



Treasury Chambers,
Whitehall, S.W.

5/6/13.

My dear Buxton,

I have only just had the opportunity of reading your book on the war which you so kindly sent me. I found it extraordinarily interesting & most informing as to the position in those countries. I am very much obliged to you for so kindly thinking of me and sending it along. Its perusal

afforded me real enjoyment.

Ever sincerely,

Wm Lloyd Garrison

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COPY.

Aug. 22nd, 1914.

Suppressed by Grey

My dear Buxton,

" Any Balkan State that decides to throw in its lot with the Triple Entente in this struggle may depend upon the support of British Credit in raising the necessary funds to equip and maintain its army. I authorise you to make such arrangements on my behalf as you may deem desirable to guarantee British financial assistance under these conditions. "

Ever sincerely,

(Signed)

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

33

12, RUTLAND GATE.

S.W. 7

30th March 1917

Dear Mr Lloyd George,

In view of the advent to power in Russia of Mr Milyukoff, whose opinions on Balkan questions are so marked & so well known, it is assumed that the new Russian Government will be ready to take advantage of any improvement in the military situation which makes it possible to detach Bulgaria from the Central Powers.

The section of public opinion in this country which has agreed with Mr Milyukoff in holding that a recognition of the legitimate claims of each & every Balkan State was required to bring all these States to the side of the Entente, has been silent since Bulgaria went to war, whereas Mr Milyukoff & his friends have continued to urge, even when Russia was at war with Bulgaria, that attempts should be made to redress the situation, & for instance, to take advantage of any apparent opening, such as occurred in the summer of 1916.

The question being likely to be raised in a more definite form by the Russian Government, I beg to enclose on behalf of a group of students of Balkan affairs a note on one or two points which would arise if negotiations with Bulgaria were entered upon.



30th. Sept. 1915

Dear Mr. Lloyd George,

Having special sources of information regarding political factors in Bulgaria, I beg to ask your attention to the enclosed note.

Yours sincerely,

W. B. Houston

13th. March. 1917.

Dear Mr Lloyd George.

I want to bring to your notice a view held by some of your most genuine friends in the House.

There are many of us, not mere partisans, who have long been personally attached to you, and who want to remain your supporters. Looking to you, not only in the conduct of the war, but also in reconstruction in the future, we do not want to see the ties between you and Liberalism severed.

I feel this strongly and expressed it lately in the House. To explain my meaning, may I enclose an extract and will you glance at the passage marked?

Wm. H. E.

What was this?

21, Abingdon Street,
London, S.W.1.

22nd. April 1931.

My dear Buxton,

Thank you for letting me have the copy of the proposed chapter for Mr. Conwell-Evans's book. I have no objection whatever to the letter on Page 83 being published and although at such a distance of time and without consulting my papers I cannot exactly remember the events which are referred to on Pages 96 et seq. I agree with it in general (excepting for the sentence in which it is said that I "chafed against the obstruction offered to the policy of attacking Bulgaria". I think "attacking" must be a misprint for "attaching" as I certainly never favoured a policy of attacking Bulgaria. Will you see that this is put right?

Ever sincerely,

A. J. G. 50008

The Rt. Hon.
Lord Buxton
12, Rutland Gate
S.W.1.

J. S. What a mess J. J.

*Grade of the Bulgarian position?
He could have kept them out of their
territory for at least one year
if he had the force at hand in 1918*

The Office of The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M.M.P.

Bron-y-de,
Churt, Surrey.

7th. March, 1940.

Tract

Mr. Lloyd George acknowledges
with thanks the receipt of the document
Lord Noel-Buxton was kind enough to send
him, and which is interested to have.

July 9th, 1940.

My dear Lloyd George,

I was very glad to hear you raise the question of possible negotiation in the future in your speech in the House on July 4th.

I find that some people are impressed by the argument in favour of initiating talks without waiting for proposals from the other side or for military events. As against the argument that we should be suing for peace, and admitting German invincibility, it is held to be only rational that the new military situation should make a difference to our war aims, and that we are in a position to make proposals because we are undefeated, and the defences of Empire are intact. It is thought by some that events may make negotiation not less difficult but more so; that the prime aim is to preserve the fleet, and that this may be best served by facing facts without further delay; that many of our aims belonged to a policy which was French and not British, and are inappropriate when France is not concerned.

It was a member of the present Government, Mr. Attlee,
who said:

"If peace is to be lasting it must result from the agreement of all, not from the dictation of a few nations. The failure of the Treaties at the end of the last war to bring abiding peace was largely due to the neglect of this principle."

Little Adstock
Adstock
Near Bletchley

Winslow 38.

5th April, 1941.

My dear Lloyd George,

Remembering your view as to the possibility of negotiation with the Germans some months ago, I should like to tell you of a point which seems to me worth putting to the right people, because of the interest which I see to be taken in the precedent of the Lansdowne movement in 1917.

Please therefore let me ask for your opinion on the enclosed. It is a suggested form of invitation to the kind of men who are keen for a good settlement, but are not full pacifists.

COPY

The Office of The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George O.M. M.P.

Bron-y-dee

Churt, Surrey.

April 17th, 1941.

My dear Buxton,

I was glad to hear from you. I am getting more and more anxious and alarmed as the war situation develops. The Government do not seem to me to realise in the least the urgent perils of the position, and I am sure they have no clear idea as to how the country is to extricate itself from the mess into which it has blundered, and into which it is still blundering deeper and deeper. When they talk of a crushing victory as something which is assured and the actual date alone in doubt, I am overcome with a sense of despair that the country is so completely deluded by its guides as to the realities of the situation.

As to your Memorandum I am not altogether satisfied with the line it takes. The mischief which arose out of the Treaty of Versailles is not attributable to its provisions, but to the fact that they were never carried out. The real tragedy was the repudiation of that document by the Senate. Everything depended upon having at least two great Powers on the Council that administered that Treaty who were strong enough to override the arrogance and vindictiveness of the French, and to insist on enforcing in their integrity the provisions made for fair treatment to the vanquished and all minorities. France and her retinue of greedy little nations dominated the League of Nations, and when the Tory Government came into power we never

fought that pernicious combination. The Treaty therefore became a scrap of paper.

You quote Grey's account of the 1916 negotiations through Colonel House for an intervention by the United States. If you will look up in my Memoirs my account of that transaction you will find that the failure of that intervention was due to the weakness of Grey on the one hand and Wilson on the other.

I should like to add another point about your Memorandum. In your second paragraph you assume that there are only two alternatives for a termination of this war; either a good settlement or a "crushing and humiliating defeat". I am sure it must have occurred to you that there is a third possibility - a stalemate which may last for years, exhausting all the combatants.

Ever sincerely,

(signed) D. Lloyd George.

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Shirks my job - the dictated peace failed.

The Office of The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George O.M. M.P.

W.H.C.

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Blockade Black tw
Exclusion of Lg. etc*

Bron-y-de

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Ever sincerely,

(signed) D. Lloyd George.

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The Office of The Rt. Hon. D Lloyd George, O.M., M.P.

Bron-y-de.

Churt, Surrey.

FLS/WR

April 17th. 1941.

AM

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Tel: Hindhead 28.
Station: Farnham.

Bron-y-de,
Churt,
Surrey.


- 2 -

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Ever sincerely,



The Rt.Hon.
Lord Noel-Buxton
ADSTOCK.

I am glad if the records of a back-bench participant in foreign affairs have provided a study from a new angle of an important period of our history.

The only ground for publishing such personal papers as mine is that they serve some public purpose, and this is Mr. Conwell Evans' object. He seeks to throw light on the attempts of individual Parliamentarians, and of organised groups, to influence Governmental policy in matters effecting peace and war, from 1904 to 1914.

I hope that such a view of the period may prove of value not only to students of history, but also to those who devote their energies to the promotion of peace and good understanding between nations.