



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1851

OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF

AND

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF

EDWARD BUCHANAN
D.D. in the year 1851
LONDON: Printed by
The University



A N A L Y S I S

O F

Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy.



I N T R O D U C T I O N.

I.

SCIENCE may be considered either as it is an attainment of the mind; as it refers to a particular subject; or as it tends to a particular object or end.

Considered as an attainment of the mind, Science is distinguished from History and Art.

History is the knowledge of particulars in detail.

Science is the knowledge of general principles.

Art is a power founded on knowledge or habit, by which men perform certain functions of mind, or operate on some external subject.

2.

Science considered with a view to its subject, is either Abstract or Applicate.

Abstract Science refers to the proceedings of reason on the mere suppositions of *entity*, *quantity*, or *number*; as in *Metaphysics*, *Geometry*, and *Arithmetic*.

Applicate Science refers to some particular subject; as, *Mind*, or *Matter*; *Understanding*, or *Sentiment*; *Bodies*, *hard*, *soft*, or *elastic*.

The applicate Sciences may be divided into two capital branches. That which refers to the Material System, and that which refers to the Intellectual.

3.

Science considered with a view to its object is of two kinds; Physical, and Moral.

Physical Science is the knowledge of what is.

Moral Science is the knowledge of what ought to be*.

A principle in Physical Science is some known fact, serving to account for a variety of appearances, considered as its effects or consequences.

A principle in Moral Science is some perception of good or evil, serving to direct the choice in a variety of instances.

The general expression of a principle constitutes a law in physics or morality.

A Law, in the Physical sense, is any general expression of what is.

In the Moral sense it is an expression of what ought to be.

* The terms *ought to be* are relative to human apprehension.

The same subject may be treated
Morally or Physically.

Human Nature treated Physically is
in part the subject of Pneumatics.

Treated Morally is the subject of
Moral Philosophy.

OF PNEUMATICS.

PNEUMATICS, consisting of two parts, treat physically of Mind or Spirit.

The first part treats of the Human Mind.

The second of the Being and Attributes of GOD.

Human Nature is Animal and Intellectual.

The Animal nature of man is the subject of Anatomy and Physiology. The Intellectual nature is the proper subject of Pneumatics: but being joined, many of their functions are mixed, and pertain equally to Pneumatics and to Physiology.

PART I.
OF HUMAN NATURE.

CHAPTER I.

The History of the SPECIES.

I.

MANKIND have some qualities in common with the other animals; some that distinguish them; and others by which they are themselves diversified.

2.

Like the other animals, they are generated and nourished, they have their period of life, and are subject to dissolution.

3.

Half the numbers that are born die, according to some observations, before the seventh year is expired; according to others, before the third.

Long life consists of between seventy and one hundred years.

It appears from the annual register of deaths, where the numbers of people are known, that one of thirty-two dies in each year.

The infancy of man, or his state of dependence on the parent, continues longer, and his instincts are more fallible than they are in the young of any other species.

When adult, he supplies many apparent defects from invention.

His ingenuity enables him to subsist in a variety of situations and climates.

He is an animal of prey; associating and political; and has a superiority over every other species.

He is qualified to discourse, and com-

communicates his meaning by a variety of fixed and arbitrary signs.

He distinguishes characters by epithets of praise or blame. He loves or hates, he admires or contemns.

The species separates into bands and companies; but the individual, freedom from choice, is found to subsist alone.

4.

Varieties in human nature are either such as distinguish different races of men, different ages of the same race, or individuals of the same race and age.

Races are distinguished by their features, stature, complexion, dispositions, and faculties.

They are reducible to six :

The European, the Samoiede, the Tartar, the Indian, the Negro, and the American *.

* Some diversities of the race appear to be connected with situation and climate.

5.

Different ages of the same race are distinguished by the unequal possession of commercial, literary, and political arts.

Ages are said to be savage, barbarous, or polished.

During the first, men live on terms of equality, without property or government.

During the second, they are distinguished by inequalities of birth and fortune, associate in tribes, and follow their leaders.

During the third, they find additional grounds of distinction, in a diversity of education, profession, and manner of life. They are governed by magistrates, hereditary or elective, under the direction of laws and established forms.

6.

Individuals of the same race are distinguished by a difference of aspect, capacity, disposition, and force.

These varieties qualify members of the same society for different stations, and render subordination consistent with natural equality.

7.

Every state in which man can employ his talents, and follow his dispositions, is a state of nature.

C H A P. II.

Of the History of the INDIVIDUAL.

SECTION I.

Of the UNDERSTANDING.

THE Individual is conscious of his personal identity, in the performance of many functions, either merely animal, intellectual, or mixed.

Consciousness is a principal attribute of mind; and is that by which it may be said to exist for itself.

Merely animal functions are those in which bodily organs and mere animal powers are exerted; as, digestion, circulation, &c.

Intellectual functions are such as cannot be referred to any bodily organ; as thought, judgement, and desire.

Mixed functions are the proceedings of mind referred to bodily organs ; as, sensation, and appetite.

2.

The mixed or intellectual functions of this active being, however otherwise distinguished, terminate in either of two ends ; the discovery of truth, or the attainment of good.

Truth is the relation of our belief or opinion to the reality of things.

Good is a quality of sentiment, and can exist only in a sentient nature.

Truth is the object of understanding. Good is the object of will.

3.

Understanding includes observation, memory, imagination, arrangement, and foresight.

Observation is that proceeding of the mind by which we collect facts.

Facts

Facts relate to the existing qualities and operations of different natures.

Observation terminates in history, or the knowledge of particulars in detail.

History is either descriptive or narrative.

Descriptive history is the detail of co-existent circumstances and qualities.

Narrative history is the detail of successive events.

We are determined by a law of our nature to believe facts to which we ourselves are witnesses, or to which we have the credible testimony of others.

4.

Memory is that proceeding of mind in which subjects past are recalled.

Its operations are either casual or intentional.

Memory is casual when objects suggest each other in some order they hold, independent of choice or intention.

Memory is intentional when the mind from design recollects any object.

5.

Imagination is the stating objects as present under a sense of their absence, or as real under a sense of their being fictitious.

Design, invention, description, and passion, or desire, depend on imagination.

6.

Arrangement is the disposing of facts agreeably to the connection or relation they have in nature.

The principal articles of relation are those of similitude, contiguity, cause and effect.

From the relation of similitude, objects in descriptive history are classed into *genera* and *species*.

From that of contiguity of time or place they are ranged in narration.

From

From that of cause and effect they are connected in theory.

Theory is the arrangement of separate appearances under some common principle.

System is the combination of theories for mutual illustration and support.

Science consists in just theory and system.

7.

Fore-sight is the faculty of conjecturing what is to follow from the past or the present.

It requires penetration and sagacity; penetration to comprehend the circumstances of any particular case, and sagacity to perceive what is likely to follow from those circumstances.

Penetration and sagacity are the foundations of art and skill.

S E C T. II.

Of the W I L L.

T H E will includes Sentiment, Inclination, and Volition.

I.

Sentiment is the perception and the enjoyment of Good, or the perception and the suffering of Ill.

The object of Sentiment is that to which it is referred as to its Cause.

Thus Provocation is the object of Anger, and Danger of Fear.

Objects are said to be good or evil on account of their connection with Sentiment.

This connection is in a great measure arbitrary.

One person is calm under a provocation by which another is enraged; or fearless in danger by which another is terrified.

There

There are four kinds of enjoyment or suffering; *viz.*

1. Sensations of Pleasure or Pain.
2. Approbation or Dislike.
3. Affection or Hatred.
4. Exercise or Languor.

The first pertains to our Animal and Sensitive being.

The others to our Intellectual and Active nature.

Sensations are pleasant or painful apart from our knowledge of their cause; as in the case of flavours, odours, &c.

Judgements of approbation or dislike are pleasant or painful from a knowledge and discernment of their object; as in distinguishing what is beautiful or deformed, great or mean.

Affection is pleasant by the delight it borrows from the welfare or good of its object; as in Friendship and Love.

Hatred is the reverse.

Exercises are pleasant or painful, in being more or less fitted to our capacity and dispositions.

Inclination is a disposition of our nature to act.

Every inclination may be considered, either in respect to itself, to its end, or to its object.

In respect to itself, Inclination is of three kinds.

1. A propensity; 2. A desire; or,
3. A mixture of both.

A Propensity is an original or acquired disposition of our nature, operating independent of reflection or design.

Desire is the intentional act of the mind, directed by the apprehension of a supposed good.

Nature and habit give propensities; information or fancy may excite desire.

Propensities, after experience of their gratification, partake in the nature of Desire; and Desires, by habit, partake in the nature of Propensities.

The subject of Inclination is the end or supposed good to which it refers;

as, when we desire *Animal Enjoyments, Intellectual Talents, or Moral Qualities.*

The object of Inclination is the person to whose enjoyment the supposed good is referred; as in the case of advantages desired for ourselves or others.

In this respect inclinations are selfish or benevolent.

The mind is differently affected by passion as the subject of inclination is differently situated.

Passions are of four principal kinds :

Joy and Grief;

Hope and Fear.

A good obtained is matter of Joy; missed, is a subject of Grief. A favourable prospect is the foundation of Hope; the reverse is the foundation of Fear.

Passion is greatly diversified in the case of different subjects and objects.

The joy or hope of the interested and selfish tend to Insolence or Vanity; his grief and fear to Dejection and
 Cowardice;

Cowardice; and in case of competition with his fellow-creatures, to Envy, Malice, and Jealousy.

The joy and hope of the benevolent are candid and just; his grief or fear are mixed with satisfaction, or lose their effect in the ardour of his principal disposition.

A right use of the understanding, and good intentions, being always equally in our reach, Moral Qualities may be studied without any variety of passion. But they who commit themselves to the direction of casual opinions are subject to a variety of passion on this subject. Their joys and hopes are Self-approbation and Confidence; their griefs and fears are Shame, Indignation, and Remorse.

3.

Volition is the determination of the mind to follow an Inclination.

Volition founded on sentiment and inclination constitutes an Action.

Every

Every Action has a motive. Every Voluntary Action is free. Every Free Action is an indication of character.

It is a privilege of the mind to contemplate itself; to chuse among its inclinations and sentiments; to suppress what is evil, and cultivate what is good.

C H A P. III.

GENERAL INFERENCES.

I.

CAPACITY and parts refer to the Understanding; ardour and force to the Heart; both united constitute a natural superiority of character.

Vehement inclinations are the source of activity and steadiness; but extreme passion of hope or fear, joy or grief, interrupt or misguide our conduct.

2.

The properties of mind have no analogy to those of matter.

They present existences of a different and opposite nature.

Divisibility is implied in every conception of matter :

Indivisibility in every sense mind has of itself.

What are called faculties of mind accordingly are not distinct parts of a complicated nature, but separate names given to different acts of the same being.

3.

Annihilation is unknown in the order of nature ; and mind, not being subject to a dissolution of parts, is physically immortal.

P A R T II.

Of the BEING and ATTRIBUTES
of G O D.

C H A P. I.

Of the Existence of G O D.

WE believe the existence of mind, as we do that of matter, in consequence of certain appearances with which that belief is connected in the frame of our nature.

To form an argument in proof of the existence of mind, is to collect such appearances.

The appearances, when known or observed, are always connected with belief.

The actions and conduct of men make known their intentions and characters.

The order and proceedings of nature make known the existence and attributes of God.

C H A P. II.

*Of the Attributes and Government
of G O D.*

THE attributes of God may be expressed in the terms, Power, Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice.

By his power all effects are produced; by his wisdom, his goodness, and his justice, they are infallibly directed to the best ends.

The belief of the existence of God is founded on the appearances of providence, and implies the belief of his government.

As the Material World is governed by the intervention of physical instruments, to which we give the names of *Gravitation, Cohesion, Elasticity, &c.* The Intellectual World is governed by moral inducements, sensations of pleasure or pain, judgements of approbation or dislike, affections of love or of hatred.

C H A P. III.

GENERAL INFERENCES.

I.

MAN being inclined to admire, to love, and obey proper objects, it follows that religion is natural.

The expressions of religion are fixed or arbitrary.

Its fixed expressions are those actions which concur with the providence of God in promoting the good of his creatures.

Its arbitrary expressions are the different ceremonies, and institutional observances, by which like sentiments of veneration may be expressed in different ages or countries.

2.

Men are charged only with the care of chusing what is good, and of doing what is right.

Events are reserved to God.

3.

The beneficence and the justice of God appearing in the order of his present government, lead us to believe a future state of rewards and punishments.

MORAL

M O R A L

P H I L O S O P H Y .

I N T R O D U C T I O N .

MORAL PHILOSOPHY treats of
Good and Evil.

Any general expression of what is good is a law in Morality, and carries an obligation to determine the choice of any sentient and intellectual being to which it refers.

The laws of Morality, relatively to man, refer either to his Mind or to his External Condition and Conduct. And Moral Philosophy consists of two parts.

The first relates to the mind and happiness of Man.

The second to his external condition and conduct, or to the relations and duties of men in civil life.

P A R T I.

Of the MIND and HAPPINESS of
MAN.

C H A P. I.

Of P L E A S U R E.

GOOD, relatively to the human mind, is expressed in a variety of terms; such as, *Pleasure*, *Virtue*, and *Happiness*.

Pleasure is good, physically considered, without any reference to its kind, measure, or comparative importance.

The following are physical laws of our nature, relative to pleasure and pain.

1.

The use of things salutary and requisite to animal preservation, is pleasant; what is pernicious, is painful.

2.

The sense of any perfection is pleasant; of any defect, is painful.

3.

Affection is pleasant; Hatred is painful.

4.

Hope and Joy are pleasant; Grief and Fear are painful. But these passions, grafted on affection or hatred, partake greatly in the nature of the disposition from which they arise.

5.

5.

Exercise of the mind or body is pleasant.

6.

Habit, in some instances, can change the source of our pleasures or pains.

C H A P. II.

Of V I R T U E.

I.

VIRTUE is *good*, considered as the excellence of man's nature, and what renders him the object of esteem and of praise.

Man is by nature the member of a community. His love of that community renders him a good member of it, and intitles him to praise.

Virtue is that qualification of soul
which

which fits the individual to procure the good of mankind.

The requisites to virtue are, Disposition, Skill, Application, and Force.

Hence Virtue has been divided into four branches, corresponding to the number of these requisites; *viz.*

Justice, Prudence,
Temperance, and Fortitude.

Justice is a disposition of the mind favourable to the rights and welfare of mankind.

Prudence is the skill and sagacity with which men chuse their ends, and the proper means to obtain them.

Temperance is the power to abstain from the pursuit of enjoyments that recal from the more important engagements of human life.

Fortitude is the power to withstand opposition, difficulty, and danger.

2.

Virtue is approved of from a principle of regard to mankind; or from

an

an original disposition of our nature, leading us to place our excellence in qualifications proper to a social and active being.

This principle has, by men of speculation, been differently named, and differently classed, with the proceedings of the understanding, or with those of the heart. In common language it is termed *Reason*, or *Conscience*.

C H A P. III.

Of H A P P I N E S S.

HAPPINESS, whether denominated by the names of *Pleasure*, or of *Virtue*, is to every sentient being his state of least suffering and greatest enjoyment.

Of necessary pains the least is to be chosen; and of incompatible pleasures, the greatest.

Continual fear is a greater pain than
any

any misfortune. Courage therefore is a principal requisite to happiness.

The pleasures of sense are mean and transient, compared to those of affection and of conduct.

It is happiness to be free from fear and disgust, from envy and jealousy; to entertain the best affections, Humanity, Friendship, and Love; that is, to be engaged in the pursuit of the best object, the good of mankind.

The excellence of man, his greatest pleasure, and his happiness, are the same.

The choice of names, of however little apparent effect in philosophy, leads sometimes to the most important consequences.

The sects that expressed happiness under the name of *Pleasure*, were led to prefer ease, animal enjoyment, and sloth.

They who expressed it by the name of *Virtue*, preferred activity, courage, and the higher enjoyments of the heart.

The

The enjoyments of the voluptuous terminate in sensuality, because attention to mere pleasure, if not defeated by temper, precludes admiration, affection, and exertion of mind.

Sensuality terminates in languor and sloth.

Where pleasures of the mind and the heart are most sensibly felt, the external marks of enjoyment are, Activity, Beneficence, and Courage.

P A R T II.

Of the laws of Morality relative-
ly to EXTERNAL CONDITIONS
and CONDUCT.

GENERAL DIVISION.

EXTERNAL condition and conduct
have a reference to individuals, or
to collective bodies.

The condition and conduct of indi-
viduals are the subjects of Ethics.

The condition and conduct of col-
lective bodies are the subjects of Poli-
tics.

C H A P. I.

Of E T H I C S.

ETHICS consist of two parts; Casuist-
ry, and Jurisprudence.

D

SECT.

SECT. I.

Of CASUISTRY.

1.

CASUISTRY treats of the stations, manners, and duties of men.

2.

Under the head of station are included fortune and rank.

Fortune implies property; and refers to the unequal measure of things, tending to animal enjoyment and safety.

The uses of fortune are subsistence and beneficence. Unequal fortune may be equally well or ill employed; and is connected with happiness or misery, so far as it gives occasion to conduct, and is the subject of opinion and fancy.

Rank is the station of the individual relatively to other men.

A rank is constituted by fortune, birth, and character.

Fortune derives rank from the opinion and dependence of others.

Birth derives rank from the lustre of ancestors.

Character is the ground of estimation, and may raise or sink men to the rank in which they are qualified to act.

Good conduct and happiness are not peculiar to any station.

3.

Manners are the external expression of a character that subsists in the mind and the heart.

Like other external signs of disposition and meaning, manners have either an arbitrary or a natural connection with the disposition signified.

Manners of the first kind depend merely on custom; and fluctuate, like language, or any other arbitrary institution.

Manners of the second kind are such appearances and conduct as men of certain dispositions naturally assume.

Manners founded in nature are sometimes varied by custom, infomuch that different nations or ages require a different aspect, carriage, and conduct, in expreffion of the fame difpofition.

A conduct tending to the good of mankind is invariably right, independent of opinion or custom.

Even in cafe of arbitrary manners, we are bound, when the good of mankind will permit, to obferve thofe of our country, as we fpeak its language, or wear its drefs.

4.

Duties may be confidered as terminating either in the perfon acting, and are decent or proper; or as having influence on others, and are beneficent or innocent.

Decency of conduct is its agreeablenefs to the opinion of others.

Propriety of conduct is its fuitable- nefs to our nature, ftation, and fortune.

Innocence is the consistency of our conduct with the welfare of others.

Beneficence is its tendency to promote that welfare.

The establishment of general rules relating to duties is a principal object of casuistry. But the best directory in human life is the disposition from which those duties proceed.

S E C T. II.

Of JURISPRUDENCE.

I.

JURISPRUDENCE treats of the conduct of men in its reference to the rights of others.

It consists of two parts. The first relates to the manner in which the rights of men are constituted.

The second, to the manner in which those rights may be vindicated.

2.

The apprehension of a right is founded in the desire of every sensitive being to preserve and to defend himself.

The rights of men are constituted either in the person or in things, and are said to be personal or real.

Personal rights include safety, freedom, and the use of talents.

Real rights include commonity, possession, property, and service.

Rights are constituted by the original appointment of nature, or the subsequent proceedings of men; and are original or adventitious.

Safety, freedom, the use of talents, possession, and commonity, are original rights.

Property and service are adventitious.

3.

Property is an exclusive right to the use of things.

Of things, some are not subjects of property; others pertain to communities; and others to individuals.

4.

Service is a right to the aid and attendance of others.

5.

Adventitious rights arise from contract, occupancy, labour, or forfeiture.

Contracts are constituted by promise and acceptance.

Contracts are binding, because to raise and to frustrate an expectation is an injury.

They do not bind in favour of a party that has failed on his part, or in case of a condition that has not taken place.

They are rendered void by the exceptions of force, fraud, or injustice.

Occupancy consists in the prior and continued use of a subject.

Forfeiture refers to a right acquired in reparation of a damage sustained.

6.

Property may be acquired by occupancy and labour. It may be transferred by contract or forfeiture.

The will of a deceased proprietor does not convey a right of property.

A right to service is acquired by contract or forfeiture.

No right to service can amount to property in the person of the servant: slavery therefore has no foundation in justice.

7.

The rights of men may be maintained by persuasion, stratagem, or force.

Parties may act either as principals or auxiliaries in maintaining a right.

Stratagem and force are lawful:

1st, Where parties have not stipulated, as in civil society, to submit their differences.

2^{dly}, Where an aid stipulated cannot be obtained.

3^{dly}, Where milder methods actually have failed, or are not likely to succeed.

8.

The condition in which parties are reduced

reduced to the use of stratagem and force, is the state of war.

The laws of war are,

1. A wrong apprehended may be prevented by stratagem or force.

2. An assault may be repelled.

3. A damage sustained gives a right to reparation.

4. Reparation is in justice proportioned to the damage sustained.

C H A P. II.

Of P O L I T I C S.

GENERAL DIVISION.

POLITICS treat of nations and collective bodies.

A nation is any company or society of men acting by concert, or under a common direction.

The united force and direction of numbers is termed *the State*.

States.

States may be considered with a view to their resources, or to their form.

The first is the subject of public œconomy.

The second, of government.

S E C T. I.

Of PUBLIC OECONOMY.

I.

PUBLIC OECONOMY refers to national wealth and revenue.

Nations are rich by possessing in abundance the means of subsistence, or what may be exchanged for such means.

Riches depend on the possession of lands, materials, industry, skill, and numbers of people.

2.

Nations acquire land or territory by conquest, casual coalitions, or colonies.

3.

They discover materials by continued observation and trials.

4.

They become industrious by a habit grafted on the sense of utility and safety.

5.

They become skilful by continued application, and by subdividing arts and professions.

Commerce being the exchange of commodities, is necessary to the subdivision of arts.

Commerce consists of barter, or of purchase and sale.

Purchase and sale requires a mode of valuation, and the use of money.

Money is a commodity of universal demand, taken in exchange for any other commodity.

Money in coin is this commodity divided into parts of a fixed quantity, and received in tale on the faith of a stamp applied by the public.

The most convenient commodities for the purposes of coin are the precious metals.

Bills are obligations to pay a specified value in money.

Commerce may redound to the profit of all parties concerned, by enabling each to improve his peculiar material, or to pursue his peculiar art.

That party gains most by commerce who receives the more useful commodity, and who, to carry on his trade, is employed in the more healthy and least corrupting occupations.

6.

Nations become populous in proportion to the means of subsistence they offer and secure to their people.

7.

7.

Wealth in the possession of individuals is a national or public resource.

That part of the wealth of individuals which is exacted for national purposes is the public revenue.

Revenue may be proportioned to the numbers, wealth, and frugality, of a people.

It is levied by taxes.

Taxes are of four kinds.

Capitation, Assessment, Customs, and Excise.

Capitation is a tax imposed on every individual, and falls equally on the poor and the rich.

Assessments are proportioned to the supposed stock in land, money, or goods.

Customs are a tax on goods in commerce.

Excise is a tax on consumption.

Customs may be so levied as to direct or to limit commerce.

Excise has a tendency to limit consumption, and affects either the quantity or the quality of goods consumed.

8.

National force is proportioned to the resources, discipline, and character of a people.

S E C T. II.

O F G O V E R N M E N T.

I.

G O V E R N M E N T is founded on subordination.

Subordination is the relation in which men acting as a body are placed to each other.

It is either casual or institutional.

2.

Casual subordination is the mere distribution of rank, founded on *Fortune*, *Character*, and *Birth*.

3.

Institutional subordination is the actual distribution of power.

Power is any part of the force of the state, committed to the direction of certain persons, for the performance of some public function.

Persons intrusted with public functions are termed *Magistrates*.

Whoever is intrusted to perform, or to delegate every function of the state, is the sovereign, or supreme magistrate.

Public functions are of three kinds.

Legislation, *Jurisdiction*, and *Execution*.

4.

Legislation is the expressing of the will of the state, for the future direction of its members.

Laws are either adopted from custom, or enacted by statute.

They refer either to the mode of subordination, to civil rights, or to the suppression of crimes; and are said to be *Political*, *Civil*, or *Criminal*.

Political laws define the relative rights of magistrate and subject.

Civil laws define the relative rights of private parties.

Criminal laws direct the proceedings of the magistrate in suppressing crimes.

5.

Jurisdiction is the interpretation of the will of the state, and its application to particular cases.

6.

Execution is the actual application of the public force, to defend the state, or give effect to its laws.

Execution, relatively to the first object, should be directed by the law of nations;

nations; relatively to the second, by the municipal law of the country.

7.

The result of wise legislation, jurisdiction, and execution, is Public Liberty.

Liberty is the security of rights.

A constitution is said to be free, when its forms are calculated to preserve the rights of the subject.

Subjects are said to be free, when they actually enjoy those rights.

8.

The form of government is constituted by the manner in which the sovereignty is exercised, by one, by select numbers, or by the collective body.

The title of a sovereign to rule is founded either in compact, or in that right which all parties have to do good to the utmost extent of their power.

Governments are either *Simple* or *Mixed*.

Simple governments are those under which sovereignty is exercised by or in the name of some single power.

They are of three kinds; *Republic*, *Monarchy*, and *Despotism*.

In republics the sovereign power is exercised by numbers.

1st, By the collective body, as in democracy. Here men act on maxims of equality, and the state is supported by the disinterested zeal of its members.

2dly, By a particular order, or select number, as in aristocracy: Men are distinguished into two classes, and the state is supported by the steadiness and moderation of the superior order.

Monarchy is that in which a single person exercises the sovereignty according to fixed laws and institutions.

There is a continued gradation of ranks; and the state is supported by
the

the regard of individuals for the maxims and honours of their station.

Despotism is that in which a single person governs by force, without any law or limitation. Subjects are held to be equal, except so far as the sovereign is pleased to distinguish them by his temporary will. The state is supported by the fear of punishment.

10.

Mixed governments are those in which the sovereignty is exercised in parts by a plurality of collateral powers, as *King, Nobles, and People*.

Men are separated into different orders and classes; and the state is supported by the balance of opposite interests and principles.

F I N I S.

