

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

WASHINGTON

8th July, 1916.

Dear Mr Buxton,

You asked me a very interesting question the other day, and on the spur of the moment I did not formulate a clear reply. It was this - how should a war end so as to discredit the military party of the enemy and at the same time avoid the humiliation which so often results in inculcating the spirit of revenge in the defeated nation. Bismarck struggled with this problem, and apparently changed his mind as to the proper solution between 1866 and 1871. In 1866 he refused to press the war and enter Vienna after Sadowa. He made peace without humiliating Austria, while at the same time the results of the war discredited the Austrian military party in the eyes of their people. In 1871 he humiliated France - the march through Paris, ~~for~~ one thing, - attempted to partially bleed her white by an enormous indemnity, and later tried to divert her military force by encouraging her to establish a colonial empire. 1914 would seem to show that the first solution was the best from Prussia's point of view.

I should say that the solution must lie between the two limits below-

Minimum limit- A situation at the close of the war which would tend to convince the people of the defeated nation that they cannot rely wholly or entirely on their military strength to accomplish what are commonly spoken of as national ambitions, or even to insure the safety of the country if the tendency to war of the military party is not curbed.

Maximum limit- A termination of the war which, by restraint in the matter of humiliations imposed on the defeated nation, tends to limit as far as possible the natural tendency towards the inculcation of a spirit of revenge. If deep humiliation is imposed, the dissatisfied element in the defeated nation will feel that they have been more aggrieved by their foreign enemy than by the

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the military party of their own nation, and they will bury the hatchet with the latter in their hate for the former.

Also may say - The Jingo were right in urging more preparation.
I should say that the wars of 1866 and 1913 (Second Balkan) were examples of which fell more or less hapily between the two limits above, and that the Franco-Prussian wars of 1806 and 1870-71 were glaring examples of the unfortunate results of overstepping the maximum limit. I do not think there has been any good example of the failure to reach the minimum limit (discrediting the military party), because the interplay between popular opinion and the military party is a growth of recent years.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,


Sherman Miles

Two 'ds.
P.S. Of course you will understand that I write this for your use only. You do not agree with me, and I dare say you are right; but I thought that if I wrote out my idea it might be of some use to you as a foil for your own.

Sh.

P.S. I have just read over a part of the M.S. I had typed for you. The woman made many mistakes, and you may not be able to read it clearly. You should also remember that the chapters were written at different times, and some of them under the assumption that the present war was over, with an Allied victory - a simple matter of foreseeing what will happen, I hope. But I am sorry the M.S. is so jumbled and uncorrected.

Sh.



HOMER D. MATTHEWS,
MANAGER.

RICE HOTEL



HOUSTON, TEXAS,


8th October, 1916.

Dear Mr Buxton,

21
Lord Bryce's advocacy of American help in
the settlement of the war made me think of you again
the other day. How are your ideas working out? It
really seems now that the end of the war was in sight,
and that your work in the settlement, especially in the
settlement of that difficult Balkan problem, must soon
come into play. I certainly wish you all success.

I do hope you English are not going to let that Turk
stay in Europe. He is the root of all evil. The Aus-
trian menace, and even Prussianism, will probably cure
themselves, as a result of this war - but so long as
Mr Turk stays in Europe there is no real hope of peace.

What do you think of the President's new advocacy
of a Peace League, to which the U.S. must belong? The
idea is growing over here, and we are getting less and
less provincial every day, but still we have a long



HOMER D. MATTHEWS.
MANAGER.

RICE HOTEL



HOUSTON, TEXAS,

way to go, and until we get over
being fat and defenceless and "holier
than thou" we wont have much weight in the world. It
really rests with the Allies to form the League.

What did you think of my manuscript? Was it any help
to you at all? I wish some day you would write me frank-
ly about it, and where and when (if at all) you think I
should publish it, revised.

I have had a busy summer. Got a lieutenant colonelcy
of a regiment raised by Yale University, and spent the
summer in training. I now go back to my own regiment,
the 3d Field Artillery, at Laredo, Texas, as a captain.

My best congratulations to your people on their splendid
success of this summer. May they keep it up, and do still
more, especially in the Balkans.

Yours sincerely

Shuman Miles

Trout



Telephone,
GROSVENOR 2103.

Telegrams,
INANDOUT, AUDLEY, LONDON.

miles.

72 for 40.

NAVAL & MILITARY CLUB,

94, PICCADILLY. W.1.

Dear Lord & Buxton

I returned last night
to find your interesting
paper, with which I
agree in principle.

We have two great
wars going on now,
in Europe & in Asia,
which no one except
the militarists - brigands
want to fight and in

which its war leaders
are having singularly
little success to show
their many people. We
should certainly ^{make} something
of this colossal
rehabitation of the futility
of war. (?)

I will try to arrange
your visit with Mr. Wells
but so far nothing is
known of his plans here.

Yours Sincerely
Wells
Luman

Sent Miles

re. article

To 9/13

ARMY SERVICE FORCES
HEADQUARTERS FIRST SERVICE COMMAND
BOSTON 15, MASSACHUSETTS

25 November 1943

Lord Noel-Buxton
Flat No. 402, Hood House
Dolphin Square, S.W.I.
London, England

My dear Lord Noel-Buxton:


Thank you very much indeed for your note of November 13th which was forwarded to me here. Unfortunately, I fear there is little chance of my returning to England during this war, much as I would like to do so.

I am very sorry to hear of the death of your brother. Please accept my sincere sympathy. I remember him well on our trip to Petric in 1914.

I read with great interest the article you sent me. I think you are entirely right in holding that the solution of the post-war problem does not lie in long occupation of Germany by considerable forces, and certainly not in the gigantic task of reeducating Germany. We must concentrate on the simple objective of preventing war. You remember that Clausewitz laid down the doctrine that war is "a mere continuation of policy by other means." I see no way of preventing the Germans and the Japanese from continuing their power policies and will to conquest, but I do clearly see the possibility of preventing their use of war as one of the "other means" to that end. I believe the solution lies, in general terms, in the maintenance by the United Nations of air and sea power, based on well defended strategic points of the world, and adequate to bring irresistible pressure on any nation that is accumulating the large reserves necessary for military conquest. This will require single-mindedness of purpose. I very much hope we will not be diverted from that purpose by any of the grandiose plans you so ably attack in your article.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,



SHERMAN MILES
Major General, United States Army