


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
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
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
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THE  
COLONIAL POLICY  
OF  
GREAT BRITAIN,  
CONSIDERED WITH RELATION TO HER  
NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES,  
AND  
West India Possessions;

WHEREIN  
THE DANGEROUS TENDENCY OF AMERICAN COMPETITION  
IS DEVELOPED,

AND THE  
NECESSITY OF RECOMMENCING A COLONIAL SYSTEM ON A VIGOROUS  
AND EXTENSIVE SCALE, EXHIBITED AND DEFENDED;

WITH  
*PLANS FOR THE PROMOTION OF EMIGRATION,*

AND STRICTURES  
ON THE TREATY OF GHENT.

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BY A BRITISH TRAVELLER.

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1816.

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## PREFACE.

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IT has been sensibly remarked by one of our ablest modern writers on statistical affairs, that whoever has thoroughly investigated the commercial and colonial system, cannot fail to have noticed how the different branches of human activity are gradually and successively developed, each at its proper period. To illustrate this point, he adds, that when agriculture and manufactures have arrived at a certain degree of perfection, the desire of foreign commerce is naturally awakened: that although the object of this propensity may be retarded or accelerated by adverse or favourable circumstances, the persevering activity of mankind will sooner or later accomplish it: that it will at length gain access to distant or unexplored regions, and succeed in its unremitting endeavours to connect all parts of the earth: that the produce of remote countries becomes a new spur to industry; and industry so excited, explores and cultivates those lands; so that the productions of new regions operate to increase the activity, and to multiply the commercial relations of the old: that this gives new life even to the interior of the more civilized countries, and multiplies the objects of traffic: that industry produces riches, and riches reproduce

industry ; and thus commerce at length becomes the foundation and the cement of the whole social edifice. \*

This is not determined by the presumption or caprice of man : it is founded in the nature of things, and is the effect of that irresistible impulse, by which every great and beneficial change, every important event in the political history of mankind, is produced. To this principle we must refer not only the origin, but the progress and extension of commerce ; and hence the system of colonization, with all its actual and possible ramifications and extent. Hence the independence of remote climates, not created nor cultivated for us only, and the new sources of opulence to which Europe is invited by their freedom and independence. Hence, too, humanity will hereafter derive many invaluable blessings, will behold many a splendid era, if the free display of this active principle be not checked by blind authority, and if human ingenuity do not aspire to be wiser than Divine Providence.

When the expansion of the human faculties, and the civil and social improvement of mankind, shall have attained the point towards which Europe has been gradually verging during the last three hundred years, all civilized nations must be impelled by the desire of establishing a permanent system of connexion with the remotest parts of the world. The love of luxury, and the thirst of knowledge, new wants, and new powers of industry, the dictates of reason, and the

\* Gentz's State of Europe before and after the French Revolution.

allurements of passion, combine to give an impulse that is irresistible to this propensity. What was originally only a spirit of adventure, is gradually converted into systematic activity, and what at first was superfluity, becomes habitual, regular, and necessary. The productions of the most distant regions become articles of daily necessity: the sea as well as the land is covered by the human species, and navigation, commerce, and colonization, are ranked with the more simple occupations of agriculture and domestic manufacture.

If then the possession of colonies upon these general principles be a matter of such high importance, as to identify their existence and prosperity with that of the parent state, it becomes still of much greater importance, when that parent is circumscribed within narrow geographical limits, yet possessing a national greatness of the first and most imposing order, founded upon the union of the state with her foreign possessions. Such is the situation of Great Britain, and such the foundations of her national pre-eminence. Begirt around by the waters of the ocean, her superior prowess upon this element, combined with an indefatigable spirit of perseverance, has given her the most valuable and extensive dominion in each quarter of the globe. But however desirable even her Eastern possessions are, which attract so much attention by their dazzling splendour, no portion of her empire is of such vital importance as her North American provinces; partly because they employ the greatest quantity of shipping, and also as being capable of supplying

the mother country, and her other dependencies, with an abundance of the articles necessary for her wants and enjoyments.

But the immense value of these colonies appears, not only from a review of their productions, their great and improvable resources, their employment of our shipping, and their utility as a nursery for our sailors: the sentiments of other European nations respecting their importance, and the deep distress experienced by them when deprived of the articles of colonial produce; and, above all, the conduct of France, in the various efforts made to retain possession of her American dominions, most clearly evinces how highly she estimates their importance; and though deprived of her Canadian territories, yet the anxious wish of again possessing some portion of the American continent, continues to rule in the breast of every French politician. This fact has been strikingly evinced in a pamphlet, written during the consulship of Buonaparte, by M. Talleyrand, one of the most sagacious and profound statesmen which that or any other country ever possessed. The following extract, while it exhibits the beauty and fertility of the country in question, displays the strongest desire for the attainment of its object, at the same time that it develops the writer's views of its importance, by his anxiety for the removal of every obstacle to its possession. Nor does it less clearly unfold the true value of the colonies to Great Britain, and the course of policy necessary for her adoption in regard to them. “ \* Our nation

\* From the New Quarterly Review.

(says M. Talleyrand, referring to Louisiana) had the vain honour of conferring a name on a portion of the globe, not exceeded by any other portion of it, in all the advantages of the climate and soil. Before the war of 1757, it was an immense valley, watered by a deep and beneficent river. This river first acquires importance in the latitude of 45, north. It flows in a devious course about two thousand miles, and enters the bay of Mexico, by many mouths, in latitude 29. In these latitudes is comprised the temperate zone, which has been deemed most favourable to the perfection of the animal and vegetable nature. This advantage is not marred by the chilling and *sterilizing* influence of lofty mountains, the pestilential fumes of intractable bogs, or the dreary uniformity of sandy plains. Throughout the whole extent, there is not, probably, a snow-capt hill, a moving sand, or a volcanic eminence.

“ This valley is of different breadths. The ridge which bounds it on the east, is in some places nearly a thousand miles from the great middle stream. From this ridge, secondary rivers, of great extent and magnificence, flow towards the centre, and the intermediate regions are an uncultivated Paradise. On the west, the valley is of similar dimensions, the streams are equally large and useful, and the condition of the surface equally delightful.

“ We must first observe, that, in gaining possession of this territory, we shall not enter on a desert, where the forest must be first removed before a shelter can be built;

whither we must carry the corn and the clothes necessary to present subsistence; and the seed, the tools, and the cattle, which are requisite to raise a future provision.

“ There cannot, in the first place, be imagined a district more favourable to settlement. In addition to a genial climate and soil, there are the utmost facilities of communication and commerce. The whole district is the sloping side of a valley, through which run deep and navigable rivers, which begin their course in the remotest borders, and which all terminate in the central stream. This stream, one of the longest and widest in the world, is remarkably distinguished by its depth, and freedom from natural impediments. It flows into a gulf which contains a great number of populous islands. Among these islands are numerous passages into the ocean, which washes the shores of Europe. Thus, not only every part of the district is easily accessible by means of rivers, but the same channels are ready to convey the products of every quarter to the markets most contiguous and remote.

“ The Nile flows in a torrid climate through a long and narrow valley. The fertility which its annual inundations produce, extends only two or three leagues on either side of it. The benefits of this fertility are marred by the neighbourhood of scorching sands, over which the gales carry intolerable heat and incurable pestilence, and which harbour a race of savages, whose trade is war and pillage. Does this river bestow riches worthy of the greatest efforts of the

nation to gain them, and shall the greater Nile of the western hemisphere be neglected? A Nile, whose inundations diffuse the fertility of Egypt twenty leagues from its shores, which occupies a valley wider than from the Duna to the Rhine, which flows among the most beautiful dales, and under the benignest seasons, and which is skirted by a civilized and kindred nation on one side, and on the other by extensive regions, over which the tide of growing population may spread itself without hindrance or danger.

“ But of what avail will be all these advantages, unless a market be provided for the produce of the soil? Now this market is already provided. For all that it can produce, France alone will supply *thirty millions* of consumers. The choicest luxuries of Europe are coffee, sugar, and tobacco. The most useful materials of clothing are cotton and silk. All these are either natives of the Mississippi valley, or remarkably congenial to it. The cultivation of these, and the carriage to market, are as obvious and easy as the most ardent politician can desire. The whole extent of the river will be our own, and in the lower and most fertile portion of its course, the banks on both sides will be our indisputable property.

“ The friend of the health, longevity, and useful pleasure of the human species, and of the opulence of France, could not devise a better scheme than one which should enable every inhabitant of Europe to consume half-a-pound of sugar a-day, and assign to Frenchmen the growth, the carriage,

and the distribution of thus much.\* Now this scheme is no other than the possession of the American Nile. But this end may be too magnificent to be deemed credible. Let us, then, confine ourselves to the consumption of France; for this alone will be adequate to the employment, and conducive to the wealth, of a vast number of cultivators.

“ A much less beneficial luxury is coffee, but this our habits have equally endeared to us. We have hitherto drawn it from the same fountain which has supplied us with sugar: the trade in it must follow the same destiny; the same benefits will flow from increasing the supply, and from drawing the supply from the valley of the Mississippi.

“ I shall pass over, without mentioning, many other articles, such as tobacco, indigo, and the like, for which France and the rest of Europe will supply an unlimited consumption, and hasten to articles which are of more importance, and these are cotton and provisions.

“ The most beautiful production of nature is cotton. It was more than the caprice of fashion that went to the extremities of the East in search of this material, for there is none capable of a greater number of uses, of so many forms, and such various colours. Its texture may constitute the

\* 225,000,000 cwt. the produce of an area, not exceeding that of Guienne, Normandy, and Brittany, are not a twentieth part of the valley of the Mississippi.—TRANSLATOR.

lightest and most beautiful of ornaments, or the best defence against the intemperature of the air.

“ The nations of the East have used it immemorially, and from them has it gradually been brought to Europe. The use of it seems to have been limited by nothing but the power of procuring it. Like sugar, the use of it has increased since it has been naturalized to the soil of America. The consumption has, in like manner, been eager to out-run the supply.

“ *The American States have, of late, become sensible of the value of the commerce in cotton, and their success supplies us with a new example, and a powerful inducement to appropriate, in part, the territory of the Mississippi to the same culture.*

“ But now come the fearful and scrupulous head to dash these charming prospects. Obstacles to these great achievements, multiply in his timorous fancy. He expatiates on the length of the way; the insalubrity of uncultivated lands; of a climate to which the constitution and habits of the colonists are uncongenial; of a soil, part of which, and that accessible and most valuable, lies under a torrid sun, and is annually inundated.

“ Now all these difficulties are imaginary. They are real in relation to a *first* settlement. They ought to be taken into a strict account, if our projects extended to New

Holland or to California. In all real cases, these difficulties have been great by reason of the avarice, injustice, and folly, of the colonizing nation; and the wisest plans could not totally exclude, though they would greatly lessen, and easily surmount them. But Louisiana is not a *new* settlement: It is one of the oldest in North America. All the labours of discovering and of setting the first foot on a desert shore, were suffered and accomplished long ago.

“The Spaniards must be thoroughly aware that their power in Mexico and Peru exists by the weakness and division of their vassals, and by the remoteness and competition of their European enemies. Unwise and imbecile as that nation has generally appeared in latter times, the admission of the French to a post from whence their dominions may be so easily annoyed at present, and from which their future expulsion is inevitable, is a folly too egregious even for them to commit, and of which the most infatuated of their counsels has not hitherto given an example.

“If Spain should refuse the cession, *there is an end to our golden views*. Our empire in the new world is strangled in its cradle; or at least, the prosecution of our scheme must wait for a more propitious season. But, should the fortune of our great leader continue her smiles; should our neighbour be trepanned or intimidated into this concession, there is removed, indeed, one obstacle, of itself insuperable; but only to give way to another, at least, equally hard to subdue and that is, *the opposition of England*.

“That nation justly regards us as the most formidable enemy to her greatness. Of late, if her pride would confess the truth, she would acknowledge that not her greatness only, but her very being was endangered, either by the influence of our arms, *or the contagion of our example*. She was assailed in her vitals, *as the confusions of Ireland will testify*. She was attacked in her extremities, as the expedition to Egypt, a mere prelude to the conquest of Hindostan, will prove. Her efforts to repel both these attacks, were suitable to their importance, and evince the magnitude of her fears. The possession of the vantage-ground enabled her to crush the Irish. Her NAVAL SUPERIORITY, and the caprice of the winds, enabled her to check our victorious career in the East.

“Will they suffer France to possess herself of the most effectual means of prosecuting future wars to a different issue? Their navy and their commerce are, at present, all their trust. France may add Italy and Germany to her dominions with less detriment to England than would follow from her acquisition of a navy, and the extension of her trade. Whatever gives colonies to France, supplies her with ships and sailors, manufactures and husbandmen. Victories by land can only give her mutinous *subjects*; who, instead of augmenting the national force, by their riches or numbers, contribute only to disperse and enfeeble that force; but the growth of colonies supplies her with zealous *citizens*, and the increase of real wealth and effective numbers is the certain consequence.

“What could Germany, Italy, Spain, and France, combining their strength, perform against England? They might assemble in millions on the shores of the channel, but *there* would be the limit of their enmity. Without ships to carry them over; without experienced mariners to navigate these ships, England would only deride the pompous preparation. The moment we leave the shore her fleets are ready to pounce upon us; to disperse and destroy our ineffectual armaments. *There* lies *their* security: in their insular situation and their navy consist their impregnable defence. Their navy is, in every respect, the offspring of their trade. To rob them of that, therefore, is to beat down their last wall and fill up their last moat. To gain it to ourselves, is to enable us to take advantage of their deserted and defenceless borders, and to complete the humiliation of our only remaining competitor.

“The trade which enriches England lies *chiefly* in the *products* of foreign climates. But her Indian territories produce nothing which the Mississippi could not as easily produce. The Ganges fertilizes a valley less extensive. Its *Deltas*, as well as those of the Nile, are in the same latitudes, and these rivers generate the same exuberant soil, only in smaller space and in less quantities than the great western Nile: but the Mississippi comprehends, in its bosom, the regions of the temperate zone as well as the tropical climates and products. The arctic circle in America will be equally accessible to us and to the English. *Our ancient possessions in Canada will in due season return to us of their own accord*; and meanwhile, a double portion of anxiety, and double provision of

forts and garrisons, will fall to the lot of the usurping English. The progress of the French will expose their islands, first to be excluded from the markets of Europe, and next to be swallowed up by military power. At present, the protector and the enemy are at an equal distance; but then there will only be a narrow frith between the Mississippi and the isles, between the invaders and the objects they covet, while the defenders would be, as now, afar off; neither apprized of our designs, nor able to defeat them.

“This nation could not bury itself in a more inaccessible fortress than this valley. The mouths of this river, as to all attacks by sea, are better than the bastions of Malta. All around the entrance is impassable to men and horses, and the great channel is already barred by forts, easily extended and improved. A wise policy would teach the English to divert our attention from this quarter, by the sacrifice of Valletta or Gibraltar.

“Can we imagine the English, so vigilant, so prudent in all affairs connected with their maritime empire; so quick in their suspicions; so prompt in their precautions; can be blind to the dangers with *which this cession will menace* them? No defeats or humiliations, short of their island, will make them acquiesce in such arrangements.

“It is contrary to all probability that either Spain or England will be tractable on this occasion; but, if the danger, by being distant, is invisible to them; or if the present evils,

arising to England from continuance of the war, or to Spain from the resentment of the French government, should outweigh, in their apprehensions, all future evils, and prevail on one to grant, and on the other to connive at the grant, by what arguments, by what promises, by what threats, by what hostile efforts, shall we extort the consent of the American States? How shall we prevail on them to alienate the most valuable portion of their territory; to *admit into their vitals a formidable and active people, whose interests are incompatible, in every point, with their own; whose enterprises will inevitably interfere and jar with theirs; whose neighbourhood will cramp all their movements; circumscribe their future progress to narrow and ignominious bounds; and make incessant inroads on their harmony and independence?*

“Long ago would the lesser princes of Italy and Germany have disappeared, if Sweden, France, Prussia, and Austria, had not stood ready to snatch the spoil from each other. Long ago would the Turkish robbers have been driven back to their native deserts, if any single nation of Europe had been suffered by the rest to execute that easy task. But the Spaniards know that Spain and America must one day fall asunder. Why then should they decline a present benefit, in order to preclude one means of an event, which yet, by other means, if not by these, will inevitably happen?

“As to England, all the disadvantages with which this event is said to menace them are real. All the consequences just predicted to her colonies, to her trade, to her navy, to her

ultimate existence, will indisputably follow. *The scheme is eligible to us chiefly on this account*, and these consequences, if they rouse the English to a sturdier opposition, ought likewise to stimulate the French to more strenuous perseverance.

“But, in truth, every Frenchman must laugh with scorn at the thought of British opposition. What would the Spaniards say, were they told by the English—You must not give away this colony. Though a great incumbrance to you, and a great benefit to those whom it is your interest and duty to oblige, you must, by no means, part with it. What patience, either in France or Spain, would tolerate an interference thus haughty, from an enemy to both? But when is this opposition to be made? This is not a subject of debate between the agents of England and France. It falls not under their discussion. It cannot, therefore, be the occasion of their interviews. There is no room for opposition to what comes not under our notice. The cession must be made without their knowledge. It is only to be published by its execution, and when the French are safely lodged in the Mississippi, the gainsayings of the English will be too late.

“But there is a nearer, and, it must be owned, a more formidable nation, to gain. If there be any truth in the picture heretofore drawn, of the value of this province to France, it must be, in a still greater proportion, of value to the American States. If the powers of this rising nation were in-

trusted to the hands of one wise man; if the *founder* of the nation was still its *supreme magistrate*, and *he* had no wills to consult but his *own*, the French, most probably, would never be allowed to set their foot on that shore; but the truth, the desirable truth, is, that opposition is the least to be dreaded from those who have most reason to oppose us. They, whose interests are most manifest, may be most easily deceived; whose danger is most imminent, may most easily be lulled into security. They, whose vicinity to the scene of action puts it most in their power to enact their own safety; whose military force might be most easily assembled and directed to this end, we shall have the least trouble in dividing, intimidating, and disarming.

“I come now to the last difficulty, which the most scrupulous objector has discovered; and *this difficulty will be dissipated with more ease than the rest. On what foundation does it repose, but the visionary notion, that the conduct of nations is governed by enlightened views to their own interest?* The rulers of nations have views of their own, and they are gained by the gratification of these private views. The more individuals there are that govern, and the more various their conditions and their character, the more dissimilar are their interests, and the more repugnant these interests to those of each other, and the interests of the whole.

“Was there ever a people who exhibited so motley a character; who have vested a more limited and precarious authority in their rulers; who have multiplied so much the

numbers of those that govern; who have dispersed themselves over so wide a space; and have been led, by this local dispersion, to create so many clashing jurisdictions and jarring interests, as the States of America?

“They call themselves *free*, yet a fifth of their number are slaves. That proportion of the whole people are ground by a yoke more dreadful and debasing than the predial servitude of Poland and Russia. They call themselves *one*, yet all languages are native to their citizens. All countries have contributed their outcasts and refuse to make them a people. Even the race of Africa, a race not above, or only just above, the beasts, are scattered every where among them, and in some of the districts of their empire, are nearly a moiety of the whole.

“Such is the people whom we, it seems, are to fear, because their *true interest* would make them our enemies; with whom *we* are to contend in negotiation, or, if need be, in arms! We, who are as much a proverb for our skill in diplomatics as in war; who have all the unity in counsels; the celerity in execution; the harmony of interests; the wisdom of experience; and the force of compactness, of which this patchwork republic is notoriously destitute. Their numbers! *That*, when the parts are discordant, is only fuel more easily kindled, and producing a more extensive and unquenchable flame. Five millions of jarring and factious citizens are far less formidable than a disciplined and veteran legion of as many thousands.

“But the great weakness of these States arises from their form of government, and the condition and the habits of the people. Their form of government, and the state of the country, is a hot-bed for faction and sedition. The utmost force of all the wisdom they possess, is exerted in keeping the hostile parts together. These parts are unlike each other, and each one has the individualizing prejudices of a separate state; all the puerile jealousies of the greatness of others; all the petty animosities which make neighbours quarrel with each other without cause. How slight an additional infusion is requisite to set this heterogeneous mass into commotion! to make the different parts incline different ways, on the great question of war!

“*The master of the Mississippi will be placed so as to control, in the most effectual manner, these internal waves.* It is acknowledged that he holds in his hands the *bread* of all the settlements westward of the hills. He may dispense or withhold at his pleasure. See we not the mighty influence that this power will give us over the councils of the States!”

This region, so valuable, has been transferred from one deadly rival of this country to another; whose inclinations and opportunities assume a more tremendous character than the former; whose restless hatred and ambition is in consequence rendered comparatively impotent; but which, at the same time, has given to the latter a source of power not to be viewed without the greatest concern; and our go-

vernment tamely looking on, while the United States most fraudulently took possession of this fine country, in trust for Buonaparte; being the first step of a projected concert between the ruler of France, and the American government, for depriving Great Britain of her Canadian territories. By this strange imbecility on our part, we have permitted a source of the most stable greatness to pass from our hands; the value of which to us must have been greatly enhanced by its contiguity to our West Indian islands; by its being the key to the rich and fertile plains of the Ohio and Mississippi; by the avenue it would open for our manufactures into one of the most populous and wealthy of all the Spanish colonies;—but most of all, by the command this would have given us, in union with the Canadas, over the United States, which would then have been surrounded by British power, and the whole length of internal frontier open at all times to the admission of our merchandise.

But these territories, that would thus have contributed so essentially to our national prosperity, have been quietly surrendered; while the features of our late policy seem to indicate an inattention or ignorance the most alarming; not only by the want of exertion in the defence of our North American provinces, and the indecisive measures of offence adopted; but also by the continuance of various commercial privileges, unknown to our own subjects. These having been enjoyed for a length of time, have contributed to give the Americans a weight and preponderance which they have

not failed to appreciate; anticipating, with malevolent exultation, the time when, possessed of our provinces also, they shall behold our venerated country bowing with ignominy to their exalted state.

The Author of the following pages is therefore induced to offer them to the public, from the fullest conviction of mind, that, in doing so, he is performing a most urgent duty. He has traversed, as an attentive observer, the West Indies, the United States, and the British provinces of North America; and has possessed himself of opinions and facts, by an intercourse with persons of all ranks and parties; having only one object in view, the development of truth, and the promotion of his country's interest.

Thus excursive, and prosecuting his plan unnoticed, he has had means of investigating causes and effects, which the mere agents of government can never possess. When commissioners are appointed to inquire into the affairs of a colony, or investigate causes of complaint, they do it under circumstances highly unfavourable to the attainment of their object. No sooner do they arrive, than their motives are avowed, their pursuits are known, and they must also support the dignity of their mission by a suitable rank, calculated to give the necessary eclat to their mission. Their company, under these circumstances, becomes assiduously courted, by what is called the respectable part of the community; while they must not degrade themselves by mixing with the vulgar. Thus, either their time is misspent in the pursuit

of pleasure, to which they are strongly allured by the hospitality of the country, or they are taught to echo the prejudices of a few individuals, and are kept in comparative ignorance of *the real state of things*. Circumstances of this kind have come under the Author's personal observation; and he could, if necessary, give a striking instance of an expensive and pompous commission, arriving in a colony where abuses in a certain department existed, and were matters of such notoriety as to be the subjects of general conversation at the very time of its arrival, and during the whole of its stay; notwithstanding which, it is a fact that the commissioners departed without making the necessary discovery. But as it is not the Author's intention to excite the popular discontent, or cast an invidious censure on the respectable gentlemen who held the commission, he waves the subject, under the full persuasion that the commissioners were blameless, except in this one point, that they visited only a few leading characters, who studied to divert their attention from the object of their inquiry, while a more open intercourse with the public would have given the desired information.

Governors of colonies would be more able to develop the truth, were it not for the necessity of supporting their rank and state. Add to which, being frequently military characters, with a very superficial knowledge of commercial affairs, they are not often much acquainted with the spirit of trade, or the secret springs which animate the body politic, particularly those which call forth the energies of a colony. In short, a variety of circumstances combine to

keep them in an astonishing state of ignorance, and thereby to perpetuate error and misconception.

Ministers to the United States are in a still more dangerous situation, having there to encounter a universal system of deception. No pains are spared to flatter their vanity, soothe their appetites, or decoy them into engagements better suited to the traveller in quest of pleasure, than to the agent of a government. By these insidious arts, false impressions are stamped on their minds; and thus prepossessed, they communicate their sentiments to the government at home; sentiments which deceive and poison the public mind, and paralyze public measures.

The evils of this fatal prepossession have been most severely felt throughout the late war; evils which might have been obviated, had just conceptions of the enemy's character been formed. It is indeed much to be regretted, that government, in order to obtain more accurate information, does not employ SECRET EMISSARIES. An intelligent active man, who might visit a colony, or the United States, as a mere traveller, would prove of the greatest service to Great Britain; furnished with credentials to show, in cases of necessity only, and funds which would be comparatively trifling to defray his expenses. He might mix in various societies, inspect the forts, sea-ports, &c. without exciting the least suspicion; and thus communicate to the government at home the fac-similes of the real state of things abroad, which neither an accredited agent, or any person in his suite, could ever possess. Persons in abundance might

be selected from the *middle class* of society, who, for a slender travelling stipend, and a trifling remuneration for their time and labour, could prosecute the necessary inquiries, and do the business most effectually.

Far be it from the Author to censure the proceedings of Government; he would much rather applaud the humanity and justice of their measures, combined with corresponding feelings on the part of the people: these pointed to the consanguinity of the American nation, and restrained the arm of power, more especially in the early stages of the war. His province will be to show the erroneous judgment which Great Britain has entertained of America, and to disclose the deadly hatred, the rooted antipathy, the active and insatiable ambition of the latter: he will endeavour to prove that, in peace equally as in war, she must be watched with a jealous eye, and vigilant precaution exercised to prevent an insidious and aspiring nation from giving her vital interests a mortal blow.

He has in the following pages endeavoured to develop what are the confident expectations of the majority of the American people, and their opinion of Britons; to trace their genius, display their resources, and exhibit a lucid view of their true character, moral and physical. In fact, exasperated at the virulence and malignity displayed by the Americans in their comments on Great Britain; mortified to hear the opprobrious epithet of *slaves* daily given to her subjects; his feelings recoiling at the more inveterate animo-

sity of many resident Britons, than even of the native Americans, and witnessing the rise and progress of the domineering faction's *war penchant*; with the gross, scandalous, and novel methods, devised to inflame the public mind; the excessive eagerness of the people to commence hostilities; the activity displayed in training the militia, enlisting regulars, building forts, and fitting out privateers, &c.;—he was led to entertain an opinion of the real character of the nation, and the necessity of dispelling the mists of error, which screened her from the view of Britain. From the commencement of the war, he feared unpleasant consequences would result from the palpable misconception and forbearance on the one hand, opposed to very extraordinary diligence and determined hostility on the other.

The Author has not been an inattentive observer also of the rapid rise of the American manufactures; he formed opinions on the spot, and being well convinced that an exposure of the national danger was essential to the national interest, he has presumed to attempt the task; to direct and prevent the dissipation of the energies of this country; to awaken the nobility, the gentry, and the public, to the vast importance of the British colonies; and at the same time to propose plans for checking the growth, and dangerous career of the United States, by taking advantage of the inherent weakness of their country, of our superior means of aggression and defence; and, in short, by adopting in many particulars *their own system of policy*.

These are the objects and the views which have induced the Author to appear before the tribunal of a liberal public. He hopes that purity of motive may apologize for any defects of style; while it will fully appear from the freedom of his opinions and censures, that he is of no party; but that, divested alike of prejudice or flattery, he consults his conscience, and the good of his country, in the production of a work which will most assuredly create numerous enemies. His strictures on public measures may give umbrage to men in power; his approbation of the Corn Bill will displease the manufacturing and commercial classes; the advice he offers respecting "coloured men" will disgust the Creoles; and the Americans will resent the whole tenor of the work. He offers his thoughts at this moment, *because every succeeding event more firmly establishes the truths he has exhibited*, and as a return of peace is likely to produce a fatal state of confidence and security, with a relaxation of measures and precautions, the necessity of which Britain was but beginning to learn at the conclusion of the war, and which will soon be forgotten, unless this effort is productive of good equal to the Author's ardent desires.



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# COLONIAL POLICY

OF  
Great Britain.

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## CHAP. I.

### ON THE TRUE POLICY OF NATIONS.

IT is an affecting proof of general depravity, that nations in a state of peace, should be obliged to entertain suspicions of the sincerity and justice of each other.

The principle of self-aggrandizement operates universally, affecting states as well as individuals, in proportion to their respective powers; and po-

liticians have therefore found the necessity of adapting their plans, not according to the systems of speculative philosophers, who consider man as he ought to be, rather than what he really is, but agreeably to the sober dictates of experience, and of fact.

Nations who have maintained mutual intercourse with each other during long successive periods, seem insensibly to act on this maxim; the numerous instances of treachery, and the conflicts which each has sustained, only tending to establish a permanent system of jealousy and caution, now proved to be necessary to the security of political existence and social order. Hence it requires no laboured argument to convince the meanest English capacity, that the French, the Spaniards, the Dutch, &c. are natural enemies: the longest peace, and closest mutual intercourse would not obliterate the indelible impression, stamped by experience on the mind of each succeeding age.

Whenever a nation, through degeneracy of manners, or too much liberality of opinion and confidence, deviates from this beaten track, it be-

comes liable to disaster. Other nations, profiting by its supineness, will not fail to attempt the establishment of their own power and grandeur on its ruins; and nothing can avert the impending calamity, but some vigorous and mighty effort of the nation awakened from its slumbers. This lamentable state of supineness and intoxication has generally proved the result of long trains of success, and of splendid victories, whose narcotic influence disposes a people to recline on the laurels they have gained, contemplating their prowess with complacency, until overpowered with the death-like sleep of false security.

If, when thus elated with success, a petty foe should arise, *it would be despised*: no precautionary measure would be adopted; the skill, courage, and resources of the enemy, would be underrated; the usual means that hitherto ensured success would be neglected; and vanity, presumption, disdain, and indolence, usurp the place of decided efforts and prudent measures. The enemy, on the contrary, ungraced by brilliant trophies, a mere stripling in the art of war, enters the lists with diffidence, armed with every precaution; with vigilance to profit by each advan-

tage; and calling to its aid veterans of all descriptions, availing itself of even profligate traitors to its adversary. Thus circumstanced, the conflict ensues; the weak and contemptible foe gains victories it dared not expect, and triumphs over its brave but too secure opponent. Disgraces of this nature, however, are not without the most beneficial results: they arouse and teach the necessity of circumspection, evincing the utility of knowing, as well as communicating the true character of the enemy.

It is not only in war that the collected wisdom of ages has established immutable maxims of vigilance and precaution: experience and observation prove the same watchful policy to be necessary to an equal degree in the time of peace. During a state of repose, emissaries obtain easy access to explore secret state diseases, the machinery, and manufactures of rival countries: while they diffuse the slow poison of corruption, and, alluring those employed with the prospect of superior rewards, they gradually obtain possession of the secret springs of national prosperity and glory.

In her intercourse with European states, Great Britain is sufficiently on her guard both in peace and war: alike maintaining an imposing, commanding attitude. Accustomed to the violation of treaties which promised stability, she views without astonishment a rupture, with one, or all the powers combined, and by a steady perseverance in the line of duty, obtains the triumph: nothing within the range of human events being capable of affecting her prosperity, while intent and watchful in the preservation of her superiority in war and commerce. But if from any cause she relax her system, or suffer a rival to feed on her resources, until from infancy it attain the strength of manhood, the period may arrive, when her glories shall only exist in remembrance, while submitting to the most painful degradations from the enemy she formerly treated with disdain.

If, on a review of the various nations of the world, *one* should be discovered more qualified to become a dangerous enemy, and successful rival, possessing superior means of disuniting her defenders, decoying her manufacturers and mechanics, what line of policy ought she then to pursue towards that state? Should implicit confi-

dence be reposed in such a nation? Should it be admitted to a participation in her commerce, divested of the restraints imposed on her own subjects, and to a lucrative intercourse with her colonies and possessions? Should it be permitted to despoil her by thousands of an industrious population, or oppose to this the encouragement of emigration to her own colonies? If that nation's frontier present on all sides points of aggression, should she fail in opposing an adequate force, or in war making the most vigorous use thereof? Or should she, on the contrary, expose her own frontier to the danger arising from wiser measures, and more prudent conduct, on the part of the aspiring rival?

AMERICA, independent America, is precisely this nation; more insidious than any other; more dangerous as using the same language; difficult of detection in the employment of emissaries and spies, or of inquisitions on the manufactures of this country. That America is a dangerous competitor; that her pretensions must be opposed; and that a consistent opinion has not been formed of the American character, it will be the Author's aim to make apparent in the following pages,

while he also presumes to offer his humble opinion and advice on this momentous subject. If what he has to say, serves to arouse the attention of Government and the people, to awaken inquiry, and excite to an active prosecution of the ordinary measures of policy which are pursued in relation to other states, he will obtain the satisfaction of having accomplished the object he has in view: in a word, if it teaches Englishmen to regard Americans in the same point of view in which they themselves are considered, that is, not in the light of *kinsmen, but of foreigners, aliens, enemies, natural-born foes.*

Let him then entreat the attention of all ranks and parties, who profess to be actuated by the sacred glow of patriotic feeling, to what he has to say; let this feeling be as simultaneous now as that which our ancestors formerly exhibited, when danger seemed to threaten. Let the opulent encourage and promote wise plans, and the poor concur in measures adopted for their good; then shall Britain avert the impending evil, and transmit her glories untarnished to the latest posterity.

## CHAP. II.

## ON THE GENIUS OF THE AMERICANS.

THE traveller whose sole object is to amuse the public, may expatiate on, and present to his readers florid descriptions of, places and things; he may relate humorous anecdotes, or enliven his work by the insertion of striking historical sketches, and excel in the delineation of individual character: but the object which the author of this work has in view, is to instruct and inform, rather than amuse: his design is rather to trace the features of a race than of individuals.

In surveying the American people, they appear to be of all nations the most active, enterprising, patient, laborious, frugal, persevering, cautious, and not deficient in ingenuity. None excel them in the conduct of a lucrative commerce, or in daring feats of seamanship; they possess personal courage, are expert in the use of fire arms; and, traversing their forests, the American military are better adapted to the woody war-

fare of their own country, than European troops, whose discipline in such situations is rendered comparatively useless; irregular troops being able to hold veterans at bay, and destroy them at pleasure, while they themselves rest secure amidst their gloomy foliage.

Such a people deserve to hold a place in our estimation: they possess qualities, which make it necessary to concede them a rank in the scale of nations, *being capable of forcing themselves into notice*.—Prejudiced persons, who regard those nations only as respectable who can claim antiquity, may attempt to degrade America in the opinion of the people of Europe; and indeed such false representations have been made to the British public, as has taught many of us to regard America as much less formidable than what experience has proved her to be. The nation that is thus despised, obtains a decided advantage by that very circumstance; and it renders peculiarly necessary the removal of the film, which seems at present to obscure the political sight of this country.

The Americans are exceedingly enterprising in

their commercial transactions, particularly those who form the New England states, where petty adventurers often risk their whole property in one small vessel, depending on their address, and the contingencies of trade, for their whole support. The very boys are speculators. If they possess a few dollars, they are immediately expended in merchandise, which is committed to the care of a master or mate of a vessel for the West Indies. Thus the spirit of enterprise is universal among them, and would deserve high commendation, were it always conducted on just and liberal principles; but the reverse is in general the case: fraud, smuggling, and perjury, are practised with success \* and without reserve; and thus cupidity

\* At one period, American vessels were not permitted to land British goods or colonial produce in the States; but the island, or rather rock of St. Bartholomew's, belonging to a power with whom open commerce was permitted, the American vessels would take in their cargo at a British island, and go to St. Barts, as it is called, in order to clear out. This circumstance was notorious. If two American ships hailed at sea, the answer to "from whence come ye?" would be, "from St. Barts," and the rejoinder, "aye, aye;" intimating by this, that they gave them credit for their knavery, and were resolved to engage in the same, when opportunity afforded. Thus while it was known to be impossible for the rock of St. Barts to produce sugars, rum, and molasses, innumerable cargoes arrived in the United States, *and were sworn to* as the pro-

prevails among them to an astonishing degree. An eminent divine of Boston, thus justly characterized his countrymen from the pulpit, on "putting away the easily besetting sin." "There have existed at all times," said he, "not only personal and peculiar, but also national sins; for instance, among the ancients, the Asiatics were accused of effeminacy, the Carthaginians of perfidy, &c. So among the moderns, the French are said to be volatile and frivolous; the Spaniards proud and cruel; the English haughty, and evincing too great contempt for strangers; and we, my brethren, of being greedy of gain, and not over scrupulous how we obtain it!" Hence it would seem, that whatever portion of ability we may concede to the Americans, we must deny them the character of either a good or a great people.

A people may be great in virtues, though not numerous: they may also be ingenious, subtle, brave, hardy, and patient; yet grovelling and contemptible. Where moral excellence does not

duce of that island A successful Captain would be complimented as a "keen hand:" if detected, it would be jocosely said, "he has missed it."

exist, other qualities cannot rescue a nation from ignominy. None can deny that the Jewish people possess an ample share of talent, ingenuity, shrewdness, and capacity for business; but who will applaud the meanness and fraud attributed to them? A few individuals even of striking probity, do not compensate for the general depravity.

The vices that now degrade the American character, are those which distinguish an aged and enfeebled nation, where corruption has out-grown the laws, and morals are despised. It may be asked, can a people, who, in the infancy of their political existence, exhibit all the decrepitude of an antiquated state, hope long to support the tottering edifice of their feeble constitution? The answer would be obvious; yet if their commerce be permitted, either mediately or immediately with our colonies and islands, they may exist long enough to make us know, by bitter experience, the real weight of successful competition. The remedy is now within our power; let not its application be longer delayed.

Another obvious trait in the American charac-

ter is vanity. Ostentatious and conceited in an eminent degree, the Americans will allow nothing to be excellent or praise-worthy in foreigners. All other men, Britons not excepted, are regarded by them with contemptuous disdain; and should one of the latter reside in America, or join in the society of her people, he will be soon informed, to his great surprise, that all British subjects are slaves and vassals, that tyranny and oppression pervade every department of the state, and that their own happy country, and admirable constitution, is the only resort for hopeless misery. *There* men are all free; *there* alone the virtues flourish; and *thither*, as to a place of refuge, are the arts and sciences destined to flee, when the progress of tyranny in Europe shall have banished them thence. His astonishment would be increased by further hearing that the people of the "*old country*," meaning Great Britain, are degenerated, not only in moral virtue, but in physical power; an opinion which might with safety be left to the judgment of the antiquarian, were not the fact so well known, as of itself to refute the idle notion, that the heroes of history did not exceed the generality of moderns in stature. But it will be further insisted on, that

there exists an exact proportion between European degeneracy and American improvement: that they now are larger bodied, more brave, enlightened, and ingenious. Flattered extremely by their having given birth to a few eminent artists,\* they presumptuously suppose that the fine arts flourish only with them! But in vain do they lay claim to this superiority, so long as it remains true that individuals *resident* in America, who have attained great eminence in mechanics, in mill work, and in the construction of immense wooden bridges † on true mathematical principles; and while men of real talent, in other departments of science that have appeared among them, ‡ are well known to have been emigrants from this side of the Atlantic. Thus then the facts stand: in physical force, the Americans resemble the Europeans: if any difference exist, it is in favour of those on this side the Atlantic.

\* Messrs. West, Copley, Stuart, &c.

† A bridge across the Merrimack, near Newbury Port, is a fine example.

‡ Dearborne's machines; patent balance; an improved Printing Press, &c.

The same comparison will hold good, if, from a general survey, we descend to minuter comparisons, unless perhaps we except the instance of close manufacturing towns, where peculiarity of situation and employment are found to affect the human constitution. In stature the Americans rather exceed the English: but their appearance is neither more manly nor more vigorous; the northern or eastern states producing the finest men, as do the northern counties of England.

That which has tended greatly to confirm the Americans in this overweening conceit of themselves, is the comparison of our seamen with their own, not recollecting the immense disproportion in numbers, and especially, that they have selected for their navy the finest men, while ours are the remains of a protracted war, which has swept away its thousands, and tens of thousands.

With respect to the Arts, admitting all that America claims, yet she can never with justice boast of an equality, much less a superiority to the more ancient nations. They were originally sunk in barbarism and the deepest ignorance; divested of foreign aid, they arose from this

moral and intellectual chaos, by the united efforts of genius and industry; discovered and improved the arts and sciences, till at length they attained comparative perfection; she adopted the fruit of their labours in its improved state, transplanted the full grown trees which they had reared, and only gave them shelter; *theirs* was the originating animating principle; *hers*, the felicity of receiving indigent strangers of merit, and founding her prosperity on their exertions. While restricted to such conduct, America deserved applause; but in depreciating those nations to which she is so much indebted for existence, and the supply of skilful men, she merits the severest censure: ingratitude stands conspicuous in the black list of her vices.

Ambition and the lust of dominion characterize the republicans of America. An ardent desire to extend their sway over every part of the continent, and to extirpate all authority but their own, has strongly marked their public acts, manifesting itself even in their favourite toasts and sentiments. In short, it is the darling object of the whole nation, which sooner or later may be gratified, if we neglect to strengthen Canada,

Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, but not otherwise.

Inflated with partial successes on the ocean, their national vanity displayed itself in the most extravagant eulogies on the superior skill and prowess of their seamen. This theme was loudly touched by the Federal party. A navy had long been an unpopular measure; the ruling faction had neglected and opposed its formation: the Federalists alone saw the vast importance of a naval power, and were the original founders of it. This circumstance ought to be particularly considered by the British public, because those have been esteemed friends, who were in fact the most dangerous foes.

At the present period the Federalists and Democrats coincide in the full persuasion of the declining state of the British naval power, and of the brilliant destinies now awaiting their own; expecting to divest the parent of her trophies, and to annihilate her commerce as well as her navy, at a period not far distant! Various circumstances have contributed to flatter them into this opinion. Great Britain has been fondly desig-

nated “ *a magnificent, but sinking vessel.*” This will prove delusive, if they by whom she is directed exert those energies and that ability they so amply possess: on the contrary, she shall ride safely amidst contending storms, till her glories shall be merged only in the last, the general convulsion, while she has existed to dispense peace and beneficence to every shore.

### CHAP. III.

#### ON THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES.

AMERICA, like every other state, is divided into political parties. These range themselves respectively under the denominations of Federal-republican,—and Democratic; the former embracing a considerable proportion of the most enlightened and virtuous part of the community, and which would in all probability rescue the nation from the disgrace and opprobrium brought upon it by impolitic and unjust measures, were not their exertions repressed: the latter are a body

in general distinguished by ignorance, pertinacity, and infuriate party violence, under ingenious but unprincipled leaders. Both parties view this country with considerable jealousy; but the Democrats, who may be styled "the people," carry this to the extremity of the most confirmed and rancorous malice; rendered indeed comparatively impotent by its wildness and extravagance; while the Federalists, who are in general the opulent, have more just and consistent views. But should these latter gain the ascendancy, conceive themselves aggrieved, and conclude on war, they will prove more formidable enemies than we have yet encountered, inasmuch as they are decidedly the "naval party," and would consequently strain every nerve to render their fleet truly formidable; and with their vast resources, would in time make it really such. The Federalists are not the friends of Britain, and would continue in peace only so long as their interests did not clash with ours.

It was the *bad policy* of the ruling faction in declaring war *while unprepared for it*, that gave umbrage to the Federalists; not any attachment to this country. The author has heard many re-

spectable characters among them assert, that they were alike injured by England and by France; and had their party been in power, war would have been declared against both! He is also convinced that the men whom we regard as friends, would prove more tenacious of the national honour, than those whom we justly consider as foes. Now as British maritime rights and American claims are incompatible, it will follow that the harmony of the two countries is liable to frequent interruption, and that wars will prove the consequence. Such being the state of parties, and each equally averse to the independence and power of this country, but differing only in the modes of developing their hostility; and the sentiments exhibited in their newspapers being designed rather to conceal, than proclaim the truth, it behoves the British minister, the American government, and the public in general, to consider that the polite attentions, and the hospitality of individuals, must not be mistaken for the feelings and sentiments of the party.

## CHAP. IV.

## ON THE CHARACTER AND QUALIFICATIONS NECESSARY IN A BRITISH MINISTER TO THE UNITED STATES.

In diplomatic transactions, much care should be exercised in the selection of suitable persons, but particularly in respect to the choice of a charge d'affairs to America. It is highly expedient that he be past the meridian of life; of retired, yet observant habits; and possessing the most extensive local information of the country to which he is deputed, as well as of our colonies on her frontier.—It is highly expedient also that his secretary be a native of the provinces, for such are best qualified to give information respecting them. Besides accredited ministers, it is incumbent on the British government to employ *secret emissaries*, who may occasionally communicate with the *charge d'affairs* or government at home. On the contrary, it would be, and indeed it has

been most injurious to delegate a young unmarried man, who may be easily entangled in the snares of an amour, to the neglect of the most important interests of his country : or surrounded by enemies in the disguise of friends, and led by them from party to party, who would also by the most insidious conversation, mislead his judgment, and bias his opinions ; hence it would follow, that being kept in ignorance of the real state of things, imbibing the opinions of his very friendly hosts, he would transmit to his government the most flattering account of things, perhaps at a time when the most hostile measures were in actual progress, and every thing beyond the pale of the minister's connexions bore the aspect of war. The consequence of this hitherto has been, that the British were cautious in their first operations of war, choosing rather to display, than use their force ; and while this ill-timed forbearance was issuing in disaster and defeat, the Americans were profiting by our inactivity to commence vigorous proceedings, and construed this exercise of benevolence into the extreme of cowardice, supposing that we feared to encounter their superior prowess : and because Britons were formerly victors on the ocean, every partial

defeat was considered as proving the declension of British, and the superiority of American naval power; for it was rarely adverted to, that the American vessels were stronger in men and guns than their opponents; such facts were not to be credited in the states.—These pretensions were carefully pressed upon the minds of prisoners, in connexion with the flattering doctrines of liberty and equality, with the folly of supporting the cause of tyrants, so as finally to overcome their principles of loyalty and patriotism, and thus inducing them to become traitors to their own country. This was universally the case throughout the late war.

A British diplomatist who should suffer himself to be cajoled, would obtain unbounded marks of pretended respect, highly flattering to human vanity; but the minister who was steadily pursuing the real interests of his country, rising superior to the allurements around him, would be utterly disliked; such men would never please the American people. It is futile to object, that unless a conciliatory disposition was manifest on the part of our minister, the two countries might be involved in war; for the Americans will ever be

guided by interest rather than by affection. Under any circumstances, if opportunity and interest combined, they would not fail to break the peace; if they maintained it, it must be for the sake of trade. In short, they have lost the filial affection that would point to their consanguinity; and it is now highly requisite for us to eradicate the idea of their having originally descended from us. When once we can meet them in this respect on equal terms, we shall negotiate with justice to ourselves, and to our posterity.

## CHAP. V.

### ON THE INJURIOUS TENDENCY OF AMERICAN RIVALSHIP IN TIME OF PEACE.

AMERICA possesses facilities for prosecuting nefarious schemes against Great Britain, superior to all other powers. The circumstance of using the same language, gives her decided advantages as a rival.—Other nations may abuse our good faith, but America alone can do it with impuni-

ty. In that country, a Briton may sometimes be distinguished from the native, by certain peculiarities of speech and manner; but in England the American proceeds unnoticed; \* he finds easy access to our manufactories, and gradually obtains, through various channels, the most complete information, which is immediately transmitted to America. Sometimes these emissaries associate with the poorer manufacturers, excite a spirit of discontent, extol in the strongest manner the happy United States, and would make apparent the great advantages of emigration to them. At other times the masters of American vessels, may pursue their plan of decoying seamen from our ships; and this predatory system calls for the most unceasing vigilance on our part; for the American government stands pledged to encourage manufactures to the utmost, while various corporations and establishments have been formed, for the avowed purpose of rivalling those of Britain. And though time is requisite to mature and bring them to perfection, yet from the

\* The American peculiarities; the nasal drone, and frequent use of "I guess," "I swear," "I calculate" (*kalkelate*), "sleek," "slim," "grade," "cents," "dollars," &c. &c. in consequence of our provincial dialects, do not excite attention.

known character of the government and people, no means, however nefarious, will remain unemployed till their object be attained. Already do the Americans manufacture iron, steel, hats, cottons, glass, leather, shoes, cabinet-work, mathematical instruments, types, books, sails, cordage, &c. to a prodigious extent, and of excellent quality. Their edge tools, although not so neat, are better tempered than ours; and their common window glass is both cheaper and superior to our own. Their cotton and woollen manufactories, it is true, are in a low state, and to these they will direct their chief attention; the business of manufactures being prosecuted with enthusiasm. No sooner did an opportunity occur, than Merino sheep were eagerly imported from Spain, and to such an extent as to be sold almost as cheap as the native breed, though the country was at the same time well stocked with mutton. The Merinos have been widely disseminated, the native breed has been in many instances crossed, and in others the Spanish breed perpetuated; it having been ascertained by numerous experiments, that the wool suffers no deterioration, but rather improves by the change of climate.

Still the Americans want the art of dressing their cloth. They can neither shear, nor press well; and no doubt, the greatest exertions will be made immediately, to procure from England a supply of manufacturers in these departments: ransacking Bradford, Troubridge, &c. for persons skilled in the broad-cloth fabric; Glasgow, Paisley, Manchester, &c. for those engaged in the cotton manufacture.—In their attempts to establish broad-cloth factories, various means have been employed to prejudice the country in favour of native goods: *one method is to erase the manufacturer's marks from pieces of English broad-cloth, and substitute those of the American factory in their stead*; thus turning our own ingenuity against us! Let, then, the measures of this country be decisive; let us recollect with whom we have to do; and adopt those precautions that may ensure our safety.

## CHAP. VI.

## ON THE RESPECTIVE NATURES OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN WARFARE, AND THE NECESSITY OF ANTICIPATING HOSTILE OPERATIONS.

As one war with America, which originated partly in French policy, has recently terminated; and as others, from various causes, maybe expected to arise, a few remarks on the mode of American warfare may not be impertinent. Its peculiarities being developed, means may be taken to prevent a recurrence of the disasters which characterized the contest, and which unhappily gave the enemy plausible ground to boast of their superior courage and ability; though the cause might be soon discovered, since a radical difference, in the war maxims, and conduct of the British and Americans is obvious, and will be found to embrace generally the following particulars:

FIRST, The British scrupulously regard the point of honour, while the Americans hold what-

ever is expedient, to be also lawful; imitating, in this respect, the French.—SECONDLY, The British maintain a strict discipline; which, though it be carried to excess, restrains the brutal licentiousness of victorious soldiers: the Americans, on the contrary, cannot enact, much less enforce, laws authorizing severity of discipline. Hence, licentiousness being tolerated, plunder is connived at, with all its concomitants.—THIRDLY, in the British army, not only obedience to, but respect for officers is maintained; while, in the American, the soldier is a companion for his officer.—FOURTHLY, The British soldier, unless from patriotism, is without any strong inducement to fight. When discharged, and unless his wounds entitle him to a pension, he is not sure of a recompense; hence, when he discovers that the Americans, besides their usual pay, &c. give to every private, on his discharge, *three hundred acres of land*, this not only damps his loyalty, but he is under the strongest temptations to desertion.\*—FIFTHLY, The military evolutions of the British are well adapted to European countries, comparatively clear of wood, but are in a great measure useless in the

\* The author will beg leave to call the attention of the public to this circumstance in its proper place.

wilder parts of America; hence, while particular posts on the frontiers should be invested, the war ought to be carried into the heart of the cleared parts of the country. On the contrary, the American tactics are simple and rude; efficient only on the frontier, where their militia can defend a post, or practise a surprise to advantage.—SIXTHLY, In naval affairs, the British have long rejected the use of other missiles than round and grape; while the Americans use longridge, composed of old knife-blades, copper nails, glass, buck-shot, &c.; also, crow-bars, chain-shot, bar-shot, and various other kinds.—SEVENTHLY, The British, in consequence of having employed their large navy for so long a period, at the commencement of the late war, could not man their ships to the full complement; and even the major part of them not being *ordinary seamen*; while the Americans not only took care to select able seamen, but almost doubled the usual complement, and appointed miscreant deserters for quarter-gunners, boatswains, &c.\*—EIGHTHLY, The British being in the habit of rather under-rating their force in guns,

\* When the *Guerriere* was taken, the British officers and crew recognised several sailors on board the enemy's ship. One man, in particular, had been cockswain to Captain Dacres.

the Americans improved on this circumstance, and enlarging the dimensions of their vessels, rated them low; and though their guns were rated as British, they were really of French calibre.—  
 LASTLY, The British, at the commencement of the war, were elate with victory, too confident of success; and by despising the force of the enemy, gave him a decided advantage, which by the Americans was carefully improved. The more thinking part among them, even before the war commenced, anticipated success, which they grounded on the neglect observable in the preparations on the part of the British. When the *Guerriere* was defeated, the ease with which the victory was obtained, excited surprise; but when a second and a third British frigate were captured, the impression of positive superiority over us, was forcibly made on the public mind.

There were opportunities of bringing the late war to an end, without compromising either our national character or interest: these, however, were not only neglected, in consequence of those fatal prepossessions already named, but the general disasters of the war must be attributed to the

same source. New Orleans, even according to the opinion of American officers, might have been captured with the greatest ease, during the first year of the war; but by giving time to fortify what was truly a defenceless coast, we, in fact, deprived ourselves of that important possession. By displaying a large force, and an injudicious mock bombardment of Storrington, \* we excited contempt and indignation.

It is not in the nature of Americans to forget things of this kind. The war now terminated, will be impressed on the mind with the most unchristian virulence: by a *sermon from the pulpit*, on the anniversary of American independence, the whole affair will be misrepresented to posterity, and their hatred confirmed by time. The author has been witness to the acrimony of inflammatory allusions made to the revolutionary

\* This measure, it is asserted, was intended merely to terrify the inhabitants into a release of a certain British lady: copies of a letter, said to be sent by Sir T. K—G to the magistrates, promising to cease the bombardment if the lady were sent on board the squadron, appeared in the American newspapers, with remarks,

war, which abounded in the American Caucuses,\* or political meetings, which preceded the war now closed: these will continue to operate with invincible force.

Since then, America, although disappointed in the issue of the European contest, † has succeeded in obtaining from us an advantageous peace, and still values herself on a supposed pre-eminence over us and all other nations; is it probable she will continue peaceable longer than necessity compels her to do so? No: she has learned to delight in war, and only wants funds to carry it on. This defect she will remedy, by extending her commerce and manufactures; and our exertions must be employed to secure ourselves from her rapacity, even in time of peace.

If at any future period, war should appear inevitable, let not a mistaken humanity induce us patiently to bear provocation, to make conces-

\* *Caucus*, a popular meeting for the discussion of politics. They generally precede elections, many persons addressing the company.

† If, indeed, the American government did not anticipate the return of Bonaparte from Elba, being in the secret.

sions, and to court American friendship; but let Britain anticipate the evil, and be the first to declare war. The distance of the enemy, and her means of annoying our commerce, by the immediate equipment of numerous privateers, before the evil would be remedied by the opposition of an adequate force; or some man of war, unapprized of a rupture, which might be attacked like the Frolic sloop of war, and captured by a vessel of the same nominal force, would inspire the enemy with a species of frantic courage: but by being before-hand in a declaration of war, we should not only deprive her of these advantages, but also, by the employment of sufficient force, cripple her means, and destroy her spirit: we should give such terrible displays of power, without a moment's delay, by the destruction of her commerce, ships, and towns, as thereby effectually to restrain her insolence. Procrastination only induces the more obstinate resistance, and gives time to concentrate and mature the means of defence and attack.\*

\* A dash at Boston, would have succeeded three months after the commencement of the late war; as, excepting the castle, which was not sufficiently strong on the land side to have resisted a bombardment from a convenient unguarded point of land, the other fort

## CHAP. VII.

ON THE RESPECTIVE NATURES OF THE BRITISH AND  
AMERICAN POPULATION.

To unfold the causes which have contributed to raise America to her present height, it will be necessary to trace the origin of property, and consider the circumstances under which the inhabitants of all countries exist.

That the earth, in its unimproved state, is the common property of uncivilized man, is a fact which few have been disposed to deny: but when men more enlightened and industrious, are induced to cultivate the ground, they in a measure create it anew, and possess a right to the labour of their hands; and as the numbers of these increase, that which before appeared a dreary wilderness, becomes a fruitful country, replete with comforts. Thus by degrees the whole terrifications were then out of repair; the whole of which were reconnoitred by the author from the harbour.

ritory is occupied by the active and industrious, while the idle and improvident, no longer able to support themselves by their former means, and in danger of perishing for want, are roused to action; betake themselves to arts, rude at first, but constantly improving, until the productions of the soil are at length explored, and human ingenuity exerted to discover the uses to which these productions may be advantageously applied. Staples are established, and manufactures give employment to those who possess no land, while others, more attached to rural life, continue in the country as labourers for hire.

This state of things is fluctuating perpetually: superior industry, skill, or various circumstances combined, elevate many; want of application and talents reduce others, purchases and sales of land divide properties, or unite many in one mass. Thus great estates are formed, and the splendour of a landed interest established; commerce at length transports superfluous productions to foreign parts, and imports from thence the necessaries or the luxuries of life. Thus employment is given to the whole community; but it dispenses its blessings by very unequal de-

grees: some are enriched, others impoverished; but the number of the latter will always greatly exceed that of the former.—Hence it will come to pass in process of time, that while arts and trade flourish, and agriculture is generally diffused, multitudes of poor will be found wholly dependent on labour, even in the best regulated country; and as these are prone to discontent, the superior condition of their rich neighbours will cause them to repine, producing a disposition to emigrate in order to better their condition. Such is the present state of Great Britain: the country is cultivated, improved, decorated; her staple commodities are well employed as sources of wealth, her trade and manufactures flourish: yet her proportion of poor is very large, whose necessities even her immense wealth, flowing so copiously through innumerable channels, can scarcely supply. Frequent wars have loaded her with taxes, and increased the poverty of some; while others, by their means, have been raised to high dignities and great wealth. It must, however, be confessed, that the condition of the poor has not improved in the same proportion as that of the rich; yet these differences arise from causes inherent and direct, not from

combinations of the rich to oppress the poor, as some imagine, and as the Americans attempt to prove. From this state of things arise effects equally beneficial and injurious. The number of poor diminishes the price of labour, and thereby benefits the mercantile and manufacturing interests; and the numbers whom a small bounty will induce to enlist, give facilities for warlike operations, without which they could not be carried on. But, in opposition to this, paupers and depredators increase, and the poor are compelled to emigrate to those countries where greater advantages are expected to be obtained.

No people know the origin of property better than the Americans; none have it so immediately before their eyes. Not only have they hewed it from their forests, but they have expelled thence the native proprietors. And if the white Americans claim absolute right to lands obtained from the Aborigines by treaty, or force of arms; if the richer Americans amass property, to the exclusion of the poor;—with what countenance can they accuse the opulent in Britain of tyranny and oppression, merely because they apply their property agreeably to the dictates of their own minds? If

the poor in this country are debarred the possession of land, the wants of the rich furnish them with employment. But certainly when the numbers overflow, care should be taken to remove the willing superfluity, by the colonization of foreign possessions, where they may take root and flourish, and eventually prove of the greatest utility to the parent country. For want of due attention to this point, great numbers of British subjects, disaffected to the government, or borne down by adverse circumstances, have sought the shores of independent America. The long continuance of a state of war in Europe, has greatly contributed to swell the lists of emigrants, who, carrying with them their arts and collective experience, have increased both the numerical force and the political importance of the American states, beyond all precedent. To this have been added the advantages of neutral commerce, when all Europe were engaged in war; the connivance of the British to an illicit intercourse with their colonies; and the increased demand for American flour;— a fortunate concurrence of events, which have so contributed to their greatness, since their disunion with the British empire, that it is not surprising

that the people should be elated, and draw comparisons to the disadvantage of other nations.

In this prosperous career the Americans might have proceeded without interruption, had they not perverted the neutral flag, by conduct highly inimical to the British interests, and at the same time given encouragement to the desertion of British seamen; which terminating in an unprofitable war, it is hoped may direct this nation to pursue its true interests.

It is to be expected that, in future, government will persevere in the wise measures it has now adopted, for directing emigration to their American provinces, as it has given decisive proofs of energy and prudence in its late enactments relative to the number of passengers in outward-bound vessels, and the restrictions on the importation of grain.

## CHAP. VIII.

## ON COLONIES IN GENERAL.

THE progress of man towards a state of civilization, and the benefits of society, seems to have been more rapid in the earliest ages, than at later periods. We learn from the sacred narrative respecting the confusion of languages, the immense multitudes that were bound together by one common language; and when circumstances occasioned their dispersion, the rapid progress of infant settlements. It would appear that Asia, the primitive seat of man, was peculiarly suited to the colonization of the emigrant tribes of the human species, in not being so entirely covered with wood as Europe or America in after times. We may possibly reject as fabulous, the accounts which historians have given us, of an army of a million of men under Semiramis, which traversed from Chaldea to India; but the history of the Patriarchs, who followed the pastoral life, and who could wander from Chaldea

to Egypt, and from Egypt back to Palestine, finding pasturage for immense flocks of cattle and herds of various kinds, abundantly shows that nature had left the country comparatively clear of wood, and that they were not often under the necessity of spending their time in cutting down immense forests, or even bestowing much labour in cultivating the ground, to procure the means of subsistence for man and beast. It is however certain, that the continent of Asia was very thickly inhabited, and that at length it poured its superfluous population, in copious colonies, throughout Europe and Africa.

Colonies, then, owe their origin to this simple circumstance, namely, a desire to wander in quest of superior advantages in a foreign land. In Europe and Asia, it is reasonable to suppose the adventurers met with the same obstacles which now present themselves to the American colonist: their progress, in the formation of societies, was neither so rapid nor so extensive as their progenitors. Entering on a forest, the work of clearing and cultivation was performed but slowly, and under the greatest difficulties: they were obliged to confine themselves to a small district, while the

adjacent country continued a solitary wilderness, but into which the more idle part of the community resorting, found subsistence on the wild fowl with which the woods abounded, and in process of time became savages like those of America. The same causes which first led to emigration continuing to operate, fresh bands continued to issue from the parent country, who were either received as friends, and, joining themselves to their predecessors, united in the same system, enlarging the bounds of cultivation; or else, attacked and subdued the defenceless colonists, investing themselves with the labours of the vanquished, whom they compelled to cultivate the soil as slaves. But whenever the original possessors were sufficiently strong, and united to defend themselves, they removed to still more distant parts, forming distinct settlements; and history records the foundations of mighty empires, laid in colonies arising from this hostile source.

The Romans first established colonies systematically in aid of their grand plan of empire. These differed not only in their tendency and organization, from all that had preceded them, but also materially from each other. All former colonies

having been led by some adventurous chief, independent of the nations from whence they issued, or gradually grew from the fortuitous amalgamation of a multitude, brought together without plan or leader; while, on the contrary, it was the Roman policy to plant colonies for the purpose of keeping conquered countries in subjection, and as a reward to those citizens who had promoted the public good.\* These colonies were either municipal, or military; the former for the general purposes of agriculture and trade, the latter merely as garrisons: in no instance, however, did a Roman senate devise a colonial system on the modern principle of monopoly and exclusion.

From the decline of the Roman empire, colonies have arisen partly from war, and partly from the desire of nations and individuals to improve their condition, till the discovery of America, and the passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, produced an entirely new system—the object of which is, equally to benefit the infant colony, and enrich the parent state, by mutual dependence, and a participation of reciprocal be-

\* In this, Britain should imitate the Romans.

nefits: the colony depending on its parent for protection, while, in return, it transmitted to *her alone* its staple exports. This system indeed was not perfected, nor its advantages fully appreciated, till, by the rapid progress of some individuals, and the failure of others, governments were induced, not barely to concur in the establishment, but to lend their aid in promoting and extending their colonies. The effects were soon apparent, by the rapid increase of those states in wealth and naval power.

Britain and France long rivalled each other in their colonial career. The latter, at length, yielded to the fortunes of the former, whose sway, in territorial influence, was now ample, and her power and riches great and increasing.

The seeds of discord, however, were sown in some of the colonies from their first establishment. These, and the hatred borne to the mother country, by convicts, whom she had transported to America, were never eradicated. A few men of speculative minds, of restless tempers, and great ambition, profited by this latent hostility, to magnify a trifling incident into a dangerous conspi-

racy of the mother country, for destroying the liberties of the colonies! No means were spared to inflame the minds of the people, and unhappily the British government adopted measures of coercion, when a timely concession of the point would probably have proved a lasting bond of union between the colonies and parent state, and have also disappointed the ambitious projects of revolutionary leaders. Had America continued a British province, she would have derived advantages in that state, vastly superior to any she now possesses in her independent form. That her commerce would have increased in a superior degree, may be proved by a simple reference to Halifax, St. John's, and Quebec.\* It would have kept pace with that of the mother country, whose power would have proportionally increased, and reflected an abundant share of prosperity on the colonies; † with the advantage of British capital,

\* The exports and imports of Quebec alone, in the year 1808, were as follows:—

Exports,	-	-	-	-	£1,156,060
Imports,	-	-	-	-	610,000
					£546,060
Balance in favour of the colony,	-				

† If the United States were still part of the British empire, France would have no chance in contending against us.

to extend their manufactures, and clear their lands, although it is well known that a very considerable proportion of their merchants now trade from the same stock in a covert way.

If these positions be admitted, then it follows that if they were yet united to us, we should enjoy, in an increasing ratio, the benefits of their trade and additional strength. If, on the contrary, it be asserted, that the United States have been gainers by the change; that they have increased in power and wealth, more than they would have done as colonies, however false these assertions; yet, if it be simply true, that they are now in a state to rival this country, and threaten its overthrow, then should our government consider American affairs as deserving its most serious attention, and adopt a corresponding system of colonization, blending the policy of the ancient Romans with that of modern nations; converting her colonies into the means of increasing both her strength and her opulence. In the next chapter, we shall attempt to prove that the measure pregnant with these benefits, would not be attended with danger.

## CHAP. IX.

ON THE SECURITY OF THE BRITISH AMERICAN  
COLONIES.

THE British provinces in North America have the strongest inducement to continue loyal, that can operate on the human mind. Interest, that powerful *impetus* to society, which frequently represses and destroys the feelings of consanguinity, rivets those provinces to the mother country. By continuing loyal, they have every thing to gain; by joining the independent federation of the neighbouring states, they have every thing to lose: by their connexion with us, they acquire importance and wealth; by seceding, they would soon sink into their original insignificance.

Their geographical position and climate, the circumstance of the river St. Lawrence being shut up by the ice during several months in each year, would reduce the Canadas, if they joined the union, to the situation of the *lowest states*;

while, equally with their own, the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia *lumber trade* would be ruined by the competition of the New England states. Instead of enjoying, as they now do, an increasing trade in these articles with Britain and her dependencies, even this diminished trade, would be obnoxious to *frequent interruption*, in time of war with England; who, by blockading *one river*, could effectually destroy the commerce of these extensive countries. Their fisheries would also suffer in a still greater proportion: even now they have felt the weight of rivalry, and in a great measure yielded to the activity and enterprise of the republicans, who possessing superior facilities, have borne away the principal share of this valuable branch of commerce: nor can it be doubted, in the event of their union with the states, that this competition, with all its disadvantages, would be increased: on the other hand, if this country properly consult her own safety and interest, they will have the glorious prospect of a monopoly, fraught with the greatest benefits.— We may add to these the evils of separation before alluded to, the growing taxes, and the exclusion from some important branches of commerce, which independent America now experiences,

and which, while they diminish her advantages, will, in the same ratio, promote the interests of the British colonies.

Can it then be supposed, that men thus situated, will voluntarily separate from a country, from whom they derive these solid advantages? The thing is highly improbable; nor can the example of the United States be fairly adduced, since, as was before observed, the seeds of revolution were early sown there. On the contrary, the British provinces of Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, were peopled almost exclusively by American loyalists, who have preserved, unimpaired, that attachment to this country which caused their expatriation. The settlers who have since joined them, have, with the former, enjoyed the fostering care of government, and a popular constitution, with all the advantages before enumerated; while the French inhabitants of Lower Canada, being those only whose good disposition might be at all questioned, have evinced on every occasion the contrary feelings of loyalty and patriotism: and whatever predilections they might entertain for France, it is certain they would most decidedly oppose the Unit-

ed States: in short, the general good disposition and conduct of the provinces, during the late war, stands eminently conspicuous, and merits a suitable reward.

Though this country, since the fatal American secession, has made but few attempts to extend her colonies, yet the bond of union between her and the loyal provinces has been drawn much closer, in consequence of the existence of an independent rival in their neighbourhood; while experience has shown the inability of the United States to conquer Canada, even in its present state: although one argument urged in Congress on behalf of a declaration of war, was the ease and certainty with which the provinces would be conquered. It was even represented that the provincials would not resist, but meet their invaders, and recognise in them deliverers from tyranny and oppression; or that if, contrary to expectation, they did resist, they might, when conquered,\*

\* So confident were the Americans of success, that General Dearborne had actually prepared a triumphal coat, richly decorated with oak leaves, as the victor's mead, which was destined to be worn on entering Quebec. The popular toast was, "may the army eat its Christmas dinner in Quebec."

be retained as a pledge, to secure more favourable terms of peace. Britain, it was said, "would make any sacrifice rather than leave valuable colonies in the enemy's hands," while, among the many curious speculations that were made of the importance of these provinces to the United States, it was estimated that the *coal alone* of Cape Breton and Nova Scotia would repay the expenses of a seven years \* war: yet with all these inducements and exertions, their aims have been frustrated, and Canada has triumphed over all the hostile attacks of the United States of America.

\* Unwise reservations to the crown of all mines, &c. essentially injure the colonies. The Cape Breton coal is farmed by a company, who make shameful use of their monopoly, to keep coals dear at Halifax. While there have been numerous grains of pure gold found in Nova Scotia; and it is presumed there are veins of that metal in the province. Chrystal is found in the basin of mines at Cape Blowmedown and the Asbestos in considerable quantities: the inhabitants having no encouragement to use their internal resources.

## CHAP. X.

## ON THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

A COUNTRY is strong in proportion to its means of defence, and weak in proportion to the extension of its frontier and the thinness of its population. Hence islands are strong as surrounded by the sea, and invincible when employing a superiority of naval force.

America, possessing a sea frontier of great extent, and large navigable rivers, enjoys the means of building ships in safety, far inland, and of sending them to sea. Those, when once off the coast, can range the ocean with impunity; while their return is facilitated by the innumerable harbours which present themselves, especially to the *eastward*. On this coast, fogs and variable winds prevail, rendering it difficult to watch or

blockade the creeks and commodious inlets with which it abounds. But these circumstances render it impossible for the Americans to guard against predatory incursions. Floating armies, confining their operations to descents on the coast, and hovering about, could perpetually harass them by marches and countermarches, while their real point of attack might be effectually concealed. The safety of their seaports, during the late war, is rather owing to British forbearance than to the strength of their fortifications: even New York is not impregnable, though protected by Castle Williams.

As it is of great importance to the British government always to be fully and accurately informed concerning the military positions of the United States, it may be fairly presumed that due attention will always be paid to this point: it would enable invaders frequently to *turn* a post that was too strong for direct attack. For instance, with the requisite information, in an attack on Boston, cavalry might be landed near Scilluate, who, by a quick movement, could surprise and possess themselves of *Dorchester heights*, while a feint was made in front of the

harbour ; and the heights once taken, the town would not be tenable, and must capitulate without much bloodshed.

The French government were very assiduous in the collection of information relative to America : the change, the parade, the public works, were all infested by French emissaries, who continually transmitted the most accurate intelligence to their employers ; and as Buonaparte had certainly the conquest of that country in view, if opportunities had been afforded for making the attempt, his operations would soon have proved, that he knew the geography of the country well.

The great extent of the United States inland frontier, renders it extremely vulnerable, while their principal rivers rise but a short distance from our own, and would greatly facilitate the advance of an army into the interior. Such being our rival's situation, it becomes an imperious duty incumbent on us to strengthen the opposing frontier, and to be ready to act on the offensive, if occasion required, which would operate as a diversion to draw the militia from the coast. And

if the British forces under Generals Amherst, Wolfe, and Prideaux, could commence operations at three distant points, and succeed in forming a junction at Montreal, it would not be difficult to march from Canada on New York, in co-operation with a sufficient force from the Atlantic; especially as the country near Lake Champlain, which in General Wolfe's time was a dreary wilderness, now presents flourishing settlements and improved roads. The same improvements are also observable on the Mohawk, Connecticut, Susquehanna, Illinois, and Kennebec rivers.

Thus holding Canada, and preserving it in a proper military condition, no state in the Union could be secure from an irruption from thence into its very interior, if occasion required; while her own inherent strength may be appreciated by calling to mind, that, previous to 1758, with a slender population, she held in check, for a considerable period, and frequently beat the whole British army, though greatly superior in numbers and equipment.

If Canada, when an infant settlement, displayed such an imposing posture, what may not be expected from her in future? In the late contest

the resistance she made, proved that her frontier is worthy the most serious attention of the parent country; and when duly re-enforced, will prove an impregnable barrier to American encroachment, as well as a key at all times to the hostile states. This subject is deserving the more respect, from the consideration that the Americans have avowed their determination to possess Canada, and never to lose sight of that object; and this especially, as the peace recently concluded cannot be regarded as very sincere. The unexpected changes that have lately occurred in Europe, may possibly contribute to encourage America again to commence hostilities. \*

It is to be regretted, that a change in the frontier line of the provinces, has not been insisted on in the treaty of Ghent. But as the author considers that subject of vast importance, he reserves his opinions upon it for another chapter. In the mean time, however, the British public ought to be informed, that American ambition aims not only at the reduction of Canada, but also at the extirpation of the Indians, which will be much facilitated

\* Written before the battle of Waterloo.

by their knowledge of the frontier, giving them a decided advantage in their negotiations with us. Hence those extensive regions lying to the westward of Lakes Michigan and Superior, have been marked out as the seat of future states, under the title of Indiana! Thus from the Lake of the Woods, to the Falls of St. Anthony, and thence to Lake Erie, hostile settlements are forming on the borders of Upper Canada; and that, no doubt, with an ultimate view to its entire reduction. The circumstance of *the existence of these colonies*, should rouse the attention of this government: their inhabitants at present are thinly scattered, and it is not likely that a great population will gather around them, if Britain do but colonise her own provinces. Forty thousand emigrants disposed along the frontier, from Kingston to Lake Superior, and the same number settled in other parts of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, would be amply sufficient for all the purposes of agriculture and defence. Until that number be completed, this nation should not be satisfied, nor consider her provinces to be secure.

## CHAP. XI.

## ON THE INDIAN ALLIES.

IT is now a fact well understood, that the friendship of the Indians to this country, when engaged in an American war, is of the most decided advantage. Hence it has been the policy of our commanders in Canada, to conciliate their esteem. In this Sir William Johnson and General Brock were eminent examples, and the death of the latter was peculiarly disastrous, as he knew so well how to manage their capricious tempers. The bravery and good conduct of these poor allies, their attachment to this country, and to its Sovereign, whom they style "*their Great Father,*" merits both our applause and gratitude; \*

\* The fate of the brave chief Tecumseth, claims the tear of sympathy. After the most signal displays of heroic courage, he fell, and was found by the Americans, who, after flaying the body, stuffed the skin with straw, and displayed it as a trophy!—If this instance of

and though in war they are cruel and revengeful, yet in peace they are just in their dealings, punctual in the observance of promises, of strict veracity, and scrupulously honest; deserving the utmost care in their instruction and civilization, yet suffering more by our bad example than they gain by our intercourse.

It now appears beyond the possibility of contradiction, that American policy is directed towards the total extermination of the Indians. Our policy, on the contrary, should be to collect and concentrate their scattered tribes, attaching them to our interests, by blending them, if possible, with our own people, by means of intermarriages: and the author entertains the pleasing opinion, that complete success in the attainment of this object may soon be expected, provided sufficient attention is paid to their true interests.

Partial attempts to improve the condition of barbarism be not sufficient to appal the admirers of republican America, it might be further observed, that about the same time, some advantages having been obtained over the western Indians, the nation was compelled to deliver up their chief, whom the victors condemned to be burnt alive!!

the Indians have been made, both by the British and American governments, notwithstanding the prevailing sanguinary views of the latter, while societies and individuals have prosecuted with ardour the same benevolent design. The Quakers of Pennsylvania, in particular, have distinguished themselves, by their endeavours to introduce among these indolent and degraded beings, agriculture and habits of industry, and that with considerable success. Their plan was, in the first instance, to conciliate and assure the Indians that they were only actuated with a view to their benefit; then to point out the importance and great advantage of these pursuits; and when they were sufficiently disposed to commence the labour, they furnished them with seeds, tools, and instructors.

The benevolent intentions of the British government towards the Indians have been variously exhibited, such as in the establishment of schools for their education; but these institutions, emanating from philanthropy, indicate absolute ignorance of the real character of those they are designed to benefit. It is better to tame them to the axe and plough, than disgust them with learning. The author has seen many, who

could converse and write, both in French and English, yet had not lost their native laziness, or savage habits. In vain may the government erect, and liberally endow such institutions, or use any other means to attain this desirable object, unless the execution of their intentions be confined to proper men. The intendants of Indian affairs may be enriching themselves from the presents which annually pass through their hands, and which are designed to conciliate the natives, while the designs of government are frustrated, and the poor Indians remain more depraved than before.—Can British authority be better exerted than in detecting and punishing such offenders?

Intermarriages between the Indians and the Canadians, is a subject that should occupy the attention of the British government. A small bounty given to the parties, would overcome innumerable objections that might otherwise arise. A premium of one thousand acres should be given to any man who married a *Squaw*, and had two children by her, subject to this condition, that it should revert to the crown, if at any time he abandoned his wife. A like premium should be given to a woman who married an Indian,

and by her influence led him into habits of industry. In this case, the man should be regarded as a minor, while the estate should be secured to the woman. A premium of one thousand pounds should be given to any philanthropist, who, by his persuasions, without the aid of liquor, prevailed on not less than fifty Indians, to form a settlement, clear the land, cultivate it, and pursue a course of industry for ten successive years, the men labouring equally with the women; the tools &c. furnished by government, and the produce of the farms being solely appropriated to the benefit of the Indians.

Various other regulations might be made, with abundant profit to the country. Gentle means must be used, and pains taken to eradicate that contempt for labouring men, and the notion of superior ease and dignity, which the meanest Indian entertains.

The author once knew a whole tribe of the Buck, or Arrowkwas Indians, on the river Corantain, in Berbice, so far aroused, by artful address, from their native indolence, as to commence, and perfect the clearance of an estate of two thousand

acres. This is not a fair example of the utility of the measures proposed, as the temptation of rum was employed, and when the contract was completed, they returned to their old habits of savage life. \*

It should be a point of considerable moment with the Governors of Canada, to make such arrangements as may induce the Indians to build their villages more remote from the frontier; in order that, should hostilities recommence, the enemy may not obtain possession of the Squaws, and Paposes, (that is, the women and children) as hostages for the conduct of the men; a policy successfully employed during the late war, and which reluctantly compelled the Indians, in some instances, to take up arms against us.—Another consideration of importance is, that vigilance be exercised to prevent emissaries from the United States seducing the affection of these Indian allies, who, in consequence of their extreme credulity, may be easily imposed on; and as nothing

\* Perhaps this was the cheapest clearance ever made; the whole double lot of two thousand acres, cost only a puncheon of rum, called *kill devil*, which sells for about 1s. 6d. a gallon, and two pieces of blue lalampores.

is more odious to an Indian than the imputation of cowardice, no doubt exists in the mind of the author, but the circumstances of the late peace will be so falsely coloured in American attempts of this nature, that unless much care is used to enlighten their minds, and prove the contrary, the unsuspecting Indians may suppose *us* such as represented, and for ever abandon our alliance.

## CHAP. XII.

### ON THE FISHERIES.

A NATION possessing natural resources, should never permit them to be employed by foreigners against herself. They may indeed, from courtesy, be permitted to participate in the benefits; but when this permission is so used, as either to become injurious to the proprietors, or when the admitted party claims the privilege as a right, and proceeds to enforce the claim, effectual measures must be employed to repress the intruders.

To the disgrace of past times, the Dutch fishermen were not only permitted to take fish on the coast of England, but actually to bring it to the London market; while this lucrative concern annually drew immense sums over into Holland, impoverishing this country, injuring our fisheries, and destructive to the supplies of seamen, whose nursery was thus transferred to foreigners.

Similar in kind, but far more injurious in its effects, was the policy which gave permission to the Americans to take cod on the banks of Newfoundland, Sable, &c. There the British maintain large establishments for curing and warehousing the fish, and support several thousand persons employed in the fishery. According to existing regulations, the fish must be cured and dried on shore, where it undergoes a minute inspection, by persons properly qualified, who divide it into classes, which are distinguished as Merchantable, Madeira, and West India fish; the former being the superior, the latter of inferior quality, while the refuse is not permitted to be sent out of the country, being destined either to feed dogs that draw the sledges, or perish with

the entrails of the fish, which are not suffered to be drawn until its arrival on the shore.

These wise regulations are intended to preserve the reputation of the goods in foreign markets, and up the Straits, where fish of the first quality is chiefly purchased; and they, at the same time, operate to preserve uninjured the fishery itself, as the cod desert those parts that are contaminated by offal.

Unrestrained in the mode of curing their fish, and regardless of reputation, the Americans adopted a cheaper and more expeditious method. Neglecting the trade in Merchantable fish, they aimed principally at supplying our West India colonies; instead of losing time to cull and dry their goods on shore, which would have employed additional boats and hands, they salted their fish down on board their vessels as soon as caught; and to the excessive injury of the fishery, threw the guts, &c. into the sea, and either did not dry their goods at all, or very imperfectly, on the deck and rigging, during their passage. On their arrival, it was usual to make the best bargain they could, lumping their whole cargo together,

according to its *apparent* quality. The merchant afterwards separated the good from the bad, reserving the former for the whites, the latter for the negroes, who are most gratified by decayed fish, of strong rancid smell; it being usual, in the same cargo, to find every variation, from absolute putrescence, to that of the middling quality.

By these means, after returning to the coast of Newfoundland, with a cargo of rum, sugar, or molasses, *smuggled on board*, and bartering their goods at Burin, the bay of Bulls, &c. they would *take in a second cargo*, either of prime fish for Europe, or West India fish, with which they would take a second trip, and sell at an advanced price, and *that even before our regular traders were prepared to make one voyage*; and when these at length arrived, the market was frequently found glutted with the American cargoes! Under these circumstances they were obliged to sell their goods at inferior prices, sometimes even below the *primè cost of labour*. \*

\* The demand for fish in our West Indian settlements, upon an average of three years, ending 1807, was 456,221 cwt. 97,486 of which was furnished by the mother country, leaving 358,735 cwt. which should have been supplied from our own American fisheries. But, strange and unaccountable as it may appear, although our own

But these evils, though great to individual merchants, are not to be compared with those which arise to the nation generally. The Americans chiefly employ in this trade old and crazy vessels, in general the joint property of master and crew, who share the profits as in privateers; which stimulates individual exertion, both in the taking and curing of the fish, as well as under the peculiar fatigues and hardships of the voyage; the state of the vessel obliging them mostly to work the pumps during the whole passage. This made them good sailors, expert in resources, and better suited than landsmen to class as ordinaries and wasters, on board ships of war. If the Americans are indebted to their more regular commerce, and large vessels, for *able seamen*, they derived the ordinary, which constitute the more numerous classes, from this trade; and the privateers in the late war derived from hence their main strength; men of proper habits, who could endure almost any privation, or encounter any danger.

fisheries produced 817,351 cwt. yet the British government encouraged the Americans to supply 188,125 cwt. of this 358,735; whilst, by their impolitic measures, they so cramped this valuable branch of the trade of our American colonies, that only 170,610 was supplied from our own fisheries in that quarter; which were kept in a discouraged state, though susceptible of the greatest improvement.

The permission of this trade certainly answered the purposes of the West India planters and merchants, who welcomed the Americans as most valuable friends; but it so depressed our rising colonies, that they hardly dared to enter into any competition, till the late war put an end to the rivalry. Then they began to partake of the benefits which nature and local situation had assigned to them; and considerable extensions of the fisheries were made by the British provincial merchants. It appears now that nothing is wanting to enable Britain to furnish the West Indies on better terms than her competitors, but an accession of manual strength to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Cape Breton, and Prince Edward's Island; these provinces being sufficiently fertile to support an increased population, while the old establishments in Newfoundland would be highly benefited by the transfer of the trade from the Americans to the provincials. Considering the sterility of the soil, and inhospitality of the climate, it will never be expedient to cultivate Newfoundland: it must continue a mere fishing establishment, dependent on foreign supplies. But this cannot with propriety be said of the provinces previously alluded to, who, if they have in any

measure been dependent on importation, it is because the towns have possessed the major part of the emigrants who came into the country, leaving the farmer almost destitute of labourers, to supply, by extended cultivation, the increased demand. Newfoundland should confine itself exclusively to the preparation of the fish for purchasers; leaving to the provincials the carrying of their goods to the West Indies, and to the European merchant the exportation to England and the Straits.

Beside the article of cod fish, there is a considerable demand in the West Indies for herrings, mackarel, salmon, &c. which abound on the coast, in the creeks and rivers of British America, from Labrador to Maine; and this description of fishery the provincials should be encouraged to prosecute on the largest possible scale. This can only be effected by an increase of population; for as matters now stand, the fishery rather injures than benefits the provinces, since, if the scanty number of labourers they contain, hire themselves to this employ, they must desert the farmers in the spring, when their services are most wanted.

It has been proposed, that a monopoly should be given to the British herring fishery at home; but those who support such a proposition would do well to reflect that the reign of absolute monopoly is over; and as this country must divide her profits and commerce to a certain extent, the only real question is, shall this participation be given to our rancorous enemies and inveterate foes, or to obedient and valuable colonies, who, during the late contest, espoused her cause with ardour, and maintained no contemptible number of troops in her defence? \* Surely Great Britain is the more compelled to adopt the latter policy, from the consideration, that by so doing the provinces will be effectually secured in their allegiance, having then the same interests, and being equally opposed to the same rivals.

In the late treaty of Ghent, no mention is made of the fisheries; but although nothing is expressed, it is hoped that government has decidedly prohibited the Americans from taking fish in our waters, and its sale in our West India islands. Unless such strong measures be adopted, the pro-

\* Newfoundland Fencibles, New Brunswick Fencibles, 104th Regiment, Glengary's Rifle Corps, &c.

vincial merchant, who has already embarked extensively in this trade, in the expectation of being supported by the legislature, will be entirely ruined, and the employ revert again to the Americans, with its numerous train of benefits. But should the most rigid prohibitions ensue, attempts will be made by these active rivals to share the gains with us! These must be immediately crushed; no evasions whatever should be connived at. Experience has sufficiently proved that the restraint of law is of little avail, when opposed to American individual interest. If cargoes are allowed to arrive from the United States, and to be sold in the West Indies with impunity, it will be in vain to guard the banks of Newfoundland with cruisers; yet if the banks are not guarded, it will be in vain to look out in the West Indies.

If this country perceives the propriety of retaining her natural advantages, and employing her resources, she must not merely exclude the Americans from the banks of Newfoundland, but by every possible means encourage emigration; for, without an increase of inhabitants, the provinces can never carry the fishery to an extent

sufficiently great to ensure that permanent advantage to the nation, which it is capable of producing.

Whatever is done with effect, must also be done quickly. The Americans, perhaps even now, are preparing once more to exercise what they have strenuously asserted to be their rights; but should they be again permitted to obtain possession, the fishery would thereby become once more a bone of contention! It is therefore better to put it completely out of their power again to mistake *our* favours for *their* property.

The advantage of the fisheries has been in a measure already experienced, although never yet carried to half their possible extent; but it is impossible to calculate on the probable benefits that might be derived from them. The increasing difficulties of the times in which we live, make it necessary to exert more vigour and greater enterprise, than we have hitherto been accustomed to; for there seems no other method of retaining our national pre-eminence.

## CHAP. XIII.

## ON THE LUMBER TRADE.

MERCANTILE men are well apprised of the vast importance to this country of the lumber trade, though it may be overlooked by those whose engagements do not connect them with it; but by referring to authentic tables, the author hopes to place the importance of this subject in a just point of view.

It appears that, in 1807, the Canadas exported oak, pine timber, planks, and staves, to the amount of £134,344, 10s. and connected therewith, pot and pearl ashes to the amount of £104,329, 15s. 7d. while Great Britain imported from Russia, in the year 1790, 1,193,125 planks, 85,647 boards, and 1456 masts.\*

\* Tooke's Life of the Empress Catharine II. of Russia.

These facts prove the high importance of this branch of commerce to Great Britain, especially considering the scarcity of wood at home, and our immense consumption for ships, houses, cooperages, cabinet-work, &c. Attempts should therefore be made to retain in this empire those immense sums, which have been annually expended among foreigners, in the purchase of lumber; and no unprejudiced mind can dispute the propriety of transferring part, at least, of the Baltic trade to our own provinces. The importance of supplying the West Indies from these provinces, and rigorously prohibiting the United States from any participation in the trade, will be enforced in the course of the chapter, by plain, but, as the author hopes, sound and convincing arguments.

Is it reasonable, that they who have separated themselves from our interests, should be permitted to enjoy all the advantages, and sustain none of the disadvantages, which are the portion of our faithful adherents? and when, at length, our true policy is ascertained, *by painful experience*, can the Americans complain if they are deprived altogether of these privileges? The consequence of their being admitted into the West India

market was, the possession of an enormous proportion of the trade, by underselling the provincial and British merchants.

We may further observe, that Bryan Edwards estimates the annual demand of a West India plantation of six hundred acres, *in staves and heading for casks alone*, at £150. In the year 1791, it was estimated, that in Jamaica there were 796 sugar estates: these, at the rate of £150 each, per annum, would give the Americans £119,400 annually, in this branch of trade from one island. Add to this, the consumption of the other colonies, the constant increase of cleared estates, and the new settlements of Barbice and Demerary, and it will clearly appear, that the supplies requisite for these, and other descriptions of timber, are immense, especially when it is recollected, that the buildings in the towns and plantations are chiefly constructed of wood. —The annual demand for lumber, previous to the restrictions, was 117,740 loads; the Americans, through the impolicy of our government, furnishing 113,600, while our provinces had only the opportunity of supplying about 3496 loads: but, in 1810, while the restrictions on the Ameri-

can commerce continued, the exports from Quebec alone amounted to 160,932 loads, proving the ability of the colonies to supply the most unlimited demand, and clearly exhibiting the immense disadvantages our colonies formerly laboured under, from the want of this single branch of trade.

But the suppliers also roughly manufactured the wood into planks, shingles, scantling, &c. the situation of the West India islands rendering this diminution of their labour necessary; thus giving to the Americans, in consequence of their great proportion of this trade, immense advantages, inasmuch as it furnished employment to numerous saw-mills and shingle-makers, and improved territory otherwise of no value, except as supplying lumber! Thence arose in the stony, sterile regions of New Hampshire, flourishing settlements, and a numerous population. At Damoriscotti, the author saw, upon one stream, eight saw-mills, in the short space of a quarter of a mile. These districts, not being able to raise within themselves a supply of food, the southern states were also benefited, by furnishing them with flour, and other necessaries: this occasioned an extensive coasting trade, which, when

interrupted by our cruisers, during the late war, was conducted on land, by means of waggons, and gave rise to the humorous idea of a "*horse marine.*"

Had there not been a great oversight in the British negotiators of 1783, New Brunswick should have extended to the river Kennebec, which seems the natural boundary, and would have included several fine streams, suitable for saw-mills; or early encouragement should have been given to the provinces to engage in the lumber trade, before those streams became thus instrumental in repressing the growth of the provinces: but, as things exist at present, it would be considered a disadvantage, by the lumber cutters of New Brunswick, were the country between Castine and East-Port possessed by Great Britain; for then the inhabitants, in consequence of the superior facilities they possess, would have quite the advantage of them in the lumber trade.—The restoration of Moose Island, however, should be resisted. It was the noted resort, during the late war, of privateer pickaroons, who so infested the Straits of Passamaquody and the Bay of Fundy, that a vessel could not escape them; and, in case

of hostilities, might again prove a severe check to the lumber trade of St John's, New Brunswick; operating as an enemy's station at the Nore, would on the trade of London; the two cases being exactly parallel. It is therefore confidently hoped that the British commissioners will appreciate its importance, if it come under their cognizance; for they may be assured, that nothing can benefit the whole province of New Brunswick so much as the possession of this island.

#### CHAP. XIV.

##### ON THE TRADE IN HORSES AND HORNED CATTLE.

THIS branch of commerce has been a fruitful source of wealth to the United States. Jamaica excepted, all the islands have been supplied with a large portion of oxen for slaughter, and nearly the whole of their horses from thence; and as the custom of these colonies disposes every person to ride that can purchase a horse, the de-

mand in this article is prodigious; especially as these animals are affected with disease, in consequence of the climate, and great numbers die in the seasoning. Hence cargoes are arriving in perpetual succession, being scarcely able to supply the great demand. In this trade American duplicity and fraud were most conspicuous, for they engaged in it always in connexion with a system of imposition.

But while the West India islands must be supplied at present from a foreign source, it is certain that, in a short period, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick would be able, with proper attention, to supply the most extensive demand. The horse thrives remarkably well in each of these provinces, particularly the latter, which has produced some fine racers; attempts have even been made to engage in the West Indian trade, but the stock on hand being too small to admit of a regular supply, the projector's expectations were in some measure disappointed. Therefore, as the total prohibition of American supplies would be highly detrimental to the plantations, they should be admitted only through certain channels, such as the Bermudas, or New Brunswick, and

in certain proportions, as one American to four or six provincials; or, if admitted direct from the United States, the importation should be limited to one hundred head for each island annually: either of the proposed measures, in connexion with importations from the Spanish Main, would prove a tolerable supply, till our colonies should be so improved as to render them no longer necessary. And here it might be proper to remark, that an abundant supply might always be procured from thence,\* were not the quality so inferior, and ill adapted to a country where beasts of strength and bottom are required. Hence, though they are purchased from £5 to £10 per head, yet the expense of oats, necessary to render them serviceable, is frequently greater than that of a good horse, unless the planter send them to his estates, and feed them with corn stalks, cane tops, sweet potatoes, &c. in which case, in addition to the value of their dung, they sometimes have proved fine cattle. From these considerations it will appear, that, notwithstanding the

\* The Spanish American horses are remarkable in shape; their faces have universally a curve backwards, from a little below the eyes to the nape of the neck; their tails are more slender, and liker those of mules, than the European and North American breed.

Spanish horses are numerous and cheap, there is an absolute necessity for supplying the islands \* with a more efficient breed.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, when Governor of Nova Scotia, made some praiseworthy efforts to improve the breed in that province, by importing stallions of famous pedigree, and permitting the gentlemen and farmers to embrace the opportunity of crossing the breed. The consequence was, that cargoes of superior horses were sent to the West Indies, and with a little perseverance and assistance from the government, a good trade would have been established. The author would still suggest, that from the same quarter, in addition to any other liberal scheme that may be devised, a sufficient number of prime stallions be sent to Halifax and St John's, with authority to the respective governors to permit all applicants gratuitously to partake of the benefits. Added to this, a premium of ten guineas should be given to any person who annually reared three

\* Jamaica is an exception, producing a fine breed, sufficient for her own consumption, and could well supply the other islands, if it were to windward; but it would take more time to beat up from Jamaica to Barbadoes, than to sail from Halifax to the same place.

colts upon lands cleared by themselves, within three years of their application; thus tending not only to increase the breed of horses, but the cultivation of the soil.

Much of the interior of the country is more adapted to the breed of horses than to any other use whatever; for, being of gentle declivity, well watered with streams and lakes, and for the breed of these animals a partial clearance only being necessary, the stumps of trees may be left standing; it therefore could be engaged in very economically. Hence, were graziers and horse-breeders to settle in the provinces, introducing, at the same time, brood mares and stallions, with trusty servants, &c. they would not only enrich themselves, but most essentially promote the welfare of their country.

With regard to oxen, the Windward Islands are not so much in want of them as they are of horses, having a breed, of which, though diminutive and lean, the flesh is usually considered to be sweeter, and to possess a more delicate fibre, than that of the American cattle. Hence, the Creoles never use the latter, if they can procure

the former: \* and the proportion of imported oxen, for the consumption of the inhabitants, was to horses nearly as two to six, independent of the supply for the troops and navy, which fluctuated according to the number on the station, and was usually drawn from the States. Jamaica produces fine large oxen, but draws, in common with the Leeward Islands, considerable supplies from Porto Rico.

The small supply, therefore, which is necessary, the provinces could at the present period abundantly export, if some regulations, by bounty or otherwise, were made to lower the price of freight, &c.; the contractors being now able to procure live oxen at from 4d. to 5d. per pound, with allowance for offal. In addition to which, it may be observed, that considerable districts, in both provinces, are peculiarly adapted to grazing; the Cumberland marshes affording most luxurious pasturage, and producing the finest cattle, as well as Colchester, Cornwallis, Horton, Pictou, Antigonishe, in Nova Scotia; and the rivers Pitecodia, and St. John's, in New Brunswick, whose shores are

\* The turtle in the West Indies can be procured as cheap as beef, and is greatly preferred.

cultivated, and abound with cattle, which might be increased to an indefinite extent. With such resources within ourselves, is it wise to permit an inveterate rival again to increase his power by our supineness? surely not. And henceforth let our policy be decided: let us pour an efficient strength into the colonies, enlarge their trade in staple articles to the West Indies, and connive at American interference no longer than absolute necessity requires; and at the same time employing the most vigorous means to shorten that period: for when our islands and provinces, linked a chain of mutual dependence, shall reciprocate the advantages arising from the exclusion of aliens, and furnish an immense accession of strength to the empire at large, we shall then clearly evince, that the stream which had watered and nourished the prosperity of the United States, has again reverted to its legitimate channel.

## CHAP. XV.

## ON THE FLOUR TRADE.

Good effects of the Corn Bill anticipated.—The Canadas and New Brunswick fully competent to supply the West Indies and Great Britain.—Relative qualities of the British, Canadian, and United States flour.—Causes of the apparent difference assigned; with hints to promote the trade.

EUROPE has been desolated by bloody and protracted wars, which have long since affected the labours of the agriculturist; and this country, in particular, has been compelled to maintain large armies and numerous fleets, which have equally contributed to advance the price of field labour, and increase the demand for flour; thus producing an *artificial scarcity*, which the Americans alone could remedy. Enjoying the repose of peace, possessing an extensive and fertile country, sufficiently peopled for the purposes of agriculture, they have raised corn sufficient for the purposes of an extensive exportation; and alive to the advantages which the cir-

cumstances of the times had given them, of extending widely a lucrative commerce, both the general and particular governments of the United States held out the most flattering encouragement to all who entered their territories, by assigning them lands for cultivation, or employing their labour. Thus, the French revolution was not only attended with the most dreadful consequences to the European nations, but it paved the way for American aggrandizement. Multitudes escaping from tyranny, oppression, and famine, in Europe, have sought an asylum on the shores of America: in addition to which, revolutionary principles, inculcated by insidious demagogues, and animated by French example, had intoxicated a large portion of the British poor. Changes in the mode of manufactures, by the introduction of machinery, as well as in the system of farming in the Highlands of Scotland, with discontents in Ireland, and consequent rebellion, have all severally contributed to pour considerable numbers of the British population into the bosom of the United States; and, swelled by these tributary streams, the agriculture and commerce of America rolled her confluent strength, like a mighty river, inundating Europe!

The United States erroneously supposed, that the people of Europe, and particularly Great Britain, could not be supported independent of their supplies of flour, and despising the *supposed incompetency* of their resources, they presumptuously anticipated our prostration to her "rising empire." But while it must be admitted that these foreign supports were necessary during the rage of battle, and the devastations of war, yet in times of peace the measure is most impolitic and absurd. Hence the author is compelled to express his warmest approbation of the late act of the British legislature, restraining the importation of corn, and which, in his humble opinion, is fraught with solid advantages to the country, though he does not inquire how far this measure may be *abused* by the rich, to the detriment of the poor. His views are directed to the consolidation of the strength of the empire, by employing its resources, which consequence must follow, as the corn bill will check the overwhelming torrent resulting from American agriculture.

In this country, the wants of an overflowing population preclude the possibility of corn remaining on hand. The grower may always en-

sure a market with ready payments; and instead of soliciting purchasers, the latter are more inclined to apply themselves to him: the consequence is, he gradually attains to affluent circumstances; and, generally speaking, the whole body of agriculturists are, as they should be, opulent. On the contrary, the American farmers, comprehending them in the same general view, are *poor*. Raised but little above a state of indigence, they are nevertheless freeholders, and can, with due attention, procure ample *subsistence* for their families, but that is all. Indeed, money is of little use to persons who reside in woods, manufacture their own apparel, and live on the produce of their farms. The proportion of such cultivators as these is very great; and the bulk of settlers have not so much in view to enrich themselves, as to be barely raised above a state of dependence. Indeed, were any so inclined, unless great exportations were going on, it would be useless; since the collective amount of the small surplus of each farmer, without any extra arrangement, would be more than adequate to the home consumption. They therefore quietly repose on their own freeholds, feeling no want, acquiring little money, strengthening and feeding the nation, but not en-

riching it.—Distinct from these are the planters of Virginia, Maryland, and others, who employ negro labour, and embark large capitals. The southern climate, like that of the West Indies, disposes the white population to habits of indolence, which, with the burdensome expense of maintaining negroes, and other circumstances, keeps them in a state of dependence on the merchant. When his staple commodities find a ready sale, he indulges in every species of extravagance; but should the foreign market be closed, he immediately ceases to raise articles for exportation, or they perish on his hands; while such is his depression, that he can scarcely obtain credit of the merchant for his negro clothing.

From the premises now laid down, it is evident that commerce is more essential to the American, than to the British agriculturist, inasmuch as it stimulates him to produce greater crops than he otherwise could do; introduces specie, not procurable through any other medium, procures foreign luxuries, gives an *impetus* to the whole country, converting the woods into productive fields, and populous towns. But, let the flour trade to this country, and her dependencies

cease, the political growth of the United States would be repressed; and in consequence of this diminished exportation, emigration from them, would to a large extent immediately ensue.—It is in this view of the subject, that the author admires the political sagacity, evinced by the framers of the corn bill; and is led to hope that other measures, equally wise, will be adopted according to the circumstances of the times. But while this bill upholds the agriculture of the mother country, it is hoped it may be so modified, as not to check the colonies. This country may raise sufficient corn, in favourable seasons, as shall enable us to export considerable quantities of her native growth; but, in peculiar exigences, this may not only be impossible, but she may unhappily experience an actual scarcity. It is therefore prudent to provide a granary, from whence regular supplies might be procured, in order to prevent the possibility of such an evil; and where can this be so well reposed, as in the Canadas, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick? Although these provinces contain some tracts of stony land, unfit for the purposes of agriculture, yet they possess vast districts, naturally more fertile than any east of Connecticut; and not so exhausted as the sandy soil

of the middle and southern states. It is a fact not generally known, that the land in the middle states has lost that peculiar fertility which its first settlers enjoyed, so that at present, without the aid of gypsum, or plaster of Paris, it will not yield an average crop. This latter is found in quarries, in large hard masses resembling stone, of a dirty greyish colour, and friable texture. It is ground into powder, and very sparingly applied. The great advantage of this admirable manure, is its imbibing and retaining moisture and coolness; and where it is used, the crop is generally abundant. This plaster abounds in the neighbourhood of Windsor, in Nova Scotia, which place derived considerable wealth from its exportation; and such was the constant and increasing demand, that a considerable number of coasters were employed in this trade previous to the late war, when it was exported at *ten shillings per ton*; but when, by that event, the supply was cut off, it found purchasers in Philadelphia, at *thirty-six dollars per ton!* proving most decidedly the diminished fertility of the soil in the United States.

Lower Canada, although long used to a most injurious system of agriculture, is not by any means

in so exhausted a state as the districts above referred to; besides that, it has a most renovating resource in the lime which it produces, while the Upper province is not only unexhausted, but very fertile, and admirably suited to the growth of any species of grain; it being difficult to find better crops in any country, than those reaped in the vicinity of Montreal and Quebec. In New Brunswick, excepting the sea coast, which is rocky, the soil is generally of a very favourable description. Abundant crops are obtained, by the farmers of the banks of the rivers St. John and Peticodiac, where the greatest number of clearances are effected. And was this province but cleared, cultivated, and well peopled, its supplies would be more than adequate to our demands. In Nova Scotia, the most sterile of the four provinces, the author once saw the finest crop of winter rye he ever witnessed: it was on a new piece of hard wood upland. In these colonies, vegetation is so rapid, that the crops sown three weeks *later* than in Scotland, are reaped from three to five weeks *sooner*. In the year 1802, Canada alone exported 100,000 bushels of wheat, 38,000 barrels of flour, and 32,000 casks of biscuit; but, in 1810, the exports from the same source, were 170,000 bushels of wheat,

12,519 barrels of flour, 16,467 quintals of biscuit, 18,928 bushels of pease, 866 bushels of oats, 16 bushels of barley, 1,600 bushels of malt, 98 bushels of Indian corn; and although it is certain that a small proportion of these articles, were not *bona fide* the growth of Canada, yet the major part undoubtedly was; and if the provinces under every disadvantage, could export to such an amount, of what extension is their trade not capable, when culture shall be more general, and labourers more numerous?

Here it will be proper to remark, that a great superiority is observable in the American flour, over the British and Canadian; but this is principally, if not entirely, to be attributed to the superior care with which it is manufactured. In Britain, that is considered fine flour, which undergoes at most three or four boltings; and in Canada, its manufacture cannot be more perfect. But at Baltimore, there are merchants who embark very large capitals in this branch of trade; and having mills of prodigious extent, with superior apparatus to those of the British miller, the flour is bolted eight or nine times, passing through several lofts in its progress, till it is shot into the barrels in

which it is exported. And were the provinces certain of a constant market, though only to the West Indies, they would soon adopt the improvements of their southern neighbours in their mode of manufacture, and produce, instead of the present deteriorated article, flour of very superior quality; which must prove an effectual check, not only on open rivalry, but on illicit importations from the States into the Canadas.

From what has been said, the necessity of diverting the flour trade from the United States to our colonies, it is hoped, will be apparent. But should it be opposed by a too favourable regard for the Americans, or the dictates of prudence and cold cupidity, let the opposers reflect,—that by depriving them of this lucrative trade, we only act upon their own measures. Immediately on the declaration of war, legislative acts of Congress were adopted, whose sole tendency was the depression of our manufactures, by levying heavy duties on the importation of British merchandise; and which were intended to continue when peace should be restored: in fact, they are now in force. Again, let the nature of the American farmer's situation be considered, and it will appear, that instead of

reducing him to want and misery, it would only confine his views, and render his condition less precarious.\* Humanity, therefore, would not suffer by our exercising the rights of an independent nation, in the prevention of a commerce, which ought to be *solely* the privilege of our own citizens. But, finally, if the prohibition of this trade be supposed to impoverish, and consequently disable, the Americans from importing our manufactures, let it be observed, that they are employing every energy to render themselves completely independent in this respect; and they will owe their success in this attempt materially to our connivance at their engaging in those species of trade, which tend to make us dependent on them, instead of exerting our own energies; measures which tend to depress our northern, and impoverish our West India colonies, and thus elevating their national reputation at the price of our own,

\* It is by no means unusual for corn to be brought from Utica to New York, a distance of 279 miles, or from Pittsburgh, on the Alleghany river, to New Orleans, a track of 1595 computed miles; when, after this loss of money, labour, and time, the farmer may find a dull sale, and after performing these immense journeys to sell his staples, and purchase in return superfluous luxuries of foreign growth for his family and friends, he may after all incur great loss by the adventure.

and hurrying on the period which they anticipate, when British manufactures and commerce shall bow with submission to those of the States.

The subject just touched upon deserves peculiar attention. That the intercourse of the Americans with the West Indies is most injurious to the latter, will appear when it is considered, that by the existing commercial regulations of this country, the United States merchant receives his principal returns in cash; and also that various expedients have been resorted to, in order to keep a sufficiency of currency in the colonies; but notwithstanding the most vigilant exertions of the colonial governments, and their reduction of the real, while retaining the nominal, value of the dollars, or the coinage of base silver, the Americans have so far succeeded in draining the islands of their cash, that the Author has known so serious a diminution of the circulating medium, as greatly to affect the internal comfort of the inhabitants. But with what ease might these evils be diminished, if, instead of conniving at an illicit commerce, a union of interests were formed between the West India planter and provincial merchant, introducing *a regular course of exchange*, and sub-

stituting the *barter* of their respective staples, for the present mode of cash payment. By these means a permanency of supply might be secured, not exposed to those sudden interruptions incident to the present system, where the caprice, resentment, precautionary regulations, or actual hostility of the power producing it, may overwhelm the islands with famine and misery. This distress can hardly be appreciated but by those who have resided in the West Indies; for though flour is certainly an article of luxury, and could be excluded altogether, yet an instantaneous stop to the accustomed importation would produce the effects above described. In confirmation of this opinion, the Author will show the mode in which the islands are affected, both by an influx and a scarcity of flour.

Whenever the market for colonial produce is good, the planter directs his whole strength of negro labour, and his disposable land, to the growth of staple commodities, depending on a foreign supply of what is denominated "bread kind." Hence it has frequently occurred, that a plantation of 400 acres was so entirely covered with crops of canes, in their various stages, as not

to leave spare land sufficient to raise food even for the negroes, who were consequently fed with a foreign article, which, although expensive in comparison to the native provisions, was found by the planter less expensive, than a waste of land employed in the cultivation of the latter. When the trade of an island was thus flourishing, the white population entirely, and the negroes partially, abandoned the use of the various excellent substitutes for wheaten bread, such as yams, sweet potatoes, Guinea corn, Indian corn, eddoes, co-coas, plantains, &c. congenial to the taste of the natives, and indigenious to the climate. This was attended with no inconvenience, so long as the Americans continued to visit the West Indies; but when their trade was interrupted, serious consequences would ensue: the whites would naturally take care of themselves in the distribution of the stock on hand; and when that was consumed, would intrench on the provisions necessary for the subsistence of the poor negroes; the lamentable effects of which, as experienced in the island of Jamaica, Bryan Edwards has described at large. He observes, that in consequence of severe hurricanes, which afflicted the island between the years 1780 and 1786, the plantain walks were desolated,

and famine ensued; the ground provisions being destroyed by the intense drought which followed. During this period of distress, the importation of provisions was only in a limited manner occasionally permitted. From the 31st January, 1785, the ports continued shut to American commerce, and the distress of the negroes became extreme; "that at length the provisions being quite exhausted, dropsies, and epidemic dysenteries, carried off immense numbers; for, in seven years, no less than 1500 negroes thus miserably perished." Similar effects, in an inferior degree, have been experienced by various islands, during the long continued restrictions, and embargoes on American commerce, though not amounting to actual starvation, yet producing extreme distress to the inhabitants, particularly in the towns. But as many evils work their own cure, so it has happened in this instance. The necessity which compelled the reluctant planter to convert part of his estate, which before had been destined exclusively to the production of staple articles, into provision grounds, has proved, beyond all doubt, the capability of the islands to support themselves, when duly apprized of an approaching check to importation.

It is therefore ascertained that the welfare of the islands does not depend on their connexion with the United States, as has been exultingly asserted by the Americans, and believed by their credulous partizans in Britain; and hence it may be inferred, that since the experiment of deriving a supply from the provinces, would not distress the islands, if warned in due time to prepare for the measure, it is worth the trial, as its result would be a permanent, instead of a precarious supply.

These sentiments, I am aware, will be opposed by many whose interests they would eventually serve. In the West Indies, particularly Jamaica, a powerful predilection exists in favour of a more open intercourse with America than has ever taken place; and many persons are sordid enough, for the sake of amassing wealth, to stake the welfare of posterity; but the good sense of the better disposed, both at home and abroad, will teach them the necessity of concurring with the mother country, from a sense of mutual danger, in measures of mutual security.

Let us then, in justice to ourselves, freely and

fully revise our colonial and trading systems; adapting our measures to the novel and alarming situation in which the nation has been placed, by suffering American avarice and ambition to prey on our resources, not only with impunity, but with indulgence; if this be done effectually, we shall not oppress that people, but check their intemperate sallies, correct their pride, secure ourselves from insidious attacks, and, instead of losing our national strength, riches, and grandeur, we shall greatly augment them.

## CHAP. XVI.

ON THE ASSORTED CARGOES IMPORTED INTO THE WEST INDIES FROM THE UNITED STATES, THEIR CONVENIENCE, AND THE CAPABILITY OF THE PROVINCES TO SUPPLY THE SAME ARTICLES, AND OF SUPERIOR QUALITY.

AMONG the various means, by which the citizens of the United States \* enriched themselves at the

\* That this is the real tendency of the American trade with the islands, will appear from the following statement of vessels and cargoes that cleared out for the States from the undermentioned islands, between 5th January, 1787, and 5th January, 1788.

Islands.	No. of vessels cleared out.	CARGOES.		
		Sugar cwts.	Rum Galls.	Molasses Galls.
St. Kitts,	21	386	167,740	
Antigua,	71	6779	375,150	1700
Montserrat and Nevis,	20	1895	122,710	
Virgin Islands,	3	91	13,900	
Total,	115	9151	679,500	1700

expense of our West India islands, that of assorted cargoes, composed of what the Americans denominated "*Notions*," were conspicuous. These consisted of a variety of miscellaneous articles; a proportion of lumber, with green or ill-cured fish, formed the bulk; the rest comprised, in general, potatoes, flour, oats, beans, pease, biscuits, crackers, cheese, hams, butter, tongues, salt-beef, pork, poultry, eggs, apples, jams, soured and smoked fish, with other articles too numerous for detail. The inhabitants of the islands certainly experienced great conveniences from these importations; and although many of the articles were contraband, yet a general disposition prevailed among the islands, and was seconded by the officers of the customs, to connive at these transactions; and with such impunity was this system carried on, that the Author once heard an officer, who held a high situation in the Customs of a certain island, openly declare, that he made £500 annually by

Now the number of American vessels that entered these islands, during the same period, with contraband goods, under the connivance of the Customs, must have been at least four times more than the above clearances; and on the most moderate computation, the proportion of ready cash paid for them, must have been at least ten to one against the produce taken in payment.

American presents, for his connivance; and he justified himself both by the expediency and prevalence of the measure.

It cannot then be matter of surprise, that these innovators should be esteemed by the Creoles as their benefactors, or that the habit of supplying the islands with such multifarious articles, so highly necessary to the West Indian, and conducive to the luxuries of life, should engender, in the minds of the Americans, a high degree of contempt for the British nation, whom they charged with holding possession of countries which they were unable to feed; than which nothing could be more unfounded; for though in time of war, the mother country *alone* might be unable, yet we shall prove, that in connexion with her North American provinces, she can, not only introduce a more abundant supply, but even that of very superior quality, and that these provinces only want suitable encouragement to bear down all American competition.

The supposition must at first sight appear absurd, that four provinces, eminently fertile, should fail to supply the ordinary productions common to

all cold climates; and it will still more strikingly appear so from the following instance:—During the late war, Halifax in Nova Scotia, the least eligible of the four provinces, in an agricultural point of view (except in peculiar districts), was the principal station of a large naval and military force, which visited it without any previous arrangements to increase the victualling means of the province. The town was also swelled by a prodigious concourse of strangers; and seven or eight hundred negroes, lured by the prospect of gain, landed by the fleets from the Delaware and Chesapeake, who proved to be a useless body of eaters, whose labours could not, for a considerable period, contribute to augment the stock of provisions. Yet, notwithstanding these extensive demands, which found the farmers quite unprepared—notwithstanding an unusual extension of the Labrador fishery having taken place, and several privateers had been manned, with the recruiting of the Glengary's rifle corps, raised in the province, which then took place, and which, with various other causes, had concurred to deprive them of a very great proportion of their labourers—the appeal may be made to all, whether naval, military, or commercial characters, not excepting

even resident Americans, who can form an estimate, if there was any appearance of scarcity. So far from that being the case, there was a profusion of all the necessaries of life, and the prices only such as all markets will obtain, when there exists a great demand and brisk sales. Necessaries exceeded but little the usual price; while articles of luxury, such as butter, eggs, and cheese, were more advanced, from the very obvious reason of the impossibility of keeping the market supplied with more than its usual limited demand. The great influx, and particularly of naval customers, would therefore make, in these articles, this difference of price.

Now, if an infant settlement, thinly peopled, and but partially cleared, could, when unprepared, issue such immense supplies,—what could it not do in ordinary times, if better cultivated and peopled? and as this is the lowest of the four provinces in the scale of agricultural rank, what might not New Brunswick, and the Upper and Lower Canadas supply, which are larger, and in every respect more eligible? The capability, therefore, of the northern colonies to produce these assorted cargoes, in point of quantity, must be un-

disputed: the quality of these articles is consequently the only point that demands attention. Now, with respect to lumber, it may be observed, that the author once conversed with an intelligent wood-merchant at Wiscassets, who declared the lumber of that place to be superior to that of Kennebunk and Saca; and that, advancing up the Bay of Fundy towards Penobscot, it sensibly improved, being still better in New Brunswick. And with regard to cod fish, there is no comparison between that taken in Boston Bay, and that from Cape Sable in Nova Scotia, though both are inferior to that from the Banks of Newfoundland. Of other descriptions of fish, esteemed as luxuries in the West Indies, salmon is more abundant in the provinces, and its quality much superior, the numerous saw-mills having extirpated this fish from a great proportion of the American waters; and though a smoked salmon of twelve pounds weight, may be purchased in St. John's for two shillings and sixpence, yet either in Boston or Portland, it would command twelve shillings. Shad, mackerel, gaspriens, and herrings, are very superior, and most abundant in the streams and shores, from Cape Sable to Labrador; the latter fish, which frequents almost exclusively

the shores of the provinces, being not only scarce, but also of very inferior quality, south of the Straits of Passamaquoddy. The eels and lobsters may be compared with any in the world; and those prepared by a lady of Halifax, who exports vast quantities, greatly excel. The apples of Canada greatly surpass those of the States, not only in flavour, but durability, by which they are rendered more suited to a West India voyage than those of America, which become mealy, while Quebec apples will keep well in a warm climate. Various other articles, the produce of the Provinces, might be enumerated, as being superior to those from the United States; but we must conclude this statement by the mention of cyder, which is produced of an excellent quality in each of the provinces; that from Cornwallis, and Horton in Nova Scotia, being equal in every respect to the manufacture of Hertfordshire, in our own country. Thus, then, encouragement only is wanting, for the provinces to secure to the Creoles a constant supply of "Notions." These articles may appear of trivial consequence to the British public, but to deprive a race of men of what they esteem luxuries, is to make them repine. The worthy Aldermen of London, when engaged

at a turtle-feast, do not less appreciate its enjoyment, because turtle is vulgar food in the West Indies; and to deprive the meanest individual in England of tea, would, in his estimation, be an abridgment of his comforts; while a failure in the supply of "Notions" would much more affect the enjoyment of all ranks—from the negro, who buys his rancid shad, to the opulent and hospitable planter or merchant, who spreads his board with a profusion of delicacies, to entertain the stranger guest.

It would be difficult to ascertain precisely the annual amount expended in these minor articles, *as they were not interfered in by the Custom-house*; but it would be very far within the bounds of probability, to estimate the sum annually passing into the hands of the Americans for "Notions," from the island of Barbadoes *only*, at 100,000 dollars, or £25,000 sterling. Thus, by insensible channels, has the stream of British wealth been diverted from its course, and the foundations of her greatness sapped; but let her awake, and fully contemplate the danger which now threatens her political existence, and adopt the measures necessary to guard against it.

## CHAP. XVII.

ON THE RELATIVE SITUATION OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND AMERICA AS MANUFACTURING RIVALS.

At the era of the French revolution, the momentous events in Europe, and the dangers of a revolution at home, so completely occupied the attention of government, that America, who had recently established her independence, and not having then given proofs of dangerous rivalship, was overlooked in the scale of nations: no watchful policy investigated her public measures. Conceived to be too insignificant for notice, encouragements were given to her trade; and during the period she enjoyed internal tranquillity, she grew up to a gigantic stature. Emigration from this country proceeded rapidly, the government either overlooking or conniving at it. The benefits of a neutral flag produced wealth, which was further augmented by the introduction of foreign capital, and the active spirit of enterprise, concur-

ring with a happy combination of other circumstances. British competition was nevertheless formidable, and, in many instances, overwhelming. The people rather dreaded than desired a contention for national pre-eminence in manufactures; and it was not until the war was forced upon the nation, by the profound and complex, though erroneous policy of its government, that the *public mind* was directed to this consideration. Prior to that period, it was regarded as a matter of dubious policy, and the question as to the propriety of the States becoming a manufacturing people, was discussed by able men of both parties, without coming to any determinate conclusion. Some years since, it was the favourite subject of the Federalists, and most strenuously opposed by the adverse party: at present, and the fact is worthy the most serious regard of this country, it is fostered by both parties, and the Democratic government stands pledged\* to promote it. It is now regard-

\* The following is what is implied in the American government's standing pledged to promote manufactures. It was cited by an eminent leader of the Federal party, in 1793, the era of the commencement of the manufacturing fever in the United States, as direct transcripts of the established customs of old nations:—"Duties laid on foreign articles, the rivals of those intended to be encouraged."

ed as a necessary means of increasing the national strength, and eventually ruining the enemy!

Here then is an entirely *new aspect of things*, since the American people, by their constituted authorities, have openly avowed their determination to commence a system of rivalry; and the state of their country is sufficiently mature, to excite confident hopes of success on the one part, and to warrant uneasiness and jealousy on the other: for, as the American manufacturers have increased in number, so have they advanced in

“Prohibitions, or duties equivalent.” “Prohibitions of the exportations of the materials of manufacture.” “Pecuniary bounties.” “Premiums.” “Exemption of the materials of manufacture from duty.” “Drawbacks of the duties imposed on the materials of manufactures.” “Encouragement of new discoveries and inventions, and the introduction into the United States of those made in other countries, particularly machinery.” “Judicious regulations for the inspection of manufactured commodities.” “Facilitating pecuniary remittances, and the transportation of commodities from place to place.”—To all these another must be added, which was only *hinted* at by the above individual, and which subsequent events have proved, has been basely acted upon; namely, not merely the encouragement of emigration to the States, but the application of its funds for the purpose of decoying away from Britain skilful artisans and mechanics!

importance and reputation at home. The national vanity always disposes them to overlook real defects, and discover imaginary excellence in all articles manufactured within the States; a principle which, whatever be its source, is of immense advantage to the rising manufactures.

With these dispositions, the Americans enjoy some very important advantages in the possession of manufacturing articles of superior quality, and a country so intersected with streams, as to facilitate the introduction of water machinery. And should the first efforts to introduce a sufficient number of weavers, and the British improved machines prove successful, by giving any considerable impulse to the home fabric, a prohibition of cotton, with other raw materials, may soon be expected, as a measure calculated to prove highly injurious to the rival interest.

It is not improbable, that mercenary individuals of this country, possessing capital, influence, and experience in particular manufactures, may be induced, by the encouragements held out by the Americans, to embark these valuable qualities in their cause, carrying with them consider-

able numbers of artisans; and so sensible are the Americans of the necessity of introducing foreign manufacturers, for the purpose of conducting and working their factories, that great importance is attached to the advantages arising from their importation; nor is it improbable that bounties may be given, or at least *secret* rewards bestowed, on the captains of American vessels, to direct their attention to this subject. The liberal minded Briton, who has not had the advantage of contemplating the American character, or from personal observation of forming a judgment of the party in power, or the collision and effervescence of opinions and motives, exposed, detected, assented to, or contradicted daily in the political contests of the States, may feel perfectly secure, and say there is no danger, estimating the character of that government and people by his own, and deprecating their being charged with such practices as too degrading. But let not our excess of candour betray this country into a state of supineness; let not false reasonings and wrong conclusions lull it into an opinion that America cannot rival the manufactures of more mature countries. Rather let such persons reflect on what she has already done, and will still farther attempt. And

here let it be observed, that where two parties of opposite political opinions meet in a common centre, it is not likely that any of their darling projects will remain untried. An extension of manufactures, therefore, is the prevailing desire of the whole nation, and it is founded on the principle of making the citizens of the States independent of a European supply, and supplanting Britain in foreign markets; the States possessing collectively many natural advantages, mutually conducing to their property, while held together by one common bond of union. And it must be remembered, that these are in the hands of a people, who have displayed the greatest degree of perseverance of spirit, and adventurous enterprise, in matters connected with trade. \* What then is wanting, in order to establish manufactories sufficiently extensive to supply the home consumption and engage in exportations, but a supply of artisans, which can only be procured from Europe?

\* The following circumstance affords an excellent illustration of the above:—A gentleman established a spinning mill near Portland, but as the country people had always been accustomed to spin cotton and wool for themselves, he could find no employment for it; to break the old system there, he actually spun gratis for a considerable time. *Query.* Was this patriotism, or was the individual secretly supported by the government?

And one grand advantage, stated by their ablest writers, rests on the circumstance of "employing foreign strength in the manufactories, leaving the natives to cultivate the soil or navigate the ships."

The author is, therefore, fully persuaded that Great Britain never before had such a dangerous rival; especially as the American government stands pledged to do something extraordinary, and has even commenced with a new tariff of duties on importations. This, then, is the era of a systematic contest, which must eventually endanger the safety of the one or the other. In the United States, where politics are so generally discussed, a stranger cannot long remain ignorant of party difference and sentiments, arising from that universal desire of communicating and inquiring, that is prevalent throughout all ranks of the community. It is easy, therefore, for an attentive observer to elicit truth from the various contrarities which exist among them. The author's opinions consequently are not singular; they are those of many other persons well qualified to judge. But the public mind in this country is too tranquil; it must be aroused from its lethargy, and it must see

America through the medium of the traveller: nothing amounting to a national feeling has yet swayed us in the contemplation of this formidable opposition. So new, so dangerous above comparison, yet so easy to be defeated, even now! It is time, however, to form a simultaneous opinion, and use, not only the ordinary precautions of prudence and foresight, but to redouble them. Ignorant of the secret views of the advocates for American manufactures; ignorant of the moral tendency of a manufacturing system, to superinduce the very restraints, the imaginary oppressions, the want and poverty, they are anxious to fly from; an unthinking populace embrace with eagerness the desire to emigrate to that happy country where liberty and affluence await them, while *the salutary restraints* at home, intended to promote the good of the whole nation, are regarded as personal slavery. They are, at the same time, allured by the high price of labour, the promised plenty, and cheapness of provision in the States; all of which operate as additional incentives, determining them to accept the insidious proposals of the foreign negotiator.

Emigration, therefore, to the United States,

must be checked, while that to the British provinces must be encouraged. New channels must be provided for our superfluous manufactures when the old ones are stopped, as the time may not be far distant when they may be excluded from the States altogether, or such duties imposed as shall give the rival commodities a complete advantage over them.

The possibility of the manufactures of America contending with this country, did not escape the penetration of Lord Melville, when Mr Dundas. With a prophetic spirit he asserted in the House of Commons, in April, 1796, that "such an event, besides the prejudicial manner in which it would operate on the navigation of the kingdom, would put out of our power the whole produce of the West Indies. For when the planters could readily find a market elsewhere, we should lose all the surplus which forms so great an article in our foreign trade; and the whole of that important advantage would be for ever lost." Speculatists, at the very commencement of the colonial system, saw the possibility of their future opposition. Sir Joshua Child, in the year 1660, remarked "that America possessed a fitness for rival manufactures,

building rival shipping, and draining the mother country of people." And it was prognosticated, that the colonies would soon revolt; notwithstanding which, the perpetual endeavours of disaffected persons could not separate them from the mother country, until upwards of a century had elapsed; during which period, the commerce, manufactures, and prosperity of Britain, increased most rapidly. The conclusion therefore is, that, like other events of the age, the novel aspect of American competition, being without precedent, precautionary measures of the same description must also be taken, adapted to the peculiar exigences of the case. A formidable party have reasoned very forcibly, and they have supported their reasonings with estimates, and calculations on the supposed tendency of restrictive measures to ruin the West India islands, and by their means the mother country; and yet it appears, that when restrictions prevailed, the Americans bore away so large a share of our commerce, as enriched and enabled them to prove our rivals in manufactures! If a restricted commerce did this, what would one less restricted do, but increase their resources and competition? If under the accumulated evils of restrictions, em-

bargoes, non-intercourse acts, and open war, the Americans could establish manufactories of large extent, what will they not do, now when peace is restored, provided they are indulged with an uninterrupted commerce with our colonies? If they have already made such rapid advances as to give this country serious cause of alarm, can it be supposed that American forbearance will abstain from future enlargement, purely from a complaisant acknowledgment of any favours and commercial indulgences we can give them? On the contrary, their dispositions will lead them to take advantage of our weakness, instead of reciprocating our benefits. Some may suppose, that the late war had in itself a tendency to encourage the manufactures of America, by ways and means inseparable from hostility and diminished importation, thereby affecting their extension; and consequently, that a continuation of restrictive measures on our part, would still more advance the views of the enemy. To this we answer, that although it may be very possible for war to give a *bias* to the manufactures of a nation; *it can do no more: peace and commerce,* are essential to its further progress. War, it may be admitted, has given *that bias* to American

manufactures: to the necessities of the nation we may in part attribute the progress that they have made; but to make any greater advances, at least *alarming ones*, requires finances, recruits of artisans, access to European manufactories, models of machines, public credit, and other adventitious supports, derivable only from peace and widely extended commerce.

What then is the precise situation of the two countries? Great Britain has a competitor, formidable from her natural advantages, which, at present may be *restrained*; but which, if permitted to flourish, will undoubtedly overwhelm her. Two trees growing near each other in the forest, will rarely stop at the same point of stature; one will overgrow, shade, and render the other unhealthy; but if the aspiring tree be lopped, although it may afterwards produce some branches of unnatural vigour, and increased verdure, yet it will scarcely ever recover its loss of stature, being shrouded in its turn by the opposing tree. America, then, is the aspiring tree; she has reared her head, and extended her branches, threatening to cover the aged and venerable oak of British power and grandeur, from the influence of the solar rays of

manufactures and commerce. The growth of the American pine must therefore be checked, ere those baneful consequences arise from her competition. Some will assert this to be impossible; American commerce must, they say, go on progressively, until it reach its *apex*! Let that be granted for the sake of argument: it will only prove the necessity for the exertion of those efforts, and the fulfilment of those duties which the Author will more fully consider in the following chapter.

## CHAP. XVIII.

ON THE DUTY OF GREAT BRITAIN TO RECOMMENCE  
AND PERPETUATE A COLONIAL SYSTEM.

LET us here, *a priori*, assume the popular opinion, entertained by the Americans and their British admirers, that this country *cannot* stop the United States in their career; who, they say, will eventually supply themselves with every article of manufacture, and exclude the British from their ports altogether. If this sentiment were well founded, we might indeed entertain the most fearful apprehensions. That America is making the attempt to render herself thus formidable, is indeed too apparent, and must be strenuously opposed. This may be effected, by a renovation of the ardour with which we once colonized; not as an experiment, but as an *actual duty*. That this ought particularly to be the case, under our pre-

sent peculiar circumstances, will appear, when the indigence of many thousands of our poor is considered, whom we cannot, even now, totally prevent from emigrating to the United States; and by partial attempts of this kind, we manifest a spirit of oppression, unless emigration be permitted and encouraged to some other country. Besides, it may be observed, that although the States, after the lapse of an age, revolted from Britain, yet they greatly contributed to her prosperity, during that long period; nor have they yet ceased to purchase our commodities. It would therefore be sound policy to plant colonies, even were we previously assured of their defection, since the benefits of their commerce would be an adequate compensation for our expense and care, independent of the probable contingency that they may remain loyal.

The condition of the poor is a matter of melancholy reflection to the benevolent mind; and the more so, as it appears to be the unavoidable concomitant of civilized society. There is the highest authority to know, that "the poor we shall have always with us." The best regulations, the most equal laws, the most perfect state of liberty, can-

not altogether prevent, though they may combine to mitigate, the evil. It is a fact proved by experience, that as a nation advances in riches, refinements, trade and manufactures, the condition of one part of its community will be ameliorated, while that of the other is deteriorated.

Aware that the introduction of machinery, and extensive manufactures, will, with the *good*, also possess the *evil* tendency; the Americans, while they invite, at the same time deprecate, those distinctions in society, which naturally result from national affluence. With the same breath, they express an abhorrence of the corruptions of the "old country," and most highly eulogize a policy, which necessarily engenders the very pestilence they affect to shun! Their predilections, or antipathies, would be of little moment to us, were they not so extensively disseminated, and calculated by their aberration from truth, to poison the minds of the poor in this country. These circumstances, therefore, call upon the government most decidedly to evince that paternal solicitude, and provident attention, which is their duty to this unhappy portion of our countrymen. If, through the vicissitudes of life, numbers are deprived of

support, or derive a precarious and scanty subsistence from hard labour, or itinerant traffic, a wise and liberal government should provide for them at the same moment an asylum, and relief from the public burdens, by removing these useless consumers to countries where they may provide their own sustenance, and acquire respectability. It is in vain to deny, or attempt to palliate the fact, that such is the condition of a large mass of the poor of Great Britain; nor do we stop to inquire whether they have thus sunk through misfortune or misconduct. They stand before us in wretchedness and woe, silently imploring the fostering hand of power, to extend to them the benefits of emigration.

These ideas have been suggested, by the measure now pending, for the encouragement of emigrants to Canada; and by the declaration of the government, "that although it did not wish to check, it by no means desired to encourage emigration." While the Author admires the policy which diverts several thousands of emigrants from resorting to the United States, and directs them to a British colony; he dissents with due deference from the sentiment thus conveyed, and conceives

that it is the *duty of the British government to encourage and promote emigration to the utmost of its power*; since, notwithstanding the most wakeful vigilance, the malecontents will continue their emigrations to the United States, carrying with them animosities never to be eradicated, and thus increasing the abhorrence of the Americans for what they think a land of oppression, wrong, and violence. It is the perpetually resorting thither of such malignant visitors, that inflames their minds with rancour against us; stained, as they suppose us to be, with the blackest crimes, and smarting under the most complicated system of grinding tyranny: and indeed it cannot be matter of surprise, that they should cherish such preposterous notions of us, when the feelings excited by the exaggerated complaints and miserable spectacle of those reprobate or unfortunate wretches, who present themselves from time to time, to the gaping crowds assembled to witness their debarkation, are industriously supported by political harangues, essays, sermons, and other expedients.

These arguments might be allowed to have some weight in ordinary cases: they apply, however, with peculiar force to the particular situa-

tion in which this country is now placed; and as America threatens, by her manufactures, to close that mart to our merchandise for ever, it should be our policy to enlarge our old colonies, and plant others, that when old markets become shut, new ones may be opened. Experience has proved that those of Europe may be so affected, as to render them inaccessible to our merchants, unless through a neutral medium; and even then they may be exposed to the rapacity of power, and persecuted almost to extinction: for among the unforeseen contingences of an eventful age, a recurrence is not impossible of continental restrictions, so fresh in our recollection, and so deeply felt by our merchants and manufacturers. Douanniers may again ransack the warehouse of the continental merchant in quest of goods, bearing evidence against themselves of their being British fabrication, in order to their being burnt. Open war, or armed neutralities may be resorted to, on the part of those powers *now friendly*: and the possibility of ingratitude being displayed even by those nations whom we have rescued from oppression, is sufficiently proved by the annals of the present age. And as Britain is again engaged with that foe, over whom she has so signally

triumphed, transatlantic policy will await the issue of the struggle, and join with either that may prove victorious; thus most decidedly proving the necessity of our recommencing a vigorous system of colonization, in order to provide new markets for our merchandise, when the customary ones may be for ever closed.\* Measures like these would bid defiance to America; she might then copy or improve upon Chinese policy, and retire as a world within herself, adopting the advice of her wild theorists, and visionary statesmen. Britain would smile at this dotage, finding in her colonies ample amends for the defalcation of American intercourse.

The same causes that should induce, or rather compel Great Britain to recommence, should also cause her to perpetuate a colonial system, on a scale of grandeur suited to her power, and the great and urgent wants of her people: a system which, instead of draining the mother country of her riches and population, would rather promote both. Idle, disorderly, or miserable subjects, always dangerous to the state, would be removed

\* It must be all along borne in mind by the reader, that the BATTLE OF WATERLOO intervened between the *Writing* and the *Printing* of this work.

to scenes, where they may be induced to labour, by the powerful stimulus of a certain competence. The relief thus experienced at home, would, by the promotion of marriages, more than compensate for the loss sustained, while the colonists themselves would rear more children than they could have done, had they remained here. In short, there is no reason why we should have deviated from the policy previously pursued, since our resources, strength, and wealth, have increased in proportion to that of our colonial possessions. And even should they revolt, they must continue for a long period, even after their separation, to enrich us by their trade. Another consideration of considerable weight, in favour of a wider extension of colonies is, that those who thus experienced the paternal care of government, in removing them according to their own inclinations from want and distress at home, to happier situations, would entertain sentiments of gratitude to their benefactors, and attachment to their native soil, which they would transmit to the latest posterity. Thus by a right commencement, sound and loyal sentiments might be perpetuated; for, be it recollected, the seeds of American disaffection were sown at the very outset.

That the original opinions, attachments, or aversions, of the first colonists are imbibed by their descendants, will appear from a comparison of the islands of Barbadoes and Jamaica. In the former, originally settled by the Royalists, an enthusiastic partiality for Great Britain universally prevails; the primitive impressions have never been eradicated: while, on the contrary, Jamaica originally conquered and peopled by the adherents of Oliver Cromwell, has evinced at all times a lofty spirit of freedom, and a passion for republican liberty, which has not been obliterated by time, or the continual change of inhabitants. Those newly arrived are soon won over to the prevalent opinions, which are more in favour of the States than of England. Again, the provinces of Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, which derived their original population in a great measure from the American Royalists, have in the late contest abundantly evinced that the loyal sentiments of the fathers are transmitted to the sons; and the Author bears testimony to that *zeal for vigorous measures* which they manifested against the United States, while he regrets that he has observed no disposition in this country to recompense their exertions. Better instructed than the native

British in the true character of the Americans from their contiguity and intercourse, they learn fully to appreciate their deadly animosity: hence a determined spirit of opposition, the surest bond of their perpetual union to Britain, who, in order to triumph, has only to foster this happy predilection, adopt *their sentiments*, and extend her maternal arm, to cherish and defend them. That she will do this in the fullest extent, as an imperious duty, is the Author's ardent and most sincere desire.

## CHAP. XIX.

ON THE FORMATION OF COLONIES; PLANS FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF EMIGRATION; AND THE NECESSITY OF SECURING TO CANADA THE ADVANTAGES OF ITS FRONTIER, BY MEANS OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.

HAVING in a former place treated generally on the subject of colonies, we shall now confine our observations to the expedients employed in the

formation of those of modern date, suggesting hints for their establishment on a more secure and organic system, combining extended cultivation with the security of the Canadian frontier.

Various measures have been adopted at different periods for peopling the colonies, both by government, individuals, and associated bodies. Exclusive charters have been granted by the former, and sometimes the people have been impelled to expatriate themselves, on the ground of real or supposed injuries. On other occasions, strong incentives have been held out by government, or the chartered proprietors of the soil, or they have been induced to enter into limited service previous to their embarkation. At one time, merchants and captains have first provided the emigrants a passage, and then sold them into absolute slavery for a greater or less period of time: at another, persons convicted of certain descriptions of crime, have been transported to labour in the plantations, either for a term of years, or life. By means so various and contradictory, innumerable defects in the colonial system were suffered to ingraft themselves in its very commencement, and these were the radical causes of that ebulli-

tion of popular discontent, which separated the United States from the parent country.

It is therefore the duty of government, not only to plant, but adopt in that instance, a more systematic and effectual mode of proceeding than heretofore; and also to take instant measures for attaching the distant provinces to the mother country, and to each other, by decidedly securing to each a reciprocal monopoly of trade, to the total exclusion of alien rivalship.

Had Mr Pitt been acquainted with the present state of things, he would in all probability have yielded assent to, and acted upon these propositions, when the first treaty was made: and had the Canadas been then more fully peopled, they would have succeeded much better in the late contest than they did. At the present, it is most assuredly the best policy to pour into them immediately large supplies of men, to prepare for any future contest with the States.

The measures now in progress, with some few alterations, would be very good. The quantity of land allowed to each settler, instead of *one*, ought

to be *five* hundred acres, with a certain proportion to each child, male or female, as soon as born, on condition, however, that ten acres of it be cleared annually. It seems to be the intention of government to establish such only as can bring strong recommendations, and deposit sixteen pounds, as a security for two years residence in the country. But this measure will be attended with great inconvenience to the new settler, and preclude his employment of additional labour, rendered so necessary by the immense numbers of large trees that must be hewn down, and the great weight of the logs which require to be moved into piles. Ministers seem to have in view the formation of respectable, yet partial settlements. These to their extent may serve the purpose; but to meet the exigences of the times, a much broader scale of national liberality must be exerted; and it may be asked why is such great respectability, or a deposit of sixteen pounds required? An individual may be unable to obtain the requisite documents, and yet possess the qualities of strength and honesty; or even if not remarkable for the latter virtue, he might with safety be taken to a place where there would be no scope for roguery!—But as the present scheme appears well calculated for the pur-

pose intended, that of introducing worthy and respectable characters, it is hoped it will be perpetuated and enlarged; though at the same time an auxiliary measure, embracing the lower orders may be safely adopted, and the Author recommends that it be founded on the following regulations.

1. That printed proposals be circulated, as in the present instance, stating explicitly the terms of emigration.

2. That all persons indiscriminately (except notorious villains), of an age proper to labour, be permitted to enrol their names in lists, gratuitously prepared for the purpose; at the same time stating to which of the colonies they intend removing. These lists should be posted in public situations, for the purpose of guarding against fraud, that no persons be permitted to leave the kingdom if their creditors choose to affix a negative on the list.

3. That the emigrants should be under martial law, but guaranteed against any kind of military service, except that common to all inhabitants of colonies in time of war; and that proper officers,

civil and agricultural, should be appointed, with a commissariat, &c.

4. That the emigrants, while they remain embodied, should be fed at the expense of government; but, except in special cases, they should clothe themselves.

5. That agricultural implements should be advanced gratuitously by the government.

6. That the several corps of emigrants should proceed in transports, provided by government, to Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick.

7. That when arrived at their destination, they should with all convenient speed, commence the clearance of the precise district allotted to them, performing the labour in a body, until the whole was cleared, drained, and ready for culture.

8. The land thus prepared should be divided to each by lot; the whole being previously surveyed and laid out, into equal shares of one hundred acres, or more, per man.\*

\* One hundred acres of cleared land would be better than one thousand of forest land uncleared.

9. The officers to be paid an equivalent for their superintendence, either out of the cleared estate, or by a salary from government.

10. The emigrants to be invested with their respective estates, free of all fees or charges; to hold them by the tenure of free and common soccage; and be discharged from further services.

To provide for these and all other settlers a proper supply of labourers, it would be expedient to furnish a free passage to as many as chose to emigrate, under an engagement to serve any farmer who wanted hands for one year, at the rate of five shillings per day; the governor of the province to see that the engagement be duly fulfilled, and that the farmer be put in possession of his labourer: and provided the latter elopes, authority should be given to punish the offender, by deprivation of his salary and imprisonment, during the remainder of his term, unless it appear that the master has been guilty of cruelty or oppression. The emigrant of this description would be placed in a condition similar to those who proceed to the United States; and, after contributing his labour to the agriculture

of the country, he would at the year's end receive a nett salary of three hundred and sixty-five dollars, or ninety-one pounds one shilling sterling; and after obtaining a colonial grant in the regular way, by petition to the governor, he could, with this sum, clear it to great advantage.

Whatever misconceptions might at first prevail respecting these regulations, time would develop their superiority. The first experiment might not agree with the feelings of some,—others might doubt their efficacy; but when one corps of emigrants were put in full possession of their grants, the good faith of government would be apparent, and the excellence of the plan conspicuous.

The Author would also beg leave to offer a few considerations relative to the disbanding of the soldiery. At the conclusion of the revolutionary American war, certain tracts of land were granted to particular regiments: the lots were divided in *an uncleared state* to the soldiers who were discharged, to cultivate, sell, or abandon them, as they thought proper. A *few* of the more industrious cleared and cultivated their land, and either they or their descendants are now opulent farm-

ers; while the far greater proportion either cleared a sufficient quota to establish their title, and then sold the property, or else abandoning it altogether, suffered it again to escheat to the Crown. Thus the benevolent designs of government were defeated, and the progress of cultivation by no means bore a proportion to the liberality of the government, or to the number of the grants.

These defects might be easily remedied by employing the embodied labour of a whole regiment, or detachment, on the entire grant of land, till the whole was cleared, and then dividing it to each individual by lot as before recommended. By this arrangement, obedience would stimulate to labour, while the prospect of speedy enjoyment would cheer it. The impulse would be powerful, and the effect surprising; more land would be cleared by such a corps in one year, than by the same number of individuals, as such, in twelve; and a man who might be too indolent to clear land, and fell trees alone, might yet have industry sufficient to cultivate the land when cleared.

As an instance of the rapid progress of clearing

land by a numerous body of men working in concert, the colony of Berbice might be adduced. That colony was cleared and settled full three quarters of a mile into the interior, for near sixty miles, extending along the sea coast and the shores of the rivers Berbice and Corantain, in the space of seven years. There the labour was performed by negroes, while that performed by the whites in a congenial climate would be as three to one in favour of the latter. Besides, this clearance, without any exception, required draining, which was effected by the digging of a dike, or fosse, nine feet wide, and six deep, completely round each lot of a thousand acres, or the part intended to be cleared. A high mound was also to be thrown up, with the soil excavated from the dike; in addition to which, cokers or floodgates were made, and the clearance of the roots was completed throughout. What then might not be accomplished by a body of one thousand men, labouring in unison, where no such obstacles existed, and where it was necessary to grub the roots from only about a half of each lot.

The Author would then advise, as a general measure, that instead of disbanding soldiers at

home, in future all regiments intended to be reduced should be sent to one of the four provinces, especially Upper Canada or New Brunswick, there to employ themselves in the manner now stated. Various benefits would arise from this disposition of our military force; but particularly it would pour a large accession of strength into our colonies, which demand from us, as an imperious duty, that they should be rendered capable of resisting future hostile encroachments. These old soldiers would not only be instrumental in strengthening the frontier by their own personal prowess, but their instructions would be extremely valuable. It should be made one condition by which they obtained their discharge, that each settler should train and exercise in the use of arms all his own sons above the age of thirteen, together with those of six neighbouring families, once at least in every two months, unless prevented by actual sickness, under a stated penalty for every instance of neglect. This would obviate the necessity of the vexatious training of the militia, which in the event of war bears so hard on the farmers. The Author has known a whole company marched forty miles to a field inspection,

in Nova Scotia, greatly to the prejudice of the individuals, from expense, fatigue, and loss of time.

Another very important advantage, arising from the adoption of these measures, would be the strong incentive to enlisting in the army. If the British government held out these rewards in connexion with the present bounty, numbers would embrace the proposals gladly. But for this powerful stimulus, the United States could not have raised a military force at all, during the late war; while, by means of it, they in a short time mustered a pretty formidable body of troops. Why then should we not profit by this example, and improve upon it to the utmost possible extent? The soldiers could not think themselves aggrieved, by being disbanded so far from their native country, since they would individually possess the right to sell their estates, immediately on being put in possession, provided they chose to return to this side of the Atlantic; and purchasers of cleared lands could readily be found, while the soldier would have no reason to be dissatisfied on leaving Canada with a property of four or five hundred pounds.

Some may object to thus draining the mother country of her population, on the ground of its diminishing the national strength; but it should be recollected, that by irrigating the colonies with the overflowings of the people, that strength which is lost at home, we transfer to a situation best adapted for our own defence. Canada is the rampart of Britain: we must guard her important frontier from a recurrence of such hostile attacks as have lately been so successfully resisted; and this is rendered the more necessary, as the major part of those who have emigrated from this country to the United States, burn with resentment for supposed injuries, and are, if possible, more inveterate enemies to the parent state than their instructors. These characters compose the principal strength of the American regular army, and constitute a great proportion of the population of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, &c.; whose militia, during the late war, were more active than those of any other state. Besides which, the three hundred acres of land, given to each private soldier on his discharge, are appointed from districts which lie not only contiguous to our Canadian frontier, but to the Indian nations. Thus a population of soldiers, who, in addition to military

experience, are the very dregs of the British people, and who have either deserted from the army and navy, or escaped the punishment of their crimes, by eloping to America, are posted in situations, menacing both the safety of our colonies, and the independence of the Indians.

But should any one still doubt the propriety of having recourse to strong measures for the defence of Canada, let him reflect on the great anxiety displayed by the Americans, to profit by our oversights and geographical ignorance in the treaty of 1783, which then most injudiciously gave the Americans half the lakes Ontario and Erie. For instead of drawing a straight line to the river Mississippi, which would have included Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior, it most impolitically diverged at an acute angle, from the western point of Lake Erie, through the middle of Lakes Huron and Superior; and thus was the enemy enabled to establish posts and a numerous military population on our flank, enjoying over us all the advantages an invader could at any time desire. Dear bought experience in the late war, has given us a practical illustration of the fatal effects that have resulted from their thus having it in their power to combine an army on shore with a hostile fleet upon

the Lakes. The enemy also obtained the whole of Lake Champlain, affording them equal facilities for an attack, either on Montreal or Quebec; and besides all this, the boundary line which commenced at the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, intersected Arestook, a branch of the river St. John, which is the only line of communication in winter, between the cities of St. John, and Quebec. Now at this period the river St. Lawrence being frozen, and the navigation of the gulf dangerous, Government despatches are sent from the latter place overland; and the courier, before he can pass from the one province to the other, must cross about fifteen miles of the territory of the United States, which thus intersects the communication, and gives them, when at war, a power of depriving the British of all intercourse with Canada for six months in the year. The inhabitants of the provinces expected that the late definitive treaty would have corrected the error of the former, and restored these important frontiers; but as this has not been done, it becomes our imperious duty to exert all the energies of the nation, by planting settlements to secure what we have.

No more must American fleets, manned with picked seamen, triumph over the inexperience

of a handful of provincials, and a few soldiers fighting on an uncongenial element: no more must a General Hull be allowed to proclaim, "Canada is in my possession, and all white men fighting by the side of Indians shall be put to death:" no more must our villages be doomed to conflagration and pillage, and the women and children banished their habitations, amidst the terrors of night, and the horrors of a Canadian winter, to perish in the snow. These scenes of desolation, too atrocious to be palliated, too notorious to be denied, must never again occur in Canada. She must assume an imposing attitude, and overawe invasion; for nothing but a consciousness of inability to make an impression, will prove a restraint on American ambition.

In order the more effectually to realize this grand scheme of national policy, it would be requisite to introduce women in sufficient numbers for the men, and by some wise regulations to promote marriages between them. For this purpose the wives and female connexions of all emigrants of the second and third classes, who chose to follow their friends, should be assured of their being enabled to join them in their settlements. Meanwhile, if any were left destitute by the em-

barkation of the emigrants, they ought to be taken under the protection of the country, and when it appeared suitable to send them, a free passage should be provided, as also for an unmarried female, as a servant to each. This would be found highly advantageous to the settlers, who being put in possession of cleared farms, would be in a condition to require female aid.

In addition to this organized system of colonization by the government, it would be proper to permit the emigration of all persons so inclined in the ordinary way: and for this purpose a modification of the register act should take place, as far as relates to the regulations of emigration, and the quantity of provisions for each passenger. As a measure of precaution to prevent emigration to the United States, this act of the British legislature stands unrivalled in political acumen. We must not diminish, but increase the restrictions on that pernicious practice; a practice so fatal to us, so salutary to our enemies. But where the object is *bona fide* to proceed to the northern provinces, it would be quite fair and expedient to relieve masters of vessels from those heavy bonds, by which they are compelled to provide oatmeal, rice, molasses, &c. for each passenger, in large

quantities, as almost to amount to a total prohibition of taking them out at all; and only to bind the captains to provide sufficient food, of the same quality as that given to seamen, which would amply secure the emigrants from starvation.

If any should object to this, as giving facility to manufacturers and mechanics to escape through the provinces to the United States, the answer is, that care must be taken, not to permit any one to embark until his name has been affixed to the list of emigrants, stating the time and place of embarkation, with the name of the ship, &c. These lists should be posted up in every market and manufacturing town in the kingdom, and a reward of five guineas should be offered to any person who should detect any mechanic appearing in the list. In addition to which, an oath should be required of each applicant, stating his circumstances and destination; and instead of permitting constant departures, it would be proper to limit, not the number, but the time of embarkation, appointing certain ports in Great Britain, from which alone emigration, divested of the restraints of the register act, should be allowed. As a further safeguard, passports should be given to every emigrant

of each class, stating the particulars of their departure; and the provincial legislatures should be directed to adopt internal regulations of greater efficacy than those at present in force, respecting egress from the country. At present, it is only requisite for persons to affix their names in the *Secretary's* office, fourteen days previous to their departure. This is intended to guard against the fraudulent escapes of debtors, but is easily evaded, for the Secretary's office is so little frequented, that a debtor might comply with every requisition, and obtain his passports, without the creditor having the slightest knowledge of the matter. It would therefore be necessary in future instances, that, besides having the names posted as heretofore, copies of the Secretary's list, with the date of the signatures, should, for greater publicity, be affixed weekly to the doors of the churches, the town or court house, and in the market of the capital of each province.—Persons coming from the United States by sea or land, should be required to give in their names, and receive a passport, at the first seaport or frontier town at which they may arrive.

These regulations would be no obstruction to

the honest traveller, whose views being just, could stand investigation. But it is most likely that the small proportion of mechanics who may arrive in Canada, would gladly remain there, and change their occupation for the pursuits of agriculture, even in opposition to the influence of American emissaries.

## CHAP. XX.

ON THE POLICY OF PERMITTING EMIGRATIONS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO OUR COLONIES, UNDER THE SAME REGULATIONS AS THOSE FROM GREAT BRITAIN.

It is hoped that the necessity of permitting emigration on the broadest scale to take place from Great Britain to her provinces has been made apparent, for the purpose both of increasing their strength, and relieving the poor of the parent state. It is now the Author's wish to show, that it will be sound policy to permit Europeans in

general to emigrate in the same manner, in aid of the first mentioned purpose.

Experience proves that settlements of foreigners may exist in the heart of a British province, not only without the introduction of any thing unpleasant, but even with the greatest advantage to the community at large. These, while they preserve among themselves most, if not all their national distinctions, habits, and language, yet soon imbibe, in common with others of different local distinctions, a love for the country that supports them. In peace they contribute largely to its cultivation, in war they are its resolute defenders. Interest, that powerful bond of society, attaches them to the nation under whose auspices they flourish.

It is not Great Britain alone that has yielded supplies of population to the United States; they have invited and entertained emigrants from all nations: why then should we not imitate this policy, which has proved so highly beneficial to them. We have it in our power to offer greater inducements than our rivals; and when a man is to be engaged in manual labour, of what conse-

quence is it whether he speak the English or the German language? Let Government therefore appoint agents on the continent of Europe, vested with full powers to invite able bodied men, with their wives and families, to embark for the provinces, under the same regulations as those already proposed for British subjects; thus adding strength to our provinces, and at the same time preventing as much as possible any accession to that of the American United States.

It may not be impertinent here to direct the public attention to existing instances of foreign settlements in our possessions. In Nova Scotia, there are two large townships, \* named Malagath, and Lunenburgh, besides scattered farms, entirely inhabited by Dutchmen and Germans; whose industry, sobriety, honesty, and plain dealing, are conspicuous, and to whom the market of Halifax is principally indebted for a supply of vegetables, which they raise both of a good quality and in great quantities, keeping market boats, or shallows, continually plying between their farms

\* By a township, in the American acceptation, is meant an extensive district, of ten or twenty miles square, either peopled, or intended to be so.

and the town, which is situated on a peninsula, containing a few acres of good soil, improved and fertilized by sea and other manure; while the surrounding country, on both sides of the estuary that forms the harbour, is poor and rocky, yielding comparatively nothing, and in short is uncleared. But whoever visits the Halifax market wharfs, will discover proofs of the greatest abundance, and not unfrequently from ten to thirty Malagath boats, of about forty or fifty tons each. The convenience of this to a town so situated is very great, as all the provisions come from distant parts of the province.—In New Brunswick, the township of Dorchester, and the banks of the river Poticodiac, to a considerable extent, are peopled by the descendants of the original French settlers, who retain their language, with the manners and dress of the last age. But notwithstanding these striking distinctions, they, equally with the Malagathers, considered themselves bound in honour and allegiance to Great Britain, and were prompt and zealous in the discharge of military duty throughout the late war; and, like them too, their industry is visible in the culture of the soil.

Numerous other instances might be adduced, but these are sufficient to prove the fact, that foreigners may become valuable British subjects. In planting settlements of foreigners, care should however be taken to place them as distant from the frontier as possible; thus effectually removing every scruple as to their loyalty, and because it is certainly better to line the frontier entirely with native British.

These are points which it is hoped government will take into serious consideration. Money thus expended would not be misapplied, for the nation must be told again and again, that the provinces are her bulwarks, and that her vital interests are sacrificed the moment they are conquered. Would to God the Author had power to persuade this country to adopt the sentiments and politics of her provinces! Britain is dazzled by her glories in Europe, and regards American affairs with indifference. Alas! how fatal a propensity! her eyes should be directed to an enemy, alike inveterate in peace or war; an enemy that will triumph, unless immediately restrained by vigorous and stupendous efforts.

## CHAP. XXI.

## ON THE WEST INDIES.

Their importance shown;—Some particular Productions called into notice;—  
 The expedience of increasing the White, and ameliorating the condition of the  
 Mulatto Population;—Advantages of clearing the Island of Trinidad as a  
 Granary for the whole;—With Hints on the propriety of altering certain  
 Custom House Regulations.

It is not now necessary to enter into minute details, in order to show that the British possessions in the West Indies are beneficial to the mother country. That has been incontrovertibly proved by Bryan Edwards and others. The Author will therefore confine his observations to subjects connected with American rivalship.

The articles of cotton wool, tobacco, and rice, are staples of American produce, from whence they have derived very considerable wealth. The following statement of the quantity imported into the ports of Clyde alone, will clearly exhibit the value of these commodities to this country.

PORT GLASGOW.—*An Account of the quantity of Cotton Wool, Rice, and Tobacco, imported from the United States, Berbice, and Demerary, into this Port, from 5th January, 1806, to 5th January, 1815, distinguishing the quantity imported each year.*

Years ending,	FROM AMERICA.			FROM BERBICE.			FROM DEMERARY.		
	Cotton Wool.	Rice.	Tobacco.	Cotton Wool.	Rice.	Tob.	Cotton Wool.	Rice.	Tob.
	Libs.	Cwt.	Libs.	Libs.	Cwt.	Libs.	Libs.	Cwt.	Libs.
5th January, 1807,	8,950		1,462,082				1,028,545		
— 1808,	295,157		1,866,327	211,000			615,970		
— 1809,				112,184			441,554		
— 1810,	71,644	732	988,211	495,200			334,769		
— 1811,	62,104	6	1,044,081	721,020			1,431,100		
— 1812,	764,531	65	1,360,477	75,000			989,782		
— 1813,	60,307		665,297	725,162			1,125,950		
— 1814,				249,180			956,480		
— 1815,				142,212			919,407		
Total,	1,262,693	803	7,386,475	2,730,958			7,853,557		

GREENOCK.—An Account of the quantity of Cotton Wool, Rice, and Tobacco, imported from the United States, Berbice, and Demerary, into this Port, from 5th January, 1806, to 5th April, 1815, distinguishing the quantity imported each year.

Years ending,	FROM AMERICA.			FROM BERBICE.			FROM DEMERARY.		
	Cotton Wool.	Rice.	Tobacco.	Cotton Wool.	Rice.	Tob.	Cotton Wool.	Rice.	Tob.
	Libs.	Cwt.	Libs.	Libs.	Cwt.	Libs.	Libs.	Cwt.	Libs.
5th January, 1807,	4,519,333	1,711	527,686	192,793			752,034		
1808,	5,306,807	325	61,553	944,571			530,886		
1809,	1,192,682			326,933			459,275		
1810,	3,607,323	3,044	1,155,751	41,887			573,760		
1811,	4,044,503	6,202	1,455,514	167,433			639,409		
1812,	5,590,220	3,488	89,479				684,960		
1813,	3,091,819	11	130,898				681,926		
1814,		98					512,605		
1815,							607,210		
5th April, 1815,							59,416		
Total,	27,352,687	14,882	3,420,881	2,281,739			5,501,481		

Those commodities could be very soon produced by the West Indies, in such abundance as to render us independent of America. We ought therefore to consult our own interest, by imitating her policy, and imposing heavy duties on their importation from her states.

The Georgia cotton is by some affirmed to be superior to that of West India growth, though by others the fact is much questioned. The superiority of the article in general however, is equally attributed to the *species*, the mode of curing the wool, and the peculiarity of soil and climate. The American cotton is an *annual*, the West Indian, a *perennial* plant. If this circumstance occasioned a difference in the quality, it might be soon obviated by a change of species. As the islands and Guiana colonies comprise various soils, a choice of situation may be made, adapted to the quality of the cotton intended to be raised. The American growth is of two kinds, the Sea Island, and the Upland; the former growing on the sea coast, the latter inland. Now, the sea coast of Guiana being a deep strong soil, produces a ranker and perhaps a coarser cotton than the Sea Island, which grows on a sandy soil; but there is inland, a range of sandy hills, running parallel

to the sea coast of Berbice, where cotton of a quality, superior even to the American upland, would in all probability grow.

The destination of the colonies of Berbice, Surinam, and Demerary, have not yet been made public; and it is therefore uncertain, whether they will be restored to the Dutch, or ceded to us.\* The latter is most desirable, and it would be better to purchase them, even at a considerable price, as their loss would be severely felt, there being not less than five or six millions of British capital vested in the whole; but in the event of our losing possession, the other islands are competent to a sufficient supply, and under proper regulations the quality may also be improved.

Tobacco is an article which the West Indies are decidedly better calculated to produce in perfection, than Virginia itself. The produce of Cuba is universally celebrated. Though this island is not British property, it proves the fact now stated; and the reason why tobacco has not been so generally cultivated as sugar, is because at an early period of the colonial system, the

\* See Note A at the end.

trade was secured to the provinces, now the United States. In process of time, predilections and local habits of planting sugar and tobacco, universally obtained, and the effect is still felt. But let a powerful stimulus be applied, and the planters be instructed in the mode of curing tobacco, we shall then have no reason to be in any measure dependant on the States for this article of luxury, which has been constituted such by the inveterate habits of the people.

Rice may be furnished by the Guiana colonies, equal if not superior in quality, to the very best Carolina. The Author has tasted some that was produced on a plantation in the river Sarramacea, in Surinam; also some that was raised by the independent Bush Indians, in the interior, and the qualities of each were excellent. He remarked its extreme whiteness, the ease with which it boiled, the plump and large appearance of the boiled grain, and the gelatinous taste, indicating an abundance of nutriment. The Bush negroes raise considerable quantities for their own use, and exchange large quantities for salt, at Paramaribo. The planter who gave the Author the specimen above noticed, cultivated it for an experi-

ment, and was of opinion that Surinam alone could furnish sufficient for the consumption of Great Britain.—And if one colony could effect this, a superabundance would be raised from this in connexion with the other three, embracing a swampy coast of near five hundred miles in extent. It is well known, that a marine swamp impregnated with salt is best adapted to the growth of rice; and it is worthy of observation, that the specimens alluded to had not the advantages of such favourable soil. If rice of superior quality is produced in the most ineligible situations, what might not be expected from the prime districts?

Independent of the coast, there are numerous small islands in the river Corantain, large enough for a plantation, and peculiarly adapted to the growth of rice, being inundated about six inches at spring tides: of course, with proper flood gates and embankments, any desirable quantity of water might be admitted to irrigate the land. But supposing Guiana to be restored to the Dutch, it would be better to give them encouragement to raise this article, by importing it of them free of duty, and imposing one of *twenty five per cent. ad valorem*, on rice imported from the states. Or,

if it be thought more expedient to cultivate it ourselves, we have abundance of uncleared land, in Trinidad and elsewhere, equally adapted to its growth as the soils that produced the Surinam specimens; and there is no doubt that the West India planters would supply our wants, if proper encouragement were given them.

Should these hints be attended to, it would be advisable to engage the services of those fugitive negroes, who absconded from the plantations in the Delaware and Chesapeake, and who are now in Nova Scotia as British free subjects. These men are well acquainted with the American mode of treating these staples; and it would therefore be sound policy for the West India planters to hire them as overseers: their liberties being duly guaranteed, the men would no doubt readily embrace the proposals, as a cold climate is by no means congenial to their feelings. But the principal difficulty of procuring them is, that in some particular instances, they are under personal engagements to serve for a limited term: but as their proportion of labour is not very great, their masters would no doubt relinquish their services, for a trifling consideration. And the provisions of

the Slave Trade Abolition Act could not apply to them, they being free agents, and, like the whites, eligible to ingress and egress at pleasure.

Should any doubt the spirit of the planters to engage in new speculations, let them look again to Berbice, where the rapidity with which cultivation can advance is clearly proved, and the consequent progress of a new staple also apparent. Heavy duties were at one time imposed on coffee, in favour of the Mocha trade; but when the advantages of planting it in the West Indies were ascertained, and the duties taken off, the cultivation of the article extended widely.

Considering the colonies as supporters of the empire, their valuable resources should be called into action; restrictions of every kind, except those relating to American commerce, should be taken off, and every species of encouragement given to the discovery and cultivation of those numerous plants, with which they particularly abound.

The cabbage tree, whose leaves are ligneous, and capable of producing a material resembling

flax, the stringy fibres of which are remarkable for their fineness and strength, and free of those occasional inequalities existing in the best dressed flax.—Linen made of the cabbage tree fibres and common flax mixed, would most probably improve the fabric in fineness of texture, smoothness of surface, and durability. The Creoles are the only persons who use it as a substitute for fine thread, by extracting the fibres without maceration, and drawing the leaf under the edge of a knife applied to the thigh. Myriads of cabbage trees could easily be raised; and it is worthy of remark, that bad soils and rocky grounds would be equally eligible for them. The tree is produced from seed which it yields copiously; and it is supposed the young plant when about ten feet high would produce the best fibres. The silk grass, or gigantic aloe, produces larger fibres than the former, and they are used singly as threads for sewing, &c.: their texture is firm, round, and thin shaped; the colour at first a glossy white, but, without bleaching, it becomes in time a pale flaxen yellow. This plant deserves peculiar encouragement, as it is capable of being made into cordage of superior elegance, and, if not exposed to wet, of great durability. Though therefore unfit for cables, it would

be very suitable for the standing rigging, braces, and bowlines of a ship; its surface being smooth and compact, would please the eye, and not injure the seamen's hands so much as the common cordage. In the manufacture of whipcord and twine, the silk grass would be found greatly superior, producing an article of peculiar smoothness and polish, divested of loose filaments. The Author has seen some twine manufactured of silk grass, both by the Indians of Guiana and the negroes of Barbadoes, far superior to that of British manufacture.

A remarkable Lochier grows in every part of the West Indies, and that in great abundance, descending in festoons of considerable length from the branches of tall trees, particularly the silk cotton. It is found in greater quantities and higher perfection in Guiana than elsewhere. The Indians call it "Wee weerie," a name generally applied to substances of quick growth. This vegetable consists of long curly fibres, wonderfully ramified, and exactly resembling curled horse hair. These fibres are enveloped in a sort of brittle crust, to extract which, simple maceration alone is necessary. This article is eligible for all the

purposes of horse hair, as a stuffing material, with which it might be mixed to great advantage, or even used alone.

There are various other things of great value that remain unnoticed, or neglected. These, in the present state of the country, should be explored, and brought into use. Prohibitions and restrictions should be removed, and all new staples imported into this country, duty free, for ten years at least. The gamboge, the gum-arabic, the cinnamon, and camphor trees, are found to thrive, both on the continent and islands. A fine specimen of the latter, grows in the Botanic Garden in Jamaica. The attention of the Creoles should be drawn to these sources of wealth, especially as the three former articles being produced from shrubs rather than trees, might be raised very conveniently in hedge-rows, without occupying much land; and experience has proved, that these useful articles can be procured from the plants in great perfection, insomuch that no well founded objection can be raised against their quality. If, in consequence, some disadvantages arise from permitting the West, to participate in the East India trade, by raising these articles, yet the bene-

fits would greatly preponderate, particularly as it would increase the resources, and consequently the white population, of the West Indies, and thus enable them to consume the increasing productions of the northern colonies. A mutual interest would thus be raised between them, and prove a strong inducement to the provincials to continue under British protection, by which they would thus be enriched with the valuable monopoly of the West India trade; while a union with the States, or a precarious independence, would yield no equivalent. These are only a few of the measures suited to times of no common danger; for in proportion to the bitterness of American calumny, should be the efforts of the British nation to ameliorate the condition of those remote establishments, whose dependence on the parent state is commented on with acrimonious plausibility, and made to appear a badge of slavery.

In attempts to improve the condition of the West India planters, they must concur even in some measures which are grating to their prejudices. The white population ought to be increased, especially in Jamaica; where, notwithstanding the manifest impolicy of the measure, many of the

opulent discourage marriage among the whites, by refusing to employ on their plantations married men, as millwrights, masons, smiths, &c. Though the law requires a given proportion of whites on each estate, the above injurious practice multiplies a coloured population beyond all the bounds of prudence; for the "coloured people," aware of their numerical strength, and deeply conscious of their degraded condition, are at all times ripe for rebellion. It is indeed most astonishing to witness the mistaken policy of the white inhabitants towards the mulattoes, whose numbers must increase under the wisest regulations; but whose distinctions of colour ought to be lost sight of, as soon as possible. By a fatal inconsistency, however they first take great care to foster their coloured children; and then discountenance or discard them when adults! The father seems ashamed to acknowledge in public the son whom he has educated with tenderness under the paternal roof. The son, thus abandoned, becomes a prey to profligacy, dissipation, or despondency. The condition of a coloured man in Kingston, Jamaica, is truly deplorable. With an education frequently liberal, and a mind enlightened, he is debarred the society of his relatives, and that of the whites in general. The females of his own colour despise, and will

rarely condescend to live with him, much less to marry him, until deserted by some white protector. He is therefore compelled to seek a partner among the negroes, and his progeny thus revert to their original shade, weakening the white, and strengthening the black, interests. But as a constitutional remedy cannot be applied to this growing evil, it is hoped the dictates of humanity and sound policy will overcome this puerile pride of the white inhabitants, and induce them to admit the Mestees to all the privileges and all the respect claimed by themselves.—The abolition of the slave trade, by stopping the supply of negroes, naturally creates a necessity for an increase of the white population, which the articles of commerce alluded to will tend to produce, by operating in favour of the middle rank of planters, that class of white inhabitants who constitute the principal strength of the islands; and thus the great proportion of waste land that now exists, might in time be peopled by those who would prove extensive consumers of the manufactures of Britain, and the produce of the provinces; while they in return supplied both with a greater abundance of luxuries.

In a former chapter was shown the necessity of

a regular importation of flour, and the mode by which provisions might be raised, provided due notice were given. We now observe that, although under the circumstances there mentioned, the measure would be highly expedient, yet it is not calculated for a permanent system. The object of West India establishments, is to raise crops of great value, which cannot be obtained with the same facility elsewhere. The cultivation of provisions is, therefore, a minor consideration; and the whole of the estate should be devoted to the production of the staple. A diminished crop not only lessens the freight, and diminishes the duties of the mother country, but also the income of the proprietor, whose purchases of British goods must decrease in proportion. These incontrovertible positions have been insisted on by the advocates of free trade with America; who have thence concluded that it would be injurious to prohibit American supplies. We have already shown the ability of the northern provinces to answer this demand, and now direct the attention of the country to a remedy against even a partial inconvenience, arising from the experiment.

Instead of reserving one island, sufficiently to

windward for the purpose of growing provisions for the consumption of the rest, at the commencement of the West India colonial establishment, expensive measures were adopted, for the purpose of drawing from comparatively small tracts of land, immense supplies of rich staples, by the employment of numerous negroes. But this error must now be corrected; and Trinidad appears favourably situated for becoming a granary to the other islands. With a soil eminently fertile, it possesses the advantage of large portions yet unappropriated, and a situation adapted to the speedy transportation of its produce, as well to Jamaica as to the other islands. It is therefore advisable that a colony be settled there, subject to the same regulations as the northern provinces; solely for the purpose of establishing farms, and cultivating the different kinds of grain, pulse, and ground provisions. Settlements of this kind are not expensive: there is no need of boiling-houses, still-houses, barbecues or mills, all necessary for plantations. The poor man must first be contented with a hut: then a loghouse and farm, depending for support entirely on his labour. Curaçoa constitutes an epitome of what Trinidad ought to be, namely, a colony of farmers; and if suitable en-

couragements were held out, numbers would emigrate thence, not only from Britain, but from Barbadoes, and other parts of the West Indies. Should this measure be objected to, as involving the certain destruction of great numbers of the settlers, I add, that this is by no means true to the extent supposed; for it is rather the pride of white men that urges them to employ negro labour, than any positive inability to work themselves. There are in Barbadoes, numerous descendants of the original settlers, who labour in the field as their fathers did before them, and who appear hardier and more healthy than any other men. It was the facility with which negroes were procured, and the prevalence of example, that nourished the opinion of the impossibility of a white man's supporting the fatigues of agriculture. Prejudice alone clogs the white man's industry, as will appear from the well known fact, that robust able-bodied Barbadiens will peremptorily refuse to labour in the field, alleging as a reason, that it would be a disgrace to work like a "*negar*;" though they have no objection to trudge to Bridgetown, with a load of one or two hundred weight on their head. If it be again objected, that the labouring men are Creoles, inured to the climate

from their birth, we admit the fact; yet there are in Surinam many *native* Hollanders and Germans, who themselves labour, and yet preserve health. In short, the Author is persuaded that, provided the settlers did not expose themselves too much in the heat of the day, there would be nothing to fear. The causes which produce the death of so many soldiers and sailors, are intemperance, and imprudent changes from heat to cold: one moment they labour and perspire; then they drink, and, sleeping in the open air all night, in the morning are seized with a fever which carries them off.

By this establishment, the West India planters might obtain constant and regular supplies; while in the common course of West Indian agriculture, especially on the plan of the Windward Islands, no inconsiderable quantity of provisions might be raised without injury to the growing crops. Plantains would yield a very beneficial shade both to young cotton trees and coffee; for which purposes they are in general planted in Berbice. Beans, *bona vis*, &c. would shade tobacco, and come off in time for the cotton crop, &c. Thus, then, partly by what the plantations would raise, and

the island of Trinidad supply, (which supplies might be got weekly if the weather permitted,) the greatest plenty would prevail, and larger quantities of the staple commodities might be planted. If this were once effected, American embargoes and wars would never be felt. It is worthy of remark too, that hurricanes are less prevalent in Trinidad, than in other parts of the West Indies, thus affording additional security; and in ordinary times, the supply of flour from the northern provinces would, with these helps, be superabundant; while in the regular course of the farm, the new settlers would of course raise cattle, as well as provisions, for which the climate is very congenial, as they thrive amazingly, both there, and on the Spanish main. In Guiana, cattle are reared of the finest breed, particularly on some farms on the river Corantain, in Demerary. These, with the supplies from Jamaica, Porto Rico, and the northern provinces, would prove more than sufficient for any demand.

An attempt was made some years since, to prove the practicability of cultivating Trinidad *without slaves*, by planting a colony of Chinese; but though the idea was good, the effect did not correspond

to the wishes of the projectors, owing to the circumstance of a sufficient number of women not being provided; for though they produced some admirable specimens of cultivation, yet the temptations to a more indolent mode of life prevailed on a body of *men* who had no wives or children to prompt them to industrious habits. But a large colony of free Chinese, consisting both of women and men, would be eminently useful in the promotion of the scheme here suggested, if only as hired labourers; and the example of their extreme neatness in farming, would produce a laudable emulation in the Whites. The hints now suggested, may be acted upon to an amazing extent. Let the business be once engaged in, from a conviction of its necessity, and the beneficial result will exceed the most sanguine expectation.

To give greater efficiency to such a system, a revival of some custom-house regulations is necessary. Vexatious restraints on the importation of trifling articles, such as conserves and preserves, injure and disgust the Creoles, without benefiting the mother-country in any adequate degree. Any person wishing to send to his friends in Britain, a jar of tamarinds, or Guava jelly, is deterred by

the circumstance that the duties and fees on importation, would actually amount to more than the like quantity might be purchased for, in the shops of London: the large quantity imported for sale, and the smallest jar, being subject to nearly the same rates. The Author has heard this grievance loudly complained of, in all parts of the West Indies: and although this circumstance may appear trifling, it is a fair sample of many others, apparently as much so, but which forcibly operate against the increase of a middle class of Whites, whose encouragement government should by all means strive to promote.

Many ladies, and these frequently aged, destitute of relations or friends, and every way objects of our commiseration, have been accustomed to support themselves by the aid of two or three female negroes, whom they employ in making bread; while others purchase boxes of candles, soap, with various haberdashery articles &c. which the women retail in the streets: others make confections and preserves for home consumption or exportation. Now, as from various causes, particularly the frequent reduction of the large estates owing to the want of due supplies of negroes, this

class of persons must increase, it would be humane in the British legislature to amend the custom-house regulations in question; permitting the common sailors, each to import into this country any quantity, not exceeding half a hundred weight, of the various West-India preserves, *duty free*; also mates one, and masters of vessels two hundred weight, on the same terms. They should likewise allow all presents not exceeding half a hundred weight to be sent to their destination free of any expense, except freight. Trifling as these things may seem, they would be peculiarly gratifying to the Creoles, and tend much to conciliate their affections; and the benefits resulting therefrom would be very great, since if sailors were permitted to import, they would purchase vast quantities of these articles, and thus encourage those to domestic industry who have no other resources.

The financial loss arising from this indulgence would be but trifling: we should gain by the measure in many respects, particularly by the promotion of marriage among the poorer class of Whites, by opening a field for their industry, without depending upon the labour of negroes. And it is no inconsiderable advantage to the West Indies, in

their present situation, to promote such callings as may support white men without the agency of slaves, who are or may be difficult to obtain; while every respectable white family is an additional prop to the stability of the colonies and the empire; for the greater the sum of affluence and industry introduced, the greater must be the consumption of British manufacture. Thus what was sacrificed in one instance, would be gained in another; and by thus increasing the fair prospect of white families, the number of white men would increase, and those false maxims and injurious practices now prevailing in our colonies would greatly diminish. The British subject always considers himself in the West Indies, as a transient person, whose business it is to make money, and depart to his native country. To marry frequently is difficult, and he is caught by the contagious libertinism of others in a like situation: hence a coloured connection is formed, and a coloured progeny arises. This system has a baneful effect on the islands: the improvement of the towns is checked; and accordingly those in the British colonies are paltry and mean when compared to towns in foreign settlements, whose inhabitants are residents for life, and consequently endeavour to make

their residences as commodious and splendid as possible. But if the majority of those who go out to the West Indies, with the view of accumulating wealth, and then returning to their native country to enjoy it, really succeeded, the advantage would then rest with the mother country; but the contrary is manifestly the fact. Resorting to taverns and brothels, or keeping coloured girls, the end is defeated, and the white man ruined! He drags out a useless existence, and frequently ends his days in poverty, without at all contributing to the national wealth. That miserable race of beings, known in Jamaica by the opprobrious negro-epithet of "Walk and Nyam Buchras," or white men who only walk and eat, afford a striking example of this truth. These abject wretches are for the most part those who once were industrious, and, descended from good families, had the fairest prospects opened before them, either as merchants' clerks, or book-keepers on some plantation. Nothing was wanting to make them valuable members of society, but the presence of relatives, honourable connexions, and the dread of censure. Solitary, and in a strange country, when a young man arrives in the West Indies, he knows not how to employ his leisure time, and looks in

vain for those innocent amusements which he has left. The climate disposes him to sensuality: he enters loose company; is soon ridiculed out of those virtuous principles in which he was educated, or which he may subsequently have imbibed; and feeling a high flow of spirits, he rushes amidst the pleasures of voluptuousness, to the very extreme of libertinism. By these means he descends with rapidity to the lowest point of degraded existence, and meanly condescends to subsist as an absolute pauper. Rambling over the island, he abuses the hospitality of the planters, by begging food of one, a bed of another, and of a third the loan of a horse to ride to the next plantation. If the planter spurns him from his door, he goes to the negro-yard to beg from them; and if any charitable person procures him clothes to cover his half-naked body, he will immediately purchase with them a night's lodging in the hut of some negro-girl: in short he will do any thing but work.

By what then can a better state of things be introduced, and these exhibitions of depravity prevented or alleviated? By nothing so effectually as by an increase of the staple commodities, to induce the Europeans to marry, and settle in the

islands, instead of merely visiting them, and then returning home: and if the legislature of the different colonies were to impose a tax on non-resident free holders, it would operate in the promotion of internal improvements. Too much attention cannot be paid to these valuable possessions; and it is matter of deep regret that they should be held by so precarious a tenure as that of the influence of terror on the minds of the coloured men and negroes. But when the West Indies shall have obtained this requisite attention, and are properly stocked with white families, the stagnation of trade so lamentably experienced by this country, should it again take place, will not be so severely felt. The surplus produce will at all times force its way into the United States and the European continent, giving the Creoles the means of purchasing our merchandise, even in time of war. It is therefore ardently hoped, that the exertions of Britain to improve these distant dependencies will be proportionate to the exigences of the times, and the value she has at stake.

## CHAP. XXII.

STRICTURES ON THE TREATY OF GHENT.—ITS FOLLY  
EXPOSED, AND THE EVILS WITH WHICH IT IS  
PREGNANT EXHIBITED.

THERE has never been a state paper of such vast importance to this country, as the Treaty of Ghent. It will be proper therefore, to devote a chapter to a review of what may be justly termed one of the most unfortunate acts of diplomacy in which Great Britain ever engaged.

When the hostile incursions of the Americans into Canada furnished a practical illustration of the necessity of changing the frontier, in order to maintain its secure enjoyment of tranquillity, *many* persons confidently expected that Britain, having closed her European contest, would have immediately directed her principal disposable force towards that point, and attempted *at least* to reduce some of the enemy's settlements on the Lakes; and in the event of peace, insist on the

cession of the whole opposite coast. These hopes, almost universal, cheered the Upper Canadians, amid the terrors and desolations of war, animating them to a vigorous resistance, at a period when the small number of regular troops caused the duty of defending the frontier to devolve chiefly on the militia. But peace has been proclaimed, and such a peace, the Author does not scruple to assert, as may prove to be a death-warrant to the British nation. One more pernicious was never made: it not only contains the seeds of future war, but is altogether incompatible with the true interests of the mother country and her dependencies. Instead therefore of congratulating the country on the event, as many through ignorance or mistaken opinions have done, he most decidedly affirms, that perpetual war with America should have been preferred, and that she has even triumphed more by negotiations than by her arms. This country is by that event cajoled of the right and power to secure from invasion, provinces of incalculable value; the naturally strong situation of Canada is rendered of little avail; while, together with the Indian tribes on Lake Superior, she is left to the mercy of an inveterate enemy, who is growing stronger every day: and

if Canada fall in a future contest, the British nation must attach the blame entirely to the blindness and negligence equally conspicuous in the conduct of the late war, and in yielding to the enemy's politics in concluding a treaty of peace. Our power and resources should have been fully exerted, until the enemy, unable to prolong the contest, consented to sue for peace, offering to deliver into the victor's hands, indemnity for the past, and pledges of security for the future. But the golden opportunity has been thrown away, of forcing our inveterate enemy to make those sacrifices and concessions, which would have taught her a severe but just lesson of humility.

It is unfortunately too easy to analyze the causes that operated to produce this baneful treaty. It is evident that not only the nation at large, but its rulers in particular, are void of perception, as to the *real character* of the Americans! Principles of humanity and forbearance, arising from mistaken feelings of consanguinity, have repressed our military ardour throughout the late war. The same generous motives have also guided the councils of the nation in the conclusion of peace: and while the Author would applaud the *motives*

that induced the measures which he now execrates, he cannot but lament the fatal blindness, not only of ministers, but of the whole British community, and would wish to apply to their vision, the collyrium of provincial politics. Let this country learn her true interests from loyal adherents, possessing the local information which the country itself really wants. Let those who have studied the American character, and experienced the necessity there is for the most wakeful vigilance in all dealings with the states, communicate information to Britain; and instead of reclining in security, let her be prepared for a renewal of the contest. America will be so elated, as to assume in future a more lofty tone, and from a conviction of her imagined superiority, force a quarrel on the slightest grounds. The proposition stated by Mr Madison in his declaration of war, that, "a nation jealous of its *rights*, and conscious of its *strength*, has no alternative but to exert the one in defence of the other," was at that time deserted from by the Federalists, who much doubted this "conscious strength," and asserted that their sea-ports, and whole line of coast, had no dependence but on British clemency and magnanimity. But in consequence

of continued trains of brilliant exploits having in some measure concealed the national weakness, vanity will overcome their better judgment; they will conceive the idea of having *compelled* Britain to sign this peace, and hence a conviction of the power to declare war, combined with the desire of further establishing the national character, which has already gained so much, will make hostilities popular, even with the Federal party. And after preparing means of defence and aggression, to which it will apply itself with the utmost promptitude, the republic will rather court than decline a war: ambition being a most predominant feature in the American character, in no respect qualified by any principle of morality, or regard for the law of nations.

The dangerous and destructive principles of French policy are well understood, and suitable precautions are adopted. When Buonaparte's ambition was apparent, the allies declared they could not treat with him, nor with any of his family.\* And if no peace with him could be regarded as permanent, so, by parity of reason,

\* This has received another, and triumphant, exemplification in the conduct of Great Britain since Buonaparte's return from Elba.

must that just concluded with the United States, be received in the same light. For as the democratic government is notoriously influenced by Buonapartean politics, \* and as it has for the sole purpose of serving him, declared one war, under every symptom of rashness and presumption, unprovided with funds, with a dubious, defective, and untried force, do these circumstances give us reason to expect greater sincerity, more prudence, and love of concord, for the future? more especially, as the objects of the government have been advanced, hostile experiments successfully made, even war itself rendered instrumental in the promotion of native manufactures, and the nation elated with victory? What bond of security then, and of lasting amity, can there be in the treaty which has been recently concluded?

But should the peace be defended on the ground of manufacturing and commercial advantage, let those who contemplated such a result, consider the hostile measures of the American government, who as soon as peace was proclaimed, imposed a new tariff of duties on foreign merchandise and manufactures, which *doubles* those previously ex-

\* The National Intelligencer did not scruple openly to express its exultation at Buonaparte's return.

isting, and amounts almost to a total prohibition of importation. This law is, it seems, to continue in force two years from that period: why then should peace be solicited for the sake of commerce, when that commerce cannot be obtained on any equitable footing?

With regard to commissioners, is it not surprising that this country could not appoint men thoroughly acquainted with American affairs? No doubt Lord Gambier, and his worthy coadjutors, acted from the dictates of honour and benevolence; but were they competent to the task of negotiating with such shrewd, not to say subtle men, as Bayard and Galatin? for as in the treaty of 1783, so in the present instance, the British delegates have been foiled by American sophistry. It is much to be regretted that some native of the provinces, was not added to the list of British negotiators, as many gentlemen of superior talents, might have been readily obtained from either of the colonies.\* Our interests would then have

\* Many judicious Essays on the subject appeared in the Montreal, Halifax, and St. John's Newspapers. In the former particularly, the exact line of conduct government should have adopted, was clearly laid down, and produced some very angry comments from the United States.

been ascertained, and as certainly defended. The Author feels assured, that ignorance, and not conscious weakness, swayed our councils in the signature of the treaty. The spirit of that part of it at least, which relates to the boundaries, is founded on the American claims, established by the treaty of 1783. The arrangements made on the late occasion, relate to surveying this frontier, and ascertaining with precision, its exact geographical limits, in order to prevent disputes in future. In ordinary cases this would be just and equitable on both sides; but it must be recollected, that although disputes had arisen on this subject, it was not even a collateral cause of the war: on the contrary, the United States commenced hostilities for the real, though concealed, purpose of wresting Canada from Great Britain altogether. It was this circumstance *alone* that produced the war vote in congress; and therefore sanctioned a departure from terms of reciprocity, and the enforcement of measures necessary to the security and repose of those provinces, against which the enemy's force was directed. The ostensible motives assigned by the American government for the declaration of war, such as the establishment of sailors' rights and a free trade, &c.

were rather political engines, employed to gain popularity, than real causes of hostility. Subjects calculated to inflame the public mind were forced into notice, and commented on with the utmost malignity and virulence; false statements, and even palpable absurdities, were assiduously propagated, both by newspapers, and various other means: and it is a fact, worthy the serious consideration of Britons, because it develops in some measure, the deadly rancour of the ruling party, and the dangerous principles of American policy, that these injurious comments and assertions were intended to *shake the loyalty of British seamen*, whom they designedly hold up, as being *at present no better than degraded slaves*.

Is it not then surprising, that the litigated questions have not been set at rest by an express article in the treaty, where not a word is said respecting the right of search and impressment, points which affect the vital interests of Britain, and that ought to have been made the basis of the whole; while some objects of comparatively insignificant importance, are carefully inserted! Is it understood, that a secret article of the treaty exists, by which the above questions are decided? If so, all

may be well: but if the questions are waved, *generally* and *verbally*, by the respective plenipotentiaries, without a written document, what pledge can this country have from such vague proceedings, that they will not again disturb the repose of both nations?

It may be asked, was this a subject proper for the decision of a friendly power?—such a measure being contemplated by the Americans prior to the appointment of commissioners, with assurance of an issue favourable to the States, since it was well known there existed not one friendly power, who in *this* particular was not biased against Great Britain. In this it appears American policy was foiled; but the adverse decision of an umpire, would hardly have had a worse effect than the adopted mode of tacit connivance, or mutual evasion. And notwithstanding what may have been *pretended* by the American plenipotentiaries, many are clearly of opinion, that the old ground will be again taken by the people of the States; and that by omitting to make the decision of the contested rights a prominent article in the treaty of Ghent, this country has given America an opportunity to insinuate, that these indisputably belong to her.

This opinion will be fostered with care, till the smothered flame rekindles, and flags bearing political mottos are again displayed on the ocean.

The complexion of the late events in France, particularly the appointment of the immaculate Lucien Buonaparte as minister of the interior, might almost lead to the conclusion, that Mr President might have been also in the secret before it was developed: and perhaps it may never have been understood in Great Britain, that the war recently terminated with America, was determined on some time before it was actually declared, by Messrs Buonaparte and Madison. For the American *Charge d' Affairs* in Paris, is said to have hinted in company, some time before war was declared, that it would take place on a certain day. This being received with surprise by those present, he laid a bet to confirm the assertion: inquiry was made, and the time found to correspond exactly. This circumstance being developed, the affair became a matter of considerable notoriety in America.

We should therefore not be sanguine in our expectations of a lasting peace. The mercantile

part of the American community may in some respects be tired of war, but the government is not, because it suits the purposes of state. There is in Republican America, as well as in other countries, an *Arcanum* locked up in the cabinet. War inures the people to taxation; reconciles them to standing armies, and provides employment for a host of needy locusts, who swarm in the country. In short, a government feeling an interest *separate from that of the nation*, may well be supposed capable of declaring war, when the vast increase of the national debt enables it to keep its seat more securely. Let us therefore be on our guard, and employ the labours of the soldiery, agreeably to the system laid down in a former chapter. If this measure be adopted, the interests both of the provinces and mother country may yet be promoted, and the evil tendency of this disastrous peace in some degree mitigated.

We now proceed to examine the Canadian frontier, most exposed to the ill effects of this degrading treaty. The Americans well knew the advantages they possessed, improved the opportunity, and established numerous settlements, at points most calculated to annoy the British, in

case of war. Detroit, Ogdensburgh, Sackets Harbour, Oswego, Plattsburgh, Blackrock, and Buffalo, all attracted notice during the late contest; and the advantages which the enemy gained over our fleets, may be primarily attributed to their possessing those places. But there are many other important out-posts, which have as yet remained unnoticed, affording the Americans either peculiar facilities for aggression, or for the maintenance of a superior navy on the Lakes and waters of Canada. Cape St. Vincent, situated at the debouchure of Lake Ontario, threatens to cut off the communications between that lake and the river St. Laurence. Kingston Ferry, in its vicinity, Chaumont, Brownville, Waterton, Henderson, Ellisborough, and Mexico, all near the mouth of the lake, may be powerfully employed for the same purpose. Michillimackinac, in the narrows between Lakes Huron and Michigan, equally guards both, and prevents all communication from one to the other. Fort St. Joseph, on the river of the same name, which flows into Lake Michigan, affords security for the building of vessels; Miami Bay, Sandusky, and Cunningham Islands, with several capes along the streights of Erie, obstruct the passage from Lake St. Clair to Lake

Erie. The Miami river, flowing through Indiana, gives facility to an irruption from that part of the United States territory given to the soldiery. Detroit is well situated, either to command Lake St. Clair, and the water communications between that lake and Erie, or to make an incursion into Essex, against the posts of Sandwich, Amherstburgh, and Malden; and Fort St. Clair commands the river of that name, running from Lake St. Clair to Lake Huron. In the river St. Lawrence, abundance of stations, either are or may be taken up, for the purpose of destroying the small craft employed thereon, and cutting off all communication between Montreal and the Upper Province, St. Regis, Massena, Louisville, Madrid, Ogdensburgh, Morriston, Oswegatche, and Alexandria, with several islands affording either strong military positions, or posts of annoyance.

On Lake Champlain, are Champlain to guard the entrance, Plattsburgh, Peru, Willsborough, Crown Point, Ticonderago, Skeensborough, Fairhaven, Benson, Orwell, Bridport, Burlington, &c. while the British have only, to defend the water communication, Forts Chambly and William

Henry; the former about midway, the latter at the confluence with the St. Lawrence.

On an attentive perusal of the above summary, and examination of the map, it will be clearly seen, that Canada can never be really safe, while the United States possess these frontiers, founded on the treaty of 1783, and guaranteed by the late disgraceful one at Ghent. It will also be apparent, that the American territories of Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana, are most advantageously situated to command Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron, and Erie; while Lake Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence running from thence three parts of the way to Montreal, are completely lined with settlements and ports which tempt the enemy to make incursions, and render it almost impossible, in the present state of the two frontiers, to guard sufficiently against them. It would be easy for an enemy, holding Sackets Harbour, Ogdensburgh, and St. Regis, to descend upon Montreal; but to send a reinforcement up the river, from Montreal to Kingston, would be a work of great labour and difficulty. The evils of this were severely felt several times during the late war. Again, the falls of Niagara intercept the

water communication between Montreal and Lakes Erie, Huron, and the adjoining districts, which must ever be disturbed in time of war; for while the Ohio and Michigan territories are on their flank, and hostile fleets scour the Lakes, what prospect have these fertile regions of ever rising in importance, so long as the enemy can direct all his force against them, without their being able to obtain reinforcements from Kingston, or Montreal, except very slowly? Hence a British army stationed there might be soon outnumbered, and defeated before any succour could arrive; and, provided the enemy commanded Lake Ontario, even that would be entirely precluded. Thus the Americans could invade at *several* points, while at present the British would be able to reinforce only at one, and even *that* a very precarious one. Supposing the above mentioned district, included in the angle between Lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron to be *perfectly cleared*, and the towns of London and Oxford populous and extensive, there would be no security for them, so long as America commanded the Lakes: for a combined movement might be made on them from the four different points, of Burlington Bay, in Lake Ontario, Otter Creek, in Lake Erie, the river

Thames, in Lake St. Clair, and the Riviere Du Sable, in Lake Huron. Such a movement, if well conducted, would succeed like Generals Amherst, Prideaux, and Wolfe's celebrated expedition against the provinces.

May not Canada then complain with justice, that her interests not being understood, have been sacrificed, by permitting the means of desolating her most fertile districts to remain in the power of her enemies, who, if their boast be accomplished, will keep the mastery of the lakes?—in which case, they will at all times have access to the lower provinces, unless large fleets and numerous forts are built and maintained at a great expense; the supposition of which most essentially establishes the validity of the advice respecting colonization, given in a former chapter of this work.

America will never lose sight of her favourite object, the reduction of Canada, however it may be concealed. As well might Britain imagine that Buonaparte would abandon the desire of conquering her, as that the States will relinquish the idea of possessing Canada. And as the various points

of aggression are guaranteed to her as heretofore, and ambition is still suffered to retain its grand incentive to hostility, it may be asked, where is the humanity of the treaty of Ghent? By protracting the contest a little longer, the desired concessions would have been obtained, without the further effusion of blood, besides an immense annual expenditure saved.

Whatever may have been the motives that induced the British plenipotentiaries at Ghent, to ratify the treaty of 1783, and amuse themselves and the Americans with proofs of a scrupulous regard to the laws of nations, they were very ill-timed. If the attack on Copenhagen is vindicated on the plea of *necessity*, surely a departure from the precepts of the civilian would have been justifiable in the pacific negotiations with America. Denmark was at peace; the United States at war with us, and for the real purpose of possessing Canada. Her finances were inadequate to prolong the struggle, and Britain should have extorted the cession of a line of demarcation, necessary to the security of that country, against which the force of the enemy had been directed. If she had not obtained the whole line of coast along the

lakes, the principal posts, such as Oswego, Sackets Harbour, Detroit, and Buffalo, should have been insisted on peremptorily; while by express stipulation, the enemy should have been deprived altogether of having a fleet on the lakes, or limited as to the force and number of their ships. At the same time, they might have continued to enjoy an uninterrupted commerce, and to have covered the lakes with peaceable craft as before, though it would have been wiser, and ultimately more humane, to shut them out entirely from any participation in the benefits arising from trade on the lakes; since they converted what were intended as peaceable *depôts* of commerce, into military and naval stations.

■ If the enemy had refused to treat on such disadvantageous terms, (which I am scarcely afraid of had the British plenipotentiaries insisted on them as an *ultimatum*) Britain should have changed the aspect of the war on the Canadian frontier, from defensive into the offensive, and attacked each of the strong holds with an overwhelming force, which would have ensured success by making resistance useless.

As things now stand, this country must build a large fleet immediately, on the Lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron; and not yield to the Americans in exertion, who will strain every nerve to establish a superior force, and who construct their ships with surprising rapidity. Should we succeed in the superiority of ships, equal exertions should be made to furnish them with men. It was proved by Sir G. Prevost's general order, that there were only fifty British seamen on board the fleet defeated by the Americans on Lake Erie; the remainder were British soldiers, Canadian militia men, and peasantry, who had to contend against one thousand *picked* American seamen, sent for the express purpose of manning the hostile fleet.

The principal posts should have been obtained either by treaty or force of arms, as points, whose possession would have placed in our hands those facilities for an invasion of the States, which would be calculated to overawe and deter them from again disturbing our repose. In particular, the following should all have been secured: Oswego, which commands the routes to New York,

by Liverpool, Albany, or Onandago, Oxford, Rochester, and Hudsons river; \* to Philadelphia, by Onandago, Jericho, Harmony, Stockport, and the river Delaware; and to Baltimore, by Salina, Port-Watson, Troga-Point, and the Susquehana river. Crown Point and Ticonderago, are keys to New York, by the route of Sandy Hill, Greenwich, Waterford, and Hudsons river. Skeensborough also is the key to the great road on the eastern bank of Hudsons river, leading to New York. The inhabitants of the provinces, aware of the above circumstances, and knowing the importance of Oswego, anxiously expected that a large force would have been directed against it, that its reduction might have been secured. No doubt there must have been cogent *reasons* for not making the attempt: these are mysteries not to be explored by *vulgar eyes*; but certainly considerable disappointment and discontent prevailed in the provinces in consequence.

But Sackets Harbour is still of greater importance than either of the afore-mentioned places. Its convenience as a naval station has been fully

\* This river, besides being navigable, has good roads along each bank.

proved by America; while its fatal efficacy, in *blockading the entrance* to Lake Ontario from the river St. Lawrence has been most painfully experienced by us. With this peculiar fitness for offensive operations, it is likewise a key to New York by Harrisburgh, Leyden, and thence either by Trenton, Utica, and the Mohawk river; or else by Renesen, Johnstown, Waterford, and the Hudsons river. Such is the line of frontier opposed to the British settlements; and it can never be sufficiently regretted, that the Treaty of Ghent guarantees the full possession of these to the United States. Was it supposed that such "perfect reciprocity" would conciliate the affection of the Americans, or convince them that Britain desired peace from motives of humanity? Such conceptions may exist in an English cabinet, but they are not suitable to a Transatlantic climate.

The same misguided policy, of adhering to the principles of justice and liberality, instead of assuming an authoritative tone of resentment, which induced this country to guarantee the integrity of the American frontier, and of causing the lines to be accurately surveyed, doubtless prompted the British plenipotentiaries to accede to the apparent-

ly fair proposal of referring the contested islands \* in the Bay of Passamaquoddy to arbitration. Those islands being well situated for annihilating the trade of St. Johns, New Brunswick, are objects of eager desire to the United States, though only of use to them as nests for privateers and smugglers. But mark the crafty policy with which it is concealed. Assuming an air of indifference, "We have," we may suppose them to say, "gained several important points already; if too great stress be laid on these islands, we shall betray ourselves, alarm the opposite party, and perhaps by breaking off the negotiation, defeat our object altogether: but by proposing to refer such *trifles* to the decision of umpires, we shall gain our ends; taking special care to select for ourselves, those men who will resolutely stand out, and stop at nothing to suit their purpose, men to whom an oath is of no consequence. The British, on the contrary, in pure good faith, will choose honest, liberal men, not perhaps renowned for uncommon sagacity, whom we can model to our own satisfaction, and hoodwink so as to make them declare, that the islands belong to the United States; and when

\* Grand Manan, Campo Bello, Wolf Island, Deer Island, Moose Island, besides a great number of small islands or rocks.

that decision is once made, we can laugh at their simplicity." But it is most earnestly hoped, that these gentlemen may be outwitted, by the appointment of umpires on our part, who are as shrewd and resolute as their opponents; and who, if they enter fully into the merits of the case, will appreciate the value of the islands in question, and completely unmask the real views of the adverse party. But should the contested property be most clearly ascertained to belong to Britain, a decision in her favour may prove the cause of future hostilities, so tenacious are the Americans of their claims.

Besides these, there are many islands in the river St. Lawrence, and the several lakes, to come under the cognizance of the arbitrators: such are Wolfe Island, at the mouth of Lake Ontario; Grand Isle, in the river Niagara; Pelé, Cunningham, and Sandusky Islands, in Lake Erie; Gross, Turkey, Peach, and Hog Islands, in the water communication between Lakes Erie and St. Clair; a considerable number in Lake Huron, particularly Michillimackinac Isle and Fort, which commands Lake Michigan. This important post is as valuable to the United States, as the islands in

Passamaquoddy Bay are to Great Britain: since, if the latter holds Fort Michillimackinac, the passage of the Americans from Lake Michigan to Lake Huron is totally interrupted. It would therefore have been good policy to secure that post as a fair equivalent for Moose Island, &c., instead of which it is agreed, if any disputes arise, that some friendly power shall decide the difference; in which case, an unfavourable result must be expected, for the interest of the provinces will not then be better understood than in the arrangement of the treaty of Ghent.

From a review of the premises advanced, a just conclusion may be drawn, that the present peace is not founded on terms of such perfect reciprocity as has been represented. It is most decidedly adverse to Great Britain, since the rival nation enjoys all the credit, and profit too.—This treaty moreover declares to the world, that any nation who chooses to insult us, may hope to do it with impunity. It has left our provinces in the same defenceless state it found them: what few advantages were gained, are to be given up. And it has given the Americans the opportunity of placing themselves in a more imposing attitude in future.

Under all the circumstances in which it now stands, this country should take wise precautions, by strengthening the Canadian frontier, many of whose strong points should be immediately fortified, such as Long Point, or North Foreland, Point, Pelé, or South Foreland, and Landguard Point in Lake Erie; Nicholas Island, St. Peter's Head, Amherst Island, Burlington Point, and Gibraltar Point, in Lake Ontario. Colonization must proceed with great rapidity, as this country may be soon at war again with the States, when few emigrants would choose to embark, in the immediate prospect of fighting the enemy. But if, on the contrary, peace is destined to continue, it will be better to prosecute the colonial system, that the improvements of the Canadian frontier may at least keep pace with those of the United States. And if there would have been a necessity for an unusually vigorous system, in the event of their having obtained an extension of territory, an equal necessity exists in present circumstances. Great objections are anticipated to a system which will not only put the nation to great expense, but draw away so many of the people at a time when their

services as soldiers, &c. \* may probably be wanted at home. This would have weight, were American affairs of minor importance ; but as the contrary is the fact, they are not to be slighted any longer, without subjecting this country to danger : and unless some steps are also taken to renovate trade and manufactures, her situation will be truly lamentable.

If Britain lose Canada, the loss of the West Indies must inevitably follow ; and the ruin of her navy will succeed. But if she well people, and thereby strengthen, Canada, the West Indies will also increase in population; and wealth will reanimate the drooping commerce of the realm in general. And with proper restrictions on the American fisheries, the provinces may yet bear up for a short time without feeling the direful effects of the treaty of Ghent. However, if America should think proper again to declare war, the British nation is faithfully exhorted not to conduct another contest on the principles by which the last was regulated; and not again to make peace, until she can *coerce* the enemy into an abandonment of the whole line

\* The want of Soldiers does not now exist.

from St. Regis in the river St. Lawrence to the Lake of the Woods ; including also Lake Michigan, and the Michigan territory, and insisting on the Americans retiring from the waters of the rivers and lakes a few miles into the interior. All that portion too of the district of Maine, extending from the Grand Lake, or Chapeneticook, in New Brunswick, in a straight line, to the river Chaudiere in Lower Canada, ought also to be secured : or, if thought more advisable, a straight line may be drawn from the confluence of the rivers Piscatagnis and Penobscot in Maine, to the same river Chaudiere, and down the Penobscot to Castine, continuing it out at sea to the Isle Haute. This would include an important coast well stored with islands and harbours, notorious in the late war, as the refuge of privateers, from the British cruizers, but which might be converted to the most valuable purposes.

## CHAP. XXIII.

## CONCLUSION.

ON a review of what has been advanced, it will appear that the United States are attempting to rival Great Britain in manufactures; and that they entertain ambitious projects for the purpose of effecting her final overthrow:—That Americans in general are hostile to this country; and that the Federalists in particular, if in power, would be more formidable opponents than the present ruling faction, since they are more prudent in their councils, consistent and weighty in their resentment, active in hostility, and possessing the greatest share of wealth:—That the present state of American manufactures demands peculiar jealousy and vigilance on our part:—That America has risen to her present dangerous elevation in consequence of the troubles which have distracted Europe, and the impolitic connivance of Great Britain:—That since she has thrown aside the mask, and displayed her latent animosity, by a rash and

premature declaration of war, it is become the duty of Britons to study the enemy's character, and exert all their energies to counteract this dangerous competition:—That this country has abundant resources, if properly called into action, and that by wise plans of colonization, new markets may be opened when American ports shall be closed against our manufactures :—That the colonies in North America are fully competent to supply the West Indies with lumber and provisions :—That those colonies are barriers to the nation, and therefore should by all means be fully peopled as early as possible :—That there exists no danger of their defection from British allegiance so long as they continue to enjoy their present advantages ; especially if these were duly extended according to the plan here laid down:—That emigration, therefore, ought to be encouraged, on a broad and magnificent scale, suited to the power and the *dangers* of the nation:—That the West Indies would become more beneficial and populous under wise regulations ; and that, in some plans for their improvement, the colonies must unite with the British government:—That the cultivation and settlement of Trinidad, would be productive of important advantages to the other islands, and through

them also benefit the mother country:—And lastly, that the treaty of Ghent is a most unwise and impolitic measure, calculated to deprive Great Britain of the immense advantages which her great wealth and power have given her over the United States; inspiring the latter with a vain opinion of their importance, thus feeding their national pride, and encouraging their disposition to quarrel and to declare war, which they most probably will again do, as soon as the state of public affairs in Europe shall furnish them with the hope of succeeding against Great Britain. \*

The British public is therefore most seriously requested to consider these things calmly; and to divest themselves of those fatal partialities which fettered the arms and councils of the nation throughout the late war; and which produced the most baneful consequences in the treaty of peace. If there ever existed a time that called for unusual vigour, jealous scrutiny, vigilance, and caution in our national affairs, that period is now arrived. In consequence of the ratification of peace, the secret

\* The battle of Waterloo has wofully disappointed their expectations in this respect.

operations of emissaries will soon commence. The rival is about to adopt her old system of undermining the best interests of the country under the specious garb of amity. The tocsin of alarm must therefore be rung out, and seasonable antidotes provided for the poison; true patriots must see the necessity of ceasing to regard Americans as part of the British family: they must in future be regarded in the same light as Frenchmen, or Spaniards, that is, *as enemies* by birth and education; determined rivals, possessing many qualities that make them dangerous; and now that the effects of peace appear in a renewal of the accustomed intercourse between the two nations, let there be an end of that fraternization and ingenuous frankness which on many occasions laid this country open to the machinations of her foes. Let it be repeated, even though the sound should prove ungrateful—let the voice of truth be heard, which proclaims, “*that Britain never had an enemy so much to be dreaded, as the United States.*” Never was there a foe, until now, that possessed her language, that master-key to her councils: never could a foreigner, until now, introduce himself, unnoticed, into a British Parliament, Army, Navy, or Manufactory, to sound her policy, learn the

arts of war and peace, to employ these acquisitions against the source whence they were derived. Experience has proved that these are not mere chimeras: the American naval officers studied in a British school, and have proved themselves sufficiently apt scholars to chastise their masters. They have even given rise to hopes of being able ultimately to destroy our naval power! The progress of American manufacture evinces the same source of education. While the British nation has tamely surrendered to the enemy all the advantages that could be desired by such a character, one party thought it cruel to hurt the poor inoffensive Americans; another affected to despise and underrate the "contemptible Yankees." A wish to bring about a reconciliation, induced Great Britain to despatch an Admiral with a large fleet, as a negotiator: accordingly he wasted that time in negotiation which he ought to have employed in bombarding New York, or Boston, thereby exciting only derision, and bringing contempt on our naval power; while the enemy used the opportunity to strengthen her line of coast, eventually causing the disasters which occurred at New Orleans, Boston, and other places. Vigorous warfare, unchecked

and unqualified with clemency and forbearance, can alone ensure success to Britain in any future contest. And must she, who has ever proved victorious over other powers, and holds such a commanding rank in the scale of nations, ingloriously lay her trophies at the feet of America? Can it be, that Britons have been beaten on the ocean, and not burn with shame? or an army of veterans, who fought and conquered under Wellington, be swept away like sparrows, without awakening the nation to a true knowledge of the enemy? \* No! Britain is still conscious of her prowess, and ought to blame her own wrong opinions, and tardy measures, for all her disasters. She cannot feel a dread of the superior bravery of her foe, while she knows that the enemy employs her own unnatural sons against her; and

“ When Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war.”

Aware of this in future wars, (for wars will come) she must pour all her energies at once into the

\* The manner in which Americans are accustomed to fowling in the woods, and bush fighting, gave their riflemen an immense advantage over our better disciplined but less subtle soldiers. They lay among the trees and hedge rows, and dealt destruction around them, without our men being able to bring down a single individual.

contest, and prove that though she may not be able to conquer, and hold possession of the States, she can, beyond a doubt, make terrible inroads, destroy the seaports, and lay the country waste. Excess of clemency is often cruelty, and will most emphatically prove so in wars with America; while one severe castigation would have repressed the Mania for a century. Britain is victorious over the nations of Europe, because she knows them, and no fond regard for a race of descendants checks her military operations: she enters on a war with confirmed hostility; no temporizing conciliatory measures are employed; she fights and conquers.

Far from the writer be any wish to inflame the British nation, and goad it on to war. Peace is concluded, and, let the disadvantages be what they may, good faith requires our adherence to it. But the true intent of this work is, to put the nation in a posture of defence in the event of another declaration of war by the United States, or to give the first blow when the conduct of the enemy may render it unavoidable. It is one thing to expose and condemn a rival; another to urge acts of injustice. The measures here recommend-

ed are just, although severe. It is necessary to be explicit on this point, as the Author's intentions may possibly be misconstrued into an attempt, in itself base and cruel, and which he abhors and disclaims. It is his sincere desire to see British prosperity perpetuated; and a full conviction of the national danger has alone called forth this work. His great aim is, that it may lead to a renovation of its ardour, in the various pursuits by which the nation has reached its present summit of wealth and power.

So far from losing sight of the dangers of a naval power seated on the opposite shores of the Atlantic, this country should be always prepared, as it is in her distant provinces and islands alone that she is vulnerable. Jerome Buonaparte's fleet had levied contributions on several West India Islands, before intelligence could be received in Britain; and nothing could prevent an American squadron from committing similar depredations, if they were ever suffered to declare war in the absence of a British force: and particularly, were the vessels of war of the United States all collected together, they would then form a powerful force, competent to an attack on

any island, even though standing most prepared; much more so if British vigilance be relaxed. The insolent temerity and daring enterprise, even of American privateers must not be overlooked, since it may serve as a proof of the ability of an American navy to inflict a severe wound on the British empire. It is a fact, alas too true, that the Scourge, and several other privateers, actually chose the Irish Channel, as a cruising station, and remained there for a considerable time, to the great annoyance of the trade to Greenock and Liverpool; and one cruising off the Holmes, in the Bristol Channel, took a merchant ship of Bristol, released the prisoners, and sent them on shore with an American newspaper, and the Captain's compliments to an individual in the city! Another attacked a transport, close in with Sambro' lighthouse, at the mouth of Halifax harbour; but being beaten off after a gallant resistance, was chased for upwards of forty-eight hours by the *Nymphé* frigate, carrying royals and sky-scrapers, with lower, top-mast, top-gallant, and royal studding sails; the privateer all the time being under easy sail, and sometimes even with reefed top-sails, keeping exactly out of the range of the frigate's shot, but capable of running her

*hull down*\* in a short time. The natural inference to be drawn from the above facts is, that unceasing vigilance must be exercised, since the United States' fleet is really capable of striking some alarming blow ; and the daring exploits of her sailors (no matter whether native Americans or British,) have been such as to prove that they will readily attempt any enterprise however hazardous.

In future, French and American politics must be regarded as inseparable; the latter, however they may affect neutrality, will ever incline to the French side. In the event of a French fleet being at sea, should the British pursuing squadron fall in with an American just parted from them, the latter will most assuredly mislead the British commander respecting the course which the enemy are steering. No sooner was the *Guerriere* taken, than a messenger was despatched to France, to borrow ships of Buonaparte. These his pride did not suffer him to lend; because that would have extorted a virtual confession, that the superiority of the American sailors over his own made it eligible to surrender to them the management

\* A term applied to a ship, when she is at such a distance that only her masts and sails are to be seen.

of his navy. And as it cannot be believed, that the moderation lately affected by Buonaparte was sincere, so neither can the amicable professions of his satellites in America be implicitly relied on. Plans of universal dominion engrossed the mind of the French ruler: plans for the reduction of the whole continent of America, together with the West India islands occupy the thoughts of his humble imitators, and it may very soon appear that the councils of both are united.

Where then is the security or repose which this country has to expect? Her severe destiny either entails upon her war, or consigns her to a peace equally disastrous: and nothing within the range of human events can save the British nation from the ruin of her trade, manufactures, and navy, but a proper application of her resources to the enlargement of her colonies. It therefore behoves the nation at large, and opulent individuals in particular, to make exertions suited to the exigences of the times; and as money cannot be better applied, the man who, by application of his capital, clears and plants an extensive district, must be regarded as a national benefactor.

The Author is well persuaded, that the public has not hitherto seen this subject in a right point of view. Far *less* importance is attached thereto than it deserves; and many may be disposed to deny, that it is so intimately connected with the interests of the country as is here asserted. But should any individuals doubt the advantages of this system, and yet admit the probability of the continued march of the United States towards successful competition in arts and arms, let him reflect on the alternative which this country must then adopt. What must be the fate of the merchants, manufacturers, mechanics, all in short but the land holders? For unless previous care is taken by Britain to guard against the evil, by widening her foreign possessions, and providing a resource for her subjects, will not all the persons thus thrown out of employ flock to the States, and thereby increase the disaster? while even British capitalists, finding affairs on the decline at home, may communicate their strength, by resorting to a country which promises them scope for speculation.

Can the *landed interest* object to colonization, when they reflect on the reduced value of *their*

*estates*, which would be necessarily consequent on a decline of the empire? On the contrary, they ought to embark extensively in the measure, by the formation of societies, or otherwise, for the purpose of sending settlers abroad; and no fear of draining the country should be apprehended, for two hundred thousand souls might emigrate without inconvenience. The idle, dissipated, or dishonest, might be sent to New Holland; the more respectable should be planted in Trinidad, or the North American provinces. And what would Great Britain lose by the removal of all her sturdy-beggars, ballad-singers, mountebanks, pick-pockets, prostitutes, &c. or rather how great would be her gain? These people may frequently yield to fair representations of the advantages of emigration, and not only emigrate but reform, and become useful members of society. A very slight acquaintance with human motives will convince us, that despair of ever attaining opulence often produces in the poor habits of indolence which generate dishonesty; and that those who have been long abandoned to evil courses may rouse at the prospect of interest, and shake them off altogether. But in planting a colony of these wretched characters, care must be taken to select

a spot distant from any town, where spirits might be easily procured; because the more remote and wild the settlement, the greater the prospect of ultimate success. And considered in one point of view, a colony of such loose persons, who had never applied themselves to any manufacturing or mechanical occupation, would be of more service to the mother country than one composed of industrious characters; since the former being unable to provide apparel, &c. would be better customers to the merchant than the latter, whose women could spin and manufacture cloths at home.

Colonization would open a fair prospect for younger brothers of good families to establish large estates for themselves; and gentlemen of small property would do well to remember, that their opportunities of getting money would be greater, and their expenses less than in Britain. A moderately opulent farmer might live in the provinces in great respectability and ease. The young and gay may possibly object to alienate themselves from the luxurious pleasures of the mother country; but men of family would not al-

low such trifles to divert the attention; for, if there exists not that variety of enjoyment, there are ample means to sweeten life even in the depth of winter, many recreations being peculiar to the snowy regions, of which we in Britain know nothing.

Instead then of giving opportunity to an implacable, indefatigable, and dangerous rival to tempt the people of Britain to settle within its territories, let the utmost vigilance and care be exercised, both by Government and individuals, to direct emigration wholly to the British provinces. Thus will the superb plans of the "Rising Empire" be checked, and the greedy eyes of Congress may then survey in vain those immense regions destined to be peopled by Europeans; and it will soon be proved that the increase of population and wealth in the despised colonies of a monarchy, may equal, if not far exceed, that in a republic constituted upon the federal plan of the United States.

If a general sentiment prevail in favour of America, and Britons can seriously think that she owes her success to superior courage or talents, or to a destiny more brilliant than their own, they

may well be dispirited, and give up the contest: they may contemplate without emotion the ruins of their vast structure of national magnificence and glory, hurled from its foundations, by the unceasing and mighty efforts of a wily and too much despised antagonist.

But, if there remain one spark of that heroic spirit which once animated their forefathers; if the “*Amor Patriæ*” be not obliterated; let conscientious superiority, let even a sense of shame imperiously urge them to their duty, and obliterate the foul stain that has been suffered to tarnish the national reputation.

Thus has an obscure individual presumed to lay before the public a work intended to unveil the nature of the American competition, and display to Britain the present alarming state of her commercial affairs. If it produce the good effects which the Author intended, he will indeed feel himself most amply rewarded. He is entirely unsolicitous of personal applause, and not less regardless of censure. He has no views of personal aggrandisement from the system he recommends,

and bears no animosity to any individual American, but he has written from personal knowledge and the most confirmed convictions, and as this is his first Political Essay, so, in all probability, it will be his last.

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## POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the above was written and committed to press, a publication has appeared, said to be sanctioned by the American government, entitled "An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the late War with Great Britain." This work is entirely political, and does not therefore come immediately under our consideration; but as the spirit in which it is written is so congenial to what we have often had occasion to allude to as truly American, and as it must clearly evince to the British dominions the inveterate animosity of the American government to this country, we deem it necessary to make a few observations upon it.

This extraordinary production views every movement of the British government with an averted look and a jaundiced eye, and distorts every event which it narrates.

The authors are not satisfied with adorning America with every amiable virtue which can adorn a nation, such as good faith, the purest and most honourable intentions, patience under the most unprovoked and accumulated aggressions, a sincere respect for the rights of all nations, a

fervent love of peace, and a steady prosecution of every honourable means to preserve and secure it; but, as if America could not be every thing that is great and good while Great Britain enjoyed any fragment of character as a nation, they, with fervent zeal and great liberality, load Great Britain with every crime which a nation can commit:—she is overbearing and tyrannical; unfaithful to her engagements; professes the purest motives and a sincere desire for peace, while she is exerting all her energies to render peace unattainable to any nation which will not submit to her commercial sway.

But while the present generation of men exists, the disinterested exertions of Great Britain in behalf of oppressed nations will not be forgot; and the future historian will mark with peculiar delight the gigantic efforts which she has made in behalf of *general liberty*, when all the nations of Europe were prostrate or paralyzed before the most desolating tyranny that the world ever beheld, sustained and rendered nearly triumphant by the greatest abilities ever concentrated in one individual. And yet Great Britain, single-handed, has withstood this desolating scourge; and at last rallied around her all the nations of Europe,

“To fight and to conquer, again and again,”

not for the purposes of selfish aggrandizement, but to assert and defend the rights of outraged humanity: while America, regardless of her own liberty, and of the liberty of all other nations; inflated with prosperity, and ambitious

of monopolising the commerce of the world, greedily seized the opportunity when hope in Europe was at the lowest ebb—when Great Britain had strained every nerve and every sinew of her power to aid Russia in her last convulsive effort for national existence—when the French armies, headed by Napoleon in person, were accumulated in overwhelming force on the frontiers of Russia, ready to move forward in the cause of despotism and ambition, even in Britain, hope was alloyed with painful apprehension: we waited in suspense, with a humble reliance on the assistance of Divine Providence, and we waited not in vain:—this was the crisis, earnestly prayed for— anxiously watched for, and eagerly hailed by the *soi-disant* independent Americans, to unite with the enemy of the human race, in sinking to the bottom the last buoy of hope which, under Providence, despairing Liberty had to look to. But Heaven inspired the Russians with a self-devoted patriotism, which led them to lay their ancient capital in ashes, that it might not harbour such a fiend within its bosom: this was an immense offering sacrificed on the shrine of Freedom, and it accomplished the desired purpose. Had Buonaparte succeeded in his enterprise as he fondly anticipated, and as the government of America eagerly wished, Britain, single-handed, would have had to struggle for her existence against the united energies of the whole world. But, America alas! too soon attempted to imitate the ass in the fable: the lion has revived, and will not submit to an insult from her base-born heel.

These are facts which even American sophistry will in vain attempt to varnish over; and so long as they appear in the faithful page of history, so long will America's contemptible cant about liberty and independence, be contrasted with her strenuous, though fruitless efforts to expunge the very name of liberty from the earth; nor can he ever be esteemed attached to genuine liberty, who can refrain from branding America as the only *willing* ally, of the ruthless tyrant of the earth. And when Great Britain had by her persevering efforts rescued Europe from slavery, and obtained respite from war; had she been characterized by that spirit of tyranny which this work calumniously charges her with, she might have put forth her strength, and swept away the pretence of the United States to a rank among nations; but she has clearly exhibited her moderation and her love of peace, by consulting their interests more than her own, in the peace which has been concluded.

But who would characterize the authors of such a production as "The Lovers of Peace?" Does the love of peace identify with an earnest and openly manifested desire to stir up the evil passions—to reproach our neighbours with every crime which a fervid imagination can conceive, or the energies of language express? It is questionable if the worst of governments ever sanctioned with their authority a publication teeming with such unjust aspersions; imputations of such criminal intentions; and insinuations still more gross than the crimes libelled; and all this under the semblance of justice—of moderation—of the love of peace, and forsooth, of the patient suffering of injuries.

Those who know the spirit and character of American politicians will not wonder at this exposition, and could not expect any thing else than the spirit which it breathes; but even they, can scarcely fail to be surprised that a pamphlet abounding with such unjust and injurious charges should be published by any government, professing at least to be at peace with the one it calumniates. This fact will, it is conceived, incontrovertibly prove that the United States of America are the avowed ENEMIES OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN PEACE AS WELL AS IN WAR.

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NOTE A.

*Referred to in Page 162.*

WHEN this part of the work was written, no account had been made public of the provisions of the treaty relative to Berbice, Surinam, and Demerara. We have now the satisfaction to state that Surinam alone has been restored to the Dutch. Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara, are ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity, under the condition that the Dutch are permitted to supply their own estates, in these settlements, with what they may require, and to convey directly to Holland the produce of their own estates only, liable to the same government-duties which are paid by our own countrymen in the same settlements.

## AMERICAN PROJECTS.

[The following remarks, founded on recent occurrences, are taken from a respectable Newspaper dated November 1815, and are so well suited to elucidate the subject of this publication, as to be thought worthy of a place in this work.]


“THE intelligence from America is of very considerable importance, inasmuch as it seems to afford us some insight into the views and intentions of the Americans. We beg the public attention to it. In the first place, the Americans have ordered a large fort to be built without loss of time near Detroit, north-west of Lake Erie, on the banks of Lake St. Clair, which connects Lake Erie with Lake Huron. The spot chosen is at the Spring Wells, three miles below Detroit, “a position which completely commands all the adjacent country.” In addition to this, the governor of New York has received official information of its being the intention of government to place the American fleet upon Lake Erie in an immediate state of readiness for service. For this purpose, a part of the armed American vessels which were ordered to be scuttled and sunk last spring, are to be raised and refitted. Similar exertions are to be made on Lake Huron; and in addition to this, we are already in possession of the copy of a treaty between the American government and the Indians of the Seneca nation, for the purchase from the latter of the islands on the Niagara River. They are small, but one of them, Navy Island, is supposed to be within the boundary of Upper Canada, within our territories. As the objects purchased were so small, the transaction did not at first excite much attention in this


country; but, coupled with the intelligence which arrived yesterday, it assumes an appearance of much more importance. It seems to give the Americans the command of the Niagara River, and of the communication between Lakes Ontario and Erie, while the fort near Detroit will ensure them the command of the communication between Lake Erie and Lake Huron. The Americans, in the account from New York which we inserted yesterday, affect to state that all these measures and preparations have been the consequence of our preparations. They assert that "the activity of the British in building and procuring by purchase a considerable fleet, has no doubt excited our government to see the necessity of still keeping the superiority on the Lakes. The British are also very busily engaged in building a fleet on Lake Huron; and no doubt on all the Lakes they will, in time of peace, when they think we are asleep, make every exertion to have the ascendancy." Suppose the above statement to be correct, does not every one see that our preparations can only have defensive objects in view? That if we keep a naval force on the Lakes, it can only be for the purpose of securing us from attack, not of enabling us to make an attack? We have no hostile designs from Canada against the United States. But the case is very different with the Americans. If it be true, as is said in the New York account, that "the American government sees the necessity of still keeping the superiority on the Lakes," can it be said that that necessity for the superiority arises from any apprehension they feel of an invasion from us? It certainly cannot. But it is not, as we have already shown, to


naval preparations that they are confining themselves; they are making preparations by land, building forts, &c. Are they doing this because we have set them the example? They do not set up any such defence, and therefore we cannot, for our own parts, consider this conduct of America (supposing the New York account to be correct) to be such as we should have expected from a nation anxious to cultivate the relations of peace in the real spirit of peace. We shall be glad, however, to find we are mistaken."


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1870  
1871  
1872

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