

AN  
ANSWER  
TO  
A LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
THE EARL OF B...

LONDON, 1761







13. Answer

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A N  
A N S W E R  
T O

A Letter to the Right Honourable

The EARL of B\*\*\*\*,

In which the false Reasoning, and absurd  
Conclusions, in that Pamphlet, are fully  
detected and refuted: Addressed to

The Right Hon. EARL T—MPLE.

---

*quærens illidere dentem*  
Offendet solido: *\_\_\_\_\_*

*ridentem dicere verum*  
Quid vetat? *\_\_\_\_\_* HOR.

---

L O N D O N:  
Printed for J. WILKIE, in St. Paul's Church-  
Yard. 1761.

(147)

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THE  
ANNALS  
OF  
THE  
REVOLUTIONARY  
WAR

BY  
THE  
REV. JOHN  
MURRAY  
D.D.  
OF  
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,  
CAMBRIDGE

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY  
RICHARD CLAY AND COMPANY,  
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

1911

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TO THE  
RIGHT HONOURABLE  
EARL T—MPLE.

My LORD,

**I** HAVE taken the Liberty of  
addressing the following Pages  
to your Lordship, not because  
you are a Friend of Mr. P.'s, and,  
on that Account, may be supposed  
to lend a more willing Ear to any  
Thing that is urged in his De-  
fence; for, I believe, your Lord-  
ship has such a Regard for Truth,  
that, did you really think the Con-  
duct of that Gentleman indefensi-  
ble, you would not even wish to



DEDICATION.

see it defended: But I have addressed them to your Lordship, because, being intimately connected with Mr. P. and privy to all his Measures, you must, of course, be the most competent Judge of whatever is advanced, either in Support or Diminution of his Character.

I have the Honour to be,

My LORD,

*Your Lordship's most obedient,*

*And most humble Servant.*



A N

A N S W E R, &c.

**S**HOULD an able and skilful pilot, after having steered a ship through many storms and tempests, and almost conducted her safely to her wished-for harbour, be removed from the helm; and should any one of the passengers, in order to prevent this pilot from being restored to his former station, endeavour to convince the rest, that the merit of guiding the ship was not due to him, it is certainly the duty and interest of every man on board, to attend to the arguments advanced by this passenger, that, if they are just, he

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may



may acquiesce in the measure that has been taken; and, if false, he may employ every justifiable method for recommitting the helm to that hand, which had so long ruled it with such signal success.

Such, and such only, is the motive that induced the writer of the following sheets, to make some animadversions on a pamphlet lately published, entitled, "A Letter to the right honourable the Earl of B\*\*\*," in which the author, (who seems to be a gentleman of learning and abilities, and therefore the more dangerous an advocate in a bad cause) endeavours to diminish the merit of a late great minister, and to rob him of the glory of those important conquests, which distinguished his administration.

He indeed pretends to say, that truth is the only scope of his enquiry; but as all truths (mathematical alone excepted) are of a doubtful nature, he must excuse  
me,



me, if I happen to differ from him in opinion, and think that truth does not always lie on his side of the question.

He further declares, that one of his chief intentions was, to preserve that spirit of concord and unanimity, which hath so happily prevailed in the nation, ever since the accession of his present majesty to the throne, and to prevent those heats and animosities, which may probably succeed the resignation of the great minister he endeavours to decry. I am as great a lover of peace and concord, and as great an enemy to feuds and animosities, as he can possibly be; but, I hope, I shall neither be accused of destroying the former, nor exciting the latter, by vindicating the conduct of Mr. P. from those invidious reflections, which he has thought proper to throw upon it.

If he means that we ought not to find fault with any measures of the present



ministry (for, as it is a maxim in the English constitution, that the king can do no wrong, we cannot possibly find fault with any measure of his majesty) he expects such a blind and implicit obedience, as free-born Britons were never accustomed to pay, and, I trust, never will be accustomed to pay to any ministry whatever.

Indeed, had his majesty removed Mr. P. from the post of S--- of S---te, and declared his fixt resolution never to employ him for the future, perhaps a regard to public peace and harmony, might have induced many people to acquiesce tacitly in the measure; though even that is a stretch of complaisance, which the nation has not been always disposed to shew, and which, particularly, it did not shew, when the same right honourable gentleman was, some years ago, turned out of office. In this case, an attempt to reconcile the minds of the people to the measures of the  
govern-



government, by depreciating the merit of the displaced minister, might be deemed the more excusable: the unjustness of the means, according to the old jesuitical maxim, might be supposed to be justified, or, at least, palliated by the goodness of the end.

But as that is not the case; as the right honourable gentleman resigned voluntarily, and as we have reason to think that his majesty received his resignation, rather with reluctance than otherwise, and with such a mark of his royal favour, as contains a strong approbation of his past conduct, and makes it presumable that he has no objection against employing his services on future occasions; an endeavour to lessen his character, by destroying that well-founded popularity, which he has hitherto maintained with the nation, and that trust and confidence, which he has always possessed with his sovereign, is not only an injury done to Mr. P.

it



it is an injury to the public in general; and, as such, deserves the animadversion of every sincere lover of his country.

It is owing to this consideration, and this alone, that the public are troubled with the following reflexions, which are humbly submitted to their candid and impartial judgment.

The author of the letter to the right honourable the earl of B\*\*\*, not content with employing the body of his work in vilifying the conduct of Mr. P. begins to throw his squibs even in his title-page. He says in his motto:

“Such flames as high in patriots burn,  
“Yet stoop to bless a child or wife;”

POPE.

What does the author mean by this couplet? does he mean to insinuate that Mr. P. has been actuated, during the course of his administration, not by the principles of public spirit and patriotism,



ism, which he professed, by the low motives of self-interest and advantage? if he does, the united voice of the whole nation, (a few snarling cynics excepted, whose narrow and contracted souls are not susceptible of any generous and noble sentiments) will give him the lie. Or does he mean, that no man can be a patriot without laying aside all regard to his wife, and children, and other relations? if he does, he advances an opinion, than which, however generally received, nothing can be more ridiculous and absurd, as will plainly appear by attending a little to the nature of true patriotism.

The first exercise of the social principle, is that sense of duty and obedience which a child feels towards his parents. As he advances in years, and extends his connexions, the circle of his social affections begins to widen apace: at first, it takes in his friends, relations, and acquaintances, then the neighbourhood in  
which



which he lives, after that, his native country, and last of all, the whole human kind without exception. This principle, as it includes the love of our country, is called patriotism; as it comprehends the whole human race, it is termed philanthropy, or universal love and benevolence.

But will this author, or will any man pretend to say, that this spirit of patriotism may not be felt and exercised, without destroying those original affections, from which it sprung, and upon which it is built? he may, with the same propriety, affirm, that an edifice is not compleatly finished, till once the foundation upon which it rests is entirely ruined and destroyed. A true patriot will never prefer his own interest to that of his country; but when he can consult the former without injuring the latter, and much more, when by consulting the former he can even promote the latter; he would not act like a patriot,



triot, he would not act like a man of sense, he would act like a fool and a madman, should he neglect the favourable opportunity.

But Mr. P. has accepted of a peerage for his family, and a pension for himself and family. He has: and what then? did not he deserve it? does not his sovereign say he deserved it? and does not the united voice of the nation applaud this instance of the royal favour? has he, in consideration of those rewards, betrayed his country, or engaged to betray it for the future? on the contrary, has he not resigned one of the most lucrative and honourable employments in the kingdom, because he could not be allowed to pursue such measures as he judged most conducive to the glory and interest of his country?

But still Mr. P. has accepted of a peerage and a pension: he has; and, by that means, he has given his majesty the pleasing satisfaction of thinking, that

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he shall not be reckoned an ungrateful master; for, had that right honourable gentleman retired from office without any marks of the royal approbation, such a reflection would have arisen in the breast of every British subject, notwithstanding his loyalty and attachment to the best of sovereigns.

By the same means too, instead of diminishing, he has greatly encreased his power of serving his country; for, though his incorruptible integrity, and distinguished abilities, would have always procured him the same influence with men of sense and probity, yet the late addition to his fortune will give him greater interest with those, who regulate their opinions of men by their external circumstances; and under this category, perhaps, may be comprehended nine hundred and ninety-nine parts in a thousand of the human kind.

But



But let us now proceed to consider the body of the work, to which we shall find the motto, invidious and malignant as it is, to be a very proper introduction.

He begins by laying down four propositions, which we shall beg leave to transcribe, that the reader may be the better enabled to judge how far he has succeeded in proving them.

His first is, “ that a solid, honourable  
 “ and advantageous peace, in the present  
 “ circumstances of Great Britain,  
 “ exhausted as her people, and multiplying  
 “ as her debts are, is preferable to the  
 “ most splendid successes of war.”

His second proposition is, “ that such a  
 “ peace would give Great Britain an opportunity,  
 “ with honour and credit for the future,  
 “ to decline all continental connexions,  
 “ attended with such a profusion



“fusion of blood and treasure, as those  
“she is now engaged in.”

His third, “that this system can re-  
“ceive no manner of shock by the re-  
“signation of the right honourable gen-  
“tleman, who a few days ago gave up  
“the seals of his office.”

And his fourth is, “that the same  
“right honourable gentleman and his  
“friends, whose patriotism and disin-  
“terested attachment to their country  
“cannot be questioned, will and must,  
“in consistence with that character, co-  
“operate in the same good work, whe-  
“ther he or they be in place, or out  
“of place, as they cannot be suspected  
“of distressing his majesty’s measures,  
“even supposing *those measures* not to be  
“their own.”

Such are the propositions which our  
author undertakes to prove: but how  
does he prove them? why, he endeavours

vours



vours to prove the first by shewing, that Mr. P. had far less concern than is commonly imagined, in the glorious conquests that distinguished his administration; by depreciating the value of these conquests, in order to make us resign them, or, at least, part of them, with less reluctance; and by some slight touches on the greatness of our national debt, and our consequent inability to maintain the war.

The second he attempts to demonstrate by bitterly inveighing against Mr. P. for giving into continental connexions, and carrying them to such a length, after the warm and vigorous opposition he had made to these connexions, before his advancement to the office of S--- of S--te, and by some pitiable lamentations on the miserable fate of the British troops in Germany, which he is pleased to represent as their shambles, and them as cattle devoted to slaughter.

The



The third he endeavours to prove by supposing that every courtier is a P. a very comfortable supposition to be sure, and which wants nothing but truth to make it compleatly so.

And the fourth proposition he endeavours to demonstrate, by presenting us with a very fine panegyric on the ministry immediately preceding Mr. P.'s, and by declaring that the first man who attempts to oppose the measures of the ministry in parliament, even though he should judge these measures to be inconsistent with the public welfare, ought to be considered as an enemy to his country; a doctrine, which, were it once to prevail, and pass into a law, would not only degrade our parliament below the parliaments of France, in which the measures of the ministry are frequently opposed, if not rejected; but would go well nigh to annihilate our parliament entirely, which, to be sure, would be one method of preventing all animosity  
and



and party-spirit, at least in that august assembly, though, we believe, the nation will take some time to consider the matter, before they try such a dangerous and unprecedented experiment.

But let us now descend to particulars, by which means we shall be better able to judge of the strength or weakness of our author's arguments, and of the truth or falsity of his reasoning. In order to observe some kind of method, which we are sorry to say our author has hardly done, his observations on the same subject lying, frequently, scattered and detached in different parts of his work, we shall consider what he has said under his first head, which is by far the longest, and most important, in three distinct divisions.

In the first, we shall examine what he has alledged in diminution of Mr. P.'s merit: in the second, what he has advanced in order to depreciate the value  
of



of our conquests : and in the third, what he urges in favour of a peace with France, and upon what terms he would have that peace concluded.

In page 7, he says, “ No minister, perhaps, ever entered into power with greater advantages on his side, than Mr. P. His personal and family connexions, the good opinion his sovereign had of him, with the homage the people paid to his integrity and abilities, left him nothing to wish for. All the departments in government were filled up by his nomination, and every scheme he laid down was adopted, even before it was examined.”-----  
 “ His popularity,” adds he, “ received a vast accession by the miscarriage of our fleet in the Mediterranean, and that unaccountably ridiculous measure of sending for Hessians and Hanoverians to protect Great Britain, with many other favourable accidents of the same kind.”

With



With regard to Mr. P.'s family connexions, though honourable and powerful, several other ministers have entered into office with as great advantages of the like nature, nor does it appear that Mr. P. was ever obliged to have recourse to the interest of his relations, in order to support himself in any of his measures ; depending chiefly, if not wholly, upon his own reputation, popularity, and influence. As to his personal connexions, the good opinion of his sovereign, and the homage paid him by the people, these were entirely owing to his incorruptible integrity and distinguished abilities ; and if a man ought to be blamed for these endowments, the author should have taken the trouble to point out the qualities that merit applause.

That all the departments in government were filled up by his nomination, is certainly more than the author is able to prove. It was, no doubt, Mr. P.'s

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in-



interest, and he was in the right to make it his business, that no person should be in office, who would oppose his measures from a spirit of party and contradiction.

“ Every scheme he laid down was adopted, even before it was examined”: if, by this, he means, that all his schemes were so rational, and so evidently calculated for the public good, that they gained the approbation of the other members of the council at first sight, and without the labour of a strict scrutiny, he pays him the highest compliment that can possibly be paid to any minister; but if he means that the members approved of them without understanding them, he throws a reflection upon their characters, which perhaps he did not mean to throw.

With regard to the increase of popularity which Mr. P. acquired by his warm and spirited declamations against  
the



the miscarriage of our fleet in the Mediterranean, the conduct of the ministry at that time, and the unaccountable measure of sending for Hessians and Hanoverians to defend Great Britain, the author surely cannot mean this as any diminution of Mr. P.'s merit. Did he not deserve the popularity he acquired? Did not all the other members of parliament enjoy the same means of increasing their popularity? And did not such of them as understood, and regarded, the interest of their country, greedily embrace the opportunity? They did: and they obtained degrees of popularity, proportionable to their merit; but Mr. P. inferior to none in the virtues of the heart, and superior to all others in the abilities of head, shone forth unrivalled and alone, and distinguished himself above all his compatriots.

He says, that many other favourable accidents of the same kind, contributed



to encrease Mr. P.'s popularity. If, by these favourable accidents, he means (and he can hardly mean any thing else) the deplorable state in which the nation was at the time of Mr. P.'s receiving the seals; this, I apprehend, is so far from diminishing, that it greatly contributes to enhance his merit. Indeed it must be allowed, that the more wretched our situation then was, the greater must have been his glory in restoring us to our former state of power and grandeur. But does not this suppose, that he had the virtue to plan, the courage to attempt, and the capacity to execute such an arduous undertaking?

Before Mr. P.'s advancement to the office of S--- of S--te, discord and irresolution prevailed in our c---nc-ls, dejection and despair overwhelmed the nation, and our fleets and armies were sunk into a state of the most lazy inactivity, if not of absolute cowardice  
and



and pufflanimity. But no sooner was that gentleman entrusted with the management of public affairs, than he seemed, by a kind of magical influence, as it were, to infuse his own virtuous, prudent, and heroic spirit, into every British subject. He restored unanimity and vigour to our c--nc-ls, filled the minds of the people with trust and confidence, and inspired our soldiers and sailors with such a spirit of courage and intrepidity, as has raised the British name to a degree of military glory, which few nations have equalled, and none have exceeded.

In page 9, he acknowledges that the conquest of Canada was a plan laid down by Mr. P. and that it has redounded greatly to his honour. "But," adds he, "will the most idolatrous admirer of that gentleman deny, that, had not providence, for I shall not call it chance, co-operated with the incredible resolution of the British troops, and



“ and the British general, it must have  
 “ been *felt* as the most *fatal*, and *con-*  
 “ *sidered* as the most *extravagant* scheme  
 “ that ever was attempted to be put in  
 “ execution by this country :” the plain  
 meaning of which is, that we ought never  
 to attempt any bold and hazardous en-  
 terprize, however necessary for our safe-  
 ty and preservation ; but that we should  
 sit quietly and tamely down, and allow  
 our insolent and rapacious enemies to  
 trample on our necks, and rob us of  
 our property : an advice which a British  
 spirit rejects with contempt and indig-  
 nation. Britons ever have, and ever  
 will attempt any enterprize, however  
 difficult and dangerous, whenever their  
 interest or their honour require it, and,  
 by their success, will confound the  
 gloomy predictions of all those grave  
 politicians, who, with a solemn shake  
 of the head, foretel the miscarriage of all  
 our schemes, and the certainty of our ap-  
 proaching ruin. There is something plea-  
 sant enough in seeing this author ascribe all  
 our



our successes, during Mr. P.'s administration, to Providence, and all our losses to mismanagement: but we are bound in charity to believe, that he is actuated rather by a principle of religion than a spirit of detraction!

In page 10, he makes it a disputable point whether the reduction of Louisbourg was planned by Mr. P. or not. But he insinuates, that even admitting it was, he cannot possibly claim any merit from that conquest, because, forsooth, the same place was once conquered under a former administration. By the same way of reasoning, we may prove that admiral Hawke deserves no praise for beating the French fleet during the present war, because admiral Blake did the same in the time of Oliver Cromwel.

But, perhaps, we have mistaken the sense of our author; perhaps he meant to pay a compliment to Mr. P. Certain it is, whether he meant it or not,  
 he



he has paid him one of the highest compliments that one man can pay to another; for is it possible to pay a greater compliment to any man, than by confessing that nothing material can be urged against his character? and this confession the author has made with regard to Mr. P. by having recourse to such pitiful shifts, in order to lessen his merit. What could induce him to employ this kind of panegyric, it is hard to determine, unless perhaps he considered Mr. P. as one, who, in the words of the poet,

--- could not bear too modestly refined,  
A panegyric of a grosser kind.

All that he further advances in diminution of Mr. P.'s merit, is exactly in the same strain; either impotent satire, or concealed panegyric, according as the reader is pleased to understand it.

Let us next consider what he alledges to depreciate the value of our conquests,  
in



in order to make us resign them, or, at least part of them, with less reluctance.

“Louisbourg, he observes, p. 20, is “but a *negative* advantage, and no acquisition to Great Britain.” Louisbourg has always been considered as the key to North-America, and, as such, is of infinite consequence to us. No private man thinks his property secure, while the key of his warehouse is in the hands of his enemy; and the author should have taken the trouble of shewing that the same maxim will not hold in a national sense, before he ventured to undervalue the reduction of Louisbourg.

He says, in page 10, “I shall readily “admit that the conquest of Senegal “and Goree was entirely owing to Mr. “P. ----- but the question with me is, “whether we have hitherto found those “acquisitions to be of so great advan-

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“tage



“tage as they were given out to be to  
 “our interest and commerce.” Hitherto,  
 perhaps, we have not; but is that a  
 proof that we never shall do so? is it  
 to be expected, that, amidst the hurry  
 and tumults of war, we should find  
 leisure to improve our conquests to the  
 utmost advantage? the least reflexion,  
 one should think, would have prevent-  
 ed any sensible man from putting such  
 a question.

He affects to undervalue our con-  
 quests in the East-Indies, because he  
 says it is a disputable point whether the  
 advantages resulting from those con-  
 quests are national or partial. The  
 wealth of a state has always been con-  
 sidered as consisting in the wealth of  
 its members, and whether the advan-  
 tages resulting from these conquests  
 accrue to the public or private persons,  
 it is still an advantage to Great Britain.

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The conquest of Belleisle he is pleased to term a flower in the British Garland. "I call that conquest a flower," says he, page 12, "because I think no reasonable man, either at home or abroad, can imagine that it will be permanent; or if permanent, that it will not cost us fifty times more than it is worth." And, in a still higher strain, in page 17, he affirms, "that all the emoluments, that possibly can accrue to us from our conquests, are insufficient to indemnify us for the sixth part of the annual interest of the money they cost us." This is certainly a very bold assertion, and much more than the author is able to prove. What emoluments may *possibly* accrue to Great Britain from her late conquests, it is neither in his power, nor the power of any other man absolutely to foretell; trade (and these conquests are chiefly valuable as they are subservient to trade) being of such a very abstruse and intricate nature that no man can



fix the precise limits beyond which it cannot be carried. But if all the emoluments that can possibly accrue to us from our conquests, are insufficient to indemnify us for the sixth part of the annual interest of the money they cost us; then (we suppose the author means) as a necessary consequence, that we had better restore these conquests to the French, upon their paying us a third part of that interest, because, by such a bargain, we shall save one half of the sum we must otherwise lose; a very advantageous kind of traffic, to be sure, as it is trading at the rate of Cent. per Cent. profit, though, we believe, it is a kind of traffic in which the English will not chuse to engage, until they have some other proof of its real utility, than this author's assertion.

In the same page, the author affects to laugh at the common cant of those shallow politicians, as he calls them, who endeavour to apologize for the  
greatness



greatness of our national expences, by alleging that the money is all spent amongst ourselves; and we, in our turn, cannot help laughing at the no less ridiculous cant of those more shallow politicians, who make money the measure of every thing, and gravely tell us that because our conquests cost us more money than they are worth (according to their computation) they are therefore rather a detriment than an advantage to the nation.

Every smatterer in politics knows, that the value of money is merely ideal and imaginary; that the use of it was, at first, invented, and is still continued, for no other purpose than that of facilitating the course of trade and commerce; for could trade be carried on as easily, and as expeditiously, without as with money, a pound of gold would be of no more value than a pound of iron, and hardly even of so much, as it is  
utterly



utterly unfit for a thousand purposes to which the other may be applied.

For instance, could the farmer give as much grain to the clothier as would be exactly equal, in value, to the quantity of cloth he receives from him, the bargain would be as fairly and as effectually made, as if it had been transacted by the greatest banker in Europe; and such, undoubtedly, was the manner of traffic among the original inhabitants of the earth, and such, even at this day, is the manner of traffic among those nations, that are still uncivilized and uncultivated.

But as it was found difficult to ascertain the exact proportion between different kinds of commodities, or to determine precisely how much grain, for example, was equal in value to a certain quantity of cloth, the use of money was invented to remove this difficulty, and to reduce these commodities to the same stand-



standard ; and, for this purpose, gold and silver were employed, as being the most hard and durable metals. Thus so much grain was supposed equal to a piece of money, and so much cloth equal to the same piece, and, by transferring this piece from one person to another, the property of these commodities, or of any other commodities that were to be exchanged, was as fully transferred as if the goods had been delivered into the hands of the respective merchants. Hence it appears, that the value of money is merely arbitrary, and depends upon the mutual consent of mankind, who have agreed to consider it as the *common measure* of every other commodity.

But if a person be so situated that he cannot purchase the commodities he wants, or if these commodities are of such a nature that they cannot be purchased, all the money in the world will signify nothing. The first Spaniards  
who



who took possession of South-America, had gold-hilts to their swords; but unluckily they had neither a shirt to put on their back, nor meat to put in their belly; and yet they had great plenty of money: but with all their money, were they really rich? if they were, I give them joy of their unsubstantial riches, and would rather chuse to remain in Old England, where, without a gold-hilted sword, or even without a sword at all, I can have a clean shirt and a good dinner.

The case is the same, if the commodities we want be such as cannot be purchased with money. By these, I do not mean health, strength, beauty, sense, or any other qualities, whether of body or mind (if indeed these may be called commodities) which it is neither in our power to procure, nor in the power of any human creature to bestow; but I mean empires, kingdoms, and all independent states of what denomination  
 soever,



soever, the impossibility of purchasing which does not arise from the nature of the thing itself, but from the high opinion which the possessors of these countries entertain of their value, or rather from their thinking, and justly thinking, that they are absolutely invaluable.

The value of all the land in Great Britain (I mean the imaginary value, for the real value cannot be estimated) at the rate of twenty, of thirty, of forty years purchase, or at any rate you please, may be easily computed; but should the proprietor of the mines of Chili and Peru, offer us a sum of money equal to that value, and demand, in consideration of that sum, to be put in possession of all the lands in the island, how should we receive the proposal? Why, to be sure, we should, at first, consider the man as a lunatic, and treat him accordingly; but should he still persist in his demand, we should, with-

F out



out any ceremony, toss him over the rocks of Dover, and send him and his money to the bottom together. In a word, it is absolutely impossible to estimate the value of any commodity, unless the money arising from the sale of it, will be sufficient to purchase some other commodity of equal value; but if no such commodity is to be had, then it is really invaluable.

Now if this reasoning be just with regard to Great Britain, it will hold, in some measure, with regard to all the dominions of Great Britain. I have not time to pursue the argument to its utmost extent, nor to trace it through all its consequences; and I have only made these cursory reflexions to expose the fallacious reasoning of those, who alledge, that our late conquests are rather a detriment than an advantage to the nation, because they have cost us more money than they are worth, never reflecting that their real worth cannot possibly be known. The wealth of  
a coun-



a country does not consist in the quantity of gold and silver it contains, but in the number and industry of its inhabitants; and a single province that maintains ten thousand industrious and dutiful subjects, is of more consequence to the government, to which it belongs, than all the money in the world together.

It is not to be supposed, that our author, after having been at so much pains to depreciate our conquests, will have any great difficulty in concluding a peace with France, which he seems inclined to make almost upon any terms. He would have us to restore-----but does not chuse to descend to particulars; though he seems strongly to insinuate, that we ought to restore Senegal and Goree, because, “ he doubts whether  
 “ Great Britain hitherto has found those  
 “ acquisitions to be of so great advantage  
 “ as they were given out to be to our  
 “ interest and commerce; whether they



“ are not the grave of English subjects,  
 “ or whether they can compensate for  
 “ that immense mortality that is entail-  
 “ ed upon our possessing them;” Belle-  
 isle, “ because, if it is retained, it will  
 “ cost us fifty times more than it is  
 “ worth;” Guadaloupe, “ because it is  
 “ extraneous to the original necessary  
 “ principle upon which the war began,  
 “ and because he thinks such a cession  
 “ preferable to the continuance of this  
 “ devouring and expensive war,” which  
 he would make us believe can be no o-  
 therwise prevented; nor would he even  
 have us to retain Quebec and Canada,  
 unless they can be proved to be condu-  
 cive to the security of our American co-  
 lonies, which he alledges they are only  
*said* to be; but if they *really* are so, he  
 has the complaisance to allow us to keep  
 them. In a word, he seems to hint  
 that we should retain nothing but what  
 evidently contributes to obtain the end,  
 for which the war was originally under-  
 taken,



taken, namely, the protection of our trade and commerce.

But does not he know, that when a person is cast in a suit, he is obliged to pay, not only the sum for which he was sued, but likewise the costs and damages. And may not we, with the same equity, compel the French to indemnify us for the expences of the war, by retaining all our conquests? These, indeed, according to his own calculation, are not sufficient to indemnify us for a sixth part of the annual interest of the money they cost us; and this, it must be owned, is but a poor indemnification; but better this than nothing. But does not he further know, that nations are to each other what men are in a state of nature? and that, in that state, if one man invades the property of another, the injured party may not only endeavour to recover what he has lost, but may likewise deprive the aggressor



gressor of all power of hurting him for  
 the future? but suppose we were to  
 restore all our conquests to the French,  
 what have they to give us in return?  
 for our author tell us that something  
 must be given up on both sides: why,  
 they are to give us their most gracious  
 acquiescence in what shall be agreed  
 upon at the congress, and their good  
 faith in performing it, which he hum-  
 bly apprehends must be purchased by  
 some concessions on the part of Great  
 Britain. But what is this good faith of  
 the French? take our author's own  
 words for it, "they are a people that  
 "measure *right* by *power*." "It is a ca-  
 "pital maxim of the French monarchy,  
 "that all renunciations are, of them-  
 "selves, void and of no effect, if they  
 "tend to the prejudice of the crown;  
 "---- and the most express stipulations  
 "made by France will last no longer  
 "than her inability to break them." So  
 that the good faith of the French in  
 performing



performing their treaties is no more than their inability to break them : and yet we must purchase this good faith of the French by such concessions as will both enable and tempt them to break it : we must, by the very same act, at once procure and destroy their inability to hurt us. Excellent logic, truly ! surely our author cannot be in earnest ; he certainly means one thing, and pretends another : and while he professes to defend the measure of restoring our conquests, he, doubtless, intended to betray it : at least, he has shewn the badness of the cause by the weakness the arguments, though, it must be owned, they are the best that could be advanced on the subject ; for indeed, had the cause been defensible, no man appears to be better qualified for defending it than our author, as may be easily gathered from the many shrewd and sensible remarks to be found in other parts of his work.

Our



Our author, after having expatiated largely on the greatness of our national debt, and the dangerous consequences of over-straining our public credit, subjoins, page 23. " I am, however, somewhat concerned to reflect, it is possible some well-meaning people may think I ought not to tell those matters in *Gath*, or to publish them in *Askalon*. Alas! my lord, they are truths that are already but too well known to the Philistines, and even to the daughters of the Philistines; they are the truths that make them rejoice." Why, truly, the Philistines, if they compare their own situation with ours, have no great cause to rejoice. The Philistines, after suffering a national bankruptcy, have already been obliged to contribute their plate to supply the exigencies of the state, and the daughters of the Philistines will probably be soon obliged to contribute their jewels, and ear-rings, to answer the same salutary



tary purpose; but, thank heaven! neither the Israelites, nor the daughters of the Israelites, have yet been driven to such extremities.

We have nothing to add to what we have already said on our author's three last propositions, except that he embraces every opportunity of detracting from the merit of Mr. P. with an eagerness that betrays him into the most glaring contradictions. After ascribing, in his usual pious strain, our success in the battle of Minden, to the miraculous interposition of providence, he adds, "had matters fallen out otherwise, in what a situation here must the minister have been, who advised, and even hastened, the sending over a body of troops, that, to all appearance, were too few for victory, but too numerous for butchery." But can any thing be more absurd, than to argue against the utility of a scheme,

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from



from the dangerous consequences that might have ensued from its miscarriage. On the contrary, we should imagine, that in proportion to inconveniences attending the failure of any scheme, must ever be the advantages accruing from its success. A scheme of such an indifferent nature as to produce no good by its success, or no evil by its miscarriage, is hardly worth the carrying into execution.

In order to reconcile us to the resignation of Mr. P. he gravely asks ; “ what has this nation to apprehend “ from such a resignation ? will France,” says he, “ will the empress queen, take “ it amiss ? ” No : they will not take it amiss ; they will take it extremely well ; they will triumph and rejoice : but is that a reason why we, likewise, ought to rejoice ? Our author, surely, will not pretend to say that it is, unless he either takes us for fools, or enemies to our country,



country. But we suppose, that, with his usual delicacy, he meant to pay Mr. P. a compliment; for a greater compliment he could not possibly have paid him, than by acknowledging, that his resignation affords matter of joy and triumph to all the enemies of Great Britain.

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[ 43 ]

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