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I AM

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BY

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TO JAMES WARD

"Feeling, though never a complete state of consciousness, is the most central one, as Kant came at long last to recognize."

"Kant's own supreme principle is the centrality of the appercipient self."

(*A Study of Kant*, by James Ward, pp. 90, 172).

CONTENTS

THE ARGUMENT

We all of us *appear* to ourselves and to our fellows as living material organisms of body, brain and thought existing as objects in Space-Time and coming into existence in Space-Time at birth while going out of existence on death. We *appear* to ourselves and our fellows as impermanent, for each one of us, in appearance, changes in bodily form from childhood to age between the times of birth and death. We *know* all this, and some hold that man is no more than what he appears to be, that is, an impermanent object in Space-Time.

But we know, also, that to carry on our normal lives we must regard ourselves and our fellows *as if* they were permanent. You exist in the form of a living organism when you write a letter to a friend who also exists in the form of a living organism when he receives the letter. But from the time when you began to write up to the time when your friend receives the letter you both have changed in material form. As living organisms you are both impermanent. But you are quite sure that you remain the same self and he remains the same self, in spite of the passage of time, which has changed your forms as living organisms. You regard yourself and your friend as permanent. Why is this?

It is because we *feel* ourselves as permanent in the midst of all our changes of body, brain and thought. Alexander, in his *Space, Time and Deity*, holds that we enjoy ourselves as permanent in the midst of all our changes. We *feel* ourselves as *I AM*.[1] We do not speak of ourselves as living material organisms of body, brain and thought; we speak of *my* body, *my* brain, *my* thought. It is *I* who make body, brain and thought (correlated to the motion of the brain) effective, as Alexander recognises, by using them as *my* body, *my* brain, *my* thought, in order to carry on my normal life in our universe of Space-Time. I can, by choosing for myself, *my* thought and *my* conduct, determine, in great measure, what *my* body and *my* brain shall be in the future.

There exists a contradiction between the doctrine that man is a permanent self and the doctrine that he is no more than an impermanent self of Space-Time. Science has as yet always ignored the feeling of permanence that we have in feeling *I AM*. It has assumed that it has nothing to do with it because it is unmeasurable.

Until Kant gave us his *Critique of Pure Reason* no attempt had been made to get rid, scientifically, of the contradiction. For Kant was scientific, he was the first philosopher whose procedure was scientific. He was the first philosopher who under-

[1] You may hold this *feeling* as existing in personal moral certainty if you like. Before you can do or think anything you must feel your own existence as a fact quite apart from *evidence* of the fact. The fact is there, its reason we cannot see!

stood that metaphysics ought to be treated as a science, and he was the first who so treated it. This is why James Ward said that he (Kant) relied on philosophical anthropomorphism rather than pure philosophy.

Kant's *Critique* points definitely to proof that the conscious ego *of science* is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it, while as impermanent things of body, brain and thought we are but impermanent forms, conditioned in Space-Time, of our real proper selves (permanent egos), which we feel, but do not know. Each one of us feels *I AM*. Kant proved that the subject of science (a conscious self coupled with experience) could not think as it does think, unless its conscious self were permanent with continuity of consciousness in freedom from the impermanence arising from the limitations of Space-Time. Kant met the contradiction by proof that we are permanent selves coupled with impermanent experience.

The proof is scientific and it will be well to show, definitely, in spite of repetition, how it is scientific.

The subject of science is a conscious ego coupled with experience. But this experience has no existence in itself; it is no more than the experience of a conscious ego. Ignore the conscious ego, then its experience no longer exists.

Now, this subject has sense, understanding and reason. And, most important of all, it *can think*. And in thinking it can exercise its understanding and power of reason.

Reasoning from *the point of view of the subject*

Kant shows that the subject *itself* is driven to accept the fact that its conscious ego must be a permanent self active with imagination, or it, the subject, could not think as it does think. But the subject does not *know*; it *feels* the existence of the conscious ego as permanent in feeling *I AM*. It feels its conscious ego as permanent, it *knows* that its experience is impermanent. The centrality of the consciousness of the conscious ego of science must exist for science in feeling. For without this *feeling* the subject could not use thought in knowing itself as a conscious ego coupled with experience. It is because of this feeling of permanence that, though we *know* that as living organisms of body, brain and thought we are impermanent, we are driven, in order to carry on our normal lives, to regard ourselves and our fellows as permanent.

Kant's procedure is scientific in that the proof he offers is proof evidential to us as subjects. The proof is offered to us as subjects of science, that is, as conscious selves coupled with experience.

Kant reasoned from *two* points of view. He was mainly scientific in that most of his *Critique* is written from the point of view of the subject—it is evidential for the subject. That is why James Ward, in his *Study of Kant*, terms his procedure philosophical anthropomorphism. It is this procedure the argument concerns itself with. The argument assumes to prove scientifically that the conscious ego of science is a permanent self active with imagination. With Kant's second point of

view, from that of the conscious ego apart from experience, the argument has nothing to do. It ignores all questions of God, immortality and, mainly, of freedom of the will.

Kant's *Critique* only *pointed*, as before said, to the above proof, for, unfortunately, as James Ward shows in a *Study of Kant*, Kant never stated his conclusion definitely—apart from a passage in the *Critique* which is still the subject of dispute.[1]

It is this indefiniteness in Kant's recorded words that justifies the writing of the present book.

Let us consider the present position of science. Science is not involved in consideration of scientia, it does not attempt to analyse the experience of living organisms. It is engaged, as Von Baaber pointed out long ago, with conscientia, not scientia. It has for consideration *only* the experience of a conscious ego.[2] This is why the subject of science is defined as a conscious ego coupled with experience.

Now science is concerned only with that which is measurable. But science is dynamic, not static; it is always measuring something not yet measured. The man of science therefore must be conscious of being faced by something not yet measured. And he must admit that he may be faced by something unmeasurable. At present science holds that it has nothing to do with the unmeasurable.

Here comes in Kant with his scientific procedure. Science uses its conscious self only so far as it is

[1] This passage is, hereafter, considered at length. (Cf. p. 77).
[2] The theory of Behaviourism is rejected.

an experiencer, that is, as a measurer. But, when we say the subject measures, what do we mean? We mean that he thinks. Without thought he could not measure. But from where does the subject get his power to think? Not from experience. He must get it from himself as a conscious ego or self.

Kant proves that the subject could not have this power of thought unless as a conscious self it were a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. He proves this scientifically in proving it as sound from the point of view of the subject itself. For he shows that the subject itself is fully aware that it could not think as it does think unless its conscious self were a permanent self with continuity of consciousness. The subject must *feel* its conscious self as permanent before it can begin to think. In fact, the subject knows that its thought is limited, and this it could not do if it were no more than a thinking subject. For, then, thought would be, for it, absolute.

But science is concerned with thought, not feeling, and the subject only feels this conscious self as permanent, does not know it as permanent. And as a permanent self it is *unmeasurable*.

Science must *begin* with the fact of a permanent self, but, as this self is unmeasurable, science, quite rightly, *ignores* its existence except in so far as it is an experiencer, and measurer. Science must admit that the centrality of the consciousness of knowledge exists in feeling. But, as it functions with thought, not feeling, it is quite right in

ignoring the existence of its permanent conscious ego except in so far as it is an experiencer. What Kant does is to bring the *unmeasurable within the purview of science*. Science, as before stated, must begin with a permanent self which is unknowable in that the subject only *feels* its existence. It is unmeasurable. But, coupled with experience, it becomes knowable. So, only when coupled with experience, does science take it into consideration.

The purview of the subject of science is widened by extension of its consciousness to the feeling of its conscious self as permanent and active with imagination. Its purview is no longer confined to the measurable. This feeling is, as it were, the unseen, unknown foundation of all that science erects with thought. It *must* exist for science for the stability of thought.

If we are no more than living organisms of body, brain and thought, coming into existence on birth in Space-Time and going out of existence on death in Space-Time, then questions of God, Immortality and Free-will concern us in no way. We are no more than impermanent things of Space-Time. On the other hand, if we are permanent selves unconditioned by the impermanence of Space-Time, then such questions do, in all probability, concern us greatly.

But the argument is scientific, it ignores all questions relating to God, Immortality or, mainly, to Free-Will. In the words of James Ward, the procedure of the argument is philosophical anthropomorphism, not pure philosophy. It is confined

to proof that the conscious ego of science is a permanent self with the activity of imagination.

It must be admitted that if the argument be held sound it establishes a *scientific basic fact* in support of the possibility that belief in God, Immortality and Free-will is well-founded. If the argument be held unsound, and man no more than an impermanent subject, any such belief is unreasonable. But with what *results* from acceptance or refusal of the argument, the argument, I repeat, has nothing to do.

I must ask those, if any, who read and study this book to try not to be annoyed at constant repetition. I use repetition not only to emphasise the facts relied on but to "round up" the differing arguments used. At the same time, however strong may be the objections that can be reasonably offered to my form of writing, do not forget that the tenour of the argument is not thereby affected. For the tenour of the argument is that Kant gave us scientific proof that the conscious ego of science is a permanent self active with imagination. And if this argument be accepted as sound, then Kant was the first philosopher who gave us a *scientific basic fact* for entering on his second point of view, which assumed to prove the existence of God and the immortality of man as a soul.

INTRODUCTION

Before I read lately *A Study of Kant* I had for very many years been studying Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and had been stumbling over much therein. For instance:

Did Kant accept or deny the reality of Space, Time, and the reality of things-in-themselves? What is the relation between transcendental unity of apperception and transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception? How far did Kant go in treating metaphysics as a science? How can the feeling of *I AM* come within the purview of science?

Then James Ward—to whom I already owed much for assistance given me in correspondence—sent me a copy of his Philosophical Lecture on Kant spoken at the British Academy. I purchased *A Study of Kant* and read it carefully. At first Ward's definition of Kant's philosophy as philosophical anthropomorphism hurt me. But at last I understood that thereby he clarified the meaning and strengthened the authority of Kant. In spite of his criticism of Kant's philosophy James Ward recognises the fact that Kant still holds an unique place among the great philosophers.

In reading *A Study of Kant* I was at once struck by the statement that Kant's supreme principle was

the "centrality of the appercipient self."[1] The more I thought of it the greater the impression this statement made on me, till, at last, it seemed to me not only to elucidate many of the contradictions which exist, or appear to exist, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but to reveal the secret of Kant—to explain how it is that he still holds an unique position among the great philosophers.

I take the "centrality of the appercipient self" to mean this: The appercipient self is a permanent self which is active (appercipient) because imagination is fundamental for it. Kant regards metaphysics as a science and so finds the centrality of this self in the fact that science must *start* with the feeling of a conscious self which is permanent with imagination fundamental for it. This is Kant's transcendental subject, a subject that we feel but know not as *I AM*.

The fact brought home to me was this: Kant's *Critique* was written and must be considered from *two points of view*. The one, that of man as a subject; the other, that of man as a transcendental subject or soul. Between these two points of view there is conflict, even apparent contradiction.

What did Kant set out to do? He set out to prove the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.[2] The question of this trinity is, I think, one for pure philosophy.

[1] Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 90. The references hereafter to *Kant* are references to Meiklejohn's translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. There are references also to Max Müller's translation.

[2] *Kant*, p. 484.

But *before* the above question can be considered what is necessary? It is quite useless to enter on the question unless man is a soul.[1] All scientific evidence is absent unless we, as subjects, have for *ourselves* evidence that we are at the lowest free from the limitations of Space and Time. Mankind generally starts with a dogmatic assurance that man is or is not a soul; evidence is ignored. Kant, to open the way for proof of the soul in man, relies on evidence,[2] that is, he relies on facts which are facts for man *from his own point of view as a subject.*

Now, a consideration of man and the universe from the point of view of man as a subject cannot be termed pure philosophy. James Ward defines it as philosophical anthropomorphism. I would accept this definition. And I accept it for the following reason:

Kant held that up to his time metaphysics had never had the good fortune to attain to the pure scientific method. He held that, rightly, metaphysics should be treated as a science. Metaphysics, it is true, deals with conceptions entirely independent of the teachings of experience. So far it occupies a completely isolated position from other sciences, and that is why Kant terms it a

[1] Kant uses the term "soul" as the same as "transcendental subject." What the soul is we cannot know. I now use it as little as possible because it is so closely associated with ideas of God and Immortality.

[2] The centrality of the appercipient self. Kant strives to prove scientifically that the conscious self of science is a permanent self, which opens the way for consideration of the soul in relation to God, Freedom of the Will and Immortality.

speculative science.[1] But if it be admitted that man *as a subject* can deal with conceptions entirely independent of the teachings of experience then metaphysics *is* a science. And what does this mean?

It means that metaphysics can produce *evidence* for man from *his own point of view* as a subject.

Now all science is necessarily anthropomorphic—its evidence is that which is veridical for man as a subject. And when we keep in mind the isolated position of metaphysics (which proceeds ultimately independent of experience) we find the procedure of metaphysics as a science is rightly termed philosophical anthropomorphism, *so far* as it relies on what is evidential for the subject.

What does Kant do? The main part of his *Critique* (the Dialectic comes separately and last) deals largely with synthesis, the categories, the schematism of the understanding, the transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception.[2] All these are regarded by him as *realities* from the point of view of man as a subject. Not only this. Kant holds that man as a subject is a subject *a priori* of Space and Time. So, from the point of view of man as a subject, Space and Time are realities and objects exist as things-in-themselves in Space and Time. To carry on our lives as subjects we necessarily bow to the fact that we are subjects

[1] Cf. *Kant*, p. xxvii. Does not science rely on the existence of energy as the feeling of a fact unknown in itself? And yet a fact which must be because of its manifestations to us as subjects?

[2] As distinct from the transcendental unity of apperception.

of Space and Time. So, for us as subjects, Space and Time are realities and we are real objects in Space and Time. (Space and Time are *evidential* absolutes). We must live on *as if*[1] we were realities in real Space and Time and *as if* other objects were realities. It is a fact for us, as thinking "things," that objects do not appear to us as they really are but only as they exist at passing moments of their change in continuity of Space-Time. And the same is true for ourselves and our fellows as we *appear* to ourselves and others. But we must live on *as if* we and other subjects remained the same "things" permanently. We could not live on as subjects if we did not do this.

Kant, still using philosophical anthropomorphism, does not stop here. He shows that man, as a subject, cannot, in thought, stop at the reality of Space and Time and of the reality of himself and other objects in Space and Time. For even physicists now hold that motion (change) is fundamental for the universe presented to us.[2] So, *as subjects*, we must hold there is nothing of the permanent in us. There is nothing in us of the permanent which could possibly enjoy permanence.[3] The *I AM*, so far, is absent.

Keep in mind what it is that we are now con-

[1] Vaihinger, in his *Philosophy of As If*, is right, so far, in claiming Kant as an adherent to his (Vaihinger's) philosophy.

[2] Of which universe we, as things of Space and Time, are part.

[3] We need now only to define the permanent, negatively, as that which is free from the fundamental changes of Space and Time.

sidering. We are *not* considering the question of God, Immortality and Free-will; we are *not* considering the moral sense. The argument is that *before* we can enter on any such consideration we must have evidence which appeals to us *as subjects*, evidence that, as subjects, we are not realities, but that the "real proper self" of each one of us is a transcendental subject or soul.[1]

If we give reality to Space and Time, if we define ourselves as "incomplete finite existents"[2] in Space and Time, then the question of God, Immortality and Free-will concerns us in no way—unless as useful for ironic laughter. If *I AM* marks *me* as no more than a "thing" which begins its existence at birth and ends its existence at death, then God, Immortality and Free-will have no existence *for me*. Before Kant could reasonably begin to consider any such trinity he was bound to give me *evidence* that, as *I AM*, I am something which is free from the changes of Space and Time.[3] He had to prove that, for me as a subject, Space and Time are mere formal principles which condition me as a subject, but from which I, as a real proper self, am free. From the point of view of the subject Space and Time are realities (evidential absolutes), and so things-in-themselves are realities. But from Kant's second point of view—that is, of the transcendental

[1] We want scientific evidence, for only from the point of view of man as a soul can God, Immortality and Free-will have any value or meaning for us.

[2] Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*.

[3] *I AM* is but defined negatively as permanent. It is a fact for each one of us, but an unknown fact. We *feel* the fact.

subject (the real proper self)—Space and Time are but phenomena; they are but formal principles conditioning the subject but not the transcendental subject. Space and Time are realities for the subject; the subject is an experiencer. Kant holds to this. But he holds that the subject does not exist in itself. It *is* a transcendental subject conditioned *a priori* in Space-Time. Therefore, while this experience exists, it is not the experience of the subject but of the transcendental subject conditioned in the form of a subject of Space-Time. If Space and Time are realities there can be no *I AM*.[1]

Kant, regarding metaphysics as a science, proceeds by his method of philosophical anthropomorphism. He thus arrives at what James Ward terms his (Kant's) supreme principle of the centrality of the appercipient self.[2] Kant proceeds thus:

"Each one of us is conscious in feeling of *I AM*. This consciousness is a continuity free from the changes of Space and Time. Not only this. The reason of man *as a subject* makes him aware that this continuity *I AM* must accompany all his thought and activity *as a subject* or he could not

[1] Cf. Vaihinger's *Philosophy of As If*, p. 107. Mahaffy and Bernard's *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, p. 203 et seq. *Kant*, 90, 308, 309, 327, 473. Max Müller's translation, p. 291.

[2] It is too often forgotten that Kant claimed his procedure to be scientific. He is scientific *qua* proof that the real proper self of man is a transcendental subject. It is on this scientific proof that he gets his foundation for his pure philosophy, that is, his consideration of God, Immortality and Free-will. We are now concerned solely with his scientific procedure.

exist as a thinking subject. Every man as a subject thinks from moment to moment successively in Time. All this thought is *his* thought, and it could not be *his* thought unless during this succession he himself remained the same *I AM*. Man must always enjoy (be aware of) himself as permanent or he could not think.[1] By no possibility could Professor Alexander have defined himself as an 'incomplete finite existent' unless he had enjoyed himself as permanent. By his own reasoning he had to enjoy himself as what he is *not* in order to define himself as what he *is*.[2]

So far Kant's philosophy is rightly termed philosophical anthropomorphism—its *point of view* is from that of man as a subject. Ignore all that Kant wrote as to God, Immortality and Free-will, ignore all that he wrote as to the moral sense; there still remains his supreme principle of the centrality of the appercipient self.[3]

This supreme principle, when considered alone, is of great importance. If accepted as sound it proves that the real proper self of each one of us is a transcendental subject. What we have definitely proved for us is that we are not mere passing things of Space and Time. The *I AM* is found to exist for each one of us not only in the

[1] *Kant*, p. 62. Max Müller's translation, p. 65.

[2] He had to be the I who feels in order to determine himself as the I known. The pure ego had to exist for him, in order to *determine* the empirical ego. (Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 155).

[3] Cf. James Ward's reference to "a conscious subject." *Physiological Principles*, p. 40. The argument now is that the conscious self is, for science, a permanent self, which we feel as *I AM*.

consciousness but of *necessity* for our existence as subjects.

And bear in mind that we have, so far as the argument goes, nothing to do with *what* the soul is. We have only the fact that each one of us is a transcendental subject, that is, something permanent in freedom from the changes of Space and Time.

In spite of repetition let me try to state dogmatically what it is that is now attempted to be proved.

Kant's supreme principle of the centrality of the appercipient self can be considered alone, quite apart from any question of God, Immortality and Free-will or the moral sense. Indeed, it must be considered first alone. For until evidence is produced in support of this supreme principle we, as subjects, cannot, scientifically, be concerned with any question of God, Immortality and Free-will, or even the moral sense.[1] We *feel* ourselves as *I AM*.

Kant's supreme principle of the centrality of the appercipient self is, now, alone under consideration.

Descartes arrived at the *cogito ergo sum*. And his conclusion has been very generally accepted, for, from the philosopher to the ploughboy, each one of us *feels* that he is permanent. Even Professor Alexander holds that we *enjoy* ourselves as permanent amid our changes of body, brain and thought.

But Descartes was not scientific. He made no detailed attempt to prove that the subject *from its own point of view* arrives at the fact that it could

[1] Cf. *The Divine Law of Human Being.*

not exist as a thinking subject unless its real proper self were permanent, that is, free from Space and Time with their fundamental changes. In other words he made no detailed attempt to prove that the subject *from its own point of view* could arrive at evidence for the conclusion that *as a subject* it is no more than a form, conditioned *a priori* in the *formal* principles of Space and Time, of *itself* as a transcendental subject or soul. Descartes did not rely on scientific evidence. The *cogito ergo sum* appeals to us all in feeling. In itself it offers no scientific evidence of the fact for the subject that we are permanent.[1]

Then came in Kant with his philosophical anthropomorphism. Kant is scientific. He relies on the *cogito ergo sum qua* feeling.[2] But, beyond that, he offers scientific evidence that the subject, from its own point of view, can arrive at the fact that it could not be a thinking subject unless its real proper self were a transcendental subject. For the subject to be able to say *cogito*, the *sum* must be *felt* as referring to a *permanent* self. The subject must *feel* itself as permanent before it can think. Kant's use of philosophical anthropomorphism marks the distinction of his philosophy from all other forms of philosophy.

Metaphysics deal with conceptions quite apart from experience.[3] Philosophical anthropomorphism,

[1] Ignorant of what the *I AM* is we must necessarily *feel it before* we can say *cogito ergo sum.* (*Prolegomena,* ff. 46).

[2] Cf. *Kant,* p. xxvii.

[3] We shall find that science always relies on conceptions (postulates) before its study of experience.

a form of metaphysics, relies on the *scientific* use of conceptions apart from experience; it relies on them as evidential for the subject.[1] Kant claims to be scientific, so he must have his philosophical anthropomorphism as a stepping stone to his pure philosophy. *Before* he could enter on the question of God, Immortality and Free-will or the question of the moral sense, he had, scientifically, to prove to the subject that the subject itself is aware that it is no more than a conditioned form of its real proper self.[2] And its real proper self is a transcendental subject.

So far as what is now written is concerned we do not proceed beyond the ambit of Kant's philosophical anthropomorphism. Kant's supreme principle is the centrality of the appercipient self. For proof he uses philosophical anthropomorphism.

The ego of science is the conscious self coupled with experience. There are two terms. If Kant be correct the conscious ego of science is a permanent self, existing apart from normal experience, though Kant uses experience to prove its existence. This conscious self, Kant shows, is a self which persists (is permanent) amid the changes of body, brain and thought; it is free from the formal principles of Space and Time. But this "real proper self"

[1] When we attempt to define God, Immortality and Free-will we use conceptions quite apart from experience. Science uses only those conceptions which relate or can be related to experience.

[2] All *thought exists* only in relation (*relatione accidentis*) to the feeling of *I AM*. Cf. *Prolegomena*, ff. 46. In Belfort Bax's translation, p. 82.

has imagination deep buried in it; imagination is fundamental for it. So it has the activity of apperception.

Kant produces scientifically evidence to show that this appercipient self is the ultimate *centrality* for the possibility of the existence of the subject and its experience; he relies on evidence for the fact.[1] For he shows that the subject *itself* is not only conscious but can prove to itself that it could not exist unless it were but a form of its *real proper self*, that is, of itself as a transcendental subject with imagination fundamental for it. What does this mean? It means that each one of us is a permanent self and that our experience as subjects is a mere accident of our embodiment as "things," subject *a priori* to the formal principles of Space and Time.

How, then, does Kant affect science? The ego of science is the conscious self coupled with its experience. Science does not transcend subject and object.[2]

The ego of science, according to Kant, is the transcendental subject coupled with its experience as a subject. And this transcendental subject is the real proper self, felt as *I AM*.

The argument now is that Kant leaves science

[1] The man of science must *begin* with a conception of himself as a permanent self. For he contemplates himself as a subject, and a subject cannot contemplate itself. Science has nothing to do with what is; it *begins* with conceptions of what *is*.

[2] This is why Kant, so far as the present argument goes, stops short at his transcendental subject and transcendental object. (*Kant*, 307-9).

in the same position as before, that is, its ego remains a conscious self coupled with experience. That Kant gives reality to the transcendental subject as apart from its human experience cannot affect the main object of science; science still has its empirical ego, that is, the conscious ego coupled with experience.

The argument is this: The man of science must start with an assumption that he exists. He must be a conscious subject or he could not be a man of science, could not have any experience for his consideration. And his consciousness must be a consciousness of *permanence* in himself. He, himself, must remain the same self or he could not go on thinking in the succession of time. Thought is *his*. A man of science does, as Alexander puts it in *Space, Time, and Deity, enjoy* himself as permanent amid all his changes of body, brain and thought.[1] He must, the argument assumes, begin with the fact that he is a permanent self, that is, unaffected by the fundamental changes of Space and Time. We call this the *I AM*, which we *feel* but do not know.[2]

The main object of the man of science, even when considering psychology as a science, is the ultimate analysis of the experience of the conscious self.[3] The man of science deals with the conscious subject *only so far* as it is a subject of experience. His *ego*

[1] Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*, p. 29. But Alexander does not admit the existence of the permanent self.

[2] For this feeling the term *ein Ichsein* is preferable to that of *ein Dasein*. Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 172.

[3] *Psychological Principles*, p. 40.

is the conscious self *coupled with its experience;* his subject is man as an experiencer. The man of science must, quite rightly, treat this experience as real, not merely accidental. What, then, is the conscious self from the point of view of the man of science? It is nothing but a fact which must be, in order that he may be enabled to proceed towards the ultimate analysis of the experience of the conscious self. The man of science has nothing to do with the *what* of his self-consciousness of permanence. He merely wants the fact. So long as he has the fact he has all that he wants.[1]

Kant leaves science in possession of its ego, that is, of the conscious self coupled with its experience. Kant's transcendental self *is* the conscious self of science. Quite truly it is, as a conscious self, permanent and apperceptive (active) in that imagination is fundamental for it. Kant merely shows that the conscious self science starts with must, fundamentally, be permanent and active with imagination. For all science, as it evolves, uses imagination for the existence of those conceptions which give it the theories it uses in the evolution towards its ultimate analysis of experience; the postulates of science are particular conceptions.

Kant's philosophical anthropomorphism leaves science free to pursue its ultimate analysis of experience. Indeed, he goes so far as to hold that *from the point of view* of the subject Space, Time and things in Space-Time are realities. They only become phenomenal from the point of view of the

[1] Cf. *Myself and Dreams,* p. 16.

transcendental subject when the subject uses conceptions apart from its human experience. This, Kant shows, the subject can do.

Though we only *feel* the *I AM*—that is, feel ourselves as transcendental subjects—something must be stated as to how the real proper self exists. For it is difficult to imagine a self which exists outside the limits of Space and Time or, as we may write it, outside Space-Time.[1]

The real proper self, the pure ego, exists in Duration. What is the relation of Duration to Space-Time?

In what follows I write almost fully in agreement with Bergson's *Time and Free-will.* A reference merely to the definition of Duration in the index to his book will show how closely I am in agreement.

But Bergson states: "In this very confusion of true (pure) Duration with its symbol both the strength and weakness of Kantianism reside" (p. 233). Again Bergson states: "Thus the very distinction which he (Kant) makes between Space and Time[2] amounts at bottom to confusing Time with Space and the symbolical representation of the ego with the ego itself" (p. 232). These objections to Kantianism, I think, disappear when we appreciate the fact that Kant wrote from *two* points of view.

[1] The Space-Time of science is now used as no more than a four-dimensional continuum.

[2] Does he make distinction? He says that *both* Time and Space are the absolutely first formal principles of the sensible world. Kant's *Inaugural Address* (pp. 63, 67), Columbia College, New York.

Now Bergson tells us what the ego itself is. He states: "To act freely is to recover possession of oneself and to get back into pure duration" (p. 232). The *oneself*, then, is the pure ego existing in duration; the symbolical representation of the ego is the ego conditioned in Space-Time. It is true that the confusion, even contradiction, Bergson refers to does *apparently* exist. But why does it exist? It exists, not because Kant confused the pure ego existing in Duration with the ego existing in the formal principles of Space and Time, but because he so definitely distinguished the one from the other. Kant wrote from *two points of view*, the one that of the subject, the other that of the transcendental subject (Kant's real proper self). The apparent confusion arises from this fact being ignored; it arises from the difference of the conclusions the two points of view arrive at.

From the point of view of the subject conditioned *a priori* in Space-Time, Space and Time are realities; they are evidential absolutes. The greater part of Kant's philosophy is really philosophical anthropomorphism. Why is this? Because it is mainly written from the point of view of the subject, and it is from that point of view he gives reality to Space and Time and to objects in Space-Time.[1] The subject itself is an object in Space-

[1] "The 'I' is not itself a mental act, but a power intrinsically enduring, which precisely through its endurances can bind what is successive into a single unity" (Melchior Patazzi), *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. III., p. 163.

[1] It is from this point of view that he considers his conceptions (categories) and synthesis as proceeding from the understanding of the subject.

Time. So far we must regard Kant's philosophy as empirically sound; it is scientific.

It is when Kant proceeds to his second point of view, whereby he makes the conclusions of the subject no longer objective but subjective, that the apparent confusion, even contradiction, arises. For this second point of view is that of the pure ego (Kant's transcendental subject) which, in transcendence of Space-Time, exists in Duration. The consideration is this: For the subject Space and Time are realities; for the pure ego they are but symbols of Duration, they are phenomenal.

To understand Kant we must keep clearly in mind that he wrote from two points of view. From the first point of view, that of the subject, he is mainly in agreement with Alexander's empirical philosophy; he agrees that the subject is an incomplete finite existent. It is impermanent.[1]

From his second point of view, that of the pure ego (the transcendental subject, the existence of which Alexander denies), Kant does not abandon his first point of view, he but makes it subjective to his second point of view. It is as if he said to Alexander: Your empirical philosophy is all right as far as it goes. But you do not go beyond the impermanence of Space-Time. You *do* determine man, *as a subject*, to be an impermanent "thing," that is, an incomplete finite existent. But if *you* were an incomplete finite existent you could not do

[1] The Achilles' heel of empirical philosophy we find in the fact that we feel (are aware of) ourselves as permanent. We *feel* the *I AM*.

this. For, if you were, you would be making yourself an object to yourself; you would be transcending subject and object. And this you cannot do. How then is it you have been able to do what you have done? It is because you enjoy (feel) yourself as permanent. Only with this enjoyment (awareness) could you have determined yourself *as a subject* as impermanent. More than this. You admit that for your subject you must have continuity of self-consciousness[1]; that is, you must have *Duration* of self-consciousness, free from the changes implicit for Space-Time. And this Duration of consciousness cannot exist for an impermanent subject of body and mind. You cannot, in reason, find any likeness between a subject which has existence only in a body which constantly changes in Time and one with the pure Duration of self-consciousness.

I must admit here what may be a distinction from Bergson. Bergson appears to me to use the term *I KNOW* in too general a sense. Following Kant, I hold that all knowledge is, *to the subject*, limited. How is it that we can be aware (we cannot know) that our knowledge is limited? If we existed within the limits of knowledge, knowledge would be, for us as subjects, an evidential absolute. It is because the subject has the power of what is termed feeling.[2] The subject must have a power transcending thought in order to determine thought as limited.

[1] *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. 1, p. 94.

[2] I prefer the term *awareness*, a power which transcends thought, but for obvious reasons I keep to the term feeling.

We, as subjects, are faced by facts which remain hidden from our mental vision. "The fact is there, the reason of the fact we cannot see."[1] All these are *facts* for us as subjects, but they are unknown facts. For instance, we do not know what we are as permanent selves, we simply feel the *I AM*. But if we did not *feel* the *I AM* we could not think as we do think. The power of feeling (awareness) in the subject transcends its power of thought. "Though feeling is never a complete state of consciousness it is the most central one, as Kant came at long last to recognise."[2]

Now Duration has nothing to do with Space and has nothing to do with Time.[3] Time is meaningless without Space.[4] But science must deal with time and motion, and the *essential and qualitative element of time is Duration.* What then must science do? It must eliminate Duration while admitting that Duration is the essential and qualitative element of time.[5] What does this mean? The fact of Duration is a basic fact for science. But it cannot *measure* duration because it has nothing to do with space and time, unless phenomenally. It is only by considering time and motion that science can proceed in its analysis of experience.[6] Duration, itself, is beyond any *know-*

[1] *Kant*, pp. 377, 90, 417. *Prolegomena*, ff. 57.
[2] Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 172.
[3] *Time and Freewill*, p. 91.
[4] Cf. Eddington's *Time, Space, and Gravity*, p. 13. Bergson's *Time and Freewill*, p. 93.
[5] *Time and Freewill*, pp. 115, 228.
[6] The experience of a conscious subject.

ledge that science can attain to. And yet science must hold that the essential and qualitative element which makes knowledge possible is Duration which *transcends knowledge*. So there exists for science this feeling (awareness) which transcends knowledge. Duration is a basic fact for science, but an unknown fact; it exists, for science, in feeling (awareness). Here, again, we find that for the subject of science *feeling* is the most central state of consciousness, as Kant found at long last. Science must start with this central fact.

Now the criticism of Bergson as to Kant's use of the term "inner perception" I cannot reply to, just as I cannot reply to James Ward's criticism of Kant's use of the term *inner sense*. But when Bergson states that Kant makes the "genuine free self" (Kant's transcendental subject) supposed to be outside Duration I cannot agree.[1] It is true that Kant makes his real proper self "out of the reach of our faculty of knowledge"; we do not *think*, we *feel* the *I AM*. But I cannot agree that we *perceive* this self "whenever, by a strenuous effort of reflection, we turn our eyes from the shadow which follows us and retire into ourselves."[2] By any such strenuous effort we do not perceive, we *feel* the *I AM*. The *I AM* is out of reach of our faculty of knowledge. It has nothing to do

[1] *Time and Freewill*, pp. 232, 233.

[2] It seems to me that Kant sometimes uses *Time* as the same as Duration, sometimes as not the same. His genuine free self is outside *Time*, not outside Duration. It is *permanent*.

with perceptions, nor even with conceptions; it is the feeling of a reality.[1] Kant, however he may express himself in writing, does, from the point of view of his transcendental subject, make Space and Time subjective; but he leaves Duration standing. We *feel* the *I AM* as existing in Duration, as permanent in Duration.

And here comes in what is perhaps the most important result of all as to Duration when we consider Kant's philosophy from *two* points of view.

Let us compare Alexander's empirical philosophy with Kant's philosophy. I think we may take Alexander as a protagonist of empirical philosophy.

Following this empirical philosophy[2] we find that man is an object in Space-Time, existing in a body and mind, where the mind cannot exist without a body. Man is "an incomplete finite existent." Space and Time are realities for him; apart from them he does not exist.

But this is in agreement with Kant's philosophical anthropomorphism. For according to Kant man, *as a subject*, is this incomplete finite existent and for him, *as a subject*, Space and Time are evidential absolutes; man is an object in Space-Time, and, so far, his mind can only be manifest when joined to, when part of, a body. But Alexander must have a conscious subject,[3] so I cannot see how his subject

[1] *Prolegomena*, ff. 46. In Belfort Bax's translation, p. 82. *A Study of Kant*, p. 172.

[2] We must now ignore Alexander's admission that he enjoys himself as permanent.

[3] *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. I., p. 94.

differs from the subject of science, which is a conscious subject coupled with experience. Here, again, we find Kant in agreement.

But here comes in Kant's *second* point of view. Alexander denies the existence of what he terms "a superior entity," and this superior entity is Kant's transcendental subject. Kant's *second* point of view gives reality to this "superior entity" and so, while admitting the existence of the subject, he makes the subject subjective to its real proper self which is a transcendental subject.

It has been necessary for the sake of clarity to state what above appears. But at present we are not concerned with the question of *how* Kant proves the existence of the transcendental subject. We are concerned only with the fact that this transcendental subject exists in Duration, it is *not* a subject of Space-Time. What then is the relation of Duration to Space-Time?

Science, as we have seen, must admit the essential and qualitative element of Duration, but science for its analysis of the experience of the conscious ego must eliminate this essential and qualitative element. What does this mean? If we hold that the experience of the subject is real in itself for the subject as existing *in itself* where is Duration?[1] Its existence remains inexplicable, even impossible.

But now consider another point of view: The real proper self exists in Duration, the subject does *not* exist in itself, it is the real proper self (a transcendental subject) conditioned *a priori* in

[1] Pure Duration, not homogeneous Duration.

Space-Time. To the subject Space and Time are evidential absolutes, its experience *is to it* its own experience. But in fact this experience is not its own, it is the experience of the transcendental subject *conditioned* in Space-Time. Duration is thus left standing, left standing for the real proper self and it is this real proper self which, when conditioned in Space-Time, has this experience. If Duration be the essential and qualitative element of Space-Time then we cannot give real reality to Space and Time, though they remain as evidential absolutes for the real proper self *when* it is conditioned in Space-Time.

There is a difficulty as to how the real proper self, existing in Duration which we feel but do not know, can have experience in Space-Time.[1] Bergson, I think, gets over the difficulty so far as science can get over it.

Bergson states: "Hence there are finally two different selves,[2] one of which is, as it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representation." Again he states: "To act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration."[3]

The first self is *oneself*, the pure ego, the second self is the external projection of the first into Space-Time. It is the first conditioned in Space-Time.

[1] The difficulty is somewhat like that which Minkowski meets with as to his fourth dimension. He must introduce the mysterious $\sqrt{-1}$. He can only measure Duration in relation to space.

[2] Kant's two points of view.

[3] pp. 231, 232.

The experience of the subject is the experience of the transcendental subject when conditioned in Space-Time.

But then Bergson states: "Duration thus restored to its original purity will *appear* (my italics) as a wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another."[1] Why does Bergson use the term *appear*?

The pure ego with transcendental unity of apperception exists in pure Duration. This Duration is a pure continuity so, as we have found, science can only feel it as the essential and qualitative element of Space and Time.[2] Science, for its analysis of experience, must eliminate it, for science uses thought, though it begins with feeling.

The subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception exists in Space and Time; they are, for it, evidential absolutes. It is the conscious ego coupled with experience, so Science *uses* the conscious ego only so far as it is an experiencer.

Now the external is presented to the subject as a quantitative multiplicity and this multiplicity the understanding of the subject must have the power to synthesise for the synthetical unity of apperception of the subject.

Bergson states that it is extraordinarily difficult for the subject to think of Duration in its original purity.[3] I prefer to hold that the subject cannot

[1] p. 229.

[2] Time for science can only exist if Space exists. Eddington's *Space, Time, and Gravity*, p. 13.

[3] Cf. *Time and Freewill*, p. 106.

think, it can only feel (be aware of) Duration in its original purity.

What then can the understanding of the subject with its power of synthesis do? It must recognise the fact of the presentation of multiplicity in quantity, or it would have nothing to synthesise. It must recognise the fact that the synthetical unity of self-consciousness exists in quality not quantity. It cannot get rid of Duration in feeling, but it can deal with Duration only so far as thought allows. It gets as near to pure Duration as it can and so can only treat it as "appearing for the subject" as a wholly *qualitative* multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another." Numerical multiplicity is set forth in Space and it is this that the understanding synthesises. The regard of the self-consciousness of the subject is the same for all of the details of multiplicity under synthesis. And this sameness is a quality. So this multiplicity appears to the subject as a qualitative multiplicity. It is not pure Duration but homogeneous Duration. This appearance is sound for the subject of thought. But the feeling of the subject (transcending thought) makes it aware that in reality pure Duration exists in a continuity and only *appears* to the subject as a wholly qualitative multiplicity. As Bergson states, "Duration properly called has no moments which are identical or external to one another, being essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and with no analogy to number."[1]

[1] *Time and Freewill*, p. 120.

The above consideration is important for the main argument for the following reason:

Science is faced by the basic fact that pure Duration is the essential and qualitative element of Space and Time. Science *feels* this fact, feels it in transcendence of knowledge. But science functions with thought not with feeling. So science when *thinking* about Space and Time must *eliminate* their essential element Duration.

What does this prove? It proves that *feeling* is a basic fact for the subject of science. It proves that feeling is the most central state of the consciousness of the conscious subject of science, a fact which Kant "at long last" recognised.[1]

We have found scientific proof that the subject of science is aware of the limitations of its own knowledge. This power of awareness must, for its existence, transcend knowledge. Feeling is the central state of the consciousness of the conscious subject of science.

The main argument is that the conscious self of science has the power of feeling (awareness), a power which transcends thought. And this power exists in the feeling (awareness) *I AM*. It is not simply *cogito ergo sum*. It is a feeling that as *I AM* I must be a permanent self (free from the impermanence of Space-Time) with imagination fundamental for me in that I am active (appercipient). I must feel this personal continuity *before* I can say *cogito ergo sum*: I could not think as I do think, unless I were this permanent self.

[1] *A Study of Kant*, p. 172.

The bearing of our consideration of Duration on the main argument is obvious. For it proves that science must start with the basic fact that Duration which it feels is the essential and qualitative elements of Space-Time.

The argument is mainly confined to consideration of Kant's philosophy from the point of view of the subject. But to make this argument reasonable we have to remember that Kant's philosophy must, ultimately, be considered also from the point of view of the transcendental subject. All Kant's anthropomorphism is, for him, no more than scientific proof of the centrality of the appercipient self. It is with this proof we now deal. This scientific proof was necessary not for itself alone but as a scientific foundation for pure philosophy. Kant stands alone in making the foundation of his philosophy scientific. That is why, as James Ward states, on a broad survey of the history of Modern Philosophy, the "lonely philosopher of Konigsberg occupies the central place."

Even in the ultimate Kant does not depart altogether from the scientific. He refuses to transcend subject and object. His ultimate on the one hand is the transcendental subject, his ultimate on the other hand is the transcendental object.[1] But his philosophy points to transcendence of subject and object.[2]

[1] *Kant,* pp. 309, 377.

[2] *Kant,* pp. 307, 308, 377. Compare p. 473. Fichte, I think, *adds* to Kant's philosophy.

The subject is conditioned *a priori* in and by the formal principles of Space and Time. Therefore its unity of apperception is *synthetical*. The transcendental subject is not conditioned in and by these formal principles; it exists in Duration.[1] Therefore its unity of appereception is not subject to any synthesis.[2] Herein we find the distinction between transcendental unity of self-consciousness and transcendental synthetical unity of self-consciousness, the former exists from the point of view of the transcendental subject, the latter from the point of view of the subject. The point of view of the real proper self is that of transcendental unity of self-consciousness, it is apperceptive (active) because imagination is fundamental for it. The point of view of the subject is real for the subject; it becomes phenomenal from the point of view of the real proper self. The subject *itself* can determine its own synthetical unity of apperception as no more than a conditioned form of the unity of apperception of *itself as a real proper self*, which it feels as *I AM*.

From the point of view of the transcendental subject, which exists in Duration, Space, Time and things in Space-Time[3] fall back into the subjective.

Now I think we may hold that the transcendental subject functions with imagination. But how does

[1] The relation between any ultimate unity and Duration I cannot consider, for I find no guidance in recorded past thought. But I think we must hold that the *I AM* exists in Duration free from the impermanence of Space-Time.

[2] It is an intuitive self. Cf. *Personality and Telepathy*.

[3] Time apart from space has no meaning. Cf. *Space, Time, and Gravity*, p. 13.

it function? So long as we remain subjects we cannot know fully; there is what Kant terms necessary ignorance. All we can know as to the imagination of the transcendental subject is that our knowledge has its origin in imagination.

So far as Kant's philosophy goes we arrive at the transcendental subject and the transcendental object as realities.[1] But *what* they are we know not. We cannot know how that being, the transcendental subject, functions with imagination except in so far as this activity is manifest to us as subjects in its existence as the necessary origin for our thought and conduct (resulting from thought) as subjects.[2]

In the present argument there is no rejection of what Kant has found as to personal moral certainty, the moral sense, God, Immortality, and Free-will. All these are simply ignored. For the argument is confined to a consideration of Kant's supreme principle "the centrality of the appercipient self."

Let us, by another line of reasoning, try to follow out how it was that Kant arrived *scientifically* at the centrality of the appercipient self. If he did so arrive his conclusion is of vital importance for science, though it decries science in no way in its main object which is the investigation of the experience of the conscious self.

In the first place we have the point of view of the man in the street. He feels the *I AM*. He is assured that he remains the same *I AM* from the cradle to the grave. His body, brain and thought

[1] Kant does not go outside the purview of science.
[2] *Kant*, p. 63.

change and change and change. He remains always the same *I AM*. Ask him what he means by this. He replies he does not know and does not want to know. He is quite sure of the fact without any knowledge about it.

Then we come to the point of view of the man of science. He says, my ego is myself as a conscious self coupled with my experience. What I am solely interested in is to help on the evolution of knowledge of *what* experience is, my aim being towards an ultimate analysis of the experience of myself as a conscious subject. For me my experience is reality and if, then, you ask what I mean by myself as a conscious subject I reply: I *must* have the enjoyment of myself as a conscious ego or I could not have the power—which I have—of considering my experience. I *must* enjoy myself as permanent: that is all I want. As a conscious subject I must always be the same continuous self or my experience, which exists in a succession of Time, could not be my own. I must be free from the continuity of change of Space-Time.

Alexander[1] puts this very clearly. He states: "We enjoy ourselves as permanent amid our changes," and his whole work shows that this statement may be read as follows: "We enjoy ourselves as permanent amid our changes in body, brain and thought." It is true he explains his statement by adding, "our mind is in its own enjoyment a substance". But what does this mean? Is it that the enjoyment of permanence is to be found

[1] *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. 1, p. 29.

in the permanence of the subject? If so, how can this permanence exist in Alexander's constantly changing universe of Space, Time, and Deity? If "substance" is not something permanent then the mind, which in its enjoyment of permanence is a substance, is in itself an impermanent "thing" which enjoys permanence. What then does permanence mean? Is "substance" material, spiritual or something unknown?[1]

You, let us assume, say to the man of science, "You admit you could have no experience unless you enjoyed yourself as permanent?" He, I suggest, assents to the question. Then you ask him, "Can you exist as a conscious subject apart from your experience?" He replies, "The question is foolish. I have nothing to do with it. For *me* the ego is the conscious self *coupled with* experience. So far as my investigations go I must have *both* terms. If you can prove that as a conscious self I exist apart from experience that is no concern of mine. The experience still remains for my investigation.[2]

Again you ask the man of science: "Do you use imagination?" He replies, "Of course I do. The universe presented to me for investigation is a universe of Space-Time. It is a universe of

[1] It must not be forgotten that Alexander's philosophy is empirical, so he does not consider the question of *I AM*. Science, I think, now denies that substance is absolute.

[2] The argument assumes that the man of science is so concerned. A man can investigate the constitution of the most complex machine in exactly the same way whether its motion be derived from steam, electricity, or some unknown power.

relativity, so I can investigate only *relative* truth, I cannot investigate what *is*. I must start with conceptions (postulates) of what *is*. And imagination is the genesis of these postulates.[1] Then, as I advance in my investigation, after using one postulate I probably abandon it for one that is better. My knowledge evolves in getting better and better starting points in imagination for my guidance."

Then you ask the man of science, "Must you not admit that imagination is the foundation for all your activity of thought in investigating your own experience?" He probably replies: "I admit that I use imagination. But I don't trouble about where it comes from".

Then comes in Kant's philosophy from the point of view of the subject, which is termed philosophical anthropomorphism. Kant is scientific. He has already, to begin with, what has been recorded as to the man in the street and the man of science.

Now never mind about the opposition which is held to exist between the physical and metaphysical. In fact, the physicist is now moving towards acceptance of the fact that scientifically the foundation of the physical exists in the metaphysical.[2] But with this form of evolution we have nothing to do. All we are concerned with is: Does Kant prove *scientifically* that the real proper self of man is a transcendental subject? That is, does he prove

[1] If he holds that conceptions are impossible without experience he will not admit this.

[2] Cf. *Psyche*, Vol. V., p. 111 et seq.; mark pp. 115, 120.

that the subject from his own point of view determines himself (as a subject) to be no more than a conditioned form of himself, he *himself* being a transcendental subject?[1]

If Kant does so prove, we must hold that, quite apart from any question of God, Freewill, and Immortality, he established a supreme principle of vital importance for science. Science, as before said, always begins with conceptions (postulates).[2] As time passes these postulates are subject to progressive evolution. For instance, the postulate of the atom as indestructible has been of use in the investigation of man and the universe. And this increase of knowledge has not been lost when the postulate has been superseded by the use of another postulate—the divisibility of the atom. The new postulate has offered not an opposite, but a wider view of man and the universe. In the same way, when we no longer regard the conscious self of science as impermanent, but as permanent, we do not affect the purview of science in its investigation of experience. If Kant be right in proving that the appercipient self is the centrality for all the conceptions of science, science is interfered with in no way. It still has its empirical ego, that is, a conscious self coupled with experience. All science wants is the *conscious* ego as one of the terms for its empirical ego; it is not at present concerned with the what of this conscious ego.

[1] Kant uses the term "transcendental subject" as having the same meaning as "soul."

[2] Postulates are particular conceptions which science finds of use.

Science investigates conscientia, not scientia. Whatever this self may be, experience remains for the investigation of science.

So, if the scientific interpretation of the conscious ego leads, scientifically, to the conception of the conscious ego of science as being a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it, that interferes with science, *qua* its investigation into man and nature, in no way.

If we assume that Kant is successful in his proof of the centrality of the appercipient self[1] the proof interferes in no way with science. Science has nothing to do with the soul of man in relation to God, Freedom of the Will, and Immortality. The present argument has nothing to do with God, Freedom of the Will, or Immortality. It regards metaphysics as a science.

The present position of science is this.[2] Science must start with the implication of a conscious ego. It must start with the conception of a conscious subject coupled with experience. For science cannot deal with the absolute; it must start with conceptions of what is, and the first (the central) conception it must start with is that of the conscious ego. But the main object of science is the ultimate analysis of the experience of a conscious ego, though science, by the use of progressively evolving postulates, can only move towards the goal it seeks. So all science wants is no more than a conscious

[1] Proof that each one of us is a transcendental self, that is, a permanent self for which imagination is fundamental.

[2] Cf. *Psychological Principles,* by James Ward, pp. 39-40.

ego *so far* as it must exist for the man of science to proceed with his investigation into its experience. It matters not *what* this ego may be so long as it has consciousness *for experience*. The subject of science is an ego coupled with experience. It is for this subject that Space and Time are *evidential* absolutes. This is why Kant, from the point of view of the subject, regards Space, Time and objects as having reality, whereas from the point of view of the real proper self he regards them as phenomenal.

What then must the conscious ego of science be for the man of science to investigate its experience? It must be a *permanent* self-conscious ego, for the conscious ego of science must be permanent in order that its subject should be able to think as it does think, an ego free from the changes fundamental for Space-Time, one which always *is* and remains the same. If, as a conscious subject, the man of science did not enjoy (feel?) himself as a permanent self he could not, *existing as the same subject*, investigate his passing experience *in Time*.

Kant concerns himself mainly with the question of the subject with its transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception, and from this point of view regards Space and Time as realities. He recognises the fact that the subject, to carry on its normal existence, must regard Space and Time *as if* they were realities: they are evidential absolutes for the subject. But he recognises the fact that Space and Time have no reality in themselves, they are but formal principles. Duration is the essential and

qualitative element of Space-Time. At the same time he recognises the fact that the subject with its transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception must regard Space and Time *as if* they were realities. This Vaihinger understands, and—neglecting as he does the transcendental subject—he is right in claiming Kant as an adherent to his (Vaihinger's) philosophy of *As If*.

Science, I repeat, cannot begin with investigation into what *is*; it has to begin with *conceptions* of what *is*. The postulates of science are conceptions, and if the centrality of these conceptions is found in the existence of the appercipient self then science is based on the feeling that the real proper self of man is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it.

This conclusion may open the door for faith; open the door for God, Immortality and Free-will. But with any such question we are not now concerned. Science has no concern with what the soul of man may or may not be; the ego of science is a conscious self *coupled with experience*. It may be that the appercipient self is a purely spiritual subject, so that Kant's philosophy leads to a conclusion that only in the spiritual is reality to be found, a conclusion that is like to Bradley's in *Appearance and Reality*.[1] But with any such question we have now nothing to do. We are concerned, I repeat, only with Kant's principle of the supremacy of the appercipient self; we must keep at arm's length from any question of

[1] Cf. *Kant*, pp. 473, 474.

what the result may be if the principle be sound scientifically, as held by Kant.

Now one school denies the existence of the transcendental subject; its real proper self is the subject with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception. It gives reality to Space-Time and its subject is an object in Space-Time—it is a subject of body, brain and thought (correlated to motion of the brain), or, I think, in other words, an incomplete finite existent as held by Alexander. This subject comes into existence in Time and goes out of existence in Time. There is nothing permanent in or about it. There is no *I AM*.

But this school, I think, holds that its subject enjoys (feels?) itself as permanent in the midst of all its changes in body, brain and thought. The argument now is that we could not enjoy ourselves as permanent unless we were permanent. If so, the impermanent subject of this school cannot be the real proper self. This subject comes into existence in Time and goes out of existence in Time; it has nothing to do with the permanent. That it can enjoy itself as permanent amounts to a contradiction in terms. There is for it no *I AM*.

Kant, on the other hand, holds that the transcendental subject with transcendental unity not only exists, but is the real proper self, whereas the subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception is a state or form (conditioned in the *formal principles* of Space-Time) of the transcendental subject, which we feel as *I AM*.

Kant makes his postion clear in that part of

the *Critique* which is headed "Of the Original Synthetical Unity of Apperception." He holds that the transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception is the highest principle *of the subject*; it is an operation of the understanding of the subject.[1]

For the subject Space-Time is a reality. The subject is a subject of Space-Time and so cannot *itself* get outside of its limits to *define* them as limits. Space-Time is therefore a reality for the subject and the subject is an object in Space-Time. But it has the power of thinking.[2]

The subject can think, and this power of thinking has nothing to do with sensibility. It is an act of *spontaneity*. Kant says: "I call it pure apperception to distinguish it from empirical or primitive apperception, because it is a self-consciousness which, while it (as an act of spontaneity) gives birth to the representation *I think*, must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and, unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist *for me*. The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of apperception."[3]

[1] Cf. *Kant*, p. 81. In Max Müller's translation, p. 745. The understanding gets this power of synthesis from imagination, a function of the soul. Cf. Bergson's *Time and Freewill*, p. 123. There he refers to "an organisation of these units going on in the depths of the soul."

[2] This power of *thinking* cannot be traced for origin to the subject. The objects of experience are not things-in-themselves; they have no existence apart from experience. (*Kant*, 308). They exist for the conscious self *coupled with experience*.

[3] That is, the transcendental unity of apperception must exist and be *permanent* for the existence of the transcendental *synthetical* unity of the *subject*, which is that of a subject conditioned in Space and Time.

Mark the distinction Kant points out between the transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. The transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception is a reality for the subject because the subject exists within the limits of Space-Time, so that, for the subject, Space-Time with its objects is a reality. But it is the transcendental subject with consciousness of transcendental unity of apperception which is the genesis of the subject's transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. It is this pure apperception (the act of spontaneity) which *gives birth* to the representation *I think*, and so must accompany all our representations.[1]

Now how can *I* as a subject be conscious of this transcendental unity of apperception? As a subject of Space-Time I can only be conscious with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception. So long as Space-Time is regarded *by me* as a reality there is nothing in me that can transcend such consciousness.

But transcendental unity of apperception cannot exist in itself; there must be a subject of transcendental unity of apperception. This subject of transcendental unity of apperception is a permanent self in that, as a self-consciousness, it must "necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations."[2] It is something which must

[1] That is, we must be transcendental subjects with transcendental unity of apperception or we could not be subjects with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. But this *I AM* we feel, do not know.

[2] The *I AM* gives us the feeling of this permanent self-

always exist and exist free from the changes fundamental for Space-Time. What, then, is the relation between this subject of transcendental unity of apperception and the subject of transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception?

The subject of transcendental synthetical unity of apperception is a state or condition (limited by the formal principles of Space-Time) of the subject of transcendental unity of apperception. As Kant states it, we have the permanent self with its transcendental unity of apperception, while the changes of the subject with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception are but mere varieties in the condition of this permanent self which is always the same. The unity of the subject is synthetical because the subject is not itself permanent. The subject (impermanent) cannot have permanent unity; cannot be the *I AM*.[1]

The subject of transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception presents itself and its changes to *its real proper self*, the permanent self. The subject is conscious in *feeling* of being a state of its real proper self.

Kant makes this clear when he states: "Nay, the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), the determination of which is represented by the succession of different states in time,[2] is not the real proper self as it

consciousness. Bear in mind that those who deny the existence of the transcendental subject admit that we "enjoy" ourselves as permanent.

[1] *Kant*, p. 418.

[2] The *I* can determine itself as a subject of Space-Time existing in a succession of different states in Time.

exists in itself—not the transcendental subject—but only a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to it, unknown being."[1]

This transcendental subject is a permanent self; this "unknown being" is, for each one of us, our "real proper self." We feel *I AM*. Kant, by his philosophical anthropomorphism, offers proof that the subject can *prove* to itself that it is no more than a form, conditioned in Space-Time with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception, of its real proper self with transcendental unity of apperception. *What* this real proper self is the subject knows not. But it must be for the subject or the subject could not exist in its conditioned form. The subject *feels I AM* as a fact.

What then have we?

We are transcendental subjects with transcendental unity of apperception. What are we as subjects? We are forms (conditioned in the formal principles of Space and Time) of our own real proper selves, of ourselves as transcendental subjects, and, as such subjects, we have transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. "This principle is the highest of all *human* cognition."[2]

Now the subject knows not what it is as a transcendental subject, but it *feels* (enjoys) itself as a transcendental subject, that is, as a permanent self midst all its changes, and the term "changes"

[1] *Kant*, pp. 307, 308.
[2] *Kant*, p. 83. In Max Müller's translation (p. 747) he uses the term "knowledge" for cognition.

includes the changes fundamental for the subject itself as an object in Space-Time. The subject feels that its real proper self is a permanent self, and we assume that the subject could not feel this unless it were a transcendental subject. The subject feels *I AM*.

Regarding metaphysics as a science we have it that the subject is a thinking subject, and, with its transcendental synthetical unity of apperception, it thinks in Time. And what have we found? We have found that the subject could not think in Time unless it felt (enjoyed) itself as a permanent self. We may go further than this. Unless the real proper self of the subject were a transcendental subject it could not think at all. We must feel the *I AM* in order to think.

You say to me: "It follows that unless its conscious self were a permanent self the subject of science (a conscious self coupled with experience) could not *begin* to investigate its experience by thinking about it?"

"That is so. Science must begin with a conscious self which is permanent. It is thus that Kant, contrasting the transcendental unity of apperception of the transcendental subject with the transcendental synthetical unity of apperception of the subject, arrives at his proof of the centrality of the appercipient self."

"Science must begin with a conception of the existence of the appercipient self?"

Yes and No. In thinking, science must begin with the conception. But it only *feels* the existence

of its real proper self. It *uses* a conception the genesis of which is in the *feeling I AM*. Science has nothing to do with the absolute, it can only deal with conceptions of the absolute. *What* this appercipient self is science knows not, but it must be for science or the subject of science could not do what it does do. Without it, its subject could not think, could not *begin* to investigate the experience of its conscious self. The conscious self of science is the *I AM* which is *felt* but unknown. Science does not analyse experience, it analyses the experience *of a conscious self*, so it must *begin* with the conception of a conscious self coupled with experience.

The argument, shortly stated, is that the conscious self of science is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. It is Kant's transcendental subject. This self the subject does not know but *feels* as a reality. The subject feels it as *I AM*. It is thus Kant proves, scientifically, the centrality of the appercipient self, that is, of a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. And it is thus we find that the central state of the consciousness of the conscious subject of science exists in feeling. For the subject of science can and does say *cogito ergo sum*. And it could not say this unless it *felt* itself as *I AM*. This feeling as a fact must be for the subject before it can begin to think. It is a scientific fact that feeling transcends knowledge.

I AM

The Centrality of the Appercipient Self

The subject of Science exists in two terms There is a conscious self or ego and there is the experience of the conscious self. Science deals only with the conscious self *coupled with* its experience. What science centres its procedure on is to get nearer and nearer to an ultimate analysis of the experience *of the conscious self.*

The appercipient self is Kant's transcendental subject. It is not only a permanent self but a self which is apperceptive because imagination is fundamental for it. This self is appercipient because it is active with imagination.[1, 2]

Kant's supreme principle of the "Centrality of the Appercipient self" must be proved from the point of view of the subject, that is, scientific proof must be found that the conscious self of science is an appercipient self.

Science must *begin* with the basic fact of the existence of a conscious ego, so the *centrality* of the appercipient self is attained by proof that science must *begin* with the conception of an appercipient self *so far* as it is coupled with experience, for

[1] Cf. *Kant,* p. 81, bottom note. *A Study of Kant,* p. 173.
[2] The German term *ein Ichsein* is preferable to the term *ein Dasein* for this self. Cf. *A Study of Kant,* p. 173.

science only deals with its conscious self *so far* as it is coupled with experience.

As Kant, for proof, relies on what is evidential for the subject (with transcendental *synthetical* apperception)[1] his procedure is what James Ward terms philosophical anthropomorphism. So far, it is not pure philosophy, for his proof of this centrality does not involve any reference to God or Immortality. He merely states that it exists free from the impermanence of Space-Time.

Proof of the centrality of the appercipient self is necessary before God, Immortality, and, perhaps, Free-will can be considered by pure philosophy.[2] But with such questions we are not now concerned. We are now concerned only with Kant's proof of the centrality of the appercipient self. He regards metaphysics as a science (*Prolegomena*, ff. 46, *Kant*, p. xxvii.) and he must do this or his proof could not be scientific.

Kant, as we have found, wrote from two points of view, from that of the subject with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception and from that of the transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception. The question is:—

Does he prove scientifically, that is, from the point of view of the subject, that the *subject* can determine itself as no more than a form (conditioned, *a priori*, in the formal principles of Space and Time)

[1] Kant proves, evidentially, that the subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception is but a form of its real proper self with transcendental unity of apperception.

[2] Cf. *The Divine Law of Human Being* (Kegan Paul).

of itself as the real proper self? That is, does he prove, scientifically, that we are permanent appercipient selves?

Kant states:—"We now come to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position, and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions—not, like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition—and in it reason is the pupil of itself alone."[1]

Kant holds that metaphysics is a science because the subject can function with conceptions quite apart from the teachings of experience. Can the subject do this? Kant holds that the subject can do this: if it cannot his proof as to the appercipient self falls to the ground, falls to the ground as surely as Alexander's empirical philosophy of "Space, Time and Deity" falls to the ground if the extension of mind beyond the limits of the bodily life be verified.[2]

What Kant is now assumed to prove scientifically, is that the conscious self of science is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. This real proper self we *feel* to be a reality, but we do not know what it is. We *feel* it as *I AM*.

[1] *Kant,* p. xxvii. Max Müller's translation, p. 692. *Prolegomena,* ff. 40.
[2] Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity,* Vol. II., p. 424.

Conceptions

Let us get clear first of all what we mean by conceptions.[1]

In the first place we have it that Kant considers them from the point of view of the subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception *not* from the point of view of the *real proper self*, a subject with transcendental unity of apperception. This, as Valhinger understood, is important. Kant regards his categories (conceptions) *as if* the subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception were the real proper self.[2]

"These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, term categories" (*Kant*, p. 64); Kant's *categories are conceptions*. Now Kant's categories are closely akin to those of Aristotle. But the points of view from which Aristotle and Kant consider them are in direct opposition.

Let us consider this question of opposition. I now follow Sir W. Hamilton.

Aristotle did not attempt an analysis of human reason. He started with an assumption that things are real. What he attempted was to get a synthesis

[1] Cf. *Kant*, pp. 55 et seq. Max Müller's translation, pp. 52 et seq.

[2] Cf. *Kant*, p. 308. Valhinger's *The Philosophy of As If*, pp. 34, 75.

of these real things in their multiplicity. This synthesis was, for him, a power which exists in relation to thought. He had to get this synthesis in order that his subject, a subject of unity, could begin to think. The predicaments of Aristotle are real things as objectively understood.

Kant started with an analysis of mind *in its synthetical unity*. He did not start with the objective reality of things as real; that, he held, would be putting the cart before the horse. That the universe is presented to us in multiplicity is a fact. But how could the mind *in its unity* think about this multiplicity?

That great man, Hume, points out clearly the difficulty that arises from Aristotle's *starting* with objects as objectively real for thought. He says:

"In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to surrender either of them; viz., *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences*. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case."[1]

Now the mind never *perceives* any real connection among distinct existences, intuition[2] does not offer

[1] Cf. *Encycl. Brit.* (11th ed.), Vol. XIII., p. 882. *The Philosophical Works* of David Hume. Appendix, Vol. II., p. 543 (A. and C. Black, 1854). Refer also to Vol. I., p. 325 et seq. Hume uses the terms "conception" and "feeling"!

[2] Intuition here relates to the intuition of the subject which is limited in Space and Time.

to the subject any synthesis of the multiplicity presented. Hume could not find in perception the *synthesis* he must have under the categories (conceptions) as considered by Aristotle.

Then stepped in Kant with his new point of view as to the Categories. But, before Kant stepped in, what was the position?

Locke and Hume followed Aristotle. They *began* with the reality of experience, of experience as *perceived*. Locke met with pure conceptions of the understanding *in experience* and so sought to deduce them from experience. But this led him, vainly, to attempt, with their aid, to arrive at Cognitions (knowledge) which lie for beyond the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, to render this possible,[1] something was wanting in his philosophy. He understood that if the mind could *perceive* some real connection between the multiplicity of *distinct existences* the difficulty he was placed in would disappear. But he understood also that the mind could *not perceive* this connection, and in his philosophy he could not find the connection in *conception*. The position before Kant stepped in was that the categories were held to be deduced from (*a posteriori* to) experience. Kant reversed this. He held that the categories are *a priori* to experience. Kant's categories are conceptions of the understanding.

Science has nothing to do with what *is*, nothing

[1] That is, to arrive at cognitions beyond the limits of all experience, he must have synthesis; the mind must have a real connection amongst distinct existences.

to do with the absolute. It must *begin* with conceptions of what is before it can enter on its task of analysing human experience. These conceptions are conceptions of the understanding of the subject,[1] a subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. They not only are independent of the teachings of experience, but must exist, *a priori*, before the subject can be affected by the teachings of experience. This is what Kant held. He got from *conceptions* what Hume failed to get from *perceptions*.

But where did these conceptions come from? They did not come from perception—from the external *perception* of experience—and without these conceptions the multiplicity which experience presents could not be a subject of thought. Conceptions, Kant held, must have existence *a priori* before the subject could begin to think—could begin to have experience. These conceptions had to come from the understanding of the subject. They are conceptions of the subject, though the subject could not itself originate them.

Aristotle, Locke and Hume used Synthesis.[2] Hume understood that he *must* have it or he was faced in his philosophy by an insuperable difficulty. He sought it in *perception*, and failed to find it.

Kant recognised the fact that he must have synthesis for his subject, a subject of transcend-

[1] Their *origin* is in imagination, as we shall find.

[2] "In the most general sense I understand by synthesis the act of arranging different representations together and of comprehending what is manifold in them under one form of knowledge." (Max Müller's translation, p. 64. *Kant*, p. 62).

ental *synthetical* unity of apperception. He could not find it in perception; he could not find it in the understanding of the subject. What he did was to introduce what Alexander terms "a superior entity." Kant holds that:

> "Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation (result) of the imagination—a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition (knowledge) whatever, but of the working (existence) of which we are seldom even conscious."[1]

Kant thus makes all knowledge subjective to synthesis, and this synthesis he holds comes from the soul of man, imagination being fundamental for the soul.[2] (*Kant*, p. 62).

But still, Kant has not so far got his conceptions. For these conceptions are conceptions *of the understanding of the subject.* For the existence of these conceptions the *a priori* existence of synthesis is imperative, but these conceptions come into existence from the subject itself; it is the subject which has the power, through synthesis, to give birth to conceptions. Kant holds:

> "But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by *perception* (my italics), but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining *a priori,* and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest in all human cognition (knowledge)."[3]

[1] *Kant,* pp. 62, 63. Max Müller's translation, pp. 64, 65. I give Müller's words in brackets.

[2] Kant never defines the soul. He considers it as akin to his real proper self, that is, to his transcendental subject.

[3] *Kant,* p. 83; Max Müller's translation, p. 747. Mark the words *human cognition,* that is, the knowledge of the subject.

This unity of apperception is a synthetical unity of apperception.

Again, Kant states:

> " The first thing which must be given to us in order to the *a priori* cognition of all objects is the diversity of the pure intuitions[1]; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second, but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding."[2] Thus Kant gets conceptions.

Following Kant, conceptions (Kant's categories) come from the understanding of the subject, *but* the possibility of the existence of these conceptions exists in the fact of *synthesis*, and synthesis comes from the imagination of the transcendental subject. Kant relies on the existence of a " superior entity."

In considering this question of the origin of conceptions we must keep in mind the fact that the unity of the subject is no more than a transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. The understanding of the subject can only think; it cannot intuite. It has to depend on the intuition which is given to it. And its intuition presents to it multiplicity. That is why, for its unity, it requires synthesis.

Kant's categories are conceptions of the understanding of the subject, a subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception; it is because this unity is *synthetical* that synthesis is necessary

[1] We must start with something given us to think about.
[2] *Kant*, p. 63. Max Müller's translation, p. 65.

for the unity of the subject.[1] This synthesis cannot come from perception, cannot come from the understanding of the subject, but it *must* be for the subject or the understanding of the subject could not have conceptions quite apart from the teachings of experience; the subject has these conceptions.

Whence then comes this synthesis? All attempts at tracing its source from the subject itself fail. But synthesis does exist *for* the subject. It must come from imagination, and imagination is "deep buried" in the soul of man.[2] Even at this stage of the argument we have found that synthesis is necessary for the subject *before* it can begin to think. And synthesis comes from imagination, from the imagination of the transcendental subject.

Can the subject function with conceptions quite apart from the teachings of experience? This must be proved or Kant's attempt to treat metaphysics as a science fails, and it is therefore impossible for him to prove scientifically the centrality of the appercipient self.[3]

Now Alexander, in *Space, Time and Deity*, denies that the subject can function with conceptions apart from experience.[4] The mind that he postulates is a

[1] The transcendental subject has transcendental unity of apperception.

[2] Bear in mind, I repeat, that this term "soul," as used by Kant, is the same as his transcendental subject, a subject which *is* but which we cannot define in thought.

[3] Cf. *Kant,* pp. 77, 78. Max Müller's translation, pp. 79, 80, 81.

[4] I think we may take Alexander as a protagonist of empirical philosophy.

mind of restrictions, " the most important of which is that it shall not go beyond what is found or suggested by experience." Alexander's subject is a conscious ego coupled with (restricted by?) experience. He holds that it is not necessary to invent an entity superior both to things and to passing mental states.[1] And then he goes on:

> " Such a mind is never experienced and does not enter, therefore, into the view of an empirical philosophy. Nor is it of any avail to answer that, although not experienced, it must be postulated to account for certain experiences. The empirical method approves such postulation, which is habitual in science. But the entities, atoms or ions which physics, for instance, postulates, or the molecules of the chemist, are all of them conceived on the analogy of something else which is *known* (my italics) to experience."[2]

As to this no reply is now necessary. For we shall find when we next consider " Imagination and Science " that experience is dynamic, not static—our knowledge evolves, and it could not evolve, could not even begin to exist without preceding conceptions of what *is*. The postulates of science are conceptions which science assumes will assist it in giving *knowledge* of what the experience is of its conscious self. If the conscious self were not conscious in feeling of the reality of something unknown to it, it would have nothing to learn. The feeling of the unknown must precede all knowledge.

So far as the argument has gone we have found that the subject has the power of thought and the power of using conceptions which have their

[1] He denies the existence of the transcendental subject.
[2] Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*, p. 17.

genesis in imagination. The very existence of the subject as a thinking subject, it is herein held, must begin with conceptions apart from the teachings of experience. And the *genesis* of these conceptions of the subject's understanding we have found in imagination, imagination being the activity of the transcendental subject, an *appercipient self*, that is, a permanent self which is active because imagination is fundamental for it. The real proper self is the transcendental subject; the subject is but a form (conditioned *a priori* under the formal principles of Space and Time)[1] of its real proper self.

We have been scientific, that is, we have relied on what is evidence for the subject; our procedure has been that of philosophical anthropomorphism. For we have ignored all reference to God and Immortality. The permanent self is no more than a self free from the restrictions of Space-Time. All in and of Space-Time is impermanent.

Now science, I repeat, has nothing to do with the absolute. It would like to get and strives to get a postulate which would explain the absolute. But this it cannot do. It must *start* with conceptions (apart from experience) of what *is*; conceptions, that is, of the absolute.[2]

Science not only can function with conceptions apart from the teaching of science, but must start

[1] As the argument develops we shall find Space in itself and Time in itself, held by science, not to be absolutes.

[2] Science uses perception but must proceed to reliance on conceptions for its subject to be able to get into touch with reality.

with its postulates (which are conceptions) *before* it can enter on its analysis of experience. Science does not investigate the experience of living organisms at large. It investigates the experience of conscious subjects. To do this it must begin with conceptions apart from the teachings of experience, and the genesis of these conceptions is found in imagination. Science is concerned with conscientia, not with scientia (Baaber).

Metaphysics regarded as a science can deal with conceptions quite apart from experience.

Imagination and Science

Proof has already been offered that science has nothing to do with the absolute but must begin with conceptions of the obsolute, that is, with conceptions of what *is*. And these conceptions have been traced back, for origin, to imagination. But still more direct scientific proof is open to us to the effect that science *must* use imagination before entering on the analysis of experience. And, if this be so, science must hold that the conscious self of the subject of science[1] must so exist as to give science its conceptions *quite apart* from the teachings of experience.

This direct scientific proof we find evidenced in a paper by Tyndall on "The Scientific Use of the Imagination."[2] He prefaces the paper by the following statement of Sir Benjamin Brodie:

"Lastly, physical investigation, more than anything besides, helps to teach us the actual and right use of the imagination—of that wondrous faculty which, left to ramble uncontrolled, leads us astray into a wilderness of perplexities and errors, a land of mist and shadows; but which, properly controlled by experience and reflection, becomes the noblest attribute of man, the source of poetic genius, the

[1] That is, a conscious self coupled with experience.
[2] Cf. *Fragments of Science* (6th Ed.), Vol. VI., p. 101.

instrument of discovery in science, without the aid of which Newton would never have invented fluxions, nor Davy have decomposed the earths and alkalies, nor would Columbus have found another continent."[1]

This means that *ignorance is of more importance for science than acquired knowledge*. Scientific knowledge evolves, and so, to evolve, it must have the vast prairie of imagination to evolve into. This vast *unknown* must be a *felt* reality for science or there would be nothing for it to advance into. The prairie must exist for thought to have something to cultivate.[2] Tyndall himself may be taken to agree with Sir Benjamin, for he not only uses his statement but says himself:—

"Scientific men fight shy of the word" (imagination) "because of its ultra-scientific connotations; but the fact is that without the exercise of this power our knowledge of nature would be a mere tabulation of co-existences and sequences." (p. 104).

Dr. Dorothy Wrinch states:[3]

"A theory,[4] to be successful, must go beyond the facts it is designed to explain and point the way to new advances. It must give a lead to experiment and observation. It must go *before* (my

[1] Hume states: "The memory, senses and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination or the vivacity of our ideas." But he points out also that, left to ramble uncontrolled, imagination leads us into a land of mists and shadows. Cf. Hume's *Philosophical Works*, Vol. I., p. 327 (1854).

[2] Fichts understood that *feeling* (awareness) of the unknown must precede the known.

[3] *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. II., p. 162.

[4] All theories are based on postulates.

italics) practical scientific practice, not lag behind it."

I can find no authoritative statements in opposition to what is above recorded, so I accept the statements as correct. Then what have we?

We have the scientific fact that science *uses* imagination. But we have more than this. We have the fact that *without* imagination science could make no advance in its analysis of the experience of the conscious self. For this analysis is not analysis of what is known; it spells constant advance into the unknown—the prairie of imagination. The stuff that science uses is the unknown: if the unknown did not exist for science, science would have nothing to do. It is thus that science must *begin* with imagination. Science begins with the innumerable conceptions that imagination offers to it, and picks and chooses those of them which it expects will hold in the analysis of experience. Those it picks and chooses it terms postulates. We find that though we are seldom conscious of the working of imagination we should, without it, have no knowledge (*Kant*, p. 112). Imagination is fundamental for science. The subject cultivates with thought the prairie of imagination which the transcendental subject presents to it.

Imagination and Synthetical Unity

Science, I again repeat, has nothing to do with the absolute; it must begin with conceptions of the absolute, conceptions of what *is*. These conceptions are conceptions of the understanding of the

subject. But before these conceptions can exist for the subject we must have the unity of the subject.[1] What is this unity? It is *not* a transcendental unity of apperception; it is a transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. Synthesis is obligatory for this unity. Synthesis cannot be traced back to perception or directly to the understanding of the subject. Synthesis has its genesis in imagination. But imagination cannot exist in itself; there must be a subject of imagination, and this subject must have transcendental unity of apperception. The transcendental *synthetical* unity of the subject is a particular form of transcendental unity. The conscious subject of science, with its synthetical unity of apperception, must, before entering on any analysis of its experience, begin with conceptions. And the genesis of these conceptions is found in imagination. Science must begin with imagination.

The wondrous faculty of imagination, "which, left to ramble uncontrolled, leads us astray into a wilderness of perplexities and errors, a land of mist and shadows," does this because in itself it requires no synthesis. The subject can *use* it scientifically only so far as it gives the understanding of the subject, with its synthetical unity, *conceptions*, some of which (terming them postulates) the subject can use for its analysis of its experience.

The conscious self of science is absorbed in the analysis of its own experience, and to *begin* this

[1] We have found that this unity cannot be traced back to perception.

analysis it must exercise the power of imagination. But imagination, as we have seen, cannot be traced back either to perception or to the understanding of the subject, for the understanding of the subject can only operate with the conceptions which imagination offers to it. Pure imagination is the imagination of Kant's real proper self with transcendental unity of apperception—the transcendental subject. The conscious subject of science with synthetical unity of apperception starts its analysis of experience with the use of imagination which comes from its real proper self.

A conscious subject, which is an impermanent object in Space-Time, cannot of itself exercise the power of imagination. But the conscious subject of science does exercise this power. The conscious self of science, then, must be a permanent self. For science, using imagination, proceeds beyond the limits of Space-Time and its fundamental changes.[1] Science begins with postulates (which are conceptions) *before* it can enter on its analysis of experience, and, as these conceptions have imagination for their origin, it follows that science *begins with the use of imagination*. Therefore the conscious self of science must have imagination fundamental for it; it must be a permanent self or the subject (impermanent) could not exist with its synthetical unity and so have knowledge. This conscious self we *feel* as *I AM*.

[1] Cf. *Psyche*, Vol. V., p. 365.

Character

We have found that the subject with its synthetical unity of apperception exercises imagination and this subject can say *cogito ergo sum.* The present argument is that the subject cannot say *cogito ergo sum* unless it first of all feels the *I AM.*[1]

Let us consider the philosophy of a large school which stops short at man with synthetical unity. It denies the existence of the transcendental subject, holding that man with synthetical unity is the real proper self. Let us consider this hypothesis. What it does is to make the personality of man determined by his character. How can we define character?

In the 13th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (Vol. I., p. 569) there is a definition and analysis of character which I now follow.

Instincts, habits, impulses, desires, emotions, sentiments all belong to character. But where the principles of conduct and its ideals come from we do not know. The writer ends by stating: "The potentials of his (man's) character transcend for better or worse everything that he has drawn from

[1] We must feel the "pure ego" in order to *know* the "empirical ego." (Cf. *A Study of Kant,* p. 155).

them to build up his natural woes and hates, and remain a perpetual enigma to him."[1]

This shows, I think, that character does not determine the personality of man. Character does not determine its principles and ideals; they are the potentials of character. The reason of man reaches out to the fact that character is determined by its potentials, but they remain for man a perpetual enigma. Character does not determine the personality.

But we can attack the question of character more directly by a reference to Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity*, where (Vol. I., p. 103) he states: "I call this union of mind and body the person. In every stage of the growth of our self or person two elements are palpably present, one the body and the other the subject or consciousness. Sometimes it is the body which is predominant, as when I say I have a headache or a cold and do not feel quite myself; sometimes it is the subject or mental factor, as when I say I am most myself when I let myself go dreaming by day, or I never feel like myself when I am doing something so distasteful as reading examination papers or books of travel, or that I wish myself 'like to one more rich in hope.' In the first case myself is an embodied self; in the second it is the inner self, the self which thinks, desires, imagines, wishes, wills. The most developed stage of the person is the personality,

[1] Hugh Elliott, in his book *Human Character* (pp. 5 and 6), recognises the fact that feeling (often unconsciously) is at the back of logical reasoning, and that the character of an individual is not an absolute fixed property.

the persistent stable organised set of habits, of action, thought and feeling by which I am to be judged, by which I stand or fall. I say, for instance, I was not myself when I lied or cheated. The person is in the first place mainly a body, in the second it is mainly something psychical, in the third it is something spiritual. The *two elements* (my italics) are, however, traceable everywhere in the history; the one the body, what Locke calls the man, the other the subject, the element of consciousness itself."

When Alexander states that the most developed stage of the person is the personality and that this personality exists in a persistent stable organisation of a set of habits, of action, thought and feeling by which I am to be judged, by which I stand or fall, he holds that the personality is determined by *character*. For it is my *character* by which I am judged and by which, in relation to my fellows, I must stand or fall. He thus denies the existence of the transcendental subject; he terms it a "superior entity," which is not necessary in order to determine the personality of man. It is by my *character* that I am judged and by which, in relation to my fellows, I must stand or fall. He states, indeed, that there is something of the spiritual in man's personality, but how he brings the spiritual into subjection to his *two elements* he does not explain. If we are to give any meaning to the spiritual I think we must hold it is *something* which has nothing to do with the changes implicit for Space-Time, that it is something unconditioned thereby.

But now let this objection pass. The main objection to Alexander's reliance on character is that character is never for any man "a persistent stable organisation." The character of a man is not only "built up" by changes in social and economic environment, but it is subject to sudden changes in *time*. It is impermanent; it is never a persistent stable organisation.

At the meeting of the British Association at Leeds Dr. W. T. Mitchell was president, on the 5th September, 1927, of one meeting. In his presidential address he states:

"The unitary personality as an organisation of mental activities and mental powers is not static, but dynamic, and is in process of development throughout life.[1] Although it carries with it, as a physical correlate, a unitary working of the brain and of other parts of the body, this does not necessarily involve complete dependence upon the latter for its continued existence."

This is in agreement with what we have found in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Character does not exhaust the personality, for the potentials of personal character remain a perpetual enigma to each one of us as personalities.

Consider certain instances of the instability of character:

In fiction we find drawn *one* personality manifest now as Dr. Jekyll, again as Mr. Hyde. An exaggeration, it is true, but based on facts of human personality, as were Dickens' human beings.

[1] This is a definition of the *character* of the personality.

Again, Dr. Primrose in *The Vicar of Wakefield*, speaking of his two daughters, says: "I have often seen them exchange characters for a whole day together. A suit of mourning has transformed my coquette into a prude, and a new set of ribands has given her younger sister more than usual vivacity."

In judging marked men of the past, or even of the present, the personality of any one man is to some of us good, to some of us bad, to some of us a mixture of good and bad. When I say to myself I am *not* myself when I lie or cheat, I am lying to myself. For I, the same personality, have been for the time a liar and a cheat. *Spiritually*, I think, I *do* feel, after lying or cheating, that in so doing I was *not* myself. But this is not what Alexander means. For the personality he gives to man is that of an incomplete finite existent, not that of a spiritual being.

Coming down to instances of normal life we find that the Salvation Army and no few priests of dogmatic forms of religion give definite evidence of sudden changes of character, cases where the man remains the same man but manifests a definite change of character. We now have nothing to do with the *cause* of this change; all relied on is the fact of the change. Each one of us is conscious that however he may, *in passing time*, change in character, that is, change *qua* habit, impulse, emotion, he remains himself as a personality. He remains *I AM*.

This question of character has direct bearing on

the present argument. For the present argument is largely in agreement with Alexander's empirical philosophy; *so far as that philosophy goes*, it may be in great part accepted.

It is true that, in relation to my fellows, I stand and fall and am judged by my character—by my "set of habits, of action, thought and feeling." But my character, as we have found, is not "a persistent stable organisation." It is subject to change in time. If it determines the personality of man, then man is what Alexander terms him, that is, "an incomplete finite existent," coming into existence at birth and going out of existence on death. So far Alexander's empirical philosophy is sound. And, I think, we may go further in agreement with him. For he must give unity to his personality; the personality can and does say *cogito ergo sum*, and it could not do this unless it were a unity. But it has no more than *synthetical* unity of apperception.[1] Alexander rejects the existence of pure unity of apperception. The subject does think, but without this synthetical unity it could not think (*Kant*, p. 83). Empirically, Alexander does determine himself and his fellows as incomplete finite existents; if the character of man determines his personality, man is no more than an impermanent "thing."

[1] Descartes denied that imagination gives to the subject synthetical unity; he held that the universe is presented to man in multiplicity and that man has but distinct unrelated ideas. But Descartes *had* to find his synthetical unity. He found it in God. (Cf. *Spinosa, Descartes, and Maimonides*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.)

But, sound as empirical philosophy is, does it go far enough? Does it not leave unsolved a great deal that the reason of the subject makes him aware *must be* for empirical philosophy to be accepted as possible and reasonable?

If Alexander were himself this incomplete finite existent how could he determine himself and his fellows as incomplete finite existents? How could he transcend subject and object by making himself an object to himself? This he could not do.

Not unfairly to paraphrase Alexander, he says that we all enjoy (feel?) ourselves as permanent in the midst of all our changes of body, brain and thought; in the midst, that is, *of all our changes of character*.[1]

It is because of this *feeling* of permanence in himself that Alexander has been able to determine himself and his fellow subjects as incomplete finite existents, as things of character. Without this *enjoyment* of himself as permanent he could not have done what he has done. He could not have begun to embark on his empirical philosophy without a previous assumption of the reality of himself as permanent. He must have felt the *I AM*.

Let us consider what it is he has done. He has proved that, as subjects of science, he and his fellows are incomplete finite existents; as subjects they are not permanent.[2] But, for proof, what has he started with? He has started with the conceptions of a conscious self coupled with experience.

[1] *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. I., p. 29.
[2] This is in full agreement with Kant.

Then, what does he assume? He assumes that his subject is no more than an *experiencer*. What does this mean? It means that the personality (the real proper self) is no more than a conscious self coupled with experience. He holds that the conscious self has no existence except as an experiencer. His very definition of personality is the definition of an experiencer.[1] He holds that the conscious self exists only *so far* as it is an experiencer; the personality is determined by the character of the subject—man is no more than an incomplete finite existent.

Empirical philosophy, I think, carries us no further. But it must go further. For it assumes that we as empirical subjects can *know* ourselves as empirical subjects. And this we cannot do, for we, as subjects, cannot transcend subject and object. The empirical ego must *feel* its conscious self as a permanent subject, as *I AM*, before it can know itself as an empirical ego. James Ward puts this clearly when he states:

"Well, it is an undoubted fact that when at length we have attained to self-consciousness we can distinguish between our knowledge of self—the so-called empirical Ego—and the subject that we must be to have this knowledge—the so-called 'pure Ego.'"[2]

In order to know himself and his fellows as empirical egos Alexander was bound, first of all,

[1] In deference to Alexander I ignore his statement that, in man, there is something of the spiritual.

[2] Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 155.

to *feel* (be aware of) himself as a pure Ego.[1] In his own words, he enjoyed (and enjoys) himself as permanent. This enjoyment (?) is in feeling, not knowledge, but the feeling had to exist for Alexander *before* he could begin to think out his philosophy.

Our consideration of character offers a particular instance of the general fact that the present argument assumes to prove: Science cannot deal with what is; it has to begin with conceptions of what is. Otherwise it is ignorant of what is. The basic or central fact that science must start with is the awareness of a conscious self which is permanent with imagination fundamental for it. The subject of science is this conscious self coupled with experience; that is, science uses its conscious self only so far as it is coupled with experience. Personality is so far defined by character, for science regards its subject as no more than an experiencer. But this subject of science can think, and reason makes it aware, as an experiencer, that its experience must, for its existence, be that of a permanent conscious self with imagination fundamental for it. The character of any subject exists only for it as an empirical ego.

[1] This "pure Ego" is a permanent self for which imagination is fundamental.

Sense and Understanding

When we consider Kant's statement that "all our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason" (*Kant*, p. 121) we find, again, that the conscious self of science is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it.

We will begin with a consideration of sense and show how science must thence proceed to understanding.[1] Reason must be considered later on.

Let us first consider Sense. The subject is an object in Space-Time. From its place in Space-Time it has perception.

You perceive two trees of the same size, one near you, the other at a distance. The near tree appears to you larger than the distant tree. You perceive the sun; it appears to you to be about the size of a dinner plate and to move slowly round you. You perceive the stars; they appear to you as fixed points of light.

But then you have the power of thought and you begin to think about all that you perceive. When you think about the two trees you think about them not as differing in size, as they appear, but as equal in size. When you think about the sun you think

[1] "The mind is lord and master—outward sense
The obedient servant of her will." (*The Prelude*).

about it as very great in size, and not moving round you slowly, but that *you* are moving round it at a great rate. When you think about the stars you think about them not as fixed points of light but as vast bodies at vast distances moving at prodigious rates of speed.

Which point of view do you accept as giving you the nearer approach to truth? Your point of view of *perception* or your point of view in *conception*, that is, in thinking about what you perceive? You accept the point of view of conception.

Science begins by using perception, but corrects what it perceives by its *thought* about what it perceives; that is, by conception. Science relies on its conceptions to explain and transcend its perceptions; it makes the sensible universe subjective to the intelligible universe. Sense-percepts do not satisfy science (Hume). Science relies on the concepts of imagination, and from them chooses some, which it terms postulates, for use. These innumerable conceptions *must* be first presented to science or it would not have the postulates that it uses.

Science proceeds to understanding from sense.

Now, in making perception subjective to conception, what is it science has done? It has done this. Its point of view is no longer that of man as an object in Space-Time, for then the law of the inverse square applies, while for thought this law does not apply. If you say all thought does is, in imagination, to extend the body as occupying all Space-Time, what are you doing? You are

destroying Space-Time. If, in *extension, your body is Space-Time* you will find Space-Time has no meaning at all. In such case science uses imagination to get rid of Space-Time![1]

Science begins with and uses perceptions, but transcends them by conceptions.

When science begins its analysis of experience with conceptions, what is its point of view?

Alexander's statement that the mind exists but in the body is not, herein, accepted.[2] But the mind, as he holds, *can* contemplate its body. It contemplates it how? As an impermanent object in Space-Time. But to do this the mind must, itself, be free from (outside) the limitations of Space-Time. This is the point of view that science takes in making perception subjective to conception. Conception transcends perception. For, in thought, the conscious self of science may be said to see its body and its universe as they really are, unconditioned by the law of the inverse square. And to do this it (the mind) must be assumed to be everywhere at the same moment.

For the mind Space-Time, with its limitations, does not exist. The point of view of the mind which thinks is free from the restrictions of Space-Time. Then what have we? The reason of man makes him aware that from this general point of view he gets nearer to the truth of what is than

[1] Alexander, in *Space, Time, and Deity,* considers his "Angelic" point of view. (Cf. Vol. I., p. 19). Is not his " angel " anthropomorphic?

[2] If we ourselves are mere objects in Space-Time our minds exist only when in bodies.

from the point of view of himself *as a subject of Space-Time*. As a subject of Space-Time man cannot get outside Space-Time to have the general point of view. There must be power to experience or exercise imagination.

Consider, again, what the conceptions are that imagination offers to science to begin with. Imagination, our wondrous faculty, "left to ramble uncontrolled, leads us astray into a wilderness of perplexities and errors, a land of mist and shadows." The conceptions offered to science for its use are innumerable and they are not, as given, conditioned under the formal principles of Space and Time. Science, to use them, must condition them in Space-Time—really in its four dimensional continuum, though we must continue to use the term Space-Time. There are the conceptions of the Arabian Nights and of innumerable faerie imaginings; the conceptions of wireless, television and no few others were offered to science long before science made any use of them. What, then, does the "land of mist and shadows," into which imagination leads us, mean? It means no more than that these conceptions are, for the most part, useless for science. Why useless? Because generally they give science no assistance towards its analysis of human experience. These conceptions do exist for us as subjects, and it is as erroneous to say they are false as to say they are true. The Chinaman who *was* a butterfly while he was dreaming that he was one, and woke up to find himself a man, was right when he held he

might really be a butterfly while dreaming he was a man. He was right in deciding that he could not determine which was a mere dream. The only test we can use scientifically to determine conceptions as true or false is this: Are they or are they not useful for science?

Till lately, for instance, the conception of wireless communication was useless for science. The conception itself has not changed, but while formerly science regarded it as a fictitious conception it now regards it as reasonable. It is now a postulate of science. Science wants only those conceptions which are useful and necessary for it in its analysis of human experience. The conscious self of science has innumerable conceptions; the subject of science *uses* only those which it wants for its analysis of experience, and terms them postulates.

What takes place is this:

Imagination presents to the understanding innumerable conceptions. If these conceptions were not so presented science could not begin its analysis of the experience of the conscious self. Science picks and chooses certain of these conceptions which it finds useful (and necessary) for its analysis of experience. Then it terms the conceptions it has accepted the *postulates of science*. These postulates are conceived, not perceived. Though termed postulates they remain conceptions. Thus we see that science proceeds from sense to understanding, for it gets its conceptions from understanding.

But there is a great distinction between conceptions and postulates. Trace back human thought into the past and we find that conceptions have always existed for the conscious self; it has always been functioning with the conceptions offered to it by imagination. Indeed, in the past the conceptions of imagination have been more rampantly used than in the present. But postulates?

It may be assumed that science, in its analysis of experience, progresses. As Time passes we learn more and more of what our experience is. It is true that science would like to arrive at some simple, ultimate postulate which would explain everything, which would lead to an *ultimate* analysis of human experience. But this would appear to be impossible, for the universe of science is a universe of relativity. At the same time, I think, science does advance towards this ultimate analysis. How does the advance take place? By the *evolution progressively of the postulates of science*. Imagination always presents innumerable conceptions to the understanding; from this inexhaustible reservoir the understanding, as time passes, picks and chooses postulates for its analysis of experience and, learning from the past, its postulates evolve towards the truth. For instance, till the last few hundred years science proceeded on the postulate that the sun moves round the earth, and with this postulate made some advance in its analysis of experience. *Now* the postulate is abandoned for the postulate that the earth moves round the sun. We *perceive* the sun moving round

the earth; we *conceive* the earth moving round the sun. We transcend perception by conception. Then what is it we do? We *use* perception, but make it subjective to conception.

Again, till lately, science accepted the postulate that the atom is indestructible, is an ultimate of matter. The theory it accepted was based on this postulate. Now, the postulate is abandoned as incorrect; the atom is held to be divisible, and science (faced by the land of mist and shadows which the conceptions of imagination present to it) is labouring to find *what* is the ultimate of matter. At present its sheet anchor is energy; that is, something unknown, apart from its manifestations, but which must be free from the impermanence of Space-Time. (Cf. *Kant*, p. 259, where he shows that any ultimate analysis of matter lands science into the unconditioned).

But as Alexander, in *Space, Time, and Deity*, regards the conception of the atom as derived from or analogous to experience something more must be said on the subject.

Till lately science held to the conception of the indivisibility of the atom as being useful as a postulate of science. Did it get the conception from experience? It did not, for now it holds the conception to be useless as a postulate. The conception *preceded* the analysis of experience. Positive and negative electrons, the nucleus, the proton, quantums of energy, forms of energy, energy itself? Perception has no part here; all are based on conceptions which may or may not be

sound for theories as to the ultimate of matter; they are but "shots" made at the target of truth—they may or may not be near the bulls-eye. Science can never hit the bulls-eye; it can only use conceptions which get nearer and nearer to the bulls-eye. Science is faced by experience. It must *first of all function* with conceptions before it can begin to try and find out what experience is. Science must exercise imagination before it can get to work. Theory must precede practice.

What happens is this: Science begins its analysis of experience by exercising its power of imagination; that is, it *begins* with conceptions which imagination presents to it. These conceptions are innumerable—"a land of mists and shadows." What does science do? It picks and chooses certain of these conceptions and then terms them the postulates of science. But they remain as conceptions.

These postulates are not absolutes; they evolve as time passes and as science progresses in its analysis of experience. For instance, up to a certain time science used a theory based on the postulate that the atom is indivisible. Then it abandoned the postulate for another. Science *changed* the theory on which it proceeds in its analysis. Its analysis of experience is always impossible unless preceded by some theory. All theories are based on postulates and these postulates must precede experience, for if they were deductions from experience they would *all be sound* for the analysis of experience. They are, in fact,

useful for the analysis, but useful only for passing time.[1] The postulate that the atom is indestructible was useful for science for the passing time. But now it is found that the postulate is unsound; it had in its origin nothing to do with any ultimate of experience. Even at the present time science has not reached out to any *ultimate* postulate; the postulates of science are not more than shots at the bulls-eye of the ultimate postulate. But I think the shooting improves.

The point is that science must begin with theory before it can enter on practice. And the postulates on which theories are founded are but approximations to the ultimate postulate which is the ideal of science.[2] The analysis of experience by science, assuming it evolves progressively, is always defective. Why? Because science, *before* it can start its analysis, must start with *some* theory founded on postulates, and no postulate is ultimate.[3]

The postulates of science precede experience. The postulates of science come from imagination, so without imagination there can be no knowledge. (*Kant*, pp. 62, 63).

Again, we find that before we have any experience, science peers into the "land of mists and shadows" which the innumerable conceptions of imagination present to us. The conceptions of

[1] To paraphrase Hegel each new postulate is based on the negation of that preceding it, but both are part of the process towards the ultimate postulate.

[2] Alexander holds that science *habitually* uses postulates. *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. I., p. 17.

[3] If science were not faced by the unknown, nothing could exist for what it knows to advance into further knowledge.

wireless communication, of television? They have always existed for us in imagination in the land of mists and shadows. But, till lately, science regarded them as *fictitious* conceptions. Why? Because they had nothing to do with experience.[1] But *now* they have been found to have something to do with experience, and so both are regarded as postulates of science.

The conscious self must exist before science can begin to analyse its experience. But perception gives no assistance in itself to help on this analysis. Experience exists, but to find out what it is science must think about it. And when science thinks about it, science must use conception, not perception. Science perceives something. To find out what it is that it perceives science can only use conceptions of what it is; it cannot think directly what it is. Imagination presents to science innumerable conceptions of what is. Most of these conceptions have nothing to do with (human) experience, and so, as a class, they neither come from nor are they analogous to experience. Science picks and chooses some of them, which it terms postulates of science. But the fact of this exercise of choice does not alter the fact that these picked conceptions come from imagination. Postulates remain conceptions. Why does science exercise this choice? Because these particular conceptions (postulates) must exist *a priori* for science before it can begin its analysis of experience. But these particular

[1] Cf. *Kant*, p. 164. Kant's consideration of telepathy is interesting.

conceptions still come from imagination, *not* from experience. Sense is used, but used only as useful for understanding.

When science starts with some theory founded on postulation it is ignored, at the outset, whether or not the theory will be useful for science in its analysis. Science, by the use of thought (not perception), tries the theory and uses it. Then, as time passes, science abandons it for one better. But still science can never reach the best of all—an ultimate postulate. Why is this? Because science can only deal with *conceptions of* what is.

Science is still engaged in and has work to do in its analysis of experience. If it had completed its analysis there would be nothing left for it to do. Ignorance *must* be for progressive activity of thought. It is imagination in its prairie of mist and shadows that is of supreme importance for thinking man.[1] It is into this prairie that science advances, picking out the conceptions that are useful. Useful for what? Useful for man as a conscious self coupled with experience to advance in knowledge. What is this experience? The experience of man as an object in Space-Time of his lilliputian world.[2] But this man can think, can use conceptions not confined to the restrictive formal principles of Space-Time. The conscious self can function with imagination, the conceptions

[1] Never mind if this brings you into agreement with Kant and Bradley that real reality is to be found only in the spiritual. With that question we have nothing to do.

[2] Do not forget that Einstein's world, though boundless, is a *limited universe*.

of his understanding are *not* confined to the postulates of science.[1]

As in a jig-saw puzzle, we are faced by the innumerable conceptions of imagination. We are conscious that, put together in true relations, these jig-saw pieces would complete a supreme picture. But all we can do, as conscious selves coupled with experience, is to put together some of the conceptions which tend to complete that little part of the supreme picture which can exist for us under the formal principles of Space and Time.

To analyse experience science must start with conceptions which have nothing to do with the teachings of experience. Kant is right. Man, as a subject, can not only function with conceptions apart from the teachings of experience, but must do so or he could not be a pupil of experience. And it is imagination which gives birth to these conceptions.

It is thus that we find all our knowledge begins with sense (perception) and proceeds thence to understanding (conception). Science makes use of perception; it functions with understanding.

[1] The argument is strengthened when we bear in mind that though science still uses the term Space-Time, it has reduced Space-Time into a four dimensional continuum.

The Germ Theory

Let us assume that the transcendental subject does not exist, so that man is no more than an incomplete finite existent, which comes into existence and goes out of existence in Space-Time. The transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception is held not to exist. The subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception *does* exist. No few hold to this theory.

Then each one of us, as a subject, comes into existence as a germ, just as, for example, elephants and fleas have come into existence.[1]

But, as germs, we came into existence with *no experience at all.* No one of us ever came into existence as a conscious *self coupled with experience.* I think that science must begin with a conception of its subject as a conscious self coupled with experience, but I fail to understand how the germ can come into existence as a conscious self. However, granting that it does, then, as conscious selves we come into existence *before* we have any experience. What of the experience of this conscious subject? When did it begin? It must have begun *after*, as a germ, it came into existence.[2]

[1] What of the fundamental potentiality of these germs to evolve into differing forms of living organisms?

[2] If we try to trace back the germ to its origin in heredity we are faced, ultimately, as Kant shows, by the unconditioned.

There seems to be no reply in contradiction to this statement. From where, then, did the potentiality of consciousness of the germ to have experience come?[1] For it must have got this potentiality from somewhere or it could not, after coming into existence, have had the power of conscious personal experience. My experience is mine and yours is yours.

We are faced by the mystery of consciousness—how can the subject be a conscious subject? Bear in mind we are still considering the germ theory.

Now, as Franz von Baaber pointed out, our knowledge (experience) is not mere scientia, it is conscientia. My knowledge is mine, yours is yours. The subject of science must be conscious of its knowledge or it would be useless to the subject as knowledge.

Riehl concludes by stating:[2]

> "Development in nature, so far as can be determined *from experience* (my italics) did not start originally with psychical existence; it has reached psychical life as its goal. The inner activity of what we *perceive* (my italics) as matter, the qualitative reality of things[3] which appear to the external senses as motion, has risen to feeling and sensation, the *elements of consciousness* (my italics), and with this has begun a course of development which has continued unbroken up to man, and has introduced the history of his psychical development."

In stating this, what has Riehl done? He has explained consciousness and its genesis. But (p. 43)

[1] All living organisms have experience. The experience science deals with is the experience *only* of a conscious subject.

[2] Cf. Riehl's *Science and Metaphysics* (1894), p. 345.

[3] Riehl holds that we must give up faith in the reality of atoms and motion of atoms (p. 38).

he has already stated: "Every possible explanation of consciousness must evidently presuppose consciousness itself." So Riehl holds that he himself must have existed as a conscious subject *before* he could have offered any explanation of consciousness! He must have been not only a subject but a conscious subject *before* he could have entered on any analysis of experience. Riehl himself holds that the self of science must be a *conscious* self *before* it can determine anything about its own existence.

If the germ theory be relied on I can find no explanation for the assumed fact that the conscious self must, scientifically, be held to exist before it can have any experience of a conscious self. The man of science must feel (be aware of) himself as a conscious self before he can consider his experience. The basis of the assumption of science that a conscious self exists is in feeling, not knowledge.

Kant's scientific principle of the centrality of the appercipient self involves the fact that the conscious self of science is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it, and this may lead to the conclusion that this self is spiritual—the mind existing apart from any bodily manifestation. But, I repeat, with any such question we have now nothing to do. We are considering the germ theory, and, if that be sound, Kant's principle fails.

What follows, directly, from the germ theory? It follows that each one of us is no more than a "thing" of body and brain, all thought being correlated to the motion of the brain; there is

nothing in or of us of thought *not* correlated to motion of the brain.[1] Space-Time is, for us, a *reality* and we are objects in Space-Time. Nothing exists for us outside Space-Time; we are, as Alexander expresses it, incomplete finite existents. We *are impermanent.*

But, then, from where does the feeling of *I AM* come? From where does Alexander's enjoyment (feeling) of *permanence* in ourselves come? It cannot come from the germ. As impermanent *things* this feeling of permanence is sheer illusion. We may term it an illusion of imagination, but even so it remains a sheer illusion. Imagination is itself, for the germ theory, sheer illusion.

And thought? We, as subjects, *do* think. How do we think? We appear to ourselves to think only in Time, think only in the passing *now*. But, as we have already found, the term *now* has no meaning in itself; it has meaning only in relation to the past and future; it has meaning only as a sort of static point in the continuity of Duration. In common parlance it is but a passing progressive moment in the continuity of the moments of Time.[2] So while we appear to ourselves to think in the *now* we really think in the now *in relation* to the past and the future. The subject of science thinks in the succession of Time. The conscious ego of science uses thought in a synthesis of past, present and future.

Your thought, as an impermanent *thing*, changes

[1] Never mind about the *Verstand* and the *Vernunft*.

[2] Do not forget there are no moments in Duration. Time, scientifically, is but a measure of Duration *in relation to space.*

from moment to moment and you change as your thought in the *now* changes. This thought in the now is meaningless to you, for the successive nows must be regarded as static and unrelated; it is meaningless and useless for you *as thought*. You may call in memory (or even prescience) as a *Deus ex machina* to assist you, and say: "My brain accumulates past thought, so I can use it in relation to what I think in the passing now."[1] This you can do. But can you do it as an impermanent subject? If the germ theory be sound you, as a permanent self, do *not* exist. You, whether as an individual or personality, change from moment to moment, your thought from moment to moment is *related* to you as a subject changing from moment to moment with your changing thought. Your synthetical thought is not permanent.

How do you think? When you think you do not use merely your passing thought in the *now*. You use this passing thought in relation to your past thought; when you think you use your past and present thought, not as separate *things*, but as together constituting the thought you use. When you *appear* to yourself to think in the passing now the thought you use is thought of the *past and the present*.[2] Memory accumulated in the motion of the brain will not help you. Why? Because as

[1] You must regard memory as no more than a modification of brain structure. Cf. *Body and Mind*, p. 330.

[2] "But the present, like a note in music, is nothing but as it appertains to what is past and what is to come" (Landor). "Time changes everything except something in us which is always surprised by changes" (T. Hardy).

a "thinking thing" you appear to yourself to think in the passing now. But for you, as an impermanent self, this very accumulation in the brain is past and gone, at each moment there is for *you* a new accumulation, so your thought in successive moments changes with *you* as a changing thing in Space-Time. And this does not account for the way in which you *do think*. In some way, inexplicable for you as an impermanent thing, you, when thinking, feel (enjoy) yourself as a permanent self midst all your changes as an incomplete finite existent. In spite of the successive *nows* by which thought comes to you in Time the way in which you think proves that your thought in the present is made up of the past and present thought; for you the *past is present*, and this is impossible in Space-Time, with its changing progression in Time. As an experiencer your experience evolves progressively, so you, as an experiencer, are impermanent. But when you think? You must *first* feel yourself as permanent before you can begin to think as you do think. Your thought in the successive *nows* of Time has no meaning for you, cannot give rise to your thought, unless past thought is present for you. You use in thought a synthesis[1] of the successive *nows* in which Time presents thought to you. This synthesis imports in some measure the transcendence of Time; it makes the past the present for you as a subject.

[1] You, as a subject, have transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception, and this synthesis, as we have found, is impermanent.

You can think in two or more successive *nows*, and to do this you must be the same self in spite of the changes of your body, brain and thought.

But the future? For we have, as yet, dealt only with the past and present. We have already found that the *now* has some meaning for the subject. But we have also found that the now has meaning only in relation to the past *and future*.

It is not yet the time to consider that original book *An Experiment with Time*. Kant refused to consider Telepathy, *not* because it was impossible, but because in his time he could not find sufficient experience to support it (*Kant*, p. 164). So, as yet, we have no experience on which to rely in support of or opposition to Dunne's theory. But, still, I think experience supports the theory that when we appear to think in the passing now we are not only thinking in the past and present, but in the future also. Consider certain simple examples.

You see a man walking towards you. At any particular *now* you *perceive* him at a certain spot. But you do not rely on what you perceive, you rely, in thought, on *conception*. In thought, you rely on your conception that the man is not on one spot, but that he is continuously moving towards you from the past into the future. That he has come from somewhere in the past and is going somewhere *in the future* is involved in your conception of what you perceive. You *perceive* the sun as a small near circle of light; you *conceive* the sun as a vast, distant globe, always moving from the past *into the future*. That it *was* in the

past and *will be* in the future is implicit for your conception. Make abstraction of the future, then the *now* has no meaning at all. You know the man has come from the past and is going into the future; you can only imagine (probably wrongly) where he has come from and is going to. But science can closely determine how the sun will move *in the future.*

When you think you not only use memory but prescience. The past and future exist for you when *you* appear to yourself to be thinking in the present *now*,[1] but this is impossible for *you* if, under the germ theory, you are an impermanent self. The very fact that you think and, using thought, rely on conception, not perception, proves that you are not merely an impermanent object in Space-Time, but a permanent self transcending the limitation of Space-Time. *You* can determine yourself in the form of an incomplete finite existent in Space-Time. If you were no more than an incomplete finite existent you could not so determine yourself. For, if no more than such a "mind," you could not contemplate yourself so as to make yourself an object to yourself.

The germ theory fails.

But, still keeping to consideration of the germ theory, we shall find the argument that it fails supported by a consideration of Huxley's theory of epiphenomenalism.[2]

According to that theory "the stream" of con-

[1] Cf. *Kant,* p. 148.
[2] Note, Cf. McDougall's *Body and Mind,* pp. 126, 128.

sciousness accompanies the flow of brain processes, each detail of the stream of consciousness being dependent upon some specific feature or detail of the total brain processes with which it coincides, or to which it immediately succeeds in time. The following figure illustrates epiphenomenalism:



Black discs, processes of the brain.
Circles, element of the stream of consciousness.

Now the symbol means nothing as it stands. We can attach no meaning to the processes of the brain in themselves or to the stream of consciousness in itself. We must *start*, as a scientific *fact*, with the assumption that these processes are the processes of the brain *of a subject* and that the stream of consciousness is a stream *of a subject*.

The straight line represents the progressive movement of Time.[1]

Now consider the subject at t'. It is a thing of experience, its experience being determined by the black disc and its consciousness being correlated to its experience. This subject is an experiencer. Again, consider the subject at t''. Then it may be argued this is the same subject with *added* experience. But the argument fails. For, working *back* in time, we find that the subject at t' is *not* the same as the subject at t''. Both subjects are

[1] Science has nothing to do with Duration itself; it can only measure and use it in relation to space. Therefore, it uses the straight line which is a " thing " of space.

experiencers, that is, each is determined by its degree of experience, and the subject at t'' is determined by experience with which the subject at t' has nothing to do. The symbol is sound for the subject of science, that is, for the conscious ego coupled with experience. But this subject is impermanent.

For the symbol to have meaning we must have a permanent subject, that is, a subject *not* determined by its experience. We must have, as it were, an empty box, capable of storing up experience.

Huxley recognised the fact of the lacuna in his theory of epiphenomenalism. For he states:

> " In the first place, as I have already hinted, it seems to me pretty plain that there is a third thing in the universe " (that is, third to matter and force), " to wit, consciousness which, in the hardness of my heart or head, I cannot see to be matter or force, or any conceivable modification of either, however intimately the manifestations of consciousness may be connected with the phenomena known as matter and force."[1]

Now epiphenomenalism as it stands imports denial that consciousness is a thing in itself; consciousness it regards as an impermanent "thing" correlated to the impermanence of brain processes.

And here something must be interposed as to the meaning of consciousness.

In the 10th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* James Ward, in his essay on " Psychology," states: " We can imagine *consciousness* without self-consciousness, still more without introspection,

[1] *Collected Essays,* Vol. IX., p. 130. Cf. *Myself and Dreams* (Kegan Paul), p. 16, for other instances to the same effect.

much as we can imagine sight without taste or smell." But, in the 11th edition and in his subsequent great work, he *cut out* the statement; he abandoned the possibility of imagining consciousness without self-consciousness. I would hold, then, that Huxley is right in holding consciousness to exist apart from matter or force, and that when he held consciousness so to exist he held that the self-conscious subject exists apart from matter or force. I do not say that he ever stated this, but if we hold that, for consciousness, a subject of consciousness is implicit, the statement stands.

On its face epiphenomenalism is in contradiction to the statement that consciousness exists *in itself*. But I think the two can be reconciled, though in such reconciliation we transcend the germ theory. The following symbol "B" attempts to effect the reconciliation.



Let the black line represent the Duration of consciousness, that is, the Duration of the self-conscious transcendental subject.[1] Let the black discs represent successive physical processes of the brain, and the circles successive elements of the stream of consciousness in relation to the physical processes of the brain, as in the symbol "A."

[1] All we can do to represent Duration is to represent it by a straight line, for science can only measure Duration *in relation* to space. This measurement science terms Time.

The black line (consciousness) always *is*; it is free from the changes of Space-Time.[1] It gives us not only the *I AM* of the man-in-the-street, but Alexander's enjoyment (feeling) of ourselves as permanent amidst all our changes of body, brain and thought.

But self-consciousness *in relation* to experience?[2] If we accept Huxley's statement that consciousness exists as a thing-in-itself, apart from matter and force, and we hold that the existence of consciousness imports the existence of a self-conscious subject, existing apart from matter and force, then we find that symbol " B " reconciles Huxley's two statements. Not only this. The symbol " B " has for its centrality the *I AM*. And this *I AM* is the conscious self of science. The symbol, also, marks the distinction between the transcendental unity of the real proper self (the *I AM*) and the transcendental *synthetical* unity of the subject. The unity of the subject is a unity *in relation* to its experience; it is the unity of man as an experiencer; it is impermanent. Man, to be an experiencer, must have experience. But he can be a *conscious* experiencer only so far as his experience goes. His consciousness is, as Kant states, no more than an empirical self-consciousness.

These successive physical processes and successive elements of the stream of consciousness are con-

[1] Duration has no beginning and no end—we can only think it in relation to Space. We relate it to Space by our straight line and then term it Time. Cf. p. xxxv. et seq.

[2] Here we find what Kant terms " empirical self-consciousness."

ditioned in Space-Time. It is the *duration* of consciousness which makes it possible for us to *determine*, as above (symbol "A"), the modified form of epiphenomenalism which we have arrived at to be sound for us as subjects.

But here an objection to the plan " B " as drawn must be considered. The duration of consciousness is represented by a straight line. Why?

In using the plan, for thought about it, we must imagine the straight line to be part of the circumference of a circle with a diameter which is *not* finite, a diameter which we call infinite. For duraton has no beginning and no end. We can imagine duration; we cannot think it. What is the Time of science? It is a measure of duration *in relation to space*.[1] So, for thought, we can only *use* duration when measured in relation to Space. Duration is not subject to the limitations of Space-Time, but we think successively in Space-Time, so that we can only think about duration so far as it can be made explicable in Space-Time. By using the straight line as a representation of duration we can think about duration in relation to Space-Time.[2]

This plan " B," as already said, reconciles Huxley's belief in consciousness as a thing-in-itself

[1] Space exists in *three* dimensions. The $\sqrt{-1}$ as introduced, means that Time is held to exist in a direction which is perpendicular to the *three* dimensions of Space. Perhaps we might hold that time exists for the subject *because* he exists in successive *nows*?

[2] Duration is not conditioned by any dimensions; that is why we can only imagine it, not think about it. To think about it we must introduce the limits of Space-Time.

with his theory of epiphenomenalism; it is, too, in accordance with Kant's distinction between the consciousness of the transcendental subject and the *empirical* consciousness of the subject. It marks Kant's vital distinction between the transcendental unity of apperception of the transcendental subject (the real proper self) as permanent and the transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception of the subject as impermanent.[1]

But, for the germ theory, it leaves standing the impossibility of explaining the fact that the conscious subject of science *must* exist before it can have any experience. Still, it explains how it is that, while we cannot *think* what the *I AM* is, science must begin with a feeling that it exists.

In illustration, consider the life of Sir Isaac Newton. He came into existence (as a subject) as a germ, but *also* with the potentiality of evolving into the Newton of fluxions and the principle of gravity with the inverse square. This is a scientific fact, if the germ theory be sound, though I cannot understand how the germ of Newton could have the potentiality. But Newton as a child? His experience when it began was no more than that of a child. What was his *manifestation* of self-consciousness? No more than that of the self-consciousness of a child. As an experiencer he was conditioned by the *degree* of his experience. As he grew older he still remained, as an experiencer,

[1] Consciousness is meaningless without a subject which is conscious. The *duration* of consciousness expresses the freedom from the impermanence of Space-Time of the transcendental subject.

limited by his degree of experience. The *manifestation* of his consciousness as a subject evolved with the evolution of his experience. We have Huxley's epiphenomenalism. But this affected in no way his potentiality of evolving as a subject of knowledge. This potentiality was always the same from childhood to death. Space-Time with its fundamental changes had no effect upon it. But, as a mere evolution from a germ, he *himself* was always subject to change; the continuity, the *isness* of potentiality, was impossible for him. This potentiality cannot be held to exist if the germ theory be sound. When we consider the germ theory we find that as a theory it fails.

Each one of us, physiologically, first comes into existence as a germ, and the germ comes into our universe of Space-Time *with no experience.* But what science is concerned with is the analysis of experience. But, again, science has nothing to do with scientia, that is, with experience as something existing for all living organisms; science deals with conscientia, that is, with the experience of an experiencer, who is a conscious self. Science must *begin* with a conception of the existence of an experiencer before it can get its experience for analysis. And this experiencer must be a *conscious* subject or its experience could not be its own experience. The germ cannot come into existence as a conscious subject with experience.

Man, when he comes into existence as a germ, has no experience at all. So the subject of science, that is, a conscious self coupled with experience,

never comes into existence as a subject. For, by the germ theory, the subject comes into existence *without* experience and it becomes an experiencer *after* coming into existence. The germ does not come into existence as an experiencer. Each one of us becomes an experiencer *after* he comes into existence as a germ, that is, *after* he becomes an object in Space-Time.

Further, man, as a mere experiencer with experience, is quite useless as a subject for science. All germs, whether they evolve into men, monkeys, fleas or elephants, have experience *after* they come into existence. So far man differs in no way from other living organisms. What, then, is it that science *must* have? Its subject as an experiencer must be a conscious subject.[1] Science must have a subject which is conscious in feeling of what it is thinking about. Science must begin with a feeling of the existence of the conscious self, and under the germ theory there is no place for the existence of such a self. The germ, I repeat, does not come into existence as an experiencer.

Again, science must use imagination before it can enter on its analysis of experience. Science has nothing to do with what is; it begins with conceptions of what *is*,[2] and these conceptions are presented to the subject by imagination. This is

[1] We know, practically, nothing as to whether other living organisms have or have not consciousness. If they do not *to us* manifest consciousness that proves nothing.

[2] You may term these conceptions, if you will, categories, as Kant does. But, if so, you must define your categories as Kant defined them. Without them you could not think. They are not subjective to thought.

why science for its analysis of experience must *begin* by using imagination. But the germ which is purely physiological cannot come into existence with the power of exercising imagination.

With love, beauty, truth and justice, with God and Immortality,[1] we have nothing to do; the argument leaves all such questions severely alone. But it must be here stated that, if the germ theory is sound, all such "things" are impossible. It is no reply to declare that, at the lowest, we imagine them. For, under the germ theory, imagination does not exist—it does not exist even for Kant's "personal moral certainty." Kant *feels* what, to him, *is* apart from conception.

The germ theory may be accepted as sound physiologically. But science must *begin* with a conception of the existence of a conscious self, this self being a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it.

Even if we accept the germ theory we have found that the germ comes into existence *before* it can have any experience. It does not come into existence as an experiencer. It would appear then that, when it comes into existence, it must, if the germ theory be sound, come with the potentiality of having experience. But what have we found? We have found that, for experience to have any meaning for science, science must *begin* with the conception of a permanent self with imagination

[1] All we can know about the *I AM* (a permanent self) is that it is *not* a mere impermanent self of Space-Time. The *germ* merely marks the entry of the real personal self into the manifested *form* of an object in Space-Time.

fundamental for it. The potentiality of having experience presupposes the existence of a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. We cannot then give the germ the potentiality of having experience.

One last statement before we leave the germ theory. Its very failure goes in itself to strengthen the theory now argued for.

The subject as it exists *is* an experiencer with experience, but the germ comes into existence without experience. Now the subject of science (the empirical ego) is a conscious self coupled with experience. Just as the germ cannot come into existence with experience, so the conscious self of science cannot come into existence with experience; it must be *after* the conscious self exists that the subject of science can be an experiencer with experience. In other words, science must begin with its feeling of the existence of a conscious self *before* it can have the experience of the subject as an experiencer presented to it for consideration. And the germ cannot be this conscious self. The failure of the germ theory in this respect supports the present argument.

Reason I

We have considered sense and understanding and have found that science starts with sense (perception) but functions with understanding (conception), that is, with what the subject thinks about what it perceives. So science starts its analysis of experience by the use of the conceptions that imagination gives birth to and presents to the understanding. In the words of Kant, the subject could have no knowledge without the precedent exercise of imagination, though the subject is often not aware of the origin of its knowledge.

Now the understanding is the faculty of thinking, and thinking is knowledge by means of concepts. We cannot think what *is*; understanding must begin with *concepts* of what *is*.[1] But our knowledge evolves progressively, and, at any given time, understanding only gives us power to think about what is known. How does knowledge evolve? It cannot evolve into what is already known. It must evolve into the *unknown*, and the unknown cannot exist directly for the understanding. The understanding can deal only with conceptions of the unknown.

Here steps in reason.

[1] The concepts that science uses it terms postulates.

Now reason, it is true, is a faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge *a priori*. But, in doing this, it necessarily makes the subject *conscious of its own ignorance*, conscious of the existence of that which is unknown. If the unknown did not exist for the subject as surely as the known, science could make no advance in its analysis of experience. And what is this unknown that the self of science is conscious of? How is it conscious? It is conscious (by the exercise of the faculty of imagination) of the vast, unexplored, unknown prairie of the *is*, to the knowledge of which the understanding of the subject can only get nearer and nearer by the use of conceptions. Only when—if ever—science reaches its ultimate analysis of experience can this *is* become known to the understanding. If such a time comes, then science will have nothing more to do. And what does this mean? It means that for the very existence of science its conscious self must be conscious of ignorance. But the conscious self cannot *know* the unknown, though its knowledge must have the unknown to advance into.

The conscious self does not know but it *feels* the existence of the unknown. The subject of science must be a knowing subject, but to be a knowing subject its conscious self must be a feeling subject.[1] The conscious subject must feel (be aware of?) its ignorance before its knowledge can evolve progressively as it does.

[1] Cf. *Prolegomena*, ff. 46. Bax's translation, p. 82. Hume himself *used* the term feeling. Cf. Fichte's philosophy.

What we now assume to prove scientifically is that the conscious self of science is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. It is the *I AM*. But this feeling self is unknown to us as subjects. All we can do is to feel the *I AM* in sheer ignorance of what it is. Kant's supreme principle of the "centrality of the appercipient self" means that the conscious self of science is the felt *I AM*; that is, it is a permanent self, appercipient in that it is active because imagination is fundamental for it. But it is unknown to the subject.

But how can the basic conception of science be something unknown to the subject? For, by admission, we do not know what the *I AM* is. Neither sense nor understanding offers us any solution of the difficulty. The solution of the difficulty is found thus in reason:

Ignorance in itself is useless for science. But *consciousness of ignorance* must be for the conscious self of science or science could not exist. This consciousness cannot come from sense or *directly* from understanding. It comes from reason; it is reason that enables us to be conscious that our understanding would be useless for knowledge unless the conscious self of science were conscious of its own ignorance.

All living organisms, including man, come into existence as germs in Space-Time without experience; that is, they come into existence with sheer ignorance. We cannot hold that the germ comes into existence with consciousness of its own

ignorance.[1] We may even, rightly or wrongly, hold that the germ comes into existence with sense and understanding. But, without reason, we cannot give it consciousness of its own ignorance, consciousness which must exist for the conscious self of science.

When, however, we consider man as one of the living organisms we find what? We find not only that he is conscious of his own ignorance, but that without this consciousness he could not, in thought, make the advance in knowledge that he *does* make by progressive evolution in his analysis of experience. If science could once reach out to its ultimate analysis, and so get rid of ignorance, its object would be attained and it would have nothing more to do. Only so long as consciousness of ignorance exists for the subject can science exist. It is only so long as ignorance exists as a fact for science that science has anything to do.

The conscious self of science is *conscious* of the existence of the unknown, unexplored prairie of imagination, and it is this consciousness of ignorance which must be for the very existence of science. The conscious self is faced in its consciousness by the known *and the unknown.* Does it function only with the known? If it only so functioned it could make no advance in its analysis of experience. But it does make this advance. How can it make such advance? Ignorance can give no assistance. There must be *consciousness*

[1] This is one reason why one school of materialists hold, quite logically, that consciousness does not exist.

of ignorance; that is, the unknown must exist for the conscious self as surely as the known, or nothing would exist for the knowledge of the subject to advance into.

How can this unknown exist for science? In sense? In understanding? In knowledge? No. But it *does* exist for science. It can exist, then, only in imagination. Again we find that science *begins* its functioning with the feeling of imagination.

What we do is to transcend sense and understanding by reason, which makes us aware of ignorance by our power to exercise imagination. We are ignorant of what the *I AM* is. But the *feeling* of the existence of the *I AM* is a basic fact for the conscious ego of science.

But what is it that reason makes us aware *does* exist and yet of which we are ignorant? We can only reply negatively, for we cannot compass what is; we can only reach out to conceptions of what is. All we can arrive at is that reason, when exercised, is not confined to the limitations of Space-Time. Imagination transcends Space-Time, for, if we give reality to Space-Time, imagination cannot be accounted for. This is why, as Tyndall pointed out, scientific men kick against the term imagination.

Here comes in a scientific fact which has been largely ignored by both materialists and idealists. When this fact is accepted we find a scientific explanation of two passages in Kant the meaning of which is still under dispute. These passages

are considered separately hereafter. They crown the main argument.

The scientific fact is that for the conscious self of science consciousness of ignorance is *of far greater importance than knowledge*.[1] Our normal experience makes us aware of this. For the more we learn the more we find is there for us to learn. The subject of science could not exist actively for thought if it were merely a thinking subject. The *cogito ergo sum* is of little importance in itself; it is the fact involved in the statement that is of importance. The fact involved is that *before* I can say *cogito ergo sum* I must not only be a permanent self but *feel* the existence of that which I do not know. For we do not merely think about that which we know. What we do when we think is to *use* what we know to assist us in burrowing into the unknown; that is, in gaining fresh knowledge. We use the known to assist us in our inroads on the unknown. As we have already found, science could make no advance but for its use of imagination *before* it begins its analysis of experience. Our imagination of the unknown must precede our attempt to cultivate the unknown by the known. Imagination opens to us the vast prairie of the unknown, and we are active in cultivating with thought more and more of this vast prairie. If the unknown did not exist for us as

[1] Socrates said that in general there is a process from the known to the unknown through a generalization (Kant's categories?), and that the more man knows the more conscious he becomes in feeling (awareness?) of the vastness of the unknown.

surely as the known we could not think as we do think. If the unknown did not exist for the conscious self of science as surely as the known, science could make no advance in knowledge; for such advance science must use the unknown, unexplored prairie of imagination. *If* science could fully cultivate with thought this prairie of imagination it would attain its ultimate analysis of experience and, its work accomplished, would have no more to do. But science cannot contemplate what is; it can only *begin with conceptions of what is*. Herein we find what Kant has pointed out; that is, the limitation of knowledge (*Kant*, p. 43). But knowledge evolves and it is the consciousness of ignorance in the self that makes such evolution possible. Endless labour still faces science.

When, then, we hold to Kant's supreme principle of the centrality of the appercipient self—that is, when we hold that the conscious self of science is the felt *I AM* (a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it) and at the same time hold that we simply feel the *I AM*, in ignorance of what it is—we find that we are alleging something for which we find no support in sense or, directly, in understanding. But here, as before said, reason steps in (*Kant*, p. 212).

All knowledge begins with sense, proceeds to understanding, and ends *in reason*. It is reason that makes us aware not only of the limitation of our knowledge but of the real existence of the vast unknown. Until we have cultivated the unknown by the evolution of our knowledge we

cannot *think* the unknown. What then? We feel it,[1] and this feeling is, for us scientifically, a fact. Alexander is right in holding that we cannot *know* ourselves as permanent selves, and so, with his empirical philosophy, he ignores the fact that we are permanent selves. But he admits that we all enjoy (feel) ourselves as permanent.

What, then, have we arrived at? We have arrived at this: The conscious self of science is conscious of the existence of the *is*, but it is ignorant of what the *is* is, for it can only function with conceptions of what the *is* is. These conceptions of the understanding of the subject are given birth to by imagination and presented to the understanding of the subject to function with.[2]

Now the *is* must be for the consciousness of the subject, for the understanding of the subject does not function with conceptions as things-in-themselves. It functions with them as *conceptions of that which is*.

Here we find what Kant told us—the limitation of all thought.

But how, then, can the *is* exist for the consciousness of the subject when the subject has no know-

[1] As James Ward pointed out, we want a new word for *feeling*. Alexander's word " enjoy " may be better, though, I think, we cannot " enjoy " that which does not exist. I like best the term aware, *awareness* transcending thought. But, for simplicity, I still use the term *feeling*.

[2] Most of these conceptions which exist apart from the teachings of knowledge are useless for science as assistance for the analysis of experience, that is, for the evolution of knowledge. Those it accepts it terms postulates. But these postulates evolve progressively in time into the unknown.

ledge of what it is? The reply is that the subject is conscious of the existence of the *is in feeling*, not in knowledge.[1] And this consciousness of feeling must be for the subject or it could not be conscious of its *ignorance*, while we have found it must be so conscious or it could not think as it does think. The subject not only thinks about what it has already thought in the past, but is always considering *what it is ignorant of* to cultivate it into thought for future knowledge. Science is always using these conceptions of what is to find out which more of them it can use as the postulates of science, as the knowledge of science evolves.

Knowledge is meaningless in itself. When we speak of knowledge it has meaning for us only as the knowledge of a subject. And, for such knowledge to enable the subject to think, the subject must be conscious of it, must be a conscious subject.

In the same way feeling (awareness) is meaningless in itself. When we speak of it it has meaning for us only as the feeling of *ourselves as subjects*. And for such feeling to be the feeling of a subject the subject must be conscious of it.[2]

Knowledge has meaning in reference to that which we know. Feeling (awareness) has meaning in reference to that which we do not know. And, as to this statement, we have found a strange fact:

[1] Cf. the philosophy of Fichte.

[2] Science must start with the conception that the conscious self exists.

The subject must be conscious of its ignorance; that is, must be conscious *in feeling* of the existence of that which it does not know, or it could not think as it does think, it could have no knowledge at all. Paraphrasing Kant's words, the subject must be conscious, in exercising imagination, of the existence of that which it does not know *before* it can make any advance in knowledge.

Feeling of the existence of the unknown must, for the subject, *precede* knowledge. In other words, for the self of science to be conscious of knowledge it *must first be a feeling self.* This *feeling* must *precede* knowledge.

Now there are not *two* subjects; the feeling subject is the thinking subject, so there must be some relation between feeling and thought.[1] We have found that all thought is limited. But feeling? The consciousness of feeling is consciousness of the existence of the unknown; the consciousness exists in imagination. So consciousness of feeling is free from the limitations of thought. This feeling imports imagination, but though thought *begins* with imagination it uses the conceptions that imagination presents to it only so far as it can use them as postulates of science. It is herein that we find the limitations of thought. Reason informs us that we must feel ourselves as *I AM* before we can think as we do think.

[1] Here comes in the importance of holding that Kant wrote from two points of view.

Feeling and Knowing

That the centrality of the consciousness of the conscious ego is to be found in feeling is proved by the fact that the *conscious ego of science* must feel itself as *I AM* with continuity of consciousness *before* it can do what it does do; that is, before it can think, *before* it can say *cogito ergo sum.*

Before we go on with the argument something must be stated as to what we mean by that troublesome word "feeling." As James Ward points out, we want for metaphysics another word—and we have not got it! What do we mean by the *feeling* subject as distinct from the *knowing* subject?

The term *feeling* is not used here as having any of the particular meanings given to it in our dictionaries, unless, perhaps, that of a "feeling of truth." The feeling subject is the subject conscious of the *I AM.* He feels himself as *I AM.*[1] This consciousness is in feeling, it is not in thought or intuition; it is a feeling of the truth. But how can this feeling exist for the knowing subject? For, if scientific, we must make it not only exist for the knowing subject, but exist in transcendence of knowledge (*A Study of Kant,* p. 172).

[1] *Prolegomena,* ff. 46. In Belfort Bax's translation, p. 82. *A Study of Kant,* pp. 90, 172.

The argument makes it exist for the knowing subject (that is, the subject coupled with experience) by proof that the reason of the subject makes it aware that it could not exist *in itself*, that it can exist only as a *form* of itself as a feeling subject, as *I AM*. The subject is not a permanent self, but it must feel (enjoy) itself as a permanent self, as *I AM*, in order to think as it does think. This feeling of *I AM* is a basic fact for the subject. We are all conscious of the *I AM* in spite of the impermanence of our bodies, brains and thought correlated to the motion of the brain. This reason of the subject makes it aware that it cannot exist *in itself*. It can exist only as a form of its real proper self which it feels as *I AM*. The subject must be a feeling subject before it can be a knowing subject. Herein we find the centrality of the appercipient self. All thought is limited and exists only in relation to the feeling *I AM*. "Though feeling is never a complete state of consciousness, it is the most central one, as Kant came at long last to recognise." (*A Study of Kant*, p. 172).

I must repeat the fact that science has nothing to do with the absolute, with the *is*. It must begin with conceptions of what *is*. But science can only function with those conceptions which it can use as the postulates of science. What then is the relation of science to those conceptions that it cannot function with? Science functions with thought, while the greater number of the conceptions which imagination presents to it it cannot function with in thought—it cannot think about

them until by reducing them to postulates it can *relate them to experience.*

All we can hold about these conceptions that science cannot function with is that science *feels their existence.* The conscious self of science is aware[1] of their existence. And, from this, what follows in reason?

The subject of science *must have* its conceptions *before* it can get its postulates. So the conscious self of science must be a feeling self before it can be a knowing self; that is, before it can be a conscious self coupled with experience. What we find is that the conscious self of science is *not* determined by its experience. It must be more than a mere subject of experience. It must be a self that feels the *I AM* before it can enter on the analysis of its experience. And here we must mark a great advance in science as to *what* experience is.

Science now holds that Space in itself and Time in itself are mere vain shadows. The experience of the subject is no more than experience in a four-dimensional continuum.[2] Now *four* has no meaning in itself; it has meaning only in relation to other numbers. Science "picks out" its four-dimensional continuum—picks out its dimensions from where? From the conceptions which imagination offers. Science picks out its conception of a four-dimensional continuum because it can use it

[1] If I could use the term "awareness" as transcending thought the position would be clearer. But as Kant uses a term *ein Dasein* as the *feeling* of an existence, I adhere to the term *feeling.* (Cf. *A Study of Kant,* p. 172). I would read *ein Ichsein* for *ein Dasein.*

[2] *Encycl. Brit.* (13th ed.), Vol. III., p. 328.

as a postulate in relation to the experience of its conscious self. Why? Because this particular continuum "fits the facts" of the experience of the conscious self. The continuum has nothing to do with the conscious self of science except in so far as science holds that its conscious self *can* have the experience.

This advance of science strengthens Kant's philosophy. For it makes more comprehensible his theory that the transcendental self is not subject to the formal principles of Space and Time. For now, scientifically, Space in itself and Time in itself are vain shadows, and all Kant can be said to want is freedom of the transcendental subject from a four-dimensional continuum.

Science no longer holds that Space and Time are realities for the subject; its reality is now a four-dimensional continuum; science defines the experience of the conscious self as subject to this four-dimensional continuum, not vaguely to Space and Time. But I think we can still use the term Space-Time without introducing any confusion for thought.

This continuum is meaningless in itself. It has meaning only in relation to other continua; the universe of science is a universe of relativity. What follows from all this? It follows that the conscious self of science must present these possible continua to the subject for the understanding of the subject to be able to "pick out" its four-dimensional continuum. The conscious self is not determined by this four-dimensional continuum; it is only the

experience of this self that is so determined. The argument that the conscious self of science exists, for us, in the feeling *I AM* is not interfered with at all. If anything the arguments against it are weakened. For science now *defines* the experience of the subject as a *formal* principle. It "picks out" its postulate of a four-dimensional continuum from the conceptions imagination presents to it.

Now assume that the subject of science is *no more* than a conscious subject coupled with experience. Then it cannot contemplate itself. Its experience is part of its personality: it cannot *define* its experience in relation to something *outside* its experience. It could not, then, get its four-dimensional continuum. For a four-dimensional continuum cannot exist *in itself*; it has existence only in relation to other possible continua, and for man, as no more than a subject of experience in a four-dimensional continuum, these continua cannot exist. Nothing, for him, exists but the four-dimensional continuum, and this continuum cannot exist in itself. It can exist only in relation to other possible continua.

The subject begins to function with the conceptions that imagination presents to it.[1] It picks out Space of three dimensions and Time of one dimension,[2] holding that the latter cannot exist

[1] These conceptions have, prima facie, nothing to do with experience, but it is out of them that the self picks and chooses those which it can use as postulates of science.

[2] This analysis science makes when functioning with its four dimensional continuum. Kant himself regarded Space as of three dimensions and Time as of one in relation to Space. Perhaps he, at times, confuses Time with Duration.

without the former. It thus arrives at its four-dimensional continuum. Why does it thus pick and choose? Because these postulates "fit the facts" of its experience. But *what* is its experience? It is the experience of its conscious self when it is conditioned in the form of a living organism with body, brain and thought correlated to the motion of the brain. Experience is meaningless unless it is the experience of a conscious self. The subject of science *is* this conscious self in the form of a living organism. It is not the conscious self which exists merely as conditioned in the four-dimensional continuum. It is when this self is conditioned in the form of a living organism that its experience comes into being.[1] It is quite true that we only *know* this conscious self when it is coupled with experience. But we could not think as we do think unless we existed and felt ourselves as permanent conscious selves before having any experience.

The conscious self exists quite apart from the four-dimensional continuum of science. Sense and understanding exist for the subject. Reason makes us aware that the subject can only exist as a form of the transcendental subject. The conscious self apart from its experience is a transcendental subject. We do not know what the conscious self is apart from its experience. But we *feel* it to exist, we are conscious in feeling of its existence. And this *feeling* must precede our power and use of thought in the analysis of experience.

[1] The argument has nothing to do with the question whether or not man is a soul or spirit in regard to religion.

Reason II

The above argument in proof that we must be feeling subjects before we can be knowing subjects supports the previous argument. For we have found that if we did not *feel* the unknown, unexplored prairie of imagination we could not exist as knowing subjects. There can be no consciousness of knowledge without the previous *feeling* of the existence of the unknown. The very existence of the thinking self imports the existence of the feeling self. But there are not two subjects. And, if this be so, what follows? The thinking self is a form of the feeling self. The feeling self may exist without the thinking self, but the thinking self could not exist without the feeling self. We can imagine the feeling self conditioned in a world entirely different from our own world, and so with a different form of thinking.

The thinking self is a form of the feeling self. The feeling self is the *I AM*, the real proper self. And this self is the conscious self of science.

We have now, from many points of view, considered Kant's supreme principle of the centrality of the appercipient self, and so can now consider more directly the importance of bearing in mind that his philosophy must be considered from two

points of view—the one that of the subject, and the other that of the transcendental subject, the real proper self, which we, as subjects, *feel* as the *I AM*.

Alexander, in *Space, Time, and Deity* (p. 424) states: "I can only repeat what I have said before, that should the extension of mind beyond the limits of the bodily life be verified, so that a mind can either act without a body or may shift its place to some other body and yet retain its memory, the larger part of the present speculation will have to be seriously modified or abandoned."

Now Kant's transcendental subject we may consider as the mind that Alexander refers to, and it can not only act (it is appercipient) without a body, but the subject, which is an object in Space-Time, has its genesis in this mind. So far Kant is in opposition to Alexander.

But Alexander's philosophy is *empirical*, it is all written from the point of view *of the subject*,[1] and all that Kant wrote from the point of view of the subject (his philosophical anthropomorphism) is largely in agreement with Alexander's empirical philosophy. So (leaving out the question of the Deity) I do not think Kant's argument that the mind can act without a body interferes with Alexander's fine *empirical* philosophy. For Kant holds that, from the point of view of the subject, man *is* a living organism of body, brain and thought correlated to the motion of the brain. He is an object in Space and Time, and, being thus

[1] The transcendental subject does not exist for Alexander.

conditioned, *a priori*, Space and Time and objects in Space-Time are realities for him.[1] So far it is difficult to find any contradiction between Kant and Alexander. Empirically there would appear to be agreement.

But the Achilles' heel of Alexander's empirical philosophy appears when he admits that we enjoy ourselves as permanent amid our changes (*Space, Time, and Deity*, p. 29). And this enjoyment no empirical philosophy can explain. For the subject is *not* permanent, so that if it exists as a thing-in-itself, it cannot enjoy itself as permanent.[2]

Here comes in Kant's second point of view, a point of view which Alexander (with Vaihinger) ignores. Kant holds that the subject does not exist in itself, is not a thing-in-itself. It is no more than a form of its real proper self; it is a form, conditioned in a four-dimensional continuum,[3] of its real proper self, a transcendental subject, which we feel as *I AM*.

But then how can Kant prove this from the point of view of the subject? If he is scientific, as he claims to be, he must do this.

In the first place, no empirical philosophy can explain this *feeling of I AM*, for it is a feeling of personal permanence. In the second place, the

[1] Science with its four-dimensional continuum analyses this continuum into three of Space and one of Time. The continuum is real for the subject. But it is not more than a particular of Space-Time.

[2] Science now relies in no way on the permanence of substance.

[3] Kant regarded Space as of three dimensions, and Time as of one. He defined Time by drawing it as a line in Space.

subject can exercise not only sense and understanding but reason. And the reason of the subject makes it aware that it could not think as it does think if it were no more than a thinking subject. Reason makes it aware that it must be a feeling subject in that it must feel itself as *I AM*, that is, as permanent, *before* it could think as it does think.

The conscious self of science must be a permanent self which the subject *feels as I AM*. But if this transcendental subject makes the subject feel its existence it must be appercipient, that is, it must be active. How is it that it is active? Because the activity of imagination is fundamental for it. The conscious self of science is the *I AM*. Thereby we find Kant's principle of the centrality of the appercipient self.

Two Disputed Passages in Kant's Philosophy

A consideration of these two passages completes the argument. For we are now in a position to show not only why there is not common agreement as to their meaning, but their vital importance to Kant's philosophy. This want is because critics have failed to give weight to the fact that Kant wrote from two points of view—the one from that of the subject with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception, the other from that of the trans-

cendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception.

The real proper self of Kant is the transcendental subject. Science considers only a conscious self coupled with experience; that is, the subject of science is a conscious self *so far as it is conditioned by experience*.[1] The aim of science is the analysis not of experience, but of the experience of a conscious subject. Science gives reality to this experience, and, the transcendental subject being unknown to the subject, science logically regards its four-dimensional continuum as a reality. Shortly, for empirical philosophy like to that of Alexander, the subject with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception is regarded as an ultimate, so that the transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception is regarded as non-existent.

It is from the point of view of this empirical subject that Kant's philosophy is mainly written, and this is why James Ward terms Kant's philosophy philosophical anthropomorphism. But Kant finds the Achilles' heel in empirical philosophy; he finds it in that the subject not only *feels* itself as *I AM*—that is, as permanent—but its reason makes it aware that it must be a permanent self before it can think as it does think. It must be a permanent conscious self before it can have experience which it can think about. The conscious subject of science

[1] This experience is now held by science *not* to be experience in Space-Time, Space and Time being both vain shadows. It is experience in a four dimensional continuum. And yet science analyses its continuum into three of Space and one of Time! So we may still, scientifically, use the term Space-Time.

is the *I AM*, a permanent self.[1] Its experience exists *relatione accidentis* (*Prolegomena*, ff. 46).

When we start with the conception that the conscious self of science is the *I AM* we get rid of the outstanding contradiction between the *I AM* and the common interpretation of the meaning of the conscious subject of science. This subject of science exists in two terms—that of the conscious self *and* its experience. When we find that the conscious self of science is the *I AM* it follows that the subject of science is the *I AM*, conditioned *a priori* in the formal principles of Space and Time, or, as science now holds, in a four-dimensional continuum.

More than this. We find an explanation of the distinction between the transcendental unity of apperception of the transcendental subject (the *I AM*) and the transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception of the subject of science. The unity of the subject does exist, but it is not pure; it is *synthetical* because the subject is conditioned in the formal principles of Space-Time. The *I AM* marks a permanent self; the *subject of science* is a conditioned form or state of the *I AM*; it is impermanent.

We are now concerned with two passages in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* which are the subject of very general dispute as to their meaning. And what has been above written is important for our consideration, because when we hold that the

[1] For which subject imagination, as we have found, is fundamental.

conscious self of science is the *I AM* the meaning of these passages is clarified.

What are the two passages? We will consider them separately.

But, before we enter on such a consideration, something more, in spite of repetition, must be stated as to Space-Time. For the scientific explanation of Space and Time has changed lately, changed vitally. And this change helps us on our way to elucidate the two passages. The change is so generally accepted and well known that authorities need not now be cited.

The universe is presented to us in Space-Time. But what is Space, what is Time? Neither is absolute. There are as many ways of measuring times as there are observers, and all are right from their own points of view as observers. Space and Time depend on subjective conceptions. Not only for Space and Time to have any meaning must there be an observer for perception, but the observer must have the power of conception, so unless man be in the form or state of an object, Space and Time have no meaning in reality in thought for us. An observer is an object in Space-Time.

But what is the *Time* of science? Locke tells us that Time is a measure of Duration.[1] But the Time of science is not a measure of Duration, it is a measure of Duration *in relation to Space*. This is why, as Eddington informs us (*Space*,

[1] Many confound Duration with infinite Time. Kant himself is not clear on this point.

Time, and Deity, p. 13), Time is meaningless without Space.

Now in the evolution of the universe we can mark a passing period when there were no observers. Where then was Space; where then was Time? I think we must hold that Duration always existed whether or not we accept Bergson's *élan vital.* The Space-Time of science is subjective, not objective.[1] This means that, for us as subjects, there must be an observer before we can consider it, and that, when we consider it, though we must *use* perception, we must be more than subjects with the power of perception; we must be subjects with the power of conception.

Again, as there is nothing absolute in Space-Time, all conditioned in Space-Time must be impermanent, must be subject to change. Minkowski states: "Space in itself and Time in itself sink to mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two retains an independent existence." He conceives that this "kind of union" *must* exist, but he knows nothing about it.[2] He must assume the existence of Space before he can consider Time. For Duration exists and he cannot measure it to use it scientifically. All he can do is to measure Duration *in relation to Space.* And Space is not absolute.

[1] Science has nothing to do with Duration; there are no moments in Duration. Science introduces moments into Duration in order to measure it *in relation to Space.* Science can do no more.

[2] Is it Duration? I think it must be. There is no immediate *time* between any cause and any effect.

Imagine yourself in a world A with t as your time. And then imagine you are suddenly translated into a world B with t′ as your time. As a "thing" of body, brain and thought (correlated to motion of the brain, that is, as an object in Space-Time) your Time t′ is as real for you as Time t was.[1] From this follows a fact well known before Einstein established clearly the relativity of Space-Time. What is this fact? It is the fact that for any observer his Space-Time may be changing, and yet, as an observer, he will be unconscious of the change. In his universe A, Time may, for the observer with perception, change from t to t′, and yet, as an observer, he will not be conscious of any change. To be conscious of the change or the possibility of the change the conscious self must use conception; perception gives him no assistance. He must use conceptions quite apart from the perceptions of experience.

Alexander holds that "I am my mind" and that this mind cannot exist apart from a body. For his empirical philosophy, then, Space-Time must be regarded as absolute; it cannot be dependent on subjective conceptions.[2]

Science accepts Einstein's statement that there are as many ways of measuring Space-Time as there are observers. But for any man of science *as an observer* the Space-Time of his world is absolute; so far as his experience as an observer

[1] Do not forget that t and t^1 are but measures of Duration *in relation to Space.*

[2] Does he not confound infinite Time with Duration? His incomplete finite existent is an object in Space-Time.

goes he cannot get outside his world; for him there is only one Space-Time, his own Space-Time. How then can he entertain the notion of differing Space-Times? Only by the use of conception, quite apart from perception.

I cannot reconcile Einstein's theory of relativity with the reality of Space-Time.[1] And do not forget that Alexander himself says that he *enjoys* himself as permanent amidst all changes. How can this be, when Space-Time is impermanent? With Duration science has nothing to do—but it is a fact, for science, though an unknown fact. Duration is the essential and qualitative element of Space-Time.

We now return to a consideration, separately, of the two passages in question.

MAN AS AN OBJECT TO HIMSELF[2]

Kant states:

> " At the same time how (the) *I* who think is distinct from the *I* which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible). and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject; how, therefore, I am able to say: 'I, as an intelligent and *thinking* subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition—only, like other

[1] Cf. *Encycl. Brit.* (13th ed.), Vol. III., p. 328.

[2] *Kant,* p. 95. Max Müller's translation, p. 760. I rely on these two translations which are alike; I have not consulted the original Latin.

phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely as I appear'—is a question that has in it neither more nor less difficulty than the question: 'How can I be an object to myself?'; or this:[1] 'How can I be an object of my own intuition and internal perception?'"

Kant says this must be a fact; that is, I can be an object to myself. But he leaves the passage quoted meaningless in itself as stated, though when he wrote it we may assume that he was clear in his mind as to what he meant to express. When we hold that he wrote from *two* points of view we can give meaning to the passage. From *one* point of view it is contradictory. For *I* cannot be an object to myself if *I* is read as the same as *myself.*

Let us analyse the passage:

"At the same time how (the) I who think is distinct from the I which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject."[2]

Now the "I who think" is a creation or form of the *I AM*; that is, of a permanent self. This we have already found. But the *I* which intuites itself? This *I* is the subject and the subject cannot intuite itself as it really is (*Kant*, p. 474). It can only intuite itself as it appears to itself. For we intuite ourselves and other things as objects in Space-Time, or, as Alexander expresses it, as in-

[1] For "or this" Max Müller has "more especially," a preferable translation.

[2] Mark the distinction between the I *who* think and the I which intuites. But Max Müller marks the distinction as between the I who thinks and the I which sees or perceives itself.

complete finite existents. So far the "I who think" is distinct from the "I which intuites itself." And yet the latter is one and the same with the former. For the "I which intuites itself" is really no more than a variety or state of the "I who think" (*Kant*, p. 148). The *I AM* gives birth to the power in the subject *to think*. The subject is no more than a state or variety of the *I AM*.

On its face the passage under consideration contains a contradiction *if* we hold that Kant wrote from the one point of view of one subject But if we hold that he wrote from *two* points of view we get rid of the contradiction. For the "I who think" is the *I AM*. The subject in order to think must be a form of a permanent self, the transcendental subject. But then, what is the "I which intuites itself"? It is the *I AM* so far as it can intuite itself. The subject is a restricted form or state of the *I AM*, the permanent self.[1] And this subject is *not* an intuitive self; its intuition is limited, *a priori*, by the formal principles of Space and Time. So, when in the state of a subject, the *I AM* can only intuite itself as it *appears* to itself in Space-Time.[2]

The *I AM* is a fact, but, for the subject, an unknown fact. So we have nothing to do with whether or not the *I AM* can intuite itself. But the subject is no more than a state of the *I AM*; it is the *I AM* manifest in Space-Time.

[1] Cf. *Kant*, p. 418. Max Müller's translation, p. 548.

[2] For Space-Time we may now, scientifically, write a four dimensional continuum. Space and Time are vain shadows.

From the point of view of the subject the "I who think" is the same as the "I which intuites itself." Alexander intuites himself and his fellows as incomplete finite existents in a reality of Space-Time. And so far as appearance goes he is correct. He makes his thought subjective to intuition; he denies the existence of the *I AM*, though he admits he enjoys himself as permanent.

Then Kant introduces what Alexander terms a "superior entity," the *I AM*. From the point of view of the *I AM*, a transcendental subject, Kant holds that the "I which intuites itself" is a form or variety (a state) of the real proper self, the *I AM*. So far the two are alike. But they are only "so far" alike. For the subject, impermanent, is no more than a variety, a restricted form of the *I AM*, the permanent self.

In another way we may reconcile the two as one and the same. Kant's "I who think" is felt as the *I AM*. The "I which intuites" is this permanent self coupled with experience; it is the subject of science. This subject of science is an experiencer and no more. If the "real proper self" is no more than an *experiencer* the passage under consideration expresses a contradiction. For it relies on the existence of a permanent self (Alexander's superior entity), whereas an experiencer is impermanent, so that a permanent self cannot exist.[1]

When we conceive the conscious self of science

[1] If man is no more than an experiencer, science remains in conflict with the *I AM*, in spite of Alexander's admission that we *enjoy* ourselves as permanent.

as the *I AM* and hold that *coupled* with experience it constitutes the subject of science we find that the "I which intuites" *is* the *I AM* in a restricted form. So far we reconcile the two as one and the same. The "I which intuites" is a state or condition of the *I AM*.[2]

The above explanation as to Kant's meaning is strengthened when, in analysis, we consider the following part of the passage:

> "I, as an intelligent and *thinking* subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition—only like other phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely as I appear."

This means that the *I AM* cognizes itself as an object thought. As a real object? No: it *appears* to itself as an object in Space-Time; that is, it appears as a thing of body, brain and thought conditioned *a priori* under the formal principles of Space and Time. I can think myself as an object only so far as I am given to myself in intuition, and my intuition is given to me conditioned under the formal principles of Space and Time. I as a subject *appear* to *myself* (the *I AM*) as an object in Space-Time. *I* cognize myself as a subject, as an object in Space-Time, a thing of body, brain and thought—as an incomplete finite existent. I myself am the *I AM*; I only *appear* to myself as a thing of Space-Time. I repeat, again, that if I am no more than an incomplete finite existent, then the *I AM* cannot exist. And the *I AM* does exist.

[2] *Kant*, p. 418. Max Müller's translation, p. 548.

Kant goes on to say that the question we have been considering is no more difficult than the question: "How can I be an object to myself?"; more especially: "How can I be an object of my own intuition and internal perception?"

Now if the *I* be the same as the *myself* I cannot be an object to myself. For thereby there is transcendence of subject and object, which is impossible for science.[1] But when we bear in mind that the *myself* is the real proper self (the *I AM*) then we understand how the subject of science (the *I AM coupled with experience*) can be, in appearence, an object to the real proper self.

The subject of science is an experiencer, and as an experiencer it is impermanent, for its *existence* as an experiencer is determined by its degree of experience. And for each one of us our experience changes in time, it is impermanent. But for the permanent self (the *I AM*) all such changes are mere varieties in its condition.[2]

The *I AM* with transcendental unity of apperception can cognize itself as a subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception; that is, as an object in appearance and so impermanent. The subject of science is a state of the permanent

[1] Kant does not deny the possibility of transcendence of subject and object (*Kant*, p. 474). He simply ignores it because science does not transcend subject and object.

[2] *Kant*, p. 418. In Max Müller's translation (p. 548) we have "all changes as belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being."

self, the *I AM*. How is it a state? It *is* the *I AM* so far as the *I AM* is an experiencer (an object) in our liliputian world; so far, that is, as the conscious subject (the *I AM*) is coupled with experience.

The *I AM* does not determine itself as an object. All it does is to determine that, when coupled with experience, it has the state of an experiencer. This state is impermanent; it is subject to change. The experience of a child is not the same as that of the child grown to manhood. But the *I AM* can and does determine that this impermanent progress exists for man as a subject. At the same time, the *I AM* does exist permanently in the midst of all these impermanent changes; we enjoy ourselves as permanent amidst all changes. It is the *I AM* as permanent which must be for each one of us before we can determine, as we do determine, all our states of impermanent changes. Alexander, empirically, makes us objects to ourselves. He proves that we are incomplete finite existents. But what is the Alexander who proves this? If he were no more than an incomplete finite existent he could not have done what he has done—transcended subject and object. The Alexander who wrote *Space, Time, and Deity* must have *begun* by enjoying himself as *I AM*—that is, as permanent amidst all his changes of body, brain and thought—or, the same thing, amidst all his changes as an incomplete finite existent.

Kant does not mean that I as *I AM* can be an object to myself as *I AM*. We, as subjects, are

not intuitive selves; we cannot intuite ourselves and other things as they really are.[1]

How then, finally, is it that I can be an object to myself? From the *one* point of view there is one subject, and, if so, I cannot be an object to myself; we cannot transcend subject and object. In Alexander's words "the mind cannot contemplate itself."[2]

But from two points of view, what have we? We have this:

"I *as a subject* can appear as an object to *myself*, the *I AM*. The subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception can appear as an object to the transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception." In such case there is no transcendence of subject and object, for, so far, the "I who think" is distinct from the "I which intuites itself."

But the "I which intuites itself" is a state or condition of the "I who think" (the *I AM*). It *is* the *I AM* coupled with experience, and, so far, it is the same subject as the "I who think" (the *I AM*).[3]

If Alexander were no more than an incomplete finite existent he could not prove that he himself and his fellows are but incomplete finite existents; he could not transcend subject and object. What he does is to *start* with enjoyment of himself as permanent amidst all changes. It is from the *point*

[1] Cf. *Kant*, p. 474. Max Müller's translation, p. 626.

[2] But Alexander says that the mind *can* contemplate its body!

[3] Bear in mind that it is assumed to have been proved that the conscious ego of science is the *I AM*.

of view of himself as permanent (as *I AM*) that he finds himself able to define himself and his fellows as incomplete finite existents.[1]

Science, as we have found, finds that from the point of view of man as an observer it can make no further advance. Perception alone is useless. It is true that science must begin with perception, just as the architect, to make manifest in Space-Time his ideal of a beautiful building, must begin with the work of ignorant workmen in digging the foundations. But, *beginning* with perception, science has to rely on conception. It has to start with a basic fact of the existence of a subject free from the restrictions of Space-Time, a subject whose point of view is *not* that of an object in Space-Time, as that of the observer is. It must be a subject whose point of view is non-finite.

When science informs us that, in the universe, vast bodies exist at such vast distances that light takes thousands of light-years to travel to our world we accept the teaching as correct. But perception has no part in our acceptance; we must use conception. And our conception is from *the point of view* of a subject whose consciousness is everywhere and every when.[2]

From where does science get *this* point of view? From the *I AM*. Its conscious self is the *I AM*.

The transcendental subject, the real proper self

[1] It is as if he regarded himself and his fellows as doomed to perpetual imprisonment in Space-Time. But even strong walls or iron bars cannot imprison the spirit of man.

[2] Do not forget that, for science, Time is meaningless without Space.

which we *feel* as *I AM*, gives birth to the subject with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception and its power to think *in relation to* its *synthetical* unity.[1]

I cannot be an object to myself, as I must be if in the passage under consideration *I* and *myself* are held to refer to the same subject. But when we hold that Kant wrote from *two* points of view we justify his statement that I can be an object to myself. For his statement then reads thus: "I (as a subject with synthetical unity) can be an object to myself (as a subject with transcendental unity)." This synthetical unity of apperception is, as a principle, the highest in all human cognition; that is, the highest unity the subject can attain to. But this synthetical unity must, for existence, involve the previous existence of the transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception. For the power of *synthesis* in the understanding of the subject proceeds from the transcendental subject with transcendental unity."

I Am

Our way is now clear to consider the second disputed passage in Kant. And this passage is of supreme importance, for it sums up Kant's theory

[1] All thought is limited (*Kant*, p. 43). The *feeling* of *I AM* is neither thought nor intuition.

as to the *I AM*. We find it is a summation of his scientific proof of the centrality of the appercipient self.[1]

The passage runs as follows:

"In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold content of representations, consequently in the *synthetical* (my italics) unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that *I AM*. This representation is a Thought, not an Intuition."

Before considering this passage, its form as it stands must be criticised.

In the first place, the *I AM* is not as a representation either a Thought or an Intuition. We *feel* the *I AM*, quite apart from thought or intuition. We may even hold, with Alexander, that we "enjoy" ourselves as permanent; that is, as *I AM*. And with this Kant agrees. For the *Prolegomena* were written *after* the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and therein Kant states:[2]

"Were the presentation of the apperception, the *ego*, a conception whereby everything whatever was thought, it could also be used as predicate of other things, or it would contain such predicates. It is, really, nothing more than the feeling[3] of a

[1] *Kant*, p. 96. Max Müller's translation, p. 741. I give Meiklejohn's translation, but omit the words "on the other hand" with which he begins. Max Müller omits these words. The passage is really a summation of Kant's previous argument.

[2] *Prolegomena*, ff. 46. In Belfort Bax's translation, p. 82. *A Study of Kant*, p. 172.

[3] *Ein Dasein? Ein Ichsein?* All now wanted is that this feeling is the centrality of the consciousness of the conscious ego. (Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 172).

reality without the least conception, but only presentation of that to which all thought stands in relation (*relatione accidentis*)." Kant's correction is vital. We *feel* the *I AM*. We do not think it or intuite it.

But the main objection to the passage as it stands is that it confuses Kant's *two points of view*. It confuses Kant's point of view from that of the transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception with his point of view from that of the subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. As it stands all seems written from the one point of view of a subject, and so the consciousness of *I AM* being considered as *not* the same as the consciousness of "as I am in myself" is inexplicable.

This passage being a summary of Kant's previous argument, it is well, in spite of repetition, to state, as shortly as possible, what the previous argument is:

There are two subjects. The one is the subject with transcendental synthetical unity of apperception; the other is the transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception.[1]

Let us assume that only the subject with *synthetical* unity exists. That is, let us with Alexander, assume that the transcendental subject (a superior entity) does not exist. Then what do we find? We find that we can determine ourselves as incomplete finite existents. We *are* no more than

[1] Never mind, at present, how Kant relates the one to the other.

" things " of body, brain and thought correlated to motion of the brain. We are impermanent " things." And we *appear* to ourselves and others as these impermanent " things." We *do* determine ourselves and our fellows, together with other things, as objects in Space-Time, and so determine all as subject to the impermanence of all that exists in Space-Time.

For the subject with *synthetical* unity we are and appear as incomplete finite existents; that is, as impermanent " things."

Here Kant's philosophy steps in and discovers the Achilles' heel of empirical philosophy.

Alexander's mind is a mind which cannot exist without a body. He admits that the mind can contemplate its body, but he holds, too, that the mind cannot contemplate itself. And, for his empirical philosophy, he is correct. But what follows, directly, from his allegation?

It follows directly that his subject *cannot contemplate itself*. For his subject is a mind in a body, where the tie is *indissoluble*. This " thing " of body and mind cannot contemplate itself as an object, cannot transcend subject and object. And yet Alexander *does* determine himself, his fellows, and other things as objects in Space-Time! How is it he can do this?

Here it is, as before said, that Kant finds the Achilles' heel of empirical philosophy. And he finds it in Alexander's own words. For Alexander states that " we enjoy ourselves as permanent amid our changes " (*Space, Time, and Deity*, p. 29),

and our changes as impermanent things are comprised in our changes. As an impermanent thing Alexander cannot determine himself and his fellows as objects in Space. He cannot transcend subject and object. But he *does* do this. How can he do it? He must *first of all* feel (enjoy) himself as the *I AM*—that is, as a permanent subject—before he can determine himself, as he does, as existing in the form of an incomplete finite existent. He does not determine himself as what he really is, but he must be this reality before he can determine himself and his fellows as they are and as they appear as subjects.

Kant proves that we can determine ourselves and our fellows as we are as subjects and as we appear to be, as subjects. So far empirical philosophy is sound. But if we were no more than subjects we could not effect this determination; for we cannot transcend subject and object, we cannot contemplate ourselves as objects. We, as subjects, must *feel* ourselves as permanent before we can do what we do do.

The subject *feels* itself as *I AM*; it feels its real proper self to be a transcendental subject with transcendental unity of apperception, and reason informs it that this feeling *must* be, or it could not determine itself as a subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception.

Let us now, keeping firmly in mind the distinction between the subject of transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception and the subject of transcendental unity of apperception, consider

the passage directly. I think we shall find Kant's meaning clear, though it is not clearly expressed.[1]

In the first place we must note that in this passage Kant makes no reference to pure unity of apperception, but only to *synthetical* unity of apperception. So the whole passage is written from the point of view of the subject with transcendental *synthetical* unity of apperception. Kant, in writing, considers metaphysics as a science.

What possible meaning, then, can we give to the statement "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that *I AM*"? As it stands it appears to me almost meaningless. As it stands the *I* and the *myself* refer to the same one subject. How then can any distinction exist between my consciousness of myself as "I am in myself" and my consciousness of myself as *I AM*? I can find none.

But let us paraphrase the passage from Kant's *two* points of view. I think that we can then give it a definite meaning. The additions are given in brackets:

"I (a subject with synthetical unity of apperception) am conscious of myself (my real proper self with transcendental unity of apperception), not as I (a subject) appear to myself (a subject), nor as I (a subject) am in myself (a subject), but only that *I AM*."

Read thus the passage has definite meaning.

[1] The reader must not forget that I am relying on Meiklejohn's and Max Müller's translations; I have not consulted the original Latin.

Though not so stated, it amounts to a summation of Kant's previous argument.

The centrality of the consciousness of the conscious self of science exists in feeling, transcending knowledge. It exists in the feeling *I AM*; that is, in the feeling of the subject that its conscious self is permanent with imagination fundamental for it.

The subject is this conscious self coupled with experience; it is an experiencer. But it is conscious that it could not be an experiencer unless as a conscious self it were a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. For the subject can think and its reason makes it aware that unless as a conscious self it were permanent it could not think as it does think. It must feel itself as permanent before it can think. This permanence we all feel in feeling *I AM*. The subject has synthetical unity of apperception and so can think. But unless as a conscious self it were permanent—that is, existed with pure unity of apperception—it could not exist as a subject with synthetical unity of apperception. The subject of science, a conscious self coupled with experience, is impermanent, for it is a subject of Space-Time. But it has *synthetical* unity of apperception and so can think, and it could not think as it does think unless its conscious self were the *I AM* (that is, a continuity of consciousness free from the impermanence of Space-Time) with pure unity of apperception. The conscious ego of science is the *I AM* which we all feel to exist.

I think we must agree with James Ward that only "at long last" Kant recognised the fact that

feeling is the centrality of the consciousness of the conscious ego of science. But the extract above cited from the *Prolegomena* shows that he, ultimately, relied on it. For the passage now under consideration (read as it is suggested it should be read) shows that the centrality of consciousness of the conscious ego of science is in the *feeling I AM*. It is this central *feeling* of *I AM* that enables the subject of science to determine (define) itself as a subject of science and to think as it does think.

Kant reasoned from two points of view. The one that of the *thinking* subject with *synthetical* unity of apperception, and, so far, his procedure was that of philosophical anthropomorphism, or it may, approximately, be termed empirical philosophy. The second was from that of the feeling subject with pure unity of apperception. What he proved was that the *thinking* subject could not exist in itself. It could exist only as a form conditioned in Space-Time of its real *feeling* self, the *I AM*. Feeling (awareness?) transcends thought. If the conscious ego of science did not *feel itself as I AM* the subject of science could not be the thinking subject that it is and that it determines itself to be. Kant agrees with empirical philosophy in only *using* its conscious ego so far as it is an experiencer.

Even from his second point of view Kant never departs altogether from his agreement with the conclusions of empirical philosophy; for he leaves empirical philosophy still in possession of its conscious ego coupled with experience.

But here comes in a difficulty. For the *impermanent* subject *feels* its conscious self as *permanent*; it feels it as *I AM*. And this feeling of permanence the subject cannot reconcile with the conclusion of empirical philosophy that man is no more than an impermanent ego. The subject, by the use of its own reason, finds that it could not think as it does think and could not determine *itself* as an impermanent subject as it does unless it felt (was aware of) its conscious self as the *I AM*. This feeling of *I AM* is a basic fact for the subject of science.

And here comes in Kant's second point of view, a point of view from that of the transcendental subject.

Kant denies that the conscious ego of science is *determined by its experience*. It is more than a mere experiencer. It *is* an experiencer, but its experience exists only *in relatione accidentis* to its conscious ego. Science must start with the feeling of a conscious ego which is permanent and which we feel (are aware of) as *I AM* before it can have the conception of its subject; that is, a conscious subject coupled with experience.

Abstract (do away with) your feeling of the unknown, abstract your feeling of the *I AM*—that is, your feeling of continuity in consciousness of yourself in spite of the momentary changes of your body, brain and thought (correlated to the motion of the brain)—and you will find you cannot think as you do think. You will find that consciousness of feeling the unknown and consciousness of feeling the *I AM* must be for you before

you can think as you do think. You determine yourself as a subject. You will find you could not do this unless you *felt* yourself as *I AM*. You will find that you must start with your feeling of *I AM* as proceeding from the basic fact that you *are* a permanent self or you could not be a subject and do and think as you do and think.

We *are* all of us conscious selves coupled with experience; we appear to ourselves and others as conscious selves coupled with experience. But reason informs us that, for the subject to be able to think, as it *does* think, about itself and its experience, the conscious ego of science must *feel* itself as a continuity free from its changes as a conscious ego coupled with experience, free from its changes as an experiencer. It must *feel* itself as *I AM*. In transcendence of knowledge we must *feel ourselves as I AM before we can begin to* think as we do think, with our *synthetical* unity of apperception.

And here comes in the main difficulty for the argument.

Science has nothing to do with feeling; for its analysis of experience it uses the conceptions of the understanding of its subject; it uses thought. Science has nothing to do with what is, with what we term the absolute. It *begins* its analysis with conceptions of what *is* and then terms these conceptions the postulates of science.

But Kant assumes to be scientific. How then can he bring feeling within the purview of science? James Ward points out that Kant never entered

into this question in detail. But I would hold that his philosophical anthropomorphism does get over this main difficulty, and in this opinion I am supported, I think, by James Ward. How is the difficulty met?

Science has never yet recognised the fact that the existence of the *I AM* is a basic fact for *science.* Science, I think, regards Kant's *I AM* as an *ens imaginarius* and ignores its existence. How can this be explained and justified?

We have found (cf. p. xxxv.) that Duration is the essential and qualitative element of Space-Time. This, if we follow Bergson, is a scientific fact. But it is an *unknown* fact. "The fact is there but the reason of the fact we cannot see." We must, then, give to the subject of science the feeling of the existence of a fact which is unknown. What then must science do with this feeling of an unknown fact? Science must have its Space-Time; at the same time it must admit that the essential and qualitative element of Space-Time is Duration. But science cannot function directly with feeling. What then must it do? It must *eliminate* Duration from its consideration. But, as Duration is an essential element for the (phenomenal) existence of Space-Time, science must still hold that, without the feeling of Duration as the essential element of Space-Time, it could not have its Space-Time to function with. The foundation of the building science erects with thought is and must exist in the *feeling* of Duration.

The same argument applies directly to the ques-

tion of the *I AM*. Science *uses* its conscious ego only so far as it is an experiencer; that is, a conscious ego coupled with experience. *So it eliminates* the *I AM* except in so far as it is an experiencer. But the conscious ego of science *feels* itself as *I AM*. It feels that as a real proper self it is not determined by its experience. It is more than a mere experiencer. It follows that science must proceed in agreement with the fact that its conscious subject *feels* itself as *I AM*. For without this feeling its subject could not think as it does think.

Science must bow to this basic feeling of *I AM*, must bow to it as the essential element for the existence of its subject; that is, for the existence of a conscious ego coupled with experience. But, just as with Duration, science must *eliminate* this feeling of *I AM*, except in so far as its subject can, as an experiencer, be a *knowing* subject. The conscious ego of science is a feeling subject, but science, I repeat, *uses* its conscious ego only so far as it is a knowing subject.

And do not forget that the subject is conscious that its knowledge is limited. If it were no more than a knowing subject its knowledge would be, for it, an evidential absolute. But the subject gets "outside" its knowledge in that it can define it as limited. Experience cannot help the subject in thus getting "outside" knowledge. It must be the conscious ego of science which has this power. It is because the conscious ego of science has the feeling of *I AM* that the subject is enabled to

determine knowledge as limited. Unsatisfactory as the term *feeling* is as existing in transcendence of knowledge, it is the only term we have to hand.

The conscious ego of science is a permanent self with imagination fundamental for it. It is the *I AM* which we all feel. The centrality of the consciousness of the conscious ego exists in feeling. This basic fact of science is not a concept, a thought, or an intuition. It exists in feeling.[1]

The subject of science has *synthetical* unity of apperception, so it can think. But it could not think in time as it does think without a continuity of self-consciousness in its conscious ego, a continuity of self-consciousness which is permanent in that it is free from the impermanence which is implicit for all conditioned in Space-Time. We must feel ourselves as permanent in the midst of all our changes in body, brain and thought *before* we can be what we are; that is, before we can be conscious selves coupled with experience.

Throughout we have, with Kant, assumed that metaphysics can be treated as a science. The procedure, as James Ward points out, has been philosophical anthropomorphism rather than pure philosophy. So the argument has been confined to proof that the conscious ego of science is the *I AM which we feel.*

This limitation of the form of the argument must be kept severely in mind.

[1] For the indefinite term feeling I would like to use "awareness which transcends (is the genesis of) knowledge."

It may be that the scientific proof now offered that the conscious ego of science is the *I AM* which we feel does, if accepted as sound, strengthen the position of those who hold man to be a soul or spirit and therefore personally interested in such questions as God, Immortality and Freedom of the Will. But with any such questions the argument has nothing to do.

The argument is confined to proof that the conscious ego of science is the *I AM* which we feel.