


Notes

from the
Lectures of Sir Wm. Hamilton
on
Metaphysics.

Prof. Munay
Edinburgh University
1854-55.

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Intimations + Exercises

Tomorrow, Monday (Prizes + Vacation Studies) Wednesday. Ross + Jardine. Censors.

Alexander Jamieson	a	1 2	b	3 4	D E	5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Baldwin Frazer	a	1 2	b c	3 4	d	5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Ewen Macaulay	a	1 2	b (c)	(3) D	3 4	e 5 6 7 8 9
George Thomson	a	1 2	b c	3 4	d E	5 6 7 8 9 10
George A. Yeomans	b	1 2	b c	3 D	4	5 e 6 7 8 9 10
John L. Cameron (a)	a	1 2	b c	2 3	4 5 6	
John B. Noel	b	1 2	b c	3 4	5 6 7 8 9 10	
Henry Edmison	a	1 2	b c	3 4	D e	5 6 7 8 9 10
Robert Jardine	b	1 2	b c	3 D	4	e 5 6 7 8 9 10
Thomas Ferguson		1 2	b (c)	d	3 4	5 6 7 8 9
Wm. R. Bain		1 2	b c	3 4	D E	5 6 7 8 9

~~Alexander Dawson~~ 1

+ Alex. Hunter 1 2 3 4 5

+ Charles Cameron 1 2 3 4 5 6

+ Donald Ross 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

+ John A. McMorine 1

+ John G. ~~Pictou~~ Gordon 1 2 3 4 5


+ John D. Robertson 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

~~Isaac Maier~~

+ J. F. Harkness 1

+ Tho. Hart 1 2 3 4 5 6


+ John Gordon



Subjects of Essays

1. Is it possible to explain the moral phenomena of our consciousness as originating in the desire of our own happiness or of the happiness of others?
2. On the origin of our belief in the uniformity of nature.
3. Are there sufficient data to warrant our belief in the existence of latent modifications of mind?

(On N^o 2 of Hume's *Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*, Sect. 7. 'On the idea of necessary connection', & 'Of Lib. & Necess.', 19. 'Of Miracles'. On the *Treatise of Human Nature*, Part III. 'Of the Idea of Probability'. Dr. Brown's *Essay on Cause & Effect*, of which a résumé is Sect. 5-8, 'On the Objects of Physical Inquiry'. Also in Chalmers' *Nat. Theology*.)



Lecture I.

What is Philosophy?

You are now, Gentlemen, about to enter a course of philosophical discipline. Before proceeding, therefore, to the consideration of the special object of our course, it will be necessary to present you with a general notion of what philosophy is. But in affording you this information, it is evident several difficulties present themselves. The definition of philosophy is the result of a lofty generalization of particulars, of which you either are, or are supposed to be, ignorant. You cannot, therefore, be at present made adequately to understand the nature of the studies in question, since these studies are themselves intended for this purpose. ~~But~~ Although,

however, you cannot avail yourselves of a Knowledge of the Nature of *phyl*, it is desirable that you should have some notion of what *phyl* is. Now, as in the order of Nature, belief always precedes *Phyl.*, you must at present believe hypothetically, that is, take upon trust: this, however, only that you may not hereafter be under the necessity of taking any Condition on trust. In the order of Nature the child must believe in order to learn; and even the primary facts of intelligence would not be original, were they revealed to us under any other form than that of necessary belief. * But this is not peculiar to *phyl*, for almost every science makes the same demand. In pursuing our plan, therefore, of giving some general notion of what *phyl* is, we propose to answer, (1.) What is the meaning of the name? (2.) What is the meaning of the thing?

I. First, then, etymologically considered, *phyl* is a term of Greek origin, being compounded of $\phi\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$ and $\sigma\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha$. The history of the word is involved in considerable obscurity. Cicero, on the authority of Heraclides, says that it was first assumed and applied by Pythagoras. The circumstances of its application he relates as follows: It happened when Pythagoras was at ~~the~~ ~~court~~ Phyllos, that Leon, the chief of the Phylians, was exceedingly charmed by his ingenuity and eloquence as he discoursed on various topics; and asked in what art he principally

* Non enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed intelligo ut credam. Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelligit. Anselm, *Parol.* 1. *De fide* tit. 2.

and he principally excelled. Pythagoras replied that he professed no art, but was merely a philosopher. Leon, struck with the novelty of the term, asked Pythagoras, who were philosophers and wherein they differed from other men? Pythagoras replied that, as in the public games, whilst some are contending for glory, and others buying and selling for gain, there is always a third party who attend merely as spectators; so in human life, amidst the various characters of men, there is always a select number who, despising all other pursuits, assiduously apply themselves to the observation and study of nature: these, added he, are the persons whom I call philosophers. Pythagoras was a native of Samos, who flourished about 560 B.C., about 150 before Plato: the statement, therefore, that the term philosophy was in use at so early a period is improbable. It rests, you will see, wholly upon the authority of Heraclides, who is generally regarded as being from a trustworthy authority. It is by no means impossible, ^{however} that it could have been then in use, for we find it in Herod. I. 30. But it is far more probable that the term was first adopted by Socrates; who was, at least, the first to generalize the expression, in order, as was natural, to distinguish his own sect or school from the Sophists - σοφισται. The term philosophy, it must be remarked,

was at first assumed in Modesty to intimate that those who had made most advance in Phil. should consider themselves rather as "lovers of wisdom" than as "wise men." It soon, however, lost its original meaning, and was borne with as much ostentation and vanity as if it had ~~exclusive~~ implied an exclusive right to the possession of wisdom. Phy was soon loaded with opprobrious appellations. It is called by Seneca, homen invidiosum; and Epictetus counselled his disciples not to assume the title of phers. Campbell, "Address to the Rainbow," says:
"I ask not proud philosophy,
To tell me what thou art."

II. What is the thing signified by the name? It would be tedious and perplexing to enumerate the various definitions that have been given of phy. There have been as numerous as the authors who have written upon it. E.g. it has been defined "the science of things human and divine"; — "the science of things possible in as much as they are possible"; — "the relations of sensible and abstract truths"; the science of the original form of the Ego or mental self. — &c. &c. But all these definitions — (Mr. Col. H. gives a long list) — are either partial and consequently imperfect, thus excluding what they ought to comprehend; or vague and unsatisfactory, supplying no

3.

preliminary information, and only to be understood after a Phil. has been acquired of that which they profess to explain. The fact probably is that a single proposition cannot include all that Phy. comprehends.

Phy. is not to be looked at from one point of view. In relation to man as a cognitive and thinking being it is theoretical; in relation to man as a moral agent it is practical; and sometimes it may be viewed as comprehending both theory and practice. Again, it may be viewed objectively as a complement of truths; or subjectively as a habit or quality of the mind knowing. In these circumstances I shall not attempt to give a definition of phy., but only endeavour to ~~give~~ ^{make} you as ~~precise~~ understand it as precisely as the imprecise nature of the object permits. As a matter of history I may mention that in Greek phy. there are six divisions. The first, ^{and second} define it from its object-matter, (materia circa quam); the third and fourth from its end - that for which it is; the fifth from its relative preeminence; the sixth from its etymology. The first defines it to be the Phil. of things existent as existent, — $\varphi\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\delta\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$ η $\delta\upsilon\tau\alpha$. 2° The Phil. of things divine and human. 3° (Plato) Meditation of death, $\mu\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tau\eta$ $\delta\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\omega\nu$. 4° Resemblance to the Deity. 5° The art of arts, and science of sciences, (Arist.); 6° The love of wisdom.

A seventh was added, that philosophy, is the medicine
of the Soul; and even an eighth is given in the expres-
sion

* 1. As all phy is a knl, the highest problems of phy &c. 2. As phy is knl
of causes & the mind is the principal constituent or cause of knl,
phy much above all objects of knl study mind wh knows.

4

All physical, but not all that phy. Phy. ∴, a kind of knl, how distinguished from other knl? All knl = consc^{ness} (of self & not self.)

KnL of the facts given in consc^{ness} is historical or empirical. Obs. on empiric. οἱ εὐπειρικοί & σοφῶτα ἀδαδικοί opposed to οἱ σοφιστικῶτα who made use both of experience & reasoning.

Still Empirical is necessary, for experiential is not in use & exper. denotes merely one kind of experience, when fact has been brot about by (voluntary) arrangement.


το οὐτὶ ἐστὶ γινώσκω οὐτὶ εἶδω = scio rem esse = (later) quod res sit (H even opinia res sit (schoolmen. Anselm.) = knl of the fact.

το διοτι = knl of cause or reason, why or how. Cannot but think a cause & knl of a phen^{on} felt to be inadequate till we have reached its cause. Illustr. of a number

Phy, as convertible with science, = knl of effects as depending on causes, & ∴ tends to first causes & ultimately to the One First Cause.

But all knl relative, possible only as far as we have faculties of knowing, the highest problem of phy is to investigate the conditions under wh knl is possible. Phy = science of mind.

Term phy misapplied in this country (Britain.)



Absolute Objective Utility of Phy.

Abs. (value properly a good (αγαθόν) that wh is (valuable in itself. το κατ' αὐτὸν) Relative (value properly the useful (ὠφέλιμον.)
Ταγαθὰ = τὰ κατ' αὐτὰ ἰσχυρότερα, καὶ ἄχρημα. Τὰ ὠφέλιμα = τὰ διὰ τούτων.

Of Goods or abs. ends only two for men:

1. Pleasure & 2. Happiness wh, from pleasure being always concomitant of ph (unimpeded & unconstrained activity) always coincide.

Absolute utility may also be called General, Relative may be called Special or Particular. First more important & its overlook ∴ more dangerous.

Absolute utility either Subjective or Objective.

Objective utility ^{of Phy.} derived from its being devoted to mind


I. From its turning our studies to mind, wh is the noblest object of Phil. Sir You's motto from Phavorinus, ^{Græce to Child} Pope's "The proper study, &c." Sir Tho' Browne.

II. From the fact, to illustrate wh this lecture is specially devoted, that it is only through mind that we can pierce to the soul of God. Inference of God's existence grounded on a certain class of phenomena demanding a Divine Cause for their explanation. This class of phenomena are found

1. Not in phenomena of matter, wh, if taken by themselves, wd rather afford the opposite conclusion, but

2. In phenomena of mind, taken in connection with wh the phenomena of matter do afford a theistic conclusion.

For what kind of a cause constitutes a Deity?



Notion of a God contained

1. Neither in that of an Omnipotent First Cause alone, for in the belief of that theists & atheists are agreed,

2. Nor in that of an intelligent & moral creator, for unless original & omnipotent a higher cause w^d require to be postulated for him. Is that higher cause not intelligence, then atheism follows. Is it intelligence, then theism.

Conditions ∴ of the proof of Duty are

1. That intelligence stands first in abs. order of existence, i.e. that final preceded efficient causes.


2. That the universe is governed by moral laws.

What are the characteristic contrasts of material & mental phen^a ?

The former are subjected to immutable laws, & man's bodily organisation connects him with these. But his organs are his, not himself. He is consc. of faculties not subjected to rigid necessity of nature: in unconditional law of duty he recog:ises liberty, & hence struggle between physical necessity & moral freedom, flesh & sp., wh is distinctive character of humanity.

1. First condition of proof of Duty drawn from psychology. It is only in so far as we discover priority of intelligence in our experience, that we are warranted in affirming its absolute priority. Psych. materialism logical atheism. Huller in Microcosmo sp., nullus in Macrocosmo Deus (Dr. Henry More.)

2. Second condition also drawn from psychology & of more importance. First satisfies speculative curiosity: second our heart. — Here again only by proving reality of our own



Moral nature do we establish moral nature of God & of the world's government. This given only in psychology.

Sir Wm. Veste's proof of liberty always on conscience of duty.

Phy operates in 3 ways in assuring us of moral freedom.

1. Though conviction is natural, an examination of the mind is required to give it clearness & scientific certainty.

2. Phy alone obviates the difficulty presented by the causal judgment.

3. Study of mind necessary to counteract twofold influence of study of matter wh is twofold.

a. It diverts mind from phen^a of moral freedom & disqualifies it for appreciating their import.

b. It habituates the mind to contemplation only of mechanical necessity.

a. Thus it is disposed to disbelieve freedom

b. Love of unity determines him to rejection hypothesis of free intelligence, when he finds constantly in his studies a rigid necessity. Not so strongly felt in the infancy of science.

Plato. Kant. Jacobi.

[Faint, illegible handwriting, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

Method of Phy.

Only one method in phy. & all different (so-called) methods are merely applications, more or less full, of this one method.

What is method? A rational progress, i.e. progress towards an end.

Physical method: progress towards end of phy.

End of phy. twofold:

1. Discovery of causes. Anal. of cause only possible as ca. traced out of effect. E.g. a neutral salt. Decomposed into an acid & an alkali (& the force which bro't them into union). This termed Analysis. But analysis is only a mean to an end — to a (re)composition, Synthesis.

These, though commonly separated (regarded as separate methods), are merely two elements of one method.

Each equally essential to complete the other. But Synthesis is valuable in itself, as the Synthesis may at any time be added.

A Synthesis however without analysis is ab initio null.

2. Reduction of multiplicity of Anal. to unity. Every Anal. complex, but our faculties are so limited that we can comprehend only simple conjunctions. E.g. a tree. E.g.


(a) With regard to one individual object, a tree.

(b) A multiplicity of objects. To comprehend that we must find one in many — that in which differing objects agree. Induction.

E.g. Gravitation.

But in induction there is not mere analysis. Something is added to the analysis. From some we cannot infer all.

What is inserted? That nature is uniform in her operations. E.g. Inductive Syllogism with regard to Gravitation. Which is merely an observation of many particulars converted into one universal law.



9.

Questions for Examination.

1. To whom does common tradition, & whom does Ham. ascribe the first adaptation of the name *philos*?
2. What kind of *phil* does Ham. distinguish from physical *phil*, & by what does he distinguish physical *phil* from that other kind & why is *phil* (or what ground does ^{he} apply 'phil' esp. to the *phil* of mind?)
3. What is the absolute, what the relative, what the absolute subjective, what the absolute objective utility of *phil*?
4. What two processes go to constitute the complete & only method of *phil*?
5. What are the three classes under wh all the phen^a of mind may be comprehended, & what are the three sciences into wh *phil* (the science of mind) may be divided?
6. What is the physical ~~sense~~ usage of the terms *subject* & *subjective*, *object* & *objective*?
7. From what are the terms 'Ethics' & 'Morals' derived, & what is the object: matter of the science wh they denote?
8. What are the two meanings wh the term 'law' is employed to denote, & in wh of these is it employed in Ethics?
9. To what element in an action is its moral quality attached?
10. What are the theories of Hedonism, Eudemonism & Utilitarianism, as these terms were limited in the lectures?
11. Who ascribed the moral phen^a of *conscientiousness* to an internal sense?
12. How does Dr. Adam Smith explain the origin of our notions of (1.) approbation & (2.) merit, ~~wh~~ with reference (1.) to ourselves, (2.) to others?

* See strongly stated. See Plato's Politicus, p. 258, quoted by Ed.

Divisions of Phy

Are phers agreed in their divisions of phy? They differ as much in this as in their definition of it. The most famous divisions i.e., those founded on a principle, are alone to be noticed.

The same limitation of our faculties, wh constrains us to seek unity in our soul, renders expedient & even necessary the division of phy, that by considering its constituent parts separately we may the better comprehend the constituted whole.

The most ancient & universally recognised division is into Theoretical & Practical phy.

1. In Theoretical (speculative or contemplative) phy scimus ut sciamus.

2. In Practical scimus ut operemur.

Engl. language deficient in expressions for this distinction. $\kappa\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ expressed by active, wh ought to comprehend $\theta\rho\omega\mu\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ as well.


E.g. Intellectual (speculative) & active powers of mind.

Practical moreover has many collateral significations wh render it in some respects unfit to supply the want.

The division first explicitly enounced by Arist. & the attempts of the later Platonists to carry it up to Plato or even to Pythagoras are unworthy of refutation. But after being promulgated it was soon generally adopted.

The division however is unsound. For

1. Phy, as phy, is theoretical only, has to do with nothing beyond soul, with no applic. of that to practice.



2. In another point of view all philosophy is practical, has to do with knowledge not as a mere inert possession, but as an act.

The principal difference of opinion among the ancients regarded the relation of Logic to philosophy.

Is it a mere instrument or a department also of philosophy?

Art & Science - what is the distinction between them which has been ~~not~~ explained in no other book?

Not convertible with the distinction between practical & theoretical philosophy, though often supposed to be so. E.g. by Whately.

If this were the case, the distinction wd be easy; for the same branch of knowledge wd be ~~science~~ an art in respect of its practical application, wd be a science in respect of the theory which that practical application supposes.

But this is not the case. We cannot say the art of ethics, politics, theology &c., though these are practical sciences. We speak however of the art of logic, rhetoric, grammar.

Historical origin of the distinction. Through the scholastic (= Aristotelic) philosophy, which formed the exclusive philosophy of Europe during the middle ages, the term Art, like many others, came into modern European languages.


Τεχνικα (generically) = πραξις (specifically) & ποιησις.

Art = ποιησις = εξις ποιητικη μετα λογου.

Ethics, politics &c. propose πραξις as their end & are ∴ not arts.


Logic, rhetoric, grammar propose some εργον (a syllogism, oration, verbal expression of the^t.) They are ∴ εεργηται.

The distinction is not above criticism & is not vindicated, but merely explained here.



It is moreover, merely a distinction in phiz. Mechanical operations were not considered. In them \therefore art is applied both to productive & unproductive operations. Rope: dancing, as well as Rope: making is an art.


Racon was the first after the revival of letters to distribute the sciences & phiz. ~~The latter into~~ All human kind into ~~Poetry~~ History, Poetry & Phiz. She lask into that wh is con: versant about 1. God, 2. Nature, 3. Man.




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Questions for Examination.

1. What is the doctrine of Reid & Stewart with regard to consciousness? Is it the common doctrine among ph^{ers}?
2. How does H. explain attention? & what 3 kinds or degrees of ~~the~~ attention does he recognize?
3. What are the 3 laws wh^{ch} must be observed in order to the legitimate application of the testimony of consciousness?
4. What is Natural, what Hypothetical Dualism? What are the two forms of the latter?
5. Who was the most distinguished Natural Dualist of modern times, & by what ph^{er} was he supposed to be a Cosmologic Idealist?
6. What is the phen^{on} connected with our acquired habits, to explain wh^{ch} H. postulates latent modifications of mind?
7. From what is the name of Logic derived, & what is the ambiguity of its etymological meaning?
8. What is the faculty with the formal laws of wh^{ch} Logic is conversant & what are the three functions of that faculty? wh^{ch} determine the threefold division of Logic?
9. What is a Categorematic, what a Syncategorematic word?
10. What is a Concrete, an abstract, a Singular, a Common term?
11. What is the extension, what the comprehension of a term, & what is the law of their relation?



1. What are the faculties into wh. H. distributes the Cognitive Power of the mind?
2. What are the two hypothesis of mediate perception & wh of these alone had Reid conceived?
3. What is Dr. Brown's charge against Reid's acc^t of the theories of perception?
4. What division was there in the Cartesian school with regard to the Descartes' theory of perception?
5. What abusive signification did Reid give to im: Mediate Phil.?
6. To what class of mental phen^a do sensation & perception severally belong & what is the law of their relation?
7. Into what classes are propositions divided as regards (a) their substance, (b.) quality, (c.) quantity, (d.) both quality & quantity.
8. What do the symbols A E I O severally represent?
9. What are the only two kinds of logical opposition & by in terms & in propositions, & by what are these two kinds distinguished?
10. By what rule is the quantity of the predicate determined?
11. Convert the following propositions & state by wh of the 3 modes each is converted:
 - (a.) All men are responsible
 - (b.) No ^{beasts} men are responsible
 - (c.) Some men are cruel
 - (d.) Some men are not cruel.



1. What are the two objections against ~~the~~ Nat. Realism wh have been founded ~~on the~~ severally on the nature of the ^{an} act of Perception Knowledge & on the nature of mind & matter?

x 2. What ancient Greek philosopher first ~~he~~ held that the four senses of Sight, Hearing, Taste & Smell are only modifications of Touch? (What was the opinion of Democritus with regard to the senses of Touch Sight &c.?)

3. What sense is much be recognised besides the five of the vulgar division & what are the sensations ~~which~~ referred to it?

4. What does H. hold regarding the connection between the sense of sight & the notion of extension?

5. Who was the author & what is the doctrine of the New Theory of Vision?


6. What are the Major, Minor & Middle Terms, the Major & Minor Premises & Conclusion of a Syllogism?

7. What are the two important Rules regarding the distribution of Terms of a Syllogism?

8. What are the Rules regarding the particular & negative premisses?


9. What is the Mood of a Syllogism, & how many moods are numerically, how many logically possible?

10. Why are the following moods impossible, viz. EOO, AIO, AOE, AOA?



1. What is the criterion of a priori truths? By whom was it first recognised, by whom first ^{fully} applied?
2. What was Locke's doctrine with regard to a priori truths, & ^{to} what ~~idea~~ was his doctrine logically reduced by the French ph^{ilo}s?
3. ~~How~~ What is the distinction between Retention, Reproduction & Representation?
4. 3. By what principle does H. explain the phen^a. of Retention?
4. Into what law does H. generalise the subordinate laws of association, & by what previous ph^{ilo}s was the general law recognised?
5. What defect ~~was~~ ^{is} there ~~been~~ in the analysis of the phen^a. of Repro-
duction by most psychologists?
6. What is the figure of a syllogism? How many figures are there & what is their difference?
7. Why is AEE impossible in the first figure, AAI in the second?
8. What kind of conclusions must be drawn in the second & third figures, & why these alone?
9. What is the meaning of the symbolic letters in dI s d m I s & f E I A p t O n?
10. To what mood of what fig. does the following syllogism belong, to what mood of the first fig. may it be reduced & how?

No Sponges have the power of locomotion,
 But sponges are animals;
 ∴ Some animals have not the power of locomotion.



1. Why is IAI impossible in the second fig., EAE in the third?
2. Why ~~does the~~ must the major premise in the first fig. be universal & the minor affirmative?
3. Show into Barbara the following argt.: The only Absolute that exists must be the egg + the honey, for it is the only Absolute that we know.
4. What is the mnemonic line for the second fig. & the meaning of its symbolic letters?
5. In what mood of what fig. is the following argt. drawn; to what mood of the first fig. may it be reduced & how?

The Ornithorynchus Paradoxus lays eggs,
 And it ~~is~~ is a quadruped;
 ∴ Some quadrupeds lay eggs.

6. Show into Cesare the following argt. & reduce it to the first figure: ~~No necessary notions, like those of~~ The notions of space, time & cause, being necessary, cannot be the products of experience.

7. What is the procedure in the modus ponens & in ^{the} modus tollens of conditional syllogisms severally?

8. What are the two fallacious modes of procedure in conditional syllogisms?

9. How are conditional syllogisms converted?

10. Convert the following syllogism from the modus ponens into the modus tollens:


If I cannot know the pleasure of benevolence ^{without being first} ~~ill I am~~ benevolent,
 I cannot be benevolent merely for pleasure;

But I cannot know &c.;

∴ I cannot be &c.

Faint, illegible handwriting in cursive script, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is mostly concentrated in the upper half of the page.

1. What is the relation of ^{the} subject to ^{the} predicate in these two propositions (a) Milk is white; (b) Milk is a liquid?
2. What two kinds of Reasoning, Inductive & Deductive, have been generally overlooked, & what is their distinction?
3. From what two ^{sources} may necessity of tho^t arise?
4. Explain the Law of the Conditioned in relation to space & time, both as maxima & minima.
5. Shew how H. deduces the mental Law of Causality from the Law of the Conditioned.
6. Why are the semi-logical classed among the logical fallacies, but distinguished from the purely logical?
7. What are the Fallacia Figuratae Dictionis, & the Fallacia Plurimum Interrogationum & the Fallacia Amphiboliae?
8. What is intrinsic, what extrinsic ambiguity?
9. Does the Fallacy of Division & Composition arise from intrinsic or extrinsic ambiguity?
10. Is the following arg^t. fallacious, & if ~~not~~^{so}, why?
 What a man knoweth is ~~not~~^{not} eternal ~~is~~[&] unchangeable;
 Truth is what a man knoweth;
 ∴ Truth is not eternal & unchangeable




[In order to understand the division of our course, a preliminary view of the different departments of phys. is required. L. W. H.]

Psychology.

Lecture VIII.

Division of the course, and Explication of philosophical terms.

We now come to the peculiar business of the course. All sc. and phy. are divided into two classes, according as they are conversant, 1^o about Matter, 2^o about Mind. With the first we have to do at present only in so far as it can throw light on the latter. The following scheme will lay before the various departments, into which the phy. of mind divides itself:



[A] This head divides itself into 3 parts, for we have as psych.
(1.) of the Cognitions; (2.) of the feelings, (~~as pleasure & pain~~ the various
modifications of pleasure & pain;) and (3.) of the Conative or appeti-
tive faculties as will and desire.

(a.) Instead of these words through which I have drawn my pen,
we should have something to this effect: ~~We~~ We have no science
for the Nomenclature of the Cognitive faculties in general, (which
should be called 'Gnosiology' or 'Gnostology,') but for the Understand-
ing we have Logic, & as ~~it~~ it would be better denominated,
'Dianoetics;' for Logic &c

But to explain: all phy. is in answer to three questions: 1° What are the facts? 2° What are the laws which regulate these? 3° What results or inferences, not immediately obvious, do these warrant us in drawing? Phy. is, therefore, threefold:

I. If we consider the mind merely with the view of observing its phenomena, we have one mental sc. or department of mental sc. wh. may be styled phenomenology. Commonly called empirical psych.; we shall call it phenomenal psych. [A.]

II. If not merely to ~~observe~~ ^{discover} phen. but universal laws by wh. the phen. are governed, we have a sc. wh. we shall call Nomology or Nomological Psych. This divides as the former, whose departments have each a sc. conversant about its laws. 1° The ^(a) ~~sc. of our cognition~~ is generically the Understanding, specifically Logic, for Logic is nothing but the sc. of the laws of thought in relation to the end wh. our faculties have in view. Universal Grammar or physical Grammar might also come under this head. 2° Not name in our language for this sc., denominated phy. of taste, and, especially on continent, Aesthetics. Neither unobjectionable. Aisthōsis = our "feeling" = either feeling in general, or that of touch in particular. But the term has been so long used for this purpose as to have become naturalized. 3° Nom. of Con. Powers is practical phy. in general. Considering man as an individual it is called ethics; as a member of a family, economics; of a whole society, politics.

III. Consists in the deduction of results or inferences. Facts may be such as not only to be objects of Phil. in themselves, but also as grounds for inferring truths out of themselves. Though we can have only a relative Phil. of mind & matter, still by inference and analogy we may rise above the mere facts wh. experience gives. Thus if the existence of God and Immort. can be are not given as phen., but if known phen. can be explained

Only on the hypothesis of God and Immort., we are warranted in inferring them. - This department is styled Ontology, or Metaph. proper.

You will observe that I have omitted in this the celebrated division of phy. into pract. & Specul. and confined practical phy. to one branch of Nomological psych. In point of fact I object to this division, 1^o Because as phy. has to do only with speculation, whatever goes beyond that, transcends phy. This is done if we divide phy. according to its end being either specul. or practical. 2^o It actually would not divide phy. for all phy. is practical, is valuable only in as far as it holds practice to be its ultimate end.

General division of the Course: Nothing to do with practical phy. - that is confined to Moral phy. chain; but there is none of the other departments of wh. we may not treat. Commence with Mental phy. strictly so called; then Logic; then Ontology.

Definition: "Psych. or ^{the} phy. of the human mind, strictly so denominated, is the sc. that is conversant about the phenomena or modifications or states of ^{the} mind, or conscious subject, or soul, or spirit, or self, or ego."

Why these various expressions? Because as they are of frequent occurrence I mean to explain them.

I. Psychology. Why use an exotic, and not phy. of the mind, sc. of the mind, &c? 1^o Because phy. & almost all its branches are denominated by Greek terms in our language; and why not this, the greatest of all? 2^o The term is now commonly used for this purpose; has the authority of Campbell, Beattie, Coleridge, Sir J. Macintosh, who justly censures Dr. Brown for his introducing the phrase "physiology of the mind." 3^o For perspicuity and to prevent Circumlocution and consequent tedium, we should

(a.) Seelenlehre. I. C. M. (from Seele = ψυχή & Lehre = λόγος.)

(b.) Psychology, however, was never so ~~determined~~ used, & is entirely free from such associations. Therefore his objections cannot apply to it.

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^{use} One term rather than a plurality, wh. is cremonious of a definition. But
4° if a Circumlocution be tolerated when used substantively, what
shall we say when we wish to employ it adjectively? How can
we express a psychological fact, law, Corisicity &c.? Even
the Germans who have a term of their own to ~~express~~ ^(a) denominate
this sc., because it has not a corresponding adjective, have
adopted the term psychology. But what shall we say of
Dr. Brown's phrase, and such words as the "physics of the soul",
and "intellectual physics." Plainly objectionable, because the
terms "nature - natura, - φυσικα" are confined in common use to
the material universe. — Dr. Stewart objects to spirit and
pneumatology; and properly, because these terms apply
equally to God, Angels, men; and, therefore, from the theologic-
al ideas associated with them are inappropriately employed
in phy. for the human mind. For the same reason he objects
to psych. but it must be remembered that all the terms em-
ployed to denominate the soul & its faculties are taken from
material objects. ψυχη, spiritus, anima and animus from aereus
Ghost (Old Engl. = spirit) = Germ. Geist, all come from words orig-
inally signifying "air." Compare such words as "Sapientia,
Sagacitas, (Gr.) phenser, Attentio, apprehensio, Conceptio, &c.

Hist. of term. Auct. wrote a work περι ψυχης, but
the combination of ψυχη + λογος is modern. The first find it
in a work of Ottocassian, published in 1594. He is the author
of the term Anthropology, on which he wrote a work in two parts:
1° Psychology. 2° Somatology. But probably he is indebted for the term
to his Master, Rodolphus Boehmius, who in the same year published
a work under the same title. Its use soon became general

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[(a) See this whole subject discussed in "Discussions," p. 608. Where
also the authorities for the statement of the recognition of this truth "by every
phase of every school."] J. C. M.

throughout Germany; it was introduced into France by Loof, & familiarized by Chas. Beausmont.

II. Phenomena, modes, &c. The explanation of these other terms of our definition will be best understood by an exposition of the great axiom, that all our Knowledge is relative.^(a) In this proposition the term "relative" is opposed to the term absolute. Therefore to say that all our Knowledge is relative is to assert that we know and can know nothing absolutely, i.e. in & for itself, without relation to our faculties. To illustrate: all our Phil. is either of Matter or of Mind. Now what is Matter? It must be the name of something either known or unknown. In so far as it is known it means that which appears under the form of extension, &c. It is the common name for a series or aggregate or complement of certain phenomena (manifested in co-existence. But as they appear only in ~~the~~ conjunction we are compelled by our constitution to think them conjoined in & by something: no phenomena, we cannot think them the phenomena of nothing, but as properties of something extended, &c. But this something, absolutely in itself, i.e. considered apart from its phenomena, is to us as zero: it is only in its relational or phenal existence, that it is cognizable by us, or conceivable. And it is only by a law of our nature, wh. compels us to think something absolute & unknown as the basis of that wh. is known, that this something obtains a kind of incomprehensible existence. This in wh. these phenal appearing qualities are supposed to inhere, is called their subject, substance or substratum. To the subject of the phenomena of extension, &c. the name of "Matter" or material substance is usually given. — The same remarks may be applied to mind (I do not repeat, J. C. M.)

Thus Mind & Matter, as known & knowable.

(a.) Therefore the Unitarian has a right to require the Dualist to prove that the two series of phenomena are incompatible with one substance. 'Negantibus incumbit probatio.'
[See 'Discussions', pp. 95. 96. I.C.M.]

[Sir Wm. Compton's that of man we might say, what Virgil said of Aeneas:

Reminque ignavis, imagine gaudet."]

(b.) previous to Reid.

(c.) [See 'Discussions' p. 14. I.C.M.]

Are only two different series of phenomena; as unknown & unknowable, they are the two substances in wh. these are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is an inference ~~too~~ ^{is an infer-} ~~ence~~ ^{ence} we are compelled to make from the existence of the known phenomena; and the difference of the two substances is only an inference from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to ^{Co-in} ~~exist~~ ^{here} in one. (a.)

This is a truth in the admission of wh. pheno have been singularly harmonious; so that the praise lavished on Reid, as having first expounded the principle, is wholly unmerited. Indeed, I am hardly aware of ~~any~~ ^{any} philosopher who has not proceeded on the assumption of the principle, of few, almost none, who have not explicitly pronounced it; and it is only since Reid's death that some German pheno have obtained celebrity for their attempt to establish phy. upon an immediate Pr. of the absolute. Aristotle says of matter, that it is ἀγνώστου καὶ εἰσῆται, and that mind is not known directly, but only indirectly, in knowing other things. He defines soul to be the principle by wh. we live, move, perceive & understand. St. Austin says, ^(c.) Materiam Cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando Cognosci. Again: (mens se Cognoscit Cognoscendo se vivere, se intelligere, se meminisse, se velle, Cogitare, seire, judicare.


So far, then, pheno are agreed, It does not follow, however, from the above principle that all relative existence is relative to us, that all that can be known even by limited intelligence is actually cognizable by us. We must, therefore, more precisely limit the sphere of our Pr. by adding that all that we know is known only under the special conditions of

[(a) On this object see Brown's 9th Lect. p. 53, col. b.] S. C. M.

Our faculties. On this also ^{our} singularly harmonious in opinion.
 Protagoras: ΠΑΡΕΩ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΕΩ ΑΥΘΩΠΟΣ. To the same
 effect Boethius, Bacon, Kant and Condillac. This principle
 divides itself into two branches: It is unphilical to conclude, 1^o
 that the properties of ~~the~~ existence are equal in number only to
 our faculties of apprehending them; 2^o that the properties known
 are known in their native purity, without addition or modi-
 fication from our organs of sense or capacities of intelligence.

I. It is evident that nothing exists for us except in so
 far as known to us, and that nothing is known to us except
 certain properties or modes of existence which are relative
 or analogous to our faculties. Beyond these we know and
 can assert the reality of nothing. But if on the one hand
 we are ~~only~~ entitled to assert as actual existence only what
 we know; on the other hand, we are not warranted in ~~infer-~~
~~ring~~ ~~so~~ denying as positively existing what we do not
 know. Sir You. illustrated this by supposing a polygon, of which
 though only two or three sides were seen by us, it would be manifest-
 ly absurd to deny that there were others. Again, suppose a column
 with inscriptions on its four sides each in different languages; as a traveller
 reading the inscription in his own language would be rash in concluding
 that the column was significant only in so far as it was known to him,
 so should we be in inferring that there are no other modes of being
 than those cognizable by our faculties. Sir You. then quoted that
 passage from one of Voltaire's philical romances which will be
 found in Brown's 7th lecture. (a.)

II. But more important than this is the other consideration
 that what we know is known ~~only~~ not as it actually is, but as it seems,



to us to be. It is of the highest importance to know that our Knowledge is not only relative, but made up of several constituents, which it is the great business of phy. to analyse ~~into~~ & discriminate from each other, & to determine whence each is derived. But perception the object is not in immediate relation to the mind, but to the organ; & may not be in immediate relation to the organ even, but made, its impression on it through ~~the~~ ^{some} intervening medium. If we do not take ~~these~~ ^{account} into consideration what these contribute to, or modify our Knowl. of any organ object, our Knowl. of that obj. may be erroneous. E.g. I see a book. Suppose my percep- tion equal no. 12, to be made up of 3 parts, 4 contributed by the obj., 4 by the intervening medium & 4 by the organ. If we do not analyse the contributions, & take into account how they modify our Knowl. of the obj. it is evident they may be a source of error. — This is true not only of perception, but of our cog- nitive ~~all~~ ^{our} faculties in general, & some of the highest problems of phy. arise in the attempt to determine the relative shares of contributions to our Knowl. by the subj. knowing & the obj. known. Materialism & Idealism are but failures in the attempt to maintain the equilibrium.

All our Knowl. then is relative: 1^o Because existence is not Cognizable absolutely, but only in its modes or phen- omena; 2^o Because these phenomena can be known only as they stand in certain relations to our faculties of knowing; 3^o Because these modes are made known to the mind only under certain modifications determined by the faculties themselves.

Si Vm: then proceeded to explain the other terms of his def-

[I do not go over what ~~Sci~~ ^{Sci} ~~can~~ ^{can} said about these terms, as I
had found the substance of his explanations scattered "passim" over
Reid's works. I have only ~~collected~~ ^{collected} those ~~places~~ ^{places} which given references to
those places which I could remember. J. C. M.]

function, and (B) Those which denote the relative Unknown, (A) The absol-
ute & unknown (A)

- (A) 1. Subject. [See note * Diss. on Reid, p. 806. h. I. C. M.]
- 2. Substance. [See
- 3. Conscious Subject. 1. What is it to be conscious? [See article on the "Phy. of Perception," "Discussions", pp. 46, 47]. Also a promised Diss., appended to Reid, viz. Note H. (See Reid, p. 223, note *). I. C. M.]
- 2. Subject. [On Subject and subjective, Object and objective, wh. con- tains all that Sir Wm. said in his Lectures, see Diss. on Reid, p. 806, h. note *]
- 4. Mind. (Etymology obscure.) = Subject of internal phenomena of wh. we are conscious.
- 5. Self, ego. Proved that the "ego" cannot be the material con- stitution, nor any part or organ of it, quoting in illustrations from the 1st Alcibiades of Plato, various other places, and a well known passage from the first Aristot. [On use of "ego", see Reid. p. 100 note * b. I. C. M.]

- (B.) 1. Mode.
- 2. Modification
- 3. State. (See Reid, p. 85, a, note *.)
- 4. Quality
- 5. Attribute
- 6. Property
- 7. Accident
- 8. Phenomenon

(a.) "So true is the saying of Callen: — 'There are ^{false} more facts ^{eminent} in the world than false theories.' So true is the saying of Hamlet: — 'There are more things in heaven & earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your play.'" *Discussions*, p. 612.

Sir Wm. illustrated the violation of this condition by two incidents in the history of the Royal Society, ^{one of} ~~the~~ well-known. The other he had from a friend of Lord Norton.

(b.) For illustration: see Sir William's Argument that "the hypoth. of Representative Perception fulfils none of the conditions of a legitimate hypoth." *Discussions*, pp. 61-66.

- (A) 4. Faculty (from old Latin 'facul' = 'facilis') = 'facultas' (quasi facilitas.) more properly applied to the active powers.
5. Capacity, to the passive affections, of the mind

After explaining the terms of his definition, Sir Wm. proceeded to the application of others, which are of frequent occurrence in philosophical discussions.

1. Hypothesis. (Explanation the same as that usually given.)

Conditions of a legitimate hypothesis:


- 1st It must be ascertained that the phenomena to be accounted for be found actually to exist (a.)
- 2nd That the phenomena can be accounted for no otherwise than by a hypothesis. — But supposing a hypothesis to be necessary, how are we to distinguish between good & bad, probable & improbable hypotheses? The comparative excellence of a hypoth. can be ascertained, 1^o by its involving nothing contradictory either internally, or externally, i.e. between the parts of wh. it is composed, or between these & other established facts; 2^o in proportion as it more or less completely explains the phenomena in question; 3^o in so far as it is all-sufficient, i.e. independent on any subsidiary hypoth. (b.)

2. Theory. In the common use of this term, especially Reid's, ~~the term~~ as convertible with hypoth., Sir Wm. made some strictures. Theory and theoretical are properly used in opposition to practice & practical. See Reid, p. 97, b, note *; also 511, note *

3. Power. For Sir William's remarks on this subject, being his strictures on Reid's erroneous criticism of Locke, see Reid, p. 519, a, note *

- (A) 6. Disposition (διαθεσις) is a natural,
- 7. Habit (ἔξις) an acquired, tendency to act.
- 8. Act, operation and energy are nearly convertible. I must here explain the distinction between actual & potential existence.

- 1^o Actual existence (τὸ ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ ἐν τελέσει, in posse) = what is now
- 2^o Potential existence (τὸ ἐν δυνάμει, in posse) = what is not at this, but may




be, at any other time. Power, faculty, capacity, disposition, habit denote existence in posse, act, operation, energy, and function (in its proper signification) denote existence in esse. (see Reid, p. 515, a, note *)

Lecture IX.

I now proceed to a distribution of the mental phenomena. Shall not give you at present a history or criticism of the various classifications which have been proposed; at the present stage of ^{your} course you could not be supposed to understand their rationale. In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental phenomena, we find that they all comprise one essential element, are all possible only under one necessary condition. I, i.e. my mind, cannot exist in any determinate state without my knowing that it does so. In consciousness alone all mental states have their phenomenal existence, & without it they no longer have such existence.

Yet consciousness is simple, and always resembles itself. Now there are not different kinds of consciousness, though there are different kinds of mental modes, of which we are conscious. Of every classification of the mental phenomena, therefore, all the members, ^{of which we are} within or under consciousness. Consc-




quently, ^{Consc.} must be regarded as comprehensive of, and Coextensive with, all the phenomena of the thinking subject. It must not be degraded to the rank of a particular class.

Taking again a survey of the mental phenomena, they are seen to divide themselves into three great classes, the phenomena, 1^o of Knowledge; 2^o of feeling; 3^o of will and desire.

The Eng. language does not afford us terms to distinguish all these. No difficulty with regard to the first. In the second the phenomena of pleasure and pain can be expressed only by "feeling", which is ambiguous. But the deficiency is most observable in the third; where we cannot find a term to express what is common both to will and desire; i.e. the visus, the tendency towards the realization of their end. The "phenomena of tendency" would be ambiguous; so of "doing". "Appetency" objectionable; because ~~both~~ appetentia ~~and appetere~~ are almost = "desire". So ορετικα. "Phenomena of activity" also objectionable. [Why, see Reid, p. 511, notes.] In German alone can I find the words to express this idea properly. Perhaps the "phenomena of exertion" is the best term. (exers = put forth.) Mr. Bury suggested "Conation" to me.


I do not suppose this division as original. First promulgated by Kant, it was soon universally adopted in Germany. Yet it appears to be wholly unknown to psychologists in this country.

It was considered by the Germans as too obvious to require proof; yet a few words in explanation may not be out of place. It is evident that every mental phenomenon is either an act of Intel. or only possible through an act of Intel. Some persons have, therefore, imagined regarded the faculty of Intel. as the self fundamental power of mind, from wh. all the others are derived.



ative. So this the answer is easy. Though our feelings and Cognitions are only as they are known to be; yet in these modifications of mind, there is a phenon, which, being never involved in, could never be evolved out of ~~our~~ Intel. The faculty of Intel. is certainly the first in order, inasmuch as it is the "conditio sine qua non" of the others, ~~and~~ we can conceive of a being possessed only of a Intel. of ~~his own existence~~ & yet devoid of feeling or appetency. We can further conceive of a being possessed of Intel. & feeling, yet incapable of desire and ~~voluntary~~ volition. Yet we cannot conceive of the existence of a voluntary activity without feeling, for it can only be determined through a pain or pleasure, through an estimate of the relative worth of objects. Thus the order of the division is determined by the relative constitution of its members.

It is not, therefore, to be supposed that in distinguishing our Cognitions, feelings & appetencies these phenon are possible independently of each other. In phical systems they stand apart in books & Chaps.; in nature they are not. It is only by a scientific abstraction that they can be analysed. Each of these resolves itself into various subdivisions, but at present we shall confine ourselves to the phenon of Cognition.




Consciousness.

It would only confuse you to give a detail of the opinions of philosophers on this subject. It is best first to gain clear notions on it, & then you will easily understand in what respect the opinions of philosophers on this point are erroneous.

Reid & Stewart have given us special accounts of Consc. The former, indeed, promised to do so in I.P. Essay I. Cap. 7. but he only gives an incidental notice of it in Essay VI. Cap. 1. We can only, therefore, gather the opinions of these philosophers from incidental notices throughout their works.

Consc. cannot be defined; and the attempt to define it has been the cause of great obscurity with regard to it. The reason of this is obvious. Itself is the root of all Phil., the source of all Comprehensibility & Illustration. There is nothing simpler by wh. it can be comprehended. To suppose that it can be to suppose another Consc. by wh. we are of Conscious of the mode in wh. the first Consc. is possible. Brown called it a "feeling"; but what is a feeling? - something by wh. we are conscious. To define Consc. by feeling, therefore, is to define the same by the same. The same may be said of the definition of it as a "Principle" or "belief." - Consc. ~~has~~ cannot be brought under any genus, therefore it cannot be defined.

But still Consc. may be rationally analysed. This is effected by observing the phenomena of its acts, & from a comparison of them evolving the universal conditions under wh. alone all Consc. is possible. Before proceeding to this, let us see what kind of act Consc. is. I cannot know, feel, &c. without know:



ing that I know, feel, &c.; if I did not know that I know, feel, &c. I would not know, feel, &c. "Now, this Pr. which I, the subject, have of these modifications of my being, and through wh. ~~modifications~~ ^{Pr.} alone these modif. are possible, is what we call Consc." Consc. thus implies three things: (1.) a subject knowing; (2.) a known modif. of that subject; (3.) a Pr. ~~of the~~ by the subject of the modif.

Consc. & Pr. thus involve each other. The one explicitly expresses what the other implicitly contains. Why, then, employ terms to express two notions that are identical? The answer is easy. Realities may be inseparable, but as objects of Pr. it may be necessary to consider them apart. Notions likewise may severally imply each other & be inseparable even in thought; yet for the purposes of science it may be convenient to distinguish them by different terms, & consider them in their ^{relation} or correlation to each other. — E.g. a triangle cannot be considered as separate from its parts, nor these parts (viz. sides & angles) from each other. — The ~~term~~ ancient Greek ^{language} had no distinctive term to denote Consc. It was only as its ^{name} began to be felt that it was introduced.

Before proceeding further, it may be proper to notice certain conditions of Consc. which have never been called in question.

- 1° Consc. is an Actual, not a potential, Pr.
- 2° Consc. is an immediate, not a mediate, Pr. (I also hold, against Reid & his school, that all immediate Pr. is Consc.)
- 3° Consc. supposes a contrast and discrimination, viz. (a) between the ego and non-ego; and (b.) ~~between~~ ^{between} one mental state & another from ^{all} others; & (c.) of one external object from others.


[Dr. Brown is wrong in ^{asserting that in} the systems of phrens (most generally
prevaleat conse. has been regarded as a particular faculty; though
right with regard to this part of the island. H.]

4^o Consc. involves a judgment, since discrimination is but a negative judgment. Judgment is the simplest act of the mind, & involved in every other.

5^o Consc. involves Memory, for discrimination & Comparison is impossible without it.

So far phers, with a few exceptions unworthy of notice, may be said to be agreed. We now enter disputed territory. And the first thesis I shall attempt to establish is, that Our Consciousness is Coextensive with Our Soul; wh. is tantamount to the assertion that it is Coextensive with Our Cognitive faculties: and this is convertible with the expression that Consciousness is not a special faculty, but that all our several faculties are only modifications of Consciousness.

Reid and Stewart have held the opposite, that Consc. is a special faculty, co-ordinate with our other faculties of intelligence. As this doctrine affects the very Cardinal point of phyl, & Reid's error ~~is~~ is opposed to the principal features of his phyl, I shall proceed to show you that his opinion is untenable. The two following passages from Reid contain the principal positions of this doctrine: viz. (1.) I. P. Essay I. Cap. 1st (p. 222, b.) and (2.) Essay II. Cap 5th (p. 442, b.) So Consc. is here granted a Soul. of all the phena of mind, & therefore a Soul. of our Cognitive acts. Knowing these operations it must know their objects; and therefore either Consc. is not a special faculty, or we have two faculties conversant about the same objects, wh. is absurd. Reid ~~at~~ eludes of tries to escape from this dilemma, by attributing to Consc. a Cognizance of our mental operations to the exclusion of their objects. But




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is this possible? Can I know that I know, without knowing what I know? Let us see; ~~I cannot~~ the Phil. of Relatives is One & the Same. I cannot know one term of a Relation without knowing the other. Now, Phil. in general is the relation between a subject knowing and an object known; & each Cognitive operation exists only in relation to a particular object, wh. calls it into existence & determines the character of that existence. We cannot, therefore, be conscious of an act without being conscious of the object to wh. it is relative.

As conce. has been particularly distinguished from our other Cognitive faculties (by Reid & Stewart) & especially from Imagination, Memory, Perception and Attention, it will be proper in discussing this subject to take up these several faculties, & shew that the doctrine of those phas in regard to them is untenable.


I. Imagination is peculiarly fitted to evidence this error. [See Reid's doctrine, I. P. Essay IV. Cap. 1st] He admits that the object of ^{imagination} perception is in the mind. Now, can there be a modification of mind of which we are not conscious? But further: Reid says that ~~we~~ we are conscious of the act of imagining, but not of its object; of the conception of a Centaur, but not of a Centaur conceived. But these are one and the same. We cannot, therefore, be conscious of the one & not of the other.

II. Memory. [See Reid's doctrine, I. P. Essay III. Cap. 1st, and 6th] Reid makes memory an immediate Phil. of the past; & if the object of memory be past, it is beyond the sphere of conce. But to assert an immediate Phil. of the



past is a contradiction. There are two Conditions of Immediate
 Phil. 1^o The object, to be known immediately, must be
 known in itself; and hence 2^o to be known in itself, it must
 be known as actually existing. — Now, immediate Phil.
 is conceivable only of the now-existent; but the past can
 be known only as not now-existent. An immediate Phil.
 of the past is, therefore, impossible. — But further: every
 act of Phil., since it exists only in as much as it now
 exists, can be cognizant only of a now-existing object.
 Either, therefore, we must refuse to memory an immedi-
ate Phil. of the past, or grant only a mediate Phil.
 of it, viz. in & through a present object. The latter
 is the correct view; for in memory we know only a men-
 tal representation of a past object — that object, as past,
 not being itself known, but only believed to have been.

III. Perception. Reid has many merits as a specu-
 lator, but the only merit which he arrogates to himself and
 which has been most generally accorded to him by others, is
 that he was the first of modern phers, who by his doc-
 trine of immediate perception indicated the ^{incontestable} correction
 of mankind against the conclusions of phers. But he
 has not carried his doctrine to its legitimate consequences,
 & has confused it by his innumerable analysis of Consc. We
 shall ^{show} that his distinction of perception and Consc. as coordina-
 ate faculties, which are ~~generally~~ respectively conversant
 exclusively either about not-self or self, is untenable; & that
 his attributing to Consc. a Phil. of the operation of percep-
 tion to the exclusion of its objects is contradictory of his



doctrine of perception.

1^o The Anal. of opposites is one & the same. Therefore we cannot know self without knowing not-self. To know that a thing is not-self is the same as the Anal. that it is not a modification of self, vice versa. But how on Reid's hypothesis could we know them? — ~~Not~~ ~~by perception~~ Since he holds that the faculty Cognizant of the one is not Cognizant of the other. — But, again, how could we know them as contrasted? — Not by perception, according to Reid; nor by conce. But we do know them as such; and we can know them only in as much as we have a faculty of knowing them. There must, therefore, be a faculty coextensive with Reid's conce. & perception. What is this but that conce. of mind & matter which we set out with denying?

2^o Reid's assertion that we are conscious of the act of perception, but not of the object, involves two absurdities: (1) that we know that of which we are not conscious of knowing. But as we know only in as much as we are conscious that we know, we cannot know an object without being conscious of the object as known. (2) An act of Anal. is only possible in relation to an object; & that object at once determines the existence & specifies the character of the existence of the intellectual energy. An act, therefore, can be known only in relation to its object, & Reid's perception is proved impossible. E.g. I see an independant. How can I be conscious that this is a perception, that it is a perception of light, that it is the perception of an independant, in 2


[(A) see Dis. on Reid, Note C. and Discussions, Art.
on the Phys. of Perception. I.C.M.]

less I be conscious of the impediment? It may annihilate the impediment, & you annihilate the perception of it; annihilate the cause of the impediment, you annihilate the cause, the condition of the operation. — It may seem strange to say that we are conscious of an impediment; but it is only in consequence of the prevalence of the theory of perception which Reid disproved.

3° Some of these self-contradictions might be avoided by adopting Brown's view of Reid's doctrine of perception; for wh. indeed, a strong case might easily be made out. But I am satisfied that it is incorrect; otherwise his refutation of scepticism is a complete failure; his whole play is one mighty blunder. (A.)

IV. Attention. Notice these errors. See Reid I. P. Essay II. Chap. 3, and VI. 1. In the first of these questions he distinguishes Attention & Reflection, in the second he makes them convertible. He is wholly wrong in his strictures on Locke. — Mr. Stewart has committed three historical blunders: 1° Reid was not the first who remarked that "Attention to objects of conscience is properly called reflection, & that to objects of senses observation." 2° Locke's employment of the term ^{reflective} psychological application, was not original. It was so used 1500 years before his time. 3° Many writers on Psychology before Stewart; particularly treated of attention.


The main question comes to be considered, Is Attention a faculty distinct from Conscience? In Reid's opinion see I. P. Essay I. Chap. 5. He has rightly stated attention to be a voluntary act.



this might have led him to see that it is not distinct from
Consc. but merely Consc. Modified by will (or desire,) subordinate
to a certain law of ~~our~~ intelligence, the law namely, that the inten-
sion of our Pnd. is in the inverse ratio to its extension.

[When Reid and Stewart say that attention is a voluntary
act, we are not to understand that it is always an act of
free-will; for I apprehend that we may be frequently deter-
mined to an act of attention by desire. Attention may be said
to be of three kinds: 1. A mere vital and irresistible act. 2. An act
which, though determined by a desire, may yet be resisted ^{by} our will.
3. An act determined by deliberate volition. In the first the name
attention has been denied, & given to the other two degrees, although by
Reid only to the last.]

I must here take up the question whether the mind can be
~~conscious of more than~~ attend to, i.e. (if our analysis be correct,) be con-
scious of, more than one thing at a time? — Now, again, I
am sorry to differ from Stewart. His first illustration, which is
drawn from a concert of music, easily shows that his opinion may
be reduced to the impossible. 1° If we hear a variety of sounds
only, as he says, in succession, in perceiving harmony we ~~can~~ must
have a minimum of time for each minimum of sound. With
this each minimum of sound must perish; and, therefore, many
minima of sound which we cannot attend to must be lost. He
to us as zero. But no concert ever reached, far less surpassed,
our capacities. 2° Now on this doctrine could we perceive the
harmony of a concert? — If it be true, we must while con-
scious of a present minimum of sound, remember a past.
But this past sound remembered is as much an object to the



Mind as the present sound of which we are conscious. Therefore in order to perceive harmony we must attend to two objects at a time.

— His second illustration from the phenomena of vision shows also the impossibility of his doctrine. For if we can attend only to a minimum of space, ~~it is limited~~ ^{at} once, & can attend to nothing else at the same moment, it is evident we could as little perceive these minima of space as related, as we could perceive harmony in the former instance.


Locke and Brown have also held this doctrine.

It is strange that Locke thought that if the mind could attend to two things at a time, it could not be immaterial; while Aristotle deduced from this fact its immateriality.

His argument is this: If the mind be material, when affected by opposites at the same time, one part must be affected by one opposite, another by another. But the part which perceived the one, (black,) could not know that this was the opposite of the other, (white,) any more than one man can know that what he perceives is different from what another man perceives. But the mind does know things as opposite, relative & different; and it cannot know them if it be material: therefore it is not material.

This doctrine is evidently absurd, since, as we have shown, in every act of sense there is implied judgment and discrimination, & these imply two things to be judged of or discriminated; therefore in every act of sense we must be conscious of at least two objects.


The further question has created discussion, How many objects can the mind attend to at once? You can



test my statement by experiment, but I think you will find that with more than six objects before the mind we get confused. In 1840


[~~But~~ then proceeded to prove that conc. is the only, or at least the prominent organ of compassing a part of the mental phenomena. He in two lectures he gave an elaborate refutation of Phrenology from certain investigations which he undertook to test the fundamental facts of that hypothesis, which he found by these investigations to be the very reverse of truth, & disproved by an almost superfluous induction. He found, 1° That the ^{cerebellum} brain of the female is not in any species of animals smaller than that of the male; 2° in all animals the cerebellum is developed long previous to puberty; 3° Castration does not reduce the proportion of the cerebellum to the brain proper; 4° the developmental proportion of the cerebellum to the brain proper is not in proportion to the physiological function attributed to it; 5° the cerebellum is not more developed at breeding season than at any other time; ~~in female animals while~~ 6° in female animals, while

And many such failures are there in phrenology. One of its fundamental positions is that the ~~cerebellum~~ human brain is at the greatest at forty years of age. By an immense induction I have found that the brain is at its fullest size in man at seven years of age."]



Authority and Certainty of Consciousness.

Having shown that there is no other means of compassing a ^{consider} ~~Princ.~~ of Mind & its modifica, but Consc. I now proceed to the authority & certainty of this instrument. Now ~~ply~~, inasmuch as I affirmo its own possibility, affirmo the veracity of Consc. Consequently to maintain its own possibility, it must authenticate the truths of Consc. That accordingly no ~~plur~~ denies, as it were suicidal on his part to do so; and even the Sceptic can only attempt to show that it is at variance with itself & therefore fallacious. But as ~~ply~~ is only an evolution of the facts of Consc. every system is true only as it fairly & fully & soundly what, & what only, Consc. reveals. But it may be objected that this revelation must be very obscure, this criterion very uncertain, since ~~plur~~ ^{usually} appeal to it in support of opinions the most contradictory. — See Substance of Answer to this, Diss. on Reid, Note A, sect. 1, p. 746. An. 7 (J.C.M.) We must see whether there are any rules by ~~conditions~~ of the which we must be regulated in appealing to the testimony of Consc., & if we find that ~~plur~~ have despised or neglected these, we remove the reproach from ~~ply~~ the instrument & attach it to those blundering workmen who have not known how to apply it. I shall attempt, therefore, the enumeration of those general laws, by which we must be regulated: if I fail, I can plead that none have before attempted the task, & that what I mean to give is a ~~mere~~ ^{rather an} outline of a train



of Reasoning than a finished Argument. — See as in all, these, three general laws:

1. That no fact be assumed to be a fact of Consc. but what is ultimate & simple. — The law of Consistency.

2. That the whole facts of Consc. be taken without reservation or hesitation, whether given as Constituent or as Regulative data. — The law of Integrity.

3. That nothing but the facts of Consc. be taken; or if inferences of Reasoning be admitted, they at least should be recognized as legitimate, only ^{data} deduced from and as subordinate to the immediate, of Consc.; & that every position contradictory of these be rejected as illegitimate. — The law of Harmony.

1. Every Mental Phenon (may, of course, be called a fact of Consc.; but as we distinguish Consc. from other mental states which are but Modifications of it, so we distinguish special & derivative phenon, from primary & universal, ~~primary~~ ^{styling} the latter the facts of Consc. as being more pre-eminently worthy of the name. Arriving at an element of thought beyond which we cannot go, we have a fact of Consc. & this in different views we call either primary or ultimate. This Character of ultimate priority involves also 2^o their Necessity, 3^o their Reality (τὸ ὄν is what we know of a fact of Consc., τὸ εἶναι.) — In this then proceeded to distinguish between the actual Reality & Veracity of a fact of Consc. See Diss. on Reid Note A, near commencement. Now, no doubt with regard to the facts of Consc. as actually given is impossible, we shall throw these out of account.

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
I. This law is too evident to require discussion. Its neglect would, of course, leave phy. incomplete. We shall illustrate it & the mind together.

II. Though the Veracity of Consc. cannot be denied, yet we shall find that phers have often overlooked its testimony & established systems in direct hostility to the primary data of intelligence. — In Trm. took his illustrations from Brown's phy; for which see Diss. near close of Art. on "Phy. of perceptions".

I shall now take up those facts of Consc. which lie at the root of phy., & show that there are always as various theories as there are modes of mutilating the facts. I shall commence with the fact of the Duality of Consc. The following scheme will exhibit the various physical systems which have their Origin in this fact.

The Duality of Consciousness.






The second General fact of Consc. to wh. I now proceed is the Activity and Passivity of Mind. As in Nature, so in Mind, there is nothing purely active or purely passive. It is because the Deity is ~~to~~ purely active that he is to us incomprehensible. Any state of Mind in which activity preponderates is called active, & one in wh. passivity preponderates passive. Many arduous problems connected with this fact. I shall here confine myself to the question, Is the Mind always Consciously Active? — Not convertible with the ~~same~~ question, Have we always a Remembrance of our Consc.? — wh. must be answered in the Negative. Must confine ourselves to those states of Mind in which observation is possible: (e.g. it is impossible in fainting and epilepsy;) such as Sleep, Somnambulism, &c.

Dr Wm. then proceeded to discuss the question, Is the mind Consciously Active in Sleep? — & after stating some experiments of his own, gave a long quotation from M. Souffroy, the result of whose observations was to prove


- 1° That in Sleep the Senses are torpid, but the Mind awake;
- 2° That certain of our Senses continue to transmit to the mind the imperfect Sensations received;
- 3° That the Mind judges of these Sensations, & it is according as it judges them to be or not be worthy of attention that it does or does not awaken the Senses;





4^o That the Mind awakens the Senses, sometimes because the Sensations disquiet it, being unusual; at other times because they admonish it, as being indicative of the time when it ought to do so;

5^o That the Mind Only awakens the Senses by its own activity.

There is another question of still more prominent interest, whether the Mind possesses energies, & is the Subject of Modifications of wh. we are Unconscious.







Division of the Mental Faculties.

Having now considered, ^{as a general} ^{course.} Condition of thought & source of phy. I now proceed to consider its special ^{peculiar} modifications. Before this, however, let me premise some ^{great & final} difficulties that attend the study of Mind. 1^o The ^{source} of difficulty is the fact, that the observing subject & observed object are the same. Hence it is that the mental energy instead of being concentrated, is divided into two divergent directions.

2^o Whereas in the study of external nature the help of companionship is obtained, he who would study the internal world must isolate himself in the solitude of his own thought; which is the most social of all animals is extremely difficult.

3^o Not as in physical science, in mental phy the student must make his ^{own} observations. He must take nothing upon authority; testimony can furnish him with no facts.

4^o In the study of Mind, its phenomena are not arrested by our observation. They are in a ceaseless flow, & the very act of reflecting upon them changes the mental state. They can only, therefore, be studied in memory, which affords a lower vivacity & precision.


5^o In perception the different qualities of objects are easily discriminated; whereas the phenomena of pain, feeling, desire are often seen almost insensibly to glide into each other.

5° The phena of Consc. are not placed side by side in space, but hang "in rows on the thread of time," & Swiftly pass away into oblivion.

7° Reflection on our internal Modifications. is not accompanied with that pleasure wh. attend ~~the study~~ we receive from the impression of external objects. It is not till an advanced period of life that we attain that higher gratific. wh. accompanies reflection.

But play has also peculiar facilities. With the exception of language it is dependent on no external condition.

In speaking of faculties & capacities. you are not to consider them as entities ~~not~~ really distinct from the thinking principle or from each other. ^{as the faculties or groups} Among others, Dr. Brown has reproached others with holding this opinion — than wh. no reproach can be more unjust, no mistake more flagrant. What is the proper view of these powers? — The mind can exert different actions & be affected by different passions wh. are not wholly dissimilar, wh. are at once like & unlike. Those that are like we assort together in thought & bestow upon them a common ^{name}. These are few & simple. But actions & passion are effects & modifications. Every effect supposes a cause, every modification a subject. When we say, therefore, that the mind exerts an energy, we say that it is the cause or subject of a modification. And we arrange the mental actions & passions into groups to wh. we give a common name, & are thus entitled to say, that the mind can exert a certain class of energies, & is capable of being modified.



fied by a certain class of passions. These various faculties will be the result of various views that are taken of the mental phenomena; each philosophical system is only a different view of the mind's phenomena.


Now we must not (1.) Overrate the value of a system, because it is not the end first in the order of ^{time} nature, nor prominent in the scale of importance; nor (2.) Undervalue a system, for the end of philosophy is the detection of unity.

That the above was the opinion of the ancient philosophers with regard to the mental faculties, I could adduce a multitude of passages to prove. In the middle ages the question divided the schools. 1^o St. Thomas held the faculties to be distinct not only from each other, but from the mind; 2^o Henry of Ghent that they were distinct from each other, but not from the essence of the soul; 3^o Scotus & Occam & all the Nominalists held them to be not really, but only formally distinguishable. Modern philosophers have made no explicit declaration of this opinion, but have evidently assumed it tacitly; & the Aristotelic view of the soul as "all in whole, & all in every part" must be in justice presumptively attributed to every philosopher of mind.

The phenomena of mind are never presented to us undecomposed & simple; & the aim of the psychologist is to analyse them by abstraction into those ultimate qualities which, in their apposition, constitute the concrete elements of actual thought. And what does

Such an Analysis Suppose? - Manifestly these ~~Cognitive~~ Conditions: 1° That no phenon be assumed as elementary which can be resolved into simpler principles; 2° that no element or phenon be overlooked; 3° that no imaginary element be interpolated. These rules, however, have been almost always disregarded.

You will now be prepared for the distribution of the Cognitive faculties which I have adopted & which is different from that of every psychologist with whom I am acquainted



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
External Perception.

As the first & most important of these faculties, — as that the analysis of which affects the solution of nearly every problem of any moment in play. Sir Wm. commenced with it. As his opinions of this point are now in print, I shall not do more than give a mere statement in their order of the different subjects which were treated of under this head.

Sir Wm. began with a history of the theories of perception held by different phers, (1.) exposing the errors of Reid, correcting his misrepresentations of other phers, & (2.) ~~correcting~~ defending Reid from Brown's misrepresentations & attack. Reid wrong in his statements. 2° But Brown has not had the fortune to stumble upon one of his ~~phers~~ errors. 3° Reid was a Natural Realist.

The distinction between Sensation and Perception, of the primary, Secundo-primary & secondary qualities of matter, — which were next discussed in order, — are with the preceding parts of his doctrine of perception published.


I now come to the discussion of the ~~grounds on~~ ~~which~~ the relative merits of the doctrines of Natural & Hypothetical Realism. It is admitted by all philosophers that



We are compelled to believe that the objects which we immediately perceive are the real objects without us. (For authorities, see Diss. phy. of Common Sense, §I.) Now in rejecting this delirance of our consciousness ^{phers} required ^{1°} to give sufficient reasons for doing so; & ^{2°} to substitute a legitimate hypothesis. The discussion of this question, therefore, naturally divides itself into two parts.

I. Of the reasons which have made ^{phers} reject the testimony of conscience in this delirance I have been able to collect in all five.

^{1°} Cognition is an immanent act of mind. But ~~therefore~~ a cognition of anything out of the mind were a transient act. Now as action implies existence, to suppose that the mind acts out of itself were to suppose that it exists out of itself — which is absurd. — This is the highest ground on which represent. may be defended; & though not explicitly pronounced is often implicitly ~~contained~~ supposed in the arguments of Representativists. Now, it might be sufficient to answer that it is illegitimate to reject the fact because we are unable to explain its possibility. As ultimate it is inexplicable. But ^{1°} on the same principle there cannot be any over act of volition, nor any Agency or Causation. And consequently ^{2°} Representation is impossible. For the material reality must act on the mind in order to produce a representation: & thus these ^{phers} deny to the immaterial principle that transient act which they ~~deny~~ to maintain in the case of the material reality.




2^o Mind & Matter are separated from each other by the whole diameter of being. This is the argument of Norris which Reid confesses his inability to understand. [See Hamilton's note, p. 300. wh. perhaps more than any other shews his immense erudition.]

3^o The mind can know immediately only that to which it is immediately present. But as external objects can never ~~go~~ come into the mind, nor the mind go out to them, such presence is impossible. This is apparent: by the only reason known to Reid & Stewart. Now in opposition ~~it has been maintained~~

(a.) It has been denied that the external reality can ~~not~~ itself come into the mind. This absurd position has been actually maintained by John Sergeant. I know the external object, he argues. Therefore it is in my act of Per. & as this act is in the understanding, the object is also. ^{in the understanding} Locke cannot be blamed for pronouncing this unintelligible.

(b.) It has been maintained by Empedocles, Plato, ~~Lord Monboddo~~ the Stoics, Euclid, &c. that the mind does go out to the external reality. This opinion has been carried to absurdity by Lord Monboddo. According to him the mind acts where its object is; so that in memory or imagination it may perceive objects distant from the body both in time & space.

(c.) It has been maintained by Reid & Stewart that, though the mind is not immediately present with the object, it may have an immediate Per. of it through the agency of God. Against this there are these objections: (a.) It is a




new hypothesis; (B.) It assumes an occult principle; it is mystical; (Y.) Perception is not on this principle intuitive.

(d.) Sir Wm. without attempting to explain this difficulty, rendered it intelligible by ~~his~~ (a.) by his doctrine that our sentient organism, as such, is part of the ego; (B.) by accurately limiting the immediate object of perception to that which is in immediate contact with the organ of sense.

4° The objection of Hume will be found in Reid, Essay II. Chap. 4, p. 299. It arises from a misconception as to the ~~two~~ ~~nature~~ immediate object of visual perception.


5° It has been maintained by Fichte that the mind can only represent to itself external objects, because the will tends to external objects; & these objects cannot come into the mind. — But (a.) this argument assumes that the object to which the will tends must lie within the mind itself. the whole arg. ∴ is a simple assumption. But (b.) the arg. takes no acct. of the difference between those cognitions wh. lie at the root of energies of will & all other kinds of Phil. Will aims at the future & consequently the cognitions connected with it cannot be immediate, as we can have only a mediate Phil. of things not present.


II. Sir William's proof that the hypoth. of Representation violates all the conditions of a legitimate hypoth. is published in his "Disc. & Diss."





Several other questions connected with this faculty come now to be considered.

I. Is our *Per.* of external objects at first a general ^{notion} of Complex wholes, or a particular *Per.* of the smallest parts to wh. sense is competent? — The latter alternative has been adopted by Mr. Stewart as the result of his doctrine that the mind can attend but to one thing at a time. It is refuted triumphantly by such illustrations as these. I can call up an image of a friend's countenance as a whole, yet may be unable to describe any of its particular features as the colour of the eyes, &c. And if I saw a portrait of him, I could pronounce it unlike (if it were so,) without being able to tell in what particular respect. It is well shown by a common illustration among the schoolmen. I see an object at a distance, but cannot tell whether it is an animal or not. As it approaches I perceive that it is an animal, though unable to tell of what species. It comes nearer & I discover that it is a horse; & when it comes within a short distance I recognize it as *Equus caballus*.









Sir Wm. was very severe on Locke & maintained that
he had copied (?) the most important points of his play
from those French plays, who for him were neglected
by their countrymen.

Self-Consciousness.

As ~~space~~ time & space ~~was~~ are necessary conditions of external perception, so time & self are necessary conditions of self-conce. But it has been argued that if space be a necessary form of thought the mind itself must be extended. "This is a mere phical crotchet." It assumes that the qualities of the ~~self~~ knowing must be similar to those of ^{space} known: & that consequently in order to think extension it is necessary to exist extended. Now, though the mind is not absolutely unlimited in its power of thinking space, yet ~~on the above principle~~ it conceives space as far ~~as~~ infinitely beyond the range of ex- perience; wh. could not be on the above principle.

The facts wh. Self-conce reveals may be regarded in two lights: 1. We may merely observe, compare & generalize them into classes; or 2. We may critically analyze them & discover their characteristics of universality & necessity. This latter process is, of course, confined to the facts obtained by the former: for all necessity is to us subjective.

Self-conce corresponds with Locke's reflection. Now Sir Wm. maintained against Stewart that Condillac had represented Locke's idly fairly enough & had only carried it to its legitimate consequences.

The Conservative Faculty.

Without this faculty we should lose our Soul as fast as we got it. And it shows the dependence of all our facs. upon one another that, as acquisition were useless without retention, so were retention without reproduction & representation.


Though mutually dependent on each other for their exercise, the faculties of retention, reprod. & repres. are perfectly distinct, governed by different laws & existing in different degrees in different individuals. But this distinction is not observable in Common language; & accordingly we find that ~~in~~ in those terms wh. are employed to denote them, though each contains one idea more prominently than any other, yet there is always some other more or less blended with it. Thus in the term "Memory" retention is the prominent idea, in wh. however is involved also the ideas of reproduction & repres. In "recollection," again, the phen^{on} of reprod. is ~~at first~~ the leading idea; & so on with others. — I shall, therefore, employ Memory to denote the faculty & phen^{on} of conservation. (That this was its proper use in Rom. proved by a long list of authorities Ancient & Modern.) Memory being the condition of reprod. is rather a capacity than a faculty, if the latter term be limited to active powers.

in this act
Sir Wm. here referred to some of the similes wh. had
been employed to illustrate this faculty & thought
that of Gassendi the happiest, who compares the ^{mind} ~~the~~
of a piece of paper or cloth wh. ~~wh~~ after having been
folded easily returns to the folds again.

I. I presume the fact of retention is admitted. That our Phil. still exists when out of Consc. must be admitted unless its resurrection be otherwise explained. Now Ari = cenna supposes a radiation of divine light by wh. the recollected fact is awakened in the Intellect. But this evidently admits the fact of Conservation. Consequently he must admit a faculty of Conserv., i.e. Memory.

II. But can this fact be explained? I think it can, & that by ^{the mind's} ~~its~~ own power of self-activity. When the mind is excited to any act, that act continues to affect our Consc. so long as it is not modified by some other. Now this act is an energy of the active power of the indivisible ego. Consequently a part of the ego must be annihilated if this possession is to be removed. The difficulty, therefore, is not how we retain, but how we ever forget, our Phil., for the latter seems to suppose that it vanishes. — This difficulty, however, is explained by the theory of latent modes of mind. For as numerous objects crowd in upon the mind's notice those wh. formerly attracted its ~~notice~~ attention, in consequence of the mind's limited power of attention, become gradually obscured, till at last they fade entirely from Consc. & remain in latency until resurrected by some of the laws of Association.

The results of this theory are
 1^o Retention or Memory belongs not merely to the energies of the Cognitive faculties, but extends to all the




three primary classes of the mental phen^a

2^o The attempts to explain memory by physiological hyp^{es} are as unnecessary, as they are untenable. No other faculty, ~~dep~~ indeed, depends more on corporeal conditions than does memory. Particular diseases of the brain often produce forgetfulness with regard to facts, places, &c.; often thus a patient loses a whole stock of ~~Pub.~~ while he retains others, loses one language & retains another. But these facts give no ground for the hyp^{es} of permanent impressions on the brain or any such. For while ~~the~~ ^{the} doctrine makes them evidently superfluous, ~~for~~ they betray an ignorance of the ^{causes of the} thinking subject wh. though dependent to some extent on bodily relations, still ever preserves its self-activity.

There is no mental power in wh. such differences exist in different individuals as in Memory. In ^{Vol.} quoted from Menetius the story of a young man possessed of so wonderful a memory that he could with ease repeat 30,000 words after having once heard them; also an actual case in wh. the young man gave a specimen of his power before Menetius.

In ^{Vol.} then refuted by facts the opinion that the great development of memory is incompatible with great intellectual power, & that wh. maintains that it is essential to it.



The Reproductive Faculty.

The term Reprod. is not good, as it does not properly distinguish this from the representative faculty. Perhaps "Resuscitative" might serve the purpose better.

The phæn^{on} of Reprod. is one of the most wonderful in our mental Constitution, & at the same time one in the explanation of wh. phy has been most successful. Aristotle indeed has left almost as complete an analysis of the laws wh. regulate the Reprod. of our mental states as has yet been accomplished. For the history of speculation on this point & for Sir William's own theory see his Diss. appended to Reid.


The Government of

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The Representative Faculty.

Others have referred Imag. to two faculties, the reproductive & productive or Creative. Stewart calls the latter "Conception". Truly 1° because a separate faculty need not be postulated, 2° because the term signifies taking up in bundles, & applies to our notion of a class. Imagination can easily be explained thus. There is first Reproduction, but this is not all. We can analyse & combine again the thoughts thus given. This is the work of Comparative faculty. Only, ^{in this complex process} the repres. is most conspicuous, for 1° it gives the materials on wh. the compar. faculty operates, & 2° the results of our elaboration should be realized in a vivid act of representation.


While Imagination is perhaps the best term that can be used to express this process, we must take care not to limit it, as common language sometimes does, to the repres. of objects of sense, & even to those of sight. Repres. ^{includes} ~~extends to~~ phical abstraction equally with poetical imagination; & in this point of view it may be doubted whether Aristotle or Homer had the strongest Imagination. There are many kinds of Imagination: there is the imagination 1° of abstraction, 2° of wit, 3° of reasoning, 4° of feeling, 5° of volition, 6° of the passions, & 7° of the poet. But Imag. is spoken of more frequently with reference to the objects of sense than to those of comparison.



although the two kinds are in fact frequently combined.

Reviewing Repres. in subordination to the Auxiliary faculties of Reprod. & elaboration, we may distinguish three principal ways in wh. Imag. presents ideas: 1^o the natural order, 2^o the logical order, 3^o the poetical order. In Vol. had some fine remarks on these, especially on the danger of indulging in Revery.

In Conclusion: the organs employed in the Repres. of sensible objects seem to be none other than those on wh. the original impressions were made. Experience proves that Imag. depends on no particular portion of the brain; but that if the extra-cranial portion of any organ cannot be destroyed without Imag. being weakened. E.g. persons have been found who have lost their sight ~~and~~ no longer Repres. a dream of visible objects. But in such cases it has been found that the dis-organization extended not merely to the eye but to that part of the brain wh. was the internal instrument of this sense, i.e. the optic nerve. Yet if this be not destroyed Imag. remains perfect. These facts would lead us to conclude that there are as many organs of Imag. as there are of perception. And if we observe in the process of Imag. we shall find that we are ^{distinctly} conversant of the play of nerves & muscles.




The Elaborative Faculty.

The operation of this faculty supposes two terms & results in a judgment, i.e. in the affirmation or negation of one of the terms of the other. Now, as Consc. always involves a judgment, (viz. that the determinate something of wh. we are Consc. exists,) every act of mind ~~&~~ involves a judgment. The Consc. is thus primarily an affirmation, or negation of existence. But as much as we are Consc. of a determinate something & can only so be Consc. by distinguishing it from something different, Consc. & consequently judgment may be said to involve ~~memory~~ recollection. & thus all the powers of Acquisition, recollection, & Comparison are seen to be mutually dependent on each other.


Now in ~~contrast~~ opposition to the faculty analysis by powers of this faculty I shall prove 1^o that Comparison is involved in every, the simplest, act of Intel.; 2^o that our factitiously simple or complet^{notions}, our abstractions or generalized notions, are only so many products of Comparison; 3^o that judgment; 4^o that reasoning, are identical with Comparison.

The first or simplest act of this faculty is the judgment of exist. ~~we cannot perform the simplest act of thought without thinking the object of our thought to exist.~~ But as the affirmation of



exist. is the negation of non-exist. The first & simplest
 act of Comparison is the discrimination of ex. from
 non-ex. But in Consc. there is given a duality of
 ex. & while we affirm ex. both of the objects
 of perception & of self-Consc. we also affirm that
 ex. in difference, in Contrast. The second act of
 Comparison is thus the discrimination of the
 ego from the non-ego. The third act of Comp. is
 the recognition of multiplicity in the phen.^a of
 the two worlds, & the affirmation of similarity
 or dissimilarity. The fourth is the ~~judgment~~^{act}
~~that these phen.^a co-exist in or as~~ ~~associations~~
 grouping together of these phen.^a according to
 their Resemblance or Dissimilarity & assign-
 ing them to different subjects. The fifth is the
 affirmation or negation of the relation of these
 phen.^a as Cause & effect. But lastly how is
 this infinity of phen.^a to be reduced to the fini-
 tude of mind? This process I shall show is
 also an act of Comparison.

I. And firstly with regard to complex or
 collective notions; such as an Army, a forest, a
 town &c. (wh. are not to be confounded with the
 notions of "Army," &c.) — Now the repetition of
 the same object implies Comparison — & this is just
 what is done in the formation of collective notions.
 But language must be brought to our assistance
 For as the mind can attend only to about five or




six objects at a time, what can it do when the objects exceed that no. ? The mind then forms them into groups of tens, hundreds, &c. wh. become all so many fictitious units; & is thus enabled to form notions, wh. would otherwise be impossible.

^{in wh.} II. But secondly I go on to consider the process of decomposition forms a part. This may be either 1^o poetical, i.e. for mere pleasure; or 2^o scientific, i.e. with a view to the interest of science.

Now in the case of the senses abstraction is necessary, for as we are presented with five varieties of qualities, they should all be confounded together if we did not attend to one more than another. Nor is it different in the case of the intellect; for since man's comprehension is so limited, that he grasp but one object at a time if the object be possessed of interest, is it not natural that his ~~whole attention~~ should abstract his attention from all the rest ~~to the level~~ & fix it exclusively on that wh. interests him. Now in the process of generalization we just abstract those qualities concentrate our attention on those qualities in wh. the objects before us agree, & abstracting these & considering them apart from their differences we give a name to our notion of that circumstance in wh. they agree.

This ~~brings~~ ^{brings} into the controversy between the Conceptualists & the Nominalists, in discuss:




ing wh. I shall 1° state the arguments of the Nominalists, 2° those of the Conceptualists, & 3° I shall show you that the whole Contest is a mere logomachy.

Mr. Wm. having stated the two theories & refuted Conceptualism in that very objectionable form in wh. it had been maintained by Locke (on wh. see Brown) ~~then~~ took up & reviewed the modif. of it wh. had been proposed by Dr. Brown. (See a Summary of Brown's arg. lect. p. 303, a) Now in the first place Brown asserts that Nominalists deny in the process any "feeling" of the resemblance of objects. This, however, is false, & Mr. Wm. disproved the assertion by quotations from the writings of all great Nominalists, Hobbes Leviathan, Chap. IV. Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge & Minute pher, Dial. 7th. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Book I. sect. 7. Smith on Formation of Language. (p. 509, Bohn's ed.) So Campbell & Stewart.

Further Dr. B. maintains that the "feeling" of the resemblance of objects is general. Now he could maintain this I am at a loss to conjecture. Every hypoth. I can make appears too absurd.

1° Could it be because it is a relation? — Then every relation Cognition of relation is general: wh. however, neither he nor any other pher ~~to~~ will maintain.

2° Could he maintain ^{that} the particular relation of similarity makes the ^{feeling} general? — Surely not: the feeling of similarity produced by the presentation of two different eggs successively is not more general than



the feeling produced by the successive presentation of the same
egg. If the one be general, so must the other. And further
if the feeling of similarity be general, why not also that of
contrariety?


3° Neither could it be maintained that the feeling
of resemblance is general, because in general we have a
capacity of feeling resemblance; else for the same reason
every mental act would be general.

4° There is only one other supposition ~~remains~~ ^{remains} ~~that the representations of notions of the Understanding & the~~
~~representations of the phantasy have been confounded~~
The whole of Dr. Brown's misconception would have been
obviated if this distinction had been drawn between these;
& certainly things so different should be distinguished
by diff. names.

I proceed to a curious question wh. has divided
phers, Does lang. Originate in general appellations or
in proper names? The latter alternative has been adopt-
ed by Vives, Locke, Condillac, Brown, Smith & others.
For a statement of the doctrine & the arguments wh. have
been ~~used~~ employed to establish it, see Smith on Form. of
Lang. first Paragraph. Locke's Essay, Book II. Chap. 3. Sect. 7.
also Brown's remarks, p. 306.


Holding the opposite view we find many distin-
guished phers especially among the Schoolmen; in mod-
ern times Campanella, & Leibnitz.

Either of these two opposite doctrines would be



held established were we unacquainted with the Arguments for the other. But there is an opinion intermediate between these wh. appears to me nearer the truth. It is that our first notions are neither of the distinctly General nor of the definitely particular; but that all our Phil. is at first vague, & that it is by an after process of Generalization that we arrive at clear notions of the General, & by specification & individualization that we obtain a definite Phil. of ~~the~~ species & individuals. This was the doctrine of Aristotle, Scaliger, & seems to have been maintained by Mr. Stewart.

Sir Wm. then proceeded to explain the manifestation of this faculty of comparison in the ~~first~~ acts of judgment & reasoning; but did not dwell long on this, as it is more particularly connected with the subject of the other course. The principal point worth noticing was his distinction between the kind of reasoning wh. has never been drawn by any other previous, according as the whole is one of comprehension or extension; & this ~~whole~~ distinction applies both to deductive & ~~the~~ inductive Arguments.




The Regulative Faculty.

The Criterion wh. distinguishes the notions derived from this faculty from those that are the result of experience, viz. their necessity & consequent universality, was first explicitly pronounced by Leibnitz. This, however, does not detract from the originality of Reid, who arrived at this truth independently of Leibnitz. It has been most successfully employed by Kant in the ^{Critical} analysis of our ideas. Sir Wm. then proceeded to a statement of his doctrine, wh. is published ^{in the} ~~at the end of~~ ^{appendix to} his Discussions.

The second class of mental phen^a. — the feelings

After dealing with a few preliminary matters, — defending their title to be ranked as a distinct class of mental powers, showing in what relation they stand to the other two classes of mental powers, the Cognitions on the one hand & the Conations on the other, — Sir Tom. proceeded to a statement of his theory of pleasure & pain.

Prop. I. Man exists only as he lives as an intelligent & sensitive being, & he lives as an intelligent & sensitive being only as he consciously energises. Human existence is only a more general expression for human life, & human life is only a more general expression for the sum of the energies in wh^{ch} that life is realized, & through wh^{ch} it is manifested in course. In a word, life




is Consc. energy & Consc. energy is life.

Prop. II. Human life, human life, human energy is not unlimited, but is determined to a certain no. of modes through wh. alone it can be manifested. These diff. modes of action are in diff. relations called powers, faculties, Capacities, dispositions & habits.

Prop. III. Man, as he Consciously exists, is the subject of pleasure & pain - & these of various kinds: but as he only Consciously exists in & through the exertion of ~~these~~ certain determinate powers, it is only through the exertion of these powers that he becomes the subject of pleasure & pain, each power being in itself the faculty of a specific energy & the capacity of an appropriate pleasure or pain as the concomitant of that energy.

Prop. IV. The energy of each power of Consc. life having as its reflex or concomitant an appropriate pleasure or pain, & no pleasure or pain being competent to man except as the concomitant of some determinate energy of life - the important question arises, What is the general law under wh. these Concomitant phen^a arise in all their special manifestations?



Prop. V. The answer to the question here proposed is - The more perfect, the more pleasurable, the energy; the more imperfect, the more painful.

Prop. VI. The perfection of an energy is twofold: 1^o By relation to the power of wh. it is an energy; & 2^o by relation to the object about wh. it is conversant. - The former may be affords its subjective, the latter its objective, Condition.

Prop. VII. By relation to its power, an energy is perfect when it is tantamount to the full, & no more than the full, Complement of spontaneous force wh. the power is Capable of exerting; an energy is imperfect when either when the power is restrained from putting forth the full amount of its force wh. it would otherwise do, or when it is stimulated to put forth a greater amount of force than it w^d. otherwise tend to do.

The amount or quantum of an energy is twofold: 1^o Intensive, 2^o Extensive; the former expressing the degree, the latter the duration of the exerted energy. These are always in the inverse ratio of each other.

— When we do not limit Our Consideration to the simple powers, we have a third Kind of Quantity, viz. the Extensive. A state is said to possess a greater amount of Extensive Quantity in proportion as the power is the Complement of a greater No. of Co-operating powers.

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
Page 8. The first part of the paper is devoted to a description of the various species of plants which are found in the neighbourhood of the station. The second part is devoted to a description of the various species of animals which are found in the neighbourhood of the station.

Page 9. The first part of the paper is devoted to a description of the various species of plants which are found in the neighbourhood of the station. The second part is devoted to a description of the various species of animals which are found in the neighbourhood of the station.

Prop. VIII. By Relation to the object, (by object is here denoted any Cause by wh^{ch} power is determined to activity,) by Relation to the object about wh^{ch} it is Con- versant, and Energy is perfect when the Object is of such a character as to afford its power the Conditions Re- quisite for it to spring into full spontaneous Energy; imperfect when the Object is of such a character as either on the One hand to stimulate its power to a degree be- yond the maximum of free exertion, or on the other hand to thwart its tendency towards its natural limit.

Prop. IX. Pleasure is thus the result of certain harmonious relations, of certain Agreements; pain, on the contrary, is the result of certain inharmonious relations, of certain disagreements. The pleasurable is, therefore, not inappropriately called the agreeable, the painful the disagreeable: and in conformity to this doctrine pleasure & pain may be thus defined; "Pleasure is ~~the~~ a reflex of a spontaneous or unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energies we are Consc." "Pain is a re- flex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power."

On this doctrine of pleasure & pain are twofold inasmuch as each is either positive & absolute or neg- ative & relative; 2^o pain is of two kinds of pain, (a.) that wh^{ch} accompanies the repression of the spontaneous en- ergy of a power, & (b.) that wh^{ch} is conjoined with its




efforts when stimulated to ~~an~~ over-activity.

From this doctrine it follows

1° That as the powers in an individual are strong either by nature or by habit, the pleasure attending their exercise will be proportionally intense & enduring. This being the case the individual will be disposed to exert the more vigorous powers, as their energies will afford him the largest complement of purest pleasure. *"Habit sua quemque voluptas."*

2° As the exercise of a power is the only mean by wh^{ch} it is invigorated, but at the same time as this exercise until perfect elicits a feeling imperfect, & consequently painful or at least of mixed pleasure; it follows that those faculties wh^{ch} stand most in need of cultivation are precisely those wh^{ch} are least likely to receive it, while those wh^{ch} are already more fully developed are precisely those wh^{ch} present the strongest inducements for still further invigoration.




History of the various Theories of Pleasure & Pain.

Sir Wm. proceeded to give a history of the ~~of~~ various theories wh^{ch} had been maintained by phers, ^{1^o} because there is no work in wh^{ch} such a historical review has been attempted, but ^{2^o} principally for the purpose of shewing that all the diff^t theories are united in the one wh^{ch} he proposed. These all come under two great classes, at the head of wh^{ch} severally stand Plato & Aristotle. Plato's doctrine wh^{ch} will be found in the Philebus, ^{Book ix. of the Republic} with occasional notices in other parts of his writings, is to the following effect:

Pleasure is nothing absolute, nothing positive; it is a mere relation to, & negation of, pain. Pain is the root, the condition, the antecedent, of pleasure; ~~the~~ pleasure is only the restoration of the feeling subject from a state contrary to nature, to a state conformable to nature. Pleasure is the mere replenishing of a vacuum, the mere satisfying of a want.

Aristotle, on the other hand, after proving that Plato's theory applies only to the pleasures of sense, & that not even to those of the higher senses, & by no means to those of intellect, establishes a theory analogous to that of Sir Wm., defining pleasure to be "the concomitant of unimpeded energy, whether of a natural power or of an acquired habit."



We may consider the feelings 1^o as Causes, 2^o as effects.


A. As Causes of the opposite phen^a of pleas.
we & pain the States of mingled pleasure & pain,
Now we have to consider the general conditions
wh^{ch} determine in a feeling one or other of these
counter qualities. These are four.


I. According as the object is new or unexpected.
This is novelty, & the principle under wh^{ch} novelty
determines a high energy & pleasure is either 1^o
subjective, inasmuch as the mind is determined to
act either from inaction or from a diff^t mode of
action, or 2^o Objective, inasmuch as a new object af-
fords gratification to the faculty of Intel.

II. In proportion as the object stands in the
relation of contrast. Contrast operates in two ways:
producing either 1^o a real intensity of feeling, or
2^o an apparent & relative intensity.

III. The relation of harmony or discord.

III. The Association of other interesting
Circumstances, for it is evident that the amount of
free energy elicited by an object singly is small in
~~proportion~~ when compared with the amount
of energy wh^{ch} may be elicited by a train of associ-
ated representations.







'The author of the Kr. d. R. V. in aiming at allaying finally the conflict not only of ph^{ers}, but of ph^y, knew no other plan than that of determining the exact point of controversy in an all-comprehensive question: 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' In the course of this inquiry it will be shewn, that this question, in its highest abstraction, is not other than this: 'How comes the absolute ego to go beyond itself & directly oppose to itself a non-ego?' It was quite natural that this question, so long as it was not presented in its highest abstraction, as also its answer, was necessarily mis-understood.' ~~Schelling~~ Schelling then goes on to say that Reinhold, in his Theorie d. Vorstellungsvermögens, by making the empirical ego the principle of ph^y, 'reached the last stage of abstraction, on wh it was necessary to stand, before we could come to that wh is higher than all abstraction.' Vom Ich als Prin- cip d. Phil. § 5, Anmerk.

"The synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point on which must be fixed all use of the understanding, even the whole of Logic & after it, Transcendental phy. This faculty is in fact the understanding itself" Kant's Kr. d. v. D. p. 124, note.

"Connection however does not lie in the objects & cannot be borrowed from them, it may be, through perception & taken up by that means first of all into the understanding, but is an act of the understanding alone, which is nothing else than the faculty of connecting a priori & bringing the manifold ~~of~~ (elements) of given presentations under the unity of apperception, wh principle is the highest in ^{all} human soul. p. 125.





x If you wish to breathe for soul with its crowning certainty, you must begin at the most elementary inquiry ^{at} ~~with~~ ^{at} which all soul must start, you must find out the immovable basis on which all must rest. You may shrink from going down into the dark abyss of doubt to grope for way towards a resting place, but if you refuse, you ^{will} find that ^{you} are standing on the inflated wind: bag of mere traditional opinions, which is ~~ready to collapse~~ ^{ready to collapse} terrifies you constantly by the fear of its collapsing before every piercing inquiry. If you bravely go down, you may be sure to reach at last that Rock of the Ages, planted on which you will be able to face without fear the darkest shadow of doubt that issues from the surrounding Immensity, or the outstretching Eternity.

§ 1. Phil is really, as it is etymologically, the love of wisdom

§ 2. Wisdom (σοφία) is really, as it is etymologically, knowledge, strictly so called.

Phil ∴ is the love of knowledge, strictly so called, & why? Because it leads us up to the questions which precede all other knowledge, 1. What is knowledge? & as the result of the first answer to the first, 2. What is existence? 1. Cosmology (not Epistemology, & why not?) 2. Ontology.

Cosmology.

What is knowledge? is the quest. which this science has to answer. Phil, as this science which takes you back to the first principles of all things, necessarily reaches its end only when it comes to the primal quest, before which no quest can be conceived, ~~that is the~~ Now what is that quest? Suppose you give up everything you have previously believed, take nothing for granted, ~~we~~ tear down the entire building in which your thoughts have hitherto been housed, what is the point to which you are forced to select as that on which the first foundation stone of a new & firmly built structure is to be rested? Do you hesitate to go thus far? There is no choice for you, if you have taken the first step. The same phil, love of knowledge, which drove you from one belief insufficiently examined, necessarily demands imperatively that you should abandon a second, a third, all; the necessities of speculation are inexorable, when they have once brought you under their irresistible impulse. In the process then of rejecting all as uncertain all that you before supposed you had known, what is the limit to which at last your doubts must come? You come at last to the conclusion, that you know nothing, that you doubt everything. But do you know that you know nothing, doubt everything? When that is asked, you see that you have arrived at the end of your doubting, at a point where your doubting, denuding of your knowledge must stop. For you have found out that you know something, & even if you know nothing; for you

"So little do we know what we're about in
This world, I doubt if doubt itself be doubting"
(Don Juan, Canto 9, vs. 17)


Know this one thing at least, that you know nothing. Thus there is removed a difficulty which you may possibly have felt in the way of my statement, that the earliest quest. of all ~~is~~ to which you can go back is, 'What is Sub.? It has been announced by all physical writers from Arist. to Sir W. Ham., that the first quest. which we require to answer in all investigations is, whether the thing which we are about to investigate really exists or not. Now, you may have supposed that I had overlooked the quest., whether Sub., ^{the nature & laws of} which we are about to investigate really exists, whether ~~and~~ there is such a thing at all. You will see however that I overlooked it this quest. not unwittingly, but because I knew that it was an impossible quest. inasmuch as it either answered or contradicted itself. I shall suppose one of you proposing to me the doubt, whether there is such a thing as Sub., whether we can know anything at all. I reply to your proposal, 'Do you know that you doubt? If you do, then you know something, there is Sub.. If you do not, you contradict yourself; for you said that you doubted, & you must have known that you doubted when you said so or, if you did not know, your doubt has annihilated itself.' The question, whether Sub. is, is \therefore impossible, destroys itself. Our Sub. may not represent reality, may be a delusion; but that we know or are conscious is a fact from which we may start; & the earliest quest. to which we can possibly ask is \therefore , as I have said, ^{not of Sub., but} 'What is Sub.?'

But there is another point of view from which the physical importance of this quest. may be seen. It not only brings to the ultimate basis of all science, it affords us the means of detecting & correcting any error which may have crept into science by transgressing the laws of Sub.. The full meaning of this remark you may not altogether appreciate at present, but the more thoroughly you inquire into the nature of Sub. & observe the conditions under which alone it can be realized, you will

x Cf. Also Kant's Kr. d. r. V., p. 225. 'If then we learn by this critical inquiry

grow the more cautious, the more truthloving in the adoption of all yr beliefs. Every one who is honest must admit that he has too often rashly hastened to conclusions without sufficient inquiry. Not in important scientific matters merely, but far more in ordinary subjects. Foolish assertions, ungenerous tho'ts & statements. Even in higher matters. Theological errors of present day. Importance in consequence of clearly 'padding the marches' between ^{the} possible ~~but~~ & impossible in fact, the actual & the merely hypoth. Cannot be better illustrated than by Locke. ~~The~~ Origin of his great work ~~is~~ in Ep. to Reader. "Were it fit to trouble thee with the hist. of this essay, I sh^d tell thee that five or six friends, meeting at my chamber & discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quietly at a stand by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming ~~to~~ any nearer a resolution of those doubts wh^{ch} perplexed us, it came into my tho'ts that we took a wrong course & that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities & see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the Company who all readily assented, & thereupon it was agreed that this sh^d be our first inquiry. Some hasty & undigested tho'ts on a subject I had never before considered, wh^{ch} I set down ag^t our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse wh^{ch}, having been ^{thus} begun by chance, was continued by intreaty, written by intermitting parcels & after long intervals, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted, & at last, in a Retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was bro't into that order thou now seest it." +


* The inadequacy of the most inadequate systems of phy to be traced to the fact of their never having clearly put this quest, the real problem they lead to solve, at the outset. Hence also, not contradictions of physical systems with themselves, but with each other. The problem has been seen differently by different phers, each in ~~seeing~~ working at a different problem. (Fenier's Inst. Introd. § 15, but esp. 16.)




wh. ∴ You are warned to steer clear, if you wd reach the point to wh
we are bound. You have nothing to do with the objects of Kwl or with
the kinds of Kwl, into which sciences they shd be distributed.
Only with Kwl itself. The quest. answered in

§ 1. Kwl is the connection of that wh calls itself 'I' with
that wh it calls 'Not-I'.

A definition of Kwl, in the strict sense of a definition, is impossible.
A definition is in strictness a partic. kind of Kwl, & ∴ Kwl in itself, wh
includes definition as well as all other kinds of Kwl under it, cannot
be bro't under definition. Kwl is the genus in wh ^{the species} def. is the ranked
& you cannot ^{include} the larger class under the smaller. Accordingly
you are not to look upon the above proposition as in strictness a definition.
If it need be accurately described at all, it may be called not a def.,
but an explication of Kwl into its constituent elements. This substitute
for definition is what we are obliged to resort to in other sciences besides
phy. When you come to the ultimate facts wh form the data from wh
a science much start, you have then no higher facts under wh these
may be classed & you are reduced to the necessity of merely ex-
plicating or resolving them into their elements, ~~these elements being the~~
~~also not truly more elementary~~. In that case what I have called
elements are not truly more elementary than the facts of wh they
are the analysis, since they presuppose those facts as much
as the facts presuppose them. E.g. the simplest def.^s of geometry
are not strictly def.^s. 'A point is that wh has position, but not mag-
nitude.' Position & Magnitude are not more elementary ideas than
that of a point. When you have the one, you have the other also.
The same may said with regard to def.^s of line, straight line. ~~A~~
~~straight line is the shortest way~~ ^{from one point to any other} ~~between two points.~~ The shortest




line between two points is certainly identical with a straight line between them, but wh of the two explains the other, wh is more elementary, may be questioned. When I have an idea of a straight line, I don't define it to my thought as the shortest line between two points. The more probable order is that, when I think of the shortest line between two points, I explain to myself as a straight line. The same difficulty may be shown in finding what can strictly be called a def. of such a simple idea as that of a right angle. But ~~the~~ the examples I have adduced are sufficient to illustrate the ~~necessity~~ impossibility of furnishing a strict def. of the highest fact with wh phy has to deal, the fact of Intel. The meaning of every term employed in the first proposition of the Gnosology presupposes Intel far more truly than Intel presupposes ~~the~~ it. This prop. is \therefore a def. of Intel only in the same sense in wh the def. of the simplest ideas in geometry are such. These express only a certain necessary coincidence of some fact with the fact wh they profess to define, ^{necessary} ~~the~~ ^{coincidence} ~~coincidence~~, e. g., ~~of the fact, that two equal angles formed by one straight~~ ~~meeting another~~ of two equal angles formed by one straight line meeting another straight line with the fact that these two angles are right angles. In like manner it is a necessary law that all Intel is the connection of that wh knows itself as 'I' & that wh it knows as 'Not: I;' in other words, in all Intel there are two elements, a subjective & an objective, Intel of self & Intel of notself. Consequently the task of phy must be to investigate these two elements or constituents of Intel; the entire end of phy, primarily of Gnosology, ultimately of Ontology, is accomplished in the accurate ~~discovery~~ discrimination of what is & contributed by the subject, what by the object in the act of Intel. This has been more



or less distinctly recognized as the aim of speculation from its very beginning, & all the failures & all the confusion of different physical systems have arisen from their not having set this aim clearly before them. In more recent times however this aim has been apprehended as it never was before. Sir W. Ham. has expressed the general tendency of the highest efforts of modern phy, when he says: "The distinction of self & not-self involves the whole science of mind; for this science is nothing more than a determination of of the subjective & objective in themselves & in their mutual relations." Disc. p. 5, note. Lect. I. 161. We may have occasion to estimate the success with wh Sir W. & other phers have so^h to determine with scientific accuracy the relation of the two terms in this distinction. The fact, that the determination of this distinction has been so clearly apprehended in recent times, may probo be an evidence that we are nearing the accomplishment of the task of phy.


§ 2. Though the objective element of *Phil*, in its general character, much be taken acct^h of by phy, yet ~~that~~ the subjective is that with wh ~~alone~~ phy ^{& particularly} alone has to do, the objective ^{matter} affordingly for the other sciences.

The various objects presented in *Phil* are those about wh ~~phy~~ the various sciences are conversant, astronomy, philology &c. Phy draws away from these objects to attend to *Phil* itself. In doing so what is the prominent fact that presents itself to the attention? It is not the presence of the objects of *Phil*. These are prominent in other inquiries. But when the inquiry arises, "What is *Phil*?"




It is a new element that arrests our attention & the nature of wh demands investigation. Such factor of our knl wh is always present, whatever else may be present is the one wh peculiarly claims to be the object of Gnosology, the science of knl. Now this factor, I have said, is self. I cannot know without knowing that it is I who know, & not some one else. Consequently I must always be present in every knl. Things cannot be kn^d ^{by me} till I am knn along with them. This it is that makes them knowable. ~~The solution~~: When the meaning of the first personal pronoun is partially determined the secret of Gnosology is unveiled. Speaking of the abuse of the words subject & object Sir W. Ham. says: "The subject of knl is exclusively the Ego or cause. mind. Subject & subjective, considered in themselves, are little liable to equivocation. But on the other hand the object of knl is not necessarily a phen^{on} of the Non-ego, for the phen^{on} of the Ego itself constitute as certable, though not so various & prominent, objects of cognition, as the phen^{on} of the Non-ego's." (Reid p. 808, note.) I am sorry that I am compelled humbly to differ from Sir W. on this point. The terms by wh the subjective element in knl is denominated appear to me extremely liable to equivocation & even to be used in an equivocal sense in this very passage by Sir W. himself. If the subject is exclusively the Ego, how can phen^{on} of the Ego become by any modification not the subject, but the object? how can I ever become not I, or that wh is not I become merely a modification of me?

Let me ask you then to stop with all seriousness at this quest. as involving in it the fate of G^r phy. Think the meaning




of I. What do you mean when you use the first personal pronoun?
~~Do you~~ Think yourself in or pure selfhood. Say 'I am I,' I
am nothing else. ~~I am truly & essentially separated from all~~
~~the~~ Repeat that to yourself over & over again till you are rever-
able & lose the conce^{ness} of the infinite mystery, the inexplicable
meaning of calling yourself 'I.'

With the ability to call yourself 'I,' begins properly or ex-
istence as an intelligent being. It is an interesting quest., though I
do not intend entering on it at present, when self conce^{ness} begins.
There is one fact wh has been referred to wh you must all have
noticed, wh may throw some light on this quest. Child, when they
begin to speak, don't use the first ^{or the second} personal pronoun, but
only the third, when speaking of themselves, as well as when
addressing persons ~~person~~ present. 'Baby, Tommy, Alice,
Ac. wishes so & so.' When the child first uses the first, says
I, may p^{ro}po be the birth of self conce^{ness}. At what time
this usually takes place I have myself never sufficiently
observed to be able to state with any certainty. I sh^d think
it seldom happens before two years. But there is a remarkable
instance in wh it w^d seem ~~to~~ to have been much earlier. The
only person whom I remember to have recorded his first
act of self conce^{ness} is Jean Paul Richter. Never shall
I forget that internal event, till now related to no mortal, wherein
I witnessed the birth of my self conce^{ness}, of wh I can still give
the place & the time. One forenoon I was standing, a very young
child, in the outer door & looking forward at the stack of the
fuel wood, when all at once the internal vision, 'I am an I,'
came like a flash from heaven before me & in gleaming light.




ever afterwards continued: then had my Eyes for the first time seen it: self for the first time & for ever. Deceptions of memory are scarcely conceivable here; for in regard to an event occurring in the altogether in the Veiled Holy of Holies of Man, & whose novelty alone has given permanence to such every day Recollections accompanying it, no posterior description from another party wd have mingled itself with accompanying circumstances at all. I regret that I have not been able to find a reference to this fine passage; so that I wd have stated articulately the date of the occurrence which relates. It wd seem, from the fact that little Richter was standing at the door when the consciousness flashed upon him: plus, I shd think, that he was at the very least about two years old, & seems to confirm the opinion I have hazarded as the earliest period when self-consciousness begins. But I am unable to explain this passage in his history, in its connection with another which ^{much have taken} took place at an earlier period & at which, since his memory reached back to it, he must have been self-conscious. Far-reaching recollections from the years of childhood, ^{gladden} ~~rejoice~~ & even elevate ^{unstable} ~~unfathomable~~ man, who seeks in this ^{fluctuating} ~~existence~~ existence everywhere to find something to which he may cling, more than the memory of later crises of his life; & this perhaps for two reasons: 1st because by this recollection he thinks to press back nearer to the gates of his life which are guarded by Night & by Spirits, & because 2^d he hopes in the spiritual power of an early consciousness to find ~~and~~ something like independence on the despicable little human body. I rejoice that I am able still to ^{bring up} ~~recall~~ a fading little recollection from my twelfth, or at the latest my fourteenth month like the first



equal snowdrops from the dark soil of chldhd. I remember that a poor scholar was very fond of me & I of him, & that he always carried me in his arms, wh is pleasanter than at a later period by the hand, & that he used to give me milk in a large dark room. His distant dorkling image & his love hovered over me down through later years. Unhappily I ~~do~~ no longer know his name, but since it w^h be possible that he was still alive above sixty years of age & that ~~some~~ being widely read these pages w^h come before him & he w^h then remember their little author, whom he has carried & kissed — & that this were to take place & he sh^d write or that he the older sh^d come & me now the old man. This little morning star of earliest memory stood tolerably clear still in boyhood ^{near} the horizon of its heavens, but ever faded more, the higher the dayligh of life rose; & now I properly remember only this with clearness, that I remembered all more clearly before. Vol. 16. pp. 15, 16

This is certainly ~~the earliest recollection from chldhd~~ I certainly do not remember having anywhere met with a case in wh the memory reached back so far into early chldhd. I leave you to estimate for Graves the weight to be attached to it in determining the period at wh we generally become conscious of our selfhood. For after all the quest. as to the date of the birth of this consciousness is a matter of secondary importance. That wh we have to deal with is the fact of selfconsciousness, whatever may be the time of its dawn; & ~~the~~ its infinite meaning in our nature as constituting us what we are as intellectual beings may be regarded as making it worthy of form.



ing the chief lesson wh is to be reaped in our earthly life. I hope
we shd consider it not merely a poetical fancy, but a physical
truth as well, wh has been beautifully uttered ^{by the greatest of living poets} in one of the
odes of 'In Memoriam':

'The baby new to earth & sky,
What time his slender hand is pressed
Soft the circle of the breast,
Has never thought that 'this is I.'

But as he grows he gathers much
And learns the use of 'I' & 'me'
And finds 'I am not what I see'
And other than the things I touch.'

So round he to a separate mind
From whence clear memory may begin
So through the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined.

This use may lie in blood & breath,
Wh else were fruitless of their due,
Had man to learn himself anew
Beyond the second birth of Death.' 44.

X
in the course of the poem, but there is one ⁱⁿ the journey of the Burgundians wh. sh. not be passed over. Hagen sets out & is impressed all along with the presentiment that their journey will have a fearful issue. As they cross the ^{Danube} Rhine they meet certain Merwomen whom he questions with regard to the probable result of their expedition:

Outspake the wild Merwoman, I tell thee 'twill arrive,
That of all your gallant host No man shall be left alive
Except King Gunther's chaplain, As we full well do know;
He only home returning To the Rhine land back shall go.

Hagen attempts to make the prophecy untrue by casting the chaplain overboard as they are crossing the river, but the chaplain reached the home shore & returned to Worms. From this point a certain fearful grandeur gathers round the actions & the character of Hagen, the awful daring of utter desperation, as well also as of utter devotion to his friends. I regret that I cannot carry you through the details of the closing scene of this old drama, & yet it is perhaps artistically the most pft, certainly the grandest part of the whole. 'Strangely,' says Carlyle, 'has the old singer, in these his loose melodies, modulated the wild narrative into a poetic whole with what we not call true art, but were it not rather ^{an} instinct of genius still more unerring. A fateful gloom now hangs over the fortunes of the Nib. wh. deepens & deepens as they march onwards to the judgment ^{hour} ~~seat~~ till all are engulfed in utter night.' The queen does not allow the feast of welcome to even to begin in peace & before long, unable to wreak her vengeance

on Hagen alone, all are embroiled in a battle of extermination. At last the Nib. are all slain but Hagen & Gunther, who are delivered over to Crimhild bound. 'Where is the treasure of the Nib.?' demands Crimhild of Hagen. 'I have sworn that none shall know while any of your brothers lives,' replies Hagen. 'I bring it to an end' & she orders her brother's head to be cut off. 'Thou hast according to thy will; of the Hoard none knows but God & I; from thee it shall forever be hid.' She kills him by her own hand with his own sword, & she herself is in her turn slain by one Hildebrand ~~who~~ out of indignation at the woe she has wrought, ~~while her husband, who had no anticipation of what has happened & does not understand it, looks on passively.~~ In these few sentences I have given you no conception of the tragical effect of these closing scenes as they are detailed in the poem itself. All descriptions of battles that I have ever ^{read} seem but the acts of mere boyish ^{sham} games, after this. The sustained horror of ~~the~~ ^{the} wages wh grows on the reader as the ~~not~~ long cherished hate of Crimhild works onward to the climax of its ^{gratification} ~~consummation~~, the sustained horror of with wh the fearful consummation is wrought out, the straightforward simplicity of the poet shrinking from no details, impart to this tale a sublimity wh in its own kind will, I believe, be so! in (rain elsewhere. Of other features of the poem I may take occasion to speak at another time. Meanwhile you will admit that the poet has fulfilled the design with wh he set ^{out} of joyances & lightides, of weeping & of woe, of noble heroes fighting, he has let us wondrous know.

has been in his right from the dwarf's blood a cap by his mother
himself invisible & has killed in the blood of a dragon that he has
as to Pender himself ^{invaluable} he has heard of the
beauty of the Queen's garden. ^{It} in ^{the} ^{same} ^{way} ^{do} ^{his} ^{father} ^{King} ^{himself}
of his mother's kind endeavours to persuade, ^{of} ^{his} ^{mother's}
himself & the Burgundians. The Queen & her maidens much
at evening night & day to sit out & to sit out of the
she has set out & arrives at the court of Dunbar, the brother
of the fair Countess; but a year (requiring & pass before he
was allowed to see her for whom he had come. Countess
had really gathered her earlier resolution on the first (even
she obtained of England from her kinders, & some time
after when she heard of his exploits in battle along with her
brother set a Danish thing, her high ambassador's blood, when
your face your face: good, because the love worthy here was his:
high respect from the danger of battle; At last however the
occasion of a great tournament is taken advantage of to intro-
duce the young prince of the N. & the beautiful princess
of Burgundy. In the appointed morning all come out to
see the display of arms, and foremost of all, at least & England,
there came beside her mother with a hundred body guards &
among a noble maiden in her train Countess like the glow of
the morning from tangled clouds; & as the light moon stands in
for the stars & it seems to clear the clouds, even so
stood she her before young fair women, whereas the heart of
the here was cheered; & did take so long to narrate all the
suits that took place at Dunbar's court before he gave
his sister & England. The much let ourselves be taken away

Remarks on the Nib. Lay. Simplicity. Everything told in the most natural manner. No straining, esp. none after images. I noticed almost the only image, Cimbuldo's appearance to Sigfried 'like the morning glow among troubled clouds' & 'as the light moon stands before the stars & its sheen so clear goes over the clouds, even so stood she now before many fair women'. Contrast with Greek etc. Figurative language. How it arises, is imposed upon early efforts to express tho' Person communes more immediately with nature & ∴ personifies. Myths. Fascination of the mythic: using (view of) nature. Explanation of the (regr.) expressed in Schiller's 'Götter Griechenlands' without supposing it to be anti: Ntu. Wordsworth & his influence. But the fact can not be doubted, ^{that} the entrance of Ntinity entirely abolished this way of looking at nature

The oracles are dumb,
 No voice or hideous hum
 Rums through the arched roof in words deceiving;
 Apollo from his shrine
 Can no more divine,
 With hollow shriek the steep of Delphos leaving:
 No mighty trance or breathed spell
 Inspires the pale-eyed priest from the prophetic cell.

The lonely mountains o'er
 And the resounding shore
 A voice of weeping heard & loud lament;
 From haunted spring & dale,
 Edged with poplar pale

dream from which we are not awaking. In the life that was coming to her
 she dreamt that she had bro't up a falcon & had kept it for many
 a day long till one day the eagle swept down upon it & carried it
 off from before her eyes. She dreamt she also sold the falcon to
 her mother who interupted it thus: 'She falcen that thou lovest
 is a noble husband. May God protect him, else he is poor indeed!'

The young maiden starts: at the mention of a husband

'Why speakst thou of husband, dear mother mine?'
 'I declare that thou wilt keep herself free from all trouble in that
 quarter by reasoning & having nothing to do with the love of horses,
 but to retain her maidenly beauty till her death. She never mother
 would have that such a statement comes from her experience; but
 in the modest utterance of the simple girl we hear a dim fore-
 boding of the fate at a coming upon her & it also is so right to
 avoid one if possible.

Dying however is stronger than 'Maiden's' courage or a
 woman's resolutions. Arrangements are made in heaven, not by
 earthly choices; & though Councils & Kings, Kings, etc.
 to much gold & the all-conquering god. For it seems that, as the
 has been growing up with all womanly beauty on the upper Rhine, etc.
 has been only prepared for becoming the bride of a hero who has
 been growing up for her into all manly nobleness far away & the
 North in the land of the Nix. Where there is a skull on the
 they were it at the same time to acquire. Their land is the land of
 nobles, of knights & lords; & these knights & lords no longer marry
 among themselves. But wherever the land lies, ^{it has been conquered by} there are here married Kings.
 good, who has been from the skin of a treasure it is uncountable.

The parting genius is with sighing sent:
With flower: invoven tresses torn
The nymphs in twilight shades of tangled thickets mourn.

In consecrated earth
And on the holy hearth
The Larv & Lemures moan with midnight plaint;
In urns & altars found
A drear & dying sound
Affrights the Flamens at their service quaint,
And the chill marble seems to sweat
While each peculiar power foregoes his wonted seat.

Zeus & Bacchus
Forsake their temples dim
With that thrice-battered God of Palestine,
And mooned Ashtaroth,
Heaven's queen & mother both,
Now sit robed with tapers
x x x x

Nor is Osiris seen
In Memphian grove or green,
Trampling the unshowered grass with lowings loud;
Nor can he be at Pesh
Within his sacred chest,
Naught but profoundest hell can be his shroud;
In vain from timbered anthems dark
The sable: etoled sorcerers bear his worshipped ark.

He feels from Judah's land
The dreaded Infants hand,

The rays of Bethlehem blind his dusky eye;
Nor all the gods beside
Longer dare abide,

Nor Typhon huge ending in Leah's twine:
Our Babe, to shew His Godhead true,
Can in his swaddling bands control the damned crew.

So when the Sun in bed,
Curtained with cloudy red,

Pillows his chin upon an orient wave,
The flocking shadows pale
Troop to the infernal jail,

Each fettered ghoul slips to his several grave,
And the yellow-skirted fays
Fly after the night-steeds, leaving their moon-loved maze.


Cf. with this the chorus in *Hellas*, p. 317.

2. Outer simplicity. In the general plan on which composition is constructed.


Energy.

Carlyle's *Cromwell* II. p. 178. 'Charge of the Light Brigade'.


do things recovered from ancient times, although the ^{now} accounts
agreements with Highland hills & glens & burnings, with Highland
note & menigite, it has been recognized by cleaners & Parkways
& comfortable hotels, has taught us that the ~~the~~ peculiar, seemingly
unnatural tone of the Oceanic poems is more ~~valuable~~ in fact
many with such keenness than in otherness be enjoyed, get it
must be acknowledged that we can scarcely find a trace
of that interest manifested in the multiple editions & translations
in the numerous critical works for & against the authenticity of the
poems, yet appeared in their first publication by Macpherson.
That the interest in the tale of old Germany ~~is~~ old have
grown as the interest of a part of the Scottish tale decreased
is certainly remarkable, & much more you remember errors
& know the character of a production in ~~the~~ fact that it
is much profound & enthusiastic study. Of will: understand
how to ~~be making you acquainted with the~~ give you an adequate
a conception of the poem as of can within the limits of a brief
lecture in the hope that my ^{of} it may induce you to seek
a fuller acquaintance with it either in the original or in a translation.
trans. (translated by Wm. Kenyon Seton. Lond. Thom. & Spargo. 1876.)
With regard to the general character of the poem it is em-
phatically tragic. The tragedy indeed is not unmitigated, does not
overshadow the whole ^{story} as in the dramatic works of the
Greeks. More truly, though ~~the~~ more superficially, pertaining to
it a but mingled sorrow & joy, the part of the Sid. details with
a most unceasing cheerfulness the passing ~~of~~ pleasure in
with the story touches in spite of the gloom of the mournful
plot thrown over the whole. But ~~the~~ the chequered character



to have cared little about the life & the writings of their
mediate forefathers. Will the Ordener's publication of the *Recherches MS.*
the national pen may be said to have been withdrawn to the Germans;
but the publication has drawn a very general attention to the deed:
and because it is not now so impossible to go to the editions & in the
original, in modernized versions & in foreign translations, as well
as the works of a critical & exploratory nature as it has collected into
existence, while at the same time you can scarcely open the cata-
logue of lectures for any season in a German university without
coming upon one corner ^{of books} to be delivered on the story of the MS. or
on subjects akin to it. The first complete edition of the poem
was published a few years after Ordener's partial edition by another
name named C. H. Müller; & Müller's work is innumerable as having
called from the great field. As a letter is still preserved in the
library of Götting, "I have by far the fairest in Spain of
these things. In my judgment they aren't worth a shilling of powder
of red not to be there in my library, of red each them out?"
I had the great however, in the same hand, was a personal
friend of Voltaire & an active slave to French taste. The first
accordingly that his opinion was far from being that of his people;
At the instance for the MS. say & the interest seem to be still undiminished
in this, whether our noble friends regard it or not, the fate of the old
German epic has contracts very strikingly with that of ~~the~~ *Recherches* and
which seems to me attached to the name of Ocean. Although
there seems to be a strong ground (well as the fishermen
investigated condemnation of Macpherson on the charge
of attempting to pass compositions of his own upon the world



I. (Kuhn, 1900) writes among the old scholars. There being no native authors
closer; language, like, etc. (as with Scott notices) German & Dutch. E.g.
in Herder's (Lectures of Mr. J. Herder). This book made the study of early
German literature of every kind at once more easy & more fruitful.
ating; & the old printed libraries of Germany, Scandinavia & Britain
now have passed to the possession of the people who were blind in
order to recover, as far as was possible, the tale & the songs in
of their fathers had delighted. Any knowledge of the history of
literature will make you better acquainted than of any other
you with the nature & extent of the differences in
of these researchers scattered. It is to one of these differences
in German literature that I wish now to bring your attention.
of have already mentioned to you that the school of scholars,
the old (reprinted) French take in Germany, French in Germany;
such in a circle of the names of Bodmer & Gessner. Bodmer was not a
man of the most original power & is: & he regarded not as the
representative rather than as the creator of the new movement in
literature as he depended. English however by the spirit of that
movement he seems to have been attracted towards the poets.
None of more simple times, & having discovered in the castle
of Count von Einsiedel, Heineken in the country of the Einsiedel, was
MSS containing what is known now as the songs of the Nibelungen,
his name to the world one of those embodying the second part
of the song under the title of Chimnische Lieder. In the 10th
cent. noted an English scholar named Wolfgang Wagner from the
fact I need it in the trial of the fragments of (songs); but during
the 16th & 17th cent. generally the old of national epic was in
known to the Germans: & in fact the work of the European poets



more
Recapitulation. In Germany, of course, the tendency was
changing & more widely at work than in any other country. ~~It is the~~
Germanic death of a truly national & national literature among
the Germans had been longer of longer duration than among
Britain. No strikingly indeed did the condition of modern Ger-
man literature contrast with that of England, that battle
had been an Englishman, he did have found almost
nothing for him to contribute to the literature of his country. He:
consequently the general of letters in Germany towards the latter part
of last cent. was in large measure not about indicated by
a more devoted study of English literature in preference to
that of France. ~~Markopans~~ ^{was passed into} the role of the new German
school. It became a criterion of orthodoxy among them to look
him up, the French dramatists. It is impossible for us to conceive
the effect produced by the discovery of the treasures of Engl.
literature & esp. of the Shakespearean dramas + the Elizabethan
poets. Hence all its next natural outlet, (regardless of the poetical
even of ^{many people} cultivated taste. Struggle struggling after a new, natural,
national type. They look upon the simplicity of the poet. Alas, they
look back upon their own past, live into it, try
to feel that it was their present. The mechanical, Romantic period
became object of attraction. Beginning in 1817 A. Schlegel, etc.
gave impulse & in H. Heine. Romantic school seek to connect
the ideal forms of poetry with the actual forms of life. Manifested in
the major & minor novels of private & social life in 18th, 19th,
science & general literature in all its branches. Herder (1774)

x See Brother's speech at Strasburg.

Cons. I. 114.

x" Had I been an Englishman & had all these numerous masterpieces been first
before me in all their power at my first dawn of Gentile consciousness, they
had have overwhelmed me & I had not have known what to do. I had
not have gone on with the same right heartedness, but had have had to
be thankful myself & look about for a long time to find a new outlet. Zeheem.

of these was the *Annals of the Study of the History of the* published by Sir
W. Scott in 1802 - ^{the study of the history of the} ^{the study of the history of the} ^{the study of the history of the}
the *Annals of the Study of the History of the* country, & his labours in this respect,
as well as in general, have done more than those of any
other man to teach men to look back in the past as on
what had ever been present & as in fact still present
back to the imagination in a literature, & it is very well
known to study & strive to imitate. But ~~nothing~~ it was
not only in Engl. literature that such discoveries were made
& such treasures of agency. There was not a nation
of Europe that did not become some of the *Annals*, & in
Germany it was ~~more~~ more (Linnæus), order & deeper
it went to the *Annals* than anywhere else. It has not time
today to make you acquainted with the *Annals*
movement among the *Annals*. You will see of many
take occasion to give you some account of it, as well
as of the great German epic, the *Annals* discovery of
it may be regarded as being the most valuable re-
sult of the *Annals* that were introduced into the
old literature of the *Annals* nations. Engl. & a
great deal of the *Annals* already. The production of old
literature in the *Annals* books, & the *Annals* in the
imitation of the *Annals*. (Linnæus, p. 238.) *Annals*
of the *Annals* legends (Mort d'Arthur. Le Contelet &
Annals. *Annals* *Annals*.)
Annals, by Ten Hellen. Legend of *Annals*, p. 39.

2 The "Minuteman" published for the first time 43 Ballads, according to Mottram.
See DeKhan's Advertisement to the "Minuteman", pp. v-vi.

spread widely & rapidly over the whole of Europe. It is
impossible for us to run down into the deepest causes that
work in the production of such changes in the tendencies
of human life, & the weed one often led Richardson
acting when he damns in their progress. It is enough
for us to show the fact & the character of this
change in the course over European literature towards
the close of last century without coming to inquire into
the causes by which it was originated or carried on.
For the fact of such a change is not the question,
but its character deserves to be more nearly examined.
As the hollow formality with which displaced was not limited
to any one sphere of human activity, but we ignored the
cause of everything that is noble in all, as the reaction to
wonder ~~more truthful consequences of nature & built~~
take an unlimited range. The lines of her ~~of these~~
after harmony with a more ethereal & more lasting ~~principle~~
easily of action than the preceding mode of eloquence. Now
in the encouragement given out of the first attempt
to return to such simple manners as native teachers then
more manifested a more earnest direction of human
activity. It was certainly in any case gratifying that sort
characteristic letters & the first had come & the more
Kemper regarded as a ~~reference~~ ^{letter} guide to a full life than
John Quincy Adams' progress. Philosophers again no
Kemper tried to show among the eternal elements in human life,
in all human phenomena, but under the surface of a heart, a finite

X Has been told in England (1965) see Columns (The other) *Chryse*
to his editor with allusions of *Chryse*, *Agro Ocean*, *Chryse*, I, p. 203. But
of. note the paper found in address catalogue of the "Chryse" *Chryse*. Note also the *Chryse*
in 1723, not mentioned by Keitt, *Chryse* to *Chryse*, p. 38. On the whole
subject consult the *Chryse*, from p. 36. Note *Chryse* take to home on the ship.
evolution of the Highlands (Westman's notes), sep. cat. note. (This must have been written about
the year of 1749. *Chryse*, by Mary Skinner, p. XXVI).

The morning presence. Beauty was awake. But ye were dead

to things ye had not of, were clearly dead
to much have lived out with untroubled rule
and compare (ye): to that ye taught a school
of debt to earth, along & else & fit.

Ye like the certain hands of ye gods' wit
their (ye) talked, every has the talk;
of thousand hardihoods have the mark

of being. He: fated, unknown face!
that beaphenied the great sign of the face
that did not show it; no, they had about,

holding a peer, described standard out,
marked with most funny practices & in large
the name of one Orleans. (State, p. 229.)

It was undoubtedly through the tendency, to rapidly picture
in these words of state, was at work throughout the whole
of Europe, yet it was undoubtedly associated with
closely with Orleans & other & other & other of France;


& accordingly in other countries the authors who spoke
of the tendency were recognized as belonging to the
French school. This was not the case in Germany

where the clearest proof of the French school
was given in a critic of the name of attacked,
who were referred by a school, headed by Bodmer,

into what endeavored to inaugurate literature
from the tradition of still gave into the freedom of
nature. This antagonistic tendency given in strength &


[Faint, illegible handwriting on lined paper]

himself is impelled to give in consequence of the impression
made upon him from without. It is indeed said not a word
later; the grand old party of the 18th & 19th cent. to become
an inconceivable & its language is that of the
for instance, men for some moralists than the themselves in
quitting more than their gift there in getting up & quote the
a superior rule of life. The disastrous effects upon the
aesthetic faculties were similar. Beauty was no longer
regarded as a divine idea illuminating with its heavenly
light all the planets of the universe. Not of heavenly,
but of earthly birth, the child of our passions, nature, instead
of mankind by its transforming power the title of man, itself
was great to give the deep of fashionable modes of
thought, & all higher ^{the degree of} ~~comparisons~~, even being itself was the
the explained as the more or less strict observance
of certain rules of conduct or (as it is called)
And all this be forgotten? No, a return,
Nurtured by Johnson & Barham,
Made great efforts, which for the time being
You were the same who I not understand
The process with a putting infants free
They look about upon a nothing more
And this is it appears. Ah! dramatic period.
The mode of heaven then, the ocean rolled
It gathering waves - ye felt not. The blue
Dared its eternal beam, & the clear
of summer might collect with it make



Wanted — Robinson's


Wanted to find out in the literature of a nation's old and
I have already referred to some illustrations of this feature of
the early literature of different peoples. There are some details
of England & Scotch Scotland, & I have more than
once taken occasion to introduce a few specimens of
them to exhibit their aptitude as means of personal forms
of aesthetic culture. It is scarcely above 3 quarters of
a century since the European nations became aware that they
possessed an early literature of such value as to merit
them to be. Undoubtedly the cause now arose with
the deeper & more lasting look with which they began to turn to
the past in general & to that part of it which is the
an separate nations were looked on as the ground of man
to which he has when a child. During that early human
life everywhere & in every sphere over which it extends was
dominated by the sacred history by a shadowy superstition,
not so to say the eternal foundation of truth & beauty &
order. That is the explanation of all the mysteries
of the inner world as here, nations & products of the
nations, though they explained in fact the innermost elements
of the temple of man's nature & found there not the in-
penetrable ego, but merely an unconscious unconscious
with among nations, & thus made truth not what
an eternal fixed truth, but what each man by



with the two former characters, these three French books given in
 upon the back of other: besides that, if lines were drawn in
 and drawn from the hand that divided them to the places at
 marked by them, they not represent a full recorder though not
 a perpendicular from the top angle cutting the base in the
 middle. Think also that of 'The Veil' in 'The Veil' and of
 the highest attainment in the style of simplicity to nature.
 The cannot express the idea in English. That childlike simplicity is
 another no feel superior to the writer in certain respects, but makes
 a master his unimitable style. The early literature of every nation
 the look illustration. Voltaire's style is almost in it. Not
 so frequent in the French style. There is also in our letters
 a sense. Original form of French verse. Only two, just the
 same as in modern (French).

This is not like the French,
 Also correct like the French,
 This is not about the middle,
 Her hand go well with the pen,
 Her hand go well with the pen,
 That she has a pattern, etc.

See also the thing, 'to you any have seen de.' Order Print 3, 313.
 imitations in modern writing. Remember morning and after:
 tion of simplicity, by its simplicity so simple more than
 by any other means. Prices than 100. Don't say in French
 the name is occasionally repeated. In the English
 of French (Manned p. 151). Don't translate 'Departure' (writing)



unavoidably have felt the inferiority of looking beginning
to give way before the close. Olan's story of man like this
side leads to the 'puncta admirations' (Carpus).

Traced forms of speech that we are apt to give
for food. However, there not all, but only specimens. ~~What~~

~~There is a~~
The purity in the diseases as a whole. Round
again that purity is merely a carrying out of purity.

1. Inner, 2. Outer purity.
1. Purity in the general tone of the & content

Running throughout the whole. The purity is there
look upon this as any stream after a pipe of which to

Illustration it does not come naturally as the first
element from for what we intend to say. The element

continued & content of the pharmaceutical school. 2.9
J. Smith's 'Androgen' (see 'contracted with (18.2, 210)

'65 622 Kupa Koa. Oxl.

Αιχμία Κεφαλή Ρεπυρτα, Ουραρπει 12 22 Χορτος.
The little 'man dying like a cloven thing' etc. John White

can scarcely be said to have ever reached a transition &
purity. Contract Zuckerman, pp. 5, 6 with Zuckerman's


debris (Wagner, pp. 135. The most frequent variation
of the kind of purity was Zuckerman. Contract Wagner


to 'soul' with full of 'soul' & 'soul' in 'soul' of
purity. The first attainment in the state of purity

to 'soul' the soul had had the evidence of the clean
that pierced the belly of the station, where heart & throat being


2. Cf. Mr. Pevsner's lecture's speech in the "Morning" & the passage of it in "Korn's Column" etc. See
also Don Johnson's "Young Men in the Morning"
* At the time he encountered an Italian gentleman who had studied himself
German by himself for three or four years. After many efforts
he was unable to get the message to this man.

to fall upon unpleasantly upon the reader or hearer instead
mere reading. In writing or speaking on relig. matters the
tendency to extravagance has of these figures is much stronger,
because there are a grandeur & importance in them the
the power of it cannot be well uttered in the fall
language of the command of our instructive notes or
speaker, & he is driven in consequence to overburden
for all his long with strong figures of speech without
considering how far they are the propriety with it
they are introduced. Every one must be conscious of
the truth of this statement who has taken the trouble
to look into any religious work written by a person who
had taken little trouble to write the statement, & it is
if any one doubts the truth of the statement, let him
take the trouble of looking into any such work & he
may verify for himself what has been said. When
expressing any strong excitement, any outbreak of
passion, or any other thing, nothing is more natural than that
the expression should take the form of exclamation.
And the thing has much moved & went up & the
chamber over the gate & up, & so he went, thus
he said: O my son Abraham, my son, my son, my son,
And God of had died for thee, O Abraham, my son,
my son, there is nothing in the utterance of David
but exclamation, & yet every one feels it to be natural
natural. And such exclamations however have
propagated into a speech of several sentences, we do






demerit? It is that died, yet rather that is seen again,
who is seen at the right hand of God, who also maketh witness
even for us. Who shall separate us from the love of God?
All the tribulation or distress or persecution or famine or
nakedness or peril or sword? When can we say we have
utterly the force of these persecutions not the error of them,
they were changed into the form of direct affirmation.
Not in earnest and alone, but also in unperceived appeal.
The prophets abound in illustrations. Ezek. 18, 21-25. &
The wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed
& shall do all my statutes & do that which is lawful & right, he
shall surely live, he shall not die. Have of any pleasure
at all that the wicked shall die, with the old, & not that
he did turn from his wickedness & live? O that the Lord
the righteous turneth away from his righteousness & commit
the iniquity & death according to all the observations
that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All the
righteousness that he hath done shall not be remembered; in his
hand; in his trespass that he hath trespassed & in his
sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die. O that he say,
The way of the old is not equal. Hear now, & know
of Israel, are not my ways equal? are not your
ways unequal? ... O that you say all of your
ways will ye die, & hence of Israel?
(I have thus illustrated here the interrogative
form of address may be introduced with effect. When



... ed he conveyed by a simple affirmation. ...
... instead of saying, e.g. that of saying to a person that
he does not believe some incredible fact, we ask him, 'Do you be-
lieve that such a such is the case?' In playfully working
any one also or in the indulgence of any bitterness we (very
naturally) fall into the interrogative form of speech. Can
regularly the way is not confined to renunciations; the
very reason of human nature find its root in the
style. The reason. But most commonly it is an earnest logic
or a passionate appeal we turn into the form. So an exam-
ple of ~~logic taking the form~~ and responding itself in interrog-
ative take speech of history.

'He with his many captures home to Rome',
where Romans did the general efforts till:
Did this in Caesar seem ambitious?'
The answer said, 'So did not seem to.'
You all did see that on the imperial
of these presented him the highly crown
Did he did three refusals: Was this ambition?'
The answer was not ambition? 'Caesar's writings, distinct:
guished for earnest reasoning, full of examples of the work
philosophy introduction of this way. 2. g. Rom. 8, 30 - 35.
'What shall we say then to these things? If God be for us, who
can be against us? He that spared not his own son, but delivered
him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give
us all things? Who shall lay any thing to the charge of
God's elect? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that con-



Confined myself to poetry, but also introduced into prose. To
 our extent, among modern writers, it characterizes Macaulay. But I take
 great pleasure in Dr. Johnson. See *Sketches*, Oct. p. 199. You see
 in Dr. Johnson it is carried to a fault, & the very return of it
 he complains here in *Johnson* is the very fault he complains
 feeling produced by the continued recurrence of the same con-
 dition.

2. *Sketches*. The construction may also be found
 in the *Sketch* development & most frequent use is *Sketch*, & *Sketch*
 across from the same goodness for a rhythm of the 1st pro-
 duces the parallelism of their poetry. Its effect is (very peculiar)
 At this is not only a change (that by being placed in contrast
 just as it is made) clearer by comparison, & the coming of
 for more ppl than being thus gratified a pleasurable feeling
 the result. Form of *Prose*. That in *Prose* (a kind) & in
 other forms: 'There then, great *Prose*, when 3 *Prose* oblige'


Such sentences occur in the *Sketches* to
 I have often been (remarked), take their point from the
 happy effect of antithesis. E.g. as a sentence in the *Sketch*:
 'Give while you live &c.' Again in the following
 the effect depends on the contrast between what we expect &
 what we read: 'I do not love thee, Dr. Fell &c.' (But this
 striking the mind cannot bear long. It grows tired even of art
 & is persons comparison & becomes intolerable. Dr. Johnson
 2. *Interrogation*. This fig. answers from a form of the
 being naturally given to our sentences even in ordinary conversation:
 then, when we look to a change & pleasure to the expression.

3 Jan Hotel Beauveaux, e.g. Ben Quilla

It with my hat upon my head
I walked along the strand,
I there did meet another man
With his hat in his hand.

Ben Quilla, 6 Profanum,
The (old) Profanum
The Profanum
The Profanum
(This is a name for the Profanum.)

'Solomon' is the work which he (Quill) attributed the protection of his name, & at the
reported according says to regard with (Quill) the affection was natural;
I had undoubtedly been written with great labor, & who is willing to think
that he has been laboring in vain? He had indeed into it much but &
much that: had often wished it to be known, often dignified it with
splendor & greatness & distinguished it to eminence; he perceived in it
many excellences & did not discover that it wanted that without which
all others are of small use, the power of engaging attention & al-
luring curiosity. Soloneness is the most fatal of all faults: 'neglig-
ence or errors are single faults, but Soloneness makes the
article; other faults are corrected & forgotten, but the power of at-
tention propagates itself. ~~It is the~~ ... ~~What is the~~ permission
failure is that with an author is least able to discover. ... ~~What is the~~ no man
ever that a fine Solonness when he first wrote it or corrected
his work till the Solonness of invention had subsided.



Now though parallelism to the Persian (Mithras) of the poetry
 of a different language & of a different people from our
 own, & many too in fact been introduced with copying
 effect into Engl. & esp. into Engl. poetry. ~~That~~ ^{the} danger
 often adds a peculiar charm to his (see by adopting the Hebrew
 Mithras) & g. in French V. 1. (p. 113) &c.
 of (see by the certain fact &c.)

But in nothing else that he has written is it so affecting in
 introduced as in this celebrated garden song. XVII. 1. 2. 3.
 8. & 10. 11. However he ~~is~~ part in our language (see
 to have been so fond of the beauty resulting from the parallel
 way of (see as 8. & 9. see. When cannot see the far better
 he has written at any place without finding instances of
 this & all his most successful efforts in (see in
 derive their most prominent charm from the structure.
 8. 9. in make.

'I dwell alone
 In a world of men
 And my soul was a stranger to
 See the fur & give the lake becomes my laughing brook,
 Till the golden-haired young lake becomes my smiling brook,
 Again in Amabel see
 I was a child & she was a child
 In the storm by the sea,
 And we found with a love that was more than love,
 I & my Amabel see,
 Think a love that the winged Purple of Heaven
 Coveted her & me.

~~The end of it~~

From Madame:

The other they were taken & other,

The leaves they were crushed & rose —

The leaves they were withering & rose;

It was night in the Rosemary garden

Of my next memorial year;

It was heard by the dim light of Amber,

In the orchard and region of their

It was down by the dark dark town of Amber;
In the garden counted woodland of their

being in it certain correspondence of the 'necessarily groups
the other into clearer views & the mind being thus associated to
a more full act of the mind is raised into a feeling of pleasure.
cases of you who ^{have} not ^{yet} studied the. being scientific
may not be aware that the beauty of art you are cases in the
construction arose almost entirely from this. in the feeling of
the like we find no elements but can with any propriety be
called imitation, & the whole rhythm is a process in
a rhythm of the expression in a parallelism of ~~the~~
reference. 2. 9. 4 24
'The earth is the debt & the future thereof.'

So varied & strong that dwell thereon;

For he hath founded it upon the rock

And founded a pillar that is upon the floods.

The shall ascend into the hill of ~~the~~ the del?

Or the shall stand in the high place?

He who hath clean hands & a pure heart,

Who hath not lifted up his feet into vanity

Or sworn deceitfully.

He shall receive the blessing from the del

And righteousness for the end of his habitation.

Therefore the parallelism is carried out more elaborately


even into single words. 2. 9. 4 1.


~~'Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly.'~~

That walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly.

His standeth in the way of righteousness,

His path is in the path of the righteous.





I. Simplicity in the choice of words. Like other qualities, this follows from propriety. Choice always the word of most propriety will make of the most clear to the person addressed & it will be the simplest. As a general rule take a person word in preference to another when it expresses or meaning with sufficient clearness. Here is the command of Bacon the reader? Consider philological study of English. Read the authors most distinguished for the pure reason of their style. Eng. (see ~~of S. Bacon's~~ ~~display~~ (Bacon on the style) & observe the reason very kind of simplicity & congruity of clearness in a style that is saturated. (I don't speak of prose or scientific works for prose or scientific men.) Milton. Johnson (in his dictionary, ~~retark~~ = anything related or connected with whatever between the points of interest.) See Johnson's paper in Spect. (165) on the introduction of French phrases into & phrases during the war. In contrast with those Engl. (see of style. Bacon's. Dryden's. Johnson's (the style) Johnson's style (esp. but also comes of his other poems. The style in his dream.) But to cultivate simplicity of language, as also to cultivate the simplicity of all kinds, nothing so valuable as the study of our early poetry, esp. our ballads.

* Cant. 2, 8-13. The power of my beloved! Behold the com-
 eth looking upon the mountains, shipping upon the hills; he looketh
 at the rivulets, showing himself through the lattice. My beloved speaketh
 and into me, Rise up, my love, my love, my love, my love, my love, the
 winter is past, the rain is over & gone, the flowers appear on the earth, the
 time of the singing of birds is come & the voice of the turtle is heard in our
 land. She sayeth unto him, Give me my own grape, & the vine with the leaves
 grapes give a good smell. Arise, my love, my love, my love, my love, my love
 arising.

Refer to


Collier took round like the pieces
which showed the dead in the back doors;
shot by some, denuded cartrip brought
back in his coat from "well a night",
Dug out horses from was also
to note upon the lady table
A murderer's house in gibbet arena,
then upon: long was undisturbed houses,
A thief now: cutted from a raker,
for? his back grasp his gold did gaper;

Five Tomahawks in "Blood Red: (next,
five specimens in "murder emerald",
A garden with a lake had chimney led,
A thick a further throat had mangled,
Whom his own son a "life length",
The young have still stuck to the logs;
The "man" a "horrible" & "after"
The son to name is? See in "Lange"?


Rule. Reception, when our case is being strong & there is but one strong
argt on our side, it is often advantageous & being it at once, & then
to address any extraordinary considerations w^{ch} may serve to confirm
the impression, always taking care that they don't destroy it. This
is esp. the case when there is nothing but the one strong argt. 2. g.
proof to remain.


IV. Peroration or Conclusion is of most essential importance.
It is often diseased, & ~~is~~ principally one of two sorts.
1. The whole speech depends upon the last impression w^{ch} is made.
In whatever way: you close, ~~the case~~ path to leave strength in
the minds of those you address, the impression you have been making
strong & convey through the whole discourse. The good way
is to sum up. Another to make the last strongest speech. And
the great rule is to close at the Right moment, neither too soon nor too
late. This peculiarly worthy of consideration by extempore speakers.
The Right manner.

There over the absolutely essential requisites of composition. The
great art of perspicuity & clearness.
Now proceed to indicate certain laws w^{ch} may be deduced from
the former law on conditions of great composition. And the first
& 2^d notice is that of simplicity, in another part of Great oratoriness.
Simplicity.
The quality & the considered a reference
to all the different elements of a discourse: words, sentences,
members & entire construction



to be met with at the bar. But in *Remond* also (very helpfully introduced. See
Roberts v. Roberts or *Roberts' Worsling*, I. 41 (n III. 322-324). In cases where
 the narration is introduced this can ought to be & present the facts as they
 really happened, stripped of any *invention* or *embellishment* which may have been
 put upon them or any *invention* or *embellishment* which naturally arises in
 coming them. By this means when the question discussed is one of facts
 or the truth & be explained in the account of the material events that
 it may be first and clearly by their narration, then the narrator is free
 nearly an enforcement of the proposition maintained. In like
 manner when the explanation does not take the form of a *narration*,
 all the considerations which are advanced, all the illustrations
 which are employed become necessarily an enforcement of our
 position. Now you may feel inclined to ask whether there are any
 rules by which you may be guided in the part of a discourse, ~~or~~ not
 have been suggested with regard to the *exposition* & the *direction*
 of general rules at least there is, worthy of being observed; but before
 stating it I may mention that the part of a discourse has by some
 been separated into three parts, viz. *narration*, *exposition*, *argument*.
 There are certainly four distinct elements to be
 taken to constitute the part of a discourse, but they cannot be sep-
 arated in reality; & the general rule is of an absurd & false
 nature & then all alike. Young's rules are only under the
 name of *exposition* and *argument* but they are, but the only one of
 have ever used or a part has been able to remember in the following
 that the discourse is of always *exposition* & *argument* & *exposition* parts
 of *exposition* & *argument* or *exposition* parts.





Conspicuous

the arrangement of discourse. The one great

is to guide you in the law of propriety. Every one must be a man of ordinary of

the individual word should be chosen, and be arranged in its relative

position to the other, and be in a sentence, & all the sentences & paragraphs

should be arranged in reference to each other, & the whole work with a

view of propriety. Now as regards the conduct in reference to

clauses, phrases & paragraphs, sentences, & minor parts of

a discourse, so these parts in reference to whole. Attention to

elaborate in their direction of these parts, the following is essential:

1. Subject, 2. Statement & division of subject, 3. Explanations &

inference, 4. End.

I. Subject. Much to be considered, i.e. you must consider the

ground, how the subject is to be introduced. You may have a general

exordium, you may begin simply, such as once in a while, see; but in

practice you must. Subject, nearly the manner in which a subject is put

of all. You refer to learners or readers. You may in this to lay

of subject before them in such a way that they may understand & receive it,

if that be introduced in such a manner as may be best fitted for it

imposed favorably, & everything else be arranged with a view to produce an

effective impression. This is not a difficult when subject is known or

known or reader is often intelligent or already conversant. But to put

it all (regard to the subject). (Beginner & learner in infernal

infernal. Part of them, see to Eng. version, see of them,

of person that in all things go on to acquire them. Part on a

you find it the most rationally part of all his pieces. The two

then made a blunder at the object? Part of the original.

'In all things of person you have Religion

Δ 1618 x 1407 2672001.

17.

It is a case of sentences which necessary, as in case of an entire work the general
rule is that it sh^d be a unity. As - (isolated) the 'in some respects not so) 'Hera' of
the opening of 'The Doctor' which after look by instructions going too far back. 'Hera'.
See notes Hist. of New York? 'See nothing' 'Stomach' as in text. 'Hera' }
See genuine hollow fragments order at no: } 146-7.
See notes

3 of ditto, pp. 143 & 144.

* Cf. Modern Engl. Lit.: St. Albans & Oxford, pp. 151-153.

* See Prof. Wilson's pamphlet, p. 75. 'In regard to many of the statements of the English school paper, given in to the Committee on the 23^d of June, carried away without a single objection, & returned of their red ink, & first seen by me on the 30th July, & not contained in his copy, of the first of which I have no copy, & the Committee have declined to give me one, & much leave them to embark in the continuation of the well conducted students, with this caveat that if the Committee had themselves believed them, & still believe them, notwithstanding my flat denials, they have dealt very leniently with me, since they have assumed the power of judgment upon the case at all, & not declaring at once & without reservation, what seems to me to be the tendency of their remarks, that of an attorney useful for the office of a bell.'

* except the two general, near the isolated rule, that each sentence has a unity in itself, given a complete italic (like a sentence) so that a sentence (i.e. period given) in the text is embodied in each word & each clause, so in each sentence of a sentence also in each larger division of a work.
 * & the same person will change the length of his sentences according to the nature of his subject & aim.

The word through all the changes by which it has been modified in its history
 the you get at the change with which its history began, i.e. the fact or facts
 (to evolve) which it has first employed to denote. Take you at times you
 arranged by its primary use back as continually to the etymology of words
 to determine its meaning with its various
 needed for the present use; but of course, the more you reflect on
 it, you will only draw me of you most valuable requirements of you
 have obtained the habit of thus carefully analyzing or word before
 you use them & of employing them only with the accurate connection
 of their meaning with you others. Besides the
 independent interest & importance of philology, comparative philology
 in relation to comparative ethnology, mythology & physiology; 2. philology
 as a means of understanding all that, in man & its events. of speech.

3. How rhyme = sources of arrangement of words (to be
) What a sentence? Remember this: containing a no. of simple
 thoughts. If you have two clauses are phrases, or many have subordinate
 phrases under them, & words are subordinate. The first step in the process
 of learning being the analysis, the parts of a sentence are taught first.
 The old Roman letter, ~~but the letter~~ & arrange them so as to
 make them the exposure of something, when words (orthography) be
 & arrange words to clauses or sentences. As in the process of writing

X like comparative (of words) of arrangement of words generally, of individual
 words into clauses, of clauses into a sentence, of chapters into a book,
 of paragraphs into a section, of sections into a chapter, of chapters into a book,
 of books into a complete work. Usually however limited to arrangement
 words into sentences. X etc.

3. Review of contents.

of pronunciation, the
then have other than made & mad: making noise & emit: hold the tongue
(then each is a holding) the same meaning he behind to get it wagging.
Consider the significance of silence: it is sometimes, never by accident.
ing to be remarked; unperceptibly profitable to the learner that
elastic link when the own part runs to waste, & confused (read
dislocation & whisper: out of place comes the strength. "Speak is power,
silence is golden; speech is human, silence is divine." "Comp. 3, 66.

II. (Learner of word or language. His "self" being clear,
the medium through it is revealed and also be clear. Words in themselves
it is then arrangement or luminance, as transparent as to let the light
shine through without being seen themselves. ~~What is the~~
~~to look in the of the process of language & grammar~~

Do you hesitate to go back to the elementary ~~and~~ sciences as if it were
a (stage) movement in or studies? Or not, if necessary, from
of the rules of grammar will come when you with a new force long
after you have met the most complete culture in composition. So
in with the being of a higher stage in any department of or studies is
valuable why so making you to look with a note & power (vision
at the stage already past. Grammar divided into 4 sub-stages

sciences: 1. Orthography; 2. Etymology; 3. Syntax; 4. Prosody (poetry &
with feeling as science of rhythm in general).

1. Orthography: basis of arrangement of letters in words
= correct writing = spelling. So it is much of a schoolboy's task
to require the attention of grammar? Heated understander.

2. Etymology = Science of the reality (to etymology) subjoined
in & explained by words. Method of etymological sciences & bases

5

x "Let your silence be great, or speak only what is necessary," *In four words:*
ἤσυχον τὸ μὲν εἶναι, ἢ ἡσυχίᾳ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ εἰ δὲ ἄλλω (Speck,
Zuch., 33)

Notes on Aristotle

First Requisite of all - uttering oneself in perspicuity. In order
to this 2 conditions must be fulfilled:

1. Clearness of thought.
2. Clearness of words.

I. Of the first I say nothing in particular at present. Will be considered

under Logic. I may only say in general that the chief condition of clearness in
thought is that only I should have in general that clearness of thought is essential
to command you at the same time in general that clearness of thought is essential
to command you at the same time in general that clearness of thought is essential

of clearness of thought is to aim at ~~of~~ accuracy in thought. Now all physics
you have been taught, in the case of accuracy in thought. The method: at present
have ascertained to be the ~~best~~ method of pursuing physics must be the
method of cultivating clearness of thought. Total: that method? A con:


distinction of analysis & synthesis. In physics: clearness of thought in any subject
you must first analyze it into its details in order to seek comprehension & clarity
as a whole. Thus understand importance of the communication to which

is a plan of teaching a subject before you commence. Ask of it, what further
does this imply? It implies that you ~~the thing~~ not a subject that is not to
merely measure to enable you to write on it, but that you should never think

and a subject becomes you not to write on it, but that in every case in which
you write you should write only what you have & only because you have that in the
subject thoroughly understood. Of course this remark is made only with regard:

and they writing for the purpose for it alone all writing what he understands
taken, the communication of truth to others. This case not considered: 1. The:

desired resources, though, to avoid the danger of writing to think out a subject
merely to be able to write on it, I have allowed you to choose your subject:



Handwritten notes in the left margin, including the word "Liber" and other illegible characters.

