchester
Guardian about him.

Pray let me hear further
from you how the position
develops. We need not wheat
any final decision from either
Bulgaria or Roumania till
the balance begins to incline
towards Russia on the Hungar-
ian frontier & ourselves on the
Hellespont. I may be in
London on Tuesday. Always yours
Bryce

Hindleap,
Forest Row,
SUSSEX.
April 14th., 1915.

My dear Noel,

There was hardly time in our hurried interview - I had to hurry back to my Committee immediately after a hasty lunch - to ask you if you are writing to Mischeff to tell him that the further he can get his Government to go in the way of making positive proposals, the more likely is he to get into effective touch with the F.O. The line Grey has always taken with me is that if he made an offer, Bulgaria would probably delay acceptance, but would tell Serbia (perhaps Greece also) and thus the position would be worsened. There is not much in this, to my mind, for a tactful envoy at Sofia could draw Bulgaria on without definite committals, till it was clear she meant business. But this seems to be the F.O. attitude, so Mischeff should go as far in the way of offers as he can. The Kavalla matter ought to prove no serious obstacle after what Venizeulos has done. Read a ~~Government~~ good article in yesterday's Manchester Guardian about him.

Pray let me hear further from you how the position develops. We need not expect any final decision from

either Bulgaria or Roumania till the balance begins to incline towards Russia on the Hungarian frontier, and ourselves on the Hellespont.

I may be in London on Tuesday.

Always yours,

(Sgd.) BRYCE.

13

Thurs 29/15

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

My dear Noel

After sending you memo- & letter, & wanting till Italy's entrance gave a favourable occasion, I wrote urgently to Grey on Bulgaria, pointing out that via Venizelos was willing to yield Kavalla and cut Turkey and Germ from that

and D. O. at once. I have now an encouraging reply on the whole subject which leads me to hope that the F. O. is about to take an instance of humble action & that the Kuwait question will not stand in the way. This is most confidential.

Neil Primrose (Gladstone)

I had written about Mr.

Armenia tells me that joint

representations, or threats,

are the addressed by the

Three Powers to the Turks

Warning them what

will be done if they

refuse to do so

I wonder what you

young Liberals think of

of this reconstruction of the Ministry. We old stagers are perhaps too wedded to the old principles, & prejudices, to enjoy such novelties, e.g. the appointment to the post of Attorney General. Why was not Mrs. Pankhurst charged with the subornation of suffragette outrages? Quite unfair to the Women.

Always yours Bryce

Hindleap,
Forest Row,
Sussex.
May 29, 1915.

My dear Noel,

After reading your memo and letter, and waiting till Italy's entrance gave a favourable occasion, I wrote urgently to Grey on Bulgaria, pointing out that since Venizelos was willing to yield Kavalla, we certainly could press for that and do so at once. I have now an encouraging reply on the whole subject which leads me to hope that the F. O. is alive to the importance of prompt action and that the Kavalla question will not stand in the way. This is most confidential.

Neil Primrose, to whom I had written about Armenia, tells me that joint representations, or threats, are to be addressed by the Three Powers to the Turks, warning them of what will be done to them if massacres go on.

I wonder what you Young Liberals think of this reconstruction of the Ministry. We old stagers are, perhaps, too wedded to the old principles, or prejudices, to enjoy such novelties, e.g., the appointment to the post of Attorney-General.

Why was not Mrs. Pankhurst charged with the suppression of suffragette outrages? Quite unfair to the Women.

Always yours,

(Sgd.) BRYCE.

15

July 16/15

My dear Noel

You might perhaps talk to Robt. Cecil about the desirability of keeping Rumbold at Sofia. Did you know Wickham Steed who has charge of Foreign Dept. of 'Times', only met Beach Grant once? The trouble is that the F.O., & indeed the whole Ministry, are the perhaps

two Exceptions, have the

Times, and would ask nothing of it.

As respects Bulgaria, when

I spoke to Crewe about it

a week ago he thought that

would now be no chance until

the Austrians were decisively

beaten in Galicia, or the

Turks at the Dardanelles:

Oh! —

and to this conclusion I had

been preserving Silence. The
failure to strike in Bulgaria
five months ago has been
fatal. Of course it
was chance now, take it,
act firmly as Howell says.
Serbs. But this Ministry.
which would let any when
the job was easy will hang
any when it is difficult.

I have been seeing Bryce

Nubar Pasha, & have accom-
-panied him to submit his
memorandum on America.
He thinks it important to
Cave
get England & France to settle
that question with Russia while
she is favourable, but I doubt
if this Ministry can will
settle anything.

Yours Dearest
Bryce.

16

July 13/14

My Dear Noel

Please consider this. Tho it is marked private he is your friend & will be glad you should see it. I am sorry for me to approach the Times; but as you know Wickham Steed you might possibly think of telling him how valuable Bonchier is

without knowing what he has written to me or to you — Or can you suggest any other course.

Yours always

Bryce

The Athaeneum,
July 16, 1915.

My dear Noel,

You might perhaps talk to Robt. Cecil about the desirability of keeping Bourchier at Sofia; and if you know Wickham Steed, who has charge of Foreign Depart.t of "Times," why not speak to him? The trouble is that the F.O., and indeed the whole Ministry, with perhaps two exceptions, hate the "Times," and would ask nothing of it.

As respects Bulgaria, when I spoke to Crewe about it a week ago, he thought there would now be no chance until the Austrians were decisively beaten in Galicia, or the Turks at the Dardanelles: and to this conclusion I had been previously driven. The failure to rope in Bulgaria five months ago has been fatal. Of course, if there is an chance now, take it, and act firmly as Howell suggests. But this Ministry, which wouldn't try when the job was easy, will hardly try when it is difficult.

I have been seeing Boghos Nubar twice, and have encouraged him to submit his Memorandum on Armenia. He thinks it important to try to get England and France to settle that question with Russia, while she is favourable, but I doubt if this Ministry of ours will settle anything.

Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) BRYCE.

14

Aug. 9
1915

My dear Nod

General

Hamelli memorandum is excellent. Will the F.O. not see him & listen to him? Now however the favourable moment has passed & we can't attack Bulgaria & Rumania to join till Russia position is better & that of the Turks worse. It is deplorable

The saddest part of it all
is that an irreparable
calamity has now befallen
which might have been
averted had Bulgaria
been brought in five months
ago. The Armenians
have been almost exterminated. Things are worse
than they were in 1895-6.

for which all the males in
many hundreds have been killed
or forced to serve, the old
men women & children have
been driven forth into desert
where they are perishing &
Muslims sent in their place
there. Yours sincerely
Bryce

3

Dec 8/15

3, Buckingham Gate,
S.W.

My dear Noel

Thanks for
yr the memo. The idea is
attractive, but how can any
thing be done when US assure
the Bulgarians that they
will be allowed to retain
Southern Macedonia without
abbeaning & inflict a cruel
blow on the Serbs! and

attitude alarming the Greeks?

I have discussed the possibilities with the best informed person accessible, and that is his view also. No matter how I frame a case already before the F.O. & there stands this an insuperable obstacle to any action by the Allies. Of course if anybody likes to suggest to the Bulgars that they would do best for themselves if they kept quiet & did not

attack the allies or prevent the Serbs any further. It would be open to a private person to offer such advice as his own. But I don't see how the allied forces could do any with small chances why the Serbs are doing what they agreed to do last March with good chances

You are welcome to have Balkan Blue Books, a dismal record of selfishness and duplicity

on the part of some Powers
of slackness and ignorance
on the part of others. Few
things in our time have been
so discreditable as the treat-
ment of Macedonia since 1878

Sincerely yours
Bryce

If the German translation of Bulgarian
turns out interesting you shall see it. It
depends how they regard there the
splendid German press propaganda
there -

Where would you like to have the lectures? They are now
beginning at
Girton at Mabel's
Strachey's house in
London Town.

3, Buckingham Gate,

S.W.1.

Dec. 8th. 1915.

My dear Noel,

Thank you for the memo. The idea is attractive, but how can anything be done now to assure the Bulgarians that they will be allowed to retain Southern Macedonia without appearing to inflict a cruel blow on the Serbs?; and without alarming the Greeks?

I have discussed the possibilities with the best informed person accessible, and that is his view also. The matter has, I fancy, been already before the F.O. and they think this an insuperable obstacle to any action by the Allies. Of course, if anybody liked to suggest to the Bulgars that they would do best for themselves if they kept quiet and did not attack the Allies or press the Serbs any further, it would be open to a private person to offer such advice as his own. But I don't see how the Allied Governments could do now with small chances what they refused to do last March with good chances.

You are welcome to these Balkan Blue Books, a dismal record of selfishness and duplicity on the part of some Powers, of slackness and ignorance on the part of

others. Few things in our time have been so discreditable as the treatment of Macedonia since 1878.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) BRYCE.

When would you like to have the papers? They are now lying in a box at Maple's storage warehouse in Camden Town.

If the German pamphlet on Bulgaria turns out interesting, you shall see it. Its opening paragraph describes the splendid German press propaganda there.

I talked to the French about Armenia
& found some sympathy

Feb. 28/16

My dear Noel

No objection

that seems to me to
show[illegible] the means. Your
friends at the Admiralty.
I can't but think that
there must be places along
the coast where a sudden
descent could be made.

Submarines or no submarines,

with a free entrance and
make a dock in Constantinople - But of course that is
a question for the sailors. If
we have plenty of torpedo
destroyers, could not a landing
place be guarded? Of
course it would be no use
keeping with any thing but
a strong force. The Essential

things would be, if possible
to destroy the relations between
Drama & Dedeagatch. I
know it, & there are places
where it would not be returned
for weeks a months — such
is the character of the gipsy
which it traverses.

But above all things don't

Let us take our offensive
against Bulgaria. The only
result would be to make them
active instead of languid
against us. If we are to
make an advance, let it
be towards Serbia. But that
also would be enormously diffi-
cult up the Vardar Valley. The
place to strike would be from the
Adriatic towards the Save Valley.
But the roads there would be very
difficult. If the Italians have
abandoned Durazzo. Could the Italians
be induced to try from Fiume? That
also is of course difficult. Ever yours
Bongie

3, Buckingham Gate,
S.W.

Feb. 21. 1916.

My dear Noel

My husband has gone to France to meet the French Senate & Chamber, as Chairman of the Franco-British Association. He will not be back until

the 27th Feb.

With regard to your question about the Memorandum which you have returned I think you might certainly show it to responsible heads in the Admiralty as you suggest, but you should not I think give the name of the writer.

Mr Bourchier himself suggests that it might be shown "in the right quarter" so it would seem to be permissible.

Very sincerely yours

E. Marion Bryce

Oct 2/15.

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

My dear Noel

Thank you for your letter. This morning's news makes me fear that all attempts to work Bulgaria in action in the way you suggest of Athens occupation would be now too late. Impossible now. It would seem, to retrieve the mistakes of last winter. Unless however it is certain that Bulgaria is on the eve of attacking Serbia, Serbia

ought not to be allowed first to attack Bulgaria. That would prejudice the position especially vis à vis Greece. We must not trust Greece any further than we see.

It seems hardly possible that E. Grey's statement about the German Officers at Sofia can be erroneous. D'Bernis still there, would hardly have arrived this

on mere suspicion.

It is all heart-breaking.

Yours always
Bryce

A member of the Cabinet will be with me this evening & I may further learn something further as to what is passing

The Athenaeum.

Feb. 28th. 1916.

My dear Noel,

No objection that occurs to me to you showing the Memo to your friends at the Admiralty. I can't but think that there must be places along the coast where a sudden descent could be made, submarines or no submarines, with a force which could make a dash on Constantinople. But of course, that is a question for the sailors. If we have plenty of torpedo destroyers, could not a landing force be guarded? Of course, it would be no use trying with anything but a strong force. The essential thing would be, if possible, to destroy the railway between Drama and Dedeagatch. I know it, and there are places where it would not be repaired for weeks or months - such is the character of the gorges which it traverses.

But above all things, don't let us take any offensive against Bulgaria. The only result would be to make them active instead of languid against us. If we are to make an advance, let it be towards Serbia. But that also would be enormously difficult up the Vardar Valley. The place to strike would be from the Adriatic towards the Save Valley.

But the road there would be very difficult. Pity the Italians have abandoned Durazzo. Could the Italians be induced to try from Fiume? That also, of course, is difficult.

Ever yours,

(Sgd) BRYCE.

I talked to the French about Armenia and found some sympathy.

Fortuné: Lord Bryce's comments are of interest:

Hindleap,
Forest Row,
Sussex.
Oct. 8, 1916.

Bryce on my list of terms:

My dear Noel,

I am glad you have been asked to state your views and give you my comments with pleasure.

Part I, C. Adjustments.

If France insists upon Alsace, she should have it.

Serbia. Most of the coast has already been given to Italy, more is the pity. Serbia ought to have several good ports: there are plenty.

Suggestion as to Serbo-Greco-Bulgar frontier a useful one. Salonica, though international as a port, will have to be Greek.

Poland. Could not have a port on the Baltic without cutting off East Prussia from the rest of Germany, which is inadmissible.

Italy. Must have Trieste and Istria, and has been promised most of the Dalmatian coast and islands.

Turkey. Russia should have as little of Armenia as possible. She will insist on Trebizond, Erznigan and Erzeroum, but better that the rest, such as Van

Beltis and Mush, should have some sort of autonomy under a Protectorate. West Coast of Asia Minor to go to Greece. Turkish Sultanate at Konieh for central tableland and north coast.

Albania. To be left severely alone. If a Protectorate, then an Italian one.

Part II. B.

There will be much resistance to German purchase of Congo Territories. Better leave her her own East Africa.

C. French may have Northern Syria, but not Palestine nor Damascus, which should be British Protectorate, with railway from Haîfa, vîa Damascus to the Euphrates. France wants Cilicia also, but it ought to be part of an autonomous Armenian Protectorate. In Anatolia and Mesopotamia Germany to have no recognition whatever beyond that of using an International Railway.

I am afraid there have already been serious commitments. Your suggestions about Open Door is good. The French and Russians want us to take Mesopotamia, but we are much better without the responsibility.

I am,

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) BRYCE.

Dictated, as I am recovering from influenza.

48167

Who to have Palestine Memo?
What Comment?

Oct. 8. 16.

HINDLEAP,
FOREST ROW,
SUSSEX.

Flowers

Bryce

My dear Noel

I am glad you have been asked to state your views & give you my comments with pleasure.

Part I. C. Adjustments.

If France insists upon Alsace she should have it.

Serbia. Most of the coast has already been given to Italy. More is the pity. Serbia ought to have several good ports: there are plenty.

Suggestion as to Serbo-Greco-

Bulgar frontier a useful one. Salonica, though international as a port, will have to be free.

Poland. Could not have a port on the Baltic without cutting off East Prussia from the rest of Germany, which is inadmissible.

Italy. Must have Trieste & Istria & has been promised most of the Dalmatian Coast & islands.

Turkey. Russia should have as little of Armenia as possible. She will insist on Batoum, Erzinjan & Erzeroum, but

better that the rest, such as Van Rattis & Mush, should have some sort of autonomy under a Protectorate. West Coast of Asia Minor to go to Greece. Turkish Sultanate at Konieh for central tableland & north coast.

Albania. To be left severely alone. If a Protectorate, then an Italian one.

Part II. B.

There will be much resistance to German purchase of Congo Territories. Better cede her her own East Africa.

C. French may have Northern Syria, but not Palestine

Damascus which should
be British Protectorate, with
railway from Haifa via Dam-
-ascus to the Euphrates. France
wants Cilicia also, but it ought
to be part of an autonomous
armenian Protectorate. In Anat-
-olia & Mesopotamia Germany
to have no recognition whatever
beyond that of using an Inter-
-national Railway.
I am afraid there have already been
serious commitments. Your sugges-
-tion about Open Door is good.
The French & Russians want us to take
Mesopotamia, but we are much
better without the responsibility.
I am very truly yours
Bryce
Dictated as I am
-recovering from influenza

20

La Rive,

Castlecomer,

Co. Kilkenny.

Oct. 25, 1918

Oct.

Confidential

Dear Lord Bryce,

I am sure you were glad to hear of Bulgaria's rejection of German control and of the friendly reception accorded to our officers at Sofia.

In view of the great advantages both political and military opened up to us by this move, we should endeavour to profit to the utmost by the new situation which requires very careful handling. The willing co-operation of Bulgaria is what we need, not her sulky acquiescence. There is no reason why we should not accept her active co-operation, as we have done in the case of Greece, with the best results to our new ally and to ourselves. In this way Bulgaria would be allowed to "earn merit" (I take the phrase from a former letter of yours) and to work out her own salvation - in other words, to obtain just treatment at the hands of the future Peace Congress. The only obstacle to such a policy is the jealousy of the rival Balkan States, who aim at retaining the illegitimate gains of the Treaty of Bucarest and even increasing them. As there is now every prospect of Rumania and Serbia obtaining their legitimate extension in other directions, especially since President Wilson has abandoned his idea of the autonomy of the subject

races in Austria-Hungary, while Greece can obtain legitimate extension in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands, there is no longer any excuse for countenancing the illegitimate claims of these nations to regions inhabited by Bulgarian majorities. The satisfaction of these claims would only lead to renewed trouble in the future.

It would therefore be unfortunate if our Government at the present moment gave any pledges regarding territorial claims, which would bind its hands at the future Peace Congress, and possibly bring it into conflict with opinion in America where Balkan questions are regarded with greater impartiality than in any European country. The whole question of the distribution of races in the regions won from Turkey in 1912 is still open (for the Treaty of Bucarest is devoid of European sanction) and will have to be subjected to careful and scientific examination before any decision can be arrived at in harmony with the principle of nationalities and possessing elements of permanence - It cannot be settled by hasty and secret compacts made under the stress of war conditions - I am sure you will agree with me in regard to this.

There are a few Englishmen who really know Macedonia; among them are ~~e.g.~~ R. W. Graves, H. N. Brailsford, and G. Fitzmaurice; among the French, Capt. Léon Lamouche possesses an exceptional first-hand knowledge of the country. There are several highly educated Americans who have been engaged for years in missionary and educational work there. The information which the Americans could afford and elicit would be invaluable. It would be necessary to wait for the report of a committee of specialists before coming to any decision regarding territorial redistribution.

The same may be said with regard to the Greek demand for an

inquiry into the reported atrocities committed by the Bulgarians. An ex parte inquiry held in war time could not arrive at a satisfactory conclusion and would only irritate the Bulgarians - whatever they have done in Macedonia must be taken in connection with what the Servians and Greeks did there from the time of their occupation of the country in 1912-1913. For this, as well as the Bulgarian crimes committed during the same period, we have the impartial report of the Carnegie Commission, a document of the greatest importance, which never received the attention it deserves - an inquiry conducted on the same lines after the war would probably elicit the real facts.

In regard to the Balkan question in general, I hope we shall avoid taking any steps to alienate the good will which the Bulgarians are showing towards us, and that we shall decline to listen to suggestions made with this object. We must strive to be just and fair all rounds: this, I am ~~told~~ informed, is the tendency of American opinion, and I am sure you join with me in hoping that we shall find ourselves in harmony with it when the time arrives for final decisions.

K336

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Not for Publication.

Amended after receipt of criticisms.
August, 1915.

PROPOSALS FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR,

WITH A

PREFATORY NOTE

BY

VISCOUNT BRYCE.

SECOND PROOF
DATE SENT. 6.8.15
DATE RETD.
DELITTLE, FENWICK & CO.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Not for Publication.

PROPOSALS FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR,

WITH A

PREFATORY NOTE

BY

VISCOUNT BRYCE.

The authors of this document will be grateful for any criticisms or suggestions from those to whom it is confidentially submitted. These will, of course, be treated as strictly confidential, and should be inserted in the margin or in the blank sheets at the end of the duplicate copy herewith enclosed. It should be returned to the Secretary of the Group, Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, King's College, Cambridge, England

PREFATORY NOTE.

The frightful catastrophe of the present War, involving more than half the human race, and bringing grave evils on neutral nations also, has driven thoughtful men to reflect on the possibility of finding means by which the risk of future wars may be dispelled, or at least largely reduced. The only effective and permanent remedy would be to convince the several peoples of the world that they have far more to lose than to gain from strife, and to replace by a sentiment of mutual international goodwill the violent national antagonisms that now exist. But this, we may well fear, would be a slow process. Meantime that which may be done, and which it seems possible to do at once, is to provide machinery by and through which that great body of international public opinion which favours peace may express itself, and so bring its power to bear upon the governments of those nations in which there may, from time to time, exist a spirit of aggression, or a readiness to embark on war in pursuit of selfish interests or at the bidding of national pride. The public opinion of the world would surely prove to possess a greater force than it has yet shewn if it could but find an effective organ through which to act.

A group of men in England who have long been seeking for some method by which this aim might be attained has recently tried to draft a scheme embodying, in outline, such a method. It is briefly set forth in the document which follows, and is explained in the Introduction prefixed thereto. It is now circulated privately to a small number of persons believed to be in general accord as to the object in view, with the hope that those of them who can find the time will criticize it fully and freely, and will append such alternative suggestions as may seem likely to be helpful. Those who have drafted the scheme are aware that it deals with only one branch of a very large subject, and they are duly sensible of the difficulties to be overcome before even these limited and tentative proposals could be likely to find acceptance with those who direct the policy of States. But there are some advantages in submitting and bespeaking attention for one particular plan, especially as the practical measures it points to would be the extension and development of an institution (the Hague Tribunal) which has so far worked for good.

Everyone seems to feel the approach of a supremely important moment. The reason and the conscience of mankind have been roused, as never before, to a sense of the moral as well as the material evil wrought by war. If the opportunity which the close of the present conflict will offer for the provision of means to avert future wars be lost, another such may never reappear, and the condition of the world will have grown worse, because the recurrence of like calamities will have been recognized as a thing to be expected, and their causes as beyond all human cure.

BRYCE.

INTRODUCTION.

The feeling that the present war is a disastrous failure of civilization, and that at its close all should be done, that human wisdom and foresight can devise, to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe, is, we believe, general, if not universal, among all the nations concerned. But to concentrate this feeling upon definite and practicable measures is not an easy task. It is clear that the reforms to be introduced must be drastic if they are to be effective. On the other hand, there must be continuity; for proposals involving too violent a breach with the established order are not likely to be seriously considered. What is attempted here is to put forward a scheme which, while it involves a real and radical advance upon the present organization of international relations, yet does not break so violently with the course of historical development as to be fairly described as Utopian.

With the deep underlying causes of war we do not here concern ourselves. Those causes, mainly connected, in the modern world, with false ideas and wrong feelings about the moral, political and economic relations of States, of classes, and of individuals, can only be gradually dissipated by the spread of intelligence and knowledge and goodwill. And until they are dissipated there can be no complete security for peace. Meantime, however, we think it possible, by such an arrangement as we suggest, to diminish very considerably the risk of war, and so to give time for the development of that educational process upon which we mainly rely.

Proposals for the reform of international relations vary in range and extent from complete schemes for a world-State, to improvements in the conduct of diplomacy. The project of a world-State, or even of a European Federation, we do not here advocate. It is perhaps a possibility of the distant future, and it well deserves the discussion it has provoked. But we do not believe it to be practicable at any near date; and there are many who do not think it desirable. Our aim is a more modest one. We desire to give definite shape to that idea of an association or union of independent and sovereign States which is being advocated by many leading men both in Europe and in America, and which, we believe, could be realized immediately at the conclusion of the war.

We propose then that existing States, retaining their sovereignty, should enter into a treaty arrangement with a view to the preservation of peace. What we contemplate is not a league of some States against others, but a union of as many as possible in their common interest.

The question then immediately arises, what States shall be admitted to the Union? It might be urged, with a good deal of force, that it should be open to all the States represented at the First or Second Hague Conference that might be willing to join. But the admission, in the first instance, of so large a number of States (44) of which some (like those of South America) are not intimately connected with European politics, might seriously hamper the earlier stages of the arrangement. On the other hand, any limitation must be arbitrary. The suggestion in Clause 1 of the present draft is for the inclusion, as of right, of all the eight Great Powers, and of any other European State that may wish to adhere. But this particular selection of States is not of the essence of the scheme. What is important is, that the membership should not be so narrow and exclusive that the Union shall appear to be a mere alliance directed against other States. For this reason it seems essential that at least all the Great Powers should be admissible as of right, whether or no they all choose to come in at the beginning. And there are others of the lesser European States, such as Holland, Belgium, the Scandinavian Countries and Switzerland, which ~~should not be excluded~~. Ultimately, if the arrangement were found to work well in practice, it might be thrown open to all the States of the world.

should obviously be included

In formulating the conditions of the Union, we have taken as our starting point the series of treaties recently concluded between the United States of America and a number of other States. The essence of these treaties is that the contracting parties agree not to have recourse to forcible measures until the matter in dispute between them has been submitted to a permanent Commission of Inquiry. Thus, under the Treaty ratified in 1914 between this country and the United States, the parties agree "that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, other than disputes the settlement of which is provided for and in fact achieved under existing agreements between the High Contracting Parties, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to a Permanent

International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding article ; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted."

What we propose is, briefly, to generalize an arrangement of this kind, imposing a moratorium before recourse shall be had to war ; and to add sanctions to insure the fulfilment of the treaty. We build thus upon existing facts and tendencies, and may fairly claim to be advocating not a revolutionary change, but an orderly development.

The members, then, of our proposed Union would bind themselves by treaty :—

(1) To refer all disputes that might arise between them, if diplomatic methods of adjustment had failed, either to an arbitral tribunal for judicial decision, or to a council of conciliation for investigation and report.

(2) Not to declare war or begin hostilities (or hostile preparations) until the tribunal had decided or the council had reported.

(3) To put pressure, diplomatic, economic or forcible, upon any signatory Power that should act in violation of the preceding conditions.

(4) To put similar pressure upon any non-signatory Power that should declare war or begin hostilities or hostile preparations against a signatory Power, without first submitting the dispute to peaceable settlement by the method indicated in (1) (see Clauses 2—16).

Concerted pressure by the Members of the Union is a treaty obligation only in the case where one of them has resorted to force, or the threat of force, in breach of the conditions imposed by the treaty. The measures required would be taken by the Powers as sovereign States acting through their ordinary diplomatic and governmental machinery, and would be supported, if necessary, by their national armaments. We do not propose an international force, nor an international executive.

In suggesting economic, as an alternative to forcible, pressure, we are putting forward a means of coercion which, in some cases, might be as effective as armed force and as easy of application.

A whole series of such measures can be conceived, differing in their severity and their applicability to different cases :—e.g., an embargo on the shipping of the recalcitrant State ; a prohibition of loans to it ; cutting it off from railway, postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication ; prohibition of exports to or imports from it, supported if necessary by a "pacific blockade."

Applied against a small Power, such measures as these would be likely, by themselves, to be effective. Applied to a Great Power, they ~~would often be likely to~~ be met by armed force, and so lead on to war. But the possibility of a concerted use of them should be seriously considered, when the case arises, by the signatories to such a Union as we are planning.

Our proposal is that disputes between the treaty Powers should be referred either to arbitration or to conciliation. We distinguish, therefore, two classes of disputes, and two processes of settlement.

(1) The first class of disputes we call "justiciable." They are such as are capable of settlement by judicial determination ; for example, the interpretation of a treaty, or any question of international law or of fact, where the fact in dispute is one which, if proved, would constitute a breach of international duty (see Clause 4). In case of disagreement as to whether a dispute is justiciable or not, the arbitral tribunal is to decide (see Clause 5).

All disputes of a justiciable character, including those that involve honour and vital interests, are to be referred to the Hague Court, as it now is, or may in future be constituted, or to some other arbitral court.

In framing treaties of arbitration it has been usual for States to exclude from the scope of the treaty, cases involving "honour" or "vital interests." We have not excluded them in our draft, partly because we propose to determine by this judicial procedure only those cases which are properly susceptible of it, leaving to conciliation cases to which legal principles and methods cannot be applied, and which will comprise at any rate the great bulk of those involving "vital interests" or "honour" ; partly because it seems essential to an international order that, where law is recognized, it should be applied, whatever the consequences A State, for instance, ought to be compelled to submit to judicial

process any dispute about territory involving treaty rights, however important it may consider the possession of the territory to be to its "vital interests." As to "honour," in any reputable sense of that term, it can never be to a nation's honour to repudiate a legal obligation.

(2) The other class of disputes, and, of course, the class most likely to lead to war, comprises those which are not justiciable; such as, for instance, those which arise out of the general economic and political rivalry of States, or, it may be, from the discontent of nationalities within a State, where such discontent commands the sympathy of a kindred people. For the settlement of such disputes a judicial tribunal is not the best authority. We propose, therefore, to institute for this purpose a new international body which we call the Council of Conciliation. The functions of the Council would be similar to those hitherto performed by the diplomatic representatives of the Powers when they meet in concert to discuss difficult questions; but it is intended that the composition of the Council should enable its members to take a more impartial and comprehensible international view, and to suggest a radical settlement rather than a mere temporary compromise, likely to be broken as soon as some Power is ready to risk war.

The difficulty, of course, will be to secure the appointment of the right men. Each Power must appoint its own representative, or representatives, and determine the method of appointment. But it is prescribed in our draft (Clause 7) that the appointments shall be made for a fixed term of years, the Council being thus always complete and in being.* The object of this provision is, that the members shall not be exposed to the suspicion of having been appointed for the purposes of a particular dispute, and because of their supposed views upon it. Nothing further on this subject is laid down in the draft. But we consider it desirable, if not essential, that the members shall not act under constant instructions from their governments, but shall deliberate and vote freely according to their best judgment, in the interests of the whole society of nations. On the other hand, it is to be presumed that the members will be, and remain, sufficiently in touch with public opinion in their own country not to be likely to assent to proposals

* A non-signatory Power sending a representative under Clause 8 would, of course, appoint its representative *ad hoc* only.

violently in conflict with that opinion; and also will be of sufficient capacity to have influence with the Council, and of sufficient weight in their own country to ensure a fair consideration there of any proposals with which they may associate themselves. The fulfilment of these conditions can only be ensured by the public opinion of the appointing States. And with a view to making that opinion effective it is to be presumed that in all countries possessing representative institutions the names of the members to be appointed will be submitted to the approval of the Legislature.

The objection may be taken that governments will never consent to allow decisions that may vitally affect their nation to be agreed to by representatives who have not been subject to their constant instructions. But this objection misapprehends the purpose and powers of the proposed Council. It is a Council of Inquiry and Conciliation only. It has no executive power, and its decisions do not bind the governments. It represents, to the public opinion of the nations, the views of an international body as to that solution of an urgent problem that is most in accordance with equity and the general interest. And if it is to do this sincerely and effectively, it is essential that its members should not take a narrowly national view, nor be mere agents of possibly reactionary governments. The Council may sometimes have to appeal to the nations behind their governments.

The question arises whether the Powers should be equally represented on the Council. This does not seem to be a point of fundamental importance, since the functions of the Council are conciliatory only, and not executive. But since it is likely that the greater Powers would have a larger number of men qualified to be members, they might be given a greater representation: say three to each of the Great Powers, and one at least to each of the rest.

The Council, as has been explained, will mediate between the disputants and endeavour to arrange a settlement which shall not be a mere compromise but shall rest upon intelligible principles and have in it some guarantee of permanence. Sometimes it may be able to arrange such a settlement privately and satisfactorily with the parties. But in every case where it fails to do this it must publish a report or reports dealing with the whole situation and setting forth its recommendations and the grounds on which they are based (Clause 11). These reports and recommendations would then form the subject of debates in Legislative

Assemblies, and of discussion, at meetings and in the press. And sufficient time being allowed for this (Clause 16) it is not unreasonable to hope that the best public opinion of all countries would support the Council in pressing for an amicable solution on the lines suggested, and that the disputants would yield to that pressure. Should this hope not be fulfilled, then it must be clearly understood that no Power is under treaty obligation either to accept the recommendations of the Council or to put pressure upon a Power refusing to accept them. The States retain on these points all their liberty of action. All that the treaty prescribes is, that if that situation arises, the Powers shall meet in conference to consider whether or no it is practicable or desirable for them to take collective action. This conference will be composed of the diplomatic representatives of the Powers, and will proceed in the ordinary way of such conferences, all the governments being free to take what action they think expedient or right.

It is possible, then, that from such a situation, in the last resort, war might arise. It is not claimed that the Union would make war impossible. But it is believed that the enforced period of delay, the consideration by an impartial Council and the publicity given to its recommendations would be very likely to prevent war by rallying the public opinion of the world in favour of peace ; and that, in the worst case, the area of war would be likely to be restricted ; for a Power making war in defiance of the recommendations of the Council could not rely on support from the other signatory Powers.

It will be observed that our plan implies and presupposes such a measure of popular control over international relations as is involved in the publication of the results of impartial inquiry, and their discussion in representative assemblies and in the press. Without pretending that public opinion is always and everywhere pacific, we believe that, when it is properly instructed, and when time is given for passions to cool, it is more likely to favour peace than do the secret operations of diplomacy.

It may be worth while to emphasize the difference between the Union we are proposing and what has been known as the Concert of Europe. In the first place, the Union is not confined to European Powers. In the second place, it binds the signatory Powers, under the sanction, in the last resort, of force, to submit

their disputes to peaceable settlement, before having recourse to military measures. In the third place, it creates for the discussion of the most difficult and contentious questions, an impartial and permanent Council, which would have some advantages over the present machinery of the Concert. We attach much importance to the creation of such a permanent international organ, and believe that its ultimate and indirect effects may be even more important than its operations in particular cases.

Such, in outline, is the scheme we propose. A few words may now be said as to some of the more obvious and serious objections that may be taken against it.

1. The essence of the proposal is to impose a period of delay before recourse can be had to hostilities, the period to be devoted to attempts at peaceable settlement. But what exactly is to be accounted recourse to hostilities? The phrase in our draft is "declare war or begin hostilities or hostile preparations" (Clauses 16 and 18). The phrase is intended to include mobilization or any similar measure such as States are accustomed to adopt when they think war imminent. It is intended also to include increase of armaments with a view to war. But it would be very difficult to prohibit this latter, short of an agreement limiting armaments. For in the absence of such an agreement a sovereign State must be allowed to be its own judge of what armaments it requires, and an increase cannot be regarded as clearly a hostile act. We therefore contemplate such an agreement as important, if not essential, to our scheme. And we give power to our Council to make and submit to the Powers suggestions in that sense (Clause 13). We think that the comparative security which the Union would guarantee to its members, as well as the economic exhaustion following the present war, and the determination of the peoples to reduce this tremendous burden, should make it possible, and even necessary, for such an agreement to be entered into, in spite of the well-known difficulties it must encounter. And if the agreement were made, a breach of it would be regarded as "hostile preparations" under Clauses 17 and 19.

2. In case any power declares war or begins hostilities or hostile preparations against a signatory Power, without first referring the dispute to peaceable settlement, the signatory Powers are under obligation to apply coercive measures (Clause 18). But

they will have to agree upon what those measures shall be, and by whom and how they are to be carried out. It may be urged, therefore, that difficulties are likely to arise; since either the Powers must be unanimous, in which case action may become impossible, or a majority must decide, in which case Powers that are taking less risk or responsibility, may outvote Powers that are taking more. The difficulty is real, but we have not thought it well to propose a solution of it in our draft. It is the kind of difficulty the Powers must settle for themselves, either by common sense round their council-table, or by forming some kind of constitution involving a graduation of voting power. If this latter were done it would be a great advance in international organization and might lead to further developments.

3. A more fundamental objection aims at the whole scope of our scheme. "If you are successful," it says, "what you will really do is to stereotype the *status quo*, as it may be established after this war. But no status can be permanently satisfactory in a changing world. What we want is a machinery for altering international relations as circumstances change, but for altering them in a peaceable way." To this we reply, first that our scheme, though it delays war, does not attempt to prohibit it. It leaves war as a last escape from an impossible situation. Secondly, that the recommendations of our Council of Conciliation will be suggestions to the Powers for a peaceable alteration of the *status quo*. Thirdly, that we give the Council powers, even when there is not a dispute, but they foresee the possibility of one, to make suggestions for dealing with the whole situation out of which such disputes may arise (Clause 12); and generally, to make proposals which may lead to the avoidance of war (Clause 13). These are very wide powers; and if they were used, the Council might become the originator of a developing public law. Still, the Powers would have to adopt the proposals, before they could become effective; and if they were proposals affecting general public law they would have to adopt them through some formal international organ. Such an organ exists in a rudimentary form in the Hague Conferences; and many people hope that after the war these conferences will be given a permanent organization, meet at regular intervals and grow into an international legislature. It is possible again, that a legislature should arise in a different way, through the development of an international conference specially summoned

to settle questions arising out of this war, and not comprising, as the Hague Conference does, practically all the Powers of the world. In any development of a true international legislature, questions must arise, at some stage, as to equality or inequality of voting power, and the binding of a minority by a majority. We do not here discuss or prejudge these questions; for, while recognizing the great importance of an International Legislature to complete international organization, we doubt whether the time is ripe for constituting it. We put forward our scheme, not as ideal, but as something which we believe to be immediately practicable, and which would constitute a great advance upon the present anarchy. The very recognition of its defects in practice may and should lead to its development and completion. Meantime, we submit it to candid, and, we hope, friendly criticism.

NOTE.—Since this draft was first drawn up and circulated privately for discussion, two societies have been formed to advocate plans, in essence, the same. One is the League of Nations Society in England (Secretary, Mrs. A. W. Claremont, 7, West Heath Avenue, Hampstead, N.W.); the other the American League to enforce Peace (Secretary, Dr. Theodore Marburg, Mount Vernon Place, Baltimore).

"I should like, if I might for a moment, beyond this enquiry into causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow countrymen to the end which in this war we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said 'The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics.' Nearly fifty years have passed. Little progress it seems has yet been made towards that great and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European policy. The idea of public right, what does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means first and foremost the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States, and of the future moulding of the European world. It means next that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities--each with a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States, they must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbours —more powerful in strength as in wealth—exactly as good a title to a place in the sun.

And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambitions, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realized either to-day or to-morrow. If and when this war is decided in favour of the Allies, it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmanship."

[*Mr. Asquith, at Dublin, September 25th, 1914.*]

Proposals for the Avoidance of War.

Parties.

1. The parties to the treaty arrangement contemplated in the succeeding clauses to be all the Great Powers (i.e., the six Great Powers of Europe, the United States and Japan), such of the other European Powers as are willing to become parties to it, and any other Powers which may hereafter be allowed to adhere to it.

Justiciable Disputes.

Justiciable disputes to be referred to arbitration.

2. The signatory Powers to agree to refer to the Court of Arbitral Justice proposed at the second Hague Conference, or to the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, or to some other arbitral tribunal, all disputes between them (including those affecting honour and vital interests), which are of a justiciable character and which the Powers concerned have failed to settle by diplomatic methods.

Awards of the arbitral tribunal to be accepted.

3. The signatory Powers so referring to arbitration to agree to accept and give effect to the award of the tribunal.

Definition of justiciable disputes.

4. "Disputes of a justiciable character" to be defined as "disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for any such breach."

Council of Conciliation to decide whether a dispute is justiciable.

5. Any question which may arise as to whether a dispute is of a justiciable character, to be referred for decision to the Court of Arbitral Justice when constituted, or until it is constituted, to the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.

Permanent Council of Conciliation.

Constitution and objects of Council.

6. With a view to the prevention and settlement of disputes between the signatory Powers which are not of a justiciable character, a permanent Council of Conciliation to be constituted.

Appointment and term of office of members.

7. The members of the Council to be appointed by the several signatory Powers for a fixed term of years, and vacancies to be filled up by the appointing Powers, so that the Council shall always be complete and in being.*

Temporary representation of non-signatory Powers.

8. In order to provide for the case of disputes between a signatory Power and an outside Power which is willing to submit its case to the Council, provision to be made for the temporary representation of the latter.

Powers to submit non-justiciable cases to the Council.

9. The signatory Powers to agree that every party to a dispute, not of a justiciable character, the existence of which might ultimately endanger friendly relations with another signatory Power or Powers, and which has not been settled by diplomatic methods, will submit its case to the Council with a view to conciliation.

---

*For some observations on the method of appointment, the number and character of the members to be appointed by each Power, and the method of voting, see Introduction.

Council to consider disputes and invite submission of cases.

10. Where, in the opinion of the Council, any dispute exists between any of the signatory Powers which appears likely to endanger their good relations with each other, the Council to consider the dispute and to invite each Power concerned to submit its case with a view to conciliation.

Council to report on disputes considered.

11. Unless through the good offices of the Council or otherwise, the dispute shall have previously been settled between the parties, the Council to make and publish, with regard to every dispute considered by it, a report or reports, containing recommendations for the amicable settlement of the dispute.

General power to Council to make suggestions with a view to conciliation.

12. When it appears to the Council that, from any cause within its knowledge, the good relations between any of the signatory Powers are likely to be endangered, the Council to be at liberty to make suggestions to them with a view to conciliation, whether or not any dispute has actually arisen, and, if it considers it expedient to do so, to publish such suggestions.

Council to have power to make suggestions for the limitation of armaments.

13. The Council to be at liberty to make and submit for the consideration of the signatory Powers, suggestions as to the limitation or reduction of armaments, or any other proposal which in its opinion would lead to the avoidance of war or the diminution of its evils.

Signatory Powers to furnish Council with all necessary facilities for discharge of its functions

14. The signatory Powers to agree to furnish the Council with all the means and facilities required for the due discharge of its functions.

Deliberations of Council.

15. The Council to deliberate in public or in private, as it thinks fit.

Committees of the Council.

16. The Council to have power to appoint committees, which may or may not be composed exclusively of its own members, to report to it on any matter within the scope of its functions.*

Moratorium for Hostilities.

17. Every signatory Power to agree not to declare war or begin hostilities or hostile preparations against any other signatory Power before the matter in dispute has been submitted to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Council, or within a period of twelve months thereafter; or, if the award of the arbitral tribunal or the report of the Council, as the case may be, has been published within that time, then not to declare war or begin hostilities or hostile preparations within a period of six months after the publication of such award or report.†

Limitation of Effect of Alliances.

18. The signatory Powers to agree that no signatory Power commencing hostilities against another, without first complying with the provisions of the preceding clauses, shall be entitled, by virtue of any existing or future treaty of alliance or other engagement, to the material support of any other signatory Power in such hostilities.

---

*It will be observed that it is not proposed to confer any executive power on the Council.

†If an agreement for limitation of armaments had been arrived at, any departure from the agreement would presumably be taken to be a "hostile preparation," until the contrary were shown.

Enforcement of the Preceding Provisions.

Enforcement of provisions for reference of disputes to arbitration or conciliation.

19. All the signatory Powers to undertake that in case any Power, whether or not a signatory Power, declares war or begins hostilities or hostile preparations against a signatory Power, without first having submitted its case to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Council of Conciliation, or before the expiration of the prescribed period of delay, they will support the Power so attacked by such concerted measures, diplomatic, economic or forcible, as, in their judgment, are most effective and appropriate to the circumstances of the case.

Measures to give effect to reports of the Council.

20. The signatory Powers to undertake that if any Power shall fail to accept and give effect to the recommendations contained in any report of the Council, or in the award of the arbitral tribunal, they will, at a Conference to be forthwith summoned for the purpose, consider, in concert, the situation which has arisen by reason of such failure, and what collective action, if any, it is practicable to take in order to make such recommendations operative.

The measures contemplated in the last two paragraphs would, of course, be taken by the governments of the signatory Powers acting in concert, and not by the Council of Conciliation. (See Introduction.)