

CPS
to Chamberlain

Room No. 13.
Upper Committee Corridor.

October 1st 1938.

Dear Mr. Chamberlain,

This is not a congratulatory letter. I owe you, and feel towards you, profound thankfulness - not merely for the results of Munich, but for your service to our country since you took up foreign policy with your Anglo-Italian agreement.

But I now write as an old colleague in the House, to say something about the words in your speech in the House on Wednesday - "I cannot help reflecting that if Article XIX of the Covenant providing for the revision of the Treaties by agreement had been put into operation, as was contemplated by the framers of the Covenant, instead of waiting until passion became so exasperated that revision by agreement became impossible, we might have avoided the crisis." This lies, in my opinion, at the root of the whole problem of British foreign policy. Your words express, in a nut-shell, the whole thesis of my book The Alternative to War, written in June 1936. I sent it to Mr. Eden at the time. I take the liberty of enclosing herewith a copy.

I should be deeply grateful if you would instruct your Private Secretary to give you a brief summary of its contents. It suggests a policy in precise terms.

There is, of course, much more to be said now; and I should be proud if I could assist you with a precise proposal on any point, particularly on colonies. Germany, in my opinion, should be offered two large territories on the West Coast of Africa, subject to a collective control applicable to all colonies alike. I should suggest the exact boundaries.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

C O P Y.

to

12th, Oct, 1938.

Dear Prime Minister,

Though you must be flooded with letters from Germany, I ought, perhaps, to pass on to you the words of a German ex-naval officer.

I feel like one having been condemned to death and set free in the last minute. The man who gave the world this last chance, in the hour of this extreme danger, is your Prime Minister. I do hope that the World, and before all, Germany and England, will realise what they owe to the tenacity and goodwill of your great Statesman.

~~It is my fervent wish to let Mr. Chamberlain know that we will thank him, and bless him all our life long.~~

~~As this comes from a fighting man, it may interest you, as indicating the still stronger feeling in the public at large.~~

~~This influence on Hitler seems to be ground for a certain optimism, if combined with the effect of continued personal contact with yourself, which is the greatest factor.~~

Having foreseen, for the past year, the danger of German action, if the just claim to the ~~Sudetenland~~ Sudetenland was not recognised, I should like to express my gratitude to you for preventing a war in an untenable cause.

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May I also say how glad I am to notice the reference which you made to German claims in *the conversation with Hitler.*

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N Chamberlain

COPY.

The Hirsell,
COLDSTREAM.

October 14th, 1938.

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

Many thanks for your interesting letter. I have had a surprising number of grateful letters and messages from Germans.

I agree with you in thinking that the German desire for peace must have its effect on Hitler, and I hope, too, that the personal contact I have established with him will help, though some of the recent speeches in the House of Commons have been very mischievous.

The trouble with the German rulers is that even when they have a good case they treat it in such a way as to alienate sympathy. But I think that is partly due to their conviction that "nobody loves them".

18 Cowley Street,
Westminster,
S.W.1.

26th. September 1939.

My dear Prime Minister,

May I say a word in regard to the problem which will arise in the event of the German Government attempting to make peace on the basis of a restored Poland?

Our Press would be ready to condemn any such proposals as providing no security against renewed aggression; but a great body of opinion would in reality be anxious to consider any grounds for confidence which such proposals might contain, and I should like to assure you of the wide support which you would receive if you should decide that adequate security for future peace was to be found in the proposals.

If we must assume that Danzig and the Corridor would not be restored to Poland, a countervailing offer would undoubtedly form part of any German plan that was intended to secure our acceptance. For example, an offer to join in a genuine scheme of disarmament, in a scheme of European co-operation, and in the settlement of East European questions on a federal basis, involving the setting up of a Polish as well as a Bohemian State.

As we have offered to negotiate with "any peace-loving government" it might be considered that such a peace

could be concluded, as containing on balance greater advantages and fewer risks than the continuance of the war. If your opinion should lie in that direction, it is certain that you would find an immense body of support.

May I add that I am sending a letter in similar terms to Lord Halifax?



10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

28th September, 1939.

Dear Noel-Buxton,

Many thanks for your letter of September 26th. I am grateful to you for having let me know your views.

I do not think I need say in replying to you more than is said in Halifax's letter to you, a copy of which I have seen. As he says, there is nothing which we more eagerly desire than a genuine peace, but we must be sure that it is a peace that will last.

Yours sincerely
Haile Chamberlain

The Right Hon.
The Lord Noel-Buxton.



Tract

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

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Gordon sends view to y
many views sent
y r welcomed views

4th March, 1940.

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

I have your letter of March 1st with which you sent me a memorandum on the subject of war aims.

Before commenting on the views expressed I should be glad if you would let me know for what purpose the memorandum is designed and how it is to be used.

Yours sincerely
Ernie Chamberlain

The Right Hon.
The Lord Noel-Buxton.

Copy

18 COWLEY STREET
WESTMINSTER.

S.W.1

CM

March 7th, 1940.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked by a group of peers, who have met to discuss the question of war aims, to send you the enclosed Memorandum. It expresses the views of a considerable number of members of the Upper House. Those who have definitely expressed a wish that their names should be given as being in general agreement with the Memorandum are Lord Abercrombie, Lord Arnold, the Bishop of Birmingham, the Bishop of Bristol, the Bishop of Chichester, Lord Darnley, Lord Harmsworth, Lord Holden and Lord Ponsonby.

*Yours sincerely
Noel Burton*

Tract

March 6th, 1940.

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your note saying that, before commenting on the views expressed in the Memorandum on war aims which I ventured to send you, you would like me to let you know the purpose in view.

The purpose of the Memorandum, which I am only justified in troubling you with on the strength of my long standing interest in the Anglo-German problem, is to support the view that a crushing victory is not the way to secure peace in the future, and to inform you (on the democratic principle) of an opinion which is widely held. I

East

March 24th, 1940

would like to add that the view taken has the support of very many members of both Houses, though it is not publicly expressed, because of the fear of "encouraging the enemy".

I have sent a copy of the Memo to Halifax and to some other members of the Cabinet.

I am only justified in troubling you with on the strength of my long standing interest in the Anglo-German problem, as to support the view that a crushing victory is not the way to secure peace in the future, and to inform you (on the democratic principle) of an opinion which is widely held.

Tratt
COPIE

Chambers

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Dear Prime Minister,

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The purpose of the Memorandum is to support the view that a crushing victory is not the way to secure peace in the future, and to inform you (on the democratic principles) of an opinion which is widely held. I would like to add that the view taken has the support of very many members of both Houses, but is not expressed ^{because of} by the fear of "encouraging the enemy". The Memo is definitely not for publication.



Tract
& memo

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

17th March, 1940.

Dear Lord Noel Buxton,

Thank you for your letters of March 6th and March 7th. I much appreciate the fact that you are refraining^x from giving public expression to the views put forward in the memorandum referred to in your letter of the 6th in order to avoid any action which might encourage the enemy.

x refers to mine re
Group memo.

I have also been glad to hear that arrangements are being made for you to have a talk shortly with the Foreign Secretary. In view of this I will not comment further on the points raised in the memoranda you have sent me, as I think the best plan will be for you to discuss them with Halifax.

Yours sincerely
Erville Chamberlain

The Rt.Hon. The Lord Noel-Buxton.

18 COWLEY STREET
WESTMINSTER.
S.W.1

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for yours of March 17th.

I note that you leave it to Halifax to express your view upon my notes on war aims. Forgive me another line, as you decided not to give me the comments which you intended making when you wrote me. May I just beg for your special attention to the point

as the result of a Conference which includes neutral,
that, if you have evidence that Germany will restore a genuine Poland, thus admitting a failure of the aims announced by Hitler, the Allies could safely negotiate and grant an armistice, without public admission of defeat on the part of Hitler, and without demanding

SECRET
1945

previous withdrawal of German troops
from Poland.