arms in similar style below, which might be described as gyronny of 4 arg. & az.; small initials in blue. 8vo., blue morocco gilt, back and borders, silk doublures, g. e., by P. Bozerian jeune. £22. XV

☙ The catchwords are each surrounded by a pen border of fanciful design. The medallion of Cicero, though slightly chipped, is interesting: the head seen in profile is turning to its left: short brown hair: clean shaven: toga of crimson heightened with gold: blue background partly covered with gold tracery: broad black border with "Marcus Tullius Cicero Orator" in perfectly formed gold capitals: the rest of the page is blank. This head, which may truly be called a portrait, undoubtedly was copied from the antique, probably from a very early MS.

65 CICERO'S Cato Major: or a Discourse upon Old Age, translated into English and humbly addresst to the Honoured Mrs. Clayton, 1730. Neatly and boldly written MS., ruled with red lines, title in red and black (135 pp.) Large 8vo., original English red morocco, gilt borders, g. e. £3 3s. 1730

☙ This is in similar style to No. 66, but appears to be a transcript made two years after the death of the translator, John Freind. Both works seem to be unpublished.

66 CICERO'S Laelius: or a Discourse upon Friendship, humbly inscrib'd to the honoured Mrs. Clayton. Ruled in red, title in red and black (100 pp.) Cr. 4to., original English red morocco, gilt borders, g. e. £4 4s. (c. 1725)

☙ This appears to be the autograph MS. of the translator, John Freind (1675-1728), distinguished physician and classical scholar; one of the writers of the "Examination of Bentley's Dissert. on Epistles of Phalaris." See D.N.B. and Allibone. Mrs. Clayton, to whom the work is dedicated, appears to have been Charlotte, Lady Sundon (died 1742): bedchamber woman to Queen Caroline. She "controlled court patronage" to which Freind distantly refers in his dedication.

67 CICERO (M. T.), De Somnio Scipionis: De Fato: De Universitate: Rhetorica. (2) CICERO (Q.), De Peticione Consulatus ad M. T. Ciceronem suum fratrem. (3) HYGINUS. Poeticon Astronomicon. (4) PHALARIS. Francisci Aretini in Phalaridis epistolas e greco sermone latinam in linguam translatas. (5) ÆNEAS SYLVIUS (Pius II. papa), Epistola sub illustr. Hanibalis Nummidie ducis titulo confecta [and other pieces]. Neatly written MSS. on 215 leaves of stout paper ($7\frac{3}{4}$ by $5\frac{1}{4}$ in.), in 2 or 3 hands (15th cent.), 23 long lines to a page, gothic letter, red and black, diagram of a Sphere in the Hyginus, large margins, sound condition. Sm. 4to., old sound russia gilt, lettered contents, g. e. £7 7s. (written c. 1487)

☙ Belonged in 1825 to Henry Drury of Harrow.

MSS. of Hyginus are rare; the verses by J. Sentinus attached are dated 1487 in the above: it may be noted that there is no printed ed. between 1485 & 1488. The Phalaris is interesting as a literary forgery, which occasioned the famous Bentley-Boyle controversy.

68 CICERO (M. T.), Tusculanæ Quæstiones. MS. of the 15th cent., finely written in roman letter, 24 long lines to a page, by an Italian scribe, on 128 leaves of thin white vellum (8 by $5\frac{1}{2}$ in.) with seven initials illuminated in gold and colours, the first one with white vine decoration in margin. Sm. 4to., green morocco extra gilt, broad inside borders, joints, g. e. £15. XV

☙ Broad margins with early MS. notes.

69 CICERO (M. T.), Rhetorica ad Herennium. MS. of the 15th cent., by an Italian scribe, in long italic letter, 25 long lines to a page, on 94 leaves of paper, 9¼ by 5⅛ in., capitals in crimson, with curious initial letter of interlaced strapwork in yellow and brown on a purple ground: marginal notes in Greek. Long 8vo. calf. £5. XV

70 CINGULO (Gentile de). Donatellus sive Flores Grammaticae editi a Maistro Gentili de Panicali de Cingulo, sub anno 1445. MS. on paper, 136 leaves, 8¾ by 5½ in., well written, large capitals in red with pen ornamentation, that on page 1 large with a grotesque animal. Sm. 4to., calf, blind stamped. £4 10s. XV

This appears to be the original autograph manuscript, and ends as follows:—"Donatellus iste nō nō inceptus fuit in millessimo CCCCXLVo et die decima prima mensis Martii in ora vespertina et necnon completus fuit in MCCCCXLVo die tertia mensis Maii in hora meredicy. Amen P.S.N." Chevalier records two persons of the name of Gentile de Cingoli, one a professor of philosophy XIII cent., the other a Franciscan XIV cent.

71 [COLONNA]. ÆGIDIUS Romanus. Tractatus de Gradibus Formarum. Finely written in broad semi-gothic letter, in red and black, double columns of 50 lines, by an Italian (?) scribe, on 30 leaves of vellum, 11½ by 8¾ in., interleaved with paper for notes. Fol., old French blue leather gilt, £4 10s. XIV

Lettered on the side in characteristic manner with title and the name of (A. A.) Monteil, French historian 1769-1850. His MSS. were sold in 1836. For another example from this library see GREGORIUS.

Ægidius Colonna, 1247-1316, was preceptor of Philippe-le-Bel; abp. of Bourges in 1295.

72 COLONNA (Guido de). Historia Destructionis Trojae. Written in rounded gothic letters, by an English scribe, double columns of 36 lines, on 108 leaves of vellum, 9½ by 7 in.: first page with painted initial in red and blue with decoration extending the length of page: numerous smaller letters with flourishes and scrolls: chapter headings in red. Sm. fol., calf. £12. XIV-XV

The name of the author occurs in the terminal chapter together with the date of composition, 1287.

On one of the fly-leaves is a poem on Drunkenness, in a XVth century hand. Early signatures are Homfredus Taylor, Atwoode, Robartus Nebbris, Edward Conway (twice on last page). The last signature is in a large sloping hand, very bold: temp. James I. It is probably that of the first Viscount Conway (d. 1631), secretary of state, governor of the Isle of Wight, &c. Numerous marginal notes in an early hand (XVth).

73 CONRADUS de Susato. Quæstiones in primos quinque libros Ethicorum Aristotelis, Conradi de Susato, Doctoris S. Theologiae, Episcopi Ratisponensis. MS. of the 15th cent., written in double columns, on 335 leaves of paper, 11¼ by 8¼ in. Fol., bound in the original oak boards covered with pigskin, with square stamp of two grotesque birds many times repeated, roses, fleurs-de-lis, &c. the frame stamped many times with a small panel "deo * laus" brass clasp. £7 7s. written 1455

The work ends "Anno Domini 1455 sexta die mensis Octobris finiti sunt quinque libri Ethicorum Aristotelis in alma Universitate Heydelbergensi per me Johannem Stopper alias Borner de Budingen, Maguntino Diocesi." Fabricius

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

66 CICERO'S Laelius: or a Discourse upon Friendship, humbly ins r b'd to the honoured Mrs. Clayton. Ruled in red, title in red and black (100 pp.) Cr. 4to., original English red morocco, gilt borders, g. e. £4 4s. (c. 1725)

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FREIND (JOHN) 1675–1728.

7561. In English, on paper: written by John Freind (?) about 1727: $8\frac{5}{8} \times 6\frac{1}{4}$ in., xviii + 114 pages: in contemporary red morocco binding with gilt edges.

'Cicero's Lælius: or a Discourse upon Friendship. humbly inscrib'd to the Honored Mrs Clayton.', with dedicatory epistle signed by the translator, John Freind. The title is in red and black, and the pages are ruled in red. A few pages at the beginning, and pp. 101–12 are blank.

Formerly in the possession of James T. Gibson Craig and (?) of Mrs. Ainslie, Parkside, Dorking. Bt. from J. and J. Leighton, 24 Oct., 1912 (lot 66 in their catalogue issued about that time). The same catalogue contains (lot 65) a transcript of a translation by Freind of 'Cicero's Cato Major', also inscribed to Mrs. Clayton, dated 1730 (i.e. two years after Freind's death), in similar style to the above. These two works, together with another volume, seem to have been lot 1264 in Sotheby's sale of the 2nd portion of the Gibson Craig library in 1888. They were then sold to Wm. Ridler for 9*s*.

Freind was appointed physician to Queen Caroline in 1727. Charlotte Clayton, afterwards Lady Sundon, was bedchamber woman to Queen Caroline and had considerable influence at court —influence which, according to Freind's dedication, had been exerted in his favour.

CICERO's

LÆLIUS:

or a Discourse

upon

FRIENDSHIP.

humbly

Inscrib'd to

THE HONORED

Mrs CLAYTON.

Hon.rd Mad.m,

I have received so many obligations from you, that however incapable I am of making such returns as they deserve, yet I have been uneasy, till I could find some occasion of expressing my acknowledgments for them: & I thought I could not do this in a way more agreeable to you, than by laying before you some little fruits of those studys, which you have by so many kind methods encourag'd me to pursue.

I knew I could produce nothing of my own worth your perusal; & when I had resolved upon some Translation, I was not at a Loss where to make my choice.

Cicero's discourse upon Friendship immediately offer'd itself to me, as the most proper present of this kind, I could make to one, whose Friendship to my Dear Father has been so conspicuous. This Treatise has been look'd upon by many, only as a pleasing peice of Speculation, & like Plato's Ideal Republick, too fine ever to be reduc'd into Practice: But you, Mad^m, have shown it to be practicable. You will find nothing here

that is new to you, no kind offices that you have not fulfilled, nay that you have not exceeded; by carrying them on to another generation, & (as I have experienc'd) by making them hereditary.

It is your Goodness, Mad^m, that has brought me forward into Life, beyond what I could otherwise have pretended to: It is your uncommon concern, & zeal for my doing well, that has introduc'd me to the Royal Presence, & laid in a foundation of favour towards me, if I am not wanting to my self. I resolve to use my utmost endeavours, that these advantages may not be thrown away upon me; & I shall do this with the greater pleasure, since, I know, I can by

iv

no other means so highly oblige you, to whom I am bound to show all Respect & Duty, and shall endeavour always to approve myself,

Mad^{m},

Y^{r} most obliged & obedient

Humble Servant,

John Freind

Tully's Discourse upon FRIENDSHIP. addressed to Titus Pomponius Atticus.

The Preface.

Quintus Mucius Scævola ye Augur was often a telling pleasant sayings that he remembred of Caius Lælius his father in law, but never spoke of him without the Distinction of Lælius ye Wise. I was so recommended to the care & tuition of Scævola by my father, when I was grown

up a youth, that I never if I could help it, & he was not otherwise employ'd, departed from the good old man's side. By which means I kept in my memory many of his wise discourses, many of his short ingenious & useful sayings: & study'd always to grow wiser by his instruction. After he dyed, I took my self to Scavola ye Pontifex: than whom I may venture to say there was not a man in Rome more esteem'd both for his parts & justice. But of him I will speak in another place. now I will return to the Augur, among other things I remember that once as he was sitting at home in his Semi-Circle when there was only 1 & 2 or 3 of his familiar Freinds present, he happened to discourse upon an affair, which was then the common subject of conversation. You may remember, Atticus, & the more, because you & Sulpicius were well acquainted, how everyone wondered or complain'd, when he was Tribune of the Commons, that there was

such a mortal hatred between him and Quintus Pompeius the Consul with whom he had liv'd in the utmost familiarity & strictest friendship. Scaevola I say, when this matter happened to be mentioned, gave us an account of a Discourse concerning friendship which Lelius held with him, & his Son in law Caius Fannius, Marcus's Son, a few days after the Death of Scipio Africanus. I remember the heads: which I have put together in mine own method & introduced them speaking them=selves in the following dialogue: least says I & says he should be too often repeated: & that it should seem as if it came from their own mouths. For since in our conver=sation you have often required of me, to write something on friendship, which I

thought worthy of every one's knowledge, & agreeable to the intimate acquaintance betwe=en us: Therefore I undertook it very willing=ly with a prospect of doing some Publick good & obliging you at the same time. But, as in my Cato Major, which I writ to you con=cerning old Age, I introduced old Cato speak=ing; not knowing any person better qualified to speak upon that subject, than he, who enjoy'd so long a life, & had above others been so much honou=red in his old age: So since we have heard by Tra=dition, that there was a great friendship between Lælius & Scipio, I thought Lælius the fittest person, to explain the notions of friend=ship, & he is here represented making that very discourse which Scavola heard him deliver. This way of writing, where Antient & Eminent men are as it were speaking to us, has a strange power upon our mind, & carrys

with it I know not how a greater weight &
authority. so that I myself reading what I
writ upon Old Age, have been so affec
=ted with it, that I have thought t'was not
I, but Cato was speaking But as then I an
old Man writ to an old Man concerning
Old Age, so now I the most friendly write
to a friend concerning Friendship. Then
Cato spoke, to whom nobody could be preferd
either in age, or wisdom: Now Lalius the
Wise (for so he is call'd) & excelling in the glo-
=ry of friendship, speaks about Friend=
ship. I desire that you would awhile turn
your thoughts from me, & persuade yourselves
that Lalius is speaking. Caius Fan=
=nius, & Quintus Mucius come to
their father in law after the Death of A=
fricanus: The Discourse arises from
these 2 Lalius answers them. who as you

will perceive by reading of it takes to himself this whole Dissertation upon Friendship.

Chapter 1.

Fannius, Scævola, Lælius.

Fannius. What you have been saying, Lælius, is undoubtedly true. There never was a man of more exemplary Virtue or of greater fame than Africanus. But you are to consider that you are now the Man whom every one esteems & calls the Wise. The Late Marcus Cato had this Name given him. Under this Title was Lucius Atilius distinguish'd: but both of them for different Reasons: Atilius had this title

given him from his judgment & skill in the Civil Law: Cato, for his experience in the world & knowledge of men: There are many things reported which he foresaw with great prudence, or acted with steadiness, or acutely reply'd to both in the Senate & in the Forum; This it was that in his old age gain'd him the Title of Cato ye Wise. But your Character is built upon another foundation, you are call'd Wise not only from your superiour Genius & moral Endowments. but also for your Education in the Liberal Sciences & your Accomplishments in Learning: Nor are you stil'd Wise as the Common People understand that Term, but as the Learned apply it & it never was so justly apply'd to any of the Grecian Sages. For those Seven to whom Tradition

has given that Title (to some who have more nicely enquired into their Merit) seem not to have deserved it. One indeed we have heard of who by the Oracle of Apollo was declard the Wisest among Men. This is that Char=acter of Wisdom which is universally attributed to you, as to one who places all his happiness in himself, & thinks that true virtue is beyond the Reach of any human misfortunes. This General Opinion of you made many People enquire of me, & I beleive of Scævola, too, how you bore the Death of Scipio Africanus, & the more, beause when we held our usual Conferences upon the last Nones, in the Gardens of Decius Brutus, the Augur, you were not there, tho' no one usd to be more punctual upon that Day, & that Occasion.

Scævola. I must own, Lælius, that many

have made the enquiry mention'd by Fann=
=ius, & my Answer was, that you bore the loss
of so excellent a man & so intimate a friend with
great moderation: Tho neither was it in your power,
nor agreeable to your good Nature not to be concern'd
& I acquainted them that it was an Indisposition
of body & no dejection of mind, that detain'd you from
our last Collegiate Meeting.

Lælius. Scævola, you have done me
justice, for I should not in regard to mine own
advantage have withdrawn myself from that duty
which I always attended when my health would
give me leave: Nor do I think that any steady honest
man would plead any casualty in Life, as an excuse
for omitting his Duty. As for the Character which you,
Fannius, have been pleas'd to give me, & which I
by no means assume to my self, I take it kindly as it comes
from a friend. But in my Opinion you have not a
right Notion of Cato, or either there never was a man,

(which I am inclin'd most to think) or if ever there was one he was the Man. For to pass over other things, how did he bear the Loss of his Son: I remember Paullus, I observ'd how Gallus bore his afflic= =tion: but theirs was only the loss of a Child: Cato's was the loss of one advanc'd in years & reputation. Where= =fore take care how you prefer even him, whom Apol= =lo judg'd to be the Wisest to Cato. for the former was celebrated for his sayings, the last for his Actions. To you, Young Gentlemen I speak to you both I freely give this account of myself.

Chapter 2.

Should I say that the Death of Scipio did not affect me with greif: this perhaps might meet with the Approbation of the Wise: but I am sure I should speak a great untruth. For I was heartily greiv'd to lose such a friend, as I beleive

never will be again; & I dare affirm, never was before. But I am not to seek for a remedy; I have it in mine own breast, & comfort myself chiefly with this thought, that I am free from that error, from whence sorrow for deceased friends is generally aggravated, for I am satisfied nothing ill could happen to Scipio ~~from~~ Death; but if any it was all mine, & to be extreamly sorry for our own misfortunes, argues not the love of our friend, but of ourselves. Who can deny that Scipio enjoy'd a great share of happiness? Unless, he desir'd immortality upon earth; (which he never thought of:) what had he not acquir'd, that's right for man to wish for? Since in his youth by his incredible vertue, he exceeded the utmost hopes, that his Countrymen had conceiv'd of him, while a child? since he never stood for the Consular Dignity, yet was twice chosen Consul; the first time before

he was of a legal age for that employment: & a second time in a proper time for him, tho almost too late for preserving the publick Safety: Since, by the utter destruction of Scutus, the most inveterate enemies to this Common-wealth, he put an end not only to all present but also to future Competitions: I shall I speak of his easy & obliging behaviour: of his Duty to his mother: his liberality to his Sisters: his beneficence to his relations: & of his justice to all in general: these are things known to you & how dear he was to his fellow Citizens, was sufficiently shown by the sorrow they express'd at his funeral. What could the Addition of a few more years have added to his happiness: for old age, tho it may not be irksome, as I remember, Cato, the year before he dy'd, affirm'd in his discourse with me, & Scipio, yet it takes off that liveliness & vigour, which Scipio yet enjoy'd.

Wherefore his felicity & glory was such, that it was capable of no increase. But the Sud=
=deness of his Death took away the sense of dy=
=ing, What kind of Disease carry'd him off it is hard to say. you know, what men generally suspected. But this I may truly say, that of all the happy & joyful Days that Scipio saw, that was the most glorious, when the Day before he dy'd, the Senate being dismiss'd, he was conducted home in the evening, by ye Senators, and Allies of ye Romans, & Latins: that from so high a Degree of Dignity he might seem rather to have gone to the Gods above, than to ye Shades below. For I do not in the least agree with them, who have maintain'd a new Doctrine, that the Souls of men do not survive the body, but that Death destroys both.

Chapter 3

The Authority of the antient Philosophers, as well as that of our own Ancestors, prevails more with me, who instituted and religiously observ'd so many funeral rites and Ceremonies: which they would never have done, had they thought that no effect of these honours could reach the Dead: I have a regard too for the opinion of those Pythagorean Philosophers, who liv'd in that part of our country call'd, Magna Græcia, (then in a flourishing condition, tho now almost ruin'd & destroy'd,) & first instructed us in Philosophy. I pay respect to his judgment, whom Apollo declar'd to be the Wisest of men: who did not as the Generality of people do first say one thing, & then another,

but was steady in this Doctrine that the Souls of men were a divine Principle, & that when they left the Body, they reascended into Heaven, & that those especially of very good, & just men had a very expeditious passage thither. So Scipio thought: who indeed as if he had foreseen his Death, which happened a few Days after, in the presence of Philus, & Manilius, & many others, & of you, Scævola, who was introduced by me, disputed for 3 Days concerning the Common=wealth: & closd the whole with a discourse concerning the Immortality of the Soul: which he had from Africanus in a Dream.

If this be so, that in the moment of Death the Souls of the best men fly away, as it were out of the chains & prison of the body; I believe no one's ever found the Passage to Heaven easier, than Scipio's did. And therefore, should we grieve at this event, that happened to him, we should disco=

=ver more of envy than of Love. But if the Opinion of some other Philosophers seem true, that the Soul & body perish together, & that no sense remains after death: Then as there is no good in Death, so certainly there can be no evil in it: for when our sense is lost, it is y same, as if we never had been born: Nevertheless we ourselves & the whole city as long as it shall remain, will rejoyce that Scipio had his being. Therefore I think as I have said before that his Lot was very happy; but mine very unfortunate; for as I enterd first into Life, so ought I first to have departed. But yet I so much enjoy the remembrance of our friendship, that I seem to have livd happy, because I livd with Scipio: with whom I still acted both in publick, & private affairs: At home, or in the Army we livd together: & (which is the Life & Soul of friend=ship) our Inclinations, our Study, our opinions were

the same. Wherefore that Opinion, which Fannius tells me, the world has of my wisdom, especially since it is ill grounded, does not please me so much, as the hope I have that the friendship I had with Scipio will forever stand upon Record; & this pleases me the more, because there are not above three, or four Instances of such a friendship. & among these I hope, that of Scipio and Lælius will be known to posterity.

Fannius Undoubtedly, Lælius, it will be so: but, because we are now at leisure, if you will, as you are us'd to do upon other occasions when your opinion is ask'd, explain the Nature of friendship to us, in what it consists, how it is to be cultivated, & what directions you have to give us concerning it you will oblige me mightily.

Scævola This will be very agree=able to me too. I was just going to propose it

when Fannius prevented me. Therefore I beleive you will extreamly oblige us both.

Chapter 4

I should not think it at all troublesome to undertake what you desire, if I thought myself equal to it: for it is a Noble subject: & we are as Fannius says at leisure. But who am I? or what Talents do I pretend to? This is the province of the learned, & of the GREEKS alone, to be ready for a disputation upon any Subject, that is propos'd. It is a great undertaking & requires a long practise. Therefore, if you desire such a discourse, I must send you to those whose profession qualifies them for such a work. I can only advise you, to prefer Friendship to all other human blessings. For there is nothing more agreeable to

Nature, nor of greater use both in Prosper-
-ity, & adversity. But first of all I think,
there can be no Friendship, but between
Good Men. Which expression I use not
in that nice & strict sense, as some subtle
Philosophers do, truly perhaps, but not
with much regard to the Common use of it in
the world. for they deny, that any man can be
good, unless he is wise. Be it so: but then they
interpret that wisdom, to be such, as never
any mortal man arrived to. We are content
with such vertue, as is to be found in com-
mon Life, not such, as we may wish for, or
form an Idea of in our minds.

It cannot be said, that
Caius Fabricius, Marcus Curi-
-us, Titus Coruncianus, which
our Ancestors esteemed wise men, were so
according to their Notion of perfection. Wherefore

let them keep to themselves that invidious and obscure Character of Wisdom; if they will but allow that these were Good Men. I know they will not allow it: because they will deny that any one can be good unless he is Wise: Let us go on without any such nice distinctions, & let them who so live, & so behave themselves, that their truth, Integrity, Equity & Liberality is unquestionable; Who are governd by no covetous immodest or ambitious Passions, who have that Constancy of mind, in which these whom I just now mentionid excel; Let such men as these I say be callid as they are Generally esteemd Good Men. Because (as far as men can) they follow Nature, the best guide to a good Life. For it seems to me, that we are all born, to have some society with others; & still a greater with those who by some Relation or other approach nearest to us. Therefore those, of

our own Country, are preferable to foreign=ers; & kindred, to strangers. for amongthese Nature has laid some foundation of Friendship: tho not such an one as may prove firm & lasting. For in this Friend=ship has the Advantage of Relation, that the last of these may subsist without kind=nes, but the other never can. For Kindnes once ceasing, Friendship is at an end, but Relation still remains.

How great the force of Friend=ship is, may from hence appear, that it is something collected from the general So=ciety of mankind, establish'd by Nature, & contracted as it were into a narrow com=pas, so that all Degrees of kindnes are united between two, or three, or at most very few.

Chapter 5.

Friendship is a perfect harmony of sentiments, in all moral & religious duty's, join'd with entire affection & kindness; than which, amongst all the blessings that heaven has bestow'd upon us, I know none more valuable, (unless it be Wisdom). Some give the preference to Riches, others to Power, others to Honour, nay many to Pleasure. The last of these is brutal: the others perishable, & uncertain, plac'd not in our own Power, but in the Caprice of Fortune. Some make Vertue the chief good, and very laudably: But this very Vertue is the parent, & preserver of Friendship: nor can there be any real Friendship without it. But let us estimate Vertue according to the manner, that we see it practis'd in common Life, & as we use the word in

Common discourse: & not according to those mag=nificent descriptions the Stoicks give us of it: Let us, I say, esteem them Good Men, which have ever been so accounted, such as the Paulli, the Cato's, the Galli, the Scipio's & the Phili's. The world is content with such as these, & we have nothing to do with those, who are nowhere to be found but in the imagination of Philosophers. Among such men as these, the Advantages which arise from Friendship, are inexpressible. For who can be said, as Ennius expresses it, to live a life worth living, that has no acquiescence in the kindness of a Friend? What can be more delightful, than to have one, with whom you may converse as freely, as with yourself? What would be the great Pleasure of prosperity, had we no one, who could equally share in ye joy of our good fortune? & how much more difficult would it be for us to bear Adversity, without one who would

have even a greater concern for it, than we ourselves have. Other things, that are desirable, have almost each of them their tendency to some one particular end: Riches, that you may make use of them; Power, that you may create dependencys; Honours, that you may meet with applause; & Pleasures, that you may gratify your inclinations.

But Friendship takes in a larger compass: wherever you turn yourself, it is present to you, it is shut out of no place: is never unseasonable, never troublesome: Therefore, as the saying is, Fire, & Water are not of more universal use to Mankind, than Friendship. Nor do I speak now of that Friendship which is usual among those that are well acquainted, (tho that too be not without its pleasure, & advantage) but of that which is true, & perfect; & such as there was among those few examples, which I have mentioned. Such a Friendship gives a lustre to prosperity,

& softens our Adversity by dividing, & communicating our misfortunes.

Chapter 6.

Among the many, & great advantages which arise from Friendship, none is more considerable than this, that it always raises upour hopes: & never suffers our Spirits to languish, much less to sink. He who looks on his friend, looks as it were upon his own Image. Therefore in absence they are together, in poverty they abound, in sickness they are healthy, (& what is more) when dead they still live: whilst the memory, the honour, the desire of them is preserved by their survivers. From whence, the Death of the one seems happy: & the life of the other praiseworthy. If you take away the Cement of mutual Affection: all society both civil, & domestick, must

be dissolvd; nor could so much as the Tillage of the Country subsist. If the advantage of Friendship & unanimity does not from hence sufficiently appear, we shall easily perceive it, from considering the effects of discord, & dissention. For what Family is so well establishd, what city so strong, that may not be utterly destroy'd by hatred, & quarrels; from this alone you may judge, what consequence Friendship is among men. We have heard that a learned man of *Agrigentum, who writ Philosophy in verse, declard that the whole System of the world, & all things that move in Nature, were kept together in this constant order by agreement, & would be all in confusion by Discord, & this indeed is what all men understand & own to be true in fact. Therefore whoever has at anytime distinguished himself either in offering himself to dangers for his friend, or sharing dangers with him, who is these that

*Empedocles

has not highly commended him? How did the Theatre ring with applause when the New Tragedy of Marcus Pacuvius's first appeard; in which the King being ignorant, which of the two Strangers that were brought before him was Orestes, Pylades, said he was the man, & shew'd an earnest desire to be executed instead of his Friend: & at the same time Orestes (as the truth was) vehemently persisted that he was the person enquir'd after. They stood up to applaud this in a fabulous Representation: what would they have then said if the fact had been Real? Nature broke out & shew'd itself upon this occasion: when men, rightly judg'd what was well done in another, tho perhaps they had not courage to do it themselves.

Thus far I have been able to declare to you, my sentiments of Friendship. if you require more, (as much more is to be said) I must send you

to those, whose profession qualifies them to discourse more fully upon these matters.

Fannius Sir, if you please we had rather have it from you: tho I have enquired of those you direct us to & heard them, with a great deal of pleasure; but we desire to hear this Argument continued by you, who treat of it after a very different manner.

Scævola. What then would you have said, Fannius, had you been present in Scipio's gardens, when he discoursed concerning the Common wealth, How did he plead the cause of justice against the study'd & artificial Oration of Philus!

Fannius That indeed was easy, for so just a man, to defend Justice.

Scævola Therefore is it not as easy for him who has gain'd the greatest Reputation, for steadily & religiously discharging all the Duty's of Friendship,

to explain to us his thoughts upon that Argument.

Chapter 7

Lalius This is indeed putting a force upon me. but it matters not which way you prevail, either by commendation, or Intreaty; for prevailed you have. nor is it easy or reasonable, to deny the request of so near a Relation, & especially upon so good an occasion. To proceed therefore in my thoughts upon this subject, I have often considered whether Friendship was sought by us upon the account of our weakness, or want, that we might give, & return mutual kindnesses & assistance to one another, or whether these are only the consequences of it, & the thing itself arose from some more noble & honourable cause founded in human Nature; & indeed Love, is the first and Principle motive that engages men in Friendship. For we reap advantages from those, to whom we make

our court, & pay our devoirs with this design and without any real Respect: But in Friendship there is nothing feign'd, nothing pretended, tis all sincere, & voluntary. Wherefore it seems to me that Friendship proceeds rather from Nature, than from any sense of want, & rises from some similar Inclination that Friends perceive in one another, than from any consideration of Interest: Something of this kind we may observe, even among brutes: who for a certain time shew a strange affection for their young & have such returns of affection from them, which may easily be discern'd. This is still more evident in mankind. First from that affection that is seen between children & Parents, which can never be dispel'd without the Imputation of an horrid crime. Secondly when a mutual sense of Love arises, between two that meet together, whose manners & Natures are alike: so that they seem to be struck as it were with a light, that shines forth from each other's

Probity & Vertue. For nothing is more amiable, and attracting than Vertue: which we regard, and even love, in the Character of those we never saw. For who that hears or reads the Actions of Fabricius & Curius can forbear pursuing their memory with kindness, as well as admiration? Who again can hear the History of Tarquinius Proud, Cassius, or Mælius, without detesting their persons, as well as their Characters? There were two Generals, Pyrrhus, & Hannibal, who disputed with us the Soveraignty of Italy. of the former, because of his honour & Integrity, we can think favourably & without aversion: the latter, because of his cruelty, we can never look back upon without the utmost abhorrence.

Chapter 8.

Now if such be the force of Vertue, that we

must love it even in those, we never saw, nay, which is more, in an enemy: what wonderful it, that the minds of men are sensibly affected, when they perceive vertue & goodness in those, with whom they are us'd to converse: Though Kindness is improv'd, by an intercourse of good offices, by frequent conversation, and by evidently perceiving a desire of obliging. Tho I say from this experience the first motives of our mind towards Love, & affection are much increased, & raised to the most exalted degree of Friendship: which if any one derives only from a Principle of gaining what we desire, he leaves nothing generous in it, and traces it from a very mean Original. were it so, the more a man thought he wanted, the better qualified would he be to engage in Friendship. which is far otherwise for the more a man confides in himself, & more

vertue, & wisdom he has to support himself without the Assistance of others, & makes his happiness consist in those things which are within his own power: the more he generally exceeds others in a desire of contracting, & cultivating Friendships.

Had Africanus any want of me: none in the least. Nor indeed had I any of him: but I was struck with an admiration of his vertue, & he, perhaps having some opinion of my Integrity, lov'd me; and our kindness was improved by longer acquaintance. And tho from hence many, and great advantages accrued to both of us, yet the beginning of our Friendship did not in the least arise from any such hopes. For as we are liberal, & generous, not that we may exact returns of gratitude (For we do not put our good offices to Interest) but our natural Inclination leads us

to Liberality: So we acquire Friend=
=ship, not with any view of advantage,
but because that very Love with which we
feel our minds affected is the most delightful
fruit that Friendship can yeild us.

These Notions are very different
from theirs, who like Brutes place all their hap=
=pines in pleasure, for they who have degraded
their reason, & made it stoop to such mean, &
contemptible Gratifications, can never relish,
or aim at any thing that is truly noble, sub=
lime, & heavenly. Wherefore let us have nothing
to do with such voluptuaries in this discourse:
T'is enough that we ourselves can apprehend,
that we have a Natural sense of kindness,
& affection, arising from the appearance of
Probity. Where these are discerni'd, we make
a closer application, & advance nearer to one
another, that we may enjoy the conversation

and good qualities of him, whom we have be=
=gun to like; that we may be upon the same
foot of kindness, & respect, still more inclin'd
& ready to do favours or services than to receive
them. Let this be the honourable strife between
Friends, and this will be a proof that Friend=
=ship is not only attended with the greatest
advantages, but that it has its rise from Na=
=ture, & is founded upon a truer & surer Principle,
than can possibly proceed from human weak=
=ness. For if Interest alone was the cement of
Friendships, as that changes it must of
course dissolve them: But as Nature is unchan=
=geable, & always the same, so true Friendship
is constant & perpetual. This I take to be the
Origin of Friendship: & have done un=
less you desire me to proceed further.

Fannius By all means, Lælius, go
on, for I think I have a right to answer for my

Junior Scævola.

Scævola. Right Sir: therefore let us hear it.

Chapter 9.

Lælius Hear then if you please, my Worthy Friends, what has often pass'd between me, and Scipio in our discourse about Friendship. tho' he us'd to say that nothing in life carry'd a greater appearance of difficulty in it, than the preserving Friendship entire to the end of Life: because, it must often happen that the same thing may not be expedient to both, or that they may differ in their opinion concerning publick affairs: besides that ye manners & tempers of men change either by misfortunes or old age & he show'd us by familiar Instances, how early

in Life this inconstancy of humour discovered itself: so that the greatest fondness between children is often dropt when they are boys: nay if they carry it on till they are farther advanced in Life, & grow up to be youths, it is often broke off when they become rivals on account of the same mistress, or if farther still it is very often lost if they come to be competitors for the same preferment. For there is nothing more destructive of Friendship, than what we see in most men an immoderate desire of wealth, & what we see in the best men Ambition, & thirst after glory: from whence the greatest animosities have arisen between the dearest Friends, often too great dissentions have arose, & indeed upon just grounds, when something has been required of a Friend, which was not honourable: as to be assisting in a Lewd, or injust action: which if he refuses, (tho he does it very honestly) yet by those who require his complyance, he will

be traduced as one that has violated the laws of Friendship: but they, who dare upon such an account demand the assistance of a Friend, profess by that very demand, that they would stick at nothing to oblige a Friend. Such Complaints as these must not only destroy the most established Friendship, but also produce the most lasting & mortal hatred. Scipio considering these, & many more fatal accidents, that might happen in Friendship, said, that to avoid all of them, a man must have a very extraordinary share not only of wisdom, but of good fortune too.

Chapter 10.

Wherefore first let us see, if you please, how far our regard to Friendship ought to carry us. supposing Coriolanus to

have had Friends, were they oblig'd to assist him in bearing arms against his Country? Ought Viscellinus, or Spurius Mælius, to have expected the help of their Friends in their ambitious designs of usurpation & Tyranny? We saw indeed Tiberius Gracchus, when he rais'd disturbances in the Common-wealth, deserted by grave Quintus Tubero, & the rest of his Friends of that sort. Caius Blosius of Cuma, well acquainted in your family, Scævola, when I was in council with Lænatus and Rupilius the Consuls, came to me, and desired me to intercede for his pardon, offering this cause for himself; that he had so great a regard for Tiberius Gracchus, as to think anything fit to be done that he desired. How says I? what if he had bid you set fire to the Capitol? He never would have desired

that: But what if he had? I would have obey'd him: What a profligate saying was this? yet the man did this, nay more: for he not only joyned in the rash enterprises of Gracchus, but was forward in them: not a follower only, but a leader in that sedition: Wherefore terrified at the inquisition that was made upon that affair, he madly fled into Asia; took refuge with a foreign enemy; but at last suffered the severe & just punishment, due to his crimes against ye Commonwealth. It is no excuse therefore for an ill action, to say you did it upon the account of your Friend. For since the opinion that one man has of another's vertue, has been laid down as the foundation of all Friendship; if Vertue once fails Friendship can hardly remain long. But if we lay this down for a right maxim, that we ought to comply

with the desire of our Friends, in every thing, & to expect the same complyance from them: This rule can never hold but between them who are perfectly wise & good. Of such as these we are not now speaking but of such as we converse with, or such as we have heard of or seen in Common Life. Out of this Number our examples are to be took, & chiefly from them who come nearest to perfect Wisdom. We have heard that Papus Æmilius and Caius Luscinus were great Friends, (so we have it from our Ancestors) that they were twice Consuls together, and twice Colleagues in the Censorship. It is said too, that Marcus Curius & Titus Coruncianus were very intimate Friends with them, & with one another. And we cannot so much as suspect, that any one of these could be capable of importuning a Friend, to engage in any thing, against honour, against an oath, or against the

publick good. But if we could suppose any one of them to have made such a request, it could not have been comply'd with by any of the rest, who were men of great Integrity; For the Complyance would have been altogether as scandalous, as the request.

Chapter 11

Let this then be an establish'd law in Friendship, that we never require base actions of our Friends, nor comply with them when they are required of us. for it is a pitiful Plea & never to be accepted in excuse for any crime, especially for a crime against the com=mon wealth, to say you did it for the sake of your Friend. For we are plaid, O Fannius, & Scævola, in such a station, that we ought

to look forward into the future state of the Com-
-mon wealth. Though it must be owned that in this
regard, we have deviated from that course, which
was markt out to us by our ancestors. Tiberius
Gracchus endeavoured to seize the Govern-
ment, and indeed he reigned a few months.
Nor was ever such an attempt before seen, or
heard of among the Roman People. His Friends
& Relations after his death pursued the same
measures, I cannot without tears relate, how they
us'd Scipio Nasica.

We bore indeed with the insolence
of Carbo, because of the punishment that
was so lately inflicted upon Tiberius Gracchus.
What we are to expect from the present Tri
=buneship of Caius Gracchus, I will not
so much as guess. Then the Spirit of Faction
grows, now it has once appear'd, it goes on more
violently, to the ruin of the Common=wealth.

You see what has been the consequence of that Law, by which the People have been allowed to give their votes privately. This was first brought up by Gabinius, & two years afterwards renew'd by Cassius. Methinks I already see the People separated from the Senate; & the greatest affairs decided by the opinion of the multitude. more men will learn, how to follow their examples, than to resist them. Why do I insist upon publick matters in such a discourse? as this? because no one would enter into such attempts without a prospect of being assisted by his Friends & acquaintance. Therefore good men must be forewarned, that if they unwarily fall into such acquaintances, they ought not to think, themselves under such obligations to a Friend, as not to leave him, when they find him engag'd in pernicious

designs against the Common-wealth: The Laws appoint severe punishments for such profligate men: nor a less to those, who follow, than to those who are the Leaders of sedition.

Who was ever more famous in Greece than Themistocles: who more Powerful: This great man after he had been General in the Persian War, and delivered Greece from Slavery, was driven into Banishment by those who envied his glory, He could not bear this Disgrace, & ungrate-ful treatment from his country, with that tem-per he ought to have done. He did the same, which our Coriolanus did about twenty years ago. they found that no one would as-sist them against their Country, and there-fore they laid violent hands upon themselves.

Wherefore all Combinations of wicked men, are not only not to be excused

under the pretensions of Friendship, but to be punished severely: that no one should think it justifiable to follow even his nearest Friend in a conspiracy against his Country, which case, according to the present appearance of things, may sometime or other happen. And I am as solliciteous for the future state of the Commen wealth after my Death, as for the present state of it in mine own days.

Chapter 12

Let this Law therefore of Friendship stand good; that we are to ask nothing but what is honourable of our Friends, nor do any thing contrary to that for the sake of our Friends: Nor let us wait till we are asked: and so far from demurring, as to

be always ready & pleas'd with any opportunity of obliging: Let us use openess & Freedom in giving advice; for this ought to have a weight a-mong Friends: and (if the matter requires it) do this not only freely, but smartly. Some, who are call'd wise men amongst the Greeks, please themselves with some strange Paradoxes. and what is it, that they will not prove by their subtle way of arguing: such as these, that too intimate Friendships are to be avoided, For why should one man be sollicitous for many: It is enough, & more than enough for every one to look after their own affairs: It is troublesome to be involved in the concerns of others: That it is convenient to let the Reins of Friendship hang loose: that you may hold them tight, or let them quite go, as you please. For Inward Tranquility is the main Source of all Happiness in Life;

which the mind can never enjoy, if one is to be in pain for many. There are others among these wise men (whose Principles I have touch'd upon already) who have still less humanity, & say that Friendships are to be sought, for our own safety, & Assistance, not out of any good will, or kindness, so that they who have less ability, and strength, of their own, are the best qualified to make Friendships. Hence it is, that Women want the support of Friend=ship, more than Men; the Poor, more than the Rich; and the Calamitous, more than the Fortunate. Excellent Philosophy indeed! it is taking the Sun out of the world, thus to take Friendship out of human Life: than which the Immortal Gods have given us nothing better, or more agreeable. For what is that boasted Tranquility of mind? indeed it has a fair app=earance, But in reality it is upon many occa=

=sions is to be rejected with Indignation & scorn. Nor is it reasonable, not to undertake, or to lay aside any honourable Design, or action, least it should give you trouble: For if you are resolv'd to quit all trouble, you must quit vertue too: For every well dispos'd Mind must be under some concern; when it hates & abhors the vices that are contrary to its own vertues; The good Man must be grieved at malice, the Temperate at Debau=chery, the Valiant at Cowardise, the righteous at injustice, the Modest at Lewdness.

Tis the Nature therefore of a well dispos'd mind, to be pleas'd with that that is good, & grieved at the contrary. Wherefore if Grief takes hold of a Wise Man (which it certainly does Unless we suppose him divested of all Hu=manity) what reason is there, why we should exclude all Friendship out of Human Life, least it should engage us in any Inconve=

niences or Difficultys? If the Affections of ye Mind were all taken away, what Difference would there be, I say, not between Men & Beasts, but even between Men & Stones, or Sticks, or any thing else of that kind? Nor are the People to be heard, that say that Vertue has a firmness, upon which no Impression can be made, whereas it is in many things, but especially in Friendship, tender & tractable, so that Men are elevated at the Prosperity, & dejected at the Adversity of their Friends. Therefore that Uneasiness of mind, which we must sometimes be under for a Friend, is not of that moment, as that Friendship should upon that account be discarded from Society, any more than that all Vertue should be laid aside because it sometimes brings us into troubles & Difficulties.

Chapter 13

But whereas I said before, any appearance

of vertue shines out, to which a mind of like Disposition applys & joyns itself, there Friendship is naturally contracted; And when that happens, Love & Affection must necessarily arise from it. For what is so absurd, as to be delighted with many vain things, such as Honour, Fame, fine houses, & ornaments of the Body, & not to be extreorely taken, with the amiable accomplishments of a vertuous mind, expressing an Inclination towards you, & desiring returns of the same kind from you?

For there is nothing more delightful, than to requite good will, & exchange good offices. And if we add that, which I think may rightly be added, there is nothing, that excites, or attracts Friendship so much, as a Similitude of manners; Let this be granted to be true, that Good People love those who are good, & adhere to them more closely than if they were ally'd to them by Nature, & Consanguinity.

Therefore, O Fannius & Scævola, (I think) this holds good that there is a were a necessary Intercourse of Benevolence between good men; which is the Original of Friendship instituted by Nature. But the same Principle of Goodness extends itself to great Numbers. For Vertue is never unsociable, selfish, or Proud: but ever dispos'd to universal kindness, & to consulting the common good of mankind; which it never would do, if it wanted a regard even to the lower degrees of men. Wherefore they who think, all Friendships to arise merely from Interest, seem to me to take away the most agreeable Tye of Friendship. For when we are the Better for a Friend, the advantage we gain by him does not please us so much, as his Kindness does: and then especially, what comes from a Friend, is delightful, when we perceive it comes from a kind Disposition;

towards us: & tis so far from being true, that Friendships are cultivated merely out of want, that they, who most abound in wealth, & most excel in vertue, & consequently have the least want of other mens services, are often the most Liberal, & Generous Friends, nor can I see, any reason after all why it may be not fit, or perhaps necessary in Friendship, that Friends should want the mutual Assistances of each other. For to what purpose had my studys & Industry been employd, if Sipio had never had any occasion for my advice, or assistance, either at Home in Council, or abroad in war? Therefore Friendships do not arise from advantages, but rather Advantages from Friendship.

Chapter 14

Therefore those men of Pleasure are

not to be regarded, when they discourse upon Friendship, which they know nothing of either by reason, or experience. For who (by all that's good & venerable) would desire to overflow in Plenty, & enjoy the greatest Luxurys of Life, without loving any one, or being belov'd. This is the Life that Tyrants lead; in which there is no trust, no affection, no confidence in any mutual kindness. There is nothing but Doubts & suspicions: no ground for Friendship. for who can love him, whom he fears: or him by whom he thinks himself to be fear'd: for a while a dissembled respect is paid to them: but if they should fall, (as generally they do) then they are sure to find out how few real Friends they have. 'Tis reported that Tarquin said after his being dethron'd, that till then he never knew, which were his sincere Friends, & which not, when he could no longer serve either of one or the other: tho't is no wonder, that with such pride & ill treatment he never could have had any. And

as the ill qualities of this man I am speaking of could never procure any sincere Friends, so the wealth of many powerful men must exclude true Friendships. For Fortune is not only blind herself, but makes her favourites blind also, for which reason they are puff'd up with arrogance, & Pride: Nor can any thing be more intolerable than a fortunate fool. And we very often may see, that men, who before seem'd to be good humour'd, & friendly, are chang'd by being in Power, & Prosperity, so that they begin to despise their old acquaintance, & are fond of getting others.

But what can be more foolish, than for men who abound in Plenty, Power, & Riches, to be eager in furnishing themselves with things, that money can supply, with Horses, servants, fine cloaths, & Plate: & in the mean time to neglect procuring FRIENDS, the best & most ornamental Furniture of Life: For when they get other things, they know not, who they get them for, or for whom they labour: for those things are his, who happens

to be strongest: But Friends are always certain, & lasting: So that, if all those things which are Fortunes gifts, should remain, yet a Life destitute of Friends can never be pleasant, & agreeable. But enough of this.

Chapter. 15

Now we are to determine, how far the Bounds of Friendship reach: concerning which I find three Opinions; tho I do not approve any one of them: The first is, that we should have the same love for our Friends, that we have for ourselves: Another is, that our Love to our Friends should exactly answer their Love of us: The third, that we should value our Friends at the same rate, that they value themselves. I cannot wholly agree with any one of these 3 positions. Nor is the first of them true, that a Man should love

his Friend in the same degree, that he loves himself. For how many things, which a man would never upon his own account, does he for the sake of his Friends: as to ask a favour of one for whom he has no esteem, & even to sollicit him: to inveigh against one that injures a Friend with warmth & vehemence: which he cannot honourably do in his own cause, but may very honourable in the cause of a Friend: Nay there are many things, in which we decline our own advantage, in order to serve our Friends. The second position is, that which limits the Duty of Friendship to an equality of good Offices. This is too little, & mean, to make as it were a calculation of good offices, & too nicely ballance the account of Debtor, & Creditor. There seems to me, to be something more generous, & overflowing in true Friendship, than strictly to observe,

that we give no more, than we receive. Nor need we fear, least anything should fall to the ground, & be lost, or least we should heap too much kindness upon a Friend. But the last Determination is the worst of the three, that a man should require to be valued by his Friend, in the same degree that he values him=self. For some People may be too humble, & have a meaner Opinion of themselves, than they deserve, & upon this account may entertain no hopes of advancing their Fortune. A Friend therefore ought not to look upon such an one, in the same light, that he looks upon himself: but rather to stir him up, to raise his spirits, & inspire him with greater hopes, & better thoughts of himself.

Therefore I shall determine the Bounds of Friendship in another manner, after I have told you an opinion, against which Scipio

was wont vehemently to inveigh. For he often said that nothing could be insinuated more opp=osite to the Nature of true Friendship, than the reserve of him, who laid down this rule, So Love your Friend, as if a Time might come when you are to hate him. The Good Man could not bring himself to think, that this was, as it was said to be, a position of the wise Bias, one of the Seven, but rather some profligate & ambitious wretch, who had nothing in view but his own Interest & Power. For how can a Man be a Friend to any one, to whom he thinks he can ever possibly be an Enemy. Were this the Case we should desire, & wish, that a Friend might often be in fault, to the End that we might the oftner have an occasion to find fault with him: & we should be moved with Grief & Envy, at every good Action of a Friend, & all the Success that happened to him. Wherefore

this Rule, whosoever it be, is destructive of all Friendship. The Rule to have been laid down ought rather to be this, that we should use that Care & Caution in the Choice of our Friends, that we should never begin to love one, whom we could ever think it possible to hate. Moreover, if we should be unfortunate in choos=ing Friends, Scipio thought it was better to bear with this, than to think of a time when some breach might happen.

Chapter 16.

Therefore I think we ought to determine thus, that, when Friends are in the main satisfied of one another's honour, & Integrity, then there should be between them

an entire Communication of Councils, of Designs & of every thing else: & if ever it should so happen, that they desire your Assistance in a case that cannot perfectly be justified, where their Life, or Reputation are concerned provided you do nothing that is base & unjust, you ought not to decline serving them. For Allowance will be made for Friendship, as far as you can preserve your own Reputation. But to return to Scipio, (to whom all this Discourse upon Friendship is owing) he often complain'd, that men were generally more diligent in other affairs; that every one could tell, how many goats, or Sheep he had: but not how many Friends: that they take great Care in providing those things, but are negligent in the Choice of their Friends: and that they are not so inquisitive after those marks, & signs by which they may

distinguish those who are fit for Friend=
=ship. We ought to choose such as are firmly
establish'd in Virtue, & good Principles: of whom
it must be own'd there is great Scarcity: and if
we have not a great deal of experience, it is hard
to make a right Judgment, yet we must learn
our experience in Friendship itself. So
Friendship has the start of our Judgment,
& prevents our Experience. Therefore a Prudent
Man will keep a tight rein upon his Inclination
to Benevolence: & try before he goes too far the
temper of his Friends, and will use them, as
he does horses, that he has tryd.

Some, in a little affair of money
are found to be wavering: Some, who comply in
a little matter, discover themselves in a greater;
but if there be any found, who think it mean
to value Money above Friendship, yet where
shall we find those, who will not prefer

Honours, Magistracys, Commands, & Power to it? so that if these are proposed on one side, & the right of Friendship on the other, their choice would not soon be determined. For Nature is very weak in resisting the temp=
=tations of power: which if they can arrive at by a breach of Friendship, they think the Importance of the Cause, for which for which they did it, will sufficiently skreen them. There=
=fore true Friendships are seldom to be found among those, who are pursuing the honours and Employments of the Common-wealth. for where will you find the man, who prefers his Friends advancement to his own? But to omit these, how grievous, how hazardous does it seem to most men, to take their shares in ye Calamities of their Friends? tho' Ennius rightly observes: that a true Friend is seen in doubtful

Circumstances: yet upon these two accounts, the Levity, and Infirmity of most men may be discovered: either that in their own prosperity they contemn a Friend, or leave him in his Adversity.

Chapter 17

Whosoever therefore in both these Circumstances remains constant, and steady in Friendship, we ought to think him above the common rank of mankind, and approaching to the Divine Nature. The Foundation of that Firmness, & Constancy which we look for in Friendship, is Faithfulness. For nothing can be stedfast, that is faithless. besides it is necessary to choose one, of a simple, ingenuous, & benevolent temper, and one that has Inclinations

suitable to our own: which all contribute to Fidelity. For a various, & fickle Disposition, is incapable of Fidelity: nor can he, who is not affected with the same things, that you are, and does not agree with you in the same mutual Sentiments, be either faithful, or steady. We may add this, that he should not be apt to raise suspicious Reflections, nor to beleive them when raised by others: which all belong to the thing, I have just now been speaking of, Constancy. Therefore that Position, which I laid down at first, must be true, that Friendship cannot subsist, but between Good Men.

It is the part of a good man (and I may say of a wise man) to observe these two things in Friendship: first, that he does nothing that carries with it either Falshood, or Dissimulation: for it is more ingenuous openly to declare Hatred, than to pretend Love: And

Men ought not only to reject all insinuations of others against his Friend, but to be free from all suspicion of imagining any violation of Faith: to this we may add an agreeableness of temper, & Conversation, which gives no little relish to Friendship. A Seriousness, & Severity upon all occasions, may argue a grave & honest disposition: But Friendship ought to be more open, free, and obliging, and more inclined to Easiness, & Complaisance.

Chapter 18

But here arises a question which some have thought difficult to resolve: whether or no new Friends, worthy of Friendship, should be preferd, as young horses are,

to those who have been long in service, this is a Doubt unworthy of a good man, for there ought not to be that satiety in Friendship, which is usual in other things, for other things (as well as wine) ought to relish the better upon the account of their being old; for there is a great deal of truth in ye Proverb, that the Love between Friends is never well confirmed, till they have eat many pecks of Salt together. New Acquaintances, if like thriving Plants, they give us hopes of Fruit, are not to be disregarded; But old Acquaintances must still keep their first rank, for what we have been long us'd to, has a natural force upon our minds. For even in a horse, which I just before mentioned, if there is no exception, there is none, but would rather chuse one he has been us'd to, than one that is new & untry'd. This Use & Custom takes place, not only in living, but in animate Creatures:

as when we are delighted in places, where we have spent much time, even tho' they happen to be wild, & montainous.

But it is of the greatest moment in Friendship, that the Superiour should put himself upon a level with the Inferiour. for there often happens a great superiority, such as was that of SCIPIO among us (whom I may call his herd of Friends. he never thought himself above Philus, Rupilius, nor Mummius, or other Friends far below him in Quality or merit. especialy to his Brother Maximus, a worthy man indeed, but by no means his equal, he paid a regard as to a superiour, upon account of his being the Elder; and he made it his endeavour that all his Friends should advance in their Character by his means. an example, that all ought to imi=tate: so that if one has arrived to a greatness

of understanding, or virtue, or fortune, he should share, & communicate these advantages with his Friends: who if they happen to be meanly born, if they have no relations to assist them, he should by his Power, & Fortune, encrease their wealth, and raise them in dignity & Honour: As we see in fabulous historys, that they who have lived some time in mean services, & have not known from what race they sprung, when afterwards they are discovered, to be the Children of some Prince, or God, they still retain their Affections to those poor Shepards, whom for so many years they had taken to be their Parents. wch ought much more to be kept up to our true, and known Parents. For we then most enjoy the fruits of good sense, and virtue, and advancement, when we bestow them upon those that are dear to us.

Chapter 19

As I have said that they who are superiour in the Alliance of Friendship, ought to put themselves upon a level with their Inferiours; so Inferiours ought not to grieve, that they are excell'd by their Friends, either in understanding, Fortune, or Dignity. 'Tis not unusual among the Common sort of People to complain of, and even to upbraid one another: and especially, if they think they can say, that at the expence of some trouble and Labour to themselves, they have done any kind or obliging services. An odious sort of men these, who can upbraid with their good offices: which he indeed, to whom they are done, ought ever gratefuly to remember, but he who does them should never mention.

Therefore as the superiour should a little submit himself; so he should endeavour to raise his inferiour, as near as he can to his own Level.

There are some People, who render Friendship troublesome, by thinking themselves neglected or despised: which does not very often happen, but to them, who have mean thoughts of their own Abilities: and these we ought by our actions, as well as our discourse, to support, & raise up into a better opinion of them=selves. As to the measure, in which you ought to distribute your kindnesses, you must consider, first, how much it is in your power to do for any one, and secondly how much the Character of him, whom you would oblige, can bear: for you cannot, be your power never so great, advance all your Friends to the highest honours: Scipio was able to prefer Rutilius to the Consulship, but not his brother Lucius. But were it in your power

to confer what you pleas'd upon another, you must still consider, what he can sustain with credit: We can make no right judgment of those, with whom we would enter into a thorough Friendship, till our understandings are ripened, and confirm'd by years; nor should we think ourselves oblig'd, to preserve an intimacy with those, whom we lov'd while we were young, because they were our companions in the same sports & exercises, with which we were then pleas'd. For at this rate our Nurse, & first instructors will have the first claim to our Friendship: These indeed ~~are not~~ to be neglected, but our regard to them is to be shown in another way. Unless this rule is observ'd, there can be no such thing as a true & lasting Friendship, which can never consist with different Principles, manners, & Inclinations: And it is upon this account, that there can be no Friendship between good & ill men.

It may not be improper here to add this caution, that we do not through an impetuous and injudicious Zeal for our Friend (which has often happened) hinder his success in that very advantage we are so over sollicitous to procure, for as the Poetical Fable says) Neoptolemus had never taken Troy, if he had hearkened to Lycomedes, with whom he was bred, who with many entreaties & tears, would have hindered him from going on that expedition. There often happen affairs of Importance, that call a man away from a Friend; and whosoever importunes him to stay, because he cannot bear the Absence of his Friend, shews himself to be of too soft & weak a Nature, and for that reason incapable of being just in his Friendship. For tis to be considered upon every occasion, what you require of your Friend, and what you will allow him to require of you.

Chapter 20.

There happens sometimes an unfortunate, but unavoidable necessity, of breaking off Friendship; I mean common Friendship; not, such as Philosophers talk of, among Wise Men, whose manners admit of no change. The Vices of men very often break out, sometimes even against the very Friends, sometimes against others, in so ill a manner, that we cannot preserve an Intimacy with them, without scandal to ourselves. In such a case, we must retreat from them by degrees, and (as I have heard Cato express himself) gently unsew, & not abruptly rend our Alliance. Unless some flagrant offence be given, so that we cannot consistently with Vertue, & Honour, avoid an immediate breach.

But if some extraordinary change

happens (as sometimes it does) in their manners & dispositions, or in the different Interests they take in State Affairs & Parties we must take care that while we drop our Friendship we do not appear to act with Enmity against them. for nothing is more unbecoming than to be in a state of war, against one with whom you have lived familiarly. Scipio (as you well know) withdrew himself from the Friendship of Quintus Pompeius, upon my account; so likewise he was alienated from that of my colleague Metellus, because of the disagreement between them, in matters relating to the common wealth. In both these cases, he behaved himself with his usual Gravity & Authority, & with a resentment, free from all Passion & Bitterness. In the first place then, we ought to prevent a Rupture, (if it be possible) but if that be unavoidable, our Friendship must seem to expire gently, & not be violently smothered. We are to take care, that our Friendship be not turned into

inveterate Hatred; from whence reproaches, Invectives, and Calumnys must arise; nevertheless if these are tolerable, we must bear with them, we must pay this respect in old Friendship, & be the fault his, who does the Injury not his who suffers it.

To prevent these ruffles, and Inconveniences, we should be forearmd with this Caution, not to enter into these engagements either too hastily, or with those of whose worth we are not fully satisfied; those alone are worthy of our Friendship, in whom we discern some intrinsick merit, that moves our Affection; such as these are very scarce, (as all things of value are) nor is there anything more difficult, than to find out, what is every way perfect in its kind. But most Men know no other good in anything, but the advantage it may bring to themselves; & choose Friends, (as they do cattle) that are likely to be most serviceable to them, so that they want that noble and genuine sense of Friendship, which renders it

desirable upon its own account, and for its own sake alone: nor are they able to set before them-selves their own example, which might teach them of what Nature, & how great the Force of Friend-ship is. For every one loves himself, not for the sake of any advantage he expects from such an Affection, but merely because he is dear to himself. and unless we transfer this sort of Love to Friendship, we shall never find a true Friend, for that must be one, that is our other self.

If this appears in Beasts, Birds, & all other Creatures, either wild or tame first that they love themselves (for that is equally natural to all animals) then, that they require, and look after other animals of their own Species, with no less desire, and application, than mankind does; how much more must the Nature of man, who loves himself, and wants a companion, lookout for

one, with whom he may communicate all the thoughts of his soul, and with whom he may joyn himself almost in a personal union.

Chapter 21.

But we are generally so reasonable, not to say insolent, as to expect our Friends should be such, as we ourselves are not; and to desire that from them, for which we take no care to make suitable Returns. Whereas we ought in the first place, to take care to render ourselves as good & perfect, as possible, and then look out for another like ourselves. It is between such men as these, that the steady Friendship, we have before mentioned, must subsist. Men united by the same benevolent Disposition, who have subdued those Passions, to which others are slaves: such as

these will be always pleased with what is just, & equitable, & serve one another to the utmost upon all occasions; since neither would require from the other, what is inconsistent with reason, & honour. Nor will they only love, and respect, but stand in awe of one another. They who banish this sort of reverence between Friends, take away the greatest ornament of Friendship. For it is a most pernicious Error in those, who think that Friendship gives a licence to all Freedom, & loosenes; whereas Nature designed it as an Assistant of Virtue, not an encourager of Vice; so that sociable & confederate Virtues, may arrive to those Heights, to which Solitary Virtue could never arise: Among whom this Confederacy is, or has been, or shall be, there will be found the best, & happiest State, that Human Nature can arrive at. This, I say, is a society, in which all, that men can think desirable, may be enjoyed, Honour, Reputation, Ease & pleasure of Mind: in these, and these only, the Happiness of Life

consists, & since Happiness is the cheif & sovereign good of Man, if we aim at that, we must make Virtue our Study; without which neither Friendship, nor any thing else truly desirable, can be attain'd. And whoever neglects this, & thinks he has Friends without it, will find himself greatly mistaken, when any misfortune happens to him, that obliges him to make a tryal of them. Therefore, (as I have often said) it concerns us to judge carefully, before we love anyone; not to love him first, and make judgment of him afterwards: for as in all affairs we suffer by Negligence, so in nothing more than in the Choice, and preference of Friends. We shall pay for this preposterous way of acting, when we are thus engag'd, where good offices will not be answered, but some offense arise, which will break of our Friendship in the middle of its Course.

Chapter 22.

For this Reason our

Negligence in a matter of the greatest Importance, will be the more inexcusable. Indeed the Value & advantage of true Friendship, is what all men with one consent allow. But many ridicule the Notion of Virtue, & would have it thought to be nothing but Pretence, & Ostentation. Many despise Riches, & contented with a little, please themselves with a slender Diet, & a very moderate Competency. Nay honour, which so much inflames the Desires of ambitious Men, how many are there who despise it to such a Degree, as to think nothing more empty, or despicable! The same may be said of other things, which some admire & pursue, and others esteem of no value. But of Friendship all have the same sentiments, both they, who apply themselves to State Affairs, & they, who please themselves in the Studys of Knowledge, & Learning; & they who retire, & employ themselves only in their own private Affairs: Nay they, who give themselves up entirely to Pleasure, and

Luxury will own there can be no true enjoyment of Life without Friendship. This Inclination to Friendship is so universal, that it insinuates itself into every State & every Age of Man. If any one be born with so rough, & inhuman a temper, that he shuns & hates all Correspondence, & conversation with mankind, as one Timon of Athens is said to have done, yet he cannot forbear, looking out somebody, in whose Company he may give a vent to his Spleen & Venom.

This we might easily be convinced of, if any such thing could happen, that some God shaid take us away from all human Society & place us in some solitude, where he supplys us in great abundance with all those things, that our Natural Appetites require, but took away from us all possibility of human conversation. whose constitution could bear such a Life as this, or enjoy any other sensual Gratifications, under such a Restraint.

Very true therefore was that saying, which Archytas of Tarentum often us'd, & which I have heard related from old men, who had it from old men in their time, that could any one ascend into Heaven, and be acquainted with the Nature of ye whole world, & the beauty of every Star in the firmament, such a contemplation would be insipid to him were he alone, whereas had he any one to whom he might communicate his Thoughts to, it would be most delightful. For Nature itself abhors solitude, and every part of it inclines to be supported, & to court the Alliance of another, & the more suitable & kindly that Alliance is, the better every thing thrives.

Chapter 23.

But when the same Nature declares by many signs, what she wants, and requires,

yet we continue, I know not how, deaf to her voice, and will not hearken to any of her Admonitions. There are many advantages in Friendship, and there may arise some jealousies & distrusts, which a wise man will endeavour to avoid, or to slight, or, if it must be so, to bear. There is one thing which is apt to give offence, and yet neither sincerity, nor faithfulness in Friendship, can be preserv'd without it. I mean a Freedom of advising, for it is often our duty to admonish, & sometimes gently to reprove a Friend; & this ought to be taken, as it is meant, very kindly; yet I must confess, that what my Friend Terence says in his Andria, is generally true:

"Complaisance gains Friendship,
"& truth hatred.

It is with some regret that

a man speaks Truth, when the Consequence of it must be resentment, which is the poison of Friendship. But Flattery is much worse, which giving indulgence to all faults, lets your Friend run headlong into ruin. It is a very great Fault in him, who both despises truth, & who is deceived by Flattery. We are to use Diligence, & Discretion in all things: first, that our advice be without sharpness, & our rebuke without reproach: Therefore Complaisance (for I will use Terence's word) must be obliging without flattery, which is the promoter of vice; and so unworthy of a Friend, that it does not become a Gentleman. To live with a Tyrant, is far different from living with a Friend. He whose Ears are so shut to truth, that he will not hear it from a Friend, his recovery is desperate. It is a quaint saying of Cato's,

as many of his are; that men are more obliged to their sharpest enemys, than to Friends that are always complaisant; for those often speak truth, but these never: & that it is very absurd, that they, who are advised, have none of that concern, they ought to have upon such an occasion; but have only that resentment, from which they ought to be free, for they are not grieved for their fault, but merely for the Reproof: which ought to be quite contrary, to grieve at the fault, but rejoyce at the Correction.

Chapter 24.

Therefore as it is the Duty of True Friendship, to advise, & to be advised: to do the first freely, but not

roughly; & to bear the other patiently, not resentingly: so it ought to be thought, that there is not a greater plague in Friendship, than Flattery. For this Vice of light & deceitful men, & such as speak rather things that please them, than things that are true, is upon many accounts to be blamed; since all Dissimulation is blameable, (as it corrupts & adulterates truth) so it is utterly repugnant to Friendship. as it takes away all Sincerity, without which Friendship can never subsist. For, since the strength of Friendship is founded upon this, that two several minds are as it were united in one; how can this possibly be, when there is not in one of them so much as one, & the same mind; but a mind uncertain, changeable, & various? For what can be so flexible, &

full of turns, as the mind of him, who is governed not only by the opinion, & will but even by the countenance & nod of another?

"Do they deny a thing? I deny it: do "they affirm it? I affirm it also. In fine I "have prevail'd with my self to comply with "every thing:

Though* he say it in the person of Gnatho the Parasite: Do admit such as these for Friends, is mere vanity. There are indeed many Gnatho's in the world, of a superiour Rank, fortune, & Reputation; The Complaisance of these is very uneasily born; because it is mixt with some Authority from their Character. For we may distinguish a complaisant from a true Friend, if we apply the same Diligence, that we use to discover other counterfeited wares.

* Terence

An Audience, consisting of very unskilful Persons, yet are able to judge, what difference there is between a flattering, trifling speaker, that affects Popularity, & one who argues gravely, seriously, & in good earnest. With what art & flattery did Caius Papirius insinuate himself into the minds of the Assembly, when he brought in a Law for continuing the Tribunes of the People? I was against it. I say no more of myself: but I may be allow'd to speak more at large of Scipio. Good Gods! what Gravity, & what Majesty was there in his Oration that Day! you must have thought him not a fellow citizen, but a Governour among the Roman People. But you were present, & the Oration is extant. You saw how a very Popular Law was rejected even by the votes of the very People themselves. But (to return to my self) you remember, when

in the Consulship of Quintus Maximus Scipio's Brother & Lucius Mancinus, with what favour & applause the Law of Caius Licinius Crassus concerning the Popular Election of the Priesthood was recieved; by which Law the Power of choosing was transferd from the Sacerdotal Colleges to the People. And he was the first who in speaking before the People turnd his face towards them, & not towards the Senators. yet the Religion of the Immortal Gods, by my poor defence of it, easily got the better of his mercenary Oration, & that was done whilst I was Praetor, five years, before I was made Consul. Therefore that cause prevailed, more by its own weight, & truth, than by any Authority in him that defended it.

Chapter 25

But if in a Scene, where great Scope is allow'd for fable, & fiction, yet truth, when it is discovered in the Catastrophe, exceedingly prevails & pleases us: What shall we say of it in Friendship, which is wholly founded upon truth: in which unless you see another's Breast open, & freely open your own, you can find nothing to rely upon: you can neither love, nor be loved, where there is no mutual Perception of Sincerity. As for flattery, that can hurt no body, but him who receives it

greedily, & with Pleasure: it commonly happens, that his ears are mostly open to flatterers, who is apt to flatter & to admire himself. Virtue is a lover of itself: for it knows itself best, & understands, how amiable it is. But I do not speak of Virtue itself, but the opinion of it. For not near so many People are really endew'd with Virtue, as are willing to be thought so. Flattery Delights these: when they are addressed to in a manner that pleases them, they imagine that empty applause to be an ample testimony of their Praise. Therefore this can be no Friendship, when one will not endure to hear truth, & the other is always ready with false colours. Nor would the Flattery of the Parasites in Comedies delight us, were it not for

vain glorious Thraso's.

* "And does Thais indeed return "me so great thanks? Terence's Eunuch

'Twas enough for the Parasite to answer, Great one's Sir: But he says,

"Exceeding Great Sir.

A Flatterer always encreases that, which he, to whom he speaks, would have appear great. Wherefore, although that vain flattery, prevails with those, who themselves entice, & invite it, yet those of a more grave, & steady mind are to be advised, that they be upon their guard, least they be caught by a skilful Flatterer. For nobody is moved by an open flatterer, unless it be one who is very insensible. But he that can do it

slyly, & dexterously, if we are not very cautious, will insinuate himself into our good liking, nor is he easily discovered; for when he seems to contradict us he may flatter us most: while he pretends to dispute, & at last yeilds up the Point, & suffers himself to be overcome in the Argument, so that he who is impos'd upon, may appear to be the more knowing. Now what is more shameful, than to be impos'd upon? To prevent which, there must be great care taken, as Cæcilius says in his Comedy call'd Epicleros:

"To Day thou hast chous'd & play'd upon
"me, beyond all the foolish Old Men
"that are represented in Comedy.

You see even in Plays that of a credulous

& unguarded old Man, is the most foolish Character that can be brought upon the Stage. But I know not how, my Discourse has wander'd from the perfect Friendships of Wise men, to those that are Common & Vulgar.

Chapter 26.

Let us return then to our proper Subject, & hasten to a Conclusion. Virtue, Caius Fannius, & Quintus Mucius, Virtue, I say, gains, & preserves Friendship. For in that there is an united harmony, in that alone there is

firmness & Constancy, which Excellencies, when they arise, & shew their Brightness, and see their own Similitude in another Object, they move towards it, & mix with it; & from hence that flame is kindled, which we call, Love, or Friendship: For to Love is to have an Affection for another, not with any view to Interest & Advantage, though these too, even without ever being propos'd, arise out of Friendship. I, while I was yet young, found these fruits of friendly Affection from Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus, Publius Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, who was Scipio's Father in Law; & this shines out more among equals, as between me, and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, & Spurius Mumonius. On the other side, now I am an old man, I have a pleasure in your Love, Young Gentlemen,

& in Quintus Tubero's; as I have also, in that of Publius Rutilius, & Aulus Virginius, who are still younger than you. And Because such is the Course of Nature, & of human Life, that if we live many years, we must see a new generation spring up; It is, I own, most desirable, to live amongst our Equals, & to go on with those, together with whom we first set out, even to the end of our Race."

But as Human affairs change & fail, we must still look out for such, whom we may love, & by whom we may be belov'd, For when once all mutual kindness, & benevolence ceases, all the Pleasure of Life is at an End.

My Friend Scipio indeed,

was suddenly snatcht from me, but he still lives, & always will live in my heart: for I lov'd the good man's virtues, which can never dye; which are still present (as it were) before mine eyes, & not before mine only, but they will live & shine to all posterity. No one will attempt any glorious Enterprize, with hope or Courage, without setting the Image of that great man before his mind.

Among all those Blessings, that Fortune or Nature, had bestow'd upon me, there is none, upon which I set so true a value, as I do upon my Friendship with Scipio. In this was founded all that unanimity with which we pursued the publick Good, all that Freedom of consulting one another upon our private Concerns; & all the Ease & pleasure we enjoy'd in our Retirement.

For I never was sensible that I ever offended him in any thing, nor did I ever hear any thing from him, which I was unwilling to hear. We had one house, one table: we were together not only in the war, but in our travels, & our rural Seats. What shall I say of our Studys & our Improvements in Knowledge, upon which when we sometimes retired from the world we employ'd all our leisure time? If the memory of these things had been lost with him, I could never have been able to bear a Separation, from so dear, and Intimate a Friend. But neither are they extinct, but they are so far from being lost, that they are rather nourished, and increased by thought, & Reflection: And were I deprived of these, the only comfort remaining to me, would be my old age: which would prevent any long continuance of my sorrow: & all short calamities

though very grievous ought to be tolerable.

This is what I had to say upon Friendship; do you, young men, so pursue Virtue, without which there can be no Friendship, as to think that there is nothing in Life, except Virtue, so valuable as Friendship.

Finis

113 (permitts.)

A. a.

From Mrs. Chisholm
Parbroide
Worthing.