



Private.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

June 30th 1915.

My dear Buxton,

Many thanks for the information contained in your letter of yesterday. It is interesting and useful to have the opinion of the leaders of the opposition in Bulgaria on the Entente offer.

I am of course most glad to receive from you, and I hope you will continue to send me, any information which may reach you from the Near East; but I fear there are real objections to your proposals about the telegrams.

Why? [It would not be possible to send you all the telegrams on the Balkan question, as this would involve telegrams from and to France, Russia and Italy with whom we are in frequent consultation. Necessarily action in the Balkans depends to a great extent on the general position of the war, and if only a certain number of telegrams reached you you would receive an incomplete and one-sided view of what was going on, so that the conclusions you came to might not be such as full knowledge would enable you to form.]

I think, therefore, that the best plan is that we should continue to exchange information on general lines as far as is practicable.

I feel sure you will understand the reasons which prevent me from complying with your request and that you will not think it due to any unwillingness to maintain an interchange of news and opinions.

Yours sincerely

Crewe

*Crewe
War*

Crewe House,
Curzon Street,
W.

My dear Buxton,

I am very glad to have the notes on the Allies and America, which you were good enough to send me on December 29th. I see you have communicated their substance to the Press in a letter.

It is curious that the President did not see that the issue of his invitation, almost on the top of the German announcement, made it almost inevitable that the two should be regarded as possessing a close connection, although he quite truly stated that such was not the case. Of course the result was to produce an undue prejudice against his intervention, and cause it to be regarded as a scarcely veiled attempt at actual mediation.

I see considerable difficulty even in a private communication to the American Government of the joint terms expected by the Allies, whether the maximum be set out or the minimum. To state the maximum obtainable by a complete victory might appear arrogant, if not actually grasping; while the minimum would involve a long preliminary discussion between the different Allies to decide by whom the sacrifice of what each regards as a just individual claim should be made. There would be some danger, too, of starting a long argumentative discussion on the justice of this or that particular demand, going deeply into historical and ethnological considerations, and not far removed from the submission of our case to arbitration. I speak without any particular knowledge, but I

question whether, at this stage, the Allies are likely to make such a communication.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) CREWE.

Private

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CREWE HOUSE.
CURZON STREET. W.

2nd. January, 1917.

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CREWE HOUSE.
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Yours v. sincerely

Crewe

12 Rutland Gate.
S.W.

5th. Jan. 1917.

Dear Lord Crewe,

Many thanks for your letter & for telling me your opinion as to the difficulty of a private communication.

Everyone must realise that the work of arriving at minimum terms by discussion among the Allies involves immense difficulty. But is not this a difficulty which must be faced in the near future in any case?

One would like to see the objections to a Russian annexation of the Bosphorus brought up by America's initiative rather than by ours, but I had thought that the fundamental terms, apart from that question, might be as well discussed now as later, & communicated to America at this stage.

GREWE HOUSE.

CURZON STREET. W.I.

11th March, 1931

My dear Noel-Buxton,

Thank you for sending me a copy of the letter which I wrote to you in January 1917. I cannot take any exception to its appearance in the volume of your papers, and looking at it after this long lapse of years, it seems to me to be tolerably intelligent.

Yours sincerely

Grewe

The Lord Noel-Buxton
12, Rutland Gate, S.W.1



Handwritten initials "JN" and "AC" in the top left corner.

CREWE HOUSE,
CURZON STREET. W.1

13th February, 1937

Crewe
Debate on Colonial question

Dear Lord Noel Buxton,

I had already observed your interesting motion put down for Wednesday, February 17th. The question bristles with difficulties, and I cannot say that our Benches will be in absolute agreement with what you propose. But you may be sure that we shall be in general sympathy.

Yours sincerely,

Crewe

Return ^{with} his real reasons -
Not strategic.

(See fore)

CREWE HOUSE.

CURZON STREET. W.1

25th March, 1937

Cols
Crewe
My dear Lord Buxton

Many thanks for your letter of yesterday about Colonial Mandates. I think it is true that most people, in refusing to return colonies to Germany, are even more impressed by the strategic argument than by fear of what may happen to the native populations. Personally, I cannot see that Tanganyika, for instance, could be a serious danger, even to Kenya, because if the Germans were fools enough to arm a large force of Askaris (who, by the way, fought brilliantly for them in the War), and thereby threatened Kenya, they would immediately lose the Colony again, because it can be assumed that the German Fleet could not protect it. But in this particular case, would there not be the triple objection, first, the fears of Kenya; secondly, some protests from the inhabitants; and thirdly, strong objections from South Africa, where it is considered that they conquered the Colony? This last objection would not apply to the German Colonies on the West Coast, nor, perhaps, would their neighbours be so apprehensive.

X

I think that the question of some extension of the Mandate System ought to be carefully examined. As I think I tried to point out in the debate, ^{by Borneo Fiji} the area of possibilities is much restricted by circumstances, but I think it is important to see how far a share in

actual

The Lord Noel-Buxton
18 Cowley Street
Westminster. S.W.1

actual administration could be given to representatives of other Governments in any of our existing Crown Colonies. Our people would not like it, and the allocation of offices would be difficult, even on the legal side. On the ^{side} other hand, the German and other Governments would not be content to contribute a few doctors and men of science. I do not think that Ormsby-Gore would take a narrow view of this question, though I have never had the chance of discussing it with him.

yours sincerely
R. W. E.