THE METAPHYSICS OF SABZAVĀRĪ
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Translated from the Arabic by

MEHDI MOHAGHEGH AND TOSHIHIKO IZUTSU

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Preface

This English translation of Sabzavārī’s Metaphysics is an outcome of close collaboration with Dr. Mehdi Mohaghegh of the University of Tehran. We worked on it while we were both teaching Islamic philosophy several years ago at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. Our original intention was primarily to introduce to the Western world of learning an aspect of Islamic philosophy that had hitherto remained almost totally unknown and unappreciated, in the form of a work representing the latest phase of its long and uninterrupted development in Iran. We wished also to introduce to those Western students interested in the field of Irano-Islamic philosophy a standard textbook which is currently in wide use by students in Iran.

In the meantime we have also collaborated in editing and publishing the original Arabic text of the book together with about 400 pages of explanatory notes selected from the commentaries by Sabzavārī himself, and by Hidajī and Āmulī. It is now available as the first volume² of the series Dānish-i Irānī (“Wisdom of Persia”) series of publications of the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran Branch. We have also published in the same series an independent commentary² on the same book by one of the leading scholars of our age, Mehdi Āshtiyānī (1888-1952). It is our hope that, equipped with those commentaries and this English translation, the student might begin to find his way in the intricacies of the ḥikmat type of Islamic philosophy.

We must admit at the same time, however, that the book is by no means easy reading. Particularly if the English translation is read independently, there will be many—especially among those who have as yet had no training in scholastic philosophy, whether Eastern or Western—who might find it very difficult to understand. This book in its original Arabic is itself far from
being easy to understand even to those who can read Arabic fairly well. This is true not only of the “Philosophical Poem” which forms the basis of the book; the accompanying Commentary in prose is also filled with difficulties, its style being remarkably dry and arid, and the ideas expressed through this style being often extremely abstruse and recondite. In rendering it into English, we did our best to smooth the difficulties away by placing everywhere explanatory words between parentheses and adding footnotes. Still the work remains far behind the ideal of easy reading. In order to make the English translation perfectly and easily understandable by itself it would have been necessary for us to write an independent commentary of our own.

However, the difficulty of a philosophical book is after all a relative matter, depending mainly upon the individual capacity of the reader and his preparedness. Those who are already familiar with any form of scholastic philosophy will find no difficulty in reading through the book and will further find it, we hope, interesting and stimulating in a number of senses. We should be happy if this work were accepted as a modest contribution toward shedding light upon some of the important aspects of the vast field of Oriental philosophy which have not yet been explored.

In ending this short introduction, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to Dr. Charles J. Adams, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University who created for us at his Institute in Montreal a pleasant atmosphere in which to work in collaboration. Warm thanks are also due to Professor Parviz Morewedge of the City University of New York for the kind help he extended to us in having this book published in the present form.

T. IZUTSU

20 May 1975
Kamakura, Japan
Introduction

By Toshihiko Izutsu

Textual and Historical Remarks

The present work is a complete English translation of the Metaphysics (umūr ēmmah) of Sabzavārī’s Ghurar al-farā‘id, a systematic exposition of the traditional Islamic philosophy comprising Logic, Physics, Theology, and Metaphysics. This book, commonly known as Sharḥ-i manẓūmah (“Commentary on a Philosophical Poem”), is the most popular textbook of scholastic philosophy which has been, and even today, is being read and studied by students of philosophy in almost all the traditional religious schools (Madāris) in Iran.

The author Ḥājī Mullā Hādī ibn Mahdī Sabzavārī (1797/8-1878) is by common agreement the greatest Iranian philosopher of the nineteenth century. In order to determine his historical position with some precision, we may do well to begin by dividing the entire process of the development of Irano-Islamic philosophy into three major phases.

The first phase: Beginning with the activity of the translators of the basic works of Greek philosophy and science into Arabic in the Abbasid Dynasty, and terminating with Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, 980-1037), Ghazālī (Algazel, 1058-1111), and Ibn Rushd (Averroës, 1126-1198).

The second phase: the post-Mongol periods beginning with Ibn ‘Arabī (1165-1240) and Suhrawardī (1155-1191) through the Şafawid Dynasty down to the appearance of Şadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (commonly known as Mullā Şadrā, 1571/2-1640).

The third phase: from Mullā Şadrā to the present. In terms of this tripartite division of the history of Irano-Islamic philosophy we may rightly locate Sabzavārī in the last of these three phases as the highest representative of the period.
The Significance of the Later Development of Islamic Philosophy

The interest of the Western world of learning in Islamic philosophy has, in the past, centered upon the active influence which Muslim thinkers exercised upon the historical formation of Christian scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages. However, in order to study the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus in their historical perspectives one must become acquainted with a detailed and accurate knowledge of the thought of at least Avicenna and Averroës. Any adequate history of medieval western philosophy, in consequence, should include an important chapter on the history of Islamic philosophy.

Quite characteristically, however, the “history” of Islamic philosophy—viewed from the usual Western perspective—practically comes to an end with the death of Averroës, leaving the reader with the impression that Islamic philosophic thought itself also ceased when that Andalusian Arab thinker died. In reality, what came to an end was only the first phase of the whole history of Islamic philosophy. That is to say, what ceased to exist after Averroës was simply the living influence of Islamic philosophy upon the formative process of Western philosophy. With the death of Averroës, Islamic philosophy ceased to be alive for the West, but this does not mean that it ceased to be alive for the East, as well.

It is important in this connection to remark that even those “histories” of Islamic philosophy written not as a chapter in the history of Western philosophy but for their own sake, have largely been dictated by the idea that the golden age of Islamic philosophy is the period of three centuries extending from Fārābī (872-950) to Averroës, and that after Averroës, in the ages subsequent to the Mongol invasion, except for few isolated prominent figures (like Ibn Khaldūn, for example), the Muslim world produced nothing but commentators and super-commentators—a long chain of lifeless and mechanical repetitions, without any spark of real creativity and originality.

That this is not a true picture of the historical facts has amply been made clear by the remarkable work done by scholars like Henri Corbin and Seyyed Hossein Nasr concerning the intellectual activity of the Šafawid Dynasty. It is at any rate quite
recently that the Orientalists in general have begun to realize that philosophical thinking in Islam did not fall irretrievably into decadence and fossilization after the Mongol invasion.

In fact, the truth of the matter is such that we can go to the extent of asserting without exaggeration that a kind of philosophy which deserves to be regarded as typically and characteristicly Islamic developed not so much before the death of Averroës as after. This typically Islamic philosophy arose and matured in the periods subsequent to the Mongol invasion, until in the Šafawid period in Iran it reached the apex of vigorous creativity. This peculiar type of Islamic philosophy which grew up in Iran among the Shi’ites has come to be known as ḥikmat (lit. “wisdom”). We can trace the origin of the ḥikmat back to the very beginning of the above-mentioned second phase of the history of philosophy in Islam.

The ḥikmat is structurally a peculiar combination of rational thinking and gnostic intuition, or, we might say, rationalist philosophy and mystical experience. It is a special type of scholastic philosophy based on existential intuition of Reality, a result of philosophizing the gnostic ideas and visions obtained through intellectual contemplation. Historically speaking, this tendency toward the spiritualization of philosophy finds its origin in the metaphysical visions of Ibn ʿArabī and Suhrawardī. In making this observation, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that ḥikmat is also, at least in its formal make-up, a rationalist philosophy having a solid and strictly logical structure. And in this latter aspect, it goes beyond Ibn ʿArabī and Suhrawardī back to Avicenna in the first phase of the history of Islamic philosophy.

The ḥikmat, having as it does these two distinctive aspects, must be approached from two different angles, if we are to analyze properly its formative process: (1) as a purely intellectual activity, and (2) as something based on trans-intellectual, gnostic experience—dhawq “tasting” as the mystics call it—of the ultimate Reality.

Looked at from the first of these two perspectives, ḥikmat discloses itself as a perfect scholastic philosophy. As such, it is a solid rational system, or systems, of scholastic concepts, most of which go back to Avicenna. The main body of the philosophical terms and concepts—and, in particular, the metaphysical ones—used by the ḥikmat thinkers are those that were
established earlier by the Head of the Peripatetics, Avicenna, and that were further elaborated by his followers, the most important of whom is Ṣādir al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d.1273).

It was Ṭūsī who represented the authentic form of Avicennism for the subsequent ages of ḥikmat philosophy. Avicenna, after his death in 1037, was severely attacked by Ghazālī, and Averroës. The former attacked Avicenna in the name of true Islamic piety, and the latter in the name of an authentic Aristotelianism. Ṭūsī defended Avicenna against all these criticisms in the most logical and philosophical way. In his Commentary on Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt, he presented the Avicennian ideas in their original and authentic forms and reformulated them into a perfect system of Peripatetic philosophy. And in his Tajrīd al-‘aqrāid, he presented his own theologico-metaphysical system. The key-concepts of Avicennian philosophy deeply influenced the formation of the ḥikmat in its intellectual or philosophic aspect.

**Salient Features of Ḥikmat.**

With regard to the second aspect of the ḥikmat as distinguished above, namely the fact that a mystical or gnostic experience underlies the whole structure of its philosophization, we may remark that the ḥikmat is not an outcome of mere intellectual labor on the level of reason. It is rather an original product of the activity of keen analytic reason combined with, and backed by, a profound intuitive grasp of reality, or even of something beyond that kind of reality which is accessible to human consciousness. It represents logical thinking based on something grasped by what we might call supra-consciousness. In this respect ḥikmat has remained faithful to the spirit of Ibn ‘Arabī and Suhrawardī.

A perfect fusion of mystical experience and analytic thinking into a conceptual form of scholasticism was achieved in a consistent and systematic fashion by Suhrawardī. He himself formulated this reciprocal essential relationship between mystical experience and logical reasoning as the most basic principle of both mysticism and philosophy. One would commit a grave mistake, he argued, if one thought that “one could become a philosopher (lit.: a member of the “people of Wisdom”) by
means of studying books only, without treading the path of Sanctity (i.e., via mystica) and without having the immediate experience of the spiritual Lights. Just as a traveler on the spiritual path, i.e., a mystic, who lacks the power of analytic thinking is but an imperfect mystic, so is a researcher (of the Truth), i.e., a philosopher, lacking the immediate experience of the divine mysteries but an imperfect and insignificant philosopher” (Kitāb al-mashāriʿ wa-al-muṭārahāt § 111, Opera Metaphysica et Mystica, ed. Henri Corbin, vol. 1 [İstanbul, 1945]).

Without going into the details of the Suhrawardian metaphysics, we must here observe one point which proved of supreme importance for the development of the later ḥikmat philosophy. Suhrawardī in his illuminationist (ishrāq) metaphysics regarded “existence” (wujūd), as a mere concept, something mental which is a product of a subjective view-point of the human mind, and corresponding to nothing real in the concrete external world. Superficially, this is the exact opposite of the thesis held by such ḥikmat philosophers as Mullā Ṣadrā and Sabzavārī, for whom “existence,” in the sense of actus essendi, precisely is the reality or Reality. Upon reflection, however, we find the opposition merely formal and superficial. It is a mere matter of different formulations, or rather of different ways of experiencing the same reality. Suhrawardī establishes, in place of “existence,” as something really “real” the spiritual and metaphysical Light (nūr) which is the one and single reality having an infinite number of degrees and stages in terms of intensity and weakness, the highest degree being the Light of all lights (nūr al-anwār) and the lowest being Darkness (ẓulmah). But the Suhrawardian nūr has nothing essentially contradictory to, or incongruous with, “existence” as conceived by a Mullā Ṣadrā, so much so that the later ḥikmat philosophers who were gravely influenced by this Illuminationist conception came to conceive of “existence” as the ultimate reality, as being something of a “luminous” (nūrī) nature. The reality of “existence” is the Light, the very nature of “light” being to be “self-manifesting in itself and bringing others into manifestation.” It is, in brief, the “presence” (ḥudūr) of itself and of others. All this, however, cannot be grasped by rational demonstration. It is a truth that can be realized only through something completely different from thinking and reasoning, i.e., inner vision and inner illumination.
Ibn ‘Arabī, another great master of gnosis of roughly the same period as Suhrāwardī, took exactly the same position regarding the reciprocal essential relationship between philosophy and mysticism. The fundamental principle, namely, that a mystic without the power of conceptual thinking is an imperfect mystic, just as a philosopher without mystical experience is but an imperfect philosopher, this principle which we found to be the guiding spirit of Suhrāwardī’s thought, is also the very basis on which stands the whole structure of Ibn ‘Arabī’s metaphysics. All his works are nothing but a grand-scale exemplification of this principle.

We may note that Ibn ‘Arabī, while still a young man in Spain, was personally acquainted with the most outstanding Muslim representative of Aristotelianism, Averroës; moreover, Ibn ‘Arabī himself, was familiar with the philosophical concepts of Aristotle and Plato. Fully equipped with this Greek analytical tradition, he was able in a most logical way to analyze his inner visions of Reality and elaborate them into a remarkable metaphysical world-view. The latter is thus a coherently structured system of metaphysical concepts based directly upon his theophanic visions.

In the view of Ibn ‘Arabī, there are two clearly distinguishable aspects to the absolute reality of “existence,” two different metaphysical dimensions which correspond to the state of ecstasy and the state of waking consciousness respectively in the mystic who experiences “existence”. In the first aspect, “existence” is sheer undifferentiation, pure “unity” in which absolutely nothing is articulated. In this capacity it is the metaphysical Mystery, the unknown-unknowable. It is not even God as theologically understood as the creator of the world or as the object of adoration and worship.

The second of the two aspects is that of tajallī. Divine self-manifestation or theophany. It is a metaphysical stage at which the absolute Reality turns toward the world of contingent Being. Theologically speaking, it is the Face of God, God as He manifests Himself as “God” to others. In the gradual process of theophany, the Reality divides itself into a number of sub-stages constituting as a whole a vast hierarchical order of “existents,” the lowest stage being that of material and sensible things as we perceive them in the empirical world. Since those various stages of being are nothing other than so many self-
manifestations of “existence,” the whole world, ranging from the Mystery to the material things, is ultimately and metaphysically one. The conception is what is usually known as the “transcendental Unity of existence” (waḥadī al-wujūd). All existents are many, and at the same time one; one (from one aspect), and at the same time, many (from another aspect).

The idea of the “transcendental Unity of existence” thus established by Ibn ‘Arabī is very important for the right understanding of Sabzavārī. For it is his standpoint; it is the very basis on which stands the whole of his metaphysics.

Later Development of Ḥikmat in Islamic Philosophy in Iran

Suhrawardī and Ibn ‘Arabī exercised a profound influence on the thinkers who came after them and thereby radically changed the course of philosophy in Islam, especially in Iran. These two schools of Islamic spirituality tended to converge and were gradually welded into a particular form of philosophy by the efforts of successive generations of outstanding thinkers. A decisive moment in the process of the development came when, in the middle of the Šafavīd period there appeared an extraordinary philosopher who, incorporating and integrating all the key-concepts of Avicenna, Suhrawardī, and Ibn ‘Arabī—to mention only the greatest names—into his own thought, created a philosophical world-view of an immense dimension. That man was Šadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Šadrā). It was he who for the first time firmly established a self-subsistent theosophic system truly representative of what we now know as Ḥikmat philosophy as a perfect unity of mysticism and scholasticism. Mullā Šadrā thus marks the culminating point of the above-mentioned second phase of the history of Irano-Islamic philosophy and, at the same time, the starting-point of the third phase of which Sabzavārī represents the highest peak.

Like Suhrawardī, Mullā Šadrā was wholly convinced of the reciprocal relationship between mystical experience and logical thinking. All philosophizing which does not lead to the highest spiritual realization is but a vain and useless pastime, just as all mystical experience which is not backed by a rigorous conceptual training in philosophy is but a way to illusions and aberrations. Such was the conviction he had obtained through
his own personal experience. The meeting point, in this experience, of mysticism and philosophy was furnished by a sudden illuminative realization of the ultimate oneness of the subject (‘āqil) and the object (ma’qūl)—the seer and the seen—and of the intellect (‘aql) itself. For in such a spiritual state alone, he believed, can the metaphysical reality of things be intuited as it really is, as opposed to the way it ordinarily looks.

It is to be remarked that this illuminative experience was taken by Mullā Ṣadrā himself to be a sudden revelation of the pure “light” as well as pure “existence.” And it directly led him to the most important thesis in his metaphysics, namely the thesis of asālat al-wujūd “the principality or ontological fundamentality of existence,” which he established as the central principle of metaphysics in opposition to the thesis of asālat al-māhiyāt “the principality or ontological fundamentality of quiddity” that had been advocated by his teacher, Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631/32). With regard to this problem, Sabzavarī follows in the footsteps of Mullā Ṣadrā. For him too, the position of asālat al-wujūd, that is, the primacy of “existence” over “quiddity,” should be the highest principle dominating the whole structure of metaphysics.

In the tradition of Islamic metaphysics, the distinction between “existence” and “quiddity” goes back to Fārābī and Avicenna, But Mullā Ṣadrā (and following him Sabzavārī) elaborated this idea into a peculiar metaphysical thesis. Briefly, the problem may be described as follows:

It pertains to the most elementary and fundamental structure of our daily experience that we constantly encounter in our life an infinity of things. We find ourselves surrounded by them, and we cannot escape from the consciousness of the presence of divergent things. The actual presence of these things is their “existence.” They are there. They exist, as we ourselves exist. On the other hand, they are not there in the form of pure “existence.” They “exist” as various and variegated things: man, horse, stone, tree, table, etc. This latter aspect of their “existence” is called “quiddity.”

There is thus contained in everything a two-fold ontological principle. Each of the things we actually encounter in the world is composed of “quiddity” and “existence”. Every *ens* (Arabic, *mawjūd*) is a composite of *essentia* (*quidditas*; Arabic, *māhiyāt*), and *esse* (*actus essendi*, Arabic, *wujūd*).
All things are different from one another, not only individually but also specifically. Nothing in the world is the same as the rest of things. A stone, for example, is a stone; it is not, it cannot be, a horse. And yet, all these things which differ from each other are found to share one and the same element: “existence”. All are the same with regard to the fact that they do exist. For this reason we can truthfully say of the things which we find in our presence; “The stone exists,” “The horse exists,” “The table exists,” etc., attributing one and the same predicate to all of them, in spite of the fact that the subjects of the propositions are definitely different from one another.

Thus, whatever is found in the world is, as Sabzavārī says, zawj tarkībī, or a duality composed of “quiddity” and “existence,” the former being that by which each thing is differentiated from all others, and the latter being a factor in which all things equally and without exception participate. This fundamental fact about the two ontological factors is what Sabzavārī refers to when he says that “existence” is the principle of unity, while “quiddities” raise only the dust of multiplicity.

What is most important to observe concerning the mutual relationship between these two component factors of a thing is that, according to Mullā Šadrā and Sabzavārī “quiddity” and “existence” do not stand on one and the same ontological level, or that they do not enjoy the same degree of “being-real”. This said, it is to be remarked at once that this view is based on an extraordinary illuminative intuition of “existence” which is an experience of a Şūfī origin. In the light of this unusual experience—which is, as we saw above, described as a self-revelation (tajallî) of “existence” in its absolute purity—all “quiddities” are found to be deprived of their seemingly solid self-subsistence and turn out to be nothing other than so many partial determinations and delimitations of the unitary reality of “existence.”

This precisely is the thesis of the aşâlat al-wujûd. It holds that of the two ontological components of everything, “existence” and “quiddity,” the former alone has a fundamental reality (ašâlah), the former alone is real (ašîl), the “quiddity” being nothing but “something mentally posited” (i'tibârî), a mere notion formed by the cognitive activity of the human mind out of a concrete extra-mental piece of reality which is, in this view, nothing other than “existence” in a determined and delimited
form. As Mullā Ṣadrā says: ‘“Existence” is what is primarily real in every “existent;” it is the “reality.” Everything other than “existence” (i.e., “quiddity”) is, on the contrary, like a reflection, a shadow, or a similitude’ (*Kitāb al-mashā‘ir*, ed. Corbin, p. 4, §4, [Tehran, 1964]).

It will be clear that those who take the position of the *aṣālat al-wujūd*, like Mullā Ṣadrā and Sabzawārī, assert that it is the notion of “existence,”, not that of “quiddity” which has a correspondent in the external world. This means that the external correspondent to the mental composite [“quiddity” + “existence”] is nothing but “existence” in its various and variegated phenomenal determinations. These forms, which the reason considers as independent “quiddities,” are in reality nothing other than so many modalities of “existence.” The “quiddities,” in this view, are intrinsic limitations or determinations of “existence.” They are merely internal modifications of the all-pervading “existence.” “Existence” itself is found everywhere. It fills up our world without leaving any interval. But it is, so to speak, something of an extremely elastic and plastic nature. It manifests itself under infinitely different forms: man, stone, table, etc. These forms are definitely different from each other. A man *qua* “man” is different from a stone *qua* “stone”. In so far, however, as they are internal modifications or modalities of one single “reality” called “existence,” they are ultimately the same. The differences observable among various things are in the last analysis a matter of degrees.

“Existence,” thus, is a reality characterized in its basic structure by *tashkīk* or “analogical gradation,” an ontological gradation comprising an infinite number of degrees of “more or less.” Or, to use the Suhrawardian concept, it is a “light” comprising infinite shades of being-intense and being-weak, ranging from the strongest and fullest luminosity, i.e., the Light of all lights, to the weakest which is ultimately to be reduced to a total lack of luminosity, i.e., Darkness (non-existence). “Existence” in the sense of a metaphysical reality characterized by this kind of “analogical gradation,” is one. And to hold such a view of “existence” is to hold the position, mentioned earlier, of the “transcendental unity of existence.”

This is, in brief, the theoretical basis of the Sabzavarian metaphysics contained in this book.
Sabzavārī’s Autobiography*
Translated by Paul Sprachman†
from the Persian Introduction to the Arabic Text

Since some of those closest to me have requested that something be written about the nature of my education, its particulars, and the selection of teachers, I will comply with what seems fitting. At the age of seven or eight, having embarked upon a study of (Arabic) grammar my learned father (may God Almighty place him among the select at Resurrection) decided to go on the Ḥājj. On the return journey, in Shiraz, he passed into the realm of divine mercy. This abject writer until the age of ten stayed in Sabzawār. Afterwards, that honorable gentleman, possessor of many virtues and talents, that wide-ranging scholar, man of complete grace, eminent scholar, that pious exemplar of self-restraint, doctor of theology, devoted worshipper and faithful upholder of prayer . . . (the quintessence of all virtues, he who makes description unnecessary, beloved of my

*This autobiography is taken from an article by the late Dr. Kāsim Ghanī published in Yād-gār, no. 3, 45-47. After his introductory remarks about Sabzavārī’s learning and intellectual gifts the author writes:

The following (auto)biography whose original was written by Mullā Hādī is in the possession of his grandson, Diyā’ al-Ḥagg Ḥakīmī, son of the late Abd al-Kayyūm. It is an example of the enlightened state of mind, simplicity and purity of that great man. The original is in Mullā Hādī’s own nasta‘īlik and written on blue colored paper. On the back we find the Ḥājjī’s seal written in saj c (metered prose) “yā hādī al-muḍillīn” (O Guide to the Unguided).

†Translator’s note: See E.G. Browne’s A Year Amongst the Persians, pp. 131-134, for an approximate translation of this autobiography.

According to Diyā’ al-Ḥagg Ḥakīmī’s account his father Abd al-Kayyūm (the son of the Ḥājjī) requested the (auto)biography from his father from Tehran, and entrusted the remainder of the work to one of his students. That student wrote a detailed biography containing the Ḥājjī’s virtues, miracles and colloquies (magamat); however the Ḥājjī was not pleased with it and wrote a briefer version of it.
soul, my noble cousin, rendered happy in this world and the next) al-Ḥājj Mullā Ḥusayn al-Sabzavārī—may God elevate his state—who for many years had pursued his education in the holy city, Mashhad, and whose father shared his wealth with mine caused me to come to Mashhad. That gentleman supervised all aspects (of my education): retirement from the world, moderation in the consumption of food, the avoidance of committing any impious acts or wrong-doing and encouraging those spontaneous acts of devotion not prescribed by law. Since we shared the same cell, he considered me a partner and companion in these endeavors.

Our modus vivendi continued in this manner for a time, in which the years passed in a satisfactory way (and with "tasal-lumiyyat" [sic]). The late Mullā became my instructor in Arabic, religious law, and principles. Despite the fact that he was possessed of intelligence and eloquence, and that he discovered a ready talent in me, he would always proclaim the logical, rarely giving expression to feelings of satisfaction. I spent a total of ten years in the pious circle of the late Mullā, until the time that my passion for learning intensified. From Isfahan the whisper of the "illuminati" reached my heart, at a time when, by the grace of God, I found great pleasure as well as competence in theological studies. I then left Khurāsān for Isfahān leaving behind a considerable amount of property and goods. I stayed there for eight years gaining, with God's aid, an ascetic temperament, free of excessive passions, as well as success in my studies of the sciences and the shari'a; however, I spent most of my time studying the philosophy of the illuminatist school. For five years I studied with that supreme doctor of theology (glory of truth seekers, shining light of savants and teachers, possessing the virtuosity of the divines—nay the virtues of God, that knower of the Truth), Ākhūnd Mullā Ismā'īl Isfahānni ("may al-Ṣharif (God) sanctify his heart").

After the death of Ākhūnd Mullā Ismā'īl for a period of two or three years I studied with that learned doctor (master of all, seeker of holy truths and shining light) Ākhūnd Mullā Ālī Nūrī—may God sanctify his soul and his grave. When I first arrived in Isfahān for two years (one hour daily) I studied with that celebrated master, renowned scholar, that famous truth-seeker Āghā Muḥammad Ālī, famous as "Najafi"—may God exalt his state.
When I returned to Khurāsān, I continued my studies of figh (jurisprudence) and tafsīr (commentary) for five years, for scholars (there) both favored these two and offered deep understanding of ḥikmat (philosophy). For this reason I rely mostly on ḥikmat, especially ishrāq (illuminatism).

After this period my pilgrimage to the Holy City lasted for two or three years. I have been teaching ḥikmat at the Dār al-Mu‘minīn of Sabzawār for twenty-eight years now—these are the “apparent causes” (of my life) but in reality “God guides, teaches, and rules me.”

I desire some eye (perception) to piece “cause” so that It can tear “cause” out by the roots

The Biography Written by Sabzawari’s Son-in-Law*

Based on the writings of Mīrzā Sayyid Ḥasan, the son-in-law of the late Sabzavārī, we find that he was asked by Nāṣīkh al-Tawārīkh to write the Mullā’s biography. The following was the result.

The Mullā was born in 1212 which date’s chronogram is the word “gharīb.” His father, Ḥājj Mahdī, was numbered among the merchants and landowners of Sabzāsār. He was attracted to the pursuit of knowledge through a (genuine) love of learning and, at the age of 21, undertook the Ḥājj. With respect to the sciences and Islamic jurisprudence he attained an exceptional status amongst his peers. He writes:

Since (at that time) Isfahan supported a “Dār al-ʿIlm,” I decided to travel there somewhat before the customary season. I wanted to benefit from Isfahan’s learned doctors. Intending to stay one month, I began studying with Ḥājjī Kalbāsī (?) and the late Shaykh Muḥammad Tagī. I also maintained a lively dialogue with the rest of those present. One day I was passing by the door of the mosque out of whose courtyard some could be seen walking to and fro. I saw many students gathered there and entered with the idea of attending some learned doctor. I noticed that a crowd of more than one hundred persons had

*This biography is found in the marginalia of Hīdaji’s commentary on the Manẓūmah (pp. 421-25), published in Tehran in A.H. 1336.
assembled. (The shaykh) who was wearing a rather demeaning costume assumed a very calm and sedate manner as students from both sides placed before him very worthy robes of silk. As he began I noticed the subject of his teaching was Kalām, specifically the problem of “tawḥīd” (unitarianism.) The beauty of his delivery and the manner of his colloquy were enchanting to me. I spent the next three days with that noble teacher, and determined to stay there and that my own studies would lie in the province of that exalted science (Kalām). I then proceeded to spend the provisions for my Ḥajj on books and the necessities of living there. For at least ten years I remained at his side studying with that great master, the late Ākhūnd Mullā Ismāʿīl.

After about five or six years Mullā Ismāʿīl after a respite from his own studies entered the fertile environment of the favored Ākhūnd Mullā Ālī Nūrī. I was also present on this occasion. After staying eight years, in the year 1340, the year the late Shakh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī arrived in Isfahan, I, in accordance with the wishes of the Ākhūnd Nūrī, became his student. I attended his classes for fifty-three days. He was unrivaled in his ascetic ways, however his graces were not evident to the other scholars of Isfahan. Towards the end of ʿ42 (1242) when Ākhūnd Mullā Ismāʿīl travelled to Tehran, I made for Khurāsān, and settled in the holy city of Mashhad, and studied the various sciences in the madrasa of Ḥājjī Ḩasan.

In the later part of the Khāgān Sultanate, I travelled to Mecca. On my return, at Bandar-ʿabbāsī I joined a caravan headed for Kirmān. Having arrived in Kirmān I found the roads unsafe due to the fall of the Khaganids.* He remained (stranded) in Kirmān for almost a year during which time (his) first wife, mother of Mullā Muḥammad, (his) oldest son, died. In Kirmān he chose another wife. (The family consisted of) two sons Āgā ʿAbd al-Ḵayyūm and Āgā Muḥammad Ismāʿīl, and three daughters of Kirmānī origin.

After returning (to Mashhad) he spent ten years of the reign of Muḥammad Shāh there, and taught both subjects (cīlm-i ʿakliyya and nakliyya?!) The students of the Mujtahid had someone who could issue “fitwās” and legal documents in both Mashhad and Sabzawār. He also had ample learning in the field

*At this point in the narrative the figure of “īltifāt” intervenes and the third person singular (more often the plural) is used to indicate Sabzawārī. It will be translated as written. (Translator’s note.)
of medicine. Based on the writings of Āgā Muḥammad Șādīg (the son of Mullā șAli) and Mujtahid Kirmānī who were contemporaries of the Mullā, the days spent in Kirmān were spent in the pursuit of his studies.

(According to) the late Ḥājj Sayyid Javād Shirāzī “al-‘aṣl”, Imām Juma, who was one of the great scholars of the age, one of Sabzavārī’s topics was the complete jurisprudence. At the time when there was a particularly sticky problem under discussion in the Sayyid’s class, one of his students, who was residing in the same madrassa as the Ḥājjī happened upon him. He asked the Ḥājjī about his life and education. To his questions (Sabzavārī) replied: I have delved a bit into the various branches of learning. He (the student) asked him about medicine to which Sabzavārī replied that he had also looked into it. He then asked about the aforementioned problem and heard the Ḥājjī’s answer. The next day in class the student repeated the Ḥājjī’s reply to Ḥājjī Sayyid Jávād. The Sayyid said: This is not your own thinking. Where did you learn it? The student said that a Khurāsānī had come to their madrassa and that he had visited him in his room (cell) after finding out about his background. During the course of the talk he asked about the problem. The Sayyid then said: It is apparent that he is a man of learning as well as a stranger. After class I will go and see him. He came to the Ḥājjī accomplished by all the students.

After the Ḥājjī returned from Isfahan he set aside some of his inherited property as an endowment for the poor. His provisions were limited to a pair of cows and a small farm and garden to which he invited all of his students when the grapes were in season. One third of the produce from his farm after paying mandatory taxes was given by degrees to the poor. One șAyd-i Ghādir he gave the poor and the “Sayyids” a Qur’an and to the “non-Sayyids” ten “shahis.” He chanted for the “Rawḍa” ceremonies during Āshūrā, as well as held a short “Rawḍa Majlis” for the poor in which food was provided (bread and “ābgūsht”.) His students were also welcome to these “majlis.” He never asked for nor accepted anything in return.

When Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh arrived in Sabzawār for the first time he visited the Ḥājjī’s house. He held an audience on the ordinary straw mats in the classroom and asked the Ḥājjī for a book on the principles of religion in Persian. After the king
left one of his men came in and told the Ḥājī that his master had sent him five hundred tomans. The money was loaded on a donkey standing at the head of the lane. The Ḥājī replied: Don’t bring it here. Tell Ḥājī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb to bring it to the madrasa and divide one half of it amongst the students and one half amongst the poor (the Sayyids should receive a double share).

He died in the last ten days of dhi( al)-ḫujja of 1289. This would make him seventy-eight, a number represented by the word “ḥakīm” (sage, learned.)

“He lived praised and died in a state of felicity.”

The works (including treatises, notes and marginalia, etc.) of Sabzavārī are numerous. Some of them have been published. He refrained from the worldly—even avoiding spices. Onions never found their way to his meat. Mīrzā Yūsuf Mustawfī al-Mamālik firmly believed in the Ḥājī’s opinions. The latter constructed the Mullā’s tomb*. He wrote the book Asrār al-Ḥikam for Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh. The book was published by Mustawfī al-Mamālik and given, gratis, to scholars.

“May God have mercy on the companions of those who pass away.”

(That is his biography—may his state be exalted and may all of us be in the company of Muḥammad (upon whom and upon whose family be God’s blessings) on the day of resurrection).

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*In Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh’s Mashhad-Safar-Nāme which was printed in 1326 in Tehran (p. 186) we find the following:

To summarize, we arrived in Mashhad and they are constructing the sepulchre and tomb of the late Ḥājī Mullā Ḥādī (peace be upon him). As has been said Mīrzā Yūsuf Mustawfī al-Mamālik is constructing this edifice and has spent two thousand tomans to date. The sepulchre of the late Ḥājī lies to the left of the road and facing it on the right side they are in the process of building a very fine Caravan-seray.
On the Mode of Sabzawārī’s Life
As Related by Two of His Sons*

...and even more of an honor and distinction for this city is the fact that during the last half of the 13th century it gained a kind of brilliance through the presence of a learned Ārif (that is, mystic-ascetic), a complete individual, a disciplined philosopher, and an aged philanthropist. The radiant brilliance of learning overflowed the boundaries of these noble parts and spread in every direction. It was that stallion who grazed in fields of wisdom and certitude, that guide to pedestrians on the road of salvation and the byways of gnostic experience, the late Ḥājjī Mullā Ḥādī Sabzawārī, may God cover him with his mercy in heaven—who adorned the nature of Sharīʿat (religious law), tarīqat (the gnostic path), and ḥagīqat (truth) with shining bolts and rays of pure wisdom. He strung pearls of widsom and from the depths of human nature spoke about the divine and everlasting. Bearing the mantle of Separation (from the mundane) he chipped away at the rust and corrosion on his heart. Out of respect for that glorious Doctor, most exceptional of men, out of all the important structures and blessed shrines of Sabzawār we shall first describe here the places, compound and resting places of that great one (may God bless him). Afterwards we shall go into the rest of the places. In doing so we shall reveal the nature of the late Doctor’s life (may God sanctify his soul).

*This account is taken directly from Ītimād al-Sultana’s work Maṭlaʿ al-Shams, under the heading Sabzawārī (vol. 3, pp. 194, 202). The author, the minister of the press and head of the royal “Translation College” (Dār al-Tarjāma), in another work al-Māthār wa al-Āthar published (“chāp-i sangi”) in 1306 in Tehran we find the following (p. 147):
During the second cavalry journey to Khurāsān I heard the details of his (Sabzawārī’s) private life directly from his two sons Āgā Muḥammad Ismāʿīl and Āgā al-Kayyum, on both of whom be blessings. I also was present as Sabzawārī’s Kirmānī wife related what she knew seated behind a curtain. This information can be found in the third volume of my Maṭlaʿ al-Shams.
Description of the Late Ḥājjī Mullā Ḥādī Sabzawārī’s Household and Life (may God have mercy on Him)

The house in which the late Mullā resided for 40, no 45 years, was located in the direction of Darwāza’i Nīshābūr. It consisted of a double “hayāt” (an inner and outer courtyard). The outer courtyard contained an enclosure six dharc by 6 dharc in whose central portion was a small untended garden with six berry trees. These trees must have been planted after the Ḥājjī’s demise. Both inside and outside the enclosure stand wells which now have dried up. Only to the east (of the compound) do we find a structure of mud and straw which is itself devoid of any decoration—even raised mud and straw stucco work. The middle chamber which houses living quarters is rectangular, five dharc by three. The roof is of thick straw backing, attached to that is wood (roughly hewn) and covering the wood are reeds. To the south of this living room and covering its entire length is a hallway one dharc wide. Over this hall is a room made of unbaked brick which is reached by means of a stairway of fired brick. In 1284 when the royal party consisting of His Majesty Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh (may God extend his reign and good fortune in perpetuity) made its way toward the Holy Land, Sanctified Mashhad. On Tuesday, the last day of the month Šafar, the Ḥājjī (may God bless him) welcomed the Monarch (may God glorify him) in this very room. At that time the floors were covered only with simple straw mats. However, during the year (A.H.) 1300 as the royal party was making its way back from the Holy Precincts (in Mashhad) and this writer was awaiting their arrival, the royal personage again visited that noble structure and saintly enclosure only to find a bare dirt surface, however, the last afterglow of divine wisdom was still infused in the rough walls and door.

In short, under this room and the empty hall was a small trap door built into the floor of the sitting room by which one entered the storage basement (full of straw at the time of the author’s visit). Along the entire north end of this room runs a hall. This passageway connects the outside courtyard with the inside one and is totally underground covered by straw and reeds. Having passed through this passage one enters a small enclosure which serves as a barn. A pair of work animals be-
longing to the Ḥājjī was kept here. After going through a narrow passage and a low door which opens to the north one enters the inner courtyard.

This courtyard is about 25 dhar in length and 12 dhar in width. In both the inner and outer courtyards only those places where winter traffic is heavy are paved with stone, the rest of the area is unpaved. As in the outer courtyard, in the inner one a structure with eastern exposure has been built. One also finds a triple alcoved porch-area, 1½ dhar of which is a bench. On each side of the porch is a hallway which is elevated off the ground five steps and connects with other hallways. On both sides of the hallway are two rooms each with windows opening onto the courtyard. The other room has only one door. Under the porch is a cold-cellar similar to the place where the late Ḥājjī often spent his winters and summers. In front of the porch is a pool which is double-tiered, i.e., the first level of the pool which has a depth of about three chārāks is covered by an arch made of brick and plaster. A small opening (sluice gate) on the north side connects the lower pool with the upper one and water is pulled from one to the other through this. Apparently, during the winter, so that the water didn't freeze they left the upper pool empty while the lower level which served as a kind of storage tank was kept full. The remainder of the courtyard is a garden in which four or five berry trees grow. Some of the more utilitarian rooms such as the kitchen are located in the southern portion of the compound. All of these rooms are built of mud and brick and, at best, mud reinforced by straw.

After observing the condition of the late Ḥājjī's abode I asked his excellent son Āgā Muḥammad Ismā'īl who himself is a man of learning and strongly attests to the noble qualities of his father about the Ḥājjī's (may God sanctify his grave) life style. As he spoke on this topic the late Ḥājjī's wife stood behind the door and expressed her own views when that which her son said seemed incorrect. Briefly, the late Ḥājjī would spend one-third of each night of the year awake, then he would pray in the dark until dawn. After his prayers he would have two cups of very strong thick tea in each of which twelve mithgāls of sugar had been placed. As he drank he would say: "I drink this sweet thick tea for energy." He never tried any stimulants like opium, tobacco or snuff. Two hours after daybreak
he would go to the madrasa where he would remain for four hours. Afterwards he would return home and eat a lunch which often consisted of no more than one piece of bread of which he would eat only a *ser*. He also drank some poor quality dūğh which he himself used to describe as “Blue dūğh” for its lack of yoghurt. After lunch in the summertime he would sleep for an hour and upon waking would not ask for tea. At night following a three hour period of prayer in the dark he would have supper at about ten o’clock. Because of his advanced age and lack of teeth, he would have plain white rice; or *Isfanjī* with Ābgūsht. Before his nightly meal he would walk in the garden for a half hour. Following supper he would retire to the aforementioned underground room and sleep on a simple wooden bed. He would place a small hard pillow devoid of cotton wool under his head.

For many years the Ḥājjī’s clothes consisted of a black *Māzandarānī* *Abbā* and a small green gabā whose elbows had been worn through from washing, and those patches had been torn off. During the winter he would wear gabā and *shalwar* the color of cane leaf and an *Amāma* which during the summer was fastened to a *karbās* (cotton lined night-cap known to the Sabzawaris as a *barjī*). In the winter instead of this nightcap a bowler-like skin cap was used.

He had no library to speak of, the sum of his books amounted to a handful of volumes. His pen case with which he wrote thousands of lines and solved the ambiguities and complexities of philosophy and gnosticism was present. This author was spiritually benefitted by viewing these objects. The workmanship of this particular pen case was Isfahānī, its field was golden and the marginal decorations on it consisted of flowers and plants. He had been using this same pen case for forty-five years and only on its two sides had any of its decorative work remained intact. Half of the “case” part was broken and nothing remained in the *khazāna* or “pen” part. The Ḥājjī’s brass inkwell had dried up. I also had the privilege of seeing the Ḥājjī’s glasses—he had fastened blue strips of *karbāsī* cloth to the nose and ear pieces so that the metallic parts of his glasses would not bother him during the winter. His prescription number was “six” and he had been wearing this pair for fifteen years. After a great deal of pleading I was successful in obtaining these glasses from his two noble sons, Messrs. Āgā Muḥam-
mad Ismāʾīl and Āgā ʿAbd al-Ḵayyūm—that this memento will remain the honorable and glorious instrument of enlightenment and farsightedness for this spiritually myopic writer. Both of the Ḥājjī’s noble sons affixed their seals to these eyeglasses and attested to their originality—they will remain more valuable than one-thousand boxes of rubies for this writer.

Āgā ʿAbd al-Ḵayyūm’s Account of the Eyeglasses

On Friday the 11th of Dūḥ al-Kaʿīda, 1300 when the royal party was returning from Mashhad, Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān Ṣanīʿ al-Dawla came to our house. I gave the late Ḥājjī’s glasses (may God preserve him in heaven and elevate his position) as a gift to the above mentioned Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān Ṣanīʿ al-Dawla. Finis.

Concerning the late Ḥājjī’s Livelihood

He was entitled to the water from the ʿAmīd Ābad Qanāt for one day, and to one day and night’s water from the Qaṣaba Qanāt and garden which was located outside of the “Pusht-e Arak.” Each year he derived an income of 40 tumans from this garden and from the two qanāts he received 30 kharwārs of grain and 10 loads of cotton. He was perfectly satisfied to allocate a portion of this as his own income, the remaining was given to the poor. Each year during the last ten days of Ṣafar he would perform Rawzā ceremonies, inviting a rather ugly voiced Rawzā-khwān from the Sabzawār area. He would present the Rawzā-khwān with five Korans at night, and would feed the poor who were lame, blind and feeble bread and Ābgūsht. For each person he would allot one Koran. He would present the deserving nobility and lords the ḵhums and the zakāt personally. On these occasions he would even weigh out the goods and count the money.

The Ḥājjī’s education was completed under the supervision of the late Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, who was one of the most famous savants of his time. After completing his education he left for Mecca and from there returned, later on, to Sabzawār. Although married three times he never had more than one wife at
any one time. After the first died, he took a second and after her death, because of his being in Kirmān for ten months a Kirmānī became his third wife. Most of his children were mothered by this same Kirmānī, who lived until the year 1300. Up to the time he was 60 the Ḥājji’s beard was black, i.e., he was wont to dye it. After 60 he allowed it to become its natural white.

Since he poetized gems and flashes of philosophical and gnostic wisdom, his nom de plume was “Asrār.” The chronogram for his birthday is “Gharīb” or 1212. The number of years that he lived reckoned by “Abjad” is “Ḥakīm” or about 78 years. On the 28th of Dhī al-Hujja 1284, with three hours remaining before sunset, the bird of his soul escaped its earthly cage and winged its way to everlasting happiness. Mullā Muḥammad Qaẓīm ibn Ākhund Mullā Muḥammad Riḍā’i Sabzawārī, with a penname “Sirr” who was one of the Ḥājji’s students, wrote the following on the day of his master’s death:

“Asrār”, now that he has left the world
There is lamentation from lowly stone
to the holy throne.

If you ask me when he died
I say, “He’s not dead, but more alive.”

They buried him outside the Sabzawār gate, known as the “Nīshābūr” gate, which is at the head of a pilgrimage route. After a short period of time the late Mīrzā Yūsuf ibn Mīrzā Ḥasan Mustawfī al-Mamālīk, who achieved greatness as prime minister towards the end of his life, constructed a takīyya and a bug c a to mark the Ḥājji’s grave. The takīyya has a length of 110 feet (gadam) and a width of 55 feet. After about 18 feet into the takīyya the bug c a starts. This consists of a cube-like structure which is 23 feet on a side. It has been divided into three parts from the entrance: a portico which is comparatively bigger and two rooms off to the side of the entrance portico. The interior of the bug c a is eight sided. On four sides it has four vaults, each of whose width is five feet. The two eastern and western vaults contain six feet of carpeting. In four corners are four small displays. There is a wide cupola about twelve dhār c in height. The facing on the grave platform is plastered stucco work and it is located in the middle. On the grave platform is a green wooden box two and one half dhār c in length.
one dhar and one chārak in width and two dhar and one chārak in height. The inside of the cupola is plastered and from the base of the vault to the top the plaster has been adorned with blue linear patterns and designs. Though the late Ḥājjī’s tomb is in this very bug, his son Ṣāḥib Mullā Muḥammad is buried outside of the coffin. Itimād al-Salṭānā in the book al-Māṭhar wa al-Āṯār (p. 147) writes the following about this son of Sabzawārī:

Mawlā M. Sabzawārī, son of the late Ḥājjī Mullā Hādī, was a learned doctor who died before his father. His coffin is located in the bug of his great father—away from his grave to the south. That bug and sahn were built on the Ḥājjī’s grave (may God domicile him in the ‘āṣālā al-ḵūṣūr) by the late Mirzā Yūsuf Āṣhtiyānī, the prime minister (may God bless him profusely and grant him happy reward).

In the southern section of the bug there is also a portico similar to the one located at the entrance, flanked also by two rooms similar to the ones at the entrance. Lateral to the entrance of the takiyya, two or three rooms were laid out. Facing those were several unfinished rooms which, of course, later on were completed. Next to the takiyya is the water cistern of the late Mullā Muḥammad Ṣafī Ābādī, a member of Sabzawārī’s gentry—this cistern has a spigot on the side. The water originates inside of the takiyya. The builder is buried next to the pool. The date of construction of the takiyya and bug and also of birth and death of the late Ḥājjī Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ābīd, known as “Furūghī” (head of the royal special Bureau of Translation and one of this writer’s personal friends) are given in the following poem:

The immortal bird has bid this world farewell
That perfect Pīr has found refuge over the aged arc.
In the court of the Almighty resides
That majestic knower of God, that clear-minded Heart.
That “makhzan al-asrār” of philosophic wisdom, Ḥājjī Mullā Hādī
He who in the universe of science and gnosticism was
like a shining sun.
Absolute emanation of the light of the Emanator—
that which
Passed from him from the non-material to the non-material was illuminated and enlightened.
The year of his birth is “Gharib” and the length of his life “Hākīm”
That ascetic soul has travelled from worldly exile to divine closeness.
A bug\textsuperscript{a} is appropriate for that most perfect shaykh so that Pilgrims can find their way to God.
That most magnificent one, proof of the bountiful universe
Honor to home and country-embodiment of the Great Individual
Mīrzā Yūsuf, prime minister of Iran who is
Without peer in greatness and glory
Refuge for the learned— lord who favored the poor
A helping hand for the needy, wise and far-sighted
Aware of the greatness of the late Ḥājjī (God bless him)
In the commission of his duties alert and intelligent
Over that grave (may God bestow favor upon it) he erected A bug\textsuperscript{a}, like the garden of Eden, pleasure-providing verdant
A bug\textsuperscript{a} to match the peerlessness of its contents
Its saḥn a palace of purity and its form pleasing to the soul
In the year 1300 this auspicious structure was made
So that the pilgrim would have pilgrimage and the spiritual wayfarer, a path.

Of the Ḥājjī’s writings the following have been published: Ḥāshiya bar Mathnawī, famous as Sharḥ-i Mathnawī; Sharḥ-i Manzūma on ḥikmat; Lālī al-Muntaẓima on logic with a commentary; Sharḥ-i Djušan-i Kabīr, Sharḥ-i Duḍā'i-i Šabāh; Asrār al-Hikam; Ḥavāshī (marginalia for) bar “Asfār;” Ḥavāshī “Shawāhid al-Rabubīyya;” Ḥavāshī “Miftāḥ al-Ghayb;” and a Divān-i Shīr-i Fārsī.

Those works which have not been published include: Manzūma-i Nibrās on fīqh with a commentary; Asrār al-SĪbād on fīqh; Rahīk on rhetoric; Rāh Afrāḥ on rhetoric; Ḥāshiya bar Mabda‘ wa Mā‘ād; Magyās dar Masā‘il-i Fīqh; Manzūm Jāwāb-Su‘āl-i Masā‘il-i Mushkila, a book on ḥikmat with 15,000 lines; Ḥāshiya bar Suyūṭī on grammar; and Muḥākimāt, a refutation of the Shaykhis.
A Bibliography of Sabzavārī’s Works

By Mehdi Mohaghegh
Translated by Paul Sprachman

The following is an annotated bibliography of works by Sabzavārī in both Persian and Arabic.

1. Šarḥ-i Manzūma-yi Ḥikmat: a didactic poem dealing with various aspects of Ḥikmat (Philosophical inquiry) with a commentary (šarḥ). The commentary, entitled “Ghurar al-farā’ id” is divided into seven major headings (maqṣad):
   I. On General Principles (ʿumūr ǧāʾīmāh)
   II. On Substance and Accident (jawhar va ʿarḍ)
   III. On the Special Idea of Theology (Ilāhīyāt bi-maʾnī ʿakhasṣ)
   IV. On Natural Phenomena (Ṭabī ʿīyāt)
   V. On Prophecy and Prophetic Dreams (Nubūvvāt va-manāmāt)
   VI. On Resurrection (maʾ āḍ)
   VII. On Selected Principles of Ethics (Shatri az ʿilm-i ṣakhlâq).

Each heading was further divided into several chapter (farāḏah), these in turn were divided into several sections (ghurar). Šarḥ-i Manzūma-yi Ḥikmat is a work which has occupied the attention of students and scholars, and, as a result many commentaries and marginalia have been written for it.

2. Šarḥ-i Manzūma-yi Maṇṭiq: Sabzavārī also versified the principles of logic and entitled the poem al-Laʿāliʿ al-Muntazīmah (Ordered Pearls). This work was composed after Šarḥ-i Manzūma for he refers to the work in this treatment of the “Sixfold Objects,” i.e.:
2. “The object of “what?” of definition” (mā-yi ḥaqī-
qīyahe)
3. “The object of simple “wheretheness” (ḥal-i basītah)
4. “The object of composite “wheretheness” (ḥal-i mu-
rakkabah)
5. “The object of “why?” of an objective fact” (lima-
ye thubūti)
īthbāti)

The best edition of Manẓūma-yi Manṭiq is the one con-
tained in Sabzavārī’s own Sharḥ-ı Manẓūma in 122 pages.
The most important commentary to the work is that of 
Mīrzā Mehdi Aṣhtiyyānī, published in 1371 (lunar). Shaykh 
Jaʿfar Zāhīdī has translated both the Manẓūma-yi Man-
tiq and the Sharḥ-ı Manẓūma into Persian and has pub-
lished them in Mashhad under the title Khud-Āmūz-ı 
Manẓūma.

3. Asrār al-Ḥikam: This work is in Persian and was composed 
at the request of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh Qājār. The author 
begins his work:

This humble author would like to present a work on 
“Mabdā” and “Maʾcād” containing the ideas of the 
Ishrāqīya, Mashshāʾī yah as well as the notions of 
Maʿārib and Mashāriq-i dhawqīya-this work is titled 
Asrār al-Ḥikam fi al-Muftatah wa al-Mukhtātam. 
The reason for writing this work is the behest of 
our great King Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh who in an inter-
view with his humble servant expressed the desire 
to see a work on the principles mentioned above. 
This author was only too willing to comply.
The book was published by Mīrzā Yūsuf Aṣhtiyyānī Mus-
tawfī al-Mamālek in 1303. It was republished many times 
afterwards and in 1380 was published by Mr. Mīrzā Abū 
al-Hasan Shaʿrānī.

4. Sharḥ-ı Baʿd-ı Ashʿar-i Mughlāqe-ye Mathnavī: Written 
in Persian at the request of Prince Sulṭān Murād in the 
time of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh, it comments on and explains 
some of the more difficult verses of the Mathnavī. It 
cites the Qurʿān, the works of philosophers like Ğārābī, 
and the works of Sūfī poets like Jāmī in order to pro-
vide valuable exegesis for Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī’s long mystical poem. The book was published in 1275 in Tehran.

5. Ǩīvān-i Āsrār: Sabzavārī’s Ǩīvān written under the pen-name “Āsrār.” This work has been published many times, the last being in 1338 in Tehran under the auspices of the Islamiyya Publishing House. The Ǩīvān contains Sabzavārī’s “Ghazals,” “Tarji Bands,” “Rubā’īyāt,” “Sāqīnāma,” and a “Question-Answer” poem.

6. Havāštī bar Shavāhid al-Rūbūbīyah: This book is a commentary on a work al-Shavāhid al-Rūbūbīyah ǧī al-Manāḥij al-Sulūkīyah by Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī. The work contains the pleasantries and fine points of Transcendental Philosophy. Sabzavārī in writing this valuable commentary has managed to free some of its more tangled and complicated aspects from the burden of obscurity. This book remained unedited until Professor Sayyed Jalāl Āshṭiyānī edited both works and wrote a lengthy introduction. The University of Mashhad published both of them in 1346.

7. Havāštī bar Asfārī Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī
8. Havāštī bar Mafāṭīh al-Ghaybi Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī
9. Havāštī bar Mabda va-Maʾādī Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī
   It is hoped that these three treatises will be published and placed at the disposal of scholars in the same way as Havāštī bar Shavāhid.

10. Ṣarḥ al-Nibrāsī ǧī Āsrār al’- Asās: This book which is written about the mysteries of religion, is set up in the same way as Manzūma-ʾi Mantiq and Hikmat are: i.e., it contains a long didactic poem along with a commentary by Sabzavārī himself. Sabzavārī explains the principles of orthodoxy and jurisprudence (fihā) from philosophical and gnostic points of view. The work was published in 1371 in Tehran.

11. Ṣarḥ al’- Aṣmā: An explanation of the “Doʾāʾ” (prayer) called “Jawshan-ʾi Kabīr” which is said on the so-called “nights of Qadar.” The work has been published many times, sometimes (1333 lunar) along with a commentary on Doʾāʾ-ʾyi Sabāh.

In addition to the above mentioned works, Sabzavārī has written numerous “tracts” (rasa’il) which have been compiled, introduced and published on the 100th anniversary of Sabzavārī’s death by Sayyed Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī:

Tracts written in Persian:
1. Answer to Questions Posed by Āqā Mīrzā Abu al-Ḥasan Raḍavī
2. Answer to Questions Posed by Shaykh Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Vā’z Tehrānī
3. Answer to Questions Posed by Sayyed Ṣādiq Simnānī
4. Answer to Questions Posed by one of the scholars of Qum
5. Answer to Questions Posed by Mīrzā Bādaī Gurgānī
6. Ḥidāyat al-Ṭālibīn

Tracts written in Arabic:
1. Answers to Questions Posed by Mullā Ismā’īl Ārif Bujnvardī
2. Answers to Questions Posed by Mūlla Aḥmad Yazīdī
3. Answers to Questions Posed by Shaykh ʿAlī Fāḍīl Tibbaṭī
4. Criticism of the Sharḥ al-ʿIlm of Shayah Aḥmad al-Baḥraynī
5. On Applying the Names of the Deity to Others; “Shirk or Non-Shirk”
6. On Monotheism and Its Proof
7. Answers to Problems Posed by Sayyed Samī Khalkhālī
8. Answers to Problems Posed by Mullā Ismā’īl Miyān Ābādī

We can, in closing, mention others who have devoted their research and energies to a study of Sabzavārī and his works:
1. Murtaḍā Mudarrisī Chahārdahī; The Life and Philosophy of Sabzavārī, Tehran, 1334.
2. Sayyed Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī; Ḥakīm Muḥaqqiq Ḥājj Mollā Ḥādī Sabzavārī, University of Mashhad, 1347.
4. Mehdi Mohaghegh; Fīlsūf Sabzavārī on the Life and Works of the Shaykh, to be published soon by Anjuman-i Āthār Millī.
THE METAPHYSICS OF SABZAVĀRĪ
I. EXISTENCE IS SELF-EVIDENT

All defining terms of "Existence" are but explanations of the word; they can neither be a "definition" nor a "description".

This chapter is concerned with self-evident nature of "existence,"; it explains how "existence" defies real definition, and how all that has been said about it by way of definition is nothing but literal definition (i.e., explication of the word-meaning).¹

All (so-called) defining terms of "existence" like, for example, "self-subsistent" or "that which allows of predication," etc., are but explanations of the word, i.e., so many answers given to the question concerning the lexical explanation of the word. This is the kind of thing which is called in Persian Pāsukh-i pursish-i nokhostīn ("an answer to the first [i.e., the most elementary preliminary] question" [concerning the meaning of a word]).

The Shaykh al-Ra‘īs (Ibn Sīnā, Avicenna) states in his Najāt:² "Existence can not possibly be explicated except lexically, because it is the primary (primitive) principle for all explications. So it itself does not allow of any explication; rather, its (essential) form is in the mind without the mediation of anything (else)."

So they, i.e., all (so-called) definitions, can neither be a "definition" in view of the fact that "existence" is (absolutely) simple, having neither specific difference nor genus, as we shall see presently; nor can it be a "description" because a "description" is obtainable only by an accidental property which is part of the five universals³ whose division itself is based on the thing-ness⁴ of "quiddity," while "existence" and its properties derive from an entirely different source from "quiddity."

Furthermore, a defining term must always be more immediately known and clearer than the defined term. But nothing is more evident than "existence."

Its notion is one of the best-known things, but its deepest reality is in the extremity of hiddenness.

Its notion, i.e., the notion of "existence" is one of the best-
known things, but its deepest reality, i.e., the simple luminous reality whose mode of being, as required by its “essence,” is (1) the refusal of “non-existence” and (2) being the prime source of all the effects that are to be expected from the existent things, and for which that self-evident notion is the formal mark, is in the extremity of hiddenness.

In this verse, the author has harmonized the theses of those who assert that the notion of “existence” is self-evident, and of those who hold (the most fundamental reality of) “existence,” is absolutely inconceivable. (The latter thesis is based on the argument that) if its reality (of “existence”) were actualized in the mind, the result would be either (1) that its effects would be actualized (externally)—but if so, such an effect would not have been actualized at all in the mind. This is the case, because a mental existent does not produce the (external) kind of effects which are to be expected of it; (2) or that it would not be followed by (the actualization of) its effects—but in that case it would not be “existence” in the real sense of the word, “existence” being the very source of (presupposed by) all its effects. In addition, when anything becomes imprinted, in its reality, in the mind, its “quiddity” must necessarily remain intact however much its (accidental features related to its “existence”) may change. But “existence” (itself) has no “quiddity,” and (if there be “quiddity” to it) its “quiddity,” by which “existence” would be “existence,” would simply be the very reality of “existence,” (itself) so there can be no “existence” as something additional to the “quiddity” in such a way that it could leave the latter as something which would continue to remain intact in the mind.

II. EXISTENCE IS FUNDAMENTALLY REAL

Existence, in our opinion, is fundamentally real.
The argument of our opponents is invalid.

Know that every possible (existent) is a duality composed of “quiddity” and “existence.” The “quiddity” which is also called a “natural universal!” is what is given in the answer to the question: “What is it?”
Of all the philosophers there has been none who has asserted that both (“quiddity” and “existence”) are equally real in the most fundamental way. For if they were both fundamentally real, it would follow that every single thing would be two distinguishable things; it would also follow that a real composition (instead of simplicity) should be found even in the First Emanation; again, in addition it would follow that “existence” would not be the very realization or coming-into-being of a “quiddity,” and other absurd consequences as well.

In fact, (the philosophers) have been divided by upholding two theories. The first asserts that the principle of the realization of anything is “existence” while “quiddity” is merely something posited, i.e., a mental counterpart to “existence” that is united with the latter. This is the doctrine held by the most authoritative of the Peripatetics. And this is also the doctrine chosen here, as is indicated by the following verse: *Existence, in our opinion is fundamentally real.*

As to the second (of the two theories), it holds that what is fundamentally real is “quiddity,” while “existence” is something (mentally) posited. And this is the position taken by the Shaykh al-Ishrāq, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī. This is what is referred to by our saying: *The argument of our opponents is invalid.*

For example, (our opponents argue:) if “existence” were actualized in concretely existent things, it would itself be something existent; and the latter would have also “existence,” which, again, would have “existence,” and so on *ad infinitum.*

Such an argument, however, is absurd because of the fact that “existence” does exist in virtue of its own self, not by another “existence.” So the matter does not in any way lead to an infinite regress. The rest of their arguments are all of the same nature. The latter are mentioned together with their proper answers in more detailed works. We shall not unnecessarily lengthen our concise exposition by mentioning them.

*Because “existence” is the source of all values.*

Let us mention six of the arguments of the school which we support.

The first argument: *Because “existence” is the source of all values* so much so that philosophers have declared that the
goodness of “existence” is self-evident. It goes without saying that neither value nor good can be attributed to a concept that is simply posited by the mind.

*The distinction between the two modes of “being” fully suffices.*

The second argument: *The distinction between the two modes of “being”* i.e., the external and the mental, *fully suffices* in establishing the thesis to be proved. This may be explained as follows: When a “quiddity” externally exists, it produces those effects to be expected from it, while the contrary is the case with the mental existents. So if “existence” were not realized, and if what were realized were “quiddity”—and “quiddity” is kept in both modes of being without any difference—there would be no distinction between the external and the mental. But since this consequent is absurd, the antecedent must also be the same.

*Also we hold the necessary existence of priority in causal relationship, while there can be no order with regard to “quiddity.”*

The third argument: *Also* our thesis can be proved by the necessary existence of an essential *priority in causal relationship*, i.e., a thing which happens to be the cause of something else, (necessarily has an essential priority over the latter) while *there can be no order with regard to “quiddity.”* This can be explained as follows. The cause necessarily precedes the effect, while there can be no priority-posteriority with regard to “quiddity.” So in case both of them belong to one species or to one genus, such as a fire being the cause of another fire, or “matter” and “form” being the cause of “body”, or again the First Intellect being related to the Second Intellect as its cause. Supposing that “existence” were something mentally posited, then specific “quiddity” of fire, for example, *qua* fire (as the cause) would be prior, and the specific “quiddity” of fire *qua* fire (as the caused) would be posterior; likewise, the generic “quiddity” of a substance *qua* substance would be prior, as it happens to be in the cause, while the same thing *qua* substance would be posterior as it happens to be in the caused. This would necessitate a priority-posteriority relationship in the “essences.”
A large number of people have combined the thesis that “existence” is something (mentally) posited with the thesis that there can be no order with regard to “quiddity.”

But, according to the position which holds that “existence” is fundamentally real, the things which are prior or posterior are admittedly “quiddities,” and yet that by which they are prior or posterior is real “existence.”

_What brings to light our contention is the existence of degrees in the gradual increase of intensity (constituting) various species._

And the fourth argument: _What brings to light our contention is the existence of degrees_, i.e., the infinite degrees of “strong” and “weak,” as indicated by our words: _in the gradual increase of intensity_—because the “gradual increase of intensity” is a kind of movement, and all movement is continuous and everything continuous allows for an infinite number of limits being posited in it—(_constituting_) _various species_ each having an actualized “quiddity.”

This can be explained as follows. According to philosophers the different degrees of “strong” and “weak” in the gradual increase of intensity—as in the case of “transformation”—constitute different species, these degrees are infinite since everything continuous is infinitely divisible. So if “existence” were something mentally posited, which would be one or many in accordance with the things from which the concept of “existence” would be abstracted, namely, “quiddities,” the latter being in this connection infinite and fundamentally real—if this were the case) then the species which are in actuality infinite would be bound by two limits, i.e., the beginning and the end.

On the contrary, if “existence” does have reality, it would be like a thread bringing the scattered “quiddities” into order and keeping them from dispersion.

If we adopt the view that it is “existence” that is fundamentally real we would recognize that here, running through all the scattered “quiddities,” is one single reality (i.e., “existence”). This is comparable to the unity which we observe in things having extension, whether they be immobile or mobile, for their multiplicity is mere potential, not actual.
How can it be otherwise, since by “being” all things have left (the state of) equality?

The fifth argument: How can it be otherwise, i.e., how can “existence” not be fundamentally real, since by “being”—the word “being” is here synonymous with “existence”—all things have left (the state of) equality, i.e., the equality with regard to “existence” and “non-existence?” The phrase “all things” here means the “quiddities,” because a “thing” (shay) means something whose “existence” is wanted (mashī wujūdu-hu), namely “quiddity.”

This point can be explained in such a way that suspicion of petitio principii may be removed. Both schools are agreed that “quiddity” qua “quiddity” is nothing but itself, and that it has, in itself, an equal relation to both “existence” and “non-existence.” If “existence” were nothing but something mentally posited, what could have made the “quiddities” leave the state of equality, and by what have they come to deserve the predicate “existent?” For adding a non-existent to another non-existent can not possibly be a cause of “being existent.”

As for the argument of our opponent, it is completely devoid of meaning. In fact, they assert that “quiddity” qua “quiddity,” although it is within the boundary of equality, has become capable of being the subject for the predicate “existent” because of a particular mode of being which it has acquired from the Maker after having come into relation with Him.

(We say that this argument is meaningless) because if (1) after having been related to the Maker its state (i.e., the state of being a “quiddity”) has become different, that by which it has become different can be no other than “existence,” though our opponent would certainly refuse to call it “existence.” Besides, that relation into which “quiddities” enter with the Maker is “illuminative,” not “categorical,” because the latter kind of relation would simply be something mentally posited just as “existence” which our opponent assumes to be mentally posited.

But if, on the contrary (2) the “quiddity” does not become different in its state of equality and yet deserves being predicated by the predicate “existence,” that would simply be nothing other than “mutation;” but if it does not deserve the predication it would remain in the state of equality. This, however, is a contradiction.
If "existence" were not fundamentally real there would be no unity actualized, because all other things raise only the dust of multiplicity.

The Truth and His Words would not be unified except by that with which unity always goes hand in hand.

The sixth argument: If "existence" were not fundamentally real there would be no unity actualized, because all other things—we mean by "other things" "quiddities," because their fundamental reality is the question at issue—raise only the dust of multiplicity.

And since it is so (i.e., since the "quiddities" are nothing but the source of multiplicity) the Truth and His Words and His Attributes would not be unified except by that with which unity always goes hand in hand, i.e., the reality of "existence."

This can be explained as follows. If "existence" were not fundamentally real, unity would never be obtained, because "quiddity" is the source of multiplicity, and by nature it causes difference. The "quiddities" by themselves are different from each other and multiple, and spread the dust of multiplicity throughout "existence," for "existence" becomes multiple in a certain way through the multiplication of its subjects, just as "existence" is the very center about which turns the sphere of unity. And if unity were not actualized, there would be no "unification" of "it-is-it-ness" (i.e., identity) as exemplified by propositions like "Man is writer" and "The writer is laugher," because we have supposed the aspect of unity which is "existence" to be something mentally posited, and what is fundamentally real to be the very "quiddity" of "man" and the concepts of "writer" and "laugher." But the essential characteristic of concepts is "difference" and they bring about only "other-ness" and "being far-removed from each other," not "it-is-it-ness." Thus by the position here discussed, the problem of "unification," which is the very basis of all problems, has not been solved in a satisfactory way, neither the problem of the "unification" of the (divine) Essence, nor the "unification" of the Attributes, nor again the "unification" of the Acts and Words.

As for the problem of the "unification" of the Divine Essence, if we assume "quiddity" (not "existence") to be fundamentally real, there would be no common element between
two Necessary Beings—in case we posit them—instead of each of them being composed of a common aspect and distinguishing aspect, since we have assumed that it is “quiddity” that is real in both of them. But it is of the very nature of the “quiddities” that they are totally different from each other. This invalidates their proof of “unification,” which is based on the idea of “composition” being necessarily entailed.7

As for the “unification” of the Attributes, if “existence” were something mentally posited, it would be impossible for reason to judge either that the concepts of Knowledge, Will, Power, and other real Attributes are one, or that they are unified with the Divine Necessary Essence, since we have assumed that the Attributes and the Essence lack the principle of unity, namely “existence.” If, on the contrary, “existence” were fundamentally real the Attributes would be unified in the dimension of “existence,” even though in the dimension of concepts they would be different one from the other as well as from the Divine Essence which they qualify, for the Divine Essence would, according to the position taken by the opponents, be one of the “quiddities.”

This would necessarily entail multiplicity in the Essence in accordance with the multiplicity of the Attributes.

As for the “unification” of the Acts and Words, according to our opponents’ view, all things that come out from God, (i.e., His Acts and Words) would be nothing other than diversified “quiddities” each of which has a proper answer to give to the question: What is it? And being without “existence” they would remain in such a state that it may properly be said of them that there is no relation between the abstract and material, heaven and earth, man and horse, etc. Where, then, would be the one Face of God which is indicated by His own words?: “Wherever you turn, the Face of God is there.”8 Since naturally the Face of the One is one. And how will it be with the one Word “Be!” which is indicated by His words?: “Our command is but one.”9

If, on the contrary, “existence” which is the pivot of “unity”—or rather “unity” itself—is fundamentally real, all the diversified things will be unified in it and all the distinguishable things will participate in it. “Existence” in fact is the luminous aspect in which all darknesses disappear, and it is also His Word, Will, Mercy, and the rest of His positive Attributes.
III. EXISTENCE IS ANALOGICAL

This is also one of the basic philosophical problems, and it will clarify the position of the Iranian philosophers that will be mentioned later. For, since the concept of "existence" is something shared by all things, while it is evident that one single concept cannot be abstracted from diverse entities in so far as they are diverse, "existences" in different existents cannot be diverse entities; rather, they are degrees of one single "reality" which allows of analogical predication.

This can be proved in several ways. The first proof is indicated by our words:

*Its analogicity is proved by the capability of its being the source of division.*

*Its analogicity, i.e., the analogical nature of "existence," is proved by the capability of its being the source of division, that is to say, by the fact that "existence" is divided into the "existence" of the necessary and the "existence" of accident, etc., and that the principle of division must necessarily be shared by all the divisions.

*Likewise by the one-ness of the concept of "non-existence."*

The second proof: *Likewise its analogicity is proved by the one-ness of the concept of "non-existence"* because there is no differentiation in "non-existence," and "existence" is its contradictory. And the contradictory of what is one is one; otherwise two contradictions would be removed together.¹

*The conviction about it will not be removed, when the conviction about "determination" comes to be shaken.*

The third proof: *the conviction about it, i.e., the conviction about "existence" will not be removed even when the conviction about "determination," like "being a substance" or "being an accident," comes to be shaken.* The word "determination" here is synonymous with the word "particularization" as used by the author of *Hikmat al-Ayn*³ when he says: Otherwise, the conviction about "existence" itself would disappear when the conviction about "particularization" happens to be discarded.
We can formulate this in the following way. When we establish the proof that the world must necessarily have an existent "mover," we become thereby firmly convinced of the existence of the "mover." If, thereafter, there occurs in our minds doubt as to whether the "mover" is a necessary being, or a substance, or an accident, that doubt does not in any way impair the above-mentioned conviction. For if we become convinced that the "mover" is a necessary being, and then the conviction happens to be changed into another conviction that it is a possible being, the conviction that it is a necessary being will certainly disappear, and yet the conviction that it is existent will not disappear. If it were not for its analogicity, the conviction that it is existent would also disappear when the conviction that it is a necessary being disappears. But this consequent is absurd, so must be also its antecedent.

All are signs of the Glorious.

The fourth proof All existents, whether in the "horizons" (i.e., in the external world) or in the "souls" (i.e., in the internal world) are signs of the Glorious whose Glory is to be glorified, as He said in His admirable Book: "We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their souls so that it may become clear to them that it is the truth." ⁴

Now the sign of a thing is not distinguishable from the latter in all respects; rather it is like a shadow with regard to the thing. Can darkness ever be a sign of light? and shadow a sign of sunshine? So if "existence" were not something shared by all existents, they would not be signs of God the Exalted, while in reality the existents quâ existents are all signs of Him which are recorded in both His external Book of creation (i.e., the world) and His internal Book of creation (i.e., the human soul) as is mentioned in various places of His Scripture which conforms to both the external and the internal Book in exactly the same way as "existence" in a written or pronounced form conforms to "existence" in its mental or external form.

Our opponents take the position of agnosticism.

The fifth proof: Our opponents like Abû al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arî⁵ and Abû al-Ḥusayn al- Başrî⁶ and many of our contemporaries who are not men of reasoning and who deny the analogicity of
“existence,” take the position of agnosticism in order to guard themselves against the doctrine of “resemblance” and “cognition” between the cause and the caused, while in reality the “cognition”—like the “cognition” of a thing and its shadow—is one of the conditions of causal relationship. They abandon the idea of knowing His Essence and Attributes. For, when we say that He is existent we understand thereby that self-evident concept which remains the same in all things of which “existence” can rightly be predicated—though one of them (i.e., God) is infinitely above infinity as regards number, time, and intensity of being, while all the others are limited, and in their very being limited, are but shadows, and not real things—so that there necessarily ensues analogicity. Those people run away from this and its consequences, just as a man suffering from a bad cold tends to run away from the fragrance of musk.

If, on the contrary, we do not take the word “existent” in that sense, but in the sense that to Him is to be attributed the opposite or the contradictory of that idea—the contradictory of “existence” being “non-existence”—it would necessarily follow that the world be devoid of an existent origin. We take refuge in God from such a view!

If, further, we do not understand anything, we would be depriving our intellect of all knowledge of God.

Likewise, when we say that He is an Essence which essentializes “essences” or a Thing which provides things with “thing-ness;” (1) either we understand hereby “non-essence” or “non-thing” (which is sheer nonsense)—God stands high above what is claimed by the unjust—(2) or we would deprive our intellect of all knowledge of God. The same is true of the Attributes. Because, when we say, for example: “He is knowing” or “O (he who is) knowing!,” in accordance with the usage of His Beautiful Names, in prayers and remembrances; (1) either we mean by the word “knowing” one to whom a thing is disclosed—in which case we would have analogicity and its consequences—(2) or not (i.e., either we mean by the word “knowing” just the opposite of “knowing,” or we do not understand anything at all), in which case there would necessarily follow the other kind of false consequences. Thus their theory would deprive the intellect of all knowledges and remembrances except by way of the mere clacking of the tongue.

In brief, all that we hear from most of our contemporaries is
nothing but sophistry based on a confusion between concepts and the objects to which they apply.

Among those things which support our thesis (is the fact that) making it a rhyme-word constitutes repetition.

The sixth proof: Among those things which support our thesis namely that of analogicity, there (is the fact that), as has been related by Fākhr al-Rāzī in his commentary on the Ishārāt concerning the position taken by some philosophers, making it, i.e., the word “existence” (wujūd) a rhyme-word in poetry constitutes repetition, i.e., the repetition of one and the same rhyme-word, which is considered defective by the rhetoricians.

This proves that “existence” maintains one meaning, for if it were homonymous, that kind of repetition would not come about from its being used as a rhyme-word, as when the word ‘ayn (a homonymous term having a variety of meanings) is used as a rhyme-word. On the contrary, one should consider using the word wujūd as a rhyme word (on the supposition that it be a homonymous term) as something praiseworthy, because this usage provides an example of the art of tajnīs al-qāfiyyah which is regarded as one of the laudable techniques in the art of beautiful and forceful expression.

IV EXISTENCE IS SOMETHING ADDITIONAL TO QUIDDITY

This is directed against al-Ash’arī when he asserts that “existence” is mentally identified with “quiddity,” in the sense that the concept of the one is the same as that of the other.¹

The authoritative philosophers have asserted that “existence” is something added to “quiddity” mentally, but not in the external world. But even in the mind (this separation of “quiddity” from “existence”) is not realized; it is obtainable only by rational analysis and laboring. This is so because something being in the mind is also mental “existence” just as something being in the external world is external “existence.” But it is of the very nature of the intellect to notice “quiddity” in
abstraction, totally discarding both modes of “existence,” by not taking them into consideration, not by simply negating them. In other words, if as a result of hard laboring of the mind we separate “quiddity” from both kinds of “existence,” then “quiddity” would not be “existence” by way of primary essential predication, though it is “existence” by way of common technical predication.2 The same is true of “divestment’ and “abstraction.”3

Existence is something which occurs to “quiddity” conceptually, while they are unified as a concrete being.

“Existence” is something which occurs to “quiddity” conceptually or mentally, for the “thing-ness” of “quiddity” (i.e., “quiddity” in so far as it is “quiddity”) itself furnishes a sufficient ground for its occurrence; but not externally, for in that case it would require the “existence” of the object (which is “quiddity”) prior to the “existence” which occurs to it, while objectively (i.e., in the external world) they are unified as a concrete being.

“Existence” alone is properly to be negated.

Let us give four proofs of the above-mentioned argument.
The first proof: “Existence” alone is properly to be negated, i.e., “existence” can properly be negated of “quiddity,” while neither “quiddity” can properly be negated of itself nor its essential properties. So “existence” can be neither the same as “quiddity” nor a part of it.

Its predication requires a middle term.
The second proof: Its predication, i.e., the predication of “quiddity” by “existence” requires a middle term, that is to say, it requires what is accompanied by “because,” as it has been made clear by the Shaykh Ibn Sīnā. Thus, when we say: “Intellect is existent,” the statement needs a proof, while the predication of “quiddity” and its essential properties does not require any proof, because the attribution of an essential property of a thing to that very thing is self-evident. Thus “existence” is neither the same as “quiddity” nor a part of it.

“Quiddity” could be separated from “existence” through intellection.
The third proof: "Quiddity could be separated in a particular way; namely, through the above-mentioned rational analysis and laboring, from "existence" through intellection. We intellect a "quiddity," the "quiddity" of a triangle, for example, while disregarding its external and mental "existence." And what is not disregarded is other than what is disregarded. This proves that "existence" is something additional to "quiddity."

All would be unified, and there would be an infinite regress.

The fourth proof: All "quiddities" would necessarily be unified if "existence" were the same as "quiddity," for "existence" is one, and the predication of "quiddities" by "existence" as well as the predication of "quiddities" by each other would all be no other than primary predications—for we are concerned here with the conceptual same-ness and other-ness—but this consequent is evidently wrong. There are a number of Şûfis who accept this consequent on the basis of the "unity of existence"—as related in the Shawârîq. But in the light of the above explanation we cannot accept it. For the argument put forward by the Şûfis certainly holds true of the real "existence" of "quiddities," but with regard to the "quiddities" qua "quiddities" and "concepts," even they would not be able to hold to "unification."

And there would necessarily be an infinite regress if "existence" were a part of "quiddity." This may be explained as follows. According to this view, "quiddity" would have to have another existent part—because it is impossible that an "existent" should be constituted by a "non-existent"—so that "existence" in this view would necessarily be a part of a part and so on, thus entailing an infinite regress with regard to the parts of a "quiddity," and it would become impossible to intellect any "quiddity" in its reality. This, however, is absurd, because we do intellect many of the "quiddities" with all the essential properties, both primary and secondary. And to deny this is simply to argue against an evident truth.

That this constitutes an infinite regress is quite evident, if these parts which are linked with one another in an orderly way were external. But even if they were conceptual parts, an infinite regress would be inevitable, because they would cer-
tainly be unified in concrete existence, but not on the level of the substantiality of their “essences,” for they are distinguishable from each other in actuality. How could it be otherwise since this very distinction is the guarantee of their priority with regard to substantiality.⁶ Such would be the view of those who take the position that “quiddity” is fundamentally real.

But on the basis of the view that “existence” is fundamentally real, we assert that the unification of the parts in concrete existence is true concerning the “quiddities” of the external simple things; but concerning the “quiddities” of the external composite things, these parts are nothing other than “matters” and “forms,” and the difference is simply a matter of viewing. And since they are infinite, there will inevitably be an infinite regress. And the inevitability of an infinite regress even in any single place is enough to show the fallacy of the theory as well as to reveal that an infinite regress is here definitely actualized.

*A single unit, just like the absolute concept of it as well as its portions, is something additional to it absolutely, whether it be general or particular.*

*A single unit* of “existence”—*just like the absolute concept of it* (i.e., “existence”) *as well as its portions* which are the very same concept of “existence” as related to various “quiddities” in such a way that the relation be included therein and the object of the relation be left outside—*is something additional to it*, i.e., “quiddity” *absolutely*; this last adverb purports to generalize the “single unit” *whether it be general or particular*. We mean by “general” and “particular” here wideness and narrowness with regard to concrete “existence” which is not opposed to “singleness.” This a very common usage among us in accordance with the usage of the people of mystical experience, for they use the words “universal,” “general” and “absolute” for the real “existence” which cannot apply to individuals, while they use the words “particular,” “determined” and “individual” for special modes of the real “existence.” By the former they mean the “Comprehensive” and “Wide,” while by the latter they mean the “comprehended” and “delimited.” The same type of usage is observable among the Illuminationists of the word “universal” for the “lord of a species.”⁷

What we want to say by this is as follows. There are three kinds of “existence,” each one of which is distinguishable from
“quiddity.” First: the self-evident general concept of “existence;” and second, its portions; and third, its “single units” which are the reality of the “unfolded existence” called the “Holy Emanation,” and which are various sorts of particular “existence” by which “non-existence” is expelled from the “quiddities.”

The first two are something additional to the third just as they are to “quiddity,” and they are not essential to the third. Only the general concept is essential to the “portions.” The Ash'ariyah, however, hold that “quiddity” and “existence” are one and the same thing in all these three stages; in other words, that there is neither general “existence” nor “portions” nor “single units,” that there are only divergent “quiddities.”

V. THE ABSOLUTE IS PURE EXISTENCE

As for Truth, His Essence is His Existence, because occurrence would necessitate His being “caused.”

The prior would be unified with the posterior, and the chain of being would not reach any limit.

The Second Teacher (al-Fārābī) says: The word “truth” is used (1) for a statement which is confirmed by the objective fact and (2) for an existent existing in actuality; and (3) for an existent to which annihilation has no access. And the First (i.e., God) is “truth” from the point of view of the objective reality, from that of “existence,” and from that of annihilation having no access to Him. However, when we say that He is the Truth, we mean thereby that He is the Necessary over which annihilation has no power and by which the “existence” of all things subject to annihilation become necessary. “Everything, indeed, except God is subject to annihilation.”

As for the Truth, i.e., the First, i.e., God the Exalted, His Essence, i.e., that by which He is He, is His Existence; the relation of Existence to God indicates that what is meant is the very singularity of His particular Existence in which consists His “being Existent,” and not the absolute kind of “existence” which is analogical, because the latter is something additional to all things according to all philosophers.
Thus He is the pure Light and unmixed Existence which is nothing else than the true Unity and the personal Ipseity. All this because occurrence would necessitate His being "caused." If His Existence were something accidental, occurring to His Essence in such a way that He would be a "thing" plus "existence" just as any "possible" being is composed of a "quiddity" and "existence," the occurrence would necessitate that the "existence" occurring accidentally to the "quiddity" be something caused. This is so because everything accidental is "caused." This is why the "essential" has been defined as something uncaused, and the "accidental" as something caused.

Thus the "existence" occurring accidentally to the "quiddity" would be one of two things: either (1) something "caused" by that to which it occurs. But the "cause" must be prior to its "caused" in terms of "existence," So if that "existence" which is the guarantee of priority happens to be that very "existence" which is "caused," the prior, i.e., the "existence" of that to which it occurs, would be unified with the posterior, i.e., the "existence" which occurs to it, and this would entail necessarily a thing being prior to itself. Or the "existence" which is the guarantee of priority may be something other than that kind of "existence" which is "caused." But in that case, we simply apply to it the same argument as above—the original supposition being that "existence" be something that occurs accidentally and that it be also something "caused" by that to which it occurs, and so on—and the chain of being would not reach any limit, thus entailing an infinite regress.

(2) Or its "existence" would be something "caused" by something other than that to which it occurs. This would entail its being "possible," because being-caused-by-something-else contradicts being-necessary. If we have not referred to this latter point in the poem it is simply because its absurdity is evident. You may include it in the poem if you can. The absurdity is evident because that "something else" would be either a "possible" thing—in which case we would be in a vicious circle, the absurdity of the circle being due to the priority of a thing to itself—or another "necessary" thing, in which case we would have an infinite regress, because exactly the same can be said of it as of the first "necessary" thing again, since the sameness of the Existence with the Essence is one of the characteristics of the Necessary Being.
VI. DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT THE UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY OF EXISTENCE

"Existence" according to the Fahlavīyūn is a reality having analogicity and comprising various degrees, richness and poverty, which vary like "light" as it becomes strong or weak.

"Existence" according to the Fahlavīyūn\(^1\) (i.e., the Iranian Philosophers)—the word fahlavī being the Arabized form of pahlavī—is a reality having, i.e., characterized by analogicity and comprising various degrees, for example "richness" (i.e., (self-subistence) and "poverty" (i.e., being in need of something other than itself) and likewise "intensity" and "weakness," and "priority" and "posteriority," etc., which vary like "light," I mean, the real, (i.e., supra-sensible) "light" which is the reality of "existence," because "light" is that which is self-apparent and which makes others apparent; and this is just the characteristic of the reality of "existence," for it is self-apparent and its makes others apparent—"others" here meaning the "quiddities" of the heavenly worlds of the spirits and the earthly worlds of the similitudes—just like sensible "light" which is also analogical entity having various degrees as it, i.e., that sensible light, becomes strong or weak. Therefore the difference between various "lights" is not a difference in terms of species; rather, it is a difference in terms of intensity and weakness, for it is the basic characteristic of "light" that it is self-apparent and that it makes others apparent. This feature is actualized in every degree of "lights" and "shadows," so that weakness does not prevent a weak degree from being a "light;" intensity and moderation are essential conditions or constituent factors only for particular degrees in the sense that intensity and moderation are included in them. Intensity and moderation do not prevent the particular degrees from being "lights."\(^2\) Thus a strong "light" is a "light" just as much as a moderate one is a "light," and the same is true of a weak one. So that "light" has a wide expanse with regard to its degrees in their simplicity, and each degree also has an expanse with regard to its relation to its various recipients. In the same way the reality of "existence" has various degrees, in terms of intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, etc., in its very reality because every degree
of “existence” is simple. It is not the case that a strong degree of “existence” is a composite formed by its reality and “intensity,” likewise a weak degree is nothing but “existence”—the “weakness” being of the nature of “non-existence”—like a weak “light,” which is not composed of “light” itself and “darkness” because the latter is simply non-existent, or like a slow motion, which is not composed of motions and rests, but is a certain measure of the extension of a particular nature. Likewise the priority of prior “existence” is neither a constituent factor—otherwise the prior “existence” would be a composite thing, while in reality “existence” is simple—nor an accident, for if it were an accident it would be possible to be posterior. But the possibility of its being posterior is equal to the possibility of “mutation,” nay, it would be the same as “mutation,” although “mutation” may not touch the reality of “existence” itself. The same is true of the posteriority of posterior “existence.”

And all these degrees, (1) inasmuch as they are “existence,” and as related to “non-existence,” like lights and shadows as related to pure darkness, (2) and inasmuch as they participate in the concept of “existence,” (3) and inasmuch as they are things with no admixture of “non-thing,” (4) and inasmuch as the distinguishing factor in the “thing-ness” of “existence” cannot but be the same as the identifying factor because of its simplicity, while this is not the case with the “thing-ness” of “quiddity,” (5) and inasmuch as the above-mentioned multiplicity, in terms of intensity and weakness, perfection and imperfection, priority and posteriority, assures the unity which is the real unity, although the multiplicity relative to the possible “quiddities” is not so—all these degrees go back to one origin and a unique root as a “unity” which is completely different from any of the unities as commonly understood.

But according to the Peripatetic school, “existence” is realities differentiated from each other. This is, in my opinion, absurd, because one single concept cannot be abstracted from things that do not have any aspect of unification.

But “existence” according to the Peripatetic school of Philosophers is nothing other than realities which are differentiated from each other by the whole of their simple “essences,” and not by specific differences—for otherwise there would be com-
position in such a way that the absolute "existence" should be a
genus—nor by classifying and individualizing factors, for in the
latter case it would be a species. Rather, the absolute "exis-
tence" is an "accidental" inseparably attached to these realities
in the sense that it is a predicate extracted from the subjects
themselves, and not in the sense that it is a predicate by way of
adherence. 4 This theory is, in my opinion absurd, because one
single concept cannot be abstracted from things that do not
have any aspect of unification.

This can be explained as follows: If a single concept should
be abstracted from different things qua different things without
any aspect of unity which could properly be the referent of that
concept, "one" would be "many." But this consequent is neces-
sarily absurd, so is also the antecedent. The explanation of this
consequence is that in this case the object referred to by this
single concept would be those many and multiple aspects.

To this you may object by saying: We do not accept the
consequent being absurd, let alone its being necessarily absurd,
because in fact the generic "one" is nothing other than the
specific "many," and the specific "one" is nothing other than
the numerical "many." 5

To this I will answer by saying: It is one thing to say that
"one" is nothing other than "many," and another to say that
"one" is predicated of "many." The basis of your argument is of
the second category.

If you say: Is it not a fact that a species is predicated of
individuals, for example? And is predication not unification in
"existence?" I will reply: Yes, indeed, but the subject of predic-
tion is in reality the aspect of unity in the individuals, for the
aspects of multiplicity in the individuals of "man," for example,
are accidents like quantity, quality, position, etc.; otherwise
everything in itself, as everybody knows, is nothing other than
itself.

Besides, if one single concept should be abstracted from
many different things qua different things, this process of ab-
straction cannot but be one of the following three: either (1) a
certain particular characteristic is considered in its predica-
bility; in which case, however, it will not be predicable of any
other characteristic of all those that are supposed to be the
proper referents of that concept; (2) or the characteristic of the
second one only is taken into consideration, in which case it
will not be predicatable of the one that has the former characteristic; (3) or the characteristics of both together are taken into consideration; in which case the abstracted concept will have no “existence” except those two, taken individually, while on the supposition that it does have its own peculiar “existence” which would be different from the two, “one” would turn out to be nothing other than “many.”

Moreover, how is it possible for two different realities to have one single “quiddity,” when there is no distinction between “quiddity” and “reality” except that the former is inside the mind and the latter outside? This alone is enough to invalidate the theory of the Peripatetics, for the concept of “existence” is in the same position as “quiddity” with regard to the reality of “existence,” and if the particular characteristics are discarded, the common aspect will be the very object of reference (i.e., of the concept of “existence”), which is one.

As for the Head of Theosophers Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, he counts in his Āfṣār and Mabda’ wa-al Ma‘ād and others, among the self-evident theses this view, namely, the view that it is impossible to abstract one single concept from divergent realities quà divergent realities.

**Those Theologians who assert that “existence” is nothing but the portions would seem to have borrowed from the “tasting” of theosophy.**

**Those Theologians who assert that “existence” is in reality nothing but the portions,** i.e., real particulars which are different from each other by their own selves or by degrees of perfection and imperfection; the portions which are nothing but the concept of the absolute “existence” as diversified, in their opinion, only in terms of accidental relations to different “quiddities”—those Theologians would seem to have borrowed and adopted this idea from a doctrine which, according to one of the authorities, al-Dawwānī, is to be attributed to the “tasting” of theosophy⁸ (ta’ālluh). “Theosophy” means “fathoming the depth of divine knowledge,” ta of the word ta’ālluh is for emphasis just as in the word taṭabbuh, “going deep into medical knowledge,” because an increase in word-structure suggests an increase in meaning. Thus “existence,” in their view, is something mentally posited.

The mental “portions” are like the whiteness of this par-
ticular snow or that particular snow in the external world, since they are all alike and similar with regard to their properties. The external individuals, which are completely different from one another, according to the doctrine upheld by the Peripatetics, are like highest genera which are different from each other by virtue of their very "essences" that are simple. And the external degrees, according to the view of the Fahlaviyún, are like the different degrees of "light," as indicated in our verse.

We have referred in this verse to two doctrines. One of them is the doctrine attributed to the "tasting" of the Theosophers who hold the unity of "existence" and the multiplicity of "existents"—"existent" meaning here what is related to "existence." For they assert that the reality of "existence" subsists by itself and is one, there being absolutely no multiplicity therein; that multiplicity is only in the "quiddities" which are related to "existence;" that "existence" does not subsist by "quiddities" nor does it occur to them; that the word "existent" is applied to that reality in the sense that the reality is "existence" itself, while when applied to the "quiddities" it means that the latter are related to "existence," as in the case of words like "sunny" (from "sun"), "milker" (from "milk"), "fruiterer" (from "fruit"), etc.

This doctrine, although it has been accepted by a considerable number of people, is, in our opinion, not right, because, since they hold that "quiddity" (not "existence") is fundamentally real, they would have to admit necessarily that "existence" has something parallel to it and that in the domain of actuality there are two roots and two origins.

As for ourselves, we are of the opinion that the doctrine of the "tasting of theosophy" demands one single root and one unique origin because of "existence" being fundamentally real, while "quiddity" is something mentally posited. This argument is based on the fact that "thing-ness" is restricted to these two and the question as to what is fundamentally real hinges upon them; and since we have established the falsity of the view that the latter is fundamentally real, we have thereby established the former being fundamentally real.

Thus the term to which all distinctions are attributed is "existence;" the attribution itself, being an "illuminative" attribution, is also "existence;" and the terms attributed are no other than various aspects of "existence," which are self-
dependent and self-reliant, differing from each other by infinite
degrees of the intensity of luminosity. Rather we would prefer
to call the latter pure “dependences” and pure “connections”
in order to make it clear that they are not “things” having
dependence and connection.

The second of the two doctrines is the above-mentioned view
of the Theologians. Since, however, this doctrine, as under-
stood literally, is absurd, we want to interpret it by referring it
to the first one, namely, by transposing whatever they say about
the concept of “existence” to the level of the reality of “exis-
tence” in such a way that what they mean by “existence” being
one single concept should be understood as the reality of
“existence” being one, as it is the case with the doctrine at-
tributed to the “tasting” of Theosophers. In this way, what
they mean by “portions” would be understood as various “self-
manifestations” of the Absolute, which do not necessitate multi-
plicity in the Self-Manifesting One except in various relations;
and this would correspond to what they say: there is no multi-
plicity in the concept of “existence” except by the purely ac-
cidental occurrence of attributions. And just as a “portion” is
that unique concept with the addition of a relation to a par-
ticular internal characteristic—in so far as it is a relation, not as
something considered as independent, for in the latter case it
would become an independent term, which would be a con-
tradiction—likewise the objective counterpart of that concep-
tual “portion,” namely, the real “portion” which is nothing
other than the reality of “existence” with the addition of an
illuminative relation or an “essential self manifestation;” the
relation, in this case, being merely a pure connection, “exis-
tence” is not made thereby devoid of reality.

The “portion” is a universal as “determined;”
“Being determined” is an (internal) part, while the
Determining factor is external.

The “portion” which is a universal as “determined;” “being
determined” is an (internal) part—in so far as it is “being
determined,” not in so far as it is a determining factor—while
the determining factor is external. So that the “portion” does
not differ from the “universal” itself except as a matter of
points of view, because the determining factor is external,
while determination quà determination, although it is internal,
is something mentally posited, having no real basis in itself; rather it has nothing to be regarded as its "self" in this respect.\footnote{9}

VII. MENTAL EXISTENCE

A "thing," besides "existence" in the external world has an "existence" by itself at the minds.

A "thing," i.e., "quiddity," besides "existence" in the external world, which is the kind of "existence" which produces the effects to be expected has an "existence" by itself and by its "quiddity"—this refers to the true theory; namely, that "things" are actualized by themselves—at the "minds," and this is the kind of "existence" which does not produce the effects of the above-mentioned kind. We have not said "in the minds" in order to indicate that the subsistence of "things" by the minds is a subsistence of "issuing," and not a subsistence of "inhering;" the former is exemplified by the subsistence of things by the higher principles, especially by the First of all principles.

Let us now mention several ways of proving this thesis. The first proof is indicated by the following verse:

(\textit{The possibility of forming}) an affirmative judgement on the non-existent.

(\textit{The possibility of forming}) an affirmative judgement; i.e., the fact that we can form affirmative judgements on the non-existent, i.e., things that have no existence in the external world, like: "The sea of quicksilver is by nature cold" or "the co-existence of two contradictories is different from the co-existence of two contraries." Affirming something of something presupposes the existence of the subject (i.e., the second "something"). And since the subject in this case does not exist in the external world, it must be in the mind.

Abstracting things characterized by generality.

The second proof: The possibility of abstracting things characterized by generality; that is to say, we can represent concepts characterized by universality and generality through an elimination of the distinguishing factors from them. Since rep-
resentation is a mental pinpointing, while anything which is absolutely non-existent cannot be pinpointed absolutely, the concepts must exist as universals. And since they do not exist in the external world—because whatever exists in the external world is individual—they must be in the mind.

A reality in its pure simplicity, having no multiplicity at all can very well be perceived by the mind.

The third proof: a reality in its pure simplicity—any reality whatsoever—having no multiplicity at all can be perceived by the mind without any of its associations, i.e., the external and foreign elements, like “matter” and all those elements that derive from it.

The gist of the argument is that every reality in its pure simplicity, without regard to its relation with any of its external and foreign elements, is one. Whiteness, for example, disassociated from its subjects, like snow, ivory, cotton, etc., and from all those things that are associated with it essentially or accidentally, like time, place, direction, etc., is one, because there are no distinctions in the purity of a thing. So whiteness is—by virtue of this kind of unity which includes whatever is of its type and which excludes all external elements—existent by an extensive “existence.” And since it does not exist in the external world—because in the latter whiteness is characterized by multiplicity and mixture—it must be in a lofty region of the mind.

These three proofs are clearly different from each other, because the first proves our contention by way of the mental “existence” being able to be the subject of affirmative propositions; the second proves by way of the mental “existence” being characterized by universality; and the third by way of its being one. Moreover, the first one proves our contention by way of “judgement,” while the other two by way of “representation.” Furthermore, the principles underlying the three arguments are different; the rule of “presupposition” is required only in the first argument, while the principles of the other two do not require it. Therefore the argument advanced by Lāhīji—in his Shawāriq, after quoting the proof by way of universality from Mawāqif and Sharḥ al-maqāsid—is untenable; namely that the proof by universality must be included in the proof which is
established by the possibility of forming an affirmative judg-
ment of something non-existent.

"Essence" is kept intact in different kinds of "exis-
tence." From it the co-existence of two opposites
would necessarily follow. How can a "substance" and
and "accident" co-exist?

"Essence," i.e., "quiddity," and its essential properties is kept
intact in different kinds of "existence," whether external or
mental, whether high or low, as it is generally admitted by
Philosophers that an essential thing allows neither of difference
nor discrepancy. This is something which is readily approved
by the reason, except that this position is opposed and chal-
lenged by the fact that from it (i.e., "essence" and essential
properties being kept intact) the co-existence of two opposites
would necessarily follow, and this also will be declared neces-
sary by logical reasoning. The co-existence of two opposites,
however, is absurd. How can a "substance" and an "accident"
co-exist? This last sentence brings out in a concrete form the
"two opposites" in question.

This process of reasoning can be explicated as follows. The
substantial realities, by the fact that "substance" is a genus of
them all, must be "substances," wherever they may be found,
and non-inhering wherever they may be actualized. For we
have already established the preservation of the essential prop-
erties in different kinds of "existence" as demonstrated by the
proofs of mental "existence," how, then, is it possible that they
be inherent in the mind—as those Philosophers claim—when
the mind is a locus which is not in need of them for its ex-
istence? Anything inherent in this kind of locus would be an
accident.

Or again, how could all fall under "quality?"

Or again how could all the nine categories fall under the
category of "quality?" This is another difficulty which is more
difficult than the first. It may be explained as follows: Philoso-
phers consider knowledge as a mental "quality," and since
knowledge is the same as what is known by essence, and what
is known by essence is sometimes a "substance," sometimes
"quantity," and sometimes some other category. Thus all
the categories would necessarily be subsumed under that of
"quality."
The reason why we say that this is more difficult than the first one is that “accident” is a common accident for all the nine accidental categories, because its original meaning is “occurring,” i.e., their being in subjects. So there is no great difficulty in a mental “substance” being an “accident,” because the latter does not become thereby a genus for it, but this is not true of “quality,” for it is one of the highest genera. If, then, a conceptual form be a “substance” like man and horse, or “quantity” like plane, or “position” like standing-upright, it would necessarily follow that one and the same thing would fall under two categories and two genera in one and the same degree with regard to its “essence.” And if the conceptual form be a sensible “quality” like blackness, it would necessarily follow that one and the same thing would be a sensible “quality” and a mental “quality” at one and the same time.

This difficulty has bewildered the minds and rendered the intellects helpless, so that everybody has sought a way out in the following manner.

Thus a group has denied mental “existence” absolutely.

Thus a group of Theologians in order to avoid this and similar difficulties, (1) has denied mental “existence” absolutely even as an “image” and they consider the knowledge of thing as a mere relation between the mind and its object. This, however, is refuted by the possibility of there being a knowledge of a non-existent thing and the soul’s knowledge of itself.

One of the thinkers distinguishes between “subsisting” and “being present.”

(2) One of the thinkers, the Eminent Qūshjī, distinguishes between “subsisting” in the mind and “being present” in the mind. He asserts: Whenever we represent a “substance,” there are two things in the mind. (a) One is “quiddity” existent in the mind; it is an object of knowledge, a universal, and a substance; and yet it is not “subsisting” in the mind as an attribute of the mind. Rather it is “present” in the mind in the same way as a thing is present in time and place. (b) The second of them is an external existent (—a mental “quality” is here regarded as an external existent because that in which it inheres, namely the mind, is an external existent—), a knowledge, an individual,
and an “accident” subsisting in the mind as a mental “quality.” Thus understood, the problem does not involve us in the above-mentioned difficulty. The only difficulty will consist in knowing the following: How can one and the same thing be a “substance” and an “accident,” knowledge and the object of knowledge, or universal and particular?

Qūshjī illustrates his thesis as follows: Supposing there is something having a certain form surrounded by a crystal mirror or water from all sides in such a way that its form is imprinted in the mirror or water. There will be in this case, two things recognizable. One of them is something not subsisting in the mirror, and yet “present” therein. This is the source of the imprinted form. And the second is something subsisting in the mirror, and it is the imprinted form itself. By this analogy you may understand what is in the mirror of the mind.

Such is his doctrine, but it is open to question.

It has been maintained that things become imprinted through their images.

(3) It has been maintained by a group of Philosohers that things become imprinted in the mind through their images, not by themselves, so that it does not necessarily follow that one and the same thing be, for example, a “substance” and an “accident” or “substance” and “quality.” For the preservation of an essential property in its two modes of “existence” presupposes the preservation of that which possesses the essential property, while according to the theory of “image,” what possesses an essential property does not come into the mind through itself and through its “quiddity.”

However, you are well aware of the fact that the proofs by which mental “existence” is established, indicate precisely the existence of the realities and “quiddities” of things in the mind; they do not indicate the existence of what differs from those things in “quiddity” and agrees with them in some accidents (i.e., they do not indicate the existence of images). This is quite evident.

It has been held; things themselves come into the mind completely transformed.

(4) It has been held by al-Sayyid al-Sanad Ṣadr al-Dīn that things themselves come into the mind, i.e., become imprinted
in the mind, completely transformed in their very "quiddities."

This person, after furnishing an introduction, explains his doctrine as follows: Since the being-existent of "quiddity" precedes the "quiddity" itself, there would be no "quiddity" at all if we should disregard "existence." And mental "existence" and external "existence" are different from one another by a real difference, so that if "existence" becomes transformed—by an external existent becoming a mental existent—there is no reason why "quiddity," too, should not be transformed. Thus when a thing happens to have an external "existence," it must have an "quiddity," whether "substance" or "quantity," or any other category. And when the "existence" becomes transformed into a mental "existence," its "quiddity" will be transformed into the category of "quality." In this way the difficulties will be removed, because the very source of all difficulties lies in the fact that "anything existent" in the mind is still supposed to maintain its external reality.

To this we would say: the source of the difficulty of one and the same thing being particular and universal does not lie in that point.

Then he raises a question against himself and asks: Is this doctrine not the theory of "image?" And he answers saying that a "thing" itself has no definite reality with regard to itself; that, rather, an external existent is of such a nature that when it happens to be in the mind it becomes transformed into a "quality," just as much as, when a mental "quality" happens to be in the external world it is the very external object of knowledge.

Then he raises another question saying that this transformation would be conceivable only if there were a common "matter" between a mental-existent and an external-existent—just as Philosophers have established the same thing concerning the indefinite Matter—but it is not the case (i.e., there is no such common "matter"). The answer he gives to this is that the transformation would require a "matter" if the said-transformation were something relating to its attribute or form, but the transformation of a reality itself in its entirety into another reality does not require "matter," although, certainly the reason does posit something indefinite and general in order to imagine this transformation. This is the doctrine of this person.

This doctrine in its present form is ridiculous, because it
maintains the position of “quiddity” being fundamentally real. How could “quiddity” have such a broad expanse when it only raises the dust of divergence and there is no common “matter” as he himself acknowledges concerning the essential transformation! Rather, it is “existence” that is entitled to such a broad expanse, because it is predicated analogically of different degrees in which one basis is kept intact and one root preserved. But, Sayyid al-Sanad does not take the position of “existence” being fundamentally real.

It has been held; giving the name “quality,” which has been handed down from them, is based on resemblance and is but a loose way of expression.

(5) It has been held by an authoritative thinker, al-Dawwâni, that giving the name “quality” to knowledge, which has been handed down to us from them, i.e., from the Philosophers, is based on resemblance and is but a loose way of expression. According to this authority, their usage of the word “quality” for the intelligible forms—like “substance” and other categories, to the exclusion of “quality”—is merely a loose way of expression which consists in likening mental facts to external qualitative realities.

But in reality, since “knowledge” is essentially identical with the essential object of knowledge, it belongs to the same category to which belongs the object of knowledge. Thus if the latter happens to be a “substance” the former is a “substance,” if the latter is a “quantity,” it is a “quantity,” and if “quality,” it is “quality,” etc. Therefore one and the same thing would not necessarily be subsumed under two categories.

But one and the same thing being a “substance” and an “accident” does not constitute any difficulty in his view, because “accident” (‘arad) derives, as we have seen, from “occurring” (‘urûd), i.e., “coming-to-inhere-in-a-locus,” which is a mode of “existence.” And “existence” is not essential to “quiddity.” Therefore, the concept of “accident” can be predicated of the accidental categories (like “quality,” “quantity,” etc.) as well as of the mental “substance” in the way in which a “general accident” (like “walking”) can be predicated of its locus (e.g., “man”). And there is no mutual exclusion between a thing being a mental “substance”—in the sense that it is a “quiddity” whose “existence” in the external world requires that it should
be not in a subject—and its being an external “accident,” although at the level of “essence” there is surely mutual exclusion between them.

The form is a category by an essential predication.

The intelligible form of every possible thing is a category, whether “substance,” “quantity,” or “quality,” etc. by an essential predication, i.e., by primary essential predication while by common predication it is a “quality.” And there is no mutual exclusion between the two cases because the type of predication is different in each case. A particular, for instance, is a particular by one of the types of predication (i.e., by the primary, essential predication) but not particular by the other type of predication. This is why the unity of predication, besides the eight unities, is made a condition in “contradiction.”

The above is the doctrine professed by the Head of the Theosophers (Ṣadr as-Dīn al-Shirāzī). He asserts, in his discourse on mental “existence” in his Asfār, that the intellectual, universal realities, with regard to their being universal and intelligible, are not subsumed under any category, while with regard to their “existence” in the soul, i.e., their being a “state” or “habitūs” in the soul—the “state” or “habitūs” manifesting or originating the universal realities—are subsumed under the category of “quality.”

Then he goes on to fortify the weak points of this theory by what may be summarized in the following way. “Substance”—even when understood in the sense of its specific reality, like “man,” or “quantity” in the sense of its specific reality, like “plane”—is defined by what comprehends it (i.e., “substance” or “quantity” respectively). Likewise, concerning the rest of the genera and species. This is quite reasonable; for, if the genera were not to be understood as being the species, the individuals, too, would not be “substances” or “quantities,” etc., neither in reality nor by way of common predication, despite the fact that the individuals are “substances” or “quantities,” etc. However, such understanding is not satisfactory, because simply understanding a generic concept in a specific concept does not necessitate making the subsumption of that species under that genus—in the way in which an individual is subsumed under the universal reality—nor does it necessitate making that genus a predicate of that species by way of common predica-
tion. This is so because the understanding of a generic concept in a specific concept would not be anything more than predicating that genus of itself, since it does not necessitate its (i.e., the genus’s) being an individual of itself. On the contrary, the kind of subsumption which would necessitate the real subsumption of a species under a genus by way of common predication would be the case in which the realization of the subsumed one (i.e., species) necessarily entails the realization of the characteristics of that reality in which it is subsumed (i.e., genus). To illustrate, a “plane” is a “quantity” continuous, immobile, and divisible into two directions, so that the “plane,” with regard to its being a “quantity” is divisible, and with regard to its being immobile possesses parts that exist all together. But the entailing of these characteristics is conditioned by external “existence” as is the case with an individual external “plane.” As for the intelligible nature\(^{11}\) of the “plane,” it does not evidently entail those characteristics, although its concept is inseparable from those characteristics.

We would say: the very central point of what Mullā Ṣadrā maintains lies in the idea that the “quiddities” which are called “natural universals”\(^{12}\) are things mentally posited. The latter, if we discard “existence,” are nothing but the concept of “substance,” the concept of “quantity,” etc. and not their real “realities,” and this is true also of the species of those “natural universals.” “Existence,” although it is neither a “substance” nor an “accident,” is that by which “quiddities” and their effects become apparent.

You may object and say: Those “quiddities,” although they are not existent by external “existence” are existent by mental “existence,” since we are now dealing with rational universals.\(^{13}\)

To this we would answer: Yes, but this kind of “existence” belongs to those “quiddities” in a subordinate and secondary way, because this kind of “existence” belongs exclusively to the soul, while that by which the effects of “quiddities” immediately follow the realization of the “quiddities” is the particular (i.e., external) kind of “existence.” And this situation is comparable to the “quiddities” and “permanent archetypes”\(^{14}\) at the stage of Divine Knowledge in that they are non-existent in spite of the fact that they do have a kind of “existence” which is subordinate to the “existence” of Divine Names and Attributes.
They are non-existent in the sense that they are not existent through their external particular “existences.” So that in that lofty stage of Divine Names and Attributes there is neither “animal” nor “man,” neither “intellect” nor “soul” of which their concepts might be predicated by way of common predication.

You may object and say: In that case, a “thing” would not have two modes of “existence.”

We would answer: We have already shown that the mental “existence” which “quiddities” possess is subordiinate. And the proofs of mental “existence” prove nothing more than this. In our gloss on the Asfâr we have established that what Mullâ Ṣadrâ asserts is valid only in far as it concerns the universals of “substances” and “accidents” which are in the mind, while the particular form of “man,” for example, which is in the imagination, is a “substance” and a “man” by way of common predication. A most decisive argument for this is found in the dictum of Philosophers: “Every nature (natural universal) has mental individuals.” An individual is a subject of which a “nature” can be predicated by way of common predication.

Mullâ Ṣadrâ would answer by saying that there is no difference between the two cases, because this “existence” (of a particular form) too, is not the “existence” of “nature,” so that that “man” in the imagination is neither an individual of “man” nor of “substance.” Rather, that “existence” also is an illumination originating in the soul and a manifestation to the soul as is the case with that comprehensive “existence” typical of rational universals. What, then, would be the position of “quiddity?” However, the validity of all these negations applicable to the “existence” of those intelligible forms is due to their being above the level of substantiality and others, not due to their being below that level.

You may object and say: If all categories as they are intellelcted were “qualities” by essence, the concept of “quality” would be included just as every “nature” is included in each of its individuals, while the concepts of the categories would be also either themselves (i.e., categories as intellelcted) or their parts, in which case there would necessarily be co-existence of two opposites. If, on the other hand, they were “qualities by accident”—as he himself states after this passage—they would have to be traced back ultimately to “qualities by essence.”
What, then, would this kind of “quality by essence” be! If it were “existence”—as we understand from his own words: ‘with regard to their existence in the soul,’ and as is expressed by his disciple in the Shawâriq—then we would say that “existence” is neither a “substance” nor an “accident.”

To this we would answer: The “existence” of those “quiddities” is their very “being” and their “actualization.” But what is meant by his words: ‘with regard to their existence’ is not that kind of “existence,” but rather it is a particular “existence” having a particular “quiddity,” which is the “quiddity” of knowledge. And that particular “existence” is their “appearance” to the soul, and this is a secondary perfection and another “existence” for the “existence” of those forms, because their “existence” in the external world has already been actualized while this kind of “existence” has not been there. Thus the “quiddity” of knowledge is a “quality by essence,” and those forms which are objects of knowledge are “qualities by accident.”

After all these laborious trials, however I would not judge in an authoritative way that knowledge is in reality a “quality,” although this Philosopher-Theosopher (Mullâ Šadrā) insists upon it in his books, because the very “existence” of those forms and their “existence” for the soul are one and the same. And that “existence” and “appearance” to the soul are nothing additional to their “existence,” distinguishable from the latter in such a way that this additional thing be a “quality” in the soul, because their external “existence” is not kept in its entirety, and because their “quiddities” in themselves belong each to a particular category, while with regard to their mental “existence” they are neither “substances” nor “accidents.” Moreover, their “appearance” to the soul is nothing but that “quiddity” and that “existence,” since the “appearance” of a thing is not something that comes to adhere to itself—otherwise that “appearance” would be an active “appearance” on its (i.e., the thing’s) part—and there is nothing else, while “quality” is of such a nature that it is predicated of (its subject) by way of adherance. And if “appearance” and “existence” for the soul were a categorical relation, the “quiddity” of knowledge would be a “relation,” not a “quality.” But since it is an illuminative relation originating in the soul, it is “existence.” Therefore, knowledge is “light” and “appearance,” and the latter are both “existence,” while “existence” is not “quiddity.”
The truth of the matter is that it is only by way of "resemblance" that knowledge is a "quality," and that the forms which are essentially known are "qualities." Just as the "Holy Emanation" of God, I mean, the "unfolded "existence," is neither a "substance" nor an "accident," and yet pervades all the "quiddities" of the "substances" and "accidents," and just as the "Most Holy Emanation" through the unity of which all the "determinations" appear at the level of Unity is not a "quality" nor are the "determinations" ("qualities"), so also the illumination of the soul which pervades all the "quiddities" that are the objects of its knowledge, is neither a "substance" nor an "accident." So it is not a "quality" while being knowledge. Nor are the "quiddities" that are pervaded by the illumination of the soul "qualities" while being objects of knowledge.

In short, I have adopted something and left out something from each of the two doctrines, namely, that of the Head of Theosophers (Mullā Şadrā) and that of the authority al-Dawwānī. That which I have adopted from the former is the idea that the forms of the objects of knowledge are categories by way of primary predication but not by way of common predication. That which I have left out is the idea that their being "qualities" is by way of common predication. That which I have adopted from the latter is the idea that their being "qualities" is by way of "resemblance," while that which I have left out is the idea that they are really subsumed under the categories in such a way that their "substance" is a real "substance" and their "quantity" is a real "quantity," and so on. This is the reason why I have refrained from mentioning in the text the idea that the forms of the objects of knowledge are "qualities" by way of common predication.

May my friends forgive me for having deviated from the basic principle of brevity in this commentary, for I have done so because this is one of the most difficult problems.

**Its unity with the subject of intellection is asserted.**

**Its unity**, the unity of an intelligible-form-by-essence with the subject of intellection is asserted and accepted by Porphyry who is one of the most eminent Peripatetic philosophers. And he bases his proof of his thesis upon what he has adopted from Alexander (of Aphrodisias) concerning the unity of "matter" and "form;" for the soul at the stage of the "material intellect"
is the “matter” of the intelligibles while the later are its “forms.”
As for the position of “mutual correlation”21 which has been
taken by the Head of the Theosophers in his Mashāʾīr22 and
others works for proving this thesis, it is not complete for the
reason which we have mentioned in our gloss on the Asfār.23

This thesis is corroborated by the observation that an “exis-
tent” in the external world and an “existent” in the mind are
twins sucking the same milk. Something being “existent” in the
external world does not mean that the external world is a thing
and Zayd for example who exists therein is another, as a
“container” and a thing “contained.” No, what is meant is that
his “existence” is the very “being-in-the-external-world,” and
that he is one of the stages of the external world. In just the
same way, something being “existent” in the mind does not
mean that the mind, i.e., the “rational soul,” is a thing and that
which exists therein is another. No, what is meant is that it is
one of the stages of the soul.

Furthermore, what is meant by those who assert the unity of
the perceiver with the essential object of perception is not that
either of the two should shift from its original stage. No; they
use this expression in reference to two cases: one referring to
the case of multiplicity within unity meaning that the “exis-
tences” of the objects perceived are involved in the very
“existence” of that perceiver on a high level, as for example the
diversified intellects are involved in the simple Intellect which
comprehends them all. The second of the two cases refers to
unity within multiplicity in the sense that the active “light”
of the perceiver pervades all the objects perceived without
shifting from its lofty stage.

Rather, every object perceived is united with the perceiver at
the level in which the latter happens to be, so that the object
imagined is united with the soul at the level of imagination, and
so on, and even the object intellected is united with the intel-
lect at the level of “appearance” through the non-material and
all-incompassing intelligibles, though not united with it at the
level of the “innermost” and the “hiddenness” of the soul.24

Thus, in reality, the object perceived is united with the
active “light” of the perceiver in the second case. That active
“light” is something inseparably attached to the perceiving
subject, having neither “subsistence” nor “appearance” except
through the subject’s “existence” and “appearance”—and all
through the stages there is one origin kept and one root pre-
served, in other words, the soul—and it is in this sense that the
object perceived can be said to be united with the perceiver.
In both cases, that unity is realized through "existence,." As
for the concepts, they are the source of divergence, and the
axis of multiplicity.

VIII. THE DEFINITION OF THE SECONDARY
INTELLIGIBLE AND EXPLANATION OF
THE TWO USAGES OF THE TERM

If the "qualification" as well as "occurrence" are
in your intellect, you must describe the intelligible
as "secondary."

If the "qualification" as well as "occurrence," that is to say, if
being qualified by an intelligible and the "occurrence" of the
latter—like the "qualification" of "man" by universality and the
latter's "occurrence" to "man"—are both in your intellect, you
must describe the intelligible as "secondary," i.e., by the term
"secondary." Thus what is meant by "secondary" is that which
is not at the first level, like "secondary matter." So the defini-
tion of the "secondary intelligible" as understood from the
verse is that the "occurring" whose "occurrence" to the "ob-
ject of occurrence" and the "qualification" of the "object of
occurrence" by it are both in the intellect.

Now that we have finished explaining the concept of the
"secondary intelligible" according to the usage of the logicians,
we turn to its descriptive definition in accordance with the
philosophers' usage:

They define it as an "occurring" whose "occurrence"
is imprinted in the intellect, whether its "qualifica-
tions" happens in the external world or in it. The first
is the usage of logicians, like "definition." The second
of them is the usage peculiar to the philosophers.

They define it as an "occurring" whose "occurrence" is
imprinted in the intellect, whether its "qualification" happens
in the external world or in it, i.e., in our intellect.
Thus the first of these two descriptive definitions is the usage of the logicians as regards the term “secondary intelligible,” like “definition” and the rest of the subjects of logic, such as “being-species,” “being-genus,” “being-essential,” “being-accidental,” “proposition,” and “syllogism.” The “occurrence” of “rational animal” as a definition for “man” and the “qualification” of the latter thereby are both in the intellect. For “man” is in the external world a particular, and a particular cannot define anything because what is in the external world is the reality of “rational animal,” not its quality as a “definer.”

The second of them, i.e., the second of the two descriptive definitions is the usage peculiar to the philosophers, and it is more general than the first.

This position can be clarified as follows. There are three kinds of “occurring.” (1) The “occurring” whose “occurrence” to the “object of occurrence” as well as the “qualification” of the latter thereby are both in the external world, like “blackness.” It is evident that this is a “primary intelligible” according to both usages. (2) The “occurring” of which both the “occurrence” and “qualification” are in the intellect, like “universal.” (3) The “occurring” whose “occurrence” is in the intellect while its “qualification” thereby is in the external world, like “being-father,” because the latter, although it, like “universal,” has no counterpart in the external world, yet the “qualification” of the father by his being father is in the external world.

These two (i.e., 2 and 3) are both “secondary intelligibles.” A proposition composed of the first (i.e., 2) class is a “mental proposition,” while one that is composed of the second (i.e., 3) is a “factual proposition.” The reason why we give them this name (i.e., “secondary intelligibles”) is evident in so far as concerns the first (i.e., 2), for when it is intellected as “occurring,” it cannot be intellected except as “occurring” to another intelligible. So also the second (i.e., 3), because as long as an intellectual analysis is not applied to it and as long as an “object of occurrence” is not intellected primarily, no “occurring” will be intellected secondarily.

Thus, for example, “thing-ness” and “possibility” are “secondary intelligibles” according to the second usage.
Thus, for example, "thing-ness" and "possibility" are "secondary intelligibles" according to the second usage.

Now that you have come to know the two usages of the word "secondary intelligibles," you should not confuse them, as some scholars have done in understanding a statement of the great scholar al-Tūsī. Because, when he says: "Being-substance," "being-accident," and "being-thing," etc., are "secondary intelligibles," he has in mind the second usage of the term, but those people have imagined that the term has no other meaning than that understood by the logicians, and they criticized his statement.

To elucidate: The "qualification" of a particular thing by general "thing-ness" is in the external world, while the "occurrence" of the general "thing-ness" to the thing is in the intellect; otherwise there would be an infinite regress, and "thing-ness" would not be general. Likewise, the "qualification" of an external "quiddity" by "possibility" is in the external world, but its "occurrence" to the "quiddity" is in the intellect, since "possibility" has no counterpart in the external world, being as it is nothing but the negation of the two sides (affirmative and negative) of "necessity" and because a property of "quiddity" (i.e., "possibility" in this case) is simply something mentally posited. Furthermore, if the "occurrence" of "possibility" to the "quiddity" were in the external world, the consequence would necessarily be either an infinite regress or self-contradiction, or that a thing be devoid of all the three "modes": "necessity," "possibility," and "impossibility"). But all these consequents are absurd.

IX. EXISTENCE AS WELL AS NON-EXISTENCE ARE ABSOLUTE AND DETERMINED

"Existence" and the concept of "non-existence" are both equally divided into "absolute" and "determined."

"Existence" and the concept of "non-existence" are both equally divided into "absolute" and "determined." The "absolute existence" is a predicate used when a simple "whether-
ness” is in question, like “man is existent;” while the “determined existence” is a predicate used when a composite “whether-ness” is in question, like “man is a writer.” And the negation of these two is “absolute non-existence” and “determined non-existence” respectively. The purpose of our specifying “non-existence” by the word “concept” is to indicate that this division, in the case of “existence,” is not confined to its concept, but extends to its “reality.” And this is in accord with the usage of the people of mystical experience. In fact, they use the term “absolute existence” for that which is not limited by any particular limit—meaning thereby the “reality” of “existence,” which is the very refusal of “non-existence” and the very prime source of all the effects, comprehending all “existences” in a loftier and more extensive manner—while the term “determined existence” is used by them for that which is limited.

X. NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE

“Existence” is neither a “substance” nor an “accident,” when considered in its reality, except accidentally.

(1) One of the negative properties is that “existence” is neither a “substance”—because “substance” is a “quiddity” which, when it is found in the external world, does not need a “substratum,” while “existence” is not “quiddity”—nor an “accident,” when considered in its reality i.e., the reality of “existence.” The reason why it cannot be an “accident” is that it has no substratum.” That is has no “substratum” must be evident since a “substratum” subsists through “existence.” Certainly, the concept of “existence” is an “accident,” i.e., “accidental” in the sense it is a predicate extracted from its very subjects, not a predicate by way of adherence.

“Existence” cannot be a “substance” and an “accident” except accidentally; namely, in accordance with substantial and accidental “quiddities,” so that particular “existences” are “substances” through the very substantiality of “quiddities,” not through any other substantiality, and they are “accidents”
through the very accidentality of the “quiddities,” not through any other accidentality. Likewise, other properties of “quiddities” occur to particular “existences,” but only accidentally.\footnote{2}

There is nothing to be opposed to “existence,” nor is there anything similar to it.

(2) There is nothing to be opposed to “existence,” for two “opposites” are both things pertaining to “existence,” which occur successively to one and the same “substratum,” having between them an extreme difference, and being both subsumed under a proximate “genus.” But “existence” is not a thing pertaining to “existence,” but it is “existence” itself, having neither a “substratum” nor a “genus,” nor again an extreme distance and difference from anything. This is why the “separation” of “quiddity” from “existence” is an “embellishment” of the former by the latter.\footnote{3}

Nor is there anything similar to it, for two similar things are things that have a common share in “quiddity” and its properties, while “existence” has no “quiddity,” whether specific or otherwise. Rather, it has nothing parallel to it, not to speak of “opposite” and “similar,” because there is no distinction in the purity of a thing. Thus whatever you posit as parallel to it is nothing other than itself.

It is not a part: likewise it has no parts, because the dividing ("differentia") would be transformed into a constituting ("differentia"), or “existence” would necessarily become subsistent by its contradictory.

(3) It is not a part of anything composed of it and something else by way of a real composition having a real unity. Because the parts of a real composite must not only be inherent in each other, but affected by each other, as is the case with mixtures. But “being inherent” and “being affected” are not suitable to the “reality” of “existence.” Nay, such a conception inevitably would lead to self-contradiction, because the other part (i.e., the part supposed to be mixed with “existence”) as well as the whole (i.e., the composite) are all “existent.” In our earlier statement: “all would be unified, and there would be infinite regress" we negated “existence” being part of “quiddity,” but here we negate “existence” being a part of anything whatsoever.

Likewise, it has no parts. Since the proof of the rest of the
negations just enumerated is evident, we have not tried to explain them specifically. The last one, however, needs explication. Thus we give here the reason why the rational parts must be negated from "existence," for that negation necessarily leads to the negation of external parts, i.e., "matter" and "form"—because these two (i.e., "matter" and "form") are the source of "genus" and differentia:" rather, they are "genus" and "differentia" themselves, the difference between them being simply a matter of two different view-points—and the latter negation necessarily leads to the negation of parts pertaining to magnitude, because "magnitude" is a property of "body;" since, however, there is neither "matter" nor "form," there could be neither "body" nor "magnitude."

This point is referred to by the following verse: Because the dividing ("differentia") of "existence" would be transformed into a constituting ("differentia"): or ("existence") would necessarily become subsistent by, and composed of, its contradictory (i.e., "non-existence") or something equivalent to its contradictory.

We can explain this as follows: If the "reality" of "existence" had a "genus" and a "differentia," then its "genus" would be either "existence" or "non-existence." In the first case, the first of the above-mentioned absurd consequents would necessarily follow, because it has already been established that both "genus" and "differentia" occur to each other, and that "genus" is in need of "differentia" not in the subsistence of its own "reality" and "quiddity," but rather in its "actualization." This is why "differentia" in relation to "genus" is "dividing," not "constituting." But such a situation is conceivable only concerning a "genus" whose "quiddity" is different from "existence." But as regards a "genus" which is "existence" itself, what is implied by its "actualization" is the same as that which is implied by its "quiddity." And this is the "mutation" which we have referred to above.4

By the same line of argument, "existence" cannot be a "species" either, because the relation between "particularizer" and "specific reality" is exactly the same relation as the one holding between "differentia" and "genus."

In the second case (i.e., in case its "genus" were other than "existence") this "other" would be either "non-existence" or "quiddity." This precisely is the second of the above-mentioned absurd consequents.
XI MULTIPLICITY OF EXISTENCE OCCURS THROUGH QUIDDITIES AND EXISTENCE IS ANALOGICALLY PREDICATED

"Existence" becomes multiplied through the multiplicity of "subjects."
As for "existence" being analogical, it has already been proved.

"Existence," becomes multiplied through the multiplicity of "subjects"—what is meant by the term "subject" is that which stands opposed to "predicate," and the object referred to by the "subject" is "quiddity"—otherwise, a thing by itself does neither double nor multiply itself. As for "existence" being analogical, it has already been proved in an earlier passage which began with "the Iranian Philosophers', etc. . . ."

It has been made clear by the verse just mentioned that there are in "existence" two kinds of multiplicity. One of them is its being "man," "horse," "tree," "stone," etc., and the other is its being prior and posterior, strong and weak, etc. Let us now clarify that the multiplicity as understood in this second sense is not a multiplicity in reality, nor is the unity of the analogical "reality" thereby damaged.

The distinction is either through the whole of an "essence," Or through part of it, or again through additional factors.

Thus we start from the very beginning of the argument and say: The distinction between any two things is either through the whole of an "essence," like the distinction between the higher genera and their species from each other, or through part of the "essence," like the distinction between "man" and "horse," or again the distinction may occur through additional factors and extraneous accidents, like the distinction between Zayd and Amr.

According to the school of Illuminationists the distinction can also occur through "imperfection" and "perfection" with regard to "quiddity."

The Peripatetic Philosophers confined the kinds of distinction to these three, and did not notice the fourth kind, which
has been noticed by the Illuminationists. This is referred to by the verse. As we have established in discussing the "reality" of "existence," according to the school of Illuminationists, the distinction can also occur through "imperfection" and "perfection" with regard to the very origin and root of one single "quiddity," by the fact that the "imperfect" and the "perfect" both belong to that "reality."

So the distinction between a particular "imperfect" and a particular "perfect" is neither through their whole "essences," namely through their being two "quiddities" nor through the "differentiae"—because they are "simple"—nor through "accidents," for in the last case "existence" would become universal, but this would be self-contradiction. Rather, the distinction is due to the "perfection" and "imperfection" of the "reality" of "existence" itself, in such a way that the "imperfect" and the "perfect" are distinguished from each other through the whole of their simple "essences," not through their being two "quiddities," but through their being one single "quiddity" which allows of analogical predication. Take two lines, for instance, which are different by virtue of the perfectness and imperfectness as a line; the factor by which one of them is longer than the other is the same as the factor which is common to both of them in reality.

All concepts are equal in not having any kind of analogicity.

Since you have already learnt that "existence" is analogical you should know now that all concepts and "quiddities"—even the concept of "existence," quà representative of the object of the concept—are equal in not having any kind of analogicity, whether "being first and last," "having preponderance and its opposite," "being stronger and weaker," "being perfect and imperfect," and "being more and less."
A NON-EXISTENT IS NOT A THING

On Some of the Properties of Non-existence and the Non-existent

What is not “existent” is “non-existent.”

What, i.e., a “quiddity” which is not “existent” is a pure “non-existent,” so that it is not “subsistent” before its “existence” either. This is against the opinion of the Mu'tazilah who maintain that “quiddity” in the state of “non-existence” is “subsistent” without being “existent” in any way.

We consider “thing” equal to “existence,”
the Mu'tazilah, however, consider “subsistence”
more general than “existence,” and “non-existence”
more general than “negation.”

We philosophers consider “thing,” i.e., “quiddity,” equal to “existence.” But the Mu'tazilah consider “subsistence” more general than “existence,” and “non-existence” more general than “negation.” Thus, according to them, a “non-existent,” i.e., a possible “quiddity,” is “subsistent,” but neither “existent” nor “negated.” And an impossible “non-existent” is, in their view, “negated” and not “subsistent.” But a sound common-sense suffices in refuting this thesis.

They deny an intermediary level between “negation” and “subsistence.” But their thesis of “state” is simply deviation.

Some Mu'tazilah assert that there does exist an intermediary level between “existent” and “non-existent,” which they call “state,” and apply the word “subsistent” to it. But they assert at the same time that there can be no intermediary level between “subsistent” and “negated.” This is indicated by the verse: They, i.e., the Mu'tazilah, deny an intermediary level between “negation” and “subsistence.” But their thesis of “state” is simply deviation, i.e., from the right way.

The “state” is defined as an attribute of an “existent,” which is neither “existent” nor “non-existent.”

The “state” is defined and explicated by them as an attribute of an “existent” which (i.e., the “attribute”) is neither “existent”
nor "non-existent." By the term "attribute" they mean a particular kind of abstracted ideas subsisting in something else, such as "being-knowing," "being-capable," "being-father," and other relations; they do not mean by it indifferently any abstracted idea subsisting in something else such as is commonly meant in the usage of the Theologians. Thus the "essence" corresponding to these two meanings of "attribute" has also two meanings. And by referring the "attribute" to an "existent" they want to exclude the "attributes" of a "non-existent," because they are "attributes" of "subsistent," not an "existent." And by saying "not-existent" they exclude the positive "attributes" of an "existent." And by saying "not non-existent," they exclude the negative "attributes" of an "existent." Thus there remain in the definition the attributes which are abstracted from the "existents," in whose conception "negation" is discarded.

To this definition al-Kātibī has raised an objection saying that this does not square with the doctrine of the Mu'tazilah, because they count "being-substance" among the "states," although it does subsist in an "essence" in both modes of "existence" and "non-existence."

To this the Commentator on the Mawāqif has replied by saying that what is meant by its being an "attribute" of an "existent" is that it is an "attribute" of it occasionally, not that it is its "attribute" constantly. Moreover, this criticism is valid on the basis of the doctrine of those who assert that a "non-existent" is "subsistent' and is qualified by "states" in the condition of "non-existence." However, according to the doctrine of those who do not assert that a "non-existent is "subsistent," or those who, though they do assert it (i.e., a "non-existent" being "subsistent"), do not assert its being qualified by "states," the objection entirely loses its ground.

"Negation" and "subsistence" are synonymous with both of them.

Let us show the absurdity of this thesis by saying: "Negation" and "subsistence" are synonymous with both of them, i.e., with "non-existence" and "existence" respectively, not only according to both reason and technical usage; but also according to the most natural usage of these words from the point of view of language and linguistic convention.
To conclude: Just as the intermediary level between “negated” and “subsistent” is inconceivable, so is an intermediary level inconceivable between a “non-existent” and an “existent,” because of the synonymity.

The fallacious arguments put forward by our opponents are all false.

The fallacious arguments put forward by our opponents concerning the “state” or even concerning the problem of the “subsistence” of a “non-existent,” are all false and are to be rejected.

One of these arguments concerning the “subsistence” of a “non-existent” is that a “non-existent” allows of predication, and everything that allows of predication is a “thing.”

To this we answer by saying that if what is meant by the subject in the above-mentioned minor premise (i.e., a “non-existent”) be a “non-existent” in the external world, it will allow of predication only because of its “existence” in the mind.

Another of these arguments for establishing “state,” is that “existence” is neither “existent”—otherwise it would equally share “existence” with others in such a way that its “existence” would be something additional to it, thus entailing an infinite regress—nor “non-existent,” otherwise it would be qualified by its own contradictory.

To this we give answer in several ways. (1) By pointing out that “existence” is “existent,” albeit through its own “reality.” (2) By pointing out that it is “non-existent” in the sense that it is not something possessing “existence,” so that it is not qualified by its contradictory; because the contradictory of “existence” is “non-existence,” not “non-existent.” (3) The “existence” of the Necessary Existent contradicts this argument. (4) The same argument can be turned against them, because if “existence” were a “state,” and the “state” were an attribute of an “existent,” it would necessarily follow that “quiddity” be “existent” before “existence,” which would lead to an infinite regress. This conclusion would be unavoidable unless it be said that “state” is an attribute of an “existent” by way of this very “existence,” or unless it be said that “existence,” in their view, is something abstracted, and that “state” is an abstracted attribute, and that being qualified by an abstracted attribute does not necessitate the priority of the “qualified” in “existence.”
Another argument is that a “universal” having “individuals” actualized in the external world, like “man,” is neither “existent”—otherwise it would be “individual,” not “universal”—nor “non-existent,” otherwise it would not be part of an “existent” like Zayd.

To this we answer by saying that that kind of “universal” is “existent.” As to the statement that it would then be “individual,” we would point out that a “natural universal” does not refuse “being-individual,” because it is that very “reality” to which “being-universal” occurs only in the dimension of the mind, particularly since it is the “non-conditioned” which is the source of division for (1) the “absolute” (i.e., “non-conditioned” quâ a division, not quâ the source of division itself), (2) the “mixed” (i.e., “conditioned-by-something”) and (3) the “non-mixed” (i.e., “negatively-conditioned”). Or we can as well answer by saying that it is a “non-existent,” and yet this does not necessitate an “existent” being subsistent by a “non-existent,” because that “universal” is not a part of the “existent” in the external world.

Another argument is that the “genus” of the real accidental “quiddities,” like the “being-color” of blackness, is neither a “non-existent”—otherwise an “existent” would be subsisting by a “non-existent”—nor an “existent,” for this would necessitate an “accident” being subsistent by another “accident,” because real “composition” is based on the “subsistence” of the parts one by another.

To this we answer by saying that the “accidents” are external simple things so that they have no “subsistence” in the external world. So one could not assert that, if “being-color” were a “non-existent” in the external world, an “existent” would be subsisting by a “non-existent.” Besides, it is quite possible that an “accident” subsist by another “accident.”

XIII NON-EXISTENCES ARE NOT DISTINGUISHABLE FROM EACH OTHER AND THERE IS NO CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM

There is no distinction between “non-existences” in as far as they are “non-existences.”
The distinction is formed between them only in the imagination.

There is no distinction between “non-existences” in so far as they are “non-existences.” The distinction is formed between them, i.e., between “non-existences” only in the imagination. The formation of those “non-existences” in the imagination is due to their relation with their positive counterparts. First, distinctive positive parts and different “existences” are represented, to which you add the concept of “non-existence;” and there you get “non-existences” which are distinguishable from one another in terms of their properties. But if this process is put outside of consideration, there would be no distinction between one “non-existence” and another. Otherwise, everything would have an infinite number of “non-existences.”

Likewise, there is no causal relationship between “non-existences”

If anyone asserts this, the assertion is based on approximation.

Likewise there is no real causal relationship between “non-existences,” even between two particular “non-existences.” If anyone asserts this, i.e., this causal relationship—as, for example, his assertion: “The ‘non-existence’ of a cause is the cause for the ‘non-existence’ of the caused”—the assertion is based on approximation and is but a figurative expression. For asserting their being causes is due to their resemblance to their positive counterparts.

Thus if one says for example: “the ‘non-existence’ of clouds is the cause of the ‘non-existence’ of rain,” this is based on the idea that clouds are a cause of rain. In reality, he is saying thereby that the causal relationship which holds between the two “existences” is not here actualized. And this is similar to the case in which the properties of affirmative propositions are transferred to negative ones in such a way that one speaks of a negative categorical proposition or a negative hypothetical proposition, whether conjunctive or disjunctive, etc., for all these are based on their resemblance to the corresponding affirmative propositions.
XIV WHAT HAS CEASED TO EXIST DOES NOT COME BACK AS IT WAS

The coming back of what has ceased to exist is an impossibility.

There is a divergence of opinions as to whether or not the coming-back of what has ceased to exist is possible. The majority of Theologians take the first position (i.e., that it is possible), while the Philosophers and some Theologians take the second, which is the right view. This is referred to by our verse: *The coming-back of what has ceased to exist* as it was—we say “as it was,” because the question at issue concerns its coming-back with all of its characteristics and accidents—*is an impossibility*. There is no repetition in His self-manifestation. At every moment He is in a new state, every state “being peerless.”¹ And “in everything He has a sign indicating that He is one.”²

Some of them have asserted its necessity.

Some of them, like al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs (Ibn Sīnā), have asserted the necessity and self-evidence of its impossibility. And Imām (Fakhr al-Dīn) al-Rāzī³ has corroborated the assertion of its being self-evident.

Its possibility would necessitate the permissibility of an infiltration of “non-existence” in the individual.

Those who maintain that this thesis is of a deductive nature (instead of being self-evident) have several proofs to offer. (1) The first is referred to by the verse: *Its possibility*, i.e., the supposition of the possibility of coming-back, *would necessitate the permissibility of an infiltration of “non-existence” in the individual* which is supposed to come back. But the absurdity of this is evident, because it would mean one and the same thing being prior to itself in terms of “time,” which is equivalent to one thing being prior to itself with regard to “essence.”

And it would become possible that there come into being afresh something which would be similar to it, while the lack of distinction negates it.
(2) And by the supposition of the possibility of coming-back, it would become possible that there come into being afresh something which would be similar to it, i.e., similar to what is supposed to come back, in all aspects, because all similar things are to be judged equally with regard to what is possible for them and what is impossible for them, while the lack of distinction negates it, i.e., negates that there come into being afresh what is similar to it. The lack of distinction between the two may be explained by the fact that, since their sharing in "quiddity" and all the "accidents" is presupposed, one of them would not be deserving to be the thing which is supposed to come back while the other would be something entirely new. On the contrary, either both of them must be coming-back, or both of them must be new. Yes, if it were possible that a "quiddity" be actualized in separation from "existence," and if "existence" were something occurring to it, their being differently judged would be possible. But this is absurd.

And the coming-back would come back exactly the same as the original one.

(3) And on the supposition of the possibility of the coming-back of what ceased to exist as it was, the coming-back would come back, i.e., become exactly the same as the original one, because, according to the supposition, the "ipseity" which has come back is itself the same as the original one. And because "time" is one of the concretizing elements, and since, moreover, "time" ceases to exist and its coming-back is possible, so when the "original time" comes back, that which has come back can properly be judged to be the first one, because it has been existent in the "original time." This would lead to "mutation," self-contradiction, and the agreement of two opposites in a single "ipseity."

And it would not reach any limit.

(4) And on the supposition of the possibility of the coming-back of what has ceased to exist as it was, it, i.e., the number of the very returnings would not reach any limit—because, in that case, there would be no distinction between the first coming-back and the second, and the third, and the fourth and so on, so that they would not come to an definite stop at a certain stage. The state of what is supposed to be the first coming-back would
be exactly the same as that of what is supposed to be the second, the third, and so on. Likewise there would be no distinction between the original state and the state of coming-back. And accordingly, the number of those that come back would not reach any limit, and for two reasons.

One of the reasons is that when an individual "reality" comes back, all that upon which the individual "reality" depends, such as "cause," "condition," "preparing-cause," etc., and also the "cause" of the "cause," the "condition" of the "condition," the "preparing-cause" of the "preparing-cause" etc.—all these must necessarily come back in such a way that all the "preparednesses," together with all spherical revolutions and planetary positions, nay, even everything that has passed in the longitudinal hierarchy and the latitudinal hierarchy must also come back. But this consequent is evidently absurd.

The second reason is that if the coming-back of a thing that has ceased to exist were possible, the coming-back of "time" would become possible. But if "time" could come back, an infinite regress would necessarily be entailed, for there is no difference between the "time" which is the "original time" and the "time" which is supposed to come back, except that the latter is in the succeeding "time" and the former in the preceding "time." In this case "time" would have another "time," and the latter also would have to come back, and so ad infinitum.

To this you may object and say: The precedence of the "original time" is due to itself, not due to its being in another preceding "time."

To this we answer by saying: According to that view, the term "coming-back" would not properly be applied to "time," because the "priority" would be essential to it and there could not be any discrepancy, nor would it ever become "posterity." Thus by the supposition of the permissibility of "coming-back," there arises the permissibility of the "priority" being separated from "time" and of the "posterity" replacing it. But this is equivalent to the permissibility of "time" being in "time."

These then, are the three aspects which we have referred to by saying: "it would not come to any limit."

Our thesis is not harmed by the fact that the body,
after having decayed, comes back in the Resurrection.

Now since the ground of those Theologians who deny our position is their notion that it contradicts the doctrine of the Resurrection of the bodies, whose truthfulness is confirmed by the tongues of all true religions, we point out the absurdity of this notion by saying: Our thesis is not harmed by the fact that the body, after having decayed, comes back in the Resurrection. The reason for this will be given in the third section of Part 6 concerning the irrefutable proofs of the thesis that the body resurrected on the Day of Resurrection will be the very same body which has existed in the House of Vanity.

Its impossibility is due to something consequential.

Its impossibility, i.e., the impossibility of the coming-back, is due to something consequential. This indicates the answer to be given to the argument of those who maintain its permissibility. The gist of their reasoning it as follows: If it were impossible, the impossibility would be due either (1) to the “quiddity” of that which has ceased to exist, and to its necessary property—in that case it would not have existed from the very beginning—or (2) to one of its separable “accidents,” in which case, with the disappearance of the “accident” the impossibility also will disappear.

The answer to this argument may be formulated in the following way. The impossibility is due to a matter which is consequential not to the “quiddity” of that which has ceased to exist, but rather to the “ipseity’ or the “quiddity” which would exist after “non-existence.”

The implication of possibility is opposite to a decisive conviction, as is exemplified by “You should leave in the area of possibility whatever is not refuted by a decisive proof.”

The implication of possibility i.e., “probability,” is opposite to a decisive conviction, as is exemplified by the common dictum: “You should leave in the area of possibility whatever is not refuted by a decisive proof.” This indicates the answer to be given to another proof of a persuasive (i.e., non-apodictic) nature which they bring forth.
The argument in question runs as follows: Whatever has the proof neither of impossibility nor of necessity, must principally be attributed to “possibility,” as Philosophers say: “whenever something strange strikes your ear, leave it in the area of possibility, as long as it is not refuted by a decisive proof.”

Our answer to this is that sticking to this principle after proofs of impossibility have been established is itself something strange, let alone being open to serious questions. As to what is meant by the Philosophers is that you should not deny whatever has the proof neither of necessity nor of impossibility; that, rather you should let its grain be in its ear, and in the area of rational probability. This does not mean that it should be regarded as an essential possibility.

XV REMOVAL OF DOUBT CONCERNING THE ABSOLUTE NON-EXISTENT

Our intellect has the power to represent the “non-existence” of itself, and of others; and to predicate non-predicability of absolute negation; and again to predicate impossibility of a “partner of the Creator,” and of a thing either “being subsistent” in the mind or “being non-subsistent” in it, without any inconsistency.

Since the rational soul comes from the world of spiritual reality and power, our intellect has the power to represent the “non-existence” of itself. Thus the intellect is necessarily qualified by “existence” and “non-existence” And also it has the power of representing the “non-existence” of others, namely other external “existents,” so that the latter must likewise be qualified by “existence” and “non-existence.” And our intellect has also the power to predicate non-predicability of absolute negation and sheer “non-existence,” while an absolute “non-existent” does not in any way allow of being predicated; and this is nothing but predicating absolute negation of its impredicability.

And again our intellect has the power to predicate impossibility of a “partner of the Creator” by saying: “a partner of the
Creator is impossible” in spite of the fact that predicating something of something depends upon the representation of the latter (i.e., the subject), while whatever is established in the intellect or imagination is an “existent” which must be judged “possible,” And it has also the power of predicating of a thing either “being subsistent” in the mind or “being non-subsistent” in it, i.e., in the mind. That is to say, it has the power of predicating of a thing, in the form of a real disjunctive proposition, either “being subsistent” in the mind or “being non-subsistent” in it, in spite of the fact that the predication requires representation of that which is not “subsistent” in the mind, and this representation again requires its “subsistence” in the mind.

It might appear at first glance from what we have mentioned that there be in all these cases contradiction and inconsistency involved. So we indicate that there is no absurdity involved therein by saying: without any inconsistency, i.e., in any of these cases.

Whatever is, by way of primary predication, a “partner of the Truth” will be considered, by way of common predication, as one of His creatures.

In order to explain that there is no inconsistency involved, we say: whatever is by way of primary predication a “partner of the Truth,” Exalted and Most High, will be considered by way of common non-primary predication, as one of His creatures. Because, just as a “particular” is a “particular” as a concept, but is a referent of the concept of “universal,” likewise a “partner of the Creator” is as a concept a “partner of the Creator,” but as a referent of the concept it is “possible” and a “creature” of the Creator.

I have seen a man who, though endowed with a capacity of understanding the matters of mystical experience, lacks the capacity of theoretical thinking, say that a “partner of the Creator” is inconceivable, and that the supposition of something impossible is impossible.

To this man and his kind we would say: if you were not men of sophistry, and if “concept” and the “referent of concept” were not confused in your minds, you would understand that any concept which is actualized, whether in the mind or in the external world, does not cease to be that concept, and the boundary of its “essence” does not become transformed. Nay,
“existence” brings it out just as it is. Whiteness, for example, when it is found in the external world or in the mind, whether in the higher region or in the lower region, does not cease to be whiteness, and is not transformed into “existence,” just as its “existence” does not become itself whiteness.

The concepts of “impossible,” a “partner of the Creator,” “absolute non-existent,” etc., are all of this nature; they do not cease to be themselves. For when you posit the concept of “impossible,” how can one say that you have posited the concept of “possible” or the concept of “necessary?” And the affirmation of a thing of itself is necessary, while the negation of itself is impossible.

Understand “non-existence” in a similar way, for it is essentially “non-existence.” But that same “non-existence” is “existence,” because it is imprinted in the mind.

Understand “non-existence” in a similar way, because it is but another particular case pertaining to this rule, for it is essentially, i.e., as a concept, “non-existence,” but that same “non-existence” is by way of common predication “existence” because it is imprinted in the mind.

XVI THE YARDSTICK OF TRUTHFULNESS IN A PROPOSITION

If judgment in an “external” proposition happens to be true like a “factual” proposition, it conforms to the objective state of things: and it is “factual” from the viewpoint of a judgmental relation. It is in conformity with the “fact-itself” in a “mental” proposition.

If judgment in an “external” proposition happens to be true like the judgment of a “factual” proposition which is true, it conforms to the objective state of things, and it is “factual” from the viewpoint of a complete predicative judgmental relation. The term “factual” is used to indicate the essential unity of the judgment with “truth,” because a judgment is “true”
when it conforms to the external state of things, while it is "factual" when it is confirmed by the external state of things. It i.e., the judgmental relation, is in conformity with fact-itself in a "mental" proposition.

The gist of this thesis is as follows. A proposition is sometimes understood in the sense of an "external" proposition. It is a proposition in which judgment is made on the individuals of its subject, which exist actualized in the external world, like for instance, the proposition: "Those who were in the house were killed" and "The cattle perished," and the like. In cases like this, the judgment is confined to the individuals whose "existence" is actualized.

Sometimes it is understood in the sense of a "mental" proposition. It is a proposition in which judgment is made concerning only the individuals that exist in the mind, like for instance: "A universal is either essential or accidental," or "An essential is either a genus or a differentia."

Sometimes, again, it is understood in the sense of a "factual" proposition. The latter is a proposition in which judgment is made concerning the individuals which exist in the external world, regardless of whether actualized or non-actualized, like for instance: "Every body is limited, or having-a-place, or divisible ad infinitum" and other similar propositions which are currently used in the sciences.

Now that you have learnt this, we shall go on and say that the "truthfulness" in an "external" proposition is due to the conformity of its relation to what is in the external world. And the same is true of a "factual" proposition, because it, too, involves judgment on external existents, but regardless of whether they be actualized or non-actualized. As for the "truthfulness" in a "mental" proposition, it is due to the conformity of its relation to what is in the "fact-itself," for a "mental" proposition has no external state of things to which it may conform.

The "fact-itself" is defined by the essential boundary of a thing.

As regards the "fact-itself," we define it as follows: The "fact-itself" is defined by the essential boundary of a thing. What is meant by "essential boundary" here is opposed to "supposition" by somebody. It comprises the level of "quiddity" and the two modes of "existence," external and mental. Thus
“man” being an animal at the level of “quiddity” and an existent in the external world, and an universal as it exists in the mind—all these are matters pertaining to “fact-itself,” because they are not simply due to a “supposition” by somebody, like: “Man is inorganic.” And what is meant by “fact” is a thing itself. For example, when one says: “Four is such-and-such in the fact-itself,” what one means thereby is that four is such-and-such in its “essential boundary.” Thus the term “fact” here belongs to the usage of an explicit term in place of an implicit one.

**Some count the “fact-itself” as the world of Command, the latter being Intellect.**

In reference to the thesis that the “fact-itself” is the “Active Intellect,”\(^1\) we say: *some people count the “fact-itself” as the world of Command, the latter i.e., that world, being a universal Intellect, in which everything, large and small, simple and composite, is recorded.*

The use of these two different terms (i.e., “world of Command” and “Intellect”) purports to indicate the existence of two different technical usages.

(1) One of them is the usage of the people of God (i.e., Şūfis), as is shown by the fact that they call the world of Intellect the world of Command, deriving this expression from the Divine Book where it is said: “Lo, unto Him belongs Creation and Command.”\(^2\) This usage is more befitting to the “fact-itself.”

God the Exalted has called the Intellect “command” from two points of view. The first is in reference to the pulverization of its “being” and its total submersion in the Light of One-ness, because the Intellects absolutely belong in the realm of the divine Lordship. Rather, the Lights of Divine Commandment have properly no “quiddity.” So the yardstick of distinction, which is “matter,” whether external or mental, is lacking in them. Thus they are sheer “existence,” which is the Command of God, and the word “Be” which is the very source of “existence” and “light.” The second is that, although the Intellect does possess “quiddity,” it is made to exist by the sheer Command of God and by His word “Be” being directed toward it, without any further addition of “matter” and particularization of “preparedness,” so that its mere essential possibility is sufficient for it.
(2) The second usage is that of Philosophers, as is shown by the fact that they call a pure abstract thing an “intellect.” This expression too is very frequently used in the language of Divine Law.

It is possible to construe the word *Yu‘add* in the text as derived from ‘add meaning “surmising,” and not “counting,” as a reminder of the preferability of the meaning as understood by the first usage, because the “appearance” of a thing by an abstract or material “existence” or its being “apparent” to something, whether the latter be “matter” or the High Luminous Tablet,³ is something lying beyond itself.

*The “fact-itself” is more general, because it comprehends the mind. Likewise, it is more-general-in-one-aspect than the mental (states).*

Now we explain the relation between the “fact-itself” and the external and mental states by saying: *The “fact-itself” is more-general absolutely than the external state, because it comprehends the mind.* Thus everything that is in the external state is in the “fact-itself,” but the reverse is not true. *Likewise the “fact-itself” is more-general-in-one-aspect than mental (states).*¹

*For they agree with each other in true proposition, and disagree in false propositions as well as in the Truth.*

As regards the point of agreement and the point of disagreement, we say: *For they,* i.e., the “fact-itself” and the mental states *agree with each other in true propositions,* like for instance: “Four is an even number,” and *disagree in false propositions as well as in the Truth*—may His Name be exalted. For in a false proposition, like “Four is an odd number,” the mental (state) is actualized, but not the “fact-itself,” while in the Truth the “fact-itself” is actualized, but not the mental (state), because of His being a pure External (i.e., because of His absolute transcendence) which is comprehended neither by reason nor by imagination.

The above-explanation clarifies also the relation between the external and the mental (state). The reason why we have used at one time the word “mind” and at another “mental” is that we have wanted to indicate thereby that these relations hold true of the subjects of the relations.
Since “existence” is divided into “copulative existence” and “self-subsistent existence,” “Making” comprehends both “composite” and “simple.”

Since absolute “existence” is divided into “copulative existence” and “self-subsistent existence,” “making” comprehends both “composite” and “simple,” i.e., “composite making” and “simple making.” From this is obtainable their definition as follows. The “simple making” is that whose object is “copulative existence.” The former is the “making” of a thing and bringing into being the thing itself. To use the terminology of grammarians, it is the kind of “making” which is “transitive” to one object. The “composite making” is the “making” of a thing (a) something (b); it is a kind of “making” which is “transitive” to two objects. An intelligent person may guess from this what we want to prove concerning the thesis that “existence” is “made,” for the division of “making” follows the division of “existence.”

As for the “composite making,” it concerns exclusively the separable “accidents,” because the “essence” is devoid of them. The “composite making” is inconceivable (1) between a thing and itself; nor is it conceivable (2) between it and its “essentials;” nor again, is it conceivable (3) between it and its inseparable “accidents”—we may give as examples of these three cases: (1) “Man is man,” (2) “Man is an animal,” and (3) “Four is an even number”—for these are all necessary relations, and the yardstick of “need” is “possibility,” while “necessity” and “impossibility” are the yardstick of “self-sufficiency.”

Use the term “composite making” in reference to an “accident” which is separable, and nothing else.

This is why Shaykh (Ibn Sīnā) says: “God did not make an apricot apricot; He simply made it.” To this refers our verse: Use the term “composite making” in reference to an “accident” which is separable, and nothing else, i.e., concerning nothing other than separable accidents.

Different doctrines have been handed down to us concerning the “making” of “quiddity,” “existence” or “becoming.”
Now since a “possible” is a duality composed of “quiddity” and “existence,” and since there is between them the relation of “qualification” (i.e., qualified-quality-relation), three different opinions have appeared concerning the “possible” being “made” through “simple-making,” as indicated by our verse: Different opinions have been handed down to us concerning the “making” of “quiddity,” “existence” or “becoming”—“becoming” is but another expression for the relation of “qualification;” sometimes the term “becoming” is used, and sometimes the other term, i.e., “qualification” is used.

The first doctrine is attributed to the Illuminationists.

The first doctrine is attributed to the Illuminationists. They assert that the effect of the Maker is the “quiddity” itself primarily and essentially; then this “making” necessitates the becoming-existent of the “quiddity” without the Maker giving either “existence” or the relation of “qualification,” because the latter are both rational concepts, whose referent is “quiddity” itself, just as an “essence,” after being made by the Maker, does not require another “making” in order to be an “essence.” I say: this doctrine was most prevalent at the time of the Shaykh al-Ishrāq (Suhrawardī) and his followers. It would seem that the idea that “quiddities” subsist independently of “existence” was prevalent in his age. They thought that if they asserted that “existence” is the object of “making,” the imagination would lead to the idea that “quiddities” be self-sufficient in subsisting independently of the Maker, because “quiddity” differs from “existence,” so that we would have to admit “pre-eternal subsistents.” In order to avoid arousing this kind of imagination, they were led to maintain that “quiddity” in the very subsistence of itself is “made” and is in need of the Maker.

This is corroborated by what Lāhījī—may Mercy be upon him—says in the twenty-seventh Question of his Shawāriq,¹ inspite of his firm belief in “quiddity” being fundamentally real with regard to both “making” and “actualization.” “What is intended by our asserting that what is “made” is only “quiddity” is to remove the false idea that the “quiddities” are subsistent in “non-existence” without “making” and “existence,” and that then there issues forth from the Maker “existence” or the “qualification” of the “quiddities” by “existence.” Once this
false idea is removed, there is no objection to anyone taking the position that "existence" or the relation of "qualification" is "made," after it has been established that there can be no "quiddity" before "making." To this refers the doctrine of our Teacher, the authoritative Philosopher-Theosopber (Mullā Šadrā) when he maintains that "existence" is "made," for he explicitly states that "existence" is "made" essentially, while "quiddity" is made "accidentally."

In the same way, the authoritative Philosoher al-Dāmād (Mīr-e Dāmād)\(^2\) asserts that since the very subsistence of "quiddity" justifies the predication of "existence," it is thought that, if "quiddity" is not in need of the Maker with regard to both itself and the basis of its subsistence, it could rightly be judged as "existent" by virtue of its own self, and it would go out from the boundaries of the realm of "possibility." But this is absurd.

We would say: exception can be taken against him on the ground that, if "quiddity," by virtue of its own self, is not in need of the Maker, it is because of its being a mirage and something merely mentally posited and because it is below the state of being "made." And this situation does not bring it out of the domain of "possibility" in such a way that it would attain the stage of self-sufficiency because of the abundance of actualization and its being above the stage of "making." Moreover how is it possible that the very subsistence of "quiddity" could justify the predication of "existence," while it is neither "existent" nor "non-existent?" If the very subsistence of "quiddity" did justify the predication of existence, the result would necessarily be a "mutation" of an essential "possibility" into an essential "necessity," as it is pointed out by Mullā Šadrā in the Asfār.

**The Peripatetics are inclined toward the latter.**

*The Peripatetics are inclined toward the latter* (i.e., the thesis that "existence" and the relation of "qualification" are "made"). The authoritative ones among them are inclined toward the idea that "existence" is "made," while others are inclined toward the idea that the relation of "qualification" is made: That is, that the becoming-of-a-"quiddity"-as-something-existent, is made. Probably these people meant to say that the effect of the Maker is a "simple" matter, which is analyzed by the intellect into "qualified" and "quality." But in reality that "simple" mat-
ter is “existence.” Otherwise, this thesis in its original form is ridiculous, because the relation of “qualification” presupposes the actualization of the two terms, and because it is something abstracted.

**Multiply “composite making” and “simple making,” Both being essential and accidental, by three.**

Let us now go on to enumerate the kinds of “making.” Multiply four—which are “composite making” and “simple making,” both being essential and accidental—by three, i.e., the three afore-mentioned things; namely, the “making” of “existence,” “quiddity” and “becoming” and it will make twelve.

According to the doctrine which we accept, the correct one from all these twelve possibilities is “existence” being essentially “made” by way of “simple making,” and “existence” being accidentally “made” by way of “composite making,” and “quiddity” and the relation of “qualification” being accidentally “made” by way of both “simple” and “composite making.” And the absurd ones are “existence” being essentially “made” by way of “composite making,” and “existence” being accidentally “made” by way of “simple making,” and “quiddity” and the relation of “qualification” both being essentially “made” by way of both “simple and composite making.”

Judge on this analogy as to the correct and false possibilities according to the doctrine of the Illuminationists and according to the doctrine that the relation of “qualification” is “made.” If you want, consult the following tables:

<p>| According to the doctrine which we accept namely, that “existence” is “made”: |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| “existence” is “made”         | “quiddity” is “made”          |
| essentially                  | essentially                    |
| through “simple making”      | through “simple making”       |
| “quiddity” is “made”          | “existence” is “made”          |
| accidentally                  | accidentally                    |
| through “simple making”      | through “simple making”       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;qualification&quot;-relation is &quot;made&quot; accidentally through &quot;simple making&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;qualification&quot;-relation is &quot;made&quot; essentially through &quot;simple making&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;existence&quot; is &quot;made&quot; accidentally through &quot;composite making&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;quiddity&quot; is &quot;made&quot; essentially through &quot;composite making&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;quiddity&quot; is &quot;made&quot; accidentally through &quot;composite making&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;existence&quot; is &quot;made&quot; essentially through &quot;composite making&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;qualification&quot;-relation is &quot;made&quot; accidentally through &quot;composite making&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;qualification&quot;-relation is &quot;made&quot; essentially through &quot;composite making&quot;</td>
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According to the doctrine of the Illuminationists, namely, that "quiddity" is "made:"
According to the doctrine of some Peripatetics, namely, that the “qualification”-relation is “made:”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>right</th>
<th>wrong</th>
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<tr>
<td>Qualification”-relation is “made” essentially through “simple making”</td>
<td>“qualification”-relation is “made” accidentally through “simple making”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“existence” is “made” accidentally through “simple making”</td>
<td>“existence” is “made” essentially through “simple making”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“quiddity” is “made” accidentally through “simple making”</td>
<td>“quiddity” is “made” essentially through “simple making”</td>
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<td>“qualification”-relation is “made” accidentally through “composite making”</td>
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<td>“quiddity” is “made” accidentally through “composite making”</td>
<td>“qualification”-relation is “made” essentially through “composite making”</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**We accept the position that “existence” is “made:” and that “quiddity” is “made” accidentally; And the relation of “qualification” likewise. And through this “making” “existence” and these two are “made” by way of “composite making.”**

Let us indicate what is right from among all these by saying: **We accept the position that “existence” is “made” essentially and that “quiddity” is “made” accidentally, and the relation of “qualification,” likewise, i.e., “made” accidentally. “Existence” and these two, i.e., “quiddity” and the relation of “qualification,” are “made” by way of “composite making” accidentally.**
Thus, since “existence” is “made” by way of “simple making,” the “existence”-is “existence” is “made” accidentally by way of “composite making.” Likewise, “quiddity” and the relation of “qualification” are made by way of “composite making,” but accidentally, by that very “making” of “existence” by way of “simple making.” Understand all this.

_I would prove the thesis which I choose by saying that a consequential property of a “quiddity” is something mentally-posited. For every “effect’ necessarily follows its partner._

Let us give proofs for the thesis which we accept. One of them is indicated by the verse: _I would prove the thesis which I choose by saying that a consequential property of a “quiddity” is something mentally-posited_. The reasons why it is mentally-posited is that it follows necessarily “quiddity” itself without any consideration of the two modes of “existence,” in such a way that even if we suppose that “quiddity” were subsistent separated from all modes of “existence,” it would still follow “quiddity.” And the “quiddity,” on this supposition, is something mentally-posited by general agreement. So, that which necessarily follows it would be, on this supposition, more deserving to be mentally-posited. For every “effect” (or “caused”) necessarily follows its partner, i.e., “cause,” because it is impossible for an “effect” to be separated from its “cause.”

_The Illuminationist thesis entails the position that everything other than the First Effect is something abstracted._

Now that we have established these two premises, we assert: _The Illuminationist thesis_—i.e., it is “quiddity” that is “made”—_entails the position that everything other than the First Effect_—of the true Maker, the absolute Self-subsistent—is _something abstracted_, because all are consequential properties of the “quiddity” of the First Effect—since the supposition, according to the Illuminationist position, is that what issues forth essentially from the First Effect and what is fundamentally real in actualization is “quiddity,” while what are other than that are effects and consequential properties of the “quiddity” of the First Effect. But that will necessarily entail the impossibility (i.e., the abstracted-ness of all that are other than the First Effect).
The reason why the First Effect is excluded from this is that it is consequential to the External Existence, because the “quiddity” of the Necessary, Most High, is his Existence.

*Also this thesis would entail the negation of their sharing the same root—like shadow and a thing—with the Giver of the “forms,” because the absence of “quiddity” in Him has been established before.*

*Also this thesis* accepted by the Illuminationists would entail the negation of their sharing the same root, i.e., the “quiddities” having the same root—like shadow and a thing, not like moisture in relation to the sea, because the latter relation is “production;” God is far beyond that!—with the Giver of the “forms,” because the absence of “quiddity” in Him has been established before. And the effect of “existence” is “existence,” and the “cause” of “quiddity” is “quiddity.” So the “quiddity” is not fit to be “made,” not to speak of “qualification.” Thus “existence” is the only thing that remains being fit to be “made.”

*Likewise, the negation of its being connected, while the “quiddity” of that which is “made” is thereby conditioned.*

*Likewise the Illuminationist thesis would entail the negation of its being* i.e., “quiddity” being, connected with the Maker—because it can be considered in itself without any consideration of “existence,” not to speak of “being created” and “being connected”—*while the “quiddity” of that which is essentially “made” is thereby conditioned,* i.e., by its being connected with the Maker. Rather, it is real “connection” itself.
SECOND GEM

Concerning Necessity and Possibility

XVIII THE THREE IMPLICIT MODES

"Existence" is (divided into) "copulative" and "inhering," then "self-subsistent." Take this (division) and keep it in mind.

"Existence" is (divided into) "copulative," i.e., affirmation of a thing as something and "inhering," then "self-subsistent." The "inhering" and "self-subsistent" share the "affirmation of a thing." Take this (division) and keep it in mind.

To explain: "existence" is "in-itself," or "not-in-itself."

To explain: "existence," generally is either (1) "(existence) in-itself," which is called "predicative existence," and which is what is meant by the verb "be" in the complete sense, (i.e., the verb "be" used in the sense of "exist," like when we say: "A is" meaning "A exists") and which is actualized in the simple "whether-ness;" or (2) "(existence) not-in-itself." This is what is meant by the verb "be" in its incomplete sense (i.e., the verb "be" used as a copula), which is actualized in the composite "whether-ness?". This latter is usually called "inhering existence." But it is preferable—as we have mentioned in the text—to call it "copulative existence"—in accordance with the usage of the authoritative Philosopher al-Dāmād in his al-Ufuq al-Mubīn and the Head of Theosophers (Mullā Ṣadrā) in his Asfār—in order to distinguish it from the "existence" of accidents, because this latter is what is called "inhering existence."

The assertion, made by the authoritative Philosopher Lāhījī in some of his works; namely, that the "existence" of accidents is what is meant by the verb "be" in its incomplete sense is groundless, because the "existence" of accidents is the "predicative existence" which is actualized in the simple "whether-ness"—see, for instance, the proposition: "The whiteness is existent"—as opposed to what is meant by the verb "be" in its incomplete sense, i.e., the "copulative existence," because the latter (i.e., the "existence" which is meant by the verb "be" in
its incomplete sense) is always “copulation” of two things, and is never separated from this function.

*What is “in-itself” should be considered as “for-itself” or “for-something-else.” As for the Truth, His mode of “existence” is in-Himself, for-Himself, and by-Himself.*

*What, i.e., “existence,” is “in-itself” should be considered either as “for-itself,” like the “existence” of substances, or “for-something-else,” i.e., “existence in-itself, for-something-else,” like for example, the “existence” of accidents. This is why it is said that the “existence” of an accident “in-itself” is the very “existence” of it “for-something-else.” So the accident has “existence” in-itself because it is a predicate, and it has a perfect “quiddity” which is essentially conceived in the mind, except that that “existence” is “in-something-else,” because in the external world it qualifies a subject.

Then the “self-subsistent existence” is of two kinds, because “existence in-itself, for-itself” is either (1) “by-something-else”—like the “existence” of substances, because it is “possible” and “caused”—(2) or “by-itself” which is the “existence” of the Truth, as indicated by the verse: *As for the Truth* most glorified, *His mode of “existence” is in-Himself*—unlike the “copulative existence,” because the latter is “existence-not-in-itself”—and *for-Himself*—unlike the “inhering existence,” because the latter is “in-itself for-something-else”—*and by Himself*—unlike the “existence” of substances, because, even if this latter is “for-itself,” it is not “by-itself.”

Our considering the accident as existent “in-itself for-something-else,” and the substance as existent “in-itself, for-itself, by-something-else” does not contradict what has been established in its proper place; namely, that the “existence” of whatever is not the One and the Unique is sheer “copulative existence,” because what is being dealt with here concerns the relations between “possible” things themselves. Otherwise, all of them are sheer “copulatives,” having no self-subsistence in relation to Him. They are nothing but phantoms and images; by themselves they are all “nothing” and “unrealities.”

*“Existence” is possessed of “explicit modes” in the mind; “necessity,” “impossibility,” and “possibility.”*
SECOND GEM
— Concerning Necessity and Possibility —

XVIII  THE THREE IMPLICIT MODES

"Existence" is (divided into) "copulative" and "inhering," then "self-subsistent." Take this (division) and keep it in mind.

"Existence" is (divided into) "copulative," i.e., affirmation of a thing as something and "inhering," then "self-subsistent." The "inhering" and "self-subsistent" share the "affirmation of a thing." Take this (division) and keep it in mind.

To explain: "existence" is "in-itself," or "not-in-itself."

To explain: "existence," generally is either (1) "(existence) in-itself," which is called "predicative existence," and which is what is meant by the verb "be" in the complete sense, (i.e., the verb "be" used in the sense of "exist," like when we say: "A is" meaning "A exists") and which is actualized in the simple "whether-ness;" or (2) "(existence) not-in-itself." This is what is meant by the verb "be" in its incomplete sense (i.e., the verb "be" used as a copula), which is actualized in the composite "whether-ness?". This latter is usually called "inhering existence." But it is preferable—as we have mentioned in the text—to call it "copulative existence"—in accordance with the usage of the authoritative Philosopher al-Dāmād in his al-Ufuq al-Mubīn and the Head of Theosophers (Mullā Šadrā) in his Asfār—in order to distinguish it from the "existence" of accidents, because this latter is what is called "inhering existence."

The assertion, made by the authoritative Philosopher Lāhījī in some of his works; namely, that the "existence" of accidents is what is meant by the verb "be" in its incomplete sense is groundless, because the "existence" of accidents is the "predicative existence" which is actualized in the simple "whether-ness"—see, for instance, the proposition: "The whiteness is existent"—as opposed to what is meant by the verb "be" in its incomplete sense, i.e., the "copulative existence," because the latter (i.e., the "existence" which is meant by the verb "be" in
its incomplete sense) is always "copulation" of two things, and is never separated from this function.

What is "in-itself" should be considered as "for-itself" or "for-something-else." As for the Truth, His mode of "existence" is in-Himself, for-Himself, and by-Himself.

What, i.e., "existence," is "in-itself" should be considered either as "for-itself," like the "existence" of substances, or "for-something-else," i.e., "existence in-itself, for-something-else," like for example, the "existence" of accidents. This is why it is said that the "existence" of an accident "in-itself" is the very "existence" of it "for-something-else." So the accident has "existence" in-itself because it is a predicate, and it has a perfect "quiddity" which is essentially conceived in the mind, except that that "existence" is "in-something-else," because in the external world it qualifies a subject.

Then the "self-subsistent existence" is of two kinds, because "existence in-itself, for-itself" is either (1) "for-something-else"—like the "existence" of substances, because it is "possible" and "caused"—(2) or "by-itself" which is the "existence" of the Truth, as indicated by the verse: As for the Truth most glorified, His mode of "existence" is in-Himself—unlike the "copulative existence," because the latter is "existence-not-in-itself"—and for-Himself—unlike the "inhering existence," because the latter is "in-itself for-something-else"—and by Himself—unlike the "existence" of substances, because, even if this latter is "for-itself," it is not "by-itself."

Our considering the accident as existent "in-itself for-something-else," and the substance as existent "in-itself, for-itself, by-something-else" does not contradict what has been established in its proper place; namely, that the "existence" of whatever is not the One and the Unique is sheer "copulative existence," because what is being dealt with here concerns the relations between "possible" things themselves. Otherwise, all of them are sheer "copulatives," having no self-subsistence in relation to Him. They are nothing but phantoms and images; by themselves they are all "nothing" and "unrealities."

"Existence" is possessed of "explicit modes" in the mind; "necessity," "impossibility," and "possibility."
These stand beyond definitions. Thus they have a perfect model in "existence."

"Existence" generally is possessed of "explicit modes" in the mind. This refers to the fact that those "modes" are in the external world "implicit," while in the mind they are "explicit." Those "explicit modes" are "necessity," "impossibility," and "possibility." These "modes," stand beyond definitions, because their concepts are a priori imprinted in the soul. Thus he who wants to give them a real definition, and not a lexical definition, cannot produce anything except circular definitions, like: "the 'necessary' is a thing the supposition of whose 'non-existence' entails an 'impossibility,'" and "the 'possible' is a thing the supposition of whose 'existence' and 'non-existence' does not entail an 'impossibility,'" and "the 'impossible' is that which is not 'possible' or that whose 'non-existence' is necessary," etc. Thus they have a perfect model in their being beyond definition in "existence."

XIX  EXPLICIT MODES ARE MENTALLY-POSITED

Their "existence" is in the mind—due to rational laboring, because it can apply to a "non-existent," and because of an infinite regress.

Their "existence," i.e., the "existence" of the "explicit modes" which are qualities of relations, is in the mind—due to rational laboring, not in the external world. This for several reasons: (1) because it can apply to a "non-existent." In fact, the "impossible non-existent" is "impossible" to exist and "necessary" not to exist; and the "possible non-existent" is "possible" to exist and not to exist. But a "non-existent" being qualified by positive external attributes is inconceivable.

And (2) because of an infinite regress. This may be explained as follows. If these "modes" were actualized in the external world, they would share "existence" with others, and they would be distinguishable from others by special characteristics. In such a case their "existence" would be different from their "quiddities," and their "quiddities" being qualified by their "existence" could not do without one of the "modes," thus entailing an infinite regress.
Their argument is not right: namely, that if those “modes” were not actualized, its “possibility” is not . . . would be the same as there is no “possibility” for it.

Let us now point out the absurdity of the proofs put forward by those who maintain that the “modes” are external things. We say: their argument is not right: namely, the argument that if those “modes”—excepting “impossibility,” for no one has ever maintained that it is something positive—were not actualized, that which will be mentioned in the following two verses would necessarily follow; that is to say, all of them (i.e., “necessity” and “possibility”) being “non-existent” would necessitate the three absurdities all together, or each one of them. The particularization which does occur (i.e., “possibility” in the first and “necessity” in the last) is but an example.

Those (alleged) absurdities are as follows: (1) In case the “modes” were not actualized, to say its “possibility” is not . . . would be the same as to say there is no possibility for it, because there is no distinction between “non-existences.” This would necessitate that a “possible” should not be “possible.” But this is absurd.

The absurdity of this argument will be explained as follows: “possibility” would in this case be something “non-existent,” and the negation of “possibility” would be the negation of this “non-existent” thing, and a thing and its negation are contradictories, and “non-existences” are, as we have seen before, distinguishable from each other with regard to what they are related to.

And the negation of two contradictories would necessarily follow.

And (2) in case the “modes” were not actualized, the negation of two contradictories would necessarily follow, because, since “necessity” and “possibility” are something “non-existent,” and since “non-necessity” and “non-possibility” are also “non-existent” things, the absurdity (i.e., the negation of two contradictories) would necessarily follow, for the negation of two contradictories exactly means that both contradictories are “non-existent.”

We can demonstrate the absurdity of this argument: First
through "destructive answer" by bringing in "blindness—non-blindness," second through a "constructive answer," by pointing out that the meaning of the negation of two contradictories in simple concepts (as opposed to propositions) is their non-predicability of one single thing—for example, "necessity" and "non-necessity" cannot be predicated of one single thing; it does not mean their being "non-existent" in themselves.

And "necessity" would be cut off from the Necessary.

And (3) in this case, "necessity" would be cut off from the Necessary. To explain: if "necessity" were something mentally-posted, it would necessarily follow that the Necessary would not be "necessary" except through a point of view taken by the reason, while apart from it there would be no "necessity." We can demonstrate the absurdity of this argument: (first) by a "destructive answer," by bringing in "possibility," even by bringing in "thing-ness;" and second by a "constructive answer" by pointing out that an "essence" being qualified by a quality in a particular stage of reality does not necessarily require the actualization of that quality therein. Besides, what we are concerned with here is only that kind of "necessity" which is a quality of the predicative relation.

XX EXPLANATION OF EACH ONE OF THE THREE IMPLICIT MODES

Each one, according to intelligent men, is "by-itself," or "by-something-else," or "in-relation," except with regard to "possibility," because "by-something-else" is excluded from this. For any of them which is "by-itself" cannot be transmuted.

Each one of "necessity," "possibility," and "impossibility" according to intelligent men is "by-itself" or "by-something-else," or "in-relation" to-something-else. Multiplication of three by three makes nine: for example, "necessity by-itself," "necessity by-something-else," "necessity in-relation-to-something-else." The rest may be understood on this analogy, except with regard to "possibility;" because "by-something-else," i.e., "pos-
sibility by-something-else,” is excluded from this division. Thus there remain actualized eight kinds. For any of them, i.e., of these implicit “modes” which is “by-itself” cannot be transmuted into another. I have opened the discussion of this question by the term “for” which indicates the reason, because I have wanted to make clear the reason of the impossibility of “possibility by-something-else.” For if a thing were “possible by-something-else” it would either be in itself “necessary” or “impossible” or “possible,” because the division into these three is in the form of a real disjunctive proposition,¹ so that it cannot be free from all of them. Thus in the first two cases, there would necessarily be “mutation,” while in the last case, the consideration of “something-else” would be necessarily pointless.

What is “in-relation” is exemplified by two correlatives and by two things supposed to be Necessary,

Now let us give examples of that which is “in-relation-to-something-else” of those three (“necessity,” “possibility,” “impossibility”). What is “in-relation,” i.e., “in-relation” among all those three, is exemplified by all the following examples. Thus our saying “exemplified by two correlatives” provides an example for “necessary in-relation-to-something-else” and for “impossible in-relation-to-something-else.” It is an example for the former with regard to the “existence” of both of them (i.e., one necessitating the other), while for the latter with regard to the “existence” of one of them and the “non-existence” of the other. In general, two “correlatives”—one of them being affirmed and the other being negated (this is an example for the second), or both being affirmed (this is an example for the first)—can be given as examples for these two (i.e., necessary-in-relation-to-something-else and impossible-in-relation-to-something-else).

The gist of the whole argument may be given in the following way. “Necessity-in-relation-to-something-else” is the “necessity” of the actualization of a thing with regard to “something-else” by way of “demanding” which is more general than “requiring.” It refers to the fact that the “essence” of that “something-else” insists on the thing’s having the “necessity” of “existence,” whether by way of essential “requirement,” as in the case of “necessity-in-relation” which is actualized in the
“effect” in relation to the “cause;” or by way of essential “need”—as in the case of “necessity-in-relation” which is actualized in the “cause” with regard to the “effect;” or again by way of “demanding” from both sides without any “requirement,” neither from both sides nor from one, as in the case of the “existence” of two “correlatives,” for each one of them is “necessary-in-relation” to the other, but not “by” the other, because there is no causal relationship between two “correlatives.” Thus “necessity-in-relation” agrees with “necessity-by-itself” and “necessity-by-something-else,” and also disagrees with them.

“Impossibility-in-relation-to-something-else” is the “necessity” of the “non-existence” of a thing with regard to “something-else” by way of absolute “demanding,” as in the case of the “existence” of the “effect” in relation to the non-existence of the “cause,” and the “non-existence” of the effect in relation to the “existence” of the “cause,” also as in the case of the “existence” of one of two “correlatives” in relation to the “non-existence” of the other, and the “non-existence” of one of them in relation to the “existence” of the other. This is also similar to the previous case in being more general (than “impossibility-by-itself” and “impossibility-by-something-else”).

“Possibility-in-relation-to-something-else” is the “non-necessity” of the “existence” and “non-existence” of a thing with regard to “something-else.” It refers to the fact that the “something-else” refuses neither “existence” of the thing nor its “non-existence” when the thing is related to the “something-else.” This is actualized only in those things which have between them no natural connection, whether causality or agreement-in-sharing-one-and-the-same-cause. We give an example of this by our saying: And by two things supposed to be Necessary, for there would be between them no connection of “necessitation” and “requirement”—otherwise (i.e., if there were such a connection between them) both of them or one of them would not be Necessary, but this would contradict our original supposition—because neither of them would refuse the “existence” and “non-existence” of the other. This supposition is useful in solving many other problems of metaphysics as, for example, the problem of the negation of “parts” in the Necessary.
XXI INQUIRIES CONCERNING POSSIBILITY ITSELF AND ITS PROPERTIES

“Possibility” occurs (to a “quiddity”) through analysis.

(1) “Possibility” occurs (to a “quiddity”) through rational analysis. The reason observes a “quiddity” itself without taking into consideration the “existence” and its “cause,” and “non-existence” and its “cause,” and it qualifies the “quiddity” by the negation of the two sides of “necessity.” However, if it takes them into consideration, the “quiddity” appears surrounded by the two sides of “necessity” or the two sides of “impossibility.”

It agrees with what is “by-something-else” of those two others.

(2) It i.e., “possibility-by-itself” agrees with what is “by-something-else” of those two others, i.e., “necessity” and “impossibility,” contrary to “necessity-by-itself” and “impossibility-by-itself;” that is to say, it agrees with “necessity-by-something-else” and “impossibility-by-something-else.” There is no contradiction between (1) “non-requirement” of “existence” and “non-existence” on the part of the “essence” of a “possible” thing and (2) the “requirement” of “existence” or “non-existence” on the part of “something-else.”

Sometimes by it is meant, in the technical usage, the “general” and the “more special possibility” and the “future possibility.”

(3) Sometimes by it i.e., by “possibility” is meant in the technical usage of metaphysicians and logicians the “general possibility.” And it is “general” and “common” (i.e., non-technical), because “possibility” in popular usage is also used in the sense of the negation of “necessity” from the opposite side. Thus they say: “Such-and-such a thing is possible,” meaning “it is not impossible.” In the same way, its well-known meaning, namely, the negation of the two sides of “necessity” is “special” and “technical” because it is that which is recognized by the specialists. We have not mentioned in the verse the latter among the different meanings of “possibility,” because we consider it as the basis, and because the whole argument concerns it.
“effect” in relation to the “cause;” or by way of essential “need”—as in the case of “necessity-in-relation” which is actualized in the “cause” with regard to the “effect;” or again by way of “demanding” from both sides without any “requirement,” neither from both sides nor from one, as in the case of the “existence” of two “correlatives,” for each one of them is “necessary-in-relation” to the other, but not “by” the other, because there is no causal relationship between two “correlatives.” Thus “necessity-in-relation” agrees with “necessity-by-itself” and “necessity-by-something-else,” and also disagrees with them.

“Impossibility-in-relation-to-something-else” is the “necessity” of the “non-existence” of a thing with regard to “something-else” by way of absolute “demanding,” as in the case of the “existence” of the “effect” in relation to the non-existence of the “cause;” and the “non-existence” of the effect in relation to the “existence” of the “cause;” also as in the case of the “existence” of one of two “correlatives” in relation to the “non-existence” of the other, and the “non-existence” of one of them in relation to the “existence” of the other. This is also similar to the previous case in being more general (than “impossibility-by-itself” and “impossibility-by-something-else”).

“Possibility-in-relation-to-something-else” is the “non-necessity” of the “existence” and “non-existence” of a thing with regard to “something-else.” It refers to the fact that the “something-else” refuses neither “existence” of the thing nor its “non-existence” when the thing is related to the “something-else.” This is actualized only in those things which have between them no natural connection, whether causality or agreement-in-sharing-one-and-the-same-cause. We give an example of this by our saying: *And by two things supposed to be Necessary, for there would be between them no connection of “necessitation” and “requirement”*—otherwise (i.e., if there were such a connection between them) both of them or one of them would not be Necessary, but this would contradict our original supposition—because neither of them would refuse the “existence” and “non-existence” of the other. This supposition is useful in solving many other problems of metaphysics as, for example, the problem of the negation of “parts” in the Necessary.
“Possibility” occurs (to a “quiddity”) through analysis.

(1) “Possibility” occurs (to a “quiddity”) through rational analysis. The reason observes a “quiddity” itself without taking into consideration the “existence” and its “cause,” and “non-existence” and its “cause,” and it qualifies the “quiddity” by the negation of the two sides of “necessity.” However, if it takes them into consideration, the “quiddity” appears surrounded by the two sides of “necessity” or the two sides of “impossibility.”

It agrees with what is “by-something-else” of those two others.

(2) It i.e., “possibility-by-itself” agrees with what is “by-something-else” of those two others, i.e., “necessity” and “impossibility,” contrary to “necessity-by-itself” and “impossibility-by-itself;” that is to say, it agrees with “necessity-by-something-else” and “impossibility-by-something-else.” There is no contradiction between (1) “non-requirement” of “existence” and “non-existence” on the part of the “essence” of a “possible” thing and (2) the “requirement” of “existence” or “non-existence” on the part of “something-else.”

Sometimes by it is meant, in the technical usage, the “general” and the “more special possibility” and the “future possibility.”

(3) Sometimes by it i.e., by “possibility” is meant in the technical usage of metaphysicians and logicians the “general possibility.” And it is “general” and “common” (i.e., non-technical), because “possibility” in popular usage is also used in the sense of the negation of “necessity” from the opposite side. Thus they say: “Such-and-such a thing is possible,” meaning “it is not impossible.” In the same way, its well-known meaning, namely, the negation of the two sides of “necessity” is “special” and “technical” because it is that which is recognized by the specialists. We have not mentioned in the verse the latter among the different meanings of “possibility,” because we consider it as the basis, and because the whole argument concerns it.
And sometimes what is meant is the “more special possibility,” which is the negation of all kinds of “necessity,” whether the latter be due to the “essence” (of the subject) or to its “property,” or to its “time.”

Al-Shaykh (Ibn Sīnā) says in the “Logic” of his Ishārāt: Sometimes they say: something is possible, and they understand thereby a third meaning. It would seem that it is more special” than the above-mentioned two meanings. The third meaning is that the judgment is “non-necessary” in terms of “essence,” and in terms of “time,” like in the case of the solar eclipse, again in terms of “state” (i.e., “property”) like changeability for a moving thing. Rather, the “more special possibility” is that which is exemplified by “writing” with regard to man.

For “writing” is “necessary” for a man in the state in which he has decided to write. But with regard to the human nature itself, there is, as is known no “necessity” due to the “essence”—because of the “essence” being indifferent to “writing” and “non-writing”—nor is there “necessity” due to “property,” nor “necessity” due to “time.” For neither a representative “property” nor “time” by which “writing” is conditioned is not implied by the “subject” itself.

And sometimes what is meant is the “future possibility,” which is the negation of all kinds of “necessity” including even the “necessity” conditioned by predication, because “future possibility” concerns the future properties of a thing.

The authoritative Philosopher al-Ṭūsī comments upon this concept mentioned by the Shaykh, and remarks: Those who take into consideration this concept do so because those “possible” things that are related to the past and the present are either “existent” or “non-existent,” so that a kind of “necessity” has driven them from the very middle ground toward either one of the two sides, while those that remain in the state of pure “possibility” can be nothing other than what is related to the future; namely, those “possible” things whose state is unknown as to whether or not they will be “existent” when the time comes. Thus this kind of “possible” things must be called “possible” in a “more special sense” with the addition of the determination “in-future,” because the first two (i.e., “general possibility” and “special possibility”) sometimes are applied to the case in which one of the two sides is determined through a
kind of “necessity,” like, for example, the solar eclipse. Thus it will not be a pure “possible.”

Al-Ṭūsī indicates by saying: “the possible things whose state is unknown, etc.,” that the non-determination of “existence” and “non-existence” in the future and the remaining of a “possible” in its pure state of “possibility” are only in accordance with our knowledge, not in accordance with the “fact-itself.”

This is why Al-Ṭūsī says in the chapter “Concerning Contradiction” in his Commentary on the Ishārāt: The truthfulness and falsity sometimes become determined, as in the case of the implicit modes of “necessity” and “impossibility” (i.e., truthfulness in the case of “necessity” and falsity in the case of “impossibility”); sometimes they are not determined, as in the case of the implicit mode of “possibility,” especially the “future possibility.”

This is because, in the case of something which occurs in the past and the present, one side of its occurrence becomes determined, whether “existence” or “non-existence,” and the true and false become determined in accordance with “agreement” and “non-agreement,” even though in relation to us they may be undetermined because of our ignorance of the fact. As for the “future possibility,” the indetermination of one of its sides has sometimes been questioned as to whether it is so in the “fact-itself,” or in relation to us. The majority imagine that it is so in the “fact-itself,” while a closer investigation reveals that it is not so, because all “possible” things in themselves rely upon “causes” by which they become “necessary” and without which they become “impossible,” and because all these “causes” are to be traced back to a Prime Maker who is “necessary” for Himself.

What has preceded is evidently what the majority of logicians have taken into consideration. But a deeper philosophical investigation leads to the conclusion that the future, past, and present are equal in not being determined in relation to us, and in being determined in the “fact-itself,” and in being determined as either “necessary” or “impossible” with regard to actual occurrence, and in being “possible” with regard to the concept itself.

“Quiddity” requires “possibility.”
(4) "Quiddity" requires "possibility," that is to say, the "thingness" of the "quiddity" itself is sufficient for requiring "possibility" without need of any additional factor, because "possibility" is nothing but the non-requirement of "existence" and "non-existence."

Thus when you represent a "quiddity" and the relation of "existence" and "non-existence" to it, you will notice that the "quiddity" is by itself sufficient to be something from which this non-requirement can be abstracted. And since "quiddity" requires "possibility" by simply being considered in itself, there is no need for us to care about the following fallacious arguments put forward concerning this problem. One of them: a "possible" thing is either "existent" or "non-existent," and whichever supposition we may take, it does have "necessity" conditioned by predication; how can it then, be "possible"? Second: A "possible" thing is either accompanied by the "existence" of its complete "cause"—in which case it would become "necessary," or accompanied by the "non-existence" of its "cause," in which case it would become "impossible."

And that a "possible" is "in-need" is a priori

(5) And that a "possible" is in need of an "active agent" is self-evident, a priori, requiring neither a proof nor anything else of those which are required by its other five divisions of "self-evidence." However, a primary judgment may sometimes contain obscurity due to the lack of the representation of its terms, but the obscurity of representation does not harm the judgments being primary.

Know that those who maintain the thesis of "chance" and "coincidence" deny this proposition (namely, that a "possible" is in need of an "active agent"). But its denial would be equivalent to the permissibility of "preponderance" without there being a "preponderant," which even al-Ash'ārī does not maintain.¹⁴

Al-Fakhr al-Razī mentions on behalf of these people several fallacious arguments. One of them is that a "possible" needs an "active agent" either in its "quiddity" in such a way that the "active agent" makes it (i.e., a "quiddity") a "quiddity," or in its "existence" in such a way it makes it (i.e., "existence") "existence"—both of which would clearly necessitate the thing not-being itself,—or in the relation of "qualification," but the latter is something pertaining to "non-existence."
The “effect” of “making” is “inhering existence”

To this we may answer by pointing out that the “effect” of “making” (i.e., what is “made” through “simple making”) is “inhering existence,” not “existence”-being-“existence,” as we have seen.

Another fallacious argument is that if a “possible” were in need of an “active agent,” the quality of “being-affected” would also be a “possible” thing, which in turn would need another quality of “being-affected,” and so on ad infinitum.

The quality of “acting” is only in the mind.

The answer to this is that the quality of “acting” is only in the mind, and is not something actualized externally. That does not harm the “active agent” being qualified by the quality of “acting,” because affirming something of a thing does not necessitate the subsistance in the external world of the subject affirmed.

There is no difference between “coming-into-being” and “continuance,” because a “possible” thing has no “requirement.”

One of the problems connected with “possibility” is that a “possible” is in need of a “cause” for its “continuance,” too. This is indicated by our verse: There is no difference between “coming-into-being” and “continuance” with regard to “need,” because a “possible” thing has no “requirement.” For just as its “existence” in its first stage is not due to a “requirement” coming from its “essence,” so is the case with the second stage and the third stage, etc., because the “need,” as we shall see presently, hinges upon “possibility” which is a consequential attribute of “quiddity.” And so is the need also a consequential attribute of “quiddity.” Rather, “possible existence,” at whichever stage of reality it may be, whether it be in the “eternal duration” or in “time” or in a “unit of time,” whether it be “temporal” or “perpetual,” is the very “need” and “want” of a “cause”—not that it is an “essence” having a “need”—and it subsists by the “cause,” acquiring an “essence” through the “essence” of the “cause,” in such a way that if the “existence” of the “cause” be discarded, it would not be anything. This may be compared—although it is a remote comparison—to
discarding the essential properties of the “thingness” of a “quiddity,” which would result in there remaining no longer that “quiddity.”

How ridiculous is the thesis of those who hold that the “effect” (i.e., “caused”) is in need of a “cause” for “coming-into-being,” but not for “continuance.” They dare to go to the extreme of saying that if “non-existence” were permissible for the Maker, His “non-existence” would do no harm to the “existence” of the world. He stands high above the utterances of the unjust!

(From Him) effuses the perpetuation of the “existence” of the things.

Our verse: (From Him) effuses the perpetuation of the “existence” of the things, is an answer to a possible objection on their part that if a “possible” were in need of an “active agent” in the state of “continuance,” then its “action” would concern either the “existence” which has been acquired before this state—that would be a case of acquiring something which has already been acquired—or a new “existence” that comes into being. But this latter supposition contradicts the original supposition.

The gist of the answer is that the “action” certainly concerns something new, but it is the continuation of the first “existence” and its perpetuation, not something separate from the first “existence.” So it does not contradict the original supposition.

The similitude of something “made” in relation to its maker is a shadow.

Since they cling to the example of “building” and “builder,” we shall tear down their building upon their heads by saying that: The similitude and the state of something “made” in relation to its maker is a shadow in relation to the sundial, because the former is a mere follower, coming into being by latter’s coming into being, continuing by the latter’s continuing, and rotating with the latter in whichever direction it turns. The builder is not a “creative cause,” but, rather, the movements of his hands are the “preparing causes” for the assembling of bricks and timbers. And that assembling is the “cause” for a certain form. Then the continuance of that form for the bricks and timbers is the “effect” of dryness which derives from Nature. The real Agent, however, is none other than God.
The “requirement” is due to “possibility.” A “pre-eternal” in terms of time is an object of “making.”

Another problem is that the reason for a “possible” thing requiring a “cause” is its “possibility.” The “requirement” of a “cause” is due to “possibility,” which is the position taken by the Philosophers. One of the consequences of this principle is that a “pre-eternal,” in terms of time, like the Universal Intellect, is an object of “making” because it is “possible.” But according to the doctrine of their opponents, this is not so, because there is in such a case no “coming-into-being,” which is, in their view, the basis of “requirement.”

The fact that the “actual proposition is “necessary.”

Now there are several evidences for this thesis. (1) The fact that the “actual proposition,” i.e., a proposition whose predicate happens to be actual in one of the three divisions of time (i.e., past, present, future), is “necessary.” This may be explained as follows.

A thing, when considered with regard to its “existence,” is “necessarily existent.” while when considered with regard to its “non-existence,” it is “necessarily non-existent.” This is a “necessity” conditioned by predication and in accordance with the time of predication. And “coming-into-being” is the succession of these two states (i.e., “non-existence” → “existence”). Thus if we consider a “quiddity” in so far as it has this state only, it is “necessary,” and “necessity” is the basis of the “non-requirement” of a “cause.” So “coming-into-being” qua “coming-into-being” is prevented from “being-in-need.” Thus as long as the “quiddity” is not considered in its “essence,” i.e., its essential “possibility,” the “necessity” is not removed, and the need for a “cause” is not actualized.

The essential properties of the First and of the “quiddity.”

(2) The second evidence is provided by the essential properties of the First, Most High, and of the “quiddity.” The explanation of this is as follows: In the view of all sects seeking for the knowledge of the realities, the Necessary, Most High, has essential properties. The Philosophers regard them as “relative attributes,” and the Illuminationists among them regard
them as "victorious Lights." The Peripatetics regard them as "imprinted forms," the Ash'arīyah as "real attributes that are additional (to the Essence)," the Mu'tazilah as "states," and the Ṣūfīs as "permanent archetypes." These essential properties are not "necessarily existent" in the light of the proofs of the Divine Unity. They are "possibly subsistent" if considered in themselves, and "necessarily subsistent" if considered in relation to the Essence of the First, Most High. Thus it is established that the "action" is not conditioned by the precedence of "non-existence."

If they object and say: We are talking about Acts, but these are not Acts, we would answer: what we want to assert is that "eternity" and "not-being-preceded-by-non-existence" do not reject dependence. And a rational principle cannot be limited to certain particular cases; (i.e., the same principle applies equally to the Attributes and the Acts). Likewise every "quiddity" has an essential property which is dependent upon it (i.e., "quiddity"), and which cannot be posterior to it in time. So that "non-existence" does not infiltrate between them.

**Further, the impossibility of conditioning by the opposite.**

**Further, (3) the third evidence is provided by the impossibility of conditioning, i.e., something being conditioned by the opposite.** The explanation of it is as follows. The "non-existence" preceding the "existence" of a thing is an "opposite." How can the "existence" of a thing be conditioned by its "opposite?" And if the precedence of "non-existence" be a condition for the "action" of the Agent, the same difficulty (i.e., a thing being conditioned by its opposite) would arise, because something which is opposite to that which must accompany the thing is also opposite to and totally different from it. As for "possibility," it does accompany the "existence" of a thing and is not opposed to it.

**The "need" in the state of "continuance:"** (These four are) my evidences.

**The fourth evidence is provided by the "need" in the state of "continuance."** This may be explained as follows. A temporal thing, in the state of "continuance," is in need of a "cause." If the opponent claims that the basis of the "need" is
“coming-into-being,” we would say that it is simply impossible because “continuance” is opposed to “coming-into-being.” But if the basis of the “need” is “possibility,” our thesis is thereby established. (These four are) my evidences.

“Coming-into-being” is not the cause of the “need” at all, neither by being a “condition,” nor by being a “part,” nor by itself.

Let us now explain that “coming-into-being” is absolutely not the basis of the “need,” by saying: “Coming-into-being” is not the cause of the “need” at all. This thesis is clarified by our saying: Neither by being a “condition,” in such a way that “possibility” conditioned by “coming-into-being” be the cause of the “need,” nor by being a “part,” in such a way that “possibility” with “coming-into-being” be the “cause,” nor by itself, in such a way that “coming-into-being” alone be the “cause.”

But how? when “coming-into-being” is a “quality” of something which follows the “need,” when the enumeration of the degrees is made in a successive order.

These are the three positions taken by the Theologians. But how is it conceivable that “coming-into-being” should be the “cause,” when “coming-into-being” is a “quality” of something, i.e., of “existence,” which follows the “need,” and which is posterior to it by degrees?

This may be explained as follows. “Coming-into-being” is a “quality” of “existence,” because it means “existence” being preceded by “non-existence” so that it is posterior to “existence,” which is posterior to “bringing-to-existence,” which is posterior to the “need,” which again is posterior to its “cause.” If “coming-into-being” were the “cause” of the “need,” whether independently or as a “part” or as a “condition,” it would precede itself by degrees. One will actually find that the “need” is followed by “coming-into-being” when the enumeration of the degrees is made in a successive order in such a way that a thing “subsists,” then becomes “possible,” then becomes “being-in-need,” then is “made necessary,” then becomes “necessary,” then is “made to exist,” then “exists,” then “comes-into-being.”
And the "non-existence" which precedes "existence" is not a special ("non-existence").

Moreover, how is that (i.e., "coming-into-being" being the cause) conceivable when the "existence" of a "possible" is conditioned by the precedence of "non-existence," and the "non-existence" which precedes "existence" is not a special ("non-existence")?

"Replacing non-existence" would contradict "existence;" its "portions" would be in a vicious circle.

If what is meant is "replacing non-existence," it would contradict "existence." Its "portions," i.e., the "portions" of "non-existence" would be in a vicious circle. This may be explained as follows. If "non-existence" were a condition for the "existence" of a "possible;" either (1) what is meant would be the preceding "non-existence" absolutely—in which case, it would not be a "condition" for a special thing which comes into being—or (2) what is meant would be "non-existence" related to the special thing which comes into being—in which case a vicious circle would necessarily follow, because both the related and the related-to would depend upon each other—or (3) what is meant would be "replacing non-existence;" but it would contradict the "existence" of the thing which comes into being, for by its very actualization (i.e., the actualization of the "existence") that "non-existence" is removed. But if what is meant by this "non-existence" is the "non-existence" which is essential to the "possible," namely, "non-requirement" of both "existence" and "non-existence," we would have to take into consideration "possibility" again. But this contradicts the original supposition. Besides its precedence is in terms of "essence," not in terms of "time."

We have mentioned the "replacing non-existence," although it is not what is meant by the opponent, only to indicate that it is the "non-existence" of a thing in truth, but only with regard to its "quiddity" itself—without consideration of its being a locus for the Divine "self-manifestation"—even when the "quiddity" is illumined by "existence." But from the point of view of its being a locus for the Divine "self-manifestation," there is no "non-existence" because precisely its contradictory is actualized. Moreover, both the preceding "non-existence"
and the following “non-existence” are not its “non-existence” in truth, because the “non-existence” of a thing is its removal, and its removal is its contradictory, and the unity of time is a condition for contradiction. Thus it could be said: the preceding “non-existence” is not its “non-existence,” because it is not its contradictory; rather, it is its “replacing non-existence” that is its contradictory, and the contradictory of one thing cannot but be one.

XXII SOME PROPERTIES OF NECESSITY-BY-SOMETHING-ELSE

A thing does not become “existent” by “preponderance,” whether due to something else, or by itself, whether sufficient or not. According to the right view, “Preponderance” necessarily requires “necessitating.”

This chapter is concerned with the thesis that a thing, as long as it is not “necessitated,” does not become “existent.” The position of “necessitated” is untenable. A thing does not become “existent” by any kind of “preponderance” whether the “preponderance” be due to something-else, or by-itself, and whether the latter, namely, the “essential preponderance” be sufficient or not in the actualization of a “possible.” According to the right view—contrary to some of the Theologians who maintain the position of “preponderance-by-something-else,” and deny the “necessitating” and “necessity” in the bringing-into-being of a “possible”—“preponderance,” i.e., an “active agent” giving “preponderance” to the “existence” of a “possible” or to its “non-existence,” necessarily requires the “necessitating” of that particular “existence” or of that particular “non-existence.”

The “nothing-ness” of a “possible” negates the second completely. Likewise, the first one (is negated) by the remaining of “equality.”

Now let us give a proof of it by saying: The “nothing-ness” of a “possible,” i.e., a “possible” being in itself “nothing,” negates
the second, i.e., the “essential preponderance,” completely, i.e., in both of its kinds, “sufficient” and “non-sufficient.” For a “quiddity” is essentially nothing but itself, and so long as it does not accidentally come into the domain of “existence,” it is “nothing;” it cannot even be said to be itself. Its “essence,” its “essential properties,” its “possibility,” and its “need”—although they precede its “existence” by way of a conceptual precedence—are only so, due to the working of the mind. But in the external world, the contrary is the case (i.e., “existence” precedes them).

Thus as long as there is no “existence,” there is no “quiddity,” nor any appearance of its “essential properties.” Thus there is no “quiddity” before “existence” so that it might require “preponderance” in either of its kinds.

Likewise, the first one, i.e., the “preponderance by-something-else” is negated by the remaining of “equality,” i.e., the “equality” of “existence” and “non-existence,” in the original state. For since this kind of “preponderance” does not reach the stage of “necessity,” it does not render the opposite side “impossible.” So “the actualization” and “non-actualization” through this kind of “preponderance” are both equal, so that one of them would not be actualized yet, contrary to the case in which it reaches the stage of “necessity,” because in the latter case the opposite side would not remain. Thus as long as the “active agent” does not obstruct all the aspects of the “non-existence” of the “effect,” it does not come into “existence;” and the question: Why has this been actualized, instead of that? still remains open. This is what is called the “preceding necessity” in a “possible,” issuing from a “cause.”

Then the “following necessity” is clarified.

Then there is another kind of “necessity” which is called the “following necessity:” and this also is demonstrated and clarified in its proper place. It follows a “possible” in actu after the actualization of “existence” or “non-existence.” This is what is called the “necessity-conditioned-by-predication.” No “actual proposition” is devoid of it.

Thus a “possible” is surrounded by two kinds of “necessity.”

If you ask: What is the meaning of “existence” being “pre-
ceded” and “followed” by “necessity,” when the nature of “existence” indicates the nature of “necessity,” rather, it is “necessity” itself, because the nature of “existence” is nothing but the nature of the “refusal of non-existence?”

We would answer: The “precedence” and “following” here in question are due to the view of the intellect when it considers these concepts, and when the consecutive order between them is considered. Thus the Philosophers’ dictum: “a thing, as long as it is not necessitated, does not become existent” means that as long as all the aspects of “non-existence” are not obstructed, the intellect does not affirm its “existence.” Thus a “possible” is surrounded by two kinds of “necessity.”

*The relation between “necessity” and “possibility” is like the relation between “complete” and “incomplete.”*

Our verse: *The relation between “necessity” and “possibility” is like the relation between “complete and “incomplete” represents a question which is often discussed among Philosophers. It means that, since “possibility” is an intermediary stage between “necessity” and “impossibility,” its relation to “necessity” is as mentioned in this verse.

It is preferable to understand by “possibility,” “possibility” in the sense of “need” which is applied to the “limited existences,” in accordance with the terminology of the Head of Theosophers (Mullâ Şadrā), and by “necessity” the “essential necessity.” Therefore sharing the same root like a thing and its shadow, which is observable in the “complete” and “incomplete,” is here actualized.

Besides its being in itself an important problem, the mention- ing of it removes the imaginary contradiction between the two kinds of “necessity” and “possibility,” for the “essential possibility” is comparable to “matter,” and the “necessity-by-something-else” to “form” so that they do agree with each other.
XXIII POSSIBILITY-THROUGH-PREPAREDNESS

Sometimes "possibility" is qualified by being "through-preparedness." And it is in their technical terminology something other than "preparedness."

Sometimes "possibility" is qualified by being "through-preparedness." and it is in their (i.e., Philosophers') technical terminology something other than "preparedness." For the "preparedness" of a thing for becoming another thing has two relations: one to the thing which has the nature of "preparedness" and another to the thing for which it is "prepared." In the first case it is called "preparedness;" for example, a sperm is said to have the nature of "preparedness" for "being-a-man." And in the second case, it is called "possibility-through-preparedness;" for example, a man is possible to exist in the sperm. If by way of a loose expression it is said that the sperm is possible to become a man, what is meant thereby is what we have just said.

This is called "realizable possibility."

This, i.e., the "possibility-through-preparedness," is also called "realizable possibility." But this "realizable possibility" which is synonymous with the "possibility-through-preparedness" is different from the "realizable possibility" which is to be understood as a thing being in such a way that the supposition of its "actualization" does not entail any impossibility, because the former concerns the material beings, while the latter is applicable to both "material" and "non-material" things.

The difference between it and the "essential" is to be considered.

The difference between it i.e., the "possibility-through-preparedness" and the "essential possibility" is to be considered from different points of view which are mentioned in the al-Ufuq al-Mubīn and the Asfār.

For it is in actu in one aspect.

(1) For it, i.e., the "possibility-through-preparedness," is in actu in one aspect. For it is something actualized in the external world, because it is a "quality" subsisting in "matter," preparing
it for receiving the "existence" of things occurring in it, which effuses from the Generous Source, like the "forms" and "accidents;" or for receiving the "existence" of things occurring with it, like the "non-material soul." Such is not the case with "essential possibility."

Thus the "preparedness" is something in actu from the point of view of its being a special "quality" in "matter" understood in the most general sense, while it is in potentia from the point of view of its being "possibility" and "receptivity" for the thing for which it is "prepared."

As for the remark made by Mullā Ṣadrā in his Asfār: "because its being in actu is with regard to a different aspect from its being "potentiality" and "possibility" for a thing. For the sperm, although it is in potentia with regard to the occurrence of the 'form' of its being-man to it, it is in actu with regard to itself and to its being in possession of the "form" of its being-sperm. Thus it is incomplete with regard to its being-man, but complete with regard to its being-sperm, contrary to the "essential possibility" which is something completely negative, and has no positive meaning with regard to a different aspect," probably he intends to point out the similarity (between "accident" and "substratum") or to say that an "accident," especially a "quality-through-preparedness," since the substratum of "possibility-through-preparedness" is composed of actuality and potentiality, is actual in one aspect, and potential in another, contrary to the "essential possibility," because the "substratum" of the latter is not actual even in "existence" and "non-existence;" so it is sheer "potentiality." Otherwise, the argument is concerned with the "possibility-through-preparedness," not with the "substratum" of "preparedness."

The "essential possibility" is in the position of the origin for it.

(2) The "essential possibility" is in the position of the "origin" for it, i.e., for the "possibility-through-preparedness." And that is so from two points of view. The first is that "possibility-through-preparedness" seems to be the same as "essential possibility" with an additional aspect taken into consideration. The second is that "essential possibility" is the source of "possibility-through-preparedness," because the Prime Matter, which causes different sorts of "evils," issues forth from the Active
Intellect through the intermediary of the aspect of the “essential possibility” in the Active Intellect.

_The object to which “potentiality” is directed is determined._

(3) _The object to which “potentiality” is directed_, i.e., the object to which “potentiality” and “preparedness” are directed, _is determined_ in the case of the “possibility-through-preparedness,” because it is the state of its being directed in special direction toward one special perfection, like the “preparedness” of the human sperm for its “form.” On the contrary, the object of the “essential possibility” is both “existence” and “non-existence,” and the determination emerges from the Agent.

_There is in it the permissibility of being separated from the “possible” thing._

(4) _There is in it_, i.e., in “possibility-through-preparedness,” _the permissibility of being separated from the “possible” thing_ by the actualization of the thing for which it is “prepared,” because “preparedness” is removed by the occurrence of actuality. On the contrary, the “essential possibility” always follows the “quiddity,” and agrees with the “necessity-by-something-else” and “impossibility-by-something-else,” as we have seen before.

_It is in the “locus” of a “possible” thing._

(5) _It_, i.e., “possibility-through-preparedness” _is in the “locus” of a “possible” thing_, i.e., in its “matter in the more general sense, including the place of the “specific forms,” the “substratum,” and the “object of association.” And it subsists in its “locus” because the latter is, in truth, the thing which is qualified by the “preparedness,” “proximity” and “remoteness,” while the “possible” thing is qualified thereby only because of its connection and relation with the “locus.” It is something similar to what is called in grammar “qualifying a thing by the state of its associate.” As for the “essential possibility,” it is a quality of a “possible” thing with regard to itself.

_Know that there is in it intensity and weakness._

(6) _Know that there is in it intensity and weakness._ For
example, the “preparedness” of the human sperm for the human “form” is weaker than the “preparedness” of the clot of blood for it, and the “preparedness” of the latter is weaker than the “preparedness” of the foetus, and so on, until we reach the “preparedness” of the fully grown body in the womb. The complete “preparedness” becomes actualized only after the actualization of the “essential possibility” through the occurrence of certain causes and conditions and the removal of certain obstacles. And its continuation ceases either through the actualization of the thing or through the occurrence of certain obstacles.
THIRD GEM
— Concerning the Eternity and Coming-into-Being —

XXIV DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS

If “existence” is not posterior to “non-existence” or to something else, it is called “pre-eternity.”

If “existence” is not posterior to “non-existence,” whether preceding non-existence” or “parallel non-existence,” or posterior to something else—this choice between these two (i.e., being posterior to “non-existence” and posterior to something else) in the expression indicates that one is allowed to define “pre-eternity” by either of the two; in fact the people of Reason have defined it both ways, but the result ultimately comes to the same thing because what is meant by “something-else” is more general than “cause” and “non-existence”—then it, i.e., the above-mentioned kind of “existence,” is called “pre-eternity.” An indication is hereby made that this definition is simply an explanation of the word.

Understand the meaning of “coming-into-being” from it as something opposite to it.

Understand the meaning of “coming-into-being” from it, i.e., from the meaning of “pre-eternity,” as something opposite to it, i.e., “pre-eternity.” That is to say, “coming-into-being” is being-preceded by “non-existence” or something else (i.e., “cause”).

Describe them as “real” and “relative.”

Now let us begin by mentioning the divisions of “pre-eternity” and “coming-into-being,” and the definitions of most of these divisions by saying: Describe them, i.e., both “pre-eternity” and “coming-into-being” as “real” and “relative.”

The “real” of both of them has just been clarified. As for the “relative pre-eternity,” its meaning is that the amount of the time that has past of the “existence” of a thing is more than the amount of the time that has past of the “existence” of another thing, while the “relative coming-into-being” is its being less.

“Coming-into-being” is described as “essential,” and
it is the precedence of the “non-existence” of the “essence.”

Know it.
Or describe it by “parallel non-existence.”

“Coming-into-being” is described as “essential,” and the definition of it is the precedence of the “non-existence” of the “essence.” Know it. Or describe it, instead of by “non-existence” of the “essence,” by “parallel non-existence.” Thus “essential coming-into-being” means the “existence” of a thing being preceded by “essential non-existence,” or being preceded by “parallel non-existence.” Both indicate the “possibility” which inseparably follows the “quiddity,” namely, the “non-requirement” of “existence” and “non-existence” through itself, as al-Shaykh Ibn Sīnā remarks: A “possible” thing in itself is “non-existent” and by its “cause” becomes “existent.”

In the same way, the precedence of “non-existence” occurring and ceasing is called “temporal,” like “nature” which renews itself at every moment.

In the same way, the precedence of “non-existence” occurring, i.e., the “preceding” one which is called the “temporal non-existence,” and ceasing is called “temporal,” like “nature,” i.e., the “coming-into-being” of “nature” which renews itself at every moment in accordance with the requirement of the “substantial movement.”

“Coming-into-being through-perpetual-duration” proposed by the Lord of the eminent Scholars is like the former: it is the precedence of “preceding non-existence” by way of “separable precedence” of it. However, it is in the “longitudinal” hierarchy.

“Coming-into-being through-perpetual-duration”—proposed by the Lord of the eminent Scholars, i.e., the Authority Mīr-e Dāmād who is so outstanding in true Wisdom that he has been called the Third Teacher, has maintained the “coming-into-being” of the world by way of “coming-into-being-through-perpetual-duration,” and he elaborated the thesis in the most perfect manner—is like the former, i.e., the “temporal coming-into-being.” It is the precedence of “preceding non-existence” over the “existence” of a thing by way of “separable prec-
edence" of it, i.e., of the "non-existence." However, it, i.e., the precedence of "non-existence" and its "separable" priority is in the "longitudinal hierarchy," contrary to their state in the "temporal coming-into-being;" because in the latter case they are in the "latitudinal" hierarchy.

Let us explain by providing three introductory theses.

The first: every "existent" has for its "existence" a "container" or something comparable to it. Thus the "container" of the "mobiles" like movement and moving things, is "time," whether "by-itsel" or "by-its-points," the latter being the supposed "moments" which are the "containers" of "momentary" things, like the "arrivals" to the limits of distances. That which is "by-itself" includes both those which occur by way of "correspondence"—like "cutting movements"—and those which do not occur by way of "correspondence"—like "mediating movements." What is comparable to the "container" for the luminous non-material things, is "perpetual duration." And the latter is, like those things themselves, simple and devoid of quantity, connection, mobility, and the like. And its relation to "time" is the same as the relation of the "spirit" to the "body" (i.e., that of "governing"). And what is comparable to the "container" for the Truth and His Attributes and Names is "sempiternity."

The second: "existence" in general has two hierarchies: "longitudinal" and "latitudinal." As for the "longitudinal," it starts from its First Point, which is the Principle of all principles and the End of all ends, then comes the Divine Dimension, then the world of pure Intellecets, then the world of souls and finally the world of bodily forms. As for the "latitudinal," what is meant here is the world of physical bodies.

The third: "non-existence" follows "existence" in its properties, like unity and multiplicity, stability and mobility, and its "container." Thus it is divided into "temporal non-existence," "non-existence-through-perpetual-duration," and "sempiternal non-existence."

That which imprints the trace of "non-existences" in the mind is the fact that among the "latitudinal existents," every stage of "existence" lacks the properties of another stage and that every "lower existence" lacks the properties of a "higher existence" among the "longitudinal existents."

Now that these preliminary theses have been established, let
us go on to say that the statement of al-Sayyid (Dāmād) that the world is “originated” on the level of “perpetual duration” means that the “existence” of the “material world” is preceded by “non-existence” at the level of “prepetual duration,” because its “existence” is preceded by the “existence” of the world of the souls whose “container” is the “perpetual duration,” by way of precedence at the level of “perpetual duration.”

Thus just as every individual term of the “latitudinal” hierarchy and every unit of its “time” are “non-existence,” or a “tracer” of “non-existence,” for another individual term of the “latitudinal” hierarchy and for another (unit) of its “time” respectively, so every stage in the “longitudinal” hierarchy is “non-existence,” or a “tracer” of “non-existence,” in that stage for another stage of the “longitudinal” hierarchy. Just as “non-existence” in the “latitudinal” hierarchy, is actual, so is “non-existence” in the “longitudinal” hierarchy, because the “existences” are actual, and in the stage of each “existence” there is “non-existence” for another stage; rather, each one is “non-existence” for the other, and each “container” of “existence” is itself a “container” for the “non-existence” of the preceding one and its “associate.” And just as the measures of circular movements in this worlds are “times,” so the extension of the movement of the Sun of the Real Light in the two curves of Descent and Ascent from the axis of the heavenly “sphere” of the “existences” of those worlds constitutes “Divine Days,” as He, Most High, says: “Remind them of the Days of God.”

The conclusion is that the “existence” of the world, in his view, is preceded by the “actual non-existence” at the level of “perpetual duration,” and not preceded by the “imaginary non-existence” at the level of “time”—as the Theologians assert—not preceded by the “parallel non-existence” which is in the stage of “quiddity” only, as some Philosophers are related to have asserted.

An “originated-as-a-name”—a term which is my own coinage—means that the “traces” and “names” are “occurring” and “erased.”

An “originated-as-a-name”—a term which is my own coinage—i.e., that which I myself have chosen as a technical term, means that “traces” and “names” which appear are “occurring,” i.e., something new—because “God was while there was noth-
ing with” Him,” neither “name” nor “trace” nor “attribute” nor “particularization,” and there “occurred” as something new from the stage of Oneness the “names” and “traces.” And as every “name” and “trace” is something “occurring” which did not exist before and then came into existence, so—they are effaced and “erased,” when they all return to the King Retri- butor. To this referred the Lord of the pious, ‘Alī when he said “the perfection of sincerity to God is the negation of the Attributes from Him.”

This technical term I have taken from the Divine Words: “They are nothing but names which you and your forefathers have made up. God has not sent down any authority for them,” and from the words of Commander of the Believers and the Lord of Unifiers, ‘Alī: “To make Him unique is to distinguish Him from His creatures. And the basis of the distinction is a difference of attributes (i.e., degrees), not a difference of complete separation.”

The distinction in terms of “qualities,” not “sepa- ration,” has been handed down from one whose relation to the Intellect is like that of our forefather to mankind.

To this refers our verse: The distinction in terms of “quali- ties,” not in terms of “separation” has been handed down from one whose relation to the Intellect is like that of our forefather, i.e., Adam, to mankind. That is to say, it has been handed down from a man whose Intellect in its being fundamental and univer- sal in relation to the Intellects in their being derivative and particular is comparable to our forefather Adam in relation to the human bodies. For ‘Alī, may God bless him, is the Father of the Intellects and Spirits, just as Adam was the father of the bodies and similitudes. How splendid is the saying:

Even if I am a son of Adam with regard to the bodily form, there is in this form a reality which attests to my being the father (of Adam).

Thus the Truth was while there was nothing,
Just as all things will be folded up completely by the Forceful.

Thus the Truth was while there was nothing, just as all things
will be folded up completely by the Forceful. This is to confirm and establish the above-mentioned position, and to indicate that the beginning and the end are one, and that the "folding up" occurs through His Name "Forceful," just as the "spreading out" occurs through the Names that are appropriate to Him, like "Beginner," "Creator," "Originator," "Producer," as the Mystics are accustomed to say.

Thus all these kinds of "coming-into-being" that have been mentioned are realized in all other than the possessor of the Command and creation whether their "particulars" or "universals," whether their "parts" or "whole."

Thus all these kinds of "coming-into-being" that have been mentioned are realized in all other than the possessor of the Command, i.e., the possessor of the world of non-material things, and creation, i.e., the world of bodies and material things. That is to say, all kinds of "coming-into-being" are realized in the whole of the two worlds. This does not contradict the whole of these kinds of "coming-into-being" being realized in a part of the whole, i.e., the world of creatures as a whole, including even the "temporal coming-into-being," to which many of the people of reasoning have not reached, so that God's abstaining from the exercise of Generosity would not become necessary.

This may be demonstrated as follows. We shall later establish "substantial movement," and we shall establish that the "natures" of the world, whether spherical or elemental, are changing through their "essences" and moving with regard to their "substances," while their "accidents" follow them in renewal, and receive any change occurring in the "substances," and are unified with them (i.e., "substances") in actualization, in the same way as a "genus" is unified with a "differentia," and move in accordance with the movements of "substances." Thus the "transformation" does not affect the "qualities" of the world only, but their "essences" as well.

Every unit considered of a "mobile" thing is surrounded by two kinds of "non-existence," "preceeding" and "following," which are both "temporal mobiles," because their "container" is the "container" of two kinds of "existence" which encompass the "mobile" thing from both sides, and these two kinds of
“existence” are “mobile.” As you already know, the “container” of “mobile” things is “time.” So the “existence” of that unit is preceded by “temporal non-existence;” and the same is true of the parts of that unit and the parts of its parts. And the same applies to that which comes next to that unit on both sides, and that which comes next to what comes next.

Thus in each of the units of the “mobile natures” there is a non-suitability for the negation of its being preceded by “temporal non-existence.” And the same is true of the total whole, because the latter has no “existence” except the “existence” of the parts, especially as regards the extended things, whether immobile, (e.g., “distance”) or not immobile (e.g., “time”), whose parts are equal with each other and with the whole in definition and name. The nature of the whole is the same as that of the parts. And the same is true of the “natural universal” of the “mobile natures,” because it has no “existence” except the “existence” of the individuals. This is why we say: whether their particulars or universals, whether their parts or whole.

But the maintaining of every “species” is realized through the Ideas.

Since someone might object and say that according to the thesis of the “essential change,” it would be necessary that every “nature” and “every specific form” should be a different “essence,” we add: But the maintainig of every “species” which is “mobile” through its “essence” and “qualities” is realized through the luminous Ideas, just as the maintaining of every individual human body, its unity and its stability—despite its gradual transformation through corruption—is realized through the rational souls. Since every one of these changing “species” is thus connected with the “illumination” of its “Lord” (i.e., Idea) which is one, simple and permanently in one state, which is comparable to “spirit” if we regard the “species” as its “body,” or is comparable to “meaning” if we regard the “species” as its “form” and “expression,” or to a pure “principle” if we regard the “species” as its “derivative”—“with God comprehending them all from behind12—it’s unity and its stability are necessarily preserved by this “illumination.”
XXV  OPINIONS CONCERNING THAT WHICH GIVES PREPONDERANCE TO THE ORIGINATION OF THE WORLD IN POST-ETERNITY

That which gives “preponderance” to the “coming-into-being” is “time” itself, because there is no “time” before it. And this view has been accepted by al-Ka'bi.

That which give “preponderance” to the “coming-into-being,” i.e., of the world and that which specifies it with a specific “time” is “time” itself because there is no “time” before it. And this view has been accepted and approved by al-Ka'bi from amongst the Theologians.

Against this we shall argue by transferring the argument to the “time-itself” and ask: Why did it occur in “post-eternity” while its “cause” was in “pre-eternity?”

It has been maintained that it is the knowledge of God about the “most befitting.”

It has been maintained by the Mu'tazilah that it, i.e., what gives “preponderance,” is the knowledge of our Lord, Most High and Most Holy, about the “most befitting,” i.e., His knowledge that the most “befitting” to the world is its being originated in “post-eternity.”

Against this we may argue by asking: How could it be “befitting” to the world that God should abstain from effusing and giving generously to the world what is limitless?

Al-Ash'arī is the one who denies that which gives “preponderance.”

Al-Ash'arī is the one who denies that which gives “preponderance” by his assertion that it is possible for the “effect” (i.e., “caused”) not to be simultaneous with the complete “cause.” Rather, in his view, there is no “causality” at all, and the “effects” follow “causes” only as a matter of pure custom. The absurdity of this position needs no explanation.

According to our view, the “coming-into-being” is something “essential,” and no “essential” thing can be subject to “causality.”
According to our view, the "coming-into-being" is something "essential," for you already know that "coming-into-being" and "renewal" are "natural" and "essential" to the natural world. And no "essential" thing can be subject to "causality." So there is nothing which would specify "coming-into-being."

XXVI EIGHT DIVISIONS OF PRIORITY

Since its opposite (i.e., "posteriority" and "co-existence") are also divisible in accordance with the division of "priority" without any discrepancy, we should not discuss them here. And since "priority" and "posteriority" are understood in the concepts of "pre-eternity" and "coming-into-being," and since "priority" and "posteriority" are of several kinds, we have immediately joined this chapter with the preceding one.

A kind of "priority" is found to be "priority" in terms of "time."

A kind of "priority" is found to be "priority" in terms of "time," and this kind of "priority" is a "separable priority" in "existence," whether the "prior" and the "posterior" essentially disagree with each other, like "time," or accidentally, like "things-in-time."

Another is "priority" in terms of "rank:" then in terms of "honor."

Another kind is "priority" in terms of "rank," i.e., in terms of degrees. Then there is "priority" in terms of "honor," like the "priority" of a superior man over an inferior one.

Another kind of "priority" in terms of "nature:" then in terms of "causality."

Another kind is "priority" in terms of "nature," like the "priority" of an "incomplete cause" over its "effect."

Then "priority" in terms of "causality," and that is the "priority" of a "complete cause" over its "effect." The "complete cause" is never separated from the "effect," but the intellect judges that "existence" occurs to the "effect" from the "cause."
not *vice versa*. Thus the intellect observes: "The hand moves, and then the key moves," putting the word "then" in-between.

_Then that which is called "priority" in terms of "quiddity."_

Then there is _that which is called "priority" in terms of "quiddity"_ or "priority" in terms of "subsistence." And it refers to (1) the "priority" of the "causes" of "subsistence" over the "effect" with regard to the very "thing-ness" of a "quiddity" and the "essence" itself, like the "priority" of a "genus" and "differentia" over the "species;" (2) the "priority" of a "quiddity" over its "consequential properties;" and (3) the "priority" of "quiddity" over "existence" according to some people.¹

And "priority" in terms of "essence," which comprehends all, and which is divided into these last three.

And "priority" in terms of "essence," which comprehends all. That is to say, it is not an independent kind of "priority" according to the prevalent view, but is something _which is shared and divided into these last three_, i.e., "priority" in terms of "nature," in terms of "causality," and in terms of "quiddity."

_In case one single thing is realized in two things, essentially for one thing, and accidentally for another: there arises a "priority" in the real sense._

There is, further, another kind of "priority." _In case one single thing is realized in two things, essentially for one thing, and accidentally for another_, like "movement" in relation to a "ship" and to those who sit therein, then _there arises a "priority" in the real sense._

This kind of "priority" which is known as "priority in the real sense" has been added by the Head of Theosophers (Mulla Sadra). It stands outside of all the divisions, because in all of them, both the "prior" and the "posterior" are qualified by the common basis of "priority" in the real sense, and it is not proper that this qualification be denied to the "posterior." But in the last-mentioned case the "posterior" may be considered to be qualified by the common basis of "priority" in the metaphorical sense by way of a thing being qualified by the state of its "associate."² And the negation of "qualification" becomes proper, like the "priority" of "existence" over "quiddity" ac-
cording to the accepted doctrine, because "actualization" can be affirmed of "existence" in the real sense, while it can be affirmed of "quiddity" only in the metaphorical sense and accidentally.

There is a "priority" which—though it is separable—occurs in the "longitudinal" hierarchy. This is called "priority" at the level of "perpetual duration" and " sempiternity."

There is a "priority" which—though it is "separable," like a "thing-in-time"—its "separability" occurs in the "longitudinal hierarchy," not in the "latitudinal," as we have seen. This kind of "priority" is called "priority" at the level of "perpetual duration" and " sempiternity." This is another division of "priority," which the Authoritative Thinker al-Dāmād has added, and which is different from the above-mentioned ones, because in all of them except the one "in-time," the "prior" and the "posterior" agree or at least do not refuse to agree in "existence," while in the "priority" at the level of "perpetual duration" and " sempiternity," the "separation" is considered, albeit not in the way in which it is considered in the case of the priority "in-time." If you have understood this, you will see that the criticism of it by the Authority al-Lāḥījī3 will be rejected, by referring back to what I have mentioned concerning the "coming-into-being" at the level of "perpetual duration."

XXVII  SOME PROPERTIES OF THE DIVISIONS

There is no "agreement" in "priority-in-terms-of-time." As for what is "prior-in-terms-of-rank," it is divided into "natural" and "positional." The first is like "body" and "animal," while the second is like orders in place.

There is no "agreement" in "priority-in-terms-of-time" which is a "mobile extension. As for what is "prior-in-terms-of-rank," it is divided into "natural" and "positional," the former meaning "priority" in terms of "rational rank" (i.e., conceptual hierarchy in terms of universality and particularity), and the latter meaning of "priority" in terms of "sensible rank." The first i.e., that
which is in terms of "natural order" is like "body" and "animal," and the same is true of the successive "species" and "genera," of whichever category they may be, while the second, i.e., that which is in terms of "positional order," is like, for example, orders in place, e.g., "priority" of the leader of prayer standing before those who are under his leadership.

Consider the "priority-in-terms-of-nature"
And "in-terms-of-subsistance," like two and one.

Consider the "priority-in-terms-of-nature" and "in-terms-of-subsistence," like the "priority" which is observable between two and one, which is in the number two. This indicates the "agreement" of these two kinds of "priority." If the "existence" is considered in "one" and "two," "one" by its "existence" being the "incomplete cause" for the "existence" of "two," the "priority" is "in-terms-of-nature." And if what is considered happens to be the very "thing-ness" of the concepts of "one" and "two," and the constitution of this composite concept (i.e., "two") from that simple concept, (i.e., "one") the "priority" is "in-terms-of-subsistence."

XXVIII DETERMINATION OF THAT IN WHICH PRIORITY CONSISTS IN EACH ONE OF THE DIVISIONS

This is what is called by the Philosophers the "common basis," shared by both the "prior" and "posterior." The "prior" may have something of that common basis which the "posterior" does not possess, while whatever belongs to the "posterior" of the common basis must necessarily be actualized in the "prior."

Its "common basis" is "time" in the "priority-in-terms-of-time."

Its "common basis," i.e., the "common basis" of "priority," is the relation to "time" in the "priority-in-terms-of-time," whether it be in "time" itself or in "things-in-time."

Consider a specific "starting-point" in the second.
Consider as the “common basis” the relation to a specific “starting-point” in the second “priority,” i.e., the “priority-in-terms-of-rank,” like the chief seat concerning “priority” in terms of “sensible-rank,” or like the “individual” or the “highest genus” concerning “priority” in terms of “rational rank.”


In the “priority-in-terms-of-honor,” the “common basis” is superiority and excellence. And in the “priority-in-terms-of-nature,” the “common basis” is “existence,” while in the “priority-in-terms-of-causality” the “common basis” is “necessity.”

In the sixth, consider the “constitution” of a thing.

In the sixth, i.e., the “priority-in-terms-of-subsistence” consider as the “common basis” the “constitution of a thing” and its being established.

In the seventh, “being,” even in a metaphorical sense.

In the seventh, i.e., the “priority-in-terms-of-reality,” the “common basis” is “being,” even in a metaphorical sense, i.e., “being” in an absolute sense, whether it be in the real sense or metaphorical, so that it may thereby become common both to the “prior” and the “posterior.”

In the eighth, “being” in the midst of “actuality.”
But the “container” which is “perpetual duration” is for the “originated things.”

In the eighth, i.e., the “priority-in-terms-of-perpetual-duration-and-sempiternity,” the “common basis” is “being” in the very midst of “actuality” and in the center of the external world. But the “container” which is “perpetual duration” is for the “originated things.” That is to say, the “container” which is “perpetual duration” is peculiar to the “originated things,” in contradistinction to the first expression, i.e., “the very midst of actuality,” which includes the “sempiternal.”

The Master (Mīr-e Dāmād) remarks in his Qabāsāt: Since it has been clarified that the “existence” which is fundamentally real in the midst of the external world is the very “quiddity” of the Creator-Truth and His very “reality,” so “reality,” the
“rational level” (i.e., the “quiddity”) and the center of the external “existence” are one there. And His “being-existent” in the midst of the “heart” of the external world and in the center of what is external to the minds is the same, from all aspects, as the “rational level” of His true Essence. Thus “being-fundamentally-existent’ in the center of the external world and in the midst of what is external to the mind in the Divine world, is comparable to the level of the “essence” of “man” itself and the “quiddity” of “intellect” itself, for example, in the world of “possibility.” Therefore, the world being “posterior” to the “rational level” of His True Essence—glory be to His Authority—by way of “posteriority-in-terms-of-causality” is exactly the same as the “posteriority” of “separation” from Him—glory be to Him—with regard to His “existence” in the very midst of the external world.

Then he goes on to say: It is not proper to compare the situation there (i.e., in the Divine world) to the sun and its rays and the relation of “priority” and “posteriority” which exist between them in terms of “essence” with regard to the “rational level,” and their “being simultaneous” in “existence” with regard to the center of the external world—people vainly agitate their tongues and make their mouths foam in making such a comparison—because, as you already know, the “rational level” of the “essence” of the sun quâ sun is not the same as its “existence” in the very midst of the external world, as is the case with the situation in the Divine world. The matter is the same as that concerning the movement of the hand and the movement of the key, for example. So lower the wing of your intellect before the Truth, and never be of the ignorant.
XXIX THE DIVISIONS OF ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY

The qūwah has been used in several different ways.

The word qūwah has been used in several different ways. We shall mention some of the most common usages among the Philosophers.

One of them is the opposite of "actuality."

One of them is its established usage as the opposite of "actuality," as when we say: The Prime Matter is something in qūwah (i.e., in "potentiality").

Another kind is that which is employed in opposition to "weakness."

Another kind is that which is employed in opposition to "weakness," as when we say: The Necessary, Most High, is above infinity in qūwah ("power"). And in this sense the terms qūwah ("power") and lā-qūwah ("non-power") are applied to the "qualities-through-preparedness."

Also recognize the "prime source" of change.

Also recognize, as a kind of it, that which is the "prime source" of change in something else quā something else. And in this sense the term is applied to the "prime sources" of "effects," like the qūwah ("faculty") of the soul, etc.

The qūwah is either "affected," either by one thing or many things, or "affecting."

The qūwah is either (1) "affected" either by one thing, like the "matter" of the celestial sphere in so far as it accepts one thing which is "positional movement," or by many things, whether finite, as in the case of the qūwah ("faculty") of "being affected" in animals, or infinite as in the case of the qūwah ("potentiality") which is the Prime Matter, or (2) "affecting"
either one thing or many things, and the latter whether finite, as in the case of the “affecting” qūwah (“power”) in the animal, or infinite, like the necessary “affecting” Power which dominates everything.

We want to divide the “affecting” qūwah (“power”) by saying that it is either the “prime source” of acts or the “prime source” of one single act. The former is either with consciousness or without, and the latter too is either with consciousness or without.

Further, that which lacks consciousness, of the latter kind, is either “subsistent” through its locus or gives “subsistence” to the locus. And that which gives subsistence to the locus is either in the “simple” or in the “composite.”

Thus the “prime source” of acts which are different from each other, not having consciousness, is the qūwah of that which grows forth.

Thus we say: The “prime source” of acts, then, which are different from each other, not having consciousness, is the qūwah (“faculty”) of that which grows forth i.e., the vegetative (“faculty”).

And when it has consciousness, qūwah is to be called the “animal faculty.”
This faculty is described as having the power of acting and abstaining from it.

And when it i.e., the “prime source” of acts, has consciousness, this qūwah (“faculty”) is to be called the “animal faculty.” And this “faculty” is described as having the power of acting and the power of abstaining from it, i.e., the act. We indicate thereby that this “description” properly applies to “the animal faculty,” as has been declared by Shaykh (Ibn Sīnā), and not to the “power” of the Necessary, Most High, contrary to what is maintained by the Theologians.

The “prime source” of one act, if it is not devoid of consciousness of its acts, is the Soul of a celestial sphere. If it is devoid of consciousness and gives “subsistence” to the “locus,” it is “nature,” when it is actualized in a “simple locus.” And it is a “specific form,” if it is posited as “composite.” But in case it does not give “subsistence,” it is an “accident.”
The “prime source” of one act, if it is not devoid of the consciousness of its act, is the Soul of a celestial sphere, because it is the source of one uniform act. If it, i.e., the “prime source” of one act, is devoid of the consciousness and gives “subsistence” to the “locus,” it is “nature,” when it is actualized in a “simple locus,” like water. And it, i.e., the same constituent “prime source,” is a “specific form,” it it is posited as “composite,” i.e., as being in a “composite” thing, that is to say, if the “locus” is posited as “composite.” But in case it, i.e., that “prime source,” does not give “subsistence” to the “locus,” but rather receives “subsistence” from it, it is an “accident.” Heat, for example, in so far as it is the “prime source” of something else becoming warm, is ḍūwah (“power”).

Those “prime sources” and the purely immaterial ones are, all of them, armies of the Prime Source of “prime sources.”

Those “prime sources,” both material—even by way of “association”—and the purely immaterial ones, are, all of them, armies of the Prime Source of “prime sources,” Most High.

Since we have pointed out that the “animal faculty” means the “power” of “acting” and “non-acting,” let us discuss now that which is the criterion of “power,” in general, in such a way that it includes even the “power” of the Necessary-by-Essence who is the Necessary Existent from all aspects.

Consider as “power” an active force, if the latter is accompanied by “knowledge” and “will.”

We say: Consider as “power” an active force, i.e., an “affecting” force, if the latter is accompanied by “knowledge” and “will.” Thus the criterion of “power” in general is the issuing of an act out of “knowledge” and “will,” as the Philosophers say: The “powerful” is the one who, if he wills acts, and if he does not will does not act. As for the “suitability” and capability of doing the act and abstaining from it, they are not to be taken into consideration as a criterion concerning “power.”

“Power” has “priority” over the “act.” It has been asserted that it has “simultaneity.” But this is not dependable.
"Power" has "priority" over the "act." It has been asserted—the one who asserts it is al-Ash'arī—that it has "simultaneity" with the "act." But this is not a dependable thesis, because the non-believers are morally responsible, and because it would entail one of two absurdities: either the "pre-eternity" of the world or the "contingency" of God's Power, and some other false consequences.

"Potentiality" has "priority" in terms of time to "actuality," just as "actuality" is "prior" to "potentiality" absolutely.

"Potentiality," i.e., qūwah as opposed to "actuality," has "priority" in terms of time to "actuality." In reality, however, this "priority" is actualized stage by stage in "potentiality" in relation to different stages of "actuality" in succession and by turns, just as "actuality" is "prior" to "potentiality" absolutely. That is to say "actuality" is "prior" to "potentiality" in all the aspects of "priority" including "essential," "in-terms-of-time," "in-terms-of-honor," etc.
FIFTH GEM

QUIDDITY AND ITS PROPERTIES

XXX ITS DEFINITION AND SOME OF ITS PROPERTIES

What is said in answer to “what?-of-definition” constitutes the “quiddity.” It is also called “essence” and “reality,” if it has external “existence.”

What is said, i.e., predicated of a thing—the “thing’ is understood from the context—in answer to “what?-of-definition” constitutes the “quiddity” of the thing. By deliberately using the expression: “what?-of-definition,” we have wanted to exclude “what?-of-lexical-explanation,” because what is said in answer to the latter is not “quiddity,” but it is a lexical explanation of the word. In Persian we might say: Māhīyat pāsukh-i pursish ab gauhar-i shay ast, wa sharḥ-i ism pāsukh-i pursish-i nokhosīn ast. “Quiddity” is an answer given to a question concerning the “essence” of a thing, while the lexical explanation of a word is an answer given to the first (i.e., the most elementary) question.

The “objects of question” are six. Although some Philosophers have added more to them, the basic ones are the objects of “what?-of-lexical-explanation” and “what?-of-definition;” the objects of the simple “whether?” and the composite “whether?”; and the objects of “why?” of an objective fact and of “why?” of the reason of affirmation.

In my poem on Logic which I plan to complete if Divine Assistance supports me, I mention the “objects of question” by saying:

The basis of the “objects of question” are three:
The object of “what?”’, the object of “whether?”’, and the object of “why?”’. “What?” is either explanatory or of definition. It is neatly knit together with “whether?” And “whether?” is either “simple” or “composite.” “Why?” refers both to an objective fact and the reason of affirmation.
To these are reducible all that some Philosophers maintain,  
(Namely), the objects of “what-kind-of?”, “where?”, “how?”, “how-many?”, and “when?”
In many cases “what-is-it?” is the same as “why-is-it?”  
Just as “what-is-it?” is the same as “is-it-the-case?”
And the lunar eclipse is appropriate as an example of the former.
And in my “existence” all these “objects” of question are unified.

And the word māhīyah (“quiddity”) is derived from “mā huwa” (quid est), and the yā is the yā of relation.

It, i.e., “quiddity,” is called also “essence” and “reality” if it has external “existence.” Thus we cannot speak of the “essence” or “reality” of a phoenix, but we can speak of its “quiddity,” because “quiddity” is more general than “essence” and “reality.” But often this distinction is not observed and each of them is used in one and the same sense.

Each of them is a “secondary intelligible.”

Each of them (i.e., “quiddity,” “essence,” and “reality”) is a “secondary intelligible,” because it is known that in the blackness for example there is nothing (in the external world) corresponding to its being an absolute “quiddity,” absolute “essence,” or absolute “reality,” beyond the particular “quiddity,” i.e., the color which contracts the light of the sight.

And it is nothing but itself quà itself.

And it, i.e., “quiddity,” is nothing but itself quà itself. That is to say, every “quiddity” with regard to itself is nothing but itself, neither “existent” nor “non-existent,” neither “one” nor “multiple,” neither “universal” nor “particular,” nor anything else. And just as “existence” and “non-existence” are neither the same nor a part of each other—rather “existence” is “existence,” and “non-existence” is “non-existence”—so each of them is neither the same nor a part of blackness, for example.

“Contradictories” can be both removed on a certain level. The “contradictory” of its being on that level is the negation of the thing “confined,” and not the “confined” negation.
“Contradictories” can be both removed on a certain level (i.e., the level of “quiddity”). And the removal of two contradictories from one level is permissible (e.g., the “body” as a “quiddity” can neither be black nor non-black), because it means that each of them is neither the same as the “quiddity” nor a part of it, although in the external world it cannot be devoid of either one of them. Moreover the contradictory of “writing” on the level of “quiddity” is “non-writing” on that same level in such a way that the “level” (i.e., the dimension of “quiddity”) be a boundary for what is negated, but not for the negation.\(^1\) This is indicated by our verse: The contradictory of its being, i.e., that thing’s being on that level is the negation of the thing “confined” by that level—because the contradictory of anything is its removal—and not the “confined” negation.

So when the affirmation of a “quality” (for example, “writing”)—on-that-level is false, the negation of that “quality”—on-that-same-level is true, because it is its contradictory, although at the same time the negation-on-that-level concerning that “quality” is false, because it is not its contradictory. Thus in the present case what are really “contradictories” (i.e., [1] the affirmation of the “confined” quality and [2] the negation of it) are not removed; what are actually removed here (i.e., [1] the affirmation of the “confined” quality and [2] the “confined” negation) are not “contradictories.”

You must put negation before “quâ,” so that the negation could extend to the “accidents of quiddity.”

You must put negation before “quâ,” and say for instance: “Neither man quâ man is writer nor “non-writer” or “Neither man quâ man is one nor non-one,” etc. and not: “Man quâ man is neither such-and-such nor such-and-such,” so that the negation, could extend, by virtue of the precedence, to the “accidents of quiddity,” and not be confined to its “accidents of existence.”

This may be explained as follows. The “quiddity” in relation to its “accidents” has two states. One of them is the state of being qualified neither by those “accidents” nor by their “contradictories,” when the “quiddity” is understood quâ itself, as is the case with the “accidents” which occur to it only after the “quiddity” has become existent, like writing, movement, etc. (These are technically called the “accidents of existence.”) The
second is the state of its being qualified by them, when it is understood in the same way (i.e., quà itself) as is the case with the “accidents” which qualify the “quiddity” necessarily when the latter happens to be existent but not conditioned by “existence” (whether “mental” or “external”), as (the concept of) “existence,” “unity,” “possibility,” etc. (These are called the “accidents of quiddity.”)

Thus the “quiddity” in relation to the “accidents of existence,” is devoid of the two alternatives (e.g., “writing” and “non-writing”) on one level of “fact-itself,” namely, the level of its “essence,” while in relation to the “accidents of quiddity,” it cannot be devoid of either one of the two alternatives (the “possible” for example, at the level of its own “quiddity” itself is “possible”), but still the “quiddity quà-itself” is not the same as the “quiddity quà qualified” by its accidents.

So the precedence which is stipulated as a condition is valid only in relation to the “accidents of quiddity,” because it is permissible for it to be devoid of both the “accidents of existence” and their opposites.

Thus when you say: “Man quà man is not existent,” the “quà” becomes part of the subject, and not a complement of the predicate. So the negation would not refer to special “existence,” namely, “existence” which is identical with him or a part of him, but rather “existence” in an absolute sense. This would necessitate that man quà man, i.e., himself, is devoid of “existence” in an absolute sense, while himself remains himself. And this is absurd. Such would not be the case if you reverse the order of negation.

So negate by it “existence” in the non-absolute sense.
Do not negate its absoluteness. Take this as a model.

So negate by it, i.e., by precedence or by negation, “existence” in the non-absolute sense. That is to say, man at the level of his “essence” is not “existent” quà himself, “existence” being understood in such a way that it be identical with himself or a part of him. Do not negate its absoluteness, i.e., “existence” in the absolute sense, including even the case in which the “qualification” (by “existence”) occurs through something other than the “quiddity” quà “quiddity.”

Take this as a model and apply it to “unity.” Put negation
before and negate the "unity" qua "quiddity" itself, not "unity" in an absolute sense, and so on.

One may point out other significances of the precedence of negation. But what we have just mentioned is better.

*Take the negation as a full negation.*
*And the non-requirement is not the requirement of that which is opposed.*

*Take the negation* in your statement: The "quiddity" is not qua itself such and such, *as a full negation,* and not as a "privative" (i.e., an affirmation in a negative form) which would require the "existence" of the "subject," because the "quiddity" considered qua itself has no "existence" yet. *And the non-requirement* of a thing for a thing is not the "requirement" of that which is opposed to it, i.e., its opposite. So one must not imagine that when a "quiddity" is not "existent" on the level of its "essence," it should be "non-existent," nor that when it is not "one" it should be "many," etc..

XXXI  DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF QUIDDITY

This chapter is concerned with those aspects with which no "quiddity" can dispense, or which are even applicable to "existence" according to the people of mystical experience. We actually follow in their footsteps concerning many problems.

"Quiddity" is "mixed," "absolute," or "pure," according to various considerations applied to it.
*They are "non-conditioned," and also "conditioned-by-something,"
And "negatively conditioned." Listen to me!

"Quiddity" is "mixed," "absolute," or "pure," according to various considerations applied to it, i.e., "quiddity." *They* i.e., these considerations, are "non-conditioned" corresponding to the "absolute," and also "conditioned-by-something" corresponding to the "mixed," and "negatively conditioned" in its two meanings, corresponding to the "pure." *Listen to me!*

*The first is the elimination of everything else.*
The first, i.e., the first of the two meanings of “negatively conditioned,” is the elimination of everything else including even “existence,” whether external or mental. And this is what is meant in the chapters on “quiddity,” as a division of “quiddity” side by side with the other two divisions, the “absolute” and the “mixed.” And since it is considered to be absolutely “pure” from everything else, the “pure quiddity” has no “existence” in the mind, let alone in the external world.

You might object and ask: How, then, can it be a “consideration” in the mind? To this we would answer: The case is similar to the doubt concerning the absolute “non-existent” and the division of “existent” into “subsistent-in-the-mind” and “non-subsistent-in-the-mind.” We have already removed the doubt. Remember well.

The second is like “animal” appearing as a “part.”

The second of the two meanings of “negatively conditioned” is that the “quiddity” (e.g., “animal”) is considered alone in such a way that, if it is accompanied by something else (e.g., “rational”), the latter must be considered as not being included in it (i.e., “quiddity”), but rather as being something added to it, and both of them constituting a whole (i.e., “rational + animal”), of which the “quiddity” (“animal”) could not be predicated in this consideration (i.e., “rational + animal” is something more than “animal”), like “animal” as being understood as “matter” (for the “quiddity” of “man”) and appearing as a “part.”

As the Shaykh (Ibn Sinā) remarks: “Quiddity” is sometimes understood as “negatively conditioned,” when a meaning is conceived, with the condition that that meaning alone is realized in such a way that everything that accompanies it will be something additional to it. Then it will become a “part” of that whole, a “matter” for it, preceding it in the two modes of “existence.” So predicating it (i.e., this “meaning”) of the whole will be impossible, because of the lack of the condition of predication, namely, the “unity” in “existence.”

Sometimes, again, it is understood as “non-conditioned,” when its “meaning” is conceived, with the permissibility of its being alone and its being not-alone, that is to say, its being accompanied by something else. Then it will be predicated of the whole (i.e., “rational animal” [= “man”] is an “animal”) and of itself alone (i.e., “animal” is “animal”).
The "quiddity" thus understood is sometimes not actualized by itself in reality, but rather is something possible of being predicated of things having different "quiddities." The "quiddity" thus understood becomes actualized only through something which is added to it, and by which it becomes specified and itself becomes one of those things (i.e., things having different "quiddities"). In such a case, it is a "genus," while that which is added to it and gives it "subsistence" and makes it one of those things is a "differentia."

And sometimes the "quiddity" thus understood is actualized in itself, not actualized by virtue of things being added to it. (It is then a "species.")

The "non-conditioned" is also of two kinds. The first is a division, and the second is the source of division.

The "non-conditioned" is also of two kinds. The first is a "division," which is conditioned at least by "non-conditioned-ness." And the second is "the-source-of-division" for the first kind of "non-conditioned" and for the two others (i.e., "negatively conditioned" and "conditioned-by-something"); it is conditioned by nothing, not even by "non-conditioned-ness." Thus it is like "existence in its absoluteness" (i.e., "existence" which is not qualified even by "being absolute") which is divided into "absolute existence" and "determined existence."

And that is to be described as the "natural universal," And its being is found to consist in the being of its two divisions.

And that, i.e., the second (i.e., non-conditioned as the source-of-division), is to be described as the "natural universal" not the first one (i.e., non-conditioned-as-division) — although the latter is in some statements of Philosophers described as the "natural universal" — because it is a mental thing having no "existence" in the external world. And its being, i.e., its "existence," is found to consist in the being, i.e., the "existence," of its two divisions, i.e., the "quiddity-conditioned-by-something" and the "quiddity-negatively-conditioned" in the second sense; for it is the "matter," and the "matter," especially the second, is "existent." How is it possible that a division of a thing be "existent" while its source of division is not "existent," when a
“division” is the same as the source of division with the addition of a determining factor? Moreover there is, between the two, “predication” by way of “attribution,” that is to say, “unity” in “existence.” And this way of proving the “existence” of the “natural universal” is better and demands less effort—as is clear to any intelligent person who is aware of the realities—than the proof which is commonly given; namely, the one which consists in pointing out that the “natural universal” is a part of an “individual” and an “individual” is “existent,” and a part of an “existent” is “existent.”

Its “individual” is the mediator of “occurrence” to it.

Now that we have mentioned that the “natural universal” is “existent” and that it is a “quiddity” which is “existent-by-accident,” and that “existence” is that which “mediates” the “occurrence” of “existence” to “quiddity,” not that it “mediates” “subsistence,” we want to explain that the “natural universal” is “existent-by-accident” and that its “individual” is the mediator of the accidental “occurrence” (of “existence”) to it (“natural universal”), i.e., in its becoming qualified by “existence,” because “individualization” is “existence” in reality. As you already know, “actualization” belongs to “existence” primarily and essentially, while it belongs to “quiddity” secondarily and accidentally.

As in the case of the “genus,” because the “differentia” actualizes it.

We have mentioned that the “individual” is the “mediator” of “occurrence.” That means that the “individual” constitutes the basis for the “object of mediation” (i.e., “quiddity”) being qualified by something accidentally. And the “mediator” is of different kinds. In some cases, the permissibility of negation is evident, like in the case of the movement of a ship and the movement of a man sitting therein. And in some cases, it is obscure, like in the case of the body being-white and the whiteness being-white. And in some cases, it is more obscure, as in the case of “genus” concerning its “actualization,” because the “differentia” actualizes it, i.e., the “genus,” since there is no level of “actualization” at which it would be devoid of the “actualization” of the “differentia,” for every “genus” is absorbed into the “differentia,” especially in the case of
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“simple” things, and every indefinite thing is absorbed in its determiner.

Let us now point out that the mediation of “occurrence” in a “natural universal” and its “individual,” the “quiddity” and the latter’s “existence,” is of this kind. So the permissibility of the negation of “actualization” and “realization” in this case is perceived only through a sharp deductive reasoning, rather through the help of mystical “experience.”

However, when we come down to a lower stage, the “actualization” for the object of “mediation” is real, and the permissibility of negation becomes inconceivable because the absorption of “quiddity” in “existence” is more intense than the absorption of a “genus” in its “differentia.” So the “actualization” of “quiddity” through “existence” is more intense than the “actualization” of “genus” through “differentia.”

The possessor of being is an “essence” which has “universality” in the mind only. And it is the “quiddity.”

The possessor of being, i.e., the possessor of “existence,” is an “essence” which has “universality” in the mind only. And it, i.e., the “essence,” is the “quiddity.” That is to say, that of which “existence” is predicated is the “essence” of a “natural universal” and the very “nature” to which “universality” occurs in the mind. And it is clear that the “natural universal” is the very object of “occurrence,” while the “quiddity” is that which is neither “universal” nor “particular.”

If you hear that it is a part of an “individual,” what is meant is a mental elaboration: otherwise there would be an infinite regress.

If you here someone saying that it is part of an “individual,” i.e., if you hear somebody saying that the “natural universal” is a part of an “individual”—as when it is said: a “universal” is a part of an existent “individual”—what is meant is a mental elaboration, i.e., what is intended is a “part” elaborated by the mind, not an externally existent part. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress, because if it were an externally existent part it would have “existence” in addition to “existence” belonging to the “individualization.” And if it were “existent” it would be an “individual,” because nothing can exist unless it is “in-
dividualized.” Then the argument is transferred to it, with the “natural universal” being a part of it, according to the original supposition. So it would be an “individual,” and so on ad infinitum.

The “natural universal” in relation to the “individuals” is not like one father in relation to children.

The “natural universal” in relation to the “individuals” is not like one father in relation to children—as was claimed by the man from Hamadān whom Shaykh al-Ra’īs (Ibn Sīnā) came across in the city of Hamadān. The Shaykh relates that the man was of the opinion that the “natural universal” is numerically one, and yet is “existent” in all “individuals,” and is qualified by “opposites” (like “white” and “black,” “knowing” and “ignorant,” etc.). The Shaykh put him to disgrace and criticized his opinion. Rather, the relation is like that of fathers with children, as we have established its unity with the “individuals.”

XXXII SOME PROPERTIES OF THE PARTS OF QUIDDITY

The “genus” and “differentia” which, taken as “non-conditioned,” are predicated of each other, are “matter” and “form,” when taken as “negatively conditioned.”

The “genus” and “differentia” which, taken as “non-conditioned,” are predicated of each other are “matter” and “form,” when taken as “negatively conditioned.” In the latter case, the one cannot be predicated of the other. This verse indicates that both (i.e., “genus” and “differentia”) are unified with these two (i.e., “matter” and “form”) essentially, but are different from each other according to different points of view.

In the “body” these two are external parts, but in its “accidents,” they are mental. Follow in our footsteps. This is because that in which they share, and that by which they are distinguished from one another, are identical in the external world.
In the "body" these two, i.e., "matter" and "form," are external parts. This is why the "bodies" are external "composites." But in its "accidents," i.e., the "accidents" of the "body," they are mental. Follow in our footsteps. For in the "accidents" these two (i.e., "matter" and "form") are no other than the "genus" and "differentia" of the "accidents" taken as "negatively conditioned" in the mind; they are not external "matter" and "form." This is why the "accidents" are external "non-composites." This is indicated by our verse: This is because that in which they share, i.e., their "genus," and that by which they are distinguished from one another, i.e., their "differentia," are identical i.e., unified in the external world: contrary to the external "composites," because the two are taken, in the latter, as external "matter" and "form," each one of them having separate "existence."

For one species there cannot be two "differentiae," on one level; nor can there be two "genera." Listen carefully in order to understand.

For one species there cannot be two "differentiae" on one level, both being "proximate," nor can there be two "genera" on one level, one of them not being part of the other. Listen carefully in order to understand.

But sometimes the real "differentia" is not known so that the closest of all its properties is used in its place. Sometimes it is ambiguous as to which of two properties which are equal in relation to it, is the closest. In such a case both of them are used in its place so that they could wrongly be imagined to be two "differentiae" on one level, like "sensible" and "moving by will" with regard to "animal." But, in reality, they are not "differentiae," for the real "differentia" is that which necessitates both of them, and it is one.

The "differentia" is "logical" and "derivative" like the source of the "differentia," and that is "real."

The "differentia" is of two kinds. First, "logical," which is a property necessitated by the "real differentia," like nātiq or nutq for "man," because the "logical differentia" is not a "real differentia." For, if what is meant is an external nutq (speech), it is an audible "quality," while if what is meant is inner nutq (rationality), i.e., the perception of "universals," it is a "quality"
or "relation" or "affection" (i.e., state of being "affected"). But all these are "accidents" which neither give subsistence to a "specific substance" nor actualize a "generic substance." Likewise, "neighing," "braying," and "moving by will," etc. And it has already been established that the "thing" (i.e., that the source of derivation) is discarded in the "derivatives," especially "differentiae."

And the second: "derivative," i.e., the source of "derivation" and the source of "attribution," like the source of the "logical differentia" which is the "necessitator," like man possessing a "rational" soul, and a horse possessing a "neighing" soul, and an animal possessing a "sensible" soul.

And the use of the word "possessing" in my expression: "possessing a soul" is to indicate verbally the viewpoint of "non-conditioned-ness" which is to be taken into consideration in a "differentia" in order that the latter might function as a predicate. In truth, however, the "soul" itself taken as "non-conditioned" is a "real differentia." But if the "soul" is taken as "negatively-conditioned," it is a "form" and an external "part." And that is also called "real differentia."

XXXIII THE REALITY OF A SPECIES IS REALIZED BY ITS ULTIMATE DIFFERENTIA

That which is constituted by various concepts will remain as long as its ultimate "differentia" is kept. For that "differentia" covers them all.

The reality of a "species" is realized by its ultimate "differentia," while the rest of the constituent factors are considered in the "species" ambiguously. That which i.e., a "species" which, is constituted by various concepts, i.e., (various) "genera" and (various) "differentiae," whether proximate or remote, will remain; that is to say, the reality of that "species" will remain unchanged, as long as its ultimate "differentia" is kept and maintained. Thus the reality of a "species" always goes hand in hand with the proximate "differentia." This is why Philosophers say: The "thing-ness" of a thing is due to its "form." And the Shaykh (Inb Sīnā) asserts: The "form" of a thing is its "quid-
dity” by which it is what it is. *For that “differentia” covers all of them*, i.e., the concepts. This means that the “existence” of all of them is covered and included in its “existence.” Thus, the “rational soul” which is the ultimate “differentia” of man, since it is of a “simple” reality, and since what is “simple” comprises all the possibilities which are found in those that are under it, the “rational (soul)” covers by way of “simplicity” and “unity,” the “existences” of “substance,” “body,” “mineral,” “vegetative,” “sensible,” “moving by will.”

*Thus it remains determined even if they change. Thus they are considered indeterminately.*

*Thus it*, i.e., the “differentia,” *remains determined, even if these concepts change*. That is to say, the “differentia” is their “principle” which is kept, and the “this-ness” of a “species” is due to it. So it is not affected by the disappearance of these the concepts. *Thus they*, i.e., all these concepts taken one by one, *are considered* in the “reality” of the “species” *indeterminately*, not specifically. The “substance,” for example, which is considered in “man” is more general than in a “non-material” and a “material;” and the “body” which is considered in “man” is more general than in a “natural elemental” body and a body belonging to the world of “similitudes;” and the “life” which is considered in “man” is more general than the “life” of the present world and the “life” of the Hereafter. Understand what remains by this analogy.

*What is particularized is like a circle in the definition of a bow.*

*And the “body” and “growth” may change. The “part” is that which is actualized within any unit.*

As to *what is particularized*, i.e., what is particular *qua* particular to each of the various concepts, if it is taken in the definition of a “species” (like, for example, when the “material substance” or the “natural elemental body” is taken into the definition of the species “man”), *is like* the case in which *a circle is taken in the definition of a bow*, as is said: “a bow is a part of a circle.” They declare that this is a case in which the definition exceeds what is defined (for a “bow” can very well be a “bow” without being a part of a circle).

*And the “body” and “growth” in the case of “man” may*
change so much so that they might be transformed to a “similitude” and something “non-material.” These two and still others in their aspect of “particularization” are neither “essential” nor a “part” (of “man”). The real “part” is that which, i.e., the common amount which, is actualized within any unit (i.e., every individual “man”).

XXXIV VARIOUS VIEWS ON THE COMPOSITION
OF THE PARTS OF DEFINITION

The authoritative scholar al-Sharīf (al-Jurjānī) describes this problem by saying that it is one of those problems which have put the imaginations of men into confusion and about which the authorities have differed among themselves.

The constituent parts of “definition” differ from each other in the mind; whether they are unified in the external world or are multiple.

The constituent parts of “definition” differ from each other in the mind both with regard to their “essences” and their “existences.” It is absolutely certain and there is no disagreement on this point. The disagreement occurs as to “how” they are in the external world; namely, whether they (the “quiddities” of the constituent parts of definition) are unified in the external world or are multiple.

Then, on the second view, either the “existences” are unified, or they are multiple like their “essences.” These are different views: the second is the one of my preference.

Then, on the second view, i.e., the view that their “quiddities” are multiple, (1) either the “existences” of the parts are unified, or (2) they too are multiple like their “essences,” i.e., “quiddities.”

These are three different views each of which has had a group supporting it.

The second, namely, that the parts of definition are multiple with regard to their “quiddities” in the external world, but unified with regard to “existence,” is the one of my preference.
For since the "quiddity" is actualized and "made" accidentally in the external world, those parts differ from each other in the dimension of their "essences" and the "thing-ness" of their "quiddities," but they are one in the dimension of their "existence."

This is the case when we consider the fact that "quiddities" are actualized accidentally. But when we consider the fact that "quiddities" are not actualized essentially, and that it is "existence" that is essentially actualized, there can be no dimension of "essence" for the parts in the external world beyond "existence;" So that there would be no room for talking about the "simplicity" or "composition" of the "essence."

*Those mental forms are through various viewpoints in it.*

We assert that *those mental forms are actualized through various viewpoints in it*, namely, in the simple mode of "existence" which carries those parts. This is similar in nature to what is asserted by those who believe in their being unified with regard to both "essence" and "existence," in answer to those who argue against them asking: How could the different intellectual forms accord, with regard to both "essence" and "existence" in the external world, with a simple thing?

The answer runs that the different intellectual forms are abstracted from that simple thing in accordance with various viewpoints and "preparednesses" occurring to the intellect through observation of a certain number of "particulars" together with the simple thing and through the intellect's becoming aware of the common elements and distinguishing elements among those intellectual forms.

Thus in reality, all "concepts" are abstracted from that "existence," whether they be "essential" or "accidental," except that those that are abstracted from, and are indicative of its primary level, are called "essential" while those that are abstracted from, and are indicative of its secondary level are called "accidental."

As for the third view (i.e., the view that the parts are different from each other with regard to both "existence" and "quiddity" in the external world), it is untenable because in that case no predication would be possible between them.
XXXV  THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF DEFINITION

The “parts” are self-evident: they dispense with the “cause” and they necessarily precede the whole.

(1) The “parts” are self-evident. That is to say, the intellect can dispense with a middle term in predicating them of a “quiddity.” This, in fact, is dispensing with the “cause,” but in the mind only.

(2) They dispense with the “cause” in the external “existence,” contrary to what is immediately understood. And the “essential” is defined by this characteristic when it is said that the “essential” is that which is not caused. What is meant thereby is their dispensing with all “causes” other than the “cause” of the “quiddity” as well as dispensing with any additional causality coming from the “cause” of the “quiddity.”

And (3) They necessarily precede the whole in both domains of “existence,” external and mental. Here, instead of “and” (in the preceding sentence) we may as well say “because” in order to indicate that the third characteristic can be a proof for the two previous characteristics.

Whenever there are “parts” there are a number of viewpoints; “All” may be used individually, and collectively, with “collectiveness” as its external condition, and as its internal part, or only the “parts” of the whole.

Since concerning the precedence of the “parts” over the whole there is a difficulty which is similar to the well-known difficulty concerning the precedence of the “perfect cause” over the “caused,” we intend to remove it by mentioning the four viewpoints which are found in any multiplicity. Thus we say: Whenever there are “parts” there are a number of viewpoints. One of them is: The word “all” may be used individually, i.e., each individual one by one. The second of them is: The word “all” is used collectively with “collectiveness” as its external condition. And the third is: “all” is used collectively with “collectiveness” as its internal part. And the fourth is indicated by what is in our verse: or only the “parts” of the whole, i.e., “all” used collectively, but meaning the “collection”
itself without any representing quality, because the “collection” itself is different from the quality of “collected-ness,” just as “one” itself is different from the quality of “oneness.”

These last three refer to our saying “collectively,” and therefore, commonly share the “collectiveness” and “being-together,” in contradistinction to the “all-individually.”

The “parts” thoroughly precede the whole in the sense which follows the first one.

Now that you have understood this, we can say: The “parts” thoroughly precede the whole in the sense which follows the first one (i.e., the second sense); that is to say, they precede the whole with “collectiveness” as its external condition; but not in the third sense, because the mode of being of “collected-ness” is a mental consideration; so is the “collection” of the “quality” and the “qualified.”

Thus differentiation is obtained between the prior and the posterior and the difficulty has been removed.

XXXVI THERE NECESSARILY IS MUTUAL NEED BETWEEN THE PARTS OF A REAL COMPOSITE

There is necessarily mutual need between the “parts” of a real “one” when it is composite.

There is necessarily mutual need between the “parts’ of a real “one,” i.e., “one” having real “oneness,” when it is composite. Otherwise, it would absolutely be impossible for them to constitute one reality by way of real oneness, as in the case of a stone put side by side with a man.

This is one of the problems which Philosophers have not demonstrated because of their being self-evident.

Real “oneness” has a standard consisting in there being, in anything qualified thereby, effects besides those effects which befall the “parts,” like, for example, an effect of a ruby, different from an army.

Now that we have mentioned the necessity of mutual need in
the case of real “one,” we want to explain the sign of the real “oneness.” Thus we say: Real “oneness” has a standard consisting in there being in anything qualified thereby, i.e., qualified by “oneness,” effects besides those effects which befall the “parts,” like, for example an effect of a ruby, like enjoyment, for example, for the latter is a fifth effect beyond the effect of each one of is four elements and besides the four effects belonging to the whole of the elements. This is different from the “oneness” of an army, because the effect produced by an army is nothing but the whole of the effects of the individual soldiers.

XXXVII WHETHER THE COMPOSITION OF MATTER WITH FORM IS UNIFICATION OR ANNEXATION

According to the doctrine of the Powerful Sayyid The “composition” in the external world is by way of “unification.” The judgment of their being multiple is due to the consideration that there is actualized between them a kind of separation. Because the “form” after becoming naked remains, and because there is before it the “secondary matter.”

According to the doctrine of the Powerful Sayyid, i.e., Şadr al-Dîn al-Shîrâzî known as Sayyid al-Sanad, who was followed on this point by the Head of Theosophers (Mullâ Şadra), the “composition” of parts in the external world is by way of “unification,” and the judgement of their being multiple—i.e., the “matter” being “locus” and “form” being “inherent” therein and the “body” being an “external composite”—is due, as in similar cases, to the consideration of the fact that there is actualized between them, i.e., the external parts, a kind of separation. This because the “form” after becoming naked, i.e., after becoming devoid of “matter” in the world of similitudes, remains without “locus,” and because there is before it, i.e., there does exist before the determinate “form,” the “secondary matter” bearing another form (i.e., the “matter,” on its part, becomes devoid of a “form”). Otherwise, in the state of their being together, they are unified with each other.
However, according to the thesis upheld by the great Philosophers who preceded him, it is "composition" by way of "annexation."

However, according to the thesis upheld by the great Philosophers who preceded him, i.e., the above-mentioned Sayyid, it is composition by way of annexation. And this latter view is appropriate for teaching and learning (i.e., it is the right view).

XXXVIII  INDIVIDUATION

"Individuation" is the same as concrete "existence" in the external world, and it coincides in the minds.

"Individuation" is the same as concrete "existence" in the external world, and it coincides with "existence" in the minds as "concept." This view, namely, that "individuation" is a mode of "existence," is a position maintained by many eminent thinkers, among whom we find the Second Teacher (i.e., al-Fārābī) and the Head of Theosophers.

It has various signs, external factors occurring with a wide expanse like the expanse of the temperaments.

It, i.e., the real "individuation" which is a mode of "existence" has various signs which disclose it—not real individualizing factors, but external factors which Philosophers call "individualizing accidents." Their being signs and disclosers of "individuation" also is not due to the consideration of an "individual" in particular, but rather of their occurring to the "individual" with a wide expanse like the expanse of the temperaments. Just as every temperament has two extremes of excess and deficiency beyond which no possessor of the temperament can go—otherwise, it would come to naught—and between which there are infinite number of limits, all of them being within the expanse of one particular temperament, likewise "where," "when" and "position"—or more generally everything which Philosophers regard as individualizing factors—have a wide expanse from the beginning of the "existence" of the "individual" to the end, each of them being a sign of "individuation" with this kind of expanse.
Because the annexation of universal "quiddities" does not produce any "individuation" to the "essence."

They are not real individualizing factors because the annexation of universal "quiddities," natural "universals," for instance, does not produce any "individuation" to the "essence." For just as the "quiddity" of man in itself is neither "universal" nor "particular," so are the "quiddities" of "where" and the like. By annexation of a "universal" to a "universal" no "individual" is actualized as long as real "existence" does not step in.

XXXIX  THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DISTINCTION AND INDIVIDUATION

When a "universal" is joined with another, "individuation" becomes differentiated from "distinction."

When a "universal" is joined with another, i.e., another "universal," as in the case of "laughing man," "individuation" becomes differentiated from "distinction," because the "distinction" from "non-laughing man" is here actualized, but not "individuation." For "laughing man" can very well be predicated of many.

"Individuation" is due to itself, while the other is related.

"Individuation" of a thing is due to itself. That is to say, something being an "individual" is a peculiar attribute of that something, which belongs to the thing in consideration of itself, while the other, i.e., "distinction," is related, because the latter belongs to it in relation to other things with which it shares something in common. So if there is nothing which participate with it, there is no need of a distinguishing element, while it has "individuation" in itself.

From this the differentiation of "distinction" is to be understood.

From this fact also the differentiation of "distinction" from "individuation" is to be understood—"individuation" in the sense of something by which a thing becomes impossible to be predicated of many.
DIVISION OF "INDIVIDUATION"

"Individuation" is the very same, as in the case of the First, or something additional. In case an "agent" is sufficient, the "species" is not multiplied. Regard as an example the "intellects."

"Individuation" is either (1) the very same as the "essence" of the "individual," as in the case of the First, Most High, for His "individuation" is the same as His "existence" which is His very "essence," or (2) something additional to the "essence." This second case is divided into two kinds: (1) The case in which the existence of an "agent" is sufficient for an effusion of "individuality" upon the "essence," on the basis of its essential "possibility;" (2) or not.

In case the existence of an "agent" is sufficient, the "species" is not multiplied. Regard as an example the "active intellects," because their "quiddities" are not individualized in themselves; however, their mere essential "possibility" is enough to induce an effusion of "individuation" upon them. Thus inevitably the "species" of each of them is confined to its "individual."

Otherwise, either the "matter" is sufficient, as in the case of a "sphere"—here the "species" also is confined—or the "matter" does not suffice. Consider "things produced" as an example.

Otherwise, i.e., in case the "existence" of an "agent" is not enough, "individuation" being in need of an external "recipient" too, it is again divided into two kinds. Either (1) the "matter" is sufficient, as in the case of a heavenly "sphere," because despite the essential "possibility" carried by its "quid- dity," the "agent" is not sufficient for an effusion of "individuation" upon it; rather it requires a "recipient" which is the "matter;" but the "matter" suffices it from having further specializing factors, because of its having been originated with no preceding element. Here the "species" also is confined to an "individual."

(2) Or the "matter" does not suffice (i.e., in inducing the effusion of "individuation"), rather "individuation" must have further specializing factors accompanying it so that the two "recipients" (i.e., the essential "possibility" and the "matter")
become close, through their originating procedure, to becoming worthy of “individuation” after “individuation” and gift after gift. “For if you are to enumerate the favors of God you would not be able to count them.” Consider “things produced” as an example of the second case. And in this case the “species” has inevitably individuals.

That the difference between “universal” and “individual” is through two modes of cognition, is not acceptable.

The thesis that the difference between “universal” and “individual” is realized through two different modes of cognition, namely, intellection and perception, is not acceptable. The thesis we maintain opposes the doctrine of some Philosophers who maintain that “universality” and “individuation” are due to different ways of cognition, and not to any difference in the object of cognition.

In order to refute this thesis you need not exercise any further effort.
"Unity," no less than what coincides with it, is the most general of all things.

And the secret of the most general thing being better-known is a "cognition" with your most perfect "essence."

"Unity" is better-known to the intellect, while "multiplicity" is more clear to the imagination.

"Unity," no less than what coincides with it, like "existence" and "necessity," is the most general of all things. Thus "unity" is the best-known of them all, because what is most general is best-known. And the secret of the most general thing being better-known than what is more particular is the fact that the most general thing has a "cognition" with your most comprehensive and most perfect "essence" and the "existence" of your "soul," because your "essence" belongs to the World of Holiness and Universality and Comprehensiveness. "Say: the Spirit belongs to the Command of my Lord." Thus the "cognition" which is the condition of "cognition" is here actualized. This must not be difficult for you to understand. It is because of this "cognition" that they say: "Unity" is better-known to the intellect, while "multiplicity" is more clear to the imagination.

Consider "unity" and "existence" as two in the mind, but "unity" is the same in the external world.

Then we point out that what they mean by the "coincidence" of "unity" and "existence" is not the synonymity of the two. Rather: Consider "unity" and "existence" as two in the mind, i.e., with regard to the "concept," but "unity," is the same as "existence" itself in the external world.
XLI THE DIVISION OF UNITY

“One” is of several kinds. To summarize: “one” is (1) either “real,” and that is the kind of “one” which, in being qualified by “unity,” does not need mediation in its “occurrence” (i.e., the “occurrence” of “unity” to the “one”); in other words, it is the kind of “one” for which “unity” is the “qualification” through itself, not through something connected with it; or (2) non-real, and that is the contrary of the former.

Now the “real one” is (1) either something having “unity,” or (2) not; namely, it is the objective “unity” itself, not its mental and representing “concept.” The second (i.e., objective unity itself) is the One by way of the true “unity” which is the truth of “unity,” like the One, the True, Whose Words are true.

And the first kind (i.e., something having “unity”) is either (1) specialized “one” or (2) generalized “one.” And the generalized “one” is either (1) generalized in terms of existential width, or (2) generalized in terms of “concept.” And the latter is either “specific” or “generic” or “accidental” in accordance with their various degrees.

The specialized “one” is either (1) indivisible because of the very “nature” to which occurs “unity” as well (i.e., as well as because of the “unity” which occurs to it), or (2) divisible.

And the indivisible “one” is either (1) the very “concept of “unity” and the “concept” of indivisibility, or (2) otherwise. And the latter is either (1) positional or (2) non-material. And the non-material “one” is either (1) purely non-material, or (2) is attached to a “body.” And the divisible “one” is either (1) divisible “by essence” or (2) “by accident.” And the non-real “one” is either “one” by “species,” by “genus,” or by “quality,” etc..

“Unity” is either “real” or “non-real.” Understand what they have understood.

In reference to these divisions of “unity” we say: “Unity” is either (1) “real”—its meaning may be known from the meaning of the “non-real unity,” as will be shown in our poetry—or (2) “non-real.” Understand what they (i.e., Philosophers) have understood.

The former has been divided by our wise companions into “true” and “non-true” (“unity”).
The former, i.e., the “real,” has been divided by our wise companions into “true” and “non-true” (“unity”).

The “essence” in the “non-true unity” Is understood in the adjective derived from it.

Now we indicate the meaning of the two divisions by saying: The “essence,” i.e., “quiddity” in the “non-true unity” is understood in the meaning of the adjective derived from it (i.e., from “unity”), namely, “one.” And the “true unity” is opposed to it in this respect. That is to say, the “one” in the “True Unity” is “unity” itself, and the “unity” is the objective “existence” itself which has no “quiddity” beyond its sheer “essence.”

It is divided into “specialized” and “generalized” With regard to “existence” and “concept.”

It i.e., the “real unity,” is divided into “specialized,” i.e., numerical “unity,” and “generalized” with regard to “existence,”—like the reality of “non-conditioned existence” and “all-pervading existence”—and with regard to “concept,” like specific or generic or accidental “unity.”

To the specialized numerical (“one”) belongs that whose “substratum” indicates “indivisibility” only, like the principle of numbers.

To the several kinds of the specialized numerical “one,” i.e., specialized “one” which is called “numerically one”—we have turned, in our exposition of ideas in the verses, from the division of “unity” to the division of “one” in order to indicate that there is no difference between them and that the divisions of the one follow exactly the divisions of the other—belong that whose “substratum” indicates “indivisibility” only, like the principle of numbers. That is to say, that which is qualified by “unity,” and “unity” itself, are both “one,” and it is the “concept” of “unity” which is the principle of numbers, which, again, is “indivisibility.” Thus the principle of numbers is, in the dimension of “concepts,” an indicator of the “true unity” in the dimension of “realities.”

Another kind of it is that which adds being—“positional,” like points.

Another kind of it, i.e., of specialized “one,” is that which
adds being “positional,” i.e., whose “substratum” adds another “concept” besides the “concept” of “unity” and indivisibility, and which is possessed of a “position,” like points.

Another kind of it is like “non-material.” And another kind of it is that whose “substratum” accepts being divided. That which accepts it is a “quantity” if it accepts it essentially. But if it accepts it accidentally, it must be understood as a body.

Another kind of it is like “non-material” i.e., that adds to the “concept” of the non-existence of divisibility something which is not “positional,” like “intellect” and “soul.”

Now these three share a common characteristic; namely, that their substratum qua the object of “occurrence” does not accept division, just as all of them do not accept division with regard to the “occurrent” which is “unity.”

And another kind of it is that whose “substratum” accepts being divided, contrary to the preceding ones, namely, the divisions of the numerical “one.” And it is of two kinds, because that which accepts it, i.e., the object of imaginary division—not real division, for the latter would annihilate the very quantity—is a “quantity” if it accepts it essentially. But if it accepts it accidentally, it must be understood as a natural body.

We say: “as a body” in order that it might include the numerical “one” which inheres in the “body,” like whiteness, and others which accidentally accept division. The same is true of one “form.” No, even one “matter,” for it also accepts accidentally imaginary division through “quantity.” Rather, “matter” accepts essentially even real division. But that is not what is at issue here.

“Non-real unity” is that which does not lack the mediator of “occurrence”.

“Non-real unity” is that, i.e., the kind of “unity,” which does not lack the mediator of “occurrence,” as exemplified by Zayd and ‘Amr, for they are one in “man,” or exemplified by “man” and “horse,” for they are one in “animal.” Thus “man” is “real one” and mediator of “occurrence” of “unity” to Zayd and ‘Amr. Likewise, “animal” is “real one” and the mediator of “occurrence” of “unity” to “man” and “horse.”

Thus “unity” is, with regard to “man,” for instance, a “qual-
"Homogeneousness," "sharing-one-species," "equality," "Similiarity," "proportionality," and "sharing-one-position."—if two things are "one" in "genus" or in "species," and with regard to "quantity," "quality," "relation," and "position."

The same is true of all the other divisions of "non-real unity." They are "homogeneousness," "sharing-one-species," "equality," "proportionality," and "sharing-one-position," if two things are "one" in "genus"—this refers to "homogeneousness"—or in "species"—this refers to "sharing-one-species,"—and with regard to "quantity," "quality," "relation," and "position," respectively.

"One" with regard to "species" is different from The "specific one." And in the other similar cases, distinction must be observed.

"One" with regard to "species," like Zayd and 'Amr, is different from the "specific one," like man. And in the other similar cases, distinction must be observed. You must be careful not to commit confusion. "One" with regard to "genus." like "man"—and "horse" is different from the "generic one," like "animal." And "one" with regard to an "accident" is different from the "accidental (one)."

XLII PREDICATION

By way of preparation let us begin by establishing that "it-is-ness" which is a certain "unification"—and it is the source of division—is one of the essential "accidents" of "unity." Thus it is one of those elements that are connected with "unity." And "otherness" which is the source of division for "opposition," "difference," and in some respect "sharing-one-species"—we say, for example: two distinguishable things are either "opposed" to each other, or "different" from each other, or "sharing-one-species"!—is one of the essential "accidents" of "multiplicity" and one of those elements that are connected with it.
“Otherness” is connected with “multiplicity;” likewise “it-is-it-ness” with “unity.”

The latter is “predication.” And in it are to be considered both of its aspects, “unity” and “multiplicity.”

So we say: “Otherness” is connected with “multiplicity;” likewise “it-is-it-ness” is connected with “unity.” The latter, i.e., “it-is-it-ness,” is “predication.”

If you object and say: “It-is-it-ness” is any kind of “unification,” so that it includes “homogeneousness,” “sharing-one-species” and other divisions of “non-real one;” how, then, do you confine “predication” to “it-is-it-ness?”

We answer by saying: In the first place, common usage, certainly, has made “predication” peculiar to “unification” in “existence.” Otherwise, however, it is equal to “it-is-it-ness.” And in our verse, too, we mention these two aspects, “unity” and “multiplicity,” without specification. And, in the second place, we say, if we are to follow the common usage, “it-is-it-ness” will not be used in its general meaning. And in it, i.e., “predication,” are to be considered both of its aspects, “unity” and “multiplicity.”

A DIVISION OF PREDICATION

Predication is called “essential” and “primary;”
Its meaning is to be understood as “unification” of “concepts.”

Predication is in some cases called “essential” and “primary,” and its meaning is to be understood as “unification” of “concepts.” That is to say, its meaning is that the “subject” is the very concept of the “predicate” with regard to “essence” and “quiddity,” not with regard to “existence” only. The latter is the case with “ordinary (or common) predication,” with an additional condition that we consider beforehand a kind of “difference,” like the “difference” of “implicity” and “explicitly” which is found when we make a “definition” the “predicate” of the definiendum, or like the consideration of a thing in such a way that it may be other than itself or it may be negated of itself. But the consideration of the thing not in such a way, but
as it-is-it, could be exemplified by Philosophers’ saying concerning the problem of “quiddity”: “Man qua man is man, nothing else;” and concerning the problem of “making:” “An apricot has not been made an apricot but it has been made existent,” because an apricot is an apricot by itself, for the affirmation of a thing of itself is self-evident, while its negation of itself is impossible, as we have said before.

Thus any “concept,” although it is not “existent” does not lose itself by “primary predication.”

Thus any “concept,” although it is not “existent”—its “existence” not coming into consideration—does not lose itself by “primary predication.” It is called “essential” only because it does not occur except concerning “essential concepts” (i.e., an “essence” being predicated of the same “essence,” like “Man is man”); and it is called “primary” because its “truthfulness” and “falsity” are “primary.”

Predication is to be called “technical” and “common,” and to be defined as “unification” in “existence.”

In other cases predication is to be called “technical” and “common,” and is to be defined as “unification” in “existence.” The meaning of this kind of “predication” is that the “subject” and the “predicate” are unified on the level of “existence,” like: “The laugher is a writer,” because they are “one” with regard to “existence,” whereas with regard to “concept” and “essence,” how far they are from each other! The reason why it is called “technical” and “common” must be clear.

ANOTHER DIVISION

Predication is to be called “non-derivative” or “derivative.” The former is “it-is-it,” while the latter is “(it-is-) possessor-of-it.”

Predication is to be called “non-derivative” or “derivative.” The sign of the former, i.e., the “non-derivative” kind of predication, is “it-is-it,” while the sign of the latter i.e., “derivative,” is “(it-is-) possessor-of-it.”
ANOTHER DIVISION

"Whether-ness" is divided into "actualized" and "non-actualized," "composite" and "simple."

"Whether-ness," i.e., a proposition which is an answer to the question "whether?," is divided into "actualized" and "non-actualized," "composite" and "simple." The verse may be paraphrased as follows: "whether-ness" is divided into "actualized whether-ness" and "non-actualized whether-ness," and into "simple whether-ness" and "composite whether-ness."

Know that a proposition consists of two acts of confirmation, that is to say, the confirmation of a "subject" and the confirmation of a "predicate." Thus when you say: "All men are laughers," its meaning is that everything to which "man" is applicable "laugher" is also applicable. And if the subject happens to have "actualized individuals" to which the indication of the subject is applicable, the proposition is of the "actualized" kind. And if the individuals of its subject happen to be "non-actualized," it is the proposition is of the "non-actualized" kind. Examples of the latter kind are: "All absolutely non-existent things can have no predicate," and "all partners of the Creator are impossible," and "Any co-presence of two contradictories is impossible."

All propositions of this latter kind are equivalent to a conditional proposition neither of whose two terms is actualized, so that there is no affirmation of the antecedent here. That is to say, everything which, if it were actualized and if the "absolutely non-existent" and the like were applicable to it, would be so-and-so; but in reality there is no actualization of the individual so that these indications are not applicable to them.

The "simple whether-ness" is a proposition which is given in answer to the question, by simple "whether?," concerning the existence of a thing. And the composite "whether-ness" is a proposition given in answer to the question, by composite "whether?," concerning its states.

To the simple "whether-ness, you must not apply the rule of "presupposition," because it is the "subsistence" of something, whereas the rule implies something-being-something,
To the simple “whether-ness” you must not apply the rule of “presupposition” by saying, concerning the simple “whether-ness,” that the affirmation of “existence” of a “quiddity,” presupposes the subsistence of that “quiddity” of which “existence” is affirmed. In such a case the argument will be transferred to this “subsistence” which will have to be considered to presuppose another “subsistence,” and so on and so forth, so that it will necessarily lead to an infinite regress. And this consequence is the necessary result of understanding the simple “whether-ness” as an affirmation of something of something else. This, however, is not true.

This is because it, i.e., the simple “whether-ness” is to be understood as the “subsistence” of something, because “existence” with regard to “quiddity” is not an external “accident” nor is “quiddity” something actualized apart from “existence,” so that the simple “whether-ness” will not constitute an affirmation of something of something else; whereas the rule, i.e., the rule of “presupposition,” implies only something-being-something (i.e., the affirmation of something of something else), not the “subsistence” of something.

Sometimes it was replaced by “necessitation”
Sometimes this rational principle was made particular.

This is the way taken by the Head of Theosophers Mullā Ṣadrā for the solution of this problem. As for other people, they fell into difficulty, and could not find a way out. Sometimes in order to solve the problem it (i.e., the rule of “presupposition”) was replaced by “necessitation.” The man who held this position was the thinker al-Dawwānī, who said: Affirmation of something of something else “necessitates” the “subsistence” of that of which it is affirmed, be it by this affirmed “subsistence.” Thus “necessitation” does not require the precedence of the “subsistence” of that which it is affirmed over what is affirmed, as is the case with the rule of “presupposition.”

Sometimes, again, this rational principle was made “particular” to that which is outside of the simple “whether-ness.” The man who held this position was al-Imām (i.e., Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī). But a rational principle cannot be confined. The position we take it that it is “particular” from the very beginning.

It has also been maintained—the man who represents this position is al-Sayyid al-Mudāqqiq—; The “source” of the deri-
vation of "existent," i.e., "existence," is not to be found even mentally. That is to say, "existence" has no individual, whether external or mental, so that it might subsist in a "quiddity," be it by way of mental "subsistence" in such a way that it would belong to the pattern of the affirmation of something of something else. Rather, he argues, the ground of something-being-"existent" consists in the fact that the "concept" of "existent" is unified with the thing, i.e., "quiddity."

This thesis is in discord with the thesis of "existence" being fundamentally real. In accordance with this latter position we assert that "quiddity" is unified with a kind of real "existence;" whereas he asserts that it is unified with the "concept," but not with the "concept" of the "source"—because it has not even a mental individual—, but, rather, with the "concept" of "existent."

Likewise, we assert: "quiddity," since it has no corresponding objective reality with regard to itself, is unified with "existence;" and if there were something corresponding to it, it would not be "unified," but rather "joined" with "existence;" thus its "unification" is due to its not-being-actualized by itself. He, on the contrary, asserts that, since "existence" has no individual, whether external or mental, there is no determining factor in "quiddity," neither external nor mental; and that the ground of something-being-"existent" is the unification of "quiddity" with the "concept" of "existent." But the sunlight and the chameleon are strangers to each other!

XLIII  OPPOSITION AND ITS DIVISION

"Opposition is a kind of "other-ness."
Our learned companions have defined it as
the impossibility of "co-presence" in one place, in
one aspect, and at one time.

"Opposition" is a kind of "other-ness," as we have indicated before. Our learned companions have defined it as the impos-
sibility of "co-presence" in one place, in one aspect, and at one
time. By this condition of the oneness of "place," the definition
extends to things like blackness and whiteness, which can co-
exist in the actual world in two places. And by the condition of the one-ness of "aspect," the definition extends to things like father-ness and son-ness, which can co-exist in one person from two different aspects. And by the condition of unity in terms of "time," the definition extends to the opposition of two things which could co-exist in two "times."

We mean by "co-presence" in the verse the "co-presence" of two things different from each other, because "opposition" is a kind of "other-ness."

And in this understanding, "sharing-one-species" will be excluded from the above definition, for although "sharing-one-species" does belong in some respect to "other-ness," the aspect of "unification" and "it-is-it-ness" is preponderant to it.

Or we may say that what is meant by "co-presence" is a kind of "co-presence;" namely, that "opposition" is the impossibility of a kind of "co-presence" concerning two different things. And that particular kind is the "co-presence" of two things which are different from each other with regard to "quiddity."

**When two "positive" things stand opposed to each other, in case they are intellected together, they are "correlatives."

If not, they are "contraries." You must call the latter "real" in case there is an extreme distance. If not, ascribe them

To the commonly accepted usage, like red and brown.

When two "positive" things stand opposed to each other —this refers to the commonly-accepted basis of classification; namely, either both of them being "positive" things or one of them being "positive" and the other "negative," etc.—in case they are intellected together, they are "correlatives" of each other; if not, i.e., if the two opposed things are "positive" but one of them is not intellected in relation to the other, they are "contraries" of each other. You must call the latter "real" (contraries), in case there is an extreme distance between the two, like blackness and whiteness; If not, i.e., in case there is no extreme difference, ascribe them, i.e., the two "contraries," to the commonly accepted usage, and call them "commonly accepted contraries," like red and brown, because there is no extreme distance between them. This is true, when they happen to be both "positive" things.
In case a “positive” stands opposed to a “negative,” the opposition in terms of the “capability” for receiving what is missing, is “privation”-and-“possession.”

In case a “positive” stands opposed to a “negative,” the opposition in terms of the “capability” in its “substratum” for receiving what is missing, is “privation”-and-“possession” (qunyah or qinyah). Very often in books of philosophy, “possession” (malakdh) is expressed by qunyah or qinyah, meaning (literally) “capital” and “wealth.”

If you consider the “capability of receiving” unconditionally, whether in the proper time or not, whether “species” or “genus,” it is “real.” It includes beardlessness (in childhood) and things like the blindness of a born-blind.

Let us mention the two kinds of “privation” and “possession,” by saying: If you consider the “capability of receiving” unconditionally whether (1) in the proper time, i.e., whether the “capability” of the substratum of “privation” for receiving “possession” be in the proper time, as in the case of the “privation” of beard for a beardless man, or (2) not in the proper time: whether (3) with regard to “species,” i.e., whether the “capability” be a “species,” examples of these two kinds being given in the verse, or (4) with regard to “genus,” like the blindness of scorpion, then it, i.e., the “opposition” of “privation” and “possession,” is “real.” It, i.e., the “opposition” of “privation” and “possession,” includes beardlessness (in childhood) and other similar “privations” not occurring in the proper time, and things like the blindness of a born-blind, etc., i.e., whose “capability” relates to “species,” and not to “individuals.”

In case “capability” is considered peculiar to individuals and to what is in its proper time, it is to be ascribed to the common usage, because it is commonly known among the people.

In case “capability” is considered peculiar to individuals—with no consideration of “species” and “genus”—and to what is in its proper time—with no consideration of “capability”
outside the proper time—then it, i.e., the "opposition" or "privation," and "possession," is to be ascribed to the common usage.

Let us mention now the reason why it is to be called "commonly-accepted." That is because it is the kind which is commonly known among the people, not the first meaning, for the latter is known only to the specialists. But it is they who have generalized it.

_This is the terminology of the Categories._

_This_ i.e., "commonly-accepted usage" _is the terminology of the Categories_. That is to say, the logicians in the discourse on the ten categories, have accepted it as its technical meaning, in order to make the study easier for the students.

And that in which "capability" is not taken into consideration has become known among them as "negation" and "affirmation."

And that, i.e., the "opposition" of "positive" and "negative," in which "capability" is not taken into consideration has become known among them as "negation" and "affirmation."
SEVENTH GEM

CAUSE AND CAUSED

XLIV  DEFINITION AND DIVISION

The “cause” is that of which a thing is in need.
And the thing which stands in need is the “caused.”

The “cause” is that of which a thing is in need, regardless
whether in coming-into-existence or in subsisting, whether
“complete” or “incomplete.” And the thing which stands in
need is the “caused.”

It is divided into “incomplete” and “complete,”
And into “external” and “internal.”
The “material” and the “formal” relate to “subsis-
tence,”
while the “efficient” and “perfecting” relate to
“existence.”
That for the sake of which “existence” becomes
actualized is the “final goal,” while “that through
which” is the “agent.”

It, i.e., the “cause,” is divided into “incomplete” and “com-
plete,” and into “external” and “internal.” In reference to the
latter two, we say: The “material” and the “formal” relate to
“subsistence,” as they are called the “causes of subsistence;”
while the “efficient” and the “perfecting” (i.e., “final”) relate to
“existence.” That for the sake of which “existence” becomes
actualized is the “final goal,” while that through which “ex-
istence” becomes actualized is the “agent.”

The “agent” is: “by-nature,” “by-being-pushed,” “by-
intention,”
“By-being-forced,” “by-compulsion;” pay attention to
what they have paid attention; “by-self-manifesta-
tion,” then “by-foreknowledge,” and “by-agreement.”
Understand, O you, men of intelligence!

Now the “agent” has several divisions. It is “by-nature,” “by-
being-pushed,” “by-intention,” “by-being-forced,” “by-compul-
sion”—pay attention to what they have paid attention— “by-
self-manifestation;" then "by-foreknowledge," and "by-agreement." Understand, O you, men of intelligence.

In the verses which follow, we refer to the basic principle from which are to be obtained the definitions of these several divisions. The gist thereof is as follows.

The "agent" either has knowledge of its actions, or not.

In this latter case the "agent" is either such that its action accords with its "nature," in which case it is an "agent-by-nature," or not. In the latter case it is an "agent-by-being-pushed."

The first (i.e., the case in which the "agent" has knowledge of its action), is either such that its action is not based on its "will"—in which case it is an "agent-by-being-forced"—or it is (based on its "will").

In the latter case, either (1) its knowledge of its action coincides with its action, rather it is the same as its action, while its knowledge of itself is the same with its preceding and non-detailed knowledge of its action only—in which case it is an "agent-by-agreement"—(2) or not, that is, its knowledge of its action precedes its action.

Then, either its knowledge is connected with an additional "motive"—in which case it is an "agent-by-intention"—or not, that is, the knowledge itself acts actively and produces the object of knowledge.

In this case, either that knowledge of the action is something additional to its self—in which case it is an "agent-by-foreknowledge"—or not, that is, the knowledge of the action is the same as its knowledge of itself, which, again is the same as its self. And this is the non-detailed knowledge of the action which is the same as the detailed revealing. Then it is an "agent-by-self-manifestation." It is also called an "agent-by-foreknowledge" in its more general sense.

Because it is either with knowledge or without knowledge, and either the action accords with its nature or does not. These are the two first. As to the "agent" with the knowledge, if the knowledge of the actions is known to be the same as the "existence" of them, what is meant is the "agent-by-agreement."

All this because it, i.e., the "agent," is either with knowledge of its action or without knowledge, and either the action of the
“agent” without the knowledge, **accords with its nature or does not accord. These are the two first kinds, i.e., “by-nature” and “by-being-pushed.”

As to the “agent” with the knowledge of its action, if the knowledge of the actions, is known to be the same as the “existence” of them (i.e., actions), what is meant is the “agent-by-agreement.”

But if the “existence” of actions is not found to be the knowledge, nor is the knowledge of the “agent itself sufficient, but if, rather, the “caused” is known before the action, then it is “intention,” if it is connected with an additional motive and accompanied by “will.” But without it, “force” is actualized.

But if the “existence” of actions is not found to be knowledge of it possessed by the “agent,” nor is the knowledge of the “agent itself sufficient to dispense with its preceding knowledge of its actions—contrary to the “agent-by-agreement” which can dispense with it—but if, rather, the “caused” is known before the action, then it is an “agent-by-intention,” if it, i.e., the “agent” with knowledge, or its knowledge, or its action is connected with an additional motive and accompanied by “will.” But without it (i.e., the “will”), i.e., if the action of the “agent” with knowledge is not accompanied by “will,” then “force” is actualized, i.e., it is an “agent-by-being-forced.”

But without the knowledge being accompanied by a “motive,”
then, if it is added, being actively active, it is fit to be “foreknowledge”

But without the knowledge being accompanied by a motive, then it it is added, i.e., if its preceding detailed knowledge of its action is added to its self, it being actively active and producing the “existence” of the object of knowledge—it i.e., the “agent” is fit to be an “agent-by-foreknowledge.”

And if it is the same, then call it “self-manifestation.”
In its knowledge there is contained the knowledge of its action.

And if it, i.e., its preceding detailed and active knowledge of
the action is the same as the “agent” itself, then call it “self-manifestation,” i.e., an “agent-by-self-manifestation.” In its knowledge, i.e., in its knowledge of itself, there is contained the knowledge of its action; that is to say, its preceding detailed knowledge of its action is contained in its knowledge of itself, in the way the “determined intellects” are contained in the “simple non-determined intellect.” This is the non-detailed (i.e., non-determined) knowledge which is the same as detailed (i.e., determined) revealing. This is contrary to the case of the “agent-by-agreement,” for there the preceding knowledge of the action is not “determined;” rather the knowledge of itself is a non-determined knowledge of the action, which precedes it, while the determined knowledge of the action is the same as the action. It is also contrary to the case of the “agent-by-foreknowledge” in the special sense, because the determined knowledge of action, although it does precede it, is something additional to the “agent” itself.

“Will” and “nature,” when they happen to be under the “compulsion” of something else, the “agent” must be regarded as of “by-compulsion.”

“Will” and “nature,” when they happen to be under the “compulsion” of something else, the “agent” must be regarded as of “by-compulsion.” Thus, for example, if the “nature” which is under the “compulsion” of the “soul,” in spite of its being an “agent-by-nature” of attracting, repelling, transforming, etc., and the “soul” itself which is an “agent-by-will-and-intention,” —if both of them (i.e., nature and soul) are considered from the point of view of the latter (soul) being compelled by God’s Command and the former (nature) being compelled by the command of the “soul” —No! everything is by God’s Command—they are “agents-by-compulsion.”
XLV REGARDING WHICH OF THE DIVISIONS OF “AGENT“ IS SUITABLE TO HIS MAJESTY THE MOST HIGH

Concerning the First, the sixth has been handed down.

But He is, in the view of Peripatetics, “by-foreknowledge.”

Concerning the First—may his Names be sanctified—the sixth out of the divisions of “agent,” i.e., the “agent-by-self-manifestation” has been handed down from the Sūfis and it (i.e., the sixth) arrogates the intellect with the life-water of knowledge. But He, i.e., the First, Most High, is, in the view of Peripatetics, an “agent-by-foreknowledge,” for they assert that the knowledge preceding “creation” is the source of the latter, and that the knowledge is “imprinted forms” which are, in their view, accidents occurring to the Sacred Essence.

But according to them, He is “by-agreement” for the “forms” which are “occurring accidents,” while according to the Illuminationists, for all.

But according to them, i.e., the Peripatetics, He is an “agent-by-agreement” for the intelligible “forms” which are “occurring accidents”—this because the knowledge of that action, i.e., the “forms,” is the same as the action—while, according to the Illuminationists, He is “agent-by-agreement” for all i.e., all actions which are external existents—because, for them, “all” means these—or for all of them (i.e., actions) and the intelligible “forms” subsisting in themselves, i.e., the Luminous Ideas. In that case, their being “occurring accidents” is simply something modelled upon the ideas of their opponents, or is a naming by their abstract property, i.e., knowledge in the abstract sense.

Theologians assert that there is an additional “motive” for the action of God. By this they mean “by-intention”

Theologians, like the Mu'tazilah, assert that there is an additional “motive” for the action of God, since according to their view it is caused by additional purposes. By this they mean an “agent-by-intention.” That is to say, He, Most High, is in their view, an “agent-by-intention.”
LXVI  ALL OF THE EIGHT KINDS OF "AGENT"
ARE ACTUALIZED IN THE HUMAN SOUL

The soul, once created, uses the "faculties" and produces "forms."

The soul, once created, uses the "faculties" and produces particular intelligible "forms" "by-agreement" or "by-self-manifestation.

As for the fact that the soul is an "agent-by-agreement" in relation to the intelligible "forms," it is clear. But in relation to the "faculties," it is because, if their being known by the soul were not their very "existence," the knowledge would be the "forms" of the "faculties." Then these forms would be either (1) in the soul—in which case they would be "universals" while the soul produces them and uses them as "particulars;" (2) or they would be in themselves, in which case, the imprinting of their "forms" in the soul would be a king of "using," and there must necessarily be knowledge of the "using and of that by which the "using" is actualized. The argument would then be transferred to this latter knowledge, and so on and so forth; and besides, how can they be "knowers" of themselves, while they are "bodily," their "existence" belonging to the "matter?;" or (3) some other organs. But there is no other organ. Besides, the argument would again be transferred to them.

As for its being an "agent-by-self-manifestation," it is because of the fact that, since it is "simple" and "comprehensive" of all its aspects and "faculties," it knows through itself all of them by one simple "existence," by a kind of knowledge which precedes all their multiple "existences" and which precedes its knowledge of them through their very actual "existences," although it has no knowledge of that knowledge.

By imagining falling-down, on a branch, the falling-down is induced "by-foreknowledge."

By imagining falling-down, i.e., when a man happens to be on a high branch, and imagines his falling down, the falling-down is induced "by-foreknowledge." For this imaginative knowledge by itself and by the sheer imagination of falling-down, without reflection and judgment about any final "goal," is a source of an action, which is falling-down.
“By-intention,” walking, for example, because of knowledge occurring together with all that may be added to it, such as motives.

And “by-intention,” is induced, walking, for example, because of knowledge occurring to the soul, together with all that may be added to it, i.e., the soul, such as motives and aims.

“By-nature” for example, health. “By-being-pushed” illnesses,
“By-being-forced” an evil is actualized from a good-natured man.

“By-nature” is induced, for example, health. For the soul at the stage of the “natural faculties” is an “agent-by-nature,” because it is qualified by their qualities, too, just as it is qualified by the qualities of the “spiritual beings” at a higher stage. There come out of it the actions of attracting, keeping, and digesting, etc., by a natural procedure.

“By-being-pushed” are actualized illnesses. Thus the production of an unnatural heat of fever, for example, is an action of the soul in a descending stage just like the production of the natural heat in that stage, and just as the ascending movement comes from a “nature,” which is “pushed,” while the descending movement comes from a “nature” which is “left free.”

“By-being-forced” an evil, like boxing the ears of an orphan, is actualized from a good-natured soul.

Now the soul with its elevation, when it comes down,
by its command all “faculties” are put under “compulsion.”

Now the soul with its elevation, when it comes down—since it is a sign of Unity, learning the “purifying” and “assimilating” Names of the Truth, Most High, with none of these Names being away from the realm of its “indication” and “manifestation,” it is elevated in its lowliness, and lowly in its elevation, everything being in accordance with it, so that it is the basis kept intact in all faculties and is the pillar of all degrees, and its relation to all is like the relation of the “mediating movement” to the “cutting movement.”

Thus, necessarily by its command all “faculties” are put under “compulsion,” so that the faculties in relation to the
supreme power of the soul over them, are “agent-by-compulsion.”

The bestower of “existence” is in metaphysics the “agent.”
The Natural Philosophers assert the bestower of movement.

Here we would distinguish the terminology of the Metaphysicians, in so far as they are Metaphysicians, in the usage of the word “agent” from the terminology of the Natural Philosophers in its usage. The bestower of “existence,” by way of bringing out a thing from “non-existence” to “existence,” whether “quiddity” or “existence,” “matter” or “form,” is in metaphysics the “agent,” whereas the Natural Philosophers assert the bestower of movement being the “agent.” For the Natural Philosophers use the word “agent” to denote what brings into “existence” neither the “matter” of a thing nor its “form,” but rather that which sets in motion an already existent “matter” from a state to another.

The Metaphysicians also often use the word “agent” in this sense, when they say, for example: “The carpenter is the agent of a throne;” or “Fire is the ‘agent’ of burning.” But they do this, not in so far as they are Metaphysicians.

To this refers the Divine Book by the following words of God, Most High; “Have you seen what you emit? Do you create it, or are We the Creator?,” etc., up to the end of the three verses. 

XLVII INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONCEPT OF GOAL

Everything strives to attain a final “goal,” even such “agents” as “natures.”

Everything strives in the action to attain a final “goal,” even such “agents” as “natures” (i.e., the four elements). If even the “natures” having no consciousness have “goals” to attain, as we shall point out later, how could higher principles lack “goals,” when consciousness is their very “essence” with regard both to “quiddity” and “existence?”
“Being-forced” is neither “continuous” nor “common,” it must be cut short, for the requirement of Wisdom and Foreknowledge is to make every “possible” attain its “goal.”

“Being-forced” is neither continuous nor common, it must be cut short, for the requirement of Divine Wisdom and Foreknowledge is to make every “possible” attain its “goal.” The “continuous being-forced” and “common being-forced” would contradict the requirement of Divine Wisdom and Foreknowledge.

‘Inâyah (“foreknowledge”), to be dealt with in the section on “knowledge,” is an active knowledge concerning the best arrangement of things.

Sometimes, however, it is used in the sense of doing something in a perfect way so that it may be followed by various good results. This is what is meant when one says, for example,: “The ‘înâyah (Providence) of God in the creation of such-and-such a thing is such-and-such.” In this meaning, ‘înâyah is an aspect of Divine Power, just as in the first meaning it denotes the highest degree of knowledge. Since the word hikmah (Wisdom) is also used in this second meaning, the word ‘înâyah here must be understood in the first sense.

It is the “cause” of an “agent” with regard to its “quiddity,” but with regard to its “existence,” it is “caused” by it.

It, i.e., the final “goal” is the “cause” of an “agent” quâ “agent” with regard to its (i.e., final goal’s) “quiddity,” but with regard to its “existence” it is something “caused” by it (i.e., by the “agent”). This is what is also expressed by the dictum: The “final cause” precedes the “action” mentally, but follows it externally.

XLVIII REMOVAL OF DOUBTS FROM THE CONCEPT OF THE FINAL GOAL

It is proper that we should defend the concept of “baseless act,” because it is thought to have no final “goal,” if it occurs.
We discuss this problem here because it is often thought that “baseless acts,” “vain acts,” “natures,” and “chance occurrence” do not have any “final goal.” *It is proper that we should defend the concept of “baseless act” because it is thought to have no “final goal” if it occurs.*

The “goal” is shared in common by “that to which” the movement 
Is directed and by “that for the sake of which.”

Let us now firstly establish preliminary notions, and then, secondly let us, remove doubts about it. We say: The “goal” (ghâyah) is shared in common by that to which movement is directed and by that for the sake of which the movement takes place. Thus the word (ghâyah) is used in these two meanings. The “agent” of any movement and its “source” may be classified in terms of a number of different kinds of “agents” and “sources:” “proximate,” “more-proximate,” and “remote;” and for each of them there is a “goal” when it becomes actualized.

*Thus the “goal” of the “faculty of movement” is the first of the two.*

*Thus the “goal” of the “faculty of movement” which is an “agent” in direct contrast with movement is the first of the above-mentioned two goals, i.e., “that to which” movement is directed.*

Often this is given a further “goal” through the “faculty” of “aspiration.”

*For instance, you are repelled from one place to another by aversion.*

Often this, i.e., that to which “movement” is directed, is given a further “goal” through the motive “faculty” of “aspiration.” In this case the two “goals” become united. For instance, you are repelled from one place to another by aversion for the first; then you form the image of another place and aspire to it, and move toward it, until your movement ceases upon reaching it. In this case that to which the “movement” is directed is itself also the “goal” of the “faculty” of “aspiration.”

*But sometimes its “goal” does not become united. In this case, there is a “goal” for the “faculty”*
located in the muscle, which is similar to “natures” in constantly being actualized.

But sometimes its (i.e., the faculty of movement) “goal” does not become united with the “goal” of “aspiration.” For example, you imagine a place and move toward it in order to meet a friend. In this case there is a “goal” for the “faculty” located in the muscle, which is similar to the “goal” of “natures” in constantly being actualized. That “faculty” is similar to an inorganic “nature,” and that “nature” is similar to an animal “faculty of movement.” For just as a “nature” moves its bearer solely in order to let it reach that to which the “movement” is directed, and not to other things, which happen to be the “goals” of those possessing consciousness; likewise what is expected of the “faculty” dispersed in the muscles is only to make itself reach that to which the “movement” is directed. As for the attainment of another “goal,” like meeting a friend, it is to be considered a “goal” of the “faculty” of “aspiration.” Thus, this “faculty” as well as “natures” do have “goals.”

In case the “faculty” of “aspiration” does not find its “goal” its action is to be considered “wasted” relatively thereto.

In case the “faculty” of “aspiration” does not find its “goal,” its action is to be considered “wasted” relatively thereto, i.e., in relation to the “faculty” of “aspiration.” That is to say, when the “faculty” of “aspiration” sets in motion an “agent” without the latter reaching its “goal,” its action is to be called “wasted” in relation to the “faculty,” not in relation to the “moving faculty,” because the latter does reach its “goal.” And its being “wasted” is here to be understood in the technical sense, i.e., in the sense of its being hindered from the “goal,” because the way of its reaching the “goal” is obstructed, and not because it has no “goal” at all. For there is a difference between something being without a “goal” and its being in such a way that a hinderance and obstruction could be put between itself and its “goal.”

Similarly, the “faculty” of a tree in the very process of making the tree attain fruition, when it is hit by hail, is to be called “being-pushed-back.” For the world of Generation and Corruption is a place where things are liable to be “pushed-back.”
Thus hinderances are part of its necessary properties. And yet, it does not mean that the tree has been created without any "goal."

*That which is possessed of two "goals"—in case "imagination" alone constitutes its "remote source," without being accompanied by "thinking"—is "baseless," if the "goal" happens to be the same as the "goal" of the movement.*

Now we begin to explain technically the difference between "baseless action," "vain action," "habitual action," and "natural intention" by saying: *That which is possessed of two "goals,"* i.e., the action having two "goals" in relation to its two "sources," "proximate" and "more-proximate,"—not by being "wasted" in relation to the "faculty" of "aspiration"—*in case "imagination" alone constitutes its "remote source," without being accompanied by "thinking"—otherwise, it would undoubtedly be a perfected action having a particular goal peculiar to "thinking"—is "baseless," if the "goal" of that action happens to be the same as the "goal" of the "movement."

Thus in the concept of the "baseless" action two factors are taken into consideration. One of them is that its "remote source" is only "imagination" unaccompanied by "thinking." This factor is commonly shared by all other divisions of the concept of "that which is possessed of two goals."

*If not, either "imagination" alone is the "source," or accompanied by "nature," or by "temperament," or by "natural disposition."

*If accompanied by "natural disposition," it is "habitual," while in the first of them, it is called "vain."*

The other is that the "faculty" of "aspiration" and the "moving faculty" coincide with each other at the "goal," this last word being understood here in the sense of "that to which movement is directed." And by this second factor it is distinguished from the other. To this we refer by our saying: *If it is not, i.e., if that to which the movement is directed is not the "goal" for both the "faculty" of "aspiration" and the "moving faculty;" if, rather, each of them has a separate "goal" (1) either "imagination alone is the "remote source" or (2) accompanied
by “nature,” it constitutes the “source;” or accompanied by “temperament,” or by “natural disposition.” If, accompanied by “natural disposition” it constitutes the “source,” it is “habitual,” while in the first of them, i.e., the first division, which is the case in which “imagination” alone is the “remote source,” it, i.e., the action, is called a “vain” action.

For example, playing with one’s beard is “habitual,” while
The rest is to be called actions “by-natural-intention.”

For example, playing with one’s beard is a “habitual” action, while the rest, i.e., the case in which the “remote source” is constituted by “imagination” accompanied by “nature” or “temperament,” it is to be called actions “by-natural-intention.”

For example, the movement of a sick man and breathing.

All these which have been given after the “baseless,” share in common the lack of coincidence between the “faculty” of “aspiration” and the “moving faculty” at the “goal” as understood in the sense of “that to which movement is directed,” the “moving faculty” having this as its “goal” while the “faculty” of “aspiration” that as its “goal.” For example, the movement of a sick man—an example of the case in which “imagination” with “temperament” constitutes the “source”—and the movement of breathing—an example of the case in which “imagination” with “nature” constitutes the “source.”

Each of the “sources” in all forms contains its own “goal.” However, in case the “source” of “thinking” is not established, such a “goal” cannot exist.

Now that you have understood this, you must understand that each of the three “sources” (i.e., the “moving faculty,” “aspiration,” and “imagination”) in all forms contains its own “goal.” As for the “goal” of the “moving faculty,” it is “that to which the movement is directed” in every case. As for the “goal” of the “faculty” of “aspiration” and “imagination,” it is the imagined “pleasure” and the animal “good.” For every action of the soul is induced by some “aspiration” and some “imagination.” But this “imagination” is often non-perpetual,
rather, quick in disappearing; or it may be that it is perpetual, but not noticed, because "imagination" is different from the consciousness of the "imagination."

However, in case the "source" of "thinking" is not established, such a goal, i.e., the "goal" proper to "thinking" cannot exist.

An action does not necessarily have a "goal" in relation to what is not a "source" for it. For example, the playing of a child is called "play" and "diversion" simply in relation to the "source" of "thinking," which is lacking in it; but not in relation to the "sources" which do exist in playing.

Thus it is clear that all the things that have been mentioned do have "goals."

The Shaykh al-Ra‘ūs (Ibn Sīnā) remarks in the "Metaphysics" of his Shifā‘: For the arising of this "aspiration" there must necessarily be some cause, namely, either (1) habit, or aversion to a certain mode of being and the will of turning toward another mode of being or (2) the "moving faculty" and "sense faculty" eagerly wishing for the renewal of the action of "moving" or "perceiving."

Habit, turning away from something boring, and eagerly wishing for a new action—all are pleasant, I mean, with regard to the animal "faculty" and imaginative "faculty." And "pleasure" is a sensible, animal, and imaginative "good" in the real sense, while with regard to a human "good" it is merely a seeming "good."

Thus when the "source" happens to be "imaginative" and "animal," its "good" is necessarily "imaginative" and "animal." So this action is not at all devoid of "good" in relation to itself, although it may not be a real "good," i.e., from the viewpoint of "reason."

There is nothing "incidental" in the world of "existence," because whatever occurs ascends to "causes" by which its "existence" becomes "necessary."

He who does not know the "cause" speaks of "incidents."

As for the falsity of "incidence," we would say: There is nothing "incidental" in the world of "existence," because whatever occurs ascends, i.e., goes up vertically, to "causes" by
which its “existence” becomes “necessary.” For the chain of “causes” ultimately goes up to the Necessary Existent.

He who does not know the “cause,” i.e., who is not aware of the fact that everything goes up to the Necessary Existent, speaks of “incidents.”

Also what he asserts is true only with regard to the “species” of what leads to the thing which he calls “incidental:” for example the “species” of digging a well in relation to stumbling upon a treasure; but in relation to the particular act of digging, it is never true, because as long as a thing does not become particularized, it does not exist; and as long as it does not exist, it does not bring to existence anything else.

Thus “incidence” is like “possibility” in that the latter is realized with regard to the “possible” itself and its being analyzed by the mind into “quiddity” and “existence” which is added to it (i.e., “quiddity”); but with regard to “existence” itself and to the necessitation by the “cause,” every “possible” is surrounded by the two kind of “necessity.”

\[\text{An untimely death is to be regarded as “natural” when considered in relation to the order of the whole universe.}\]

An untimely death is to be regarded as a “natural” death when considered in relation to the order of the whole universe and to the “causes” leading up to necessitation. For its “goal” and “that to which the movement is directed” is nothing other than this. This because the “goal” of each thing is different from the “goal” of anything else. Yes, untimely death, being attacked by robbers, not reaching the goal, etc., happen in accordance with the development of the Perfect Man—who has been created for God and for whose sake all things are created—and with regard to his “goal.”

So if someone says: A plant or an animal or a child who has died is gone without having reached the “goal,” he simply means the “goal” in the second sense (i.e., from the viewpoint of the development of the Perfect Man), not in the first sense (i.e., from the viewpoint of the order of the universe). And this expectation also is due to “species” and to “matters” being unified with “forms.”

And you, if you are born with an enlightened heart, and know the perpetuity of the effusion from God and that His
Words are inexhaustible, that His perfected Word is the Gate of Gates, and that God, Most High, has not created any “possible” in vain, you must be aware that every “possible” must of necessity sit at His Gate.

*Melodies which are not harmonious to some people are all arranged in good order in the order of the universe.*

*Melodies which are not harmonious to some people* from the viewpoint of their sensible taste *are all arranged in good order in the order of the universe*. This refers to what we have mentioned about the “goal” in the first sense.

### XLIX FORMAL CAUSE

*That by which a thing acquires its “actuality” is its “form.” That by which (it acquires) its “thing-ness” is the “formal cause” for a “composite,” and it is both the “agent” and “form” of the “locus.”*

*That by which a thing acquires its “actuality” is its “form.”* Since “form” and “matter” have not been defined in the beginning of this section, they are defined here. *That by which (it acquires) its “thing-ness” is the “formal cause” for a “composite,” and it is both the “agent” and “form” of the “locus.”* That is to say, “form” has two aspects, namely, from the viewpoint of its being a part of a “composite” which consists of it (i.e., “form”) and “matter,” it is a “formal cause” for it, while from the viewpoint of its giving “subsistence” to the “locus,” i.e., “matter,” it is an “efficient cause” and the “form” of the “locus.” The same applies to “matter;” its state may be known from what has just preceded.

*It is used to denote (1) the “bodily form,” (2) the “specific form” (3) The “shape,” (4) the “mode of being,” and (5) the “intelligible form.”*

Now it, i.e., the word “form,” is used in a number of meanings, of which five will be mentioned here. It is used to denote the “bodily form,” the “specific form,” the “mode of being” in its general sense, and the “intelligible form.”
The Shaykh al-Ra‘īs (Ibn Sīnā) remarks in the “Metaphysics” of his Shifā: As for the “form” we would say as follows. Sometimes the word “form” is used to denote anything in “actuality” which is capable to be intellected. Even non-material “substances” may be “forms” in this sense.

Sometimes “form” denotes any “mode of being” and “action” which happen to be in “receptacle,” whether “non-composite” or “composite,” so that “movements” and “accidents” may be “forms” in this sense.

Sometimes “form” denotes that by which “matter” subsists in “actuality.” In this case “non-material substances” and “accidents” will not be “forms.”

Sometimes “form” denotes that by which “matter” attains its “perfection,” even if it does not subsist thereby in “actuality,” like health and that which is by nature directed toward health.

Sometimes the phrase “special form” is used to denote the “shapes” and other things which occur in “matter” through arts. Sometimes, again, “form” denotes the “species,” “genus” or “differentia” of things, and all of them together.

Besides that, the whole-ness of a whole is a “form” in its “parts.”

L MATERIAL CAUSE

The bearer of the “potentiality” of a thing is its “element,”
either alone, or with annexation of something different from it;
and each, either (1) accompanied by “changing,”
whether in terms of “essence” or “attribute,”
due either to “increase” or “decrease,” or (2) not.

The bearer of the “potentiality” of a thing is its “element,” or its “matter” in its general sense so that it may include the “substratum” of an “accident” and that with which the soul is connected, either alone—here we begin a division of “matter” by saying that the “element” is either an element of a thing, without any annexation—or with annexation of something different from it. And each of these two is either (1) accompanied
by "changing," whether in terms of "essence" or "attribute"—
and that "changing" is due either to "increase" or "decrease"
—or (2) not, i.e., not accompanied by "changing" in all its
divisions.

The case in which "matter" is found alone without "chang-
ing" is exemplified by a tablet for writing, while the case with
"changing" in its "essence" by way of substantial "increase"
may be exemplified by the sperm with regard to its becoming
an animal, for a number of substantial "perfections" are added
to it till the sperm reaches the stage of an animal, although the
process involves at the same time a certain amount of loss in
terms of its "form;" and in case it is by way of substantial
"decrease," it may be exemplified by wood in relation to its
becoming a throne, for it does decrease through sawing. An
example of the case in which it is accompanied by "changing"
in its "attribute" by way of "increase," is furnished by wax in
relation to its becoming an idol or a child in relation to his
becoming a man, for the "element" in both cases does change
in its state due to the occurrence of movement, regarding
"where" or "quantity" etc., to it.

An example of the case in which it is accompanied by
"changing" by way of "decrease" in its "attribute," is something
white in relation to its becoming black, for the "attribute" of
whiteness is lost therefrom.

An example of the case in which something is annexed to it
without "changing" is wood and stone in relation to their form-
ing a house. To this class belong also numerical units in relation
to their constituting a certain number, and premises in relation
to their constituting the form of syllogism.

An example of the case in which it is accompanied by
"changing" is furnished by simple drugs in relation to a mix-
ture which is prepared out of them, for the former becomes
transmuted until they become a mixture. This is what the
Shifā' asserts.

Also either that which makes an imprint upon it is
one, or more than one with a numerical limitation;
or without any.

Also either that, i.e., the "form," which makes an imprint
upon it (i.e., "matter") and inheres therein is one—this is the
case in which a thing is an "element" for one single thing, like
the “matter” of each heavenly sphere, if the difference between the spheres is to be considered to be through the “species,” for under this condition it does not accept except the “form” of its particular sphere—*or more than one with a numerical limitation*, like grape juice in relation to its becoming wine, vinegar, and syrup, etc., *or more than one without any*, i.e., any numerical limitation, like the Prime Matter in relation to all things.

**LI THE PROPERTIES COMMON TO ALL THE FOUR CAUSES**

*The “cause” in general is understood to be “simple” or “composite.”*

*The “cause” in general is understood to be “simple” or “composite.”*

The “simple agent” is exemplified by the First Source.
The “composite agent” is exemplified by a number of people moving a thing.
The “simple matter” is exemplified by the Prime Matter.
The “composite matter” is exemplified by various drugs with regard to their forming theriaca.
The “simple form” is exemplified by the “form” of water.
The “composite form” is exemplified by the “form” of a garden.
The “simple goal” is exemplified by satiation for eating.
The “composite goal” is exemplified by adorning oneself and the killing of lice for wearing silk.

**Or it is “remote” and “proximate.”**

*Or it is “remote” and “proximate.”* Examples will be too evident to be given.

**Or it is “general” or “special.”**

*Or it is “general” or “special.”* The “general agent” is something by which many things are affected, like fire which burns many things.
The “special agent” is that by which one thing is affected. “Matter” also may be understood on this analogy.
The "general form" is exemplified by the "form" of chair in general.
The "special form" is exemplified by the "form" of this chair.
The "general goal" is exemplified by removal of gall for drinking oxymel and for drinking the juice of violet.
The "special goal" is exemplified by Zayd meeting his particular friend.

Or it is "universal" or "particular."

Or it is "universal" or "particular." The "universal agent" is that which does not correspond to the "caused" on the same level, but is more general, like the physician for this particular remedy.
The "particular agent" is exemplified by this particular physician for this particular remedy, or by physician for remedy. The rest may be understood on this analogy.

Or it is "essential" or "accidental."

Or it is "essential" or "accidental." The "essential agent" is that which is by "essence" the source of an action.
The "accidental agent" is exemplified by scammony for cooling, in spite of its being hot by nature; for its action essentially consists in removing the gall; and when the gall is removed cooling occurs. This is why cooling is ascribed to scammony.
A number of divisions of the "accidental agent" have been mentioned. If you like consult other books.
The "essential matter" is that which accepts a thing essentially.
The "accidental matter" is exemplified by the case in which the "receptacle" is considered with the opposite of that which it has received, and regarded as a "matter" for it (i.e., the "opposite"), like water for air and sperm for man, because the "form" of water or of sperm is the "opposite" of that which has been received so that the latter must necessarily be removed from the "matter."
The "essential form" is exemplified by the shape of a chair.
The "accidental form" is exemplified by blackness and whiteness for the chair.
The "essential goal" is exemplified by health for medicines.
The “accidental goal” has many kinds which are mentioned in the more specialized books of Philosophers.

Likewise, it is “actual or “potential.”

Likewise, it is “actual” or “potential.” Examples may be too evident to be given.

LII SOME PROPERTIES OF THE BODILY CAUSE

The effect of a possessor of “matter” is limited in terms of duration, number, and force. Likewise, it does not produce an effect except when the thing affected thereby is accompanied by a “position.”

The effect of a possessor of “matter,” a “cause” having “matter,” is limited in terms of duration, i.e., the time of producing the effect and number, i.e., the number of the effect, and force, i.e., the force of the effect. Likewise, i.e., just as the “bodily cause” and the “bodily faculties” are limited in their effect, so also it does not produce an effect except when the thing affected thereby is accompanied by a special “position.”

Thus the power of fire does not produce any effect upon the water in a kettle regardless of where the fire happens to be, but rather only when there is actualized between the two a special “position” and a special confrontation. Likewise, the sun does not enlighten the earth regardless of how the sun happens to be, but rather by a special confrontation or something of that kind.

We do not mention here any proof of the two problems in spite of the fact that the former has a long consequence, because by dint of the assertion of the “substantial movement” concerning “faculties” and “natures,” every “faculty” is reducible to a number of “faculties,” each one of which is surrounded and limited by two “non-existences” with regard to its “essence” and its “effect.”

Its being conditioned by “position,” too, will be easy to understand if one but represents that the need of a “faculty” for “matter” concerning “existence” necessitates its need for it
(i.e., "matter") concerning "bringing into existence," too, because "bringing into existence" presupposes "existence." And the need for "matter" concerning "bringing into existence" is there simply in order that a "position" be actualized for the "faculty," through the "matter," vis-à-vis the thing affected. Otherwise, it would not be in need of "matter" concerning "bringing into existence;" it would, then, not be in need of it concerning "existence," too, because whatever is independent in its action is independent in itself, too. Thus it would necessitate its being "non-material," whereas we have supposed it to be "material." This would contradict the original supposition.

In this way, the very representation of the fact the "faculty" is "bodily" and "material" has led us to what we wanted to prove.

LIII PROPERTIES THAT CONCERN BOTH THE CAUSE AND THE CAUSED

Whenever (a "cause") gathers together the effect-producing conditions, its "caused" is necessarily actualized; but not so an "imperfect cause." Know this, so that you might find the right way.

The first of the properties is that whatever (a "cause") gathers together the effect-producing conditions, its "caused" is necessarily actualized, so that there could be no discrepancy between a "caused" and a "perfect cause." This will be evident to anybody after understanding the meaning of the "perfect cause." This is why we do not mention its proof. But not so an "imperfect cause," for discrepancy does occur therein. Know this so that you might find the right way.

The "source" of this is not the "source" of that in reality,
Each would require something peculiar to itself.

The second of them is that "one" does not produce but "one," nor is "one" produced but from "one."
The "source" of this is not the "source" of that in reality, i.e., with regard to the "essence." For every "cause" must necessarily have a peculiarity by which a particular "caused" is
produced from the “cause,” just as fire has a peculiarity in relation to heat which is the “specific form” of fire; and water also has a peculiarity in relation to coldness.

Thus this and that in the present context are like light and darkness, each of which requiring a peculiarity in the “cause,” which would fit its production. If these two concepts, i.e., the source of this and the source of that, be actualized in something “simple” and become applicable to the latter, each of them would require in that “simple” thing something peculiar to itself, i.e., a special peculiarity. As a result that “simple” thing would become “composite.”

Once you have obtained a solid understanding of this explanation, you will no longer need to have recourse to all the detailed explanations, and you will be able to remove the fallacious arguments put forward by Fakhr al-Dīn (Rāzī) on this problem.

Now this thesis—namely, that “one” does not produce but “one”—has an inner meaning. If those who do not agree have a deep understanding of this, they would not have drawn out of the sheaths of their imagination the swords of objection against Philosophers.

One of these objections is that this thesis would entail “entrusting,” because a particular case of this thesis will be that the Real One brought into existence the Intellect only; then, according to what they maintain, He entrusted to the First Intellect the affair of “creation.” This, however, is nothing but a lie which they have invented against the Philosophers. No, the inner meaning of what the Philosophers maintain is no other than what God has indicated by His saying: “Our Command is nothing but one.” And this Command is the “all-pervading existence” which does not become multiple except through the multiplicity of the “subjects.” And as is well-known, it is a Word including all words, and its production is the production of all “existences.” Besides, even if what is meant were the Intellect, the Intellect also comprises all “intellects,” nay, all “actualities.”

This is why they assert: In reality there is no one who affects “existence” but God. But on the level of the explanation as to how all “existences” are produced from Him with a regular arrangement and order, they do not discard the viewpoint of the “cognition.” Thus they assert that the first thing produced
from the One in the real and true sense of the word “one,” must necessarily be “one” in the real sense, except that it be “shadow” of the former, not “one” in its limited numerical sense.

**Thus the “caused” will be one wherever the “cause” is one.**

Likewise, the “cause” follows the “caused” in its being one.

**Thus the “caused” will be one wherever the “cause” is one.** Likewise, the “cause” follows the “caused” in its being one; thus “caused” will be one. Thus it is impossible that two independent “causes” should occur to one individual “caused,” whether by way of occurring together, interchanging, or succession. This is so because of what we have mentioned above; namely, that “causality” is conditioned by a special peculiarity. So, if a particular “caused” required a special peculiarity, the latter is the common element in the “causes,” so that is must be one.

**There is between them “correlation.” And a circular relationship**

Is necessarily negated. In the same way, an infinite regress

Is negated by what is found in more detailed books:

*An example is “one-to-one correspondence;” another is “modes.”*

The third is indicated by our verse: There is between them (i.e., “cause” and “caused”) “correlation.” This is evident.

And the fourth is that a circular relationship between “cause” and “caused” is necessarily negated, so that there is no need of demonstration.

**In the same way, an infinite regress** in the chain of “cause” and “caused” is negated by what is found in more detailed theoretical books. An example is the demonstration by one-to-one correspondence. Suppose an infinite series exists. We take off from its finite end something so that two infinite series be actualized, one of which would start from the point which is supposed to be the last point, while the other starts from some previous position. Then we establish between the two series one-to-one correspondences. If to every point in the perfect series corresponds a point in the imperfect series, the whole
would necessarily become equal to its part. If, on the other hand, there is no such correspondence, to some points in the perfect series there would be no corresponding points in the imperfect series, so that the imperfect one would come to an end at a certain point. But the perfect one does not exceed the imperfect one except by something finite, so that the perfect one, too, would necessarily be finite, because it is self-evident that anything which exceeds anything finite by something finite is itself finite.

Another example of the proof is the demonstration by "modes." Suppose an infinite number of modes occur in succession. That which is between the last "caused"—or the last part, or any "mode" whatsoever—and between any other of the "modes" in the series, would be finite, because of its being necessarily confined between two boundaries. Thus the whole would also be finite.

They assert that this is an intuitive judgment made by the intellect in the state of intuition, and that it is different from the judgment it makes concerning the whole through the judgment it makes concerning each unit (of the whole). This latter kind of judgment may be exemplified by the judgment which runs: each part of this cubit is less than a cubit, so that the whole also is less than a cubit. But our case will be exemplified by the following: what is between the last point of any supposed quantity and any point to be posited therein without exception in the whole extent of the quantity, does not exceed a cubit; then this supposed quantity would not exceed a cubit.

As for what the author of Shawārīq says to the effect that what is between such-and-such is less than a cubit, so that the supposed quantity is less than a cubit, is clearly a result of carelessness. For what is supposed here is that it is a cubit. How, then, can it be less than a cubit?

Al-Sayyid Dāmād in his Qabasāt is not content with this judgment being intuitive, and maintains: The basic principle is that if a judgment which concerns exhaustively, without leaving any exception, every single unit, be unconditionally true, according to all suppositions, with regard to each of the units—whether (each single unit) be considered separately from others or (all units) be considered as being together—the fringes of its skirt are trailed undoubtedly upon all the units taken as a whole, too. But in case it is peculiar to each unit
with the condition that we consider it separately, the judgment concerning the whole is different from the judgment concerning the units.

The first case (here mentioned by Mir Dāmād) may be exemplified by the judgment of “possibility” concerning every single “possible.” The second may be exemplified by the judgment about every single man that a loaf of bread can satiate him.

Another is the proof by the -“middle”-and-the-“side.”

Another example is the proof by the -“middle”-and-the-“side,” which was established by al-Shaykh (Ibn Sīnā) in the “Metaphysics” of the Shifā).

The gist of the argument is as follows. Whatever is a “caused” and a “cause” at the same time is necessarily a “middle” between two “sides.” So if the “causes” go on to infinity, the infinite chain would also be a “cause” and “caused.” As for its being a “cause,” it is because it is the “cause” of the last “caused.” As for its being a “caused,” it is because it stands in need of its component units. But it is an established fact that whatever is a “caused” and a “cause” is a “middle.” Thus the infinite chain would be “middle” without a “side.” This, however, is impossible. Therefore it is necessary that it should reach ultimately a “cause” which would be a “cause” and nothing else.

Another is that by “successive order;” another by “correlation."

Another proof is that by “successive order.” This can be explained as follows. Every chain consisting of “cause” and “caused” arranged in successive order, necessitates it to be such that the discarding of one of them would necessarily entail the negation of what follows. So every chain which is entirely covered by “being-caused” in successive order, must necessarily have a prime “cause,” without which the whole of the successive units of the chain would come to naught, because this precisely is the characteristic of “being caused,” and because in this particular case “being-caused” covers all the units of the chain.

Another proof is that by “correlation.” It may be explained as follows. If “cause” and “caused” went on to infinity, it
would necessarily result in the number of the “caused” exceeding the number of the “causes.” But this is absurd because “being-a-cause” and “being-a-caused” are necessarily parallel to each other. The necessitation in question can be explained as follows. Every “cause” in the chain is a “caused” according to the original supposition, whereas it is not the case that whatever is a “caused” in the chain is a “cause,” as exemplified by the last “caused.”

Another is known as the most solid and concise proof.

Another example is a proof known as the most solid and concise proof, which has been put forward by al-Fārābī. It can be explained as follows. When every individual unit of the infinite chain is invariably like one unit in that it cannot exist unless there exist another unit beyond itself, preceding it—all the infinite units in their entirety can rightly be described as not coming into “existence” so long as there does not exist something beyond them, preceding them. This being the case, reason judges as self-evident that as long as there does not exist in that chain something which is preceded by the “existence” of something else, there would exist nothing after it.

There are other proofs. Learn them so that you might obtain an insight.

There are other proofs mentioned in more detailed books. So learn them, i.e., those proofs that have been mentioned and others, so that you might obtain an insight into the matter.
SECOND PART

SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

FIRST GEM

THE DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANCE"

AND

A DISCOURSE ON ITS DIVISIONS

LIV  SUBSTANCE

A "substance" is an actualized "quiddity" which, when it exists in reality, has no "substratum"

A "substance" is an actualized—not mentally posited—"quiddity," which, when it exists in reality, has no "substratum." This is similar to the definition which runs: "Substance" is a "quiddity," which, when it exists in the external world, is not in a "substratum."

Thus a "substance" which constitutes the "locus" of another "substance" is "matter," while that which inheres in another is "forms."

Thus a "substance" which constitutes the "locus" of another "substance" is "matter," while that, i.e., a "substance" which inheres in another "substance" is a "form," i.e., the "bodily form" and the "specific form."

If a "substance" which is neither that nor this is composed of both, it is to be understood as a "body."

But without it, it is a "soul," if it happens to be attached to a "body."

If not, it is an "intellect."

If a "substance" which is neither that nor this, i.e., a "substance" which is neither the "locus" of another "substance" nor "inhering" in another "substance," is composed of both, i.e., of an "inhering substance" and a "locus-substance," it is to be understood as a "body."
But without it, i.e., if a “substance” is neither a “locus” nor “inhering” nor composed of them, it is “non-material.” The latter is a “soul” if it happens to be attached to a “body.” If not, i.e., if it is not attached to a body, it is an “intellect.”

Now all divisions of “substance” have a number of detailed arguments. We have devoted to most of them independent sections; concerning the intellect in Theology and concerning the rest in Natural Philosophy.

SECOND GEM

THE DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION OF “ACCIDENT”

AND

A DISCOURSE ON ITS DIVISIONS

LV ACCIDENT

An “accident” is that whose “being” in itself is the same as its “being” in a “substratum.” Do not forget this.

An “accident” is that, i.e., a “possible,” whose “being” in itself is the same as its “being” in a “substratum.” Do not forget this.

As for its “being in itself,” it is because of the independence of its “quiddity” in the mind. As for this “being” being the same as “being-in-something-else,” and its being “inhering,” it is due to the consideration of its state in the external world, namely, its being something indicative in such a way that it is not the case that it has an independence and then occurs to it the “relation” with the “substratum,” but rather that the “relation” is its very “existence,” even though the “relation” is not its very “quiddity” except in the case of the “category” of “relation.”

In spite of this, the “existence” of an “accident” does not belong to the “category” of “relation.” For not every “dependence” or every “relation” is a “categorical relation;” the latter is a “dependence” between “quiddities.”
Do you not see that every “existence” is the same as “dependence” upon the Source, and yet is not a “categorical relation?” And the Source has an “illuminate relation” to all other than Itself, and yet it is not a “category.”

“Quantity,” “quality,” “position,” “where,” “possession,” “when,” “action,” “relation,” and “affection” do constitute the highest “genera” of it, according to the Teacher.

“Quantity,” “quality,” “position,” “where,” “possession,” “when,” “action,” “relation,” and “affection” do constitute “categories.” They are the highest “genera” of it (i.e., “accident”), according to the (First) Teacher (Aristotle). Thus they are nine.

The “categories” being three and their being four have been mentioned.

The “categories” being three—i.e., that they are “quantity,” “quality” and “relation,” the last including the seven “categories” each of which has been considered by Aristotle and his followers as a highest “genus”—and their being four—i.e., that they are the just-mentioned three plus “movement”—have been mentioned by the author of the Bāṣāʿir (Ibn Sahlān al-Sāwī) and to the Shaykh of Illumination (al-Suhrawardī), respectively.

THIRD GEM

THE DIVISIONS OF ACCIDENT

LVI QUANTITY

“Quantity” is that which “by essence” accepts division. One kind of it is “continuous,” and another “discrete.”

“Quantity” is that which “by essence”—thereby is excluded that which accepts division “by accident”—accepts an “imag-
inary division." One kind of it, i.e., of "quantity," is "continuous," and another kind of it is that which is "discrete."

By that which possesses "continuity" here is meant that in which a "common boundary" is actualized.

By that which possesses "continuity" (i.e., "continuous quantity") here is meant—it has many other meanings in other connections—that, i.e., "quantity" in which a "common boundary" is actualized after having received "division." And the "common boundary" is that whose relation to both parts is one and the same, in the sense that, if the "boundary" be considered as the beginning of one of the two parts, it would be possible for it to be considered also as the beginning of the other; and if it be considered as the end of one of the two parts, it would be possible for it to be considered also as the end of the other. This can be exemplified by a "point" between two parts of a "line;" a "line" between two parts of a "plane," a "plane" between two parts of a "body;" and a "moment" between two parts of "time."

This is contrary to what is observable in "discrete quantity;" for when you divide 5 into 3 and 2, you will not find between them a "common boundary." Otherwise, if the "common boundary" be a unit from among them, the rest would be 4, while if it be a unit coming from outside the whole would be 6. But both cases would contradict our original supposition.

The second kind of it is "numbers" only,

Whereas the first is "body," and "plane," then "line."

The second kind of it, i.e., "discrete quantity," is "numbers" only, whereas the first kind, i.e., "continuous quantity," is (divided into) "mathematical body"—which is a "quantity" expanding in the three dimensions of a natural "body"—and "plane," then "line."

And the first is characterized by "joining" and "immobility."

And the first i.e., that which is divided into these three (i.e., "continuous quantity") is characterized by "joining" and "immobility." That is to say, these three are "immobile, continuous quantities."
Then comes “time” which is essentially “passing-away.”

Then comes (as a division of “continuous quantity”) “time” which is essentially “passing-away.” That is to say, it is such that the renovation of every part of it is by way of “passing away” and its coming-into-being is by way of “being-finished,” thus having absolutely no stability. Thus “time” is a “continuous quantity” which is essentially “mobile.”

No “quantity” accepts “contrariety.”

No “quantity” accepts “contrariety,” like “substance.” For in the case of the “continuous quantity,” some of its kinds do inhere in some others. For example, a “line” inherees in a “plane.” And in the case of the “discrete quantity” some of its kinds do constitute some others. But “inhering” and “constituting” do not admit “contrariety” between two things. Besides, having one and the same “substratum” is a condition of “contrariety.” But this condition is not fulfilled here.

Its divisions are considered “mathematical.”

Its divisions i.e., the various kinds of “quantity” as a “genus,” as understood as part of the “continuous immobile quantity”—we have not taken the trouble of referring the pronoun (i.e., in “its”) back to “quantity” as the source of division because the case in which it is understood in a mathematical way is better known—are considered “mathematical.” That is to say, all “quantities” as non-conditioned by anything, i.e., without taking into consideration anything of “matters” and their “states,” are “mathematical body,” “mathematical plane,” and “mathematical line.” For the mathematical sciences study them in this way. And these “mathematical” sciences have been called ta’lîmîyah (ta’lîm meaning “teaching”) because the Ancients used to begin with them in teaching.

“Quantity” is characterized by (1) the existence of that which counts it,
likewise (2) “equality” and its “contrary:” and (3) “finitude” and “infinitude,” in the “body.” Understand this, O people of understanding!

“Quantity” is characterized by three properties. (1) The first is the existence of that which counts it, i.e., something which goes on reducing it. For there is in a “discrete quantity” “one,”
which counts all kinds of it, beside the fact that some of them do count some others. As for the "continuous quantity," it accepts division into parts. So it accepts being counted. And the "source" of the number is "one," which counts the number.

(2) Likewise "equality" and its "contrary," i.e., the "contrary of "equality" which is "non-equality," characterize it. The usage of the word "contrary" in the present case, in spite of its being "negative," follows the usage of logicians, because they do not consider as an essential condition of two "contraries" that both should be "positive." This is why al-Shaykh al-Ra's (Ibn Sīnā) has called the universal negative proposition the "contrary" of the universal affirmative proposition. This usage occurs also in some of the non-scientific sciences.

(3) Likewise "finitude" and "infinitude" in the "body," the "infiniteness" being understood in the sense of "privation," not in the sense of an absolute negation, because the latter is not one of its characteristics.

Thus these three, together with "divisibility" by which "quantity" has been defined, are its characteristics, and it is through its intermediacy that they occur to other things. Understand this, O people of understanding!

LVII  QUALITY

"Quality" is an "immobile mode of being"
Having essentially neither "relation" nor "division,"

"Quality" is an "immobile mode of being"—thereby is excluded "movement," "action," and "affection"—having essentially neither "relation"—thereby is excluded "relative accidents"—nor "division"—thereby is excluded "quantity."

It is divided into four kinds;
what is peculiar to the soul, what is peculiar to "quantity," "strength" and "non-strength," and "qualities" perceived through five senses.

It is divided into four kinds. (1) One of them is what is peculiar to the "soul," and is called "qualities belonging to the soul;" like knowledge, will power, cowardice, braveness, etc..
(2) The second is what is peculiar to "quantity," and is called "qualities peculiar to quantities," like straightness, curvedness, shape, etc., which are peculiar to the "continuous quantity," and like being odd and being even, etc., which are peculiar to the "discrete quantity."

(3) The third is "strength" and "non-strength," which are called "qualities of preparedness." The latter is a strong "preparedness" toward "being-affected," like softness and sickliness etc.. This is called "non-strength." The former is a strong "preparedness" toward "not-being affected," like hardness and healthiness, etc.. This is called "strength."

And (4) the fourth is "qualities" perceived through five external senses, namely, "tangible qualities," like "active" and "affective" "qualities," which are the most basic "tangible qualities," and others; and "gustatory qualities," like the nine simple tastes and others; and "olfactory qualities" like good and bad odors; and "auditory qualities" like sounds; "visual qualities" like lights and colors.

They are "affective" and "affection."
Understand them as "possession" and "state."

They (i.e., sensible "qualities") are "affective" and "affection."

If sensible "qualities" are stable, like the yellowness of gold and sweetness of honey, they are called "affective qualities" because of sense organs being "affected" by them and also because of the fact that they follow, in being particular and general, the "mixtures" resulting from the "affection" of the elements.

If, on the contrary, they are not stable, like the redness of a man feeling shame and the paleness of a man feeling fear, they are called "affections." For, because of the rapidity in disappearing, they closely resemble the category of "affection." Thus even though they have something in common with "affective quality" in respect of naming, the Philosophers have tried to distinguish between these two classes, by diminishing from the word ("affective" infi‘ālī) one letter (i.e., 7, making the word infī‘āl instead of infi‘ālī) in order to suggest that it represents a lower degree, i.e., lack of stability.

We refer to the two above-mentioned concepts by saying: Understand them as "possession" and "state." That is to say,
the “affective quality” is to be compared to a “possession,” while what is called “affection” is to compared to a “state.”

The former is something stable, but not so the latter. Understand this point!
Those are peculiar to the “body,” whereas the other two are peculiar to the “soul.”

The former i.e., an “affective quality” is something stable like a “possession,” But not so the latter, i.e., an “affection,” for it is not stable, like a “state.” Understand this point!
Those i.e., the “affective qualities” and “affections,” are peculiar to the “body,” whereas the other two, i.e., “possessions” and “states” are peculiar to the “soul.”

To conclude: Each of the former (i.e., “affective quality” and “affection”) corresponds, in stability and non-stability, to each of the latter (i.e., “possession” and “state”), except that the “substratum” of the former is the “body”—thus these two are comparable to “possession” and “state” for the “body”—whereas the “substratum” of the latter is the “soul.”

LVIII KNOWLEDGE

“Knowledge” has several degrees, because some of it are “substances,” nay “Necessary.”

I have not dealt in great detail with “qualities,” nay even with the rest of the accidental “categories.” Since, however, “knowledge” is the noblest of all “qualities,” I would like to attempt at studying some aspects of the problem. Thus I say:

“Knowledge” has several degrees, because some of it are “substances,” whether they be “mental substances”—for the universals of “substances” are “mental substances”—or “external substances,” the latter, whether “non-material substances” relating to the “soul” of “non-material substances” relating to the “intellect,” like the “self-knowledge” of the “intellect” and of the “soul,” nay some of it, namely the highest degree, is “Necessary”—which is the “self-knowledge” of the Necessary-Existant-by-Itself. For this “self-knowledge” is the same as Itself.
However, since some of it are “qualities” relating to the “soul,” it is suitable to be studied here.

However, since some of it—“knowledge” is not a “quality” from the viewpoint of these degrees of “knowledge,” so that it cannot possibly be discussed in a section concerning “quality” —are “qualities” relating to the “soul,” nay, some of it belonging to a still lower degree is an “abstract idea,” it is suitable to be studied here.

One of the points is that there are different opinions; whether its “genus” is “quality,” or “relation,” or “affection.”

One of the points to be discussed is that there are different opinions about “knowledge,” as to whether its “genus” is “quality,” as is commonly held, or “relation,” as has been held by Fakhr al-Rāzī, or “affection” as some have held.

Now that its analogicity has become clear, it must be understood that there is a “trace” imprinted in our “intelect.” There occurs in oursevles an “affection” which has a “relation” to the “object-known.”

Now that its analogicity has become clear, i.e., now that “knowledge” has been shown to have degrees, it must be understood, in investigating this problem, that there is a “trace” imprinted in our “intelect.” It is evident that, whenever we know something there is a “trace” actualized in ourselves so that it cannot be something abstract. In this case there occurs in ourselves an “affection”—because we thereby are transferred from “imperfection” to “perfection” as well as from “potentiality” to “actuality”—coming from an “imprinted form,” i.e., the “object-known”-by-essence, for which “existence”-in-itself is its “existence”-for-the-perceiver, which i.e., the “imprinted form,” has a “relation” to the “object-known”-by-accident.

Both “relation” and “affection” are excluded from that which is considered to be “knowledge” and “quality.”

If you have understood this, you will understand that both “relation” and “affection” are excluded from that, i.e., from the “imprinted form,” which is considered to be “knowledge” and “quality,” i.e., which is considered to be a “quality”-by-essence.
Thus the thesis that it is “relation” or “affection” is a kind of sophistry arising from the confusion between what-is-by-accident and what-is-by-essence.

_It is either “empirical” or “intuitive” the “intuitive” is not confined to “self.”_

Another point to be discussed is its division.

_It, i.e., “knowledge,” is either “empirical” or “intuitive.” The “intuitive,” i.e., “intuitive knowledge” is not confined to “self,” i.e., “self-knowledge.”_

This is against the view represented by the Peripatetics, for they do confine it to “self-knowledge,” while confining the “empirical knowledge” to “knowledge of anything other than “self,” so much so that they even hold that God’s knowledge of things before creation was “empirical,” by way of “imprinted forms.” But this is wrong.

_Nay, it does subsist in the “knowledge” of “caused” things, like “forms” that are found in our “empirical knowledge.”_

_Nay, it, i.e., “intuitive knowledge” does subsist in the case of the “knowledge” of “caused” things, like “forms” that are found in our “empirical knowledge.”_

If the word “like” here implies exemplification, what is meant by the word “form” will be things like “fantasies,” because the “knowledge” of the latter is of a “creating” and “acting” nature. But if the word “like” implies “resemblance,” then what is meant will be to assimilate “action” to “perception” based on “inherence.” For, if the “soul” knows these “forms”—the latter being “perceived” while the former being a “perceiver,” and the relation to the object “perceived” to the “perceiver” being simply a “possible” relation—by an “intuitive knowledge,” then the “knowledge” which an “efficient cause” possesses of its “caused” will more properly to be “intuitive,” because the relation of “caused” to its “agent” is a “necessary” relation, particularly so in the case of the Divine Agent who brings out the “caused” from sheer “non-existence” to “existence.” The Bestower of “perfection” cannot be devoid of it. Nothing lies outside of the whole extent of His Existence, and the Expanse of His Light. What need will there be, then, to a “form” which would be a medium for the revelation of the “caused” to Him?
Thus the first is a “form” of a thing occurring to a thing,  
While the second is the “presence” of a thing to itself.  

Thus the first, i.e., “empirical knowledge” is to be defined as a “form” of a thing occurring to a thing, while the second, i.e., “intuitive knowledge” is to be defined as the “presence” of a thing itself to itself. This is why Philosophers say: “intuitive knowledge” is a “knowledge” which is the very external “object-known.”

“Knowledge” is either “separative” or “collective.”

“Knowledge” is either “separative” or “collective.” The former is a “knowledge” of a numerous things through distinguished “forms” separated from each other. The latter consists in that one knows these things through one single “form” without separating one from the other.

Suppose you are asked a number of questions which you have mastered beforehand: you will be able to find the answer to the whole of them ready at hand, but it is still a simple state which can produce details. This kind of single and simple knowledge of answers is the “collective” one. But when you begin to explicate it in successive order, you bring into your mind the answers through numerous “forms.” This is the “separative” knowledge.

Likewise it is either “active” or “passive.” The “active” kind is that which acts as the “cause” of the “object-known.”

The “passive” one is a “form” imprinted in the “intellect,” after having been actualized in the external world. In the first, the “object” becomes actualized as soon as it is intellected.

Likewise it has another division; namely that it is either “active” or “passive.” The “active” kind, i.e., “active knowledge” is that which acts as the “cause” of the “object-known,” as we have said above. And the “passive” one is a “form” imprinted in the “intellect” after having been actualized in the external world. And the “object-known” is here its “cause.” And yet in both (i.e., “knowledge” and the “object-known”) causal relationship is reflected. But in the first i.e., “active
knowledge,” the external “object” becomes actualized as soon as it is intellected.

LIX RELATIONAL ACCIDENTS

“Where” is a “mode of being” which arises from something being in a “place.”
And “when” is a “mode of being” in “time.”

(1) “Where” is a “mode of being” which arises from something being in a “place.” By saying “a mode of being” we refer to the fact that it is a special mode of being, a special “being,” and not only a “relation” of something to a “place.” This holds true of other things parallel to “where.”

(2) And “when” is a “mode of being” which arises from something being in “time.” And something being in “time” comprises both its being in “time” itself and being in one unit of it, i.e., a moment, like the moments of “reaching” and “touching,” and other momentary events. This is the reason why they are questioned as to “when?”

Further, its being in “time” comprises also both its being in it by way of “correspondence,” as is the case with “cutting” movements, and otherwise, as is the case with “mediating” movements.¹

“Possession” is a “mode of being” of that which “covers” something, this being conditioned by its “transference” corresponding to the transference of the latter.

(3) Another “relational accident” is “possession.” “Possession” is a “mode of being” which arises because of that which covers something—thus the relation of this “mode of being” arises from even the slightest degree of “covering”—this “mode of being” being conditioned by its “transference,” i.e., the ‘transference’ of that which “covers,” corresponding to the “transference” of the latter, i.e., of the “covered” thing.

This is also described in the following way: “Possession” is a “relation” of a thing to that which covers it in such a way that the latter is transferred in accordance with the “transference” of the former.
By this condition it is distinguished from “where,” for in the case of “where” that which “covers” is not transferred in accordance with the “transference” of that which is “covered.”

The “covering” comprises both “perfect” and “imperfect” kinds, so that it includes wearing a turban, wearing sandals as well as wearing a shirt and wearing a tunic.

“Position” is a “mode of being” actualized for a thing due to the “relation” of its “parts” to each other and their “relation” to something external.

(4) “Position.” “Position” is a “mode of being” actualized for a thing due to two “relations” together; namely (1) the “relation” of the “parts,” i.e., the “parts” of the thing, to each other, and (2) their “relation,” i.e., the “relation” of the “parts,” to something external, i.e., to something external to that thing, whether inside or outside of the thing, like standing, sitting, lying on one’s back, lying on one’s face etc.. “Standing,” for example, is a “mode of being” actualized in a man in accordance with a “relation” holding between his “parts” as well as in accordance with his head being above and his feet being below.

Sometimes it denotes a “mode of being” pointed at sensibly.

Sometimes it, i.e., the word “position” denotes a “mode of being,” i.e., of something being in such a state that it could be pointed at sensibly. Thus a point possesses a “position” in this sense, but not so oneness.

“Action” is affecting gradually.

“Affection” is being-affected in the same way.

(5) and (6) “Action” and “affection.” “Action” is affecting something gradually, like the heating process of a heater as long as it remains heating. “Affection” is being-affected in the same way, i.e., gradually, like the process of something being-heated as long as it remains being heated.

The gradualness which we have taken into consideration concerning “affecting” and “being-affected” naturally excludes both “affecting” and “being-affected” which become actualized all at once, as in the case in which the Necessary, Most High, issues forth the Intellect from “non-existence” to “existence,”
and the "Intellect" receives "existence" from Him solely in virtue of its "essential possibility."

"Co-relation" is a "relation" repeated.

(7) "Co-relation." "Co-relation" is a "relation" repeated. Concerning the meaning of the "repetition" here in question, the Shaykh (Ibn Sīnā) in the "category" of his Shifa' remarks: It consists in that a consideration is given not only to the "relation," but an additional consideration is given both to the fact that the thing possesses a "relation" qua "relation," and to the "object" to which it is related qua the "object" of "relation." Thus the roof has a "relation" to the wall. Now if you consider the roof from the view point of the "relation" it possesses, it will be found to be resting upon the wall. Then if you consider it from the viewpoint of its resting upon the wall, it will be found to be "related" not to the wall qua wall, but "related" to it qua its resting upon it. Thus the connection of the roof with the wall from the viewpoint of the wall being a wall is a "relation," while from the point of view of your considering the wall as being the "object" of "relation" by the roof's resting upon it—and the roof itself being "related"—is "co-relation." And this is what is meant when Philosophers say that "relation" obtains for only one term, while "co-relation" obtains for two terms.

It is either "real" or "commonly-accepted."

It, i.e., "co-relation," is either "real"—which is nothing but the "co-relation" itself—or "commonly-accepted," i.e., "co-relation" as commonly understood. The latter means the thing to which occurs "co-relation."

"Co-relation" must necessarily manifest reciprocity. There must necessarily be symmetry in terms of "actuality" and "potentiality."

"Co-relation" must necessarily manifest reciprocity. For example, the "father" is the "father of a son" while the "son" is the "son of the father." And there must necessarily be also symmetry in terms of "actuality" and "potentiality." That is to say, whenever one of the "co-related" things is "actual" or "potential," the other is also "actual" or "potential" accordingly.

The two terms of "co-relation" are either "different" or "similar."
The two terms of “co-relation” are either “different” or “similar.” That is to say, in one kind of “co-relation” the two sides are “different,” like “father-ness” and “son-ness,” or “being-a-cause” and “being-a-caused.” In the other, the two terms are similar, like “brother-ness” in two brothers or “neighbourhood” in two neighbors.

It occurs to all things, even the First.

It, i.e., “co-relation,” occurs to all things so that nothing is devoid of a “co-relation;” nay everything does have a number of “co-relations”—at least “being-a-cause” and “being-a-caused,” “being-different,” “being-similar,” and “being-opposite”—even the First, Most High, for He has “co-relational” Attributes, like His “being-the-Creator,” “being-the-Source,” “being-the-Sustainer,” and the like, i.e., other “indicating” concepts. But otherwise, His “relation” to other things is “illuminative.”

We praise Him for His Attributes, and we offer homage to His Names.
Notes

Preface


Chapter I

1. The "defining terms" (mu'arrif) in general are of two kinds: (1) "definition" (had, and (2) "description" (rasm). The "definition" consists of genus and proximate differentia, e.g., "rational animal" for "man." The "description" consists of genus and proprium, e.g., "laughing animal" (i.e., an animal capable of laughing) for "man."

2. Ibn Sina, known in the West as Avicenna (d. 428/1037), one of the greatest philosophers of Islam. Basing himself on the Aristotelian tradition of Greek philosophy as it had been handed down through the neo-Platonic commentators, he built up an encyclopedic system of peripatetic philosophy that has thenceforth dominated the entire history of Islamic philosophy. His major work is Shifa', of which Najat is an epitome.

3. "Five universals," i.e., (1) genus, (2) differentia (or specific difference), (3) species, (4) proprium, and (5) common accident. For example, (1) "animal," (2) "rational," (3) "man," (4) "laughing," and (5) "walking." The "five universals" are dealt with in Islamic philosophy under the special heading of Isagogia (Greek: eisagoge).

4. The universal which is the source of the "five universals" is "quiddity" quwat quiddity as understood in itself without any considerations of "existence," whether external or mental. This is what is meant here by the "thing-ness" of "quiddity."

5. The essential mark of something being existent in the mind is that the thing does not produce all the effects which are naturally expected of it in the external world. For example, fire in the external world is expected to produce heat as one of its natural effects; in the mind, however, the production of such an effect does not take place.

Chapter II

1. "Universal" is divided into three kinds: (1) "logical universal" (kulli mantiqi), (2) "natural universal" (kulli tabiri), and (3) "rational universal" (kulli 'aqli). The first is the concept of universality itself. The second is an
object to which the concept (the “logical universal”) applies, e.g., man, animal. The third is the combination of (1) and (2), e.g., man as a universal, animal as a universal, etc.

2. In this passage, “first Emanation” means the “First Intellect (ʾaql awwal), in which all possible things are contained potentially in the form of a metaphysical Unity. Since the Absolute has no “quiddity,” but is sheer “existence,” the First Emanation from It should necessarily be simple without any composition.

3. Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) is the leading representative figure in the entire history of Islam philosophy, of the position that “existence” is something mentally posited, and not fundamentally real. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, or Shaykh al-Ishrāq, as he is often referred to by the honorary title, is the founder of an important gnostic tradition in Iran known as Illuminationism (ishraqīyah), and his teachings has played an exceedingly important role in the spiritual life of Islam, particularly in Shi’ism.


5. i.e., Peripatetic Philosophers and Illuminationists.

6. The “illuminative” relation is a relation consisting of only one term (i.e., the source of illumination), so that the relation becomes actualized by the very existence of the source. For example: the relation which exists between the soul and intelligible forms, since the soul as the source of illumination creates its own objects. The “categorical” relation, on the contrary, is a relation subsisting between two terms, so that it cannot be actualized unless there be actualized the object of relation. For example: what is observable in the phenomenon of empirical knowledge (ʿilm ḥußūlī), which is a relation between the perceiving subject and an already existent object.

7. This argument refers to one of the classical proofs for the oneness of God. If there were two Necessary Beings, both would share the property of being-necessary. At the same time, each one must have something which would distinguish it from the other. This would entail that each be a composition of a common element and a distinguishing element. But this consequent is absurd because God is essentially simple and not composite. This is what is known as the proof of the oneness of God by means of the concept of “composition” (tarkīb) Sabzavārī refers here to this particular proof in order to show that this proof itself cannot remain valid unless the position is taken that “existence” is fundamentally real, and not “quiddity.” For if one takes the position of “quiddity” being fundamentally real, one will have to admit that the two Necessary Beings would completely be different from each other, having absolutely no common element between them, because on this supposition each one of the two Necessary Beings would be nothing other than a “quiddity,” and because all “quiddities” are by definition essentially different from one another. This naturally leads to the conclusion that, on the supposition of “quiddity” being real, the famous proof by “composition” would not remain valid.

8. Qur’an, LIV, 50.

Chapter III

1. If the contradictory of “non-existence” (which is necessarily one) were many instead of being one, two contradictories would be removed from one and the same thing. To explain: Suppose there were several different “existences” having no commonly shared basis among them, e.g., existence A, existence B, existence C, existence D, etc. It would be possible on such supposition that two contradictories (namely, “non-existence” and any one of the existences, e.g., A, might be removed from one and the same thing, in the sense that the thing may be existent by one of the remaining existences, i.e., B, C, D, etc.

2. Suppose we are convinced that a table exists and that it has a certain color and shape. Even if we loose our certainty about its color and shape, our certainty about the “existence” of that particular table will still remain intact.

3. ‘Ali b. ‘Umar Najm al-Dīn Dabīrān al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1276). He was a contemporary of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and was closely connected with the latter in his scientific activity. Both ‘Allāmah Ḥilīlī and Qutb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī studied under his guidance. The Ḥikmat al-‘Ayn is one of his major works in Metaphysics. Many commentaries have been written upon this book, the most famous of them being Ḥidāh al-Maqāṣid by ‘Allāmah Ḥilīlī.


5. Al-Ash’ārī (d. circa 330/941), one of the greatest figures in the early phase of the historical development of Islamic theology and the founder of the “orthodox” school in theology, known as ash’āriyyah.

6. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī, (d. 436/1044 A.D.), an outstanding Mu’tazilī theologian, a disciple of ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī, the author of many important books among which the most famous is al-Mu’tamad fi Uṣūl al-Fiqh.

7. Muḥammad ‘Umar Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) is one of the most important Sunni Theologians who was among the first to systematize Islamic theology on a philosophical basis. One of his major works is his famous Commentary on the al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīḥāt of Ibn Sīnā.

Chapter IV

1. There is a complete agreement among all philosophers in Islam that “existence” is not anything which occurs to “quiddity” in the external world, but that “existence” and “quiddity” are one there. The divergence of opinion appears only regarding the problem whether or not “existence” is one and the same as “quiddity” in the mind. Al-Asha’ī takes the position that they are one, which is denied by most of the philosophers including Sabzavārī.

2. The primary essential (awwali’ dhāti) predication is that kind of predication in which the subject happens to be the same as the predicate with regard to both “existence” and “quiddity,” e.g., “Man is man,” or as we say in the definition of man, “Man is a rational animal.” The common technical (ṣṭa’i’ ẓinā’i) predication, on the contrary, is that in which the subject is the same as the predicate only with regard to “existence,” while with regard to “quiddity” they are different from each other, e.g., “Man is a writer.”

3. If we think of something concretely existent (a table, for example), and wish to separate its “quiddity” (the table-ness, for example) from its “exis-
tence," we simply abstract or divest the “quiddity” of the thing from its “existence." At the level of primary essential predication, divestment is divestment, and abstraction is abstraction. However, at the level of common technical predication, separating “quiddity” from “existence” is not simple divestment or abstraction. We must first add mentally to the “quiddity” of the thing its “existence” before we can separate “quiddity” from “existence.” Thus a simple analysis of the mental process involved in “abstracting and divesting” reveals that in order to separate the “quiddity” of a thing from its “existence,” there first occurs in the mind the combining of the two. “Divesting” (takhlīyah) recessitates the “embellishing” (taḥliyah) of the “quiddity” with “existence.”

4. The full title of the book is Shawāriq al-Ilhām, one of the major works of Mullā ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Lāhijī (d. 1051/1641). He was a son-in-law of the great philosopher Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, commonly known as Mullā Ṣadrā. The Shawāriq is a detailed philosophical commentary upon Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s famous work Tajarīd al-Kalām.

5. The primary essential properties (dhātiyyah awwalīyah) are like “animal” and “rational” with regard to “man.” The secondary essential properties (dhātiyyah thānawiyyah) are like “body,” “growing” and “sensible” with regard to “man.”

6. “Priority in term of substantiality” (sabq bi-il-tajawwur) also called “priority in terms of quiddity” (sabq bi-il-māhiyyah), refers to the priority of the causes of subsistence over the caused (i.e., effect) at the level of “quiddity” and “essence,” like the priority of genus and differentia over species.

7. In the gnostic view of the Illuminationists, for each of the species of the things that are existent in this world there is, in the higher angelic dimension of eternity, one single individual of a purely intellectual nature, which is entrusted with the maintaining of the whole species. This individual is called the “Lord of a species” (rabb naw).

The Illuminationists call it also the “universal” (kulli) of a species on the basis of the idea that (1) the relation which the “Lord of species” bears to all its material “individuals” is equal with regard to its maintaining them and its continuous emanation upon them, or that (2) the “Lord of species” is the source or principle of the species—in philosophy it is customary to call a source or principle a “universal”—or that (3) the “Lord of species” transcends all magnitudes, dimensions and directions, just in the same way as the Intellects and Souls are called “universals” on this very basis.

8. “Emanation” (fayḍ) is one of the key concepts in the mystical philosophy of Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240), one of the greatest theosopers in Islam. “Emanation” is of two kinds: (1) the “Most Holy Emanation” (fayḍ aqdas) and (2) “Holy Emanation” (fayḍ muqaddas). The “Most Holy Emanation” is the existential self-manifestation of the Absolute, which occurs at the level of the absolute “Oneness” (ahādiyyah), where the absolute i.e., “existence” still remains in its metaphysical purity, without any inner articularations. As a result of this Emanation, the absolute “descends” from the level of the absolute “Oneness” to that of “Unity” (wāḥidīyyah), which is the unity of multiplicity, or “existence” with inner articularations. The stage of “Unity” is also known as the stage of divine “Names and Attributes” (asmāʾ wa-ṣifāt). It is also the stage
of divine Knowledge, i.e., divine Consciousness. All the divergent things still remain here in the all-comprehensive Unity of divine Consciousness without taking on phenomental forms. It is through the “Holy Emanation” that these things leave the state of potentiality and come out in concrete forms into the phenomenal world.

Chapter VI

1. Fahla\v{y}ûn is a term which frequently occurs in the writings of Suhrawardî, who refers thereby to the pre-Islamic thinkers of Iran who believed in the two Principles, Light and Darkness.

2. Intensity and weakness, if considered in relation to the Light itself, are neither a condition nor a constituent part of it; but the intense (light) and the weak (light) are equal to each other in being “light.” However, intensity and weakness, if considered in relation to the intense degree and the weak degree, are the constituent elements of these degrees not in the sense of being a part as genus or species but in the particular sense that they are not external to those degrees.

3. The distinguishing factor between the intense and the weak light, which is intensity and weakness, is exactly the same as the identifying factor which is “existence.” This is true when we direct our attention to the “existence” of the intense and weak light. But when we direct our attention to their “quiddities,” we find that the distinguishing factor which is “differentia” differs from the identifying factor which is “genus.”

4. By the term “accidental” (\'ara\d{f}î) is sometimes meant something extracted from the subject and predicated of the latter, like for example, “existence” and “oneness.” But sometimes the term “accidental” is used to mean a predicate which is predicated of the subject by way of adherence, like, for example, “white” (in reference to bodies) and “knowing” (in reference to souls), for they cannot be attributed to the subject as predicates except through the mediation of “whiteness” and “knowledge” which are external and additional to the realities of “white” and “knowing.”

5. The generic “one,” for example, “animal,” is the same as the specific “many,” like “man,” “horse,” “donkey,” etc. The specific “one,” for example, “man,” is the same as the numerical (i.e., individual) “many,” like Zayd, ‘Omar, Bakr, etc.

6. Šadr al-Dîn al-Shirâzî (d. 1050/1640), commonly known as Mulla šadrâ, is the greatest philosopher-theosopher of the Safavid period in Iran. His major work is Asfâr (i.e., al-Asfâr al-Arba‘ah, Four (spiritual) Journeys”), a complete system of mystical philosophy comparable in both size and importance to Ibn Sînâ’s Shîfâ'. Al-Mabda’ wa-al-Ma‘âd is a smaller work of his, dealing with some of the most basic theosophic problems. In the present book (as well as in others) Mulla šadrâ is often referred to as the Head of theosophers (Šadr al-Muta‘ allihîn).

7. Jalâl al-Dîn Muḥammad b. As‘ad, known as ‘Allâmah Dawwa‘î (d. 907/1502), is one of the most important Iranian thinkers in the periods subsequent to Mongol invasion. He is the author of many philosophical and theological works.

8. It is a technical term peculiar to Islamic mysticism, according to which
the first stage of witnessing the Absolute is “tasting” (dhawq), the second “drinking” (shurb), and the third “satiation” (rayy).

9. Since “determination” (taqyid) is a relation of something with something else, and since relation qua relation is not anything to be considered independent, but rather is a means by which to consider others, so it has nothing to be regarded as its “self,” insofar as it is a relation.

Chapter VII

1. The subsistence of “issuing” (qiyan ʿudur) is realized in the subsistence of something-caused in its cause, like, for example, the subsistence of intelligible forms in the simple Intellect. The subsistence of “inhering” (qiyan ḥulūl), on the contrary, is realized in the subsistence of something-contained in its recipient, like, for example, the subsistence of an accident in its substratum.

2. The rule is: the affirmation of something (predicate) of something (subject) presupposes the “existence” of that to which the predicate is attributed.

3. The full title of the book is al-Mawāqif al-Sulānīyah or al-Mawāqif fī Ilm al-Kalām; it is from the pen of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAḫūdī known as al-Ījī (d. A.H. 756). It has a very famous commentary by Sharīf al-Jurjānī.

4. Both al-Maqāṣid (the full title: Maqāṣid al-Tālibīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn) and its Commentary known as Sharh al-Maqāṣid are two of the works of Maṣʿīd b. ʿUmar Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1389). They are counted among the most important books in Islamic theology.

5. “What is known by essence” (maʾlūm bi-al-dhāt) is, for example, the object of knowledge as imprinted in the mind (e.g., the image of a table), while “what is known by accident (maʾlūm bi-al-ʿaraq) is the object of knowledge as it exists in the external world (e.g., a table as an external object). Technically these are defined in the following way. The object of knowledge (maʾlūm) is of two kinds. One of them is that whose existence-in-itself is its existence for the perceiving subject. This is “what is known by essence.” The other, on the contrary, is that whose existence-in-itself is different from its existence for the perceiving subject.

6. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Alāʾal-Dīn, known as Fāḍil Qūshjī (d. 879/1474), is one of the celebrated theologians in Islam, and is also known for his accomplishments in mathematics and astronomy. His commentary on the Tajrīd al-Kalām of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is considered one of the most important works in the field of Islamic theology.

7. “What differs from those things in quiddity and agrees with them in some accidents” means the mental images of the things.

8. The reference is to Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtākā (d. 903/1497), a famous theologian-philosopher, the author of the Gloss on the Commentary by Qūshjī on Tajīrīd al-Kalām (by Ṭūsī), the Gloss on the Commentary by Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī on al-Shamsīyah in logic, etc.

9. Cf. n.2 to chap. IV.

10. For two propositions to be “contradictory” to each other there are two basic conditions to be fulfilled: (1) unity and (2) difference. The difference concerns the quality and quantity (i.e., if one of the propositions is affirmative the other must be negative; if one is universal, the other must be
particular). As for the unity, there are eight kinds: (1) the unity of the subject (e.g., “Zayd is a poet” and “Amr is not a poet” do not contradict each other because there is no unity of subject here); (2) the unity of the predicate (e.g., “Zayd is a philosopher” and “Zayd is not an astronomer” do not contradict each other); (3) the unity of the place (e.g., there is no contradiction between “Zayd is well-known [in his own country]” and “Zayd is not well-known [abroad]”); (4) the unity of the time (e.g., no contradiction between “the country is cold [in winter]” and “the country is not cold [in summer]”); (5) unity with regard to actuality and potentiality (e.g., no contradiction between “the boy is a scholar [in potential]” and “the boy is not a scholar [in actual]”); (6) unity with regard to part and whole (e.g., no contradiction between “the country is prosperous [in some of its parts]” and “the country is not prosperous [i.e., the whole of it]”); (7) the unity of condition (e.g., no contradiction between “Zayd will be successful [on condition that he work hard]” and “Zayd will not be successful [if he does not work hard]”); (8) the unity of relation (e.g., no contradiction between “Zayd is knowledgeable [in relation to his pupils]” and “Zayd is not knowledgeable [in relation to his teacher]”).

11. The intelligible “nature” of the plane does not produce the proper effects to be expected from a plane, because it is a “natural universal” which exists only in the mind (or the intellect). The proper effects are produced only by the external individuals of the “natural universal.”

12. Cf. n.1, chap. II.

13. The “rational universal” (kulli `aqil) here means a universal which is in the mind (kulli dhihni), namely, the concept which is intellecuted. This corresponds to a “natural universal” as determined by “universality;” it is not the same thing as the “rational universal” in the technical sense (cf. n.1 to chap. II).

14. “Permanent archetypes” (a ‘yān thābitah) is a concept belonging to the terminology of Ibn ‘Arabī. The Absolute in its absoluteness, i.e., as the “Mystery of mysteries,” is completely unknowable. Yet, on the other hand, the absolute contains a number of perfections, which are known as the Divine Names and Attributes. The “permanent archetypes” are the concrete forms in which these Divine Names and Attributes manifest themselves at the level of Divine Consciousness. They are eternal in the sense that they are posterior to the Divine Essence not in terms of time, but only in terms of their essences. The “permanent archetypes” in themselves are not externally actualized (i.e., they are not phenomenal things), and are in this particular sense still nonexistent. But they are the potential sources from which appear the concrete external things.

15. Sabzavārī wrote marginal notes to a number of works by Mullā Šadrā, like Asfār, Mafaṭīḥ al-Ghayb, al-Mahda wa-al-Maʿād, and al-Shawāhid al-Rubiʿībiyyah. Only the last-mentioned has been printed separately.

16. Sabzavārī means to say: Since the “existence” of intelligible forms is not the “existence” of “nature,” but rather is an illumination issuing from the soul, how could “quiddity” be the “existence” of “nature?” For knowledge is in the domain of “existence,” not in the domain of “quiddity.”

17. Cf. n.8 to chap. IV.

18. What is meant by the “determinations at the level of Unity (wāhidīyah)
is the separative (not collective) intelligible forms Wāhidīyah as well as Aḥadiyyah, both literally meaning “being-one,” belong in the technical vocabulary of Ibn ‘Arabi and his school. The Aḥadiyyah (“One-ness”) refers to the highest metaphysical level at which the Absolute is in its original pure One-ness, or the Unity beyond Unity. The Wāhidīyah (“Unity”) is a stage lower than the Aḥadiyyah in the order of the metaphysical self-evolvement of the Absolute. It is variously known as the stage of Divine Consciousness, the stage of the Names and Attributes, etc. It is a metaphysical or ontological region in which all possible existents are contained, clearly distinguished one from the other (hence the word “separative” appearing above), but only in the state of potentiality, not in that of actuality. Actually and externally, all things are still absolutely one.


20. Alexander of Aphrodisias (flourished early 3rd c. A.D.), a peripatetic philosopher and one of the most outstanding Greek commentators on Aristotle.

21. Mullā Šadrā ascertains that “being-the-subject-of-intellection” (ʿaqilīyah) and “being-the-object-of-intellection” (maʿqūlīyah) are two correlatives, just in the same way as “being-father” and “being-son.” He argues in the following way. If the existence of the object of intellection were different from the existence of the subject of intellection, it would be possible for either one of them to be considered independently of the other. But in reality the object of intellection has no other existence than its being-intellected. And its-being-intellected is inconceivable unless the other happens to be the subject of intellection for it. Two correlatives are symmetrical to each other.

22. It is one of the famous works of Mullā Šadrā in Metaphysics. It has been edited and translated into French by Henry Corbin under the title of “Pénétrations métaphysiques” (Paris and Téhran: Adrien-Maisonneauve, 1965).

23. Sabzavārī in the relevant passage from his gloss on the Asfār argues as follows:

The symmetry which is entailed by correlation necessarily implies simultaneity, not the existence of priority-posteriority relationship between the two terms. As for the unity of the two, it is not established by the proof in terms of correlation, but it requires another proof.

24. The theosophers have a particular vocabulary regarding the stages of the soul: (1) “nature” (ṭab’) with regard to the soul’s being the source of motion and rest; (2) “soul” (nafs) with regard to the soul’s being the source of particular perception; (3) “heart” (qalb) with regard to its being the source of separative universal perceptions; (4) “spirit” (rūḥ) with regard to the actualization of the simple habitus which creates concrete ideas; (5) the “innermost (sirr) with regard to the soul’s submergence into the Active Intellect; (6) the “hidden” (khafī) with regard to its submergence into the domain of Unity (wāhidīyah); (7) the “most hidden” (akhfā) with regard to its submergence into the domain of Oneness (aḥadiyyah).
Chapter VIII

1. The “being-species,” for instance, is called secondary (intelligible), despite the fact that in reality it is the fourth intelligible. Thus “man,” when abstracted by the intellect from all its individualizing factors, is the primary or first intelligible, while when universality occurs to it, it is the secondary intelligible. Then as the intellects relates it (i.e., “man”) to its particulars (i.e., the individual men) and recognizes it as not being external to them, an essentiality occurs to it, which is the third intelligible. Then, as the intellect observes the latter being predicated of many particulars having one and the same reality, it acquires the quality of “being-species;” this is the fourth intelligible. In a similar way, the secondary matter is called secondary despite the fact that it is the fourth, fifth etc. To give an example, the bodily “mixtures” are preceded by the particular matter which has become the species of the forms of the elements, which again are preceded by the particular matter which has taken on bodily forms, which latter, again, is preceded by the Prime Matter.

2. A mental proposition (qādīyah dhīhnīyah) is a proposition in which judgment is made concerning the individuals that exist only in the mind (e.g., “A universal is either essential or accidental”). A factual proposition (qādīyah haqiqīyah) is a proposition in which judgment is made concerning the individuals in the extra-mental world, regardless of whether actualized or non-actualized (e.g., “all bodies are limited, or having-a-place, or divisible ad infinitum”). Cf. infra, chapter XVI.


Chapter IX

1. The simple “whether-ness” (halīyah basīyah) is the answer to be given to the question (which is called simple “whether” hal basīyah) concerning the existence of a thing. The composite “whether-ness” (halīyah murakkabah) is the answer to be given to the question (composite “whether” hal murakkabah) concerning the accidents of the thing.

2. Literally “the people of tasting (ahl al-dhawq), meaning mystics.

Chapter X

1. By the word “existence” (wujūd) is sometimes meant the concept of existence. In this sense it is an abstract relational concept belonging to the secondary intelligibles that have no existence except in the mind. But sometimes it means the reality of existence which is in itself the source of effects, which repels non-existence by itself, and which is called “real existence” (wujūd haqīqī).

2. For example properties like “difference” (tabāyun), “opposition” (taqadd), “similarity” (tamāthul), etc. For “difference” is a property of the quid-
dities of man and horse; "opposition" is a property of the quiddities of whiteness and blackness; "similarity" is a property of the quiddities of Zayd and Amr. But they qualify the existences of all these beings accidentally.

3. The "separation" (takhliyah) of "quiddity" from "existence" consists in considering the former as something and the latter as something else. Through this manner of consideration, the reason judges the "quiddity" to be the object of the occurrence of "existence," and "existence" as occurring to the "quiddity." This is what is meant by the "embellishment" (tahliyah) of the "quiddity" by "existence."

4. The need of "genus" for "differentia" concerns its actualizations and "existence;" it does not concern the subsistence of its "quiddity." This kind of need is conceivable in the case of a "genus" having "existence" and "quiddity," so that one can say that it is in need of "differentia" in its "existence," while it does not need "differentia" in its "quiddity." But in the case of a "genus" whose "quiddity" happens to be identical with "existence," its need with regard to "existence" is no other than its need regard to "quiddity," because it has no "quiddity" other than "existence." In this case, its need for "differentia" would concern its "quiddity," so that the "differentia" would cease to be "dividing" and become "constituting," i.e., providing the "genus" with a "quiddity." This is what is meant by "mutation" (qalb).

Chapter XI

1. Cf. n. 1 to chap. VI.

Chapter XII

1. On the book Mawāqif cf. n. 3 to chap. VII. The Commentator here referred to is al-Jurjānī (Sharīf al-Dīn al-Jurjānī) generally known as Sharīf Jurjānī, an outstanding theologian of the late 8th/15th century, the author of many celebrated works from among which we may mention al-Ta 'rifāt, a book of the "Definitions" of the technical terms in Islamic sciences.

2. The "non-conditioned as the source of division" (lā bi-sharṭ maqsamī) is more indefinite than the "non-conditioned as a division" (lā bi-sharṭ qismī), because the latter is absolute, while the former is absolute in the sense that its is beyond even absoluteness. cf. XXXI.

3. "Quiddities" composed of "genus" and "differentia" are of two kinds: (1) those "quiddities" that are in the external world composed of "matter" and "form," like "body;" (2) those that are in the external world not composed of "matter" and "form." like "accidents" (blackness, whiteness, etc.). Blackness, for example, is in the external world not composed of two elements, from one of which its "genus" (i.e., color) might be derived, while from the other its "differentia" (i.e., the property of contracting the eye-sight). This is what is meant by Sabzawari's saying that the "accidents" are external simple things.

Chapter XIII

1. The categorical proposition is a proposition like "Man is a rational animal." The conjunctive hypothetical proposition is like "If the sun rises, it is day." The disjunctive proposition is like "this number is either odd or even."
Chapter XIV

1. An allusion to the Qur’anic verse (55,29) which reads: “Every day He is in a state.”

2. A poetic reference to the idea that all things are theophanies of the Truth and that their “existences” are His manifestations.

3. Mullā Şadrā in his Asfār says: “Imām ṫāzī corroborated this idea by asserting that whoever has recourse to his pure nature and removes himself all the tendentious inclinations, must recognize by the light of his intellect that the coming-back of what has ceased to exist is an impossibility.”

4. The “original time” means the time during which the thing was existent, i.e., before it ceased to exist.

5. “Mutation” would be entailed on the supposition that the mode of “coming-back” in its very being “coming-back” become transformed into the mode of “being-in-the-original-time.” Self-contradiction would result from the supposition that the mode of “coming-back” be “being-in-the-original-time,” instead of being “coming-back.” The agreement of two opposites would result from the supposition that in a single “ipseity” there be gathered together the mode of “being-in-the-original-time” and the mode of “coming-back.”

6. On the longitudinal and the latitudinal hierarchy, cf. XXIV.


Chapter XV

1. I.e., We can say: al-ma’dūm al-muţlaq ṭā yukhbar (“Nothing can be predicated of the absolute non-existent) thus making “the absolute non-existent” the subject and the “impossibility of predication” the predicate.

2. This is probably a reference to Shaykh Aḥmad Akhsāī (d. 1242/1826), the founder of the Shaykhiyah school.

Chapter XVI

1. The Active Intellect (‘aql ā‘āl) is a non-composite spiritual Substance, the pure Light in the utmost degree of perfection, in which are contained the Forms of all things.


3. That is to say, the non-material dimension of the soul.

4. The relation between two universals, which is called “more-general-in-one-aspect (and more-special-in-another)” (a ‘amm wa-akhasil min wajh) may be exemplified by “man” and “white.” The concept of “man” in fact is more general than “white” because it comprises both “white” and “non-white” (man), while “white” is more general than “man” in a similar way. Thus each of them is more-general-and-more-special-in-one-aspect than the other. The two agree with each other in one object, namely, “white man,” but disagree in two objects, namely, “non-white man” and “non-human white (thing).”

Chapter XVII

1. On Shawāriq cf. n. 4. The title of the present question is the “Properties of the Necessary Existent” (khawās al-wājib). And the discussion of the
problem is found on p. 114 of the lithograph edition (A.H. 1280).

2. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Husaynī al-Istrābādī, known as Mīr Dāmād (d. 1441/1631). He was the teacher of Mullā Ṣadrā and author of many important works in various fields, the most important of which in philosophy are al-Ufuq al-Mubīn and al-Qabasāt.

Chapter XVIII

1. Al-Ufuq al-Mubīn or “Clear Horizon” is one of the most important works in metaphysics by Mīr Dāmād. For Mir Damad see n. 2 to chap. XVII.

Chapter XIX

1. The argument may be summarized in the following way. If “possibility” did not subsist in the external world, it would be something non-existent, and if it were non-existent, there would be no distinction between “possibility” and its negation, because all non-existents are not distinguishable from each other. In that case, it would follow that a “possible” would not be a “possible.” This is absurd, because the original supposition was that a “possible” is “possible.”

2. Through a “destructive answer” (naqḍ), because blindness is something negative (blindness being the absence of eye-sight), but non-blindness also is something negative. This example destroys the absurdity which is claimed here. As for the “constructive answer (ḥall), we say that the negation of two contradictories in simple concepts means their non-predicatability of one single thing. Thus the absurdity of the adduced examples is removed, because “necessity”-“non-necessity,” “possibility”-“non-possibility,” “blindness”-“non-blindness” cannot be predicated of one single thing.

Chapter XX

1. “Disjunctive proposition” (qaḍiyyah munfaṣilah) is of three kinds: (1) Real (ḥaqiqī) disjunctive proposition (like “the number is either odd or even”) in which the two disjunctive members (“odd” and “even”) can neither be both true nor both false of the subject (“number”). (2) The one in which both disjunctive members cannot be true together (e.g., “this thing is either a tree or a stone”). (3) The one in which both members cannot be false together (e.g., Zayd is either in the sea or he is not drowned”).

Chapter XXI

1. The “two sides of necessity” refers to (1) the “necessity” which precedes the “existence of a thing and (2) the “necessity” which follows its “existence.” The “two sides of impossibility” are (1) the “impossibility” which precedes the “existence” of a thing due to the lack of a “cause” and (2) the “impos-
sibility which occurs to the thing after its existence due to the disappearance of the “cause.”

2. Al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīhāt is one of the major works of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), a complete system of peripatetic philosophy.

3. The “self-evident” propositions (badihiyyāt) are divided into six kinds, all of them sharing in common the lack of need for proof. The first kind (1), “a
priori” proposition (awwaliyyah) is the one which needs neither a proof nor anything else. This is called a “primary self-evident” proposition. The remaining five kinds all need something other than a proof: (2) a proposition based on observation (mushahadah) needs “observation;” (3) a proposition based on experience (tajribiyah) needs “experience;” (4) an intuitive proposition (hadisiyah) needs “intuition;” (5) a proposition based on hearsay (mutawiyyah) means “hearing;” (6) a proposition based on pure nature (fitriyah) needs “natural insight.”

4. “Preponderance without a preponderant” (tarajjih bilā murajjihih) consists in one of two things equal in possibility being actualized without any cause. This is something impossible to occur. “Giving-preponderance without a preponderant” (tarjih bilā murajjihih) means that an agent possessed of a free will prefers one of two things which are equal in possibility to the other without any preponderant. Al-Ash’ari upholds this latter thesis, but even he does not admit the former.

5. Since the reason of the requirement of a “cause” is “possibility” and not “contingency,” a “possible pre-eternal in terms of time” is an object of “making” and is in need of the Maker (i.e., “cause”), because it is “possible.” Here the pre-eternal is determined by the phrase “in terms of time,” because the “pre-eternal by essence” can never be “possible” by essence.

6. “Actual proposition” (qadīyah fīliyah) is what is called in Logic a “general absolute” (‘āmmah mujlaqah) proposition.

7. “Replacing non-existence” which is the contradictory of the existence of the thing which comes into being, can never take part in the latter. For taking part of the contradictory of a thing in the thing is impossible. By the very actualization of that existence the “replacing non-existence is removed.

Chapter XXII

1. A “possible,” as long as it remains in the domain of “possibility” is existent in potentia, but when it becomes “necessary” through something else, it becomes existent in actu. Thus the “possibility” of “existence” is a deficiency of “existence” while the “necessity” of “existence” is a perfection of it. Therefore, perfection is a constituting factor of what is imperfect. This is what is meant by Sabzavari when he says that the “essential possibility” and “necessity-by-something-else” agree with each other.

Chapter XXIII

1. “Essential possibility’ is the source from which issues forth “possibility-through-preparedness” which is the “matter” of the material world. Thus the aspect of deficiency proves to be the source of defects. Thus “essential possibility” of the Intellect becomes the source of “possibility-through-preparedness” in the material world. It is in this sense that “essential possibility” is to be considered the source of “possibility-through-preparedness.” As for the meaning of the “Active Intellect,” cf. n. 1 to chap. XVI.

2. This is a technical expression of Arabic grammar. For example, Zayd hasan thawbu-hu (lit. “Zayd, beautiful is his clothes”), and ‘Amr kātib abū-hu (lit. ‘Amr, writer is his father”). Here “beautiful” and “writer” are formally,
i.e., grammatically, attributes of Zayd and 'Amr respectively, but in reality they are attributes qualifying the “clothes” and “father.”

Chapter XXIV

1. “Non-existence” (’adam) is of two kinds: (1) “preceeding non-existence” (’adam muqābil) and (2) “parallel non-existence” (’adam mujāmi’). The first is “non-existence” in terms of time, which does not correspond to the “existence” of a thing in time. The second is the non-requirement of a “possible” for either “existence” or “non-existence.” This non-requirement is a negative attribute of a “possible” in itself. This is what is meant by Ibn Sīnā when he says that a “possible” thing in itself is non-existent.

2. “Substantial movement” (harakah jawhariyyah) is an idea which plays a decisive role in the metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā, so much so that it is unanimously considered one of the cardinal principles of his philosophical system. Against the peripatetic philosophers of Islam, who, following Aristotle, recognize “movement” in the category of substance only in the sense of coming-into-being of things and their passing-away, Mullā Ṣadrā chooses to consider substantial movement as a gradual transformation occurring in the inner structure itself of things. Thus a thing or substance which is now in a certain ontological state is regarded by Mullā Ṣadrā to be undergoing a continuous and gradual inner transformation until it reaches a new ontological state. The whole process of this inner transformation is in reality a series of annihilations and re-creations by God.

3. The “cutting-movement” (harakah qatīyah) becomes actualized when a moving body reaches its goal. Here the movement is something extending from the beginning of the distance to its end. The “mediating movement” (harakah tawassufiyah), on the contrary, consists in the moving body reaching at every moment a certain point of the distance, a point at which the moving body has not been before and at which it will not be after.

4. What is meant by “latitudinal hierarchy” is a hierarchy in which there is no cause-caused relationship. It is actualized in two places. One of them is in the dimension constituted on a horizontal plane by the Intellects standing in vertical order. The other is the world of physical bodies. It is this second one which is meant by Sabzawārī here.

5. A “lower existence” in the longitudinal hierarchy lacks the characteristics of the degree of a “higher existence,” because the “lower existence” is something caused by the “higher.” A “caused” cannot have the characteristics of the degree of the existence of its “cause,” because the former is nothing but a shadow or a reflection of the latter. But the “higher existence” in the longitudinal hierarchy does possess the characteristics of the “lower,” for a “cause” does not lack the characteristics of the existence of its “caused,” because the latter is nothing but an outcome of the former.

7. A famous Hadīth.
10. The statement is attributed to ‘Alī, but is not found in Nahj al-Balāghah.
11. From the Tā’īyah of Ibn Fārid. The commentator Kāshānī remarks, “It
means: I am the source of Adam and his father in reality, although I am a branch and son of Adam in physical form.

Chapter XXV

1. Abū Qāsim 'Abdallah b. Aḥmad al-Balkhī al-Ka'bī (320/932), the head of the Mu'tazilah school of theology in Bagdad, and author of a number of works in theology and on various sects.
2. Ka'bī holds the temporal origination of the world in “post-eternity,” the preponderant being “time” itself. He argues that since there was no “time” before that “time,” the thesis does not entail “preponderance without a preponderant.” Against this we may transfer the point of argument to the “time” itself and ask for its preponderant.

Chapter XXVI

1. Probably a reference to the Illuminationists.
2. Cf. n. 2 to chap. XXIII.

Chapter XXVIII

1. In the remaining cases of “priority,” the prior and the posterior share the “common basis” in the real sense. But in the particular kind of “priority” which is in question here, the prior does participate in the “common basis” in the real sense, because it is possible, for example, to negate the attribute of “movement” from a man sitting in a moving ship. It is for this reason that the author says: The “common basis” in this kind of “priority” is “being” in an absolute sense comprising both “being” in the real sense and “being” in the metaphorical sense.
2. The gist of his argument in the Qabasāt is: The Necessary Being has no “rational level” because It is absolutely impossible to be comprehended by the mind, while the “priority-in-terms-of-causality” stands on the basis of the “rational level.”

Chapter XXX

1. The “boundary” (or “confinement”) is sometimes understood as the confinement of negation and sometimes the confinement of the thing negated. In the former case, the meaning of the sentence, for example, “Man is not a writer” is the removal of “writing” from the “man,” the removal itself being “confined” to the level of “quiddity.” But in the latter case, the meaning of the same sentence will be the removal of the “writing” from the “man,” the “writing” being “confined” to that level.

Chapter XXXIII

1. The world of “similitudes” (ālam al-mithāl) or the “world of (creative) imagination” is the intermediary world situated between the purely spiritual
dimension of things and material world. There exist bodies in this dimension but they are not densely material as they are down here; they are “subtle” (laṭīf) bodies.

Chapter XXXV

1. The “cause” of “quiddity” exercises two kinds of “causality”: one is the causality with regard to the very “quiddity” itself, and the second is the causality with regard to a part of the “quiddity.”

Chapter XXXIX

1. Qur’an, XIV, 34.

Chapter XL

1. Qur’an, XVII, 85.

Chapter XLII

1. Two distinguishable things either (1) accord with each other in “quiddity” and its inseparable “property” (in this case they are “sharing-one-species”), or (2) not. In this latter case they can possibly be together in one locus (in this case they are “different”) or (3) they cannot even be together in one locus (in this case they are “opposed”).

2. The rule of “presupposition” is: Affirming something (A) of something (B) presupposes the existence of the latter (B).

Chapter XLVI

1. Cf. (3) XXIV.
2. Qur’an, LVI, 58.

Chapter XLVIII

1. The Perfect Man (al-Insān al-Kāmil): In the metaphysical system of the philosophy of Existence, the whole world of Being is represented as a cosmic circle formed by the successive stage of Divine emanation. The cosmic circle starts from God; it comes down stage after stage until it reaches the stage of man. Man represents the lowest and last stage of Descent of Existence. Since it is the last stage it comprises in itself all the elements of the preceding stages. Man is a all-comprehensive being and is therefore apt to be the exterior manifestation of the Divine Name: Allah. Man in this sense is called Perfect Man. The cosmic Ascent, i.e., the returning of all things back to their Source, starts from this stage.

Chapter LIII

1. Qur’an, LIV, 50.

2. “Occurring together” refers to the case in which each of the two causes happens to be an independent “complete cause” affecting the existence of the “caused.” “Interchanging” refers to the case in which each one of the two causes is of such a nature that if it exists it causes the existence of the
particular "caused." "Succession" refers to the case in which either one of the two, causes the existence of the "caused," and then at the disappearance of this cause, another cause comes to replace it.

Chapter LV

1. Ibn Sahlan al-Sāwī is a famous philosopher-logician of the 6th/12th century. The al-Baṣāʾīr al Naṣīriyah is his major work in logic.

Chapter LVIII

1. Cf. n. 5 to chap. VII.

Chapter LIX

1. Cf. n. 3 to chap. XXIV.