





THE CONDUCT OF THE MINISTRY IMPARTIALLY EXAMINED. In a Letter to the Merchants of London. 8vo, 3/4 calf, 68p., London, 1765.


"The scarce 1st edition. This book treats of the conduct of the war then in progress in North America and its complications with the conflict between the French and English on the Ohio, and the case of a group of English settlers seized by the French on the Ohio and sent prisoners to France."


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
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
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LETTER to the Merchants of LONDON.

LONDON: Printed for S. BLADON, in Pater-nofter-Row.

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In a Letter to the Merchants of London.

London, Oct. 26, 1756.

GENTLEMEN,

HAVE thought fit to addrefs the following difcourfe to you, both as patrons and judges of it, for thefe reafons. My defign being to enquire, without prejudice or affection, into the part Great Britain has acted fince this A 2 maritime maritime war began, fuch an enquiry is most properly infcribed to a body of traders, who are fo nearly concerned in it's fuccefs, and who have fo confiderable a share as well in our foreign as domestic commerce. You are likewife very capable to pronounce on the real merit of my undertaking; for many among you are men of a liberal education; of large and extensive views; who have studied and who understand the political fystem, not of this island only, but of Europe in general. Add to thefe things, that your refidence in this great centre of bufinefs, your near and frequent opportunities of approaching those perfons, who adminifter the public, give you a diffinguished rank of confideration among your fellowfubjects. So that an appeal to you is, in effect, an appeal to the whole nation : and, as fuch, gentlemen, this is intended.

It is acknowledged, on all hands, that the prefent fituation of our affairs is a very critical one. No man therefore, can be an indifferent fpectator of it, who is not, at the fame time, infenfible to his most important interests, to the prefent age, and to posterity. We are all embarked in one politica! political veffel, where, tho the fteerage may be in other hands, the cargo is ours : and by confequence, while the ftorm is up, our lives and fortunes, our very being as well as fafety, are exposed to the fame common dangers, and must fhare the fame general fate.

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If this great crifis calls loudly upon us, to examine how we have been brought into it; whether by real faults in our manage= ment, or by accidents unavoidable; fuch is the excellence of our conftitution, that we may enquire with the utmost freedom. This ftill is, may it ever continue to be, the birth-right of Englishmen! But then,

That fuch an enquiry may be ufeful, it muft be calm, difpaffionate, impartial. As to the decency to be obferved in examining the conduct of other men, of our fuperiors more particularly; no one, who poffeffes and who is confcious he deferves the character of an honeft man, will break through that boundary, which both reafon and felf-regard have eftablifhed. Public order, private fecurity, all the relations we ftand in to one another, require that this fence fhould be preferved facred and inviolate. From writers of a A_3 differ-

different complexion, no man of fense can expect, and no man of honour would defire any thing elfe but feurrility and flander. Every knave, as well as every fool, is a leveller. Let not our own paffions, much lefs the paffions of fuch incendiaries (who write letters to the public, in the fame view their lefs criminal brothers do to private men ---- that they may eat) inflame and miflead us. Let us not adopt that finister zeal for the common welfare, which fometimes vents itfelf in vague, but furious declamations; fometimes in a malignant joy at public, tho inevitable misfortunes; and is ever dealing forth half truths, diminished or exaggerated, as may belt ferve the prefent purpofe of malice, or levity, or revenge, or of all together. These volunteers in scandal, these little Drawcanfirs, who are ever railing at their betters, only becaufe they dare do it, were never more numerous in any age or country. They fwarm by thoufands in this great city: they infeft every place of common refort, from the chocolate house to the night cellar; and having no bufinels of their own, are conftantly regulating that of the ftate. I have feen:

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feen fome of them reduced to fpell the very names of those perfons, they were beforehand refolved to abufe. Others, of more erudition, are daily pouring themfelves out in lampoons, epigrams, advertifements, edicts. Never were the powers of dullnefs in greater or more universal commotion. Grub-freet has not only fent abroad her own aboriginal poets and hawkers; but has likewife preffed into her fervice, as affistant draughtsmen, card-engravers, and gallows-makers, perfons of another importance; who, tho' they have been humble enough, on this occasion, to wear her genuine livery, would yet think themfelves injured in being fuppofed to affift her for hire or reward. Be then their decent and well-meant ing-nuity it's own recompence; and the true motives that infpire it, their peculiar diffinction ! To be more ferious. The productions, as fuch, of these men could not, it is allowed, merit even this fhort animadverfion ; did not the obvious tendency of them all, render it, in some fort, necessary. What that tendency is, every man amongst us, who is not the avowed enemy of all good difcipline, of all political fubordination, acknowledges and laments.

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As to myfelf, gentlemen, I dare avow the honeft ambition of differing totally from all fuch authors, in the fcope and aim of this letter.—For my talent as a writer, every fcribbler may place me in reputation, if he pleafes, immediately below his fellow-dunce; that is, immediately below nothing; an ingenious device, which I have often known practifed by the fraternity. But it fhall not be in their power to prove me guilty of what is alone material for your confideration; I mean, of intentionally afferting falfe facts, and of wilfully mifreprefenting true ones.

Thend neither panegyric nor abufe; and I have no caufe to ferve, but that of truth, and of my country. If, therefore, in the courfe of this addrefs, I any where impofe upon you; I have been firft, unknowingly, impofed upon myfelf. Be affured, however, that nothing in my power, has been left undone, to avoid this miffortune; and that, on the contrary, I have exerted my beft endeavours to procore every light, every information, which a private man could, by the most deliberate refearch, arrive at the knowledge of: and the refult of this enquiry fhall be, be, fairly, produced to you. When you have examined with attention the facts I relate, and have coolly weighed their importance; you will then, gentlemen, determine equitably on the evidence before you : and the people of England will affirm your verdict.

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But, before I enter upon this tafk, give me leave to take fome little notice of a pamphlet, which has been juft now put into my hands; and which, I am told, has met with attention from the public, on account, I imagine, of the facts it is fuppofed to contain; for furely if I, who am no author, may venture to pronounce on the ftile and manner of writing, both are below criticifm.

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The charge opens against the ministry, or rather against truth and matter of fact, with the following narrative, which you shall have in his own words; as no other can be fo fit to convey his meaning, and shew him in the true colours of a libeller.

" In the year one thousand feven hun-" dred and forty nine, or fifty, some Ame-" rican traders, subjects of the king " of Great Britain, travelled to the bor-" ders ders of the Ohio, to traffick with the natives of thofe parts: this being known to the Canadian French, meffengers were difpatched to acquaint them, that, unlefs they withdrew from their mafter's territories, their effects would be confifcated, and themfelves carried to prifon at Quebec. This meffage the traders thought fit to obey, and withdrew in confequence of it.

" The fucceeding feafon, another com-" pany of British subjects came to trade " on the Ohio : and not withdrawing on " a like meffage with the former, their " goods were confifcated, and themfelves " carried priloners to Quebec, from whence " they were brought to Rochelle in France, " AND STILL DETAINED IN PRISON. Not " confcious of having violated the laws " of nations, or traded on any ground, " to which the king of Great Britain had " not an undoubted right, they remon-" frated to the British ministry, infifted " upon being claimed as British subjects, " and honourably difcharged from prifon, " as perfons unoffending the laws of na-" tions; nay, they entertained the bonor-" able hopes of Englishmen, that the minias Ary " ftry of England would not ceafe to de-" mand an indemnification for the lofs of " that merchandize, which had been un-" juftly taken from them; and reparati-" on for the infult and long imprifon-" ment of their perfons : expectations be-" coming men, who value their liber-" ties, properties, and nation's honour : " in this they were deceived, the true spirit " of an English minister no longer dwelt " amongst us. The ambaffador at Paris, " instead of demanding these subjects of his " master, as men unjustly beld in prison, " and reparation for the wrongs they had re-" ceived, was ordered by the ministry to se follicit, as a favour from the court of " France, the discharge of them only, acknow-" ledging their offence."

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Thus he relates, and circumftantiates, the fact : and here I beg leave to remark, that when the circumftances, on which alone a charge is founded, are abfolutely falfe, all reflections upon them muft be utterly abfurd and impertinent. But when those reflections, aimed too at perfons of the highest rank, of the greatest eminence in this nation, are delivered in a stile of the most indecent and furious railing; railing; what name, gentlemen, fhall we beftow on their author? Or what fhall be faid in reply to them? No more, I think, than what Beralde, in the Malade Imaginaire of Moliere, anfwers to the apothecary. Allez, Monfieur; on voit bien que vous n'avez pas accoutumé de parler à des vifages. Here however they follow, in his own words ftill:

" Were not your fovereign's rights and " your own privileges shamefully given " up? Were not the lands on the Ohio " confessed to belong to France? Were not " the French justified in imprisoning your " fellow-fubjects, and confifcating their " effects, by this tame behaviour of the " British minister ?" He refumes the fame fubject, page 8, and afferts, " That the " minifter's timidly befeeching as a favour, " what he had a right to demand as juf-" tice from the French, has given that " nation a better foundation to the claim " of the Ohio." In about fifteen lines lower, he afferts again, " That the timi-" dity of the minister gave the French no " foundation at all." But he has not yet done with this favourite topic. He goes on to fay, " If it be asked, whence it « comes 16

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to the point :

" comes to pass that this behaviour of the " British minister has never been mention-" ed in the French memorials, relative to " the disputes in America ? It may be an-" fwered, with truth, that they referve it " only between the British minister and " themfelves ; left a public declaration of this " affair might remove him from the admi-" nifiration, and the French monarch lofe " an ally of greater confequence to his " fuccefs, than any potentate in Europe!" Here then we join iffue : and let his credit with the public for veracity and candor, in whatever elfe he afferts through his libel, be determined by the truth or falfehood of the fact before us. This demand, gentlemen, is fair and equitable : you fee he affirms it in the most undoubting terms, and remarks upon it in a language that not even certainty itself could warrant. But

On a motion made to the peers, the twentieth of *February*, one thoufand feven hundred and fifty fix, certain papers and letters concerning the encroachments of the French on his majefty's fubjects in North America, were laid before the houfe. As their authenticity is incontrovertible, I have have only the eafy talk of copying them faithfully for your full fatisfaction.

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Extract of a letter from the earl of Albemarle, to the earl of Holderneffe;

Paris, 19th Febru- } 1752.

" I must acquaint your lordship, that, " in the month of November I received a " letter from three perfons, figning them-" felves, John Patton, Luke Erwin, and " Thomas Bourke; reprefenting to me, " that they were English-men, who had " been brought to Rochelle, and put into " prifon there, from whence they wrote: " having been taken by the French fub-" jects, who feized their effects, as they " were trading with the English and other " Indians on the river Ohio, and carried " them prifoners to Quebec; from whence " they have been fent over to Rochelle, " where they are hardly used. Upon this " information I applied to Mr. St. Con-" teft, and gave him a note of it, CLAIM-" ING THEM, as the KING'S SUBJECTS, " and DEMANDING their liberty, and the " RE-

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" RESTITUTION of their effects that had "been unjuftly taken from them.

" Thefe three perfons, I find by the paper " your lordship has sent me, are of the num-" ber of those demanded of the French by " Mr. Clinton, and named in Mr. de la " Jonquiere's letter. I have wrote to a "merchant at Rochelle to enquire after " them, and to fupply them with money " to make their journey hither, if they are " not gone; that I may receive from them " all the informations neceffary. On my " feeing Mr. St. Contest, next Tuesday, I will " represent the cafe to him, in obedience " to his majefty's commands, that la Jon-" quiere may have politive orders, to defift " from the unjustifiable proceedings com-" plained of; to releafe any of his maje-" fty's fubjects he may still detain in pri-" fon, and make ample reftitution of their " effects. And I shall take care to shew " him the absolute necessity of sending in-" foructions to their feveral governors, not " to attempt any fuch encroachments for the " future." o di log of es ebus conta

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Extract of a letter from the earl of Albemarle to the earl of Holdernesse;

26th February, } 1752. 8th March, } 1752.

" I am now to acquaint your lordship, " that I faw Monfieur Rouillé yesterday; " and that having drawn up a note of the " feveral complaints I had received orders to " make of la Jonquiere's conduct, I delivered " it to him, and told him, in general, " the contents of it; infifting on the necef-" fity, for preferving the good understand-" ing betwixt his majefty and the most " christian king, of fending fuch positive or-" ders to all their governors, as might ef-" fectually prevent, for the future, any fuch " encroachments on his majefty's ter-" ritories, and committing fuch violences on " his fubjects, as had been done in the " paft.

" I added to my remonftrance, that I "hoped they would be taken into confidera-"tion quickly; that he might be able to "give me an anfwer next week, or as foon afterwards as he poffibly could. This minifter told me, he would use his beft endeavours for that purpose; affured me it was the intention of his court to pre-6 " vent

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" vent any difputes arifing, that might " tend to alter the prefent correspondence " between the two nations; and that I " might *depend* upon fuch *orders* being " fent to their governors accordingly.

"Of the three men, I mentioned to your "lordfhip in my letter of laft week, that "had been brought prifeners from Canada "to Rochelle, whom I fent for to come to "Paris, Two of them are ARRIVED, and "the THIRD is GONE to London. I will "take fuch informations from them as "may be neceffary for my own inftruction, to fupport their receiving fatisfaction "for the injuries that have been done "them."

Translation of part of the memorial delivered by lord Albemarle to Mr. Rouillé, on the 7th March, 1752.

* As to the fort which the French have undertaken to build on the river Niagara, and as to the fix Englishmen who have been made prisoners; lord Albemarle is ordered

* Quant à la fortresse que les François ont enterpris de construire sur la riviere Oniagara, et aux six Anglois qui ont été arretés, Milord Albemarle est char-B gé

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ordered by his court to demand, that the most express orders be fent to Mr. de la Jonquiere, to defist from such unjust proceedings, and in particular to cause the fort above mentioned, to be immediately razed; and the French and others in their alliance, who may happen to be there, to retire forthwith: as likewise to set the fix Englishmen at liberty, and to make them ample fatisfaction for the wrongs and loss they have fuffered; and lastly, that the persons who have committed these excesses, be punished in such a manner as may ferve for an example to those, who might hereafter venture on any like attempt.

I have now, gentlemen, let you into the truth of this transaction; which the pamphleteer affures you was little known, till he explained, that is, till he falfified it

gé par fa cour de demander, que des orders les plus expres soient envoyés à Mr. de la Jonquiere de se dessifier des procedés aussifi injustes; et particulierement de faire rafer immediatement la fortresse dont il est question, et de faire retirer les François, ou autres peuples, leur alliés, qui s'y trouveroient: comme aussifi de faire rendre aux six Anglois et leur liberté et une ample réparation des torts et des pertes qu' on leur a fait souffrir. Et enfin, que les personnes qui ont commis ces excès soient punis d'une maniere à servir d'example à ceux qui auroient envie à l'avenir de faire une pareille tentative.

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in every particular but one, and that nothing at all to the purpose of calumny. Is this then the advocate of the people of England? Is it thus he informs our judgments first, to set our passions afterwards on the fide of truth and public spirit?

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Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis. Tempus eget.

I had intended to drop this writer here; but, on looking into the very next page of his pamphlet, I find that the fecond fact he afferts is ftated as falfely and ignorantly as this, which you have feen fo unanfwerably confuted. It is concerning the Ohio company. To pass over the miferable puerilities of the French king and Scylla, of a quaker and Charybdis, with which he aims at enlivening his tale, I will state the fact shortly and truly : by which you will find, gentlemen, that he had not the fmalleft knowledge of the affair he was writing about ; that he is utterly unacquainted with the nature and forms of bufinefs; and that no blame, in this matter, can be poffibly imputed to the minister, whom he has abused with fuch B 2

fuch a profusion of low and illiberal malice; nor to any other perfon in the administration.

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In the year 1747, Sir William Gooch, lieutenant-governor of Virginia, acquainted the board of trade, that he had been lately much folicited by feveral perfons in partnership, for grants of lands lying on the western-fide of the great mountains; and begged of their lordfhips to be informed of the royal pleafure on that head. Hereupon his majesty, by order in council, was pleafed to refer it to the board of trade; with directions to confider, whether it might be for his fervice, and the advantage of the colony, to empower the lieutenant-governor to make fuch grants of lands. In 1748 the board of trade made their report; and gave it as their opinion, That the fettlement of the country lying to the westward of the great mountains in the colony of Virginia, will be for his majefty's intereft, and the advantage and fecurity of that and the neighbouring provinces; in as much as the British subjects will be thereby enabled to cultivate a. friendship, and carry on a more extensive commerce

commerce with the nations of Indians inhabiting those parts : and fuch fettlements may likewife be a proper step towards difappointing the views, and checking the encroachments of the French; as it will interrupt part of the communication by lodgments on the great lakes to the river Milliffippi. Their lordships therefore were of opinion, that all due encouragement ought to be given to the extending the British fettlements beyond the great mountains; and fubmit, whether it may not be advisable to empower the lieutenant-governor to make the grants defired, upon condition-That four years be allowed them to furvey, and pay rights for the lands, upon the return of the plans to the fecretary's office; and that a fort be built, and a garrifon placed, at the expence of the grantees.

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This report having been taken into confideration by the lords of the committee of council, they agreed in opinion with the board of trade; and directed that board to prepare a draught of an inftruction to the lieutenant-governor conformable to their report; which was B 3 accordingly accordingly done, and laid before the council.

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In the mean time, a petition was prefented to the king by Mr. Hanbury, in behalf of himfelf, and feveral others, for fettling the countries upon the Ohio; praying that his majefty would be pleafed to encourage the undertaking, by directing the governor of Virginia to grant them a certain tract of ground; on condition, among others, of their feating a certain number of families upon the land, and erecting a fort, and maintaining a garrifon, for the protection of the fettlement.

This petition being referred to the board of trade, it appeared to them, that the former application was part of the prefent propofal, and made by the fame perfons; and that it might be for his majefty's fervice to comply with it. Accordingly the draught of an inftruction was approved in council, and transmitted to the lieutenant-governor.

The prefident of the council of Virginia, in a letter to the board of trade in 1749, after fetting forth the difficulties the Ohio company laboured under from the fickleness r

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fickleness of the Indians, the claims of the Penfylvanians with refpect to limits, the expence of erecting and garrifoning a fort, &c. begs for fome further indulgences ; and fhews, that the French claim to the Miffiffippi is not just, as being contrary to the original grant of Charles I. to Sir Robert Heath, which was followed by a fettlement of the English long before the French had been in those parts.

It does not appear that any further application was made by the Ohio company with refpect to their grant till 1754; when they prefented a petition to his majefty, reciting the former transactions, and their proceedings fince his majefty's inftructions relative to their grants; and fetting forth the difficulties they had met with; and, among others, that the late governor and council had made out large grants to private perfons, to the amount of near 1,400,000 acres; which lands not being properly defcribed and limited, might have interfered with the lands discovered and chofen by the company : they therefore pray, that, upon conditions specified in the petition, their bounds may be fixed by certain rivers, &cc. which they name. But

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that the limits mentioned in the petition would include too great a quantity of land, their lord/hips were of opinion, that it fhould not be complied with; and they proposed fome inftructions to the governor relative to this affair in their report. But this report still remains under the consideration of the council; and no order at all has been made on it to this day.

I now defcend at once into the fubject of this letter, by observing that it were an abfolute wafte of your time, to fhew you either the juffice or the neceffity of the prefent war, on our part. It is fresh in every man's remembrance, that the whole body of our people, the commercial part more efpecially, were unanimous and even clamorous for it; as a war to be made in fupport of our own interefts folely, without any bias towards those of ungrateful or indolent allies. The current of parliament too ran violently the fame way : and the administration would have been looked upon as enemies to their country, had they opposed or even retarded this favorite meafure. They did neither. They feized the first justifiable occasion of beginning it; and

and they fupported what was thus begun, with all the alacrity of preparation, and all the vigor of execution. Let the facts, for those alone are evidence, prove this affertion, in detail.

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In the beginning of January 1755, the duke of Mirepoix returned to England, with the greatest professions of the fincere defire of his court, to adjust, finally and expeditioufly, all difputes fubfifting in America between the two crowns. It was, therefore, with the utmost furprize, that our fovereign received, at this very time, undoubted intelligence of the French having actually difpatched orders to Breft and Rochfort for arming a confiderable fleet; without any communication made by the court of Verfailles, or their ambaffador, to his majefty, of it's object or deftination. This mysterious and extraordinary ftep, on the part of France, could not fail to be attended with a general alarm here; and made it indifpenfably neceffary for the king to caufe fuch a number of thips of war to be equipped, as might frustrate any attempts of France, and protect, at the fame time, the British rights and dominions. This was done. The utmost efforts efforts were exerted, and with fuch fuccefs, that before the end of April, our fleet was ready to put to fea. It actually failed too the twenty-fecond of that month, under the command of vice-admiral Bofcawen. The ftrength of his fquadron was as follows.

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May the 9th, fent with dispatches							
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We had at the fame time, without leaving our coafts unguarded or exposed, a reinforcement in readiness to follow the vice-admiral; as it in fact did, upon the carliest intelligence of the French fleet being failed from Breft.

May the 11th, failed with rear-admiral Holburne,

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This was about eight days after Monfieur de Macnamara failed, with eighteen fhips of the line and eight frigates, which had been fitted out at Breft and Rochfort.

You all know, that Monfieur de Macnamara, after being out at lea fome days, returned with fix fhips of the line and three frigates. So that feventeen proceeded to North America; whereof, three of the line and three frigates were *armés en* guerre : ten were only armés en flute, as they term it; that is, they had no other than their upper-deck guns, and ferved as transports to carry their troops. The feventeenth was to be used as an hospital fhip.

As the British fquadron failed ten days before the French, it was improbable that they should meet on the European feas; but they faw, and fell in with each other, more than once, on the coast of North-America. Before we mention what happened there, I beg to be indulged in making one 3

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or two remarks, which the fubject we are upon naturally fuggefts. Every child in politics knows-that, after receiving orders as to the nature of the fervice he is to be employed in, and as to his general deftination, the commanding officer, in all very distant expeditions, is, and must be intrusted with a difcretionary power; first, to chufe fuch particular stations, as may be most proper to effect the business intended; and to vary them afterwards, according as different exigencies arife, or as the earlieft intelligence he can obtain may render it adviseable. Now, that fuch was the general purport and tenor of the orders given to every admiral, for every fervice, fince the commencement of this war; and that there was nothing, in their most fecret instructions, contradictory to what is here advanced, may be affirmed, with the fevereft regard to truth. But you must be fenfible, that, to lay before the public, instructions of fuch a nature, even were it in my power to do fo, is a step of too delicate a nature for any private man to take. However just they may be in themselves, however warranted by the laws of reafon and felf-defence; the war, that occafioned them,

them, is ftill carrying on. To men of fenfe and honor no more needs be faid on this head, at prefent: and, were I enabled to lay, before readers of a different character, all that truth would warrant me in faying, but that prudence forbids, it would avail nothing. You are already perfuaded, that cavil and abufe, not information, is all they wifh to find on any fubject, even on those where our nearest and most effential interests are to be difcuffed.

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My fecond remark is, that, whenever an administration makes use of means duly proportioned to the end proposed, and chufes for obtaining fuch end men of acknowledged abilities in their profession, fully inftructed and empowered to act, they have done their duty: and, however unfortunate the iffue may be, they ftand acquitted of all demerit to the public. No minister was ever fuppofed to be the mafter of events: and the fea-(is it neceffary I fhould make fo trite an observation, gentlemen?) --- continues the most inconstant of all the elements. If our vice-admiral could not intercept the whole French fleet, either in it's paffage to North America or in it's return to Europe; is the Atlantic no wider than

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than the channel between Dover and Calais? Are there no ftorms to vex, no dark nights, no exceffive and continuing fogs to obfcure that immense ocean? land to render the taking, or even feeing an enemy's fhips, impoffible? But they did not all efcape his vigilance. Both fquadrons faw and fell in with each other more than once on the American coaft; tho the fogs, fo frequent and thick in that latitude, feparated them before they could come near enough to engage. One part however he came up with, and took two fhips, the Alcide and the Lys, of 64 guns each, the latter having on board four companies of the queen's regiment, four of the regiment of Languedoc; and, divided betwixt both, about feven thousand fix hundred pounds fterling, for the payment of the troops.

Mr. Bofcawen was joined on the 21ft of June by rear-admiral Holburne. The fame day he advanced within a mile of Louifbourg harbour, and feeing there four large fhips and two frigates, he knew that Monfieur du Perrier had outfailed him and was fafe in port. He then proceeded to his rendezvous, being the beft adapted for preventing the fquadron under Monfieur de la Motte from getting into

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into the Gulph of St. Lawrence; though this too, under cover of fogs and by hard gales of wind, had the good fortune to arrive at the place of its deftination. The thips, under Mr. Bofcawen's command, becoming now very fickly, he went to Halifax, there to fend on fhore and refresh the failors that were no longer fit for fervice: and he left rear-admiral Holburne with five or fix thips cruizing off Louifbourg. But the fame diftempers began difcover themfelves, and to fpread to amongst this part of our fleet likewife; Mr. Holburne buiying no lefs than two hundred men out of his own ship : and, in the whole fquadron, we loft upwards of two thousand. This was owing to the feverity of the weather at their first coming upon the coaft, and to the pernicious humidity of the fogs, which commonly inflames and renders mortal the fever attending feamen, at the first fitting out of a fleet.

That part of the French fquadron, which had gone to Quebec, efcaped back to Europe in the month of September, through the Streight of Bellifle. By this fireight is to be underftood the channel, which feparates Newfoundland from the continent

continent of America, running north-weft and fouth-weft; an unfrequented and very hazardous navigation, which had never before been attempted by any fleet or fquadron of fhips. Whilft Mr. Holburne continued cruizing before Louisbourg, the ftrong gales of wind at the fall of the year, often drove him many leagues to leeward, which gave the French an opportunity of coming out as they did. On the twentieth of September he came up with three of their fhips, one of which feparated from the reft and was chaced, tho fhe could not be overtaken, by the Centurion and Litchfield. The Edinburgh, Dunkirk and Norwich purfued the other two, and the Dunkirk came near them, but directly to windward; fo that, as there was no profpect of alfiltance from the reft, fhe was called off by the admiral. The other ship that had been left at Louisbourg, I mean the Esperance of feventy-four guns, was taken in her return to Breft by fome of those under the command of rear-admiral Weft.

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This, gentlemen, is a plain deduction of facts, naked of all ornament and artifice. On one hand, nothing has been kept back from your view, by being thrown thrown into fhades: nothing on the other has been brought forwards, to be fet in a light too ftrong or too advantageous Though of these two vitious extremes, the laft, as things are at prefent circumstanced, would be perhaps the most pardonable fault: for I should rank myself among the worft of mankind, as not deferving the common benefits of air and water, much lefs the privileges of a free Briton, if from levity or malice, I fhould debafe my pen fo far, as to unfettle the affections of my fellow-fubjects, by fpreading lies of men, merely becaufe they are ministers; or to inflame the calamities of my country, merely to fhew my taler, use ridicule and ribaldry. Hic niger eft : and the ou sle of England would have more reafon to baba their guard against the infusions of such a writer, than against the miscreant who had betrayed his friend, or attempted the life of his father. But let us now proceed to enquire what was doing in the mean while nearer home.

Our object, as you have feen, was the intercepting of the French fleet. The fame plan, which had fucceeded fo well in the laft war, was purfued in this; the fame

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officers, who had diftinguished themfelves then, were employed now; but the iffue was still uncertain, and in the hands of providence alone. That the administration, therefore, during those five or fix months of uncertainty, might leave nothing undone on their part, it was refolved to ftop all French ships homeward or outward bound, and bring them into our ports: And thus, if the expedition to America should not fully answer our expectations, we should yet have in our hands the greatest number possible of their vessels and failors, who woul of otherwife, most undoubtedly be employed against us. May I for ence affure the tone fo common to is relate of our politicians, and affert pom, dy mat our fafety, at that very ha-Zaldous ; wuncture, was owing folely to this measur? Instead of this, I will only beg leave to remark, that had the three hundred ships and eight thousand seamen, taken by us before Christmas, arrived fafe in France, they might have transported hither fo formidable a force, and in fo fhort a time, that those, who have fince pretended to ridicule the attempt, would have been, at that moment, the first to tremble at.

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But the damage we have occasioned to their commerce, by purfuing this measure; deferves a particular confideration. It cannot be denied, that, while our own trade never was better nor more generally protected, in any period during a war; the trade of our enemies never fuffered more, at the fame time. The confequence of which has been, that the advanced price of infurance upon merchant-fhips fince the commencement of the prefent war is very inconfiderable on our part; and that the French are under a neceffity of infuring theirs, the outward bound at 30 to 35 per cent. and the homeward bound at 40 to 55 per cent .- a load fo unequal and ruinous, that the most flourishing commerce must fink under it foon, perhaps irrecoverably This their merchants foretold; and it is the true fource of that averfion from the war, and of those uneasy murmurings which have fpread themfelves from the most remote provinces to the capital, from the very peafants to the first parliament of their monarchy .- But let us intermit for a while fuch remarks as thefe, however true and pertinent; as this feems a proper place, gentlemen, to fet before you, in one view, an abstract of all the squadrons sent out by

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by the admiralty, for this and other indifpenfible fervices, from the month of April 1755, to the beginning of the fame month 1756 inclusively. You have already been told that vice-admiral Bofcawen failed for North America, on the 22d of April 1755, with the following fhips, viz.

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	Guns.							
Of	74	27						
	70	3						
007103	64	T	II	7				
	60	4		0	10		Men.	
ing	50	ij		7	10702	1-10	5495	
17 E	Sloop	I]				
1	and the second	Sugar,	23-140					

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And that he was reinforced by rear-admiral Holburne on May 11, with

Of	74	1]	a south	
	70	4 6 7	a Coloria	St Commis
	60	IJ	-	3170
	24 .	un Luitel	n-h-6ga	La redour

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On the 24th of July 1755, failed with Sir Edward Hawke, to cruize to the westward, and followed him shortly after,

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	Guns.		mini was as ion
Of	90	2]	
	80	2	1 02 10
	74	L	1
	70	8148	Two of these followed him the beginning of August.
	66	1 3	the beginning of August.
	60	3	1 10
	50	IJ	
	44	I	14 . Channel
	Sloop	Ŧ	1 1 40 1 10

Sailed at the fame time to cruize to the weftward,

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And a few days afterwards, Of 60 I

On the 29th September 1755, Sir Edward Hawke returned into port with fome of his fquadron. Some came in about ten days before, and two or three of them a few days afterwards.

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On the 14th of October 1755, viceadmiral Byng failed from St. Helen's to cruize to the weftward. His fquadron, including fuch fhips as were fent out after him, was as follows,

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	Guns.		
Of	90	I]
	74	I	
	70	II	N. T.
	66	I	> 22
	64	1	
	60	5	
	50	2	
	44	I	
	24	3	
	Sloops	2	

About the middle of November 1755, vice-admiral Bofcawen returned to England, with thirteen fail of the line, and two frigates.

On the 22d of the fame month, vice-admiral Byng returned to Spithead; and most of his fquadron entered into port about the fame time. One of the 70 gun ships came in the 4th of November; one did not return till the 9th of December; and two continued out four days after that.

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On the 30th of January 1756, viceadmiral Ofborn failed to cruize to the weftward, with the following fhips.

	Guns.		
Of	70	10]	
	66	I	13
	60	I	3
	50	1]	ndê s
	Sloop	I	

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On the 16th February, he returned with them to Spithead.

On the 12th March 1756, Sir Edward Hawke failed to cruize to the weftward from St. Helen's, with part of the following fhips, and was joined by the others off Plymouth.

	Guns,		
Df	90	1]	
	74	I	
	70	7	> 14
	60	3	
	50	2.j	
	24	3	
	Sloop	I	
	and the second se		

On the 6th April 1756, admiral Byng failed for the Mediterranean from St. Helen's, with the following fhips:

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6	Guns.	1.	and the
Of	90	I	La Coltabe
	74	I	n mann
	70	- 3	> 10
	66	I	10
1-	64	2	
	60	2)	1 23

Having thus laid before you, which any man may verify even from the common news-papers, a lift of the fhips employed, at different times, and in different fervices, during the laft year and the beginning of this; it may not be unneceffary here to take fome notice of the cruize made by our weftern fquadron; as much licentious invective hath been thrown out at random on that topic, by those who of all men knew least what they were to condemn or approve. 凯

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The defign in fending out this fquadron, was not only to endeavour the intercepting of Du Guay's; but those likewife of La Motte and Salvert, in case they should escape our fleet in North America. Du Guay having gone to Lisbon and Cadiz, where he wasted much time, rendered the conjecture extremely probable that he was to join those other squadrons, in their return, return, at fome fixed rendezvous, and by that means fecure their fafe entry into the ports of France. It was therefore judged prudent to fend out a fquadron fufficient to intercept them in cafe of their junction : and it was left to the difcretion of the admiral to keep in fuch station as would most effectually prevent their getting into harbour; unlefs, from any intelligence he might receive, he fhould find it neceffary to proceed to the fouthward, as a more probable station to meet them. But Du Guay, on coming back, kept out in the ocean, much to the weftward of Cape Finisterre, till he came into the latitude of Breft. There he continued cruizing till the wind was fair, and gave him an opportunity of running down the latitude directly into port; by which he efcaped the vigilance of our fquadron, then croffing the Bay of Bifcay: and the ships from North America returning by themfelves, one was taken; another of greatly-fuperior force engaged by one of our cruizing frigates; and a third escaped, by our ship that chafed carrying away her topmast.

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These different and neceffary steps on the part of Great Britain, produced, and could not fail of producing in the French an ardent defire of revenge. You well remember the critical fituation of this country during the laft winter. Their fquadrons, after only a common paffage to and from America, in which by confequence they could have fuffered very little, were all returned, and in harbour. Great bodies of their troops were drawn down, and fpread themfelves along the coafts of Picardy, Normandy, and Britany, threatening a defcent either in this island or Ireland. Of this we had repeated and fure intelligence. We knew likewife that they meditated an invafion of Minorca; which, by the treaty of Utrecht, they had folemnly guarantied to England against all powers whatever. I fay, that all this was early known to the government; who therefore were not fo ill informed as hundreds, that do not believe what they publish, have dared to affert; nor will they be found fo reproachably negligent in their preparations as well-meaning credulity in fome, misled by the infidious malice of a few, has been unfortunately perfuaded to believe. But,

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But, were the writer of this letter actually posseffed of all the fecret intelligence neceffary to prove what is here afferted, the exposing of fuch intelligence at this time would be premature and hazardous. It would be to copy after the pernicious example of fome other writers, who, while they pretend to inform you, afford real and dangerous information only to your enemies. Let it fuffice, then, for the prefent to fay, that, by a letter from abroad, dated the 24th of last December, which I accidentally read in the original, it appeared the French were then going upon the equipment of a fquadron at Toulon; and that this fquadron was to confift of twelve fhips of the line. Those fhips were, in effect, got ready in about two months after the intelligence came; and failed to fupport the attack upon Minorca, where they arrived the 18th of April.

Our Mediterranean fquadron, under admiral Byng, had put to fea from the road of St. Helens *, twelve days before; and arrived, in three and forty days +, off the fame ifland.

* April 6th. + May 19th.

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Here doubtlefs, it will be, as it has been often already, afked, why there was not a fquadron in the Mediterranean early enough to have blocked up the French fleet in port, or to have intercepted it in it's paffage to Minorca: and why, for this moft neceffary fervice, it did not fail from hence by the beginning of March, at the lateft? It will be afked again, why this fquadron, even when joined with the three already in those feas, was fuperior in number to the French fleet, by only one fhip of the line? I have flated the questions fairly, gentlemen; and I will answer them with the flricteft regard to truth.

To do this effectually, it is proper to take a review of the ftate of our navy, during the autumn and a part of the winter, 1755. In those months, thirty-one thips of the line had been employed in cruizing to the westward; as you may fatisfy yourselves by casting your eyes back on the list, already laid before you; these had, almost all, returned into port, distress ed by sickness, and otherwise in a very disabled condition. For, from the unseafonable weather, they had suffered extreme damage damage in their masts, fails, yards and rigging.

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Vice-admiral Bofcawen, with the fhips under his command, to the number of thirteen of the line, did not return from North America, till about the middle of November. Among those feveral were in bad condition : most of them had fuffered greatly in their masts, yards, rigging; as the whole fquadron was quite bare of ftores, and very deficient in their complements by death and fevere illneffes among the failors. This was the fhattered ftate of almost our whole fleet at home. To this true but melancholy detail, must be added that uninterrupted feries of ftorms and turbulent weather under every appearance, which, till near the end of January, cruelly diffinguished the last from every preceding winter, for almost forty years backwards. These inevitable accidents greatly retarded the cure of our fick men, as well as obftructed the refitting our fhips, and bringing them again into a proper condition for fervice. Confiderable numbers too had died during the winter, or were become unfit for duty, or had deferted : fo that, tho all the accustomed methods of manning a fleet

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fleet had been exhaufted, and others, not commonly used, put in practice; yet still the progrefs made, towards compleating the numbers wanted, was very unequal to the neceffity. To this train of unhappy circumftances it was owing that only twenty-five fhips of the line, excluding three deftined for convoys with our outward bound trade, could poffibly be got ready for fervice, by the middle of January *. Of thefe twentyfive, thirteen were ordered to fea, under Mr. Ofborne, to accompany the convoys, just now mentioned, into a proper latitude westward, for their fecurity against whatever the French fquadron at Breft might attempt against them. They failed January the 30th, and returned to Spithead fixteen days afterwards.

In + twelve days from their return, a fquadron under Sir Edward Hawke, confifting of fourteen fhips of the line, with three frigates and a floop, appointed to attend fome Eaft-India fhips into the ocean and then to cruize off Breft, was got ready to put to fea, tho the weather prevented their failing till near the middle of March ‡.

* Jan. 16th. + Feb. 28th. + Mar. 12th.

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Now it appears, by a true flate of our fleet, that not fewer than forty-nine fhips were employed at the beginning of this month, for indifpenfable home-fervices, whereof eighteen were of the line, and thirty-one were frigates, &c. These had their stations in the Downs and parts adjacent, or on the oppofite coafts of France; or were employed as convoys, and in raifing men; or actually cruizing to the weftward. It appears likewife from the fame lift that, at this time, there remained in port, not under orders to proceed to lea, forty-fix ships of the line; and c bhem, only twenty were in condition for fervice, hall their due numbers of men been complete but in these they were deficient by two thous the hundred and fifty-fix. The cor ine si of the other twenty-fix thips and ater to thirteen thousand two hund a and fixty: of which they mustered no more than five thousand feven hundred and forty-eight. But from this number, deducting the officers, petty officers and fervants, there remained, only about two thousand two hundred foremastmen: and as there could be no other. immediate way of furnishing out the complements of the twenty fhips, ready in all other

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other respects; it is underiably evident that the doing fo would have ftripped the other twenty-fix of almost all their foremast men. Need I intreat, gentlemen, your ferious attention to thefe particulars? You fee they are not rafhly adopted from uncertain rumors or deceitful fuggestions: they are all drawn from vouchers that will be their own undoubted evidence. Obferve likewife, if you pleafe, that the French, at the latter part of the winter, had between thirty and forty ships of 80, 74, and 64 guns; besides feveral from 60 to 50 guns, lately built and well-conditioned, in their ports of Breft and Rochrort. We knew they were exerting their attmost endeavours to get as many of them as was poffible ready for the fea. We knew befides, as has been faid before, that they were drawing down from different parts, formidable bodies of troops, and extending them along their coafts; and that they had a number of what is called fmall craft in feveral ports of their maritime provinces.

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By this difposition of their force at land and fea, they had it continually in their power to infult this island, the very moment that our inferiority should furnish them the nth

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the wished-for occasion. Had a descent been then attempted; had they even facrificed fifteen or twenty thousand men in the attempt, what must have been the confequence to this great capital? I chuse, however; to throw a total veil over the fcene in my eye: and you, gentlemen, feel intimately my reafons for doing fo. I know that this invafion has been treated, even by fome men of fenfe amongst us, as chimerical; but I know too, that no good reafon has ever been affigned by any man, for treating it as fuch.

The administration indeed did not look upon it as a measure taken absolutely at Verfailles, nor as the only one in the plan of that ambitious court. They were fully apprized of the preparations carrying on; during the fame period, at Toulon : and they were aware that either of these schemes might prove the feint or reality, might be carried into execution or dropped, just as our adversaries should find either most practicable and of fureft execution. They might attack Minorca, we knew; or they might fail through the Straits of Gibraltar, either to fuccour their colonies in North-America, or to put our fleet in the ocean betwixt twixt the two fires of their Breft and Toulon fquadron. Under thefe alternatives of danger and diftrefs, when it is evident too, from the ftate of our navy above recited, that every poffible evil could not be guarded againft; would any thinking man, who weighs cooly the fum and confequence of things, have wifhed an administration to leave, at fuch a juncture, the head and heart of the commonwealth in greatest danger? thefe vital parts, where a wound is often mortal, most exposed, only to fave a limb?

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But our most vigorous endeavours however were used to secure this part of the British dominions likewise; as well as to send out an additional force, sufficient for the defence of our colonies. Orders were issued the 2d and 3d of March * for pressing

* It has been alked, why fuch orders were not iffued fooner. The anfwer is obvious and reafonable. March is the ordinary feafon for fitting out and for the departure of fhips: and therefore had the general prefs begun fooner, or in any part of the winter, it would have had no other effect than only to alarm the men; drive them away into lurking-places up and down the country, from whence no encouragements could have drawn them afterwards: and thus a premature attempt would have in a great meafure defeated the very purpofe it was intended to ferve.

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men from all protections, and for laying an embargo on all merchant-ships; to aniwer, by these extraordinary methods, the urgent call for a fufficient number of hands. Ten fail of the line were ordered to be equipped forthwith for the Mediterranean, and quickly after fix fail more were appointed for North-America, the Weft-Indies, and the coaft of Africa. All which, as foon as they were ready and the weather would permit, proceeded according to their feveral deftinations. From this fair deduction of particulars, it follows clearly, that a fquadron of equal ftrength could not have been fooner difpatched to the Mediterranean confiftently with that first and superior attention which is due to the fecurity of this kingdom. And thus much in reply to the first queftion. I proceed now to confider the fecond popular objection, that has been raifed on the head we are still examining.

The ill fuccels of our Mediterranean fquadron has given occasion to fay, that a greater force should have been sent. Let us see then whether we could have reasonably spared more ships at that time; and to judge of this, we must look impartially D_2 into

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into the ftate of our fleet at home, just before the fquadron in question put to fea.

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Exclusive of it, and fix ships more for the colonies, there remained either cruizing or going to cruize twenty fix; and in harbour twenty four, not under failing orders. Of the latter, nine only were otherwife ready, could they have been manned; but they wanted of their complement above eleven hundred; and the fix thips defigned for the colonies wanted three hundred and feventy feven. The remaining fifteen of the twenty four in harbour were either fitting or refitting. They mustered but about eight hundred foremast men; near four hundred of which being wanted for the ships going to the colonies, there would remain fcarce more than four hundred to be distributed amongst the nine fhips, ready in all respects except men: a number not nearly fufficient for those nine. However, by stripping one ship of all her hands, it would have been just poffible to mann the other eight. And then, thirty four thips of the line were the whole force we had to employ in fervices at home: of which, it was now judged indifpenfably necessary to have nine-

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teen cruizing before Breft and Rochfort. We had fure intelligence, that the ftrength of our enemies was greatly increased in those parts; and that vigorous preparations were continued there for acquiring a ftrength still more formidable, which demanded a greater number of our fhips to prevent or fruftrate whatever might be attempted against these islands. Things ftanding thus, all the reafons above deduced, for not fending any fhips to the Mediterranean before the first of March, remain here in full force for not farther weakning, now, the fleet at home; more efpecially as there was not the least apparent neceffity for our doing fo. The ten fail from hence, with three already in those feas, composed a ftrength fuperior to any the French could have there, even according to the largeft accounts : and, what might probably have enfured fuccefs to it, no fleet was ever fent from England more completely equipped, manned with abler or better failors. We knew likewife the real ftate of our enemy's fleet; that it was far from being equally well appointed with ours, or having it's due complement of hands; and they D 3

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they too, for the most part, but the fweepings and refuse of Toulon, old men past fervice, or boys not yet grown up to it.

Before we conclude this head, let us ftop a moment to make one reflection, which appears to me of importance. The greateft errors, in reafoning on the measures of an admiralty, arife from this fuppofition, that the real strength of the navy is to be estimated, at all times, by the number of fhips then in commiffion; and that every fuch fhip can be conftantly made ready to go out, and to remain always at fea. It is fcarce to be credited, how generally this vulgar prejudice prevails, even among fuch perfons, as, in other computations, are leaft fubject to error. But it should ever be remembered by him, who would impartially examine the conduct of an admiralty, that our naval strength ought not, at any time, to be rated by the number of fhips in harbour, or even in commiffion; but only by that part of it, which can be then effectually fitted out, and manned. Whatever ships remain incomplete in these respects, they are as uselefs for immediate fervice as if they were fill

ftill in the forefts, or on the mountains, where they first grew. But to go on.

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With fuch a fquadron as you have feen above, Mr. Byng failed from Spithead to St. Helen's the third of April; and from thence, the fixth of the fame month.

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It is with equal fhame and indignation, that I purfue the fequel of this narrative; and I could with what remains to be told buried in deep and lafting oblivion. Not for the fake of the men in power. Had I reafon to believe them culpable, I should think the fcene could not be exposed too ftrongly, nor painted in colours too hateful. But for the difgrace brought on the British flag, and the fatal difasters confequent on that difgrace, by ONE MAN'S -but let the justice of the nation give it a name. Whoever puts kimfelf upon his country, ought to have a fair and equal trial. To condemn the greatest supposed criminal, before fuch trial, were unjust; as to infult him otherwife is ungenerous, and a-kin to the very cowardice it pretends to abhor.

The admiral having delivered to the governor of Gibraltar fome difpatches containing the king's orders to him; that D 4 gentleman

gentleman thought proper thereupon to call a council of war, May the 4th; and it appears, from the minutes of this council, that it met to deliberate-not on paying obedience to his majefty's commands, which were express " for fending to Minorca from " the garrifon at Gibraltar a detachment " equal to a battalion;" but to confider " the expediency of fending any detach-" ment at all :" a cafe never intended here to come under their confideration. It was not, therefore, any fuppoled obfcurity, any feeming contradiction in the letters writ by the fecretary at war, as has been fince alledged, on which they affembled to debate. The orders contained in those letters were, and must have been, fully understood by them : the questions proposed, and the resolutions taken, prove invincibly that they were fo. Had it been otherwife, no fuch fuppofitions could have been made, as were made; no fuch conclufions drawn from them, as were drawn; and, in a word, there would not have been the fhadow of common fenfe in all that passed on the occasion. Their resolutions were, first, " that the relief of Minorca " would be hazardous, perhaps impracti-" cable."

" cable." Had our enemies reafoned in the fame manner, Minorca had never been invaded; Fort St. Philip's never befieged. —" Secondly, if the Britifh fleet fhould " be any way weakened by an engagement, " Gibraltar would be in imminent dan-" ger." But, though the Britifh fleet was afterwards weakened, becaufe only one half of it had been fuffered to engage the whole French fquadron, yet it was not beat; and Gibraltar run no danger at all. Let us now proceed to fee how this incredible event happened, and fo conclude a letter, gentlemen, which has infenfibly fwelled into a treatife.

The Britifh fquadron failed from Gibraltar, May the 8th; and, after a paffage of eleven days, arrived off Minorca on the 19th; at the very time when a commander of fpirit and enterprize would have wifhed it precifely to arrive : becaufe fuch a commander had an opportunity then of engaging the enemy's fleet, probably of ruining their whole undertaking, with moft reputation to himfelf and moft glory to his country. Could a Greenville or a Drake arife for a moment, from the dead, to pronounce upon this opinion, I am confident, by

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by all they thought and acted upon fimilar occafions, that they would heartily confirm it. They would blufh, at the fame time, for a daftardly half-foul'd race amongft us, who treat all fuch notions as romantic and vifionary. While this gallantry of courage, this noblenefs of purpofe prevailed in Britain, every fcheme, that had been planned with fpirit at home, was executed with anfwerable bravery and fuccefs abroad. But should contrary principles to thefe, should base and felfish views ever spread their contagion through our fleets and armies, we must, from that time, degenerate into a people of pirates and free-booters: and our very commanders, instead of folliciting employments, for the glorious dangers attending them, in order to do honor or procure fafety to their country, will feek to wear the public livery from humbler motives: I mean, the mere wages and vails fuch employments may procure them. Be this as it will.

No fooner had the French difcovered our fleet bearing towards Minorca, than their admiral, who beft knew in what a hurry and with what unequal hands bis fquadron had been manned, fent to requeft a reinforcement ilar

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forcement from the duke of Richlieu's camp before Fort St. Philips. His request was complied with: and a reinforcement, to the number of fix hundred men, was immediately fent off, in feveral tartans, to his affiftance. Now, can any thing confirm more evidently what I have oftener than once infinuated, of the condition in which their fleet put to fea? And with this incident too, Mr. Byng, as appears by his letter, was fully acquainted fome hours before he engaged it. There he tells us, that the morning proving hazey-he means the morning of that day * which will be long remembered by the friends of Britain with pain, by her enemies with triumph-two of those very vessels fell in with the rear of our fleet; and one of them was actually taken by the Defiance, with two captains, two lieutenants, and one hundred and two private men. All the reft were obliged to return to their camp, without having been able to put a fingle foldier on board Galiffoniere's fleet. This capture, you fee, was particularly encouraging, and might have been interpreted, without much fuperfition, into an omen

* The 20th of May.

omen of still greater fuccefs. Had I faid, into an affurance of victory, it had not, perhaps, been too much : when I confider, that every other circumstance, to confirm the bold or animate the fearful, concurred on our fide : the failors all in high fpirits, the officers determined and eager to fhew themfelves English-men, and the gale blowing full in favour of our attack, without once changing or failing us for the reft of the day. We had time, likewife, to form our line of battle in good order, and to fail in it. As our fleet was to windward, it must tack of course; which it did all together, through the whole extent of the line, without one blunder or one fhip miffing. The fignal to engage was made about one o'clock ; and rear-admiral Weft put immediately before the wind with his divifion, confifting of fix fhips; each fhip felecting, as fhe failed down, one of the enemy's; that they might all attack regularly, and without confusion. On our first advanceing, the French fired to rake us : but, from an impatience that oftener indicates apprehenfion than intrepidity, making their difcharge at too great a diftance, they did our

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our fhips little or no damage. Before they could load again, ours were pretty well in with them, and returned their fire with greater execution. But, as only fix of our fhips, I mean the red division, were engaged against the whole French fleet, the match must needs be unequal: And, in effect, all the fix were confiderably hurt ; the Intrepid more particularly. For, as fhe had the misfortune to lofe her foretopmaft early; and, as by that accident, the French admiral, with his two feconds, was upon her at once, who quickly demolifhed all her rigging and maintopmast, she lay in the fea almost a wreck, having received fourteen shot betwixt wind and water, and many through both fides. Thus unequally, though without once intermitting her fire, was the engaged for more than an hour and a half; 'till, at laft, captain Cornwall in the Revenge, and captain Durell in the Trident, broke their station from admiral Byng to put themfelves between the Intrepid and her three antagonists.

But why the admiral himfelf lay, all this while, aftern, and fo prevented his own division from advancing likewife to charge the enemy, altho the fame wind that

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that had brought down one half of his fleet, continued still in the fame quarter full and favourable for bringing down the other half-why, or how all this happened, I can give no account : and I will not indulge a humour of forming difadvantageous conjectures. On the contrary, I deteft, from my foul, those instances of averfion to him, which have been fo often and fo fhockingly exhibited in our public ftreets, by that many-headed monfter, the rabble; and which, in truth, are a difgrace on our national character for good nature and magnanimity. Another, and a more equitable tribunal, than that of popular fury, must determine what we are to think of this day's action, and of this gentleman's behaviour in it.

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Here I had refolved to have laid down my pen, but a * letter of a very extraordinary tendency having lately appeared, I think myfelf obliged to make fome few remarks upon it. Not for any thing material it contains; not on account of the feditious induftry with which it has been

* A Letter to a Member of Parliament, relative to the cafe of Admiral Byng, with fome original Papers and Letters, &c.

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difperfed into every quarter of this great city, and circulated through every province of the kingdom; but because the admiral has made himfelf a party and an accomplice to it, by furnishing the writer with letters and papers, which he alone could furnish. Had this libel tended to his own vindication only, without charging on other people a guilt of the most flagitious nature, he fhould have enjoyed his whole benefit of clergy from it, without any cenfure or even notice on my part. But this anonymous advocate more than infinuates, that one or two ministers at least have devoted his client, as the scapegoat of their incapacity and iniquity; and that a dark defign is formed to murder him, meerly to fcreen themfelves. Would it be too much, gentlemen, to demand fome little proof of fo high a charge? of a crime fo enormous? But, if he has produced none, not the imalleft, neither from the letters themfelves, nor from his comments on them, he ftands already convicted of the guilt he imputes to others, as a ftabber of reputations in the dark : and to men, fenfible to good fame, fuch an affaffination is worfe than the lofs of life it'elf.

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Or will he juftify himfelf by faying, as Italian bravoes do, that it is his trade, and he muft live by it ? He is fure, befides, that Mr. Byng's character would have ftood fairer in the public eye, had his letter from the Mediterranean been, at firft, publifhed entire. Tho I heartily wifh it had, and am pleafed it is fo now : I yet differ totally in opinion from him, of it's utility towards creating, in one man of unprejudiced fenfe, the leaft better opinion of the admiral's underftanding, as a writer, or of his behaviour, as a commander. Some few ftrictures on the added parts will be fufficient proof of what I now fay.

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After feven or eight pages of mere common-place invective, he proceeds to quote * the first passage omitted in the Gazette. Now I ask, whether this part of his client's letter—when I fay client, I do not mean it in the legal fense—can be of the least advantage to his character? The contrary appears to me most evident. We find him already—that is before the engagement in despair of being able to do any thing towards the relief of *Minorca*.—" Every " one was of opinion we could be of no * Page oth.

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" ufe to general Blakeney, as by all ac-" counts no place was fecured for a land-" ing." Is this the language of courage? Befides, we know fince, that Mr. Boyd went out, in an open boat about this very time; in fearch of him; and returned to the caftle without harm or interruption. And if he had then totally forgot, other irreproachable witneffes still remember, the conversation that colonel Kane held with him formerly about the Sally-port, and on the very foot where it flands-as a place of fure communication, through which not only intelligence but fuccours might be fent into the fort, even when it should be actually befieged.

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Page 10th, he fays, " the Captain, In-" trepid and Defiance were much damaged " in their mafts, fo that they were endan-" gered of not being able to fecure their " mafts." Now, the omiffion of this paffage feems noway injurious to Mr. Byng; for, whatever it may be at fea, it is not English at land. He goes on, " the fqua-" dron in general were very fickly, many " killed and wounded, and no where to " put a third of their number, if I made an " hofpital of the forty gun fhip." What can

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can he poffibly mean? Was an hofpital (hip wanted for the killed? or even for the wounded? Or does an admiral put the fick of his fquadron into an hofpital fhip, unlefs, which is not pretended, there fhould be fome epidemical and contagious diftemper, the finall pox or fever for inftance, fpread amongft them? Does there appear any malice to Mr. Byng, in the omiffion of thefe particulars? And was the fickly condition of our fleet, fuppofing his account to be true, a fecret fit to be trufted, at that time, with our domeftic and foreign enemies?

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In the next paragraph of the fame page, he goes on to fay, "He would make "fure of protecting Gibraltar, fince it was "found impracticable either to fuccour or "relieve Minorca." How could he poffibly tell? He had recalled the Phœnix and Chefterfield, "before they could get "quite fo near the harbour as to make "fure what batteries or guns might be "placed to prevent our having any com-"munication with the caftle." Then he knew nothing of its being either practicable or impracticable to fuccour the caftle; for he never made a fecond attempt,

tempt, not even to fend in a letter ! And the garrifon of Fort St. Philip's never knew that he had engaged the French at all, till they were informed of it forty days afterwards by the French themfelves. His advocate goes on to quote more-" For though we may justly claim the vic-" tory." This victory then was gained by fix thips only; the other fix of his own fquadron not having been fuffered to engage, till two of them broke away from their stations to prevent the Intrepid from being either funk or taken. One cannot recal this fcene without feeling fome emotions of honeft indignation. Had he beat the French, had he given the whole Britifh fquadron a chance for doing it, Minorca had still been ours; and he had brought back to England a marshal of France, with his army, our prifoners.

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Whether the word "cover" Gibraltar was omitted or not, is immaterial to Mr. Byng's vindication. It is befides glaringly abfurd. Does he not fay, in his letter of the 25th of May, "that he had gained a "victory?" Did not fome other hand, who has put his anger into tolerable Englifh in a fecond letter, dated July 4. fay ftill ftill more affirmatively, "that he fought, "met, attacked, and beat the enemy?" Now, could the French come to Gibraltar without their fleet? Or was a beaten

fleet in condition to engage him there? What had he then to cover? Not Gibraltar, furely.

There is a thread of fophiftry which runs through the whole of this pamphlet, but fo flimzily fpun, that it becomes a mere cobweb: and, to ufe any further effort, either in untwilling or breaking it, would be lamentable walte, gentlemen, both of your time and mine. The vilible drift of all this filly artifice, is to divert the attention of the public from one important object, and to fix it on others; which, whether true or falle, proved or difproved, will not have the finalleft influence on Mr. Byng's acquittal or condemnation. I am, with real truth and efteem. minerations a

GENTLEMEN,

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Your most humble fervant.

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