

A

Liddell Hart
ans in enclosure
I

Redworth House,
Totnes,
Devon.

4th June, 1941.

Lord Noel-Buxton,
Little Adstock,
Bletchley.

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

I have been travelling - with the result that your letter of the 28th May has only just reached me here. I was much interested to read the enclosure on war aims, with which I am fundamentally in agreement. Since you ask for comments, I will give them briefly.

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While your opening paragraph may have been designed to smooth the way for reasonable consideration of the question in this country, its opening clause hardly corresponds to the strategic realities either of the existing or the prospective situation. Until people are prepared to recognise these, only the most reasonable among them are likely to give due weight to the general argument.

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As regards your second paragraph, I wonder if the opening clause is justified. However dim may be our prospects of decisive victory, in the absence of any revolutionary invention, we have a very strong "nuisance value" so long as we are undefeated. And Hitler may well realise this. Whatever his pathological state in respect of matters of war, he would not seem to be half as crazy as many of our own leading spirits - and more conscious of the common consequences of a long-drawn attrition struggle. Indeed, it has seemed to me that he has been trying to find a way out of the hole ever since the 2nd September, 1939 - although failing to understand what was necessary in view of the emotional condition he had aroused here.

Peru w
ah

With your third paragraph I would emphatically agree - it is very shrewd and sound psychology.

Likewise I agree with all your remaining paragraphs. In this connection, have you ever read Lord Esher's reflections in his Diary and Letters - in case you have missed them I enclose a copy that I made of their salient points.*

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Hale I also enclose, in case it may interest you, an estimate of the situation which I made last autumn, "Before and After a Year of War", and an historical analysis of the development of the air bombing campaign - or "slogging match", as it might appropriately be described.

Yours very truly,

Robert Liddell Mark

* I will send this on.

Hart
II

Redworth House,
Totnes,
Devon.

16th June, 1941.

Lord Noel-Buxton,
Comeragh Court,
Woking,
Surrey.

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

I have just received your letter of the 12th, and will attempt to answer briefly your two questions.

As regards the first, taking account of the atmosphere, I think that a process of "simmering down", leading to a more palpable state of stalemate, would have to precede any attempt at settlement.

As regards the second question, I should judge that Hitler's attitude varies with his states of mind - that at one time he would like to find a way of getting out of the war, and at another - when incensed by a fresh rebuff, or elated by a fresh triumph - he is tempted to go on to complete the picture of bringing down the British Empire. All the signs, since the 1st September, 1939, seem to indicate this alternation of mood. Otherwise, it is hard for anyone who has made a sober calculation of the strategic chances, and of the great superiority of the forces at his command, to explain the repeated hesitations he has shown.

Yours sincerely,

Bethwiddell Hart

P.S. It might interest you to have the enclosed proof of an article recently written - actually as a section of a book "The Strategy of Indirect Approach", to be published in about ten days time.

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Hart

High Wray House,
Nr. Ambleside,
Westmorland.

19th August, 1943.

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

Forgive my delay in replying to your letter of the 28th July, but I have been very rushed recently.

Most of the things I have written in the last year have been of a technical nature, but you might like to see the enclosed copy of some reflections on "Strategy and Policy", which I wrote and sent to various people, including Eden, early in July.

I also enclose a copy of a rather interesting letter of the 7th August I had on the same subject from a soldier friend. I

I have not yet been able to get hold of the "Contemporary Review" for July. I suppose you have not got a copy you could just lend me for a few days? Otherwise I will try to see it at the Athenaeum when next in London.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Basiliddell Hart

Lord Noel-Buxton,
Crosslee Hotel,
Woking,
Surrey.

High Wray House,
Nr. Ambleside,
Westmorland.

3rd July, 1944.

a Hart
(reproving)

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

Many thanks for sending me a copy of your speech in the Foreign Affairs Debate of the 25th May. I read it with much interest, and admired the statesmanlike way it dealt with the problem.

The only points which I would query were in the introductory remarks, where you argued, first, that there must be an "absolutely paralysing" disarmament of Germany, and, second, that she must be made to supply labour to restore devastation elsewhere. While these demands may appear reasonable on the surface, experience seems to me to raise considerable doubt as to their wisdom.

The latter condition virtually amounts to the condemnation of a large section of the population to a long-term period of slave labour. It is not easy to see how the selection could be justly made, while it is much easier to see the complications that would arise. Beyond that, there is an important difference between wartime measures and peacetime measures. Is it desirable that the Allied nations should take a step which would be equivalent to the resurrection of slavery as a recognised institution?

As to the former condition, complete disarmament, it seems to me that the experience of such unilateral disarmament after the last War raised multiple doubts as to its wisdom, which are increased by the particular circumstances that are likely to arise from the establishment of Russian military domination of Europe. By the suppression of the military profession in Germany, we may merely drive its members abroad - as we did to a lesser extent after the last War - to become trouble-makers in other countries, where they will find scope for their professional knowledge until, as time passes, they again find opportunity in their own land.

The attempt to suppress the German General Staff after the last War has always seemed to me one of the most futile provisions of the Peace Treaty - for while you can abolish armaments, you cannot abolish thought. By attempting to suppress organs of thought, you merely drive them underground, and make them much more active than if they were encased in a conservative institution such as a War Office.

The solution that seems to offer most hope, and least danger, would be a federation of Western Europe that included the Germans. That solution, however, would forfeit much of its security value if they only came in after their defensive strength had been destroyed, and their spirit embittered by another vindictive peace and prolonged occupation. On the other hand, it would obviously be better if they were brought into the federation as several states, instead of as a solid "Germany". Statesmanship might find a way of procuring this, in favourable conditions, by holding out the offer of such membership as a contrast to the more drastic treatment that would be imposed on a Germany that remained integrated.

I take this opportunity of sending you a copy of an article that I wrote recently on the lessons of the occupation of Germany after the last War - as it may be of interest.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Boyd Hiddell

X + Churchill
+ below

Lord Noel-Buxton,
402, Hood House,
Dolphin Square,
London, S.W.1.

X P.S.

You might like to see the enclosed note of mine on the best method of ensuring international security. I should welcome your comments.

Liddell Hart

HIGH WRAY HOUSE,

AMBLESIDE.

17th Sept 1943

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

Unfortunately I had to go down
to Canterbury, from London, earlier than
expected & had no chance to call
at Woking. And from there I went
on westwards. Perhaps I may
have a chance of seeing you in
October - I should greatly enjoy it

Yours sincerely

Bro Liddell Hart

B.H.L.H. 6.9.41.

TRIAL BY FACTS.

In a careful calculation, which I made on the eve of the war, of our position and prospects in relation to Germany's I could find no justification on military grounds for expecting that we and our allies could gain victory. (And so far as I could judge the economic grounds for such an expectation they seemed to be almost as dubious.)

On the other hand I found solid ground for hoping that we could prevent the Germans gaining victory over us, and thereby forcing them to seek peace on our terms - so long as we played our hand carefully, while developing our strength quickly.

On these calculations it seemed fraudulent to commit our people to a policy of outright victory - far worse than inducing people to invest their money by "false pretences". Moreover, it was a policy of defeatism in the deepest sense, since it courted a quite needless risk of disaster.

In particular, I emphasised that the surest way to precipitate disaster, in the existing state of our armaments, would be to drag in the small neutrals on Germany's flanks, or talk in such a way as to suggest that we were planning to open up such by-pass roads to victory.

Our Government, however, not only committed itself and our people to a policy of victory, and "no negotiation", but allowed Mr Churchill and other ministers to talk in a way that was generally interpreted abroad as threatening the neutrality of these small countries. And when M. Reynaud became Prime Minister of France early in 1940 he more definitely advocated taking forcible measures in Scandinavia and the Low Countries. Natural results followed.

There have been two years of "trial by ordeal" in which the test of facts has been applied to these contrasting conclusions. However readily the members of the Government can produce fresh "assurances of victory", events have at least made it clear that the promised victory has become more and more remote, while defeat has been perilously near.

After such prolonged test of a policy, accompanied by such repeated proof of the falseness of the calculations underlying it and the assertions made in support of it, the members of Parliament neglect their duty as representatives of the people and trustees of the nation if they fail to demand that this neck-or-nothing policy be submitted to a proper audit.

For the men who have committed themselves and the nation to a particular policy, in the hope that it would be a success, cannot be disinterested judges of its prospects - least of all when it has begun to go wrong. For then it is a natural instinct on their part to go on gambling - on the mere chance that luck will turn in their favour.

There is no apparent ground for the belief that our armed strength will overtake that of Germany - since to her immense initial advantage she has been adding great captured resources. There is, consequently, no reason to expect that the war will eventually end in our victory. For, despite the importance of moral factors, a decisive victory has never been attained without a superiority in material factors - in any war between great nations.

On the other hand, we have a good chance, because of our harassing power on sea and in the air, of spurring Hitler to appease us and to make big concessions in return for peace. By pursuing a will-o-the-wisp we increasingly, and quite needlessly, court defeat.

Liddell Hart

B.H.L.H. 3.7.43.

A Reflection on Strategy and Policy - and Humanity -

In relation to the Past and the Present.

Foreword.

This reflection was stimulated by a letter from a friend in the R.A.F., a young Oxford historian of high promise, who was disturbed about the trend and ultimate results of our bombing policy. He expressed a feeling that the progressive devastation of cities threatens the roots of civilisation, and remarked that the Government "has become Frankenstein, dominated by its own creation - the monster of Bomber Command". Yet, he added, "this mechanical monster has not such a bad pedigree". For, having recently re-read The British Way in Warfare, he had come to see that it was the natural offspring of a mating between the new air power and our historical tradition of strategy - which in the past proved both more effective and more economical of life than the Continental way of war.

Thinking about his reflection, and implied question, I was led on along a line of thought with a somewhat wider bearing.

The Reflection.

Any dispassionate historian and student of war would have to admit that our traditional strategy, which we followed during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, was inherently more "barbarous" than the strategy of the Continental tradition and of Clausewitz's theory - because it was aimed at the will of the opposing people, rather than at their main armed forces, and was thus in a sense striking at the non-combatant population. At the same time, it proved in practice less damaging, and more reasonable.

The explanation of this practical paradox lies in the reasonableness of our policy regarding the object. In the past, we were usually willing to accept a negotiated basis of peace when the enemy had become sick of the war, and was willing to climb down - to abandon his opposing policy. We did not pursue the fight to a finish - which is apt to entail not merely the exhaustion of the aggressive impulse, but the mutual exhaustion of the capacity to rebuild peace.

It is the combination of an unlimited object with an unlimited target of strategy - the combination of a demand for the other side's unconditional surrender with a strategy on our part of total blockade and air bombardment - that inevitably makes our strategy a reversion to "barbarism", and thus a spreading menace to the relatively shallow foundations of civilised life.

A Further Reflection.

A primary lesson of modern history is that Victory - in war as distinct from merely in battle - is a constant illusion, a "mirage in the desert".

A primary lesson of our own history and geography is that this country, with its island situation and limited resources, cannot develop the strength required to achieve outright victory over a Continental Great Power. On the other hand, we have had the power to make any Continental enemy sick of the war, and anxious to make peace. And we have been able to do this without exhausting our capacity for post-war recovery, and without sacrificing our tradition of freedom.

Keep
Siddell Hart
war

High Wray House,
Nr. Ambleside,
Westmorland.

19th August, 1941.

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

I am taking advantage of a moment of leisure to send you a reflection - on freedom - which I used as epilogue to a recent address I gave to one of the political summer schools, on the general war situation and outlook.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

B. Siddell Hart

Lord Noel Buxton,
Comeragh Court,
Woking,
Surrey.

A REFLECTION - ON FREEDOM

The only way of winning the war that we have pursued so far has been an imitation of the German way. On the home front it has taken the form of trying to make our state as totalitarian as theirs. If we have not yet become such a slave-state in practice, it is only because our instinctive autocrats and bureaucrats have hitherto shown more restraint, or been made conscious of more resistance from the long-inherited instinct for freedom among the people. But we have allowed them to shackle us with the fetters of state-slavery in theory: with such a rigid set of regulations that we could be rendered helpless to protest or to recover our freedom if, with the intensification of the struggle, the present Government were replaced or displaced by one of a more dictatorial tendency.

Some of these regulations constitute a betrayal of our inheritance that would have shocked those who fought the long battle for freedom during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. A grave responsibility is borne by the members of a Parliament which allowed, and even encouraged, officialdom to impose such unconstitutional measures while at the same time turning this country into a potential prison-house, from which in case of defeat or a coup d'etat it might be impossible for anyone to escape and start a "Free British" movement.

The most charitable explanation is that in giving the executive such sweeping powers they were doped by the talk of "total war" - in a war which they did not understand. For efficiency in modern war can be reconciled with proper respect for the basic rights of the individual and his freedom. Indeed, this produces the soil in which initiative, itself essential to true efficiency, grows best.

The present Parliament already bears the onus of bringing us into the war inadequately prepared. Its responsibility would be still graver if, in its belated attempt to redeem the consequences of this negligence, it should be forgetful that it is trustee for the liberties of the people - for this is the foundation-stone of its own existence. Any form of government can suffice for the purpose of carrying on a war; the justification for parliamentary government lies in the purpose of upholding freedom. If it fails to maintain the basic conditions of civil liberty in the course of maintaining war, it stultifies its distinctive purpose and value. And that is the quickest way for it to commit felo de se.

If we are to convince the peoples of the world that we are really fighting for freedom, we ought to lose no time in examining our own current condition, and conscience. To make our propaganda meet for consumption abroad, we need to ensure the production at home of freedom from want and fear; freedom for truth and progress.

That appeal would, in turn, carry more conviction in converting the German people if we talked less about the pursuit of victory, and more about a common return to sanity. Our keynote should be - "we will carry on the fight indefinitely to prevent a Nazi victory and the enslavement of Europe - but isn't war supremely silly, from the point of view of all the common people? Why not join with us in finding a better way to a better life for all?"

In the light of our declared aims, this war only makes sense as a fight against nonsense. So let us make our trumpet-note "Recall to Sanity".



Peace Aims Group.

32, Victoria Street,
London, S.W.1.

),
Correspondent

13th August, 1941.

Handwritten: note for return

PEACE OFFENSIVE.

The "American Precis" published by the American Outpost in this country dated the 6th August, 1941 has the attached report from the Christian Science Monitor's Correspondent in Turkey, which should be of interest to Members of the Peace Aims Group.

Handwritten: where

It is not necessary to comment on the note but it would seem advisable that Members of the Group should meet as soon as possible after the reassembly of Parliament, and to that end a meeting has been called for the 10th September. Should anyone feel that an earlier meeting is desirable of those Members who live in or near London- it is quite obvious that an offer from Germany is likely to come in the near future- such a meeting will be arranged if those wishing to attend will notify me.

R.R.Stokes.
Secretary.

... demands are based on victory over Russia, and ... support for this".

Hurd then pointed out that France, the Balkans, and ... are not mentioned probably because they are already ... part of Hitler's "New Order". He concluded ... ally, ... the present news from the Russian front he had hardly ... Hitler for trying" (his peace offensive).

The subtlety of this propaganda aimed at possible ... elements in Britain and the U.S. ... escape ...

act from American Precis (American Outpost) 6. 8. 41.

PEACE OFFENSIVE: According to Volney Hurd (WruL August 1st), the Christian Science Monitor's correspondent in Turkey, Patmore, has reported the terms of the "Peace Offensive". Hurd said:

"Ankara diplomatic circles say this offer is as definite as anything can be these days, until official statements are released. These terms, which are said to be those which von Papen has offered to the British, are an example of Hitler's mastery of what to offer and what to hold back:

- "a) Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway to be entirely liberated and made zones of British influence.
- b) The British Empire to be left intact.
- c) An independent Czech state to be restored but without Slovakia.
- d) Poland to be liberated, except for the Polish industrial area, which formerly belonged to Germany.
- e) The Ukraine to become an autonomous state, but remain inside the German economic sphere.
- f) Russia to be divided up into separate provinces under direct Nazi control.

"In disposing of Belgium, Norway, Holland, and Czechoslovakia, Hitler frees himself of regions where anti-Nazi resistance has become unbearable, but which he could take at will once he had established his kind of peace and stopped British and U.S. arms production.

"The Nazi concept of Europe, being based on control of the industries, would make the rest of the continent dependent on Germany. Hitler's peace offer would surrender nothing of real importance.

"His remaining demands are based on victory over Russia, and British and U.S. support for this".

Hurd then pointed out that France, the Balkans, and Italy are not mentioned probably because they are already deemed part of Hitler's "New Order". He concluded sarcastically, "with the present news from the Russian front we can hardly blame Hitler for trying". (his peace offensive).

The subtlety of this propaganda aimed at possible anti-communist elements in Britain and the U.S. did not escape notice.

Eddell Hart

THE ETERNAL WILL-O'-THE-WISP - IN WAR.

I spent the years following the last war in trying to discover the secret of victory in war. I found it - so far as battle was concerned in the combination of tanks and aircraft, applying tactics of fluidity, employed in a strategy of rear attack. I became, in consequence, one of the chief protagonists of mechanized warfare.

But in studying the history of wars, I came, as my exploration deepened, to see that military victory (i.e. the complete overthrow of the other side) was only a means to an end, and that as between two or more great powers it had never proved the means to a good end. In other words, victory was the "great delusion" of the great powers - the pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp. Thus I was forced to recognize that it was the most futile policy which any peace-loving nation, with something worth preserving, could pursue if it was driven into war.

To set out my conclusions in brief - Victory, over another great power, never fulfils the expectations of a good and lasting peace. For victory always sows the seeds of a fresh war; because victory breeds among the vanquished a desire for vindication and vengeance. Victory, if won with allies, turns them into rivals - and often into enemies in the next war. This seems to be the natural result of the removal of a third-party check.

In the 17th century we broke the power of Spain with the help of the Dutch. Subsequently we fought three wars with the Dutch - and finally broke their power in alliance with the French. Within a generation we were drawn into a fresh series of coalition wars to curb the menacing power of France. After six of these wars, stretching over a century, we succeeded in breaking the power of France - in the most decisive victory we had ever attained. But our chief allies, Russia and Prussia, became in turn our chief dangers in the century that followed - together with the country that we had so completely vanquished.

In the Crimean War, we sought to cripple Russia's power - in alliance with the French. Five years later we were faced with the threat of a French invasion of England. The danger was temporarily removed through the defeat of France in 1870 by Germany - with whom our sympathies lay. Yet in the last decade of the 19th century we were, again, several times on the verge of war with France and Russia combined.

In the endeavour to counter that danger we unsuccessfully sought an alliance with Germany, and then made an alliance with Japan - as a makeweight to Russia in the Far East. This encouraged the Japanese to oppose Russian expansion there. Meantime we had come to an agreement with France about respective spheres of influence in Africa - an agreement that developed in a way that we had not foreseen. For Russia's defeat by Japan weakened the check that the Franco-Russian alliance had placed on Germany's growing power. And our anxiety about this shift in the balance of power led us into closer association with France.

Thus, in 1914, when Austria clashed with Russia over their respective Balkan interests, and Germany backed her Austrian ally, while France backed her Russian ally, we were dragged into war through the way we had tied ourselves up with France. After four years' struggle, which left us more exhausted than ever before in our history, Germany and Austria were vanquished.

Within two years we were on the verge of war with France over a conflict of interests in the Near East. And we were soon in ever deepening difficulties with our other allies of the Great War, Italy and Japan - whose appetites for expansion we had festered. That friction gave Germany the chance to rear - for revenge. And when, a generation later, in the attempt to check the renewed menace of Germany, we again got into war, Italy and Japan, our allies of the last war, became the principal confederates of our enemy.

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WSE

fr Liddell Hart
July 44

CHURCHILL IN HIS BOOK "GREAT CONTEMPORARIES"

"Hitler's success, and indeed his survival as a political force, would not have been possible but for the lethargy and folly of the French and British Governments since the war and especially in the last three years, 1932-35.

No sincere attempt was made to come to terms with the various moderate Governments of Germany which existed under a Parliamentary system. For a long time the French pursued the absurd delusion that they could extract vast indemnities from the Germans in order to compensate them for the devastation of the war.

Figures of reparation payments were adopted, not only by the French, but by the British, which had no relation whatever to any process which exists, or could ever be devised, of transferring wealth from one community to another.

To enforce submission to these senseless demands, French armies occupied the Ruhr in 1923. To recover even a tenth of what was originally demanded, an Inter-Allied Board, presided over by an able American, supervised the internal finances of Germany for several years, thus renewing and perpetuating the utmost bitterness in the minds of the defeated nation."

"Even while Germany was receiving great benefits by the loans which were made to her, Hitler's movement gained each week life and force from irritation at Allied interference."

WHAT IS THE BEST METHOD OF ENSURING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?

Basic Conditions of Modern War

1. The experience of this War has confirmed the experience of the last, that defence is in itself much stronger than attack, except where a big superiority in special defence-breaking weapons is possessed by the attacker.
2. Experience has also shown that such weapons have to be employed on a big scale to have any decisive effect, and that the scale is all the bigger in proportion as the defender possesses adequate "anti-weapons".

Basic Conditions of Security

An understanding of the basic conditions of modern warfare suggests, therefore, that the basic conditions of security are:-

1. The agreed abolition of the types of weapons that have become necessary, or are likely to become necessary, for defence-breaking purposes. Such weapons are tanks, artillery, and bombers. The list may be extended to embrace rocket types of weapon.
2. The preservation of the types of weapon that are primarily an aid to defensive strength, and that would tend to establish the supremacy of the defence, if the more shattering types of weapon were abolished. Such primarily defensive types include small arms (rifles, machine guns, etc), and single-seat fighters - which are necessary to counter the possible conversion of civil transport aircraft into improvised bombers. The list might be extended to embrace anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns of small calibre, firing projectiles capable of disabling an improvised armoured vehicle or an aircraft, but not sufficient to overcome troops who are behind cover in a trench or pill box.

Means of Fulfilling these Conditions

1. The agreed establishment of an International Commission of Inspection that would have the right to visit any military establishment they wish, in any country, without previous notice.
2. All airports and military training grounds to be "open" - i.e. 'planes of any nationality to have the right of landing at any airport in other countries, and journalists, etc. of any nationality to have the right of visiting military training grounds in other countries.

Under these conditions it would be almost impossible for weapons of the defence-breaking types to be produced, tested, and their crews trained, without the fact becoming known - at any rate on any appreciable scale. These conditions are much simpler in design, and would be much simpler to apply, than those of any other scheme of security that has been suggested - such as the creation of an International Force, etc. It is worth note that this method of qualitative disarmament was suggested at an early stage of the Disarmament Conference of 1932; then it came to be adopted in principle in April 1932; then its practical adoption was delayed by the technical quibbles of the military advisers of some of the national delegations (who were naturally disinclined to see the offensive power of their forces nullified and their professional opportunity restricted.) The argument was still proceeding when the Nazi regime came into power in Germany, and political factors then led to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference as a whole. But the value of the principle that was so nearly established can be seen in retrospect - when we realise that each of the military successes subsequently gained by aggressive powers - in China, Abyssinia, Spain, Poland, and most of all, in the 1940 conquests of the West, were achieved through the use of the very weapons that it had been proposed to abolish throughout the world, under the qualitative principle. If such weapons

30.6.44.

WHAT IS THE BEST METHOD OF ENSURING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

had not been available, or had only been available on a small scale, it would have been impossible for the aggressive powers to gain the decisive advantage that has only been wrested from them after four years of all-out struggle by the combined efforts of the four largest states in the world.

Experience has also shown that such weapons have to be employed on a big scale to have any decisive effect, and that the scale is all the bigger in proportion as the defender possesses adequate "anti-weapon" weapons.

Basic Conditions of Security

An understanding of the basic conditions of modern warfare suggests therefore, that the basic conditions of security are:-

1. The agreed abolition of the types of weapons that have become necessary, or are likely to become necessary, for balance-breaking purposes. Such weapons are tanks, artillery, and bombers. The list may be extended to embrace rocket types of weapon.
2. The preservation of the types of weapons that are primarily an aid to defensive strength, and that would tend to establish the supremacy of the defence, if the more shattering types of weapon were abolished. Such primarily defensive types include small arms (rifles, machine guns, etc.) and single-seat fighters - which are necessary to counter the possible conversion of civil transport aircraft into improvised bombers. The list might be extended to embrace anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns of small calibre, firing projectiles capable of dropping on improvised ground vehicles or an aircraft, but not sufficient to overcome groups who are being covered in a trench or pill box.

Means of Realising these Conditions

1. The agreed establishment of an International Commission of Inspection that would have the right to visit any military establishment any where, in any country, without previous notice.
2. All airports and military training grounds to be "open" - i.e. places of any nationality to have the right of landing at any airport in other countries, and journalists, etc. of any nationality to have the right of visiting military training grounds in other countries.

Under these conditions it would be almost impossible for weapons of the balance-breaking type to be produced, tested, and their crews trained, without the fact becoming known - at any rate on any appreciable scale. These conditions are much simpler in design, and would be more easily applied, than those of any other scheme of security that has been suggested - such as the creation of an international force, etc. It is worth noting that this method of qualitative disarmament was suggested at an early stage of the Disarmament Conference of 1925; then it came to be adopted in principle in April 1925; then its practical adoption was delayed by the technical difficulties of the military advisers of some of the national delegations (who were naturally distressed to see the offensive power of their forces nullified and their professional opportunities restricted). The agreement was still proceeding when the Nazi regime came into power in Germany, and political factors then led to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference as a whole. But the value of the principle that was so nearly established can be seen in retrospect - when we realize that each of the military successes recently gained by aggressive powers - in China, Abyssinia, Spain, Poland, and most of all, in the 1940 conquest of the West, were achieved through the use of the very weapons that it had been proposed to abolish throughout the world, under the qualitative principle. If such weapons