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THE GENERAL

HISTORY of the Late WAR:

CONTAINING IT'S

Riſe, Progreſs, *and* Event,

IN

EUROPE, ASIA, AFRICA, and AMERICA.

AND EXHIBITING

The STATE of the Belligerent Powers at the Commencement of the War; their Intereſts and Objects in it's Continuation; and REMARKS on the Meaſures, which led GREAT BRITAIN to Victory and Conqueſt.

INTERSPERSED WITH

The CHARACTERS of the able and diſintereſted STATESMEN, to whoſe Wiſdom and Integrity, and of the HEROES, to whoſe Courage and Conduct, we are indebted for that

NAVAL and MILITARY

Succeſs, which is not to be equalled in the Annals of this, or of any other Nation.

AND WITH

Accurate Deſcriptions of the SEAT of WAR, the Nature and Importance of our CONQUESTS, and of the moſt remarkable BATTLES by Sea and Land.

Illuſtrated with

A Variety of HEADS, PLANS, MAPS, and CHARTS, Deſigned and Engraved by the *beſt Artiſts*.

VOL. II.

Hiſtorici eſt: nequid falſi, audeat dicere: nequid veri, non audeat.
POLIB.

By the Rev. JOHN ENTICK, *M. A.*
And other GENTLEMEN.

LONDON:
Printed for EDWARD DILLY, in the Poultry;
And JOHN MILLAN, at Charing-Croſs.
M.DCC.LXIII.

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR.

THE campaign of the year 1756 in North America was closed with as little honour to those employed in its operations, and with less advantage to the nation, than that of the year 1755, though at a greater national expence, and with much larger supplies of men and officers from Old England. Which occasioned a serious observer of those times to remark, That the situation of affairs in North America grew more and more dangerous; and that it seemed to him, that the more the colonies were strengthened from Great Britain, the more ground they lost against the French, whose number of regular troops, this year, were much inferior to ours [a].

A. D. 1756.

The unfortunate campaign of the year 1756.

Numerous

[a] All the success we can pretend to boast of in the course of this war, happened in the two first years of it, when we had

A. D. 1756. Forces how diſpoſed.

Numerous garriſons being placed in Fort William Henry and in Fort Edward to prevent any ſurprize during the winter, and to defend that country within their protection from inſults, the reſt of the forces were quartered in barracks built for that purpoſe at Albany, that they might be brought

had not a fourth part of the regular troops we now have, and the French had at leaſt an equal number in Canada, and at Louiſbourg.

Our campaign in 1755 opened with an expedition againſt the French encroachments in Nova Scotia, with about 400 regular troops, and 2000 irregulars from Boſton; which was ſo conducted, that the French forts upon the Iſthmus ſoon ſurrendered; their garriſons were tranſported to Louiſbourg; one of their forts upon the river St. John was abandoned, and their ſettlements about it broke up. The ſame year our own fortifications were advanced as far as Lake Sacrament, now Lake George, as in the preceding year they had likewiſe begun to be upon the river Kennebeck, towards the metropolis of Canada: and the French general, Dieſkau, who came from France that year with about 3000 troops, and had begun his march to inveſt Oſwego, was prevented from making an attempt upon it, and defeated in his attack upon our camp at Lake George. And in the year 1756, a large party of French regulars, Canadians and Indians, which attacked, by ſurprize, a party of our battoe-men upon the river Onondago, were entirely defeated by an inferior number of men.

No ſooner were our forces encreaſed, by thoſe which arrived here from Europe with General Abercrombie, in June 1756, but things took a very different turn. Though timely information was given, that a large French camp was formed about 30 miles off Oſwego, with an intent ſpeedily to attack it; yet that moſt material place was loſt: General Webb not ſetting out till two days before it was taken.

Our next misfortune was the fate of the forts at the Great Carrying Place, juſt now related on page 490. Vol. I.

early

early, and with leſs expence and trouble than heretofore, to the ſeat of action. A. D. 1756.

As for his lordſhip, he applied ſeriouſly and diligently to provide for the ſecurity of the Britiſh frontiers, in the beſt manner his force and ſituation would permit, to reconcile the jarring intereſts of the different governments; to ſuppreſs every ſubject of contention, and to bring them to a temper to unite cordially, with him, in national meaſures, for the common intereſt, and to be provided for an early campaign. Yet, notwithſtanding all his care, many different parts of that extenſive frontier, on the back of our colonies, were expoſed to the ravages of the enemy; and the defenceleſs ſettlers were frequently plundered, and moſt barbarouſly murdered, without regard to age or ſex. Lord Loudon's conduct.

What with the terrible forebodings of theſe diſaſters, and what with the good management of Lord Loudon, the ſeveral provinces were brought to a more ſettled and rational diſpoſition. Their governors not only united with him in every propoſal for eſtabliſhing a harmony throughout their reſpective governments, and to contribute with all their ability to the ſupport of the common cauſe; but they extended their endeavours to gain the Indians to the Britiſh intereſt: and they ſo far ſucceeded, that the Delawares, who form a line along the ſouthern parts of Penſylvania, and had leaned very much to the French [b], were reconciled to us, and Its effects upon the colonies.

[b] Their quarrel with the Engliſh was begun by the following miſunderſtanding:

A. D. 1756. and concluded a peace with the governor of that province. The like good effect attended the treaty of

While a party of Engliſh ſcouters were at Shamokin, news was brought that a party of French and Indians from the borders of the Ohio were alſo arrived in the neighbouring parts, upon which Scaronyade, an Indian chief of the Six Nations, adviſed his friends the Engliſh to return back, and by all means to keep on the eaſtern ſide of the river; in conſequence of this advice they did indeed return back, but inſtead of keeping on the eaſt, they kept on the weſt ſide of the river, and before they had gone far they fell in with the French party, who killed four of them, and the reſt eſcaped.

Soon after this accident, an Engliſhman that went to trade with the Indians at Wyoming, charged them with the murder of his countrymen, and told them, that upon them their death would be revenged; this cauſed a great number of Indians to aſſemble at Wyoming, that they might be able to make head againſt the Engliſh, if they ſhould be attacked. This aſſembly of the Indians was again reported to the Engliſh, as the firſt ſtep towards commencing hoſtilities againſt them; the Engliſh therefore, without enquiring farther into the affair, or waiting for the attack, ſeized as many of the Delawares, who lived among them, as they could lay hands on, to the amount of 232. One of theſe priſoners found means to make his eſcape, and gave his countrymen notice of what had happened to the Delawares.

Upon the receipt of this intelligence they were extremely alarmed, and kept ſcouts abroad to ſee if any of the Engliſh were advancing in a hoſtile manner.

Such was the ſituation of affairs, when four Engliſh arrived, who had been deputed, though ſomewhat too late, to examine into the miſunderſtanding, and to compromiſe it: when they had told their meſſage, the Indians were about to enter into treaty with them, but the priſoner who had made his eſcape, being preſent, cried out, "Do not believe theſe men, they deſign only to deceive you, to make you their priſoners, or to put you to the ſword." Upon this the Indians immediately ſeized their

of the governor of Virginia with the Cherokees and Catawbas [c], two powerful tribes adjoining to that colony, and able to bring 3000 warriors into the field. An alliance for which we were greatly obliged to the influence of the Wolf King, who having been ſolicited by the partizans of France to break his faith with the Engliſh, and informed that two Shawaneſe and two Frenchmen, eſcorted by a party of Cherokees, were arrived at Halbamer fort on the 16th of November, and that the 18th was fixed upon for a meeting with the Upper Creeks, to preſent them with a red ſtick, and to engage them in the war againſt the Engliſh, commanded all his warriors to be ready at a call, armed with their hatchets, and painted red, fully reſolved, in caſe he ſhould find any of the Creek headmen diſpoſed to liſten to that propoſal, to attack the Cherokees, Shawaneſe and Frenchmen, that came upon that errand; and there he publicly declared, "That before an Engliſhman "ſhould be hurt, he and every one of his war-"riors would ſacrifice their lives to protect them." Which declaration ſo effectually wrought upon the Creek head-men, that they joined with the Wolf

A. D. 1756.

The Wolf King's friendſhip and influence.

their hatchets, and knocked them all on the head. Thus hoſtilities were commenced and carried on by both parties with the utmoſt malignity and violence.

[c] Upon which occaſion the Aſſembly of Virginia granted 8000 l. for raiſing 500 men, and tranſporting them to New York, and to pay for ſervants that ſhould inliſt. And 3000 l. to cloath and maintain 350 Cherokee and Catawba Indians in our ſervice; and 2000 l. to maintain a garriſon in the Cherokee country.

A. D. 1756. King in his ſentiments, and rejected and threw the red ſtick away; and put a ſtop to the intrigues of our enemies amongſt the Indians on the frontiers of the moſt ſouthern provinces.

Loſs of Oſwego how improved in Europe by the French.

The affair at Oſwego did not only diſconcert our operations in America, this year, and furniſh the enemy with a ſpecious argument amongſt the Indians to leſſen our credit and intereſt; but it was magnified in every court of Europe, and publiſhed in Italian, under the direction of the French ambaſſador at Naples, with ſuch circumſtances, as to raiſe an opinion of his country's ſuperiority in arms; to impreſs a favourable idea of his maſter's power; to ſink the credit of the Engliſh courage, and to deter the Princes and States, in that part of the world, from hearkening to any propoſals by a nation, unable to defend their own ſettlements and forts.

Nova Scotia.

On the ſide of Nova Scotia all things remained quiet, this whole year, ſince the defeat of the enemy near Chignecto. The Litchfield and Norwich, 50 gun ſhips, belonging to Commodore Spry's ſquadron off Louiſbourg, took

The Arc-en-Ciel taken.

the Arc-en-Ceil, a French ſhip of 50 guns, and laden with 518 men, and a large quantity of proviſions and ſtores, for the garriſon of that fortreſs. Another French ſhip, the Amitie of 300 tons, with 70 ſoldiers on board, and 200 barrels of powder, two large braſs mortars, a number of carriages for 24 and 12 pounders, and other military ſtores; and a large ſchooner with proviſions for St. John's iſland, were taken and carried into

Hallifax

Hallifax harbour, by the Centurion and Succeſs. Commodore Holmes cruiſing with two large ſhips and a couple of ſloops in the ſame latitude, fell in with two French ſhips of the line and four frigates; but could do no more than oblige them to ſheer off, after an obſtinate diſpute; not being ſtrong enough to take them; they being better ſailing ſhips, and had a ſecure port to flee unto. A. D. 1756. Commodore Holmes's unſucceſsful engagement.

The French account of this engagement ſays, That M. Beauſier, commander of the ſquadron, which ſailed laſt April with land forces for Canada, in his return, with the Heros, the Illuſtre, and the Le Corne and Syrene frigates, to Louiſbourg, diſcovered on the 26th of July, about three leagues S. of that port, two Engliſh ſhips and two frigates, who kept their wind as much as they could in order to come up with them. Beauſier taking advantage of a gale, which ſprung up from the N. bore down upon the Engliſh, who haſtily tacked in order to ſtand off. But the nature of his orders obliging him to land proviſions at Louiſbourg, and fearing that a purſuit would carry him to leeward of the port, he was obliged to quit the chaſe and to enter the harbour. He landed the proviſions and his ſick men with the utmoſt expedition; and next morning, by five o'clock, he got underſail in queſt of the Engliſh cruiſers; and about noon he diſcryed the two ſhips, he had given chaſe to the day before, which now had but one frigate in company. He crouded all the ſail he could to get up with them: and they did the ſame to get off. Captain Breugnon of the French account.

Syrene

A. D. 1756. Syrene ſoon came up with the Engliſh frigate, and attacked her ſo briſkly, that ſhe fell back under the cannon of the men of war, and was ſheltered from the Syrene, which durſt not follow. However this attack gave Beauſier time to come up with the two Engliſh ſhips, one of 74 and the other of 64 guns. He immediately engaged one of them, expecting that the Illuſtre, which was upon his quarter, would attack the other: but a calm coming on in that inſtant, hindered the latter from getting up: ſo that Beauſier had both the Engliſh ſhips upon him, and the engagement continued very warm till ſeven o'clock at night; when, a gale of wind ſpringing up, and enabled the Illuſtre to make ſail, the Engliſh took advantage of it to ſheer off; leaving the Heros ſo diſabled in her rigging and ſails, and injured in her hull and maſts, which had received upwards of 200 ſhot, beſides thoſe between wind and water, that ſhe could not purſue them. It further ſays, That he ſpent the night in repairing his damages, in hopes of another bruſh with the enemy. But next morning, the 28th, he found them at ſuch a diſtance, as gave him no hopes of getting up to them, and therefore returned to Louiſburg with the loſs of 18 men killed and 48 wounded.

Engliſh account. Commodore Holmes on board the Grafton, off Louiſburg, in a letter to the admiralty, informing their lordſhips of this ſame action, ſaid, That having diſcovered the above ſhips from the maſt-head to the N. E. directly to windward, the Grafton, the Nottingham, Hornet and Jamaica ſloops gave chaſe

chaſe and made their firſt board to the S. they ſteering directly for us till within two leagues: that the Engliſh ſhips then tacked, [not to ſtand off, but] in hopes to cut the French off from their port; and that they hauled in for it. That his ſhips purſued them, and brought to, about a league from the harbour, where they were come to an anchor, about half an hour paſt one at noon. That at four o'clock he made ſail to the eaſtward; and at dark diſpatched the Hornet to Hallifax for ſome of Captain Spry's ſhips to come and join him, and then ſtood on, as before, till three o'clock, when he tacked and ſtood in for the land. That ſeeing four French men of war come out of the harbour and in chaſe of his ſhips, about eight in the morning, he ſtood from them to the S. E. about a point from the wind, [not to get off, but] to draw them from the harbour, judging from the expedition with which they were returned, that they were full of men, and above his match. That when a frigate of 36 guns fired upon the Jamaica ſloop, ſhe returned the fire and rowed at the ſame time up to the Nottingham. That on the men of war firing at the frigate ſhe hauled her wind, and the Jamaica bore away to the S. W. That about two o'clock the Nottingham fired her ſtern chaſe at the French commandant, which he returned with his bow, and ſoon after the Grafton fired her ſtern chaſe alſo. That finding the ſhot reached each other, the Grafton hauled up her courſes, bunted her main-ſail, and bore down upon the French commodore, being about A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. about a quarter of a mile from him. That it fell calm at the beginning of the engagement, he being on the Grafton's ſtar-board ſide, the other large French ſhip a-ſtern of him, and the Nottingham on the Grafton's lar-board bow, the two frigates a mile off, and the Jamaica ſloop ſomewhat more. That the French commodore, finding his error in permitting his frigates to ſheer off ſo far, made ſignals for them to rejoin him, as ſoon as the wind ſprung up, and leaſt they ſhould not come faſt enough to his aſſiſtance, he bore down to them, and was followed by his partner. That at ſeven o'clock the French ſquadron was all cloſe together: and at duſk the action ceaſed, they [not the Engliſh] ſheering off to the ſouthward, and the Engliſh ſquadron ſtanding to the S. S. E. That our men lay at their quarters all night, expecting to renew the action in the morning, but were diſappointed by the French ſhips bearing away N. W. by W. diſtance about five miles, by day light, and going away with little wind at E. S. E. right before it for the harbour of Louiſbourg. That our ſhips wore and ſtood to the W. but that theirs never offered to look at ours. That they ſailing better than our ſhips, and the wind freſhning, and the weather alſo growing hazy, were out of ſight about noon: that their chief fire was at the maſts and rigging, which they wounded and cut pretty much: and that the Grafton had ſix men killed and 21 wounded.

Hallifax fortified. At Hallifax meaſures were taken by the governor to ſecure that city and harbour from any ſurprize,

prize, by erecting three new forts with barracks; viz. one barrack on the citadel hill, 365 feet long and 35 wide, of two ſtories, with a wall incloſing the hill and barrack, and well mounted with cannon, to command not only the whole town, but as far as a cannon ball can penetrate into the woods. It is thought, that, when complete, 20,000 men will not be able to do it any damage, the hill being ſo ſteep, and no place for a bomb battery within reach of it.—Another barrack and fort on the Windmill hill about half a mile ſouthward of the firſt, and of ſmaller dimenſions.—And a third on the north ſide of the north-weſt arm, on the place called Pleaſant Point. A. D. 1756.

If we return to inquire into the ſtate and tranſactions of Europe, we ſhall find a horrid ſcene of war opening in almoſt every nation. Even Spain, with all the profeſſions of friendſhip towards Great Britain, was augmenting her navy, from the ſhattered ſtate it was left in by the laſt war, to Affairs of Europe.

46	ſhips of the line, carrying	3142	guns
22	frigates — —	568	
12	Xebecques — —	224	
2	Packet boats —	36	
4	Bomb veſſels —	32	
4	Fire ſhips — —	24	
5	Galleys —	25	
95	veſſels	4051	guns

Spaniſh navy.

A ſea armament, that could not be prepared on any other pretence, than to be ready, when opportunity And ſuſpicious conduct.

A. D. 1756. portunity might ſerve, to join with the enemies of Great Britain; and not without great ſuſpicion [d] of ſome immediate attempt by the united ſtrength of France and Spain, by ſea and land, to wreſt from the Britiſh crown the fortreſs of Gibraltar.

Depredations in the Weſt Indies. The Spaniards continued their depredations in the Weſt Indies. Captain Ebbats in a ſloop belonging to New York, as he turned up from the bay to go to the Muſquitos, was brought to, and boarded by a Spaniſh guarda coſta, who demanded of him an anchor and cable, &c. and upon the captain's refuſal to comply with that illicit demand, ſeized his ſloop and carried her into Port Maho. And the Crown of Spain adopted every meaſure to drive the Engliſh entirely out of their ſettlements in Campeachy and Honduras.

Spain offers to be mediator. Yet this very nation put on the utmoſt appearance of candour, and went ſo far as to offer his moſt Catholic Majeſty's mediation between Great Britain and France: but the terms [e] were of ſuch a nature, that his Britannic Majeſty rejected them with diſdain. Which inſtead of immediate reſentment, produced ſuch a temper in the Spaniſh councils, that his Catholic Majeſty ratified the

[d] Enhanced by the recent motions of the national forces in Catalonia, Valencia, &c. and the deſtination of the men of war, &c. from Ferrol to a port in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar.

[e] It was ſaid, that ſome of the articles propoſed that England ſhould cede Gibraltar to the French and have Minorca reſtored: and that France ſhould exchange Gibraltar with Spain, for that part of Hiſpaniola now under the Spaniſh crown.

convention

convention for ſettling the commerce and navigation of the ſubjects of the two crowns during the preſent war, which had been delayed under various frivolous pretences. A. D. 1756. Settles the neutrality.

However, their diſguſt and partiality could not be ſmothered. They ſnatched at every circumſtance, that fell in their way, to ground a quarrel upon with the Engliſh, continuing their armaments both for ſea and land with great diligence. And obſerving, that the court of London was ſcrupulouſly cautious not to furniſh them with any pretences of complaint in Europe, they revived the diſpute about the Engliſh right to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras, not by way of remonſtrance to the Britiſh court, againſt the practices of our traders in that wood, but by a letter dated 14th of September 1756, from the governor of Meredith to the commander or principal officer of the Bay of Honduras, ſetting forth, "That being informed, the Engliſh had erected fortifications, &c. on the territories of his moſt Catholic Majeſty, contrary to treaties between the court of Spain and that of Great Britain; and further that the Engliſh were arming themſelves in an hoſtile manner, to make the poſſeſſions, they had indulged them with, their own; he therefore ordered them to depart out of thoſe territories, and to deſtroy the fortifications erected thereon, under the peril of being driven out from thence by force; unleſs he could ſhew any right or authority they had from the court of Great Britain for ſo doing; and that all veſſels loaden with log-

Seek a ground for a quarrel.

Reſolutions to deprive us of the logwood trade

wood

A. D. 1756.

wood, taken on that coaſt, ſhould be deemed and condemned to be lawful prizes."

Neglected in England.

This menacing order was tranſmitted to England; but was not thought of ſuch moment, as to engage the miniſtry in an open breach with Spain at this time; and the logwoodmen were left to the mercy of the Spaniards, ſhould they not be ſtrong enough to defend themſelves in their juſt and lawful ancient poſſeſſions.

Not ſucceeding by this ſcheme to provoke the pacific temper of the Britiſh miniſtry, there fell in their way two accidents at home, which they managed with great dexterity and openneſs to convince us of their partiality towards the French, and to draw from us a reſentment ſufficient to juſtify a declaration of war.

Governor of Algeziers fires upon the Engliſh in the Bay of Gibraltar.

The firſt of theſe was an affair, that happened in the Bay of Gibraltar. A French privateer had carried an Engliſh veſſel under the guns of Algeziers, the Spaniſh fort near Gibraltar, which had been taken and brought thither from the coaſt of France. Admiral Hawke, then riding, with his ſquadron, in the bay, and Lord Tyrawley, governor of Gibraltar, ſent to the governor of the Spaniſh fortreſs at Algeziers, in the moſt polite manner and terms, to demand the reſtitution of the ſhip in queſtion, that bay being within the commad of the Engliſh garriſon. This meſſage was accompanied with a number of armed ſhallops or men of wars boats, to board the ſaid ſhip, and to bring her away, at all events. But the Commandant of Algeziers received this demand

mand with a haughtineſs, that indicated a determined partiality to the Frenchman, and not without threats, in caſe our boats dared to attempt to board the prize. However, no menaces were ſufficient to deter the Engliſh tars from executing their orders; and being peremptorily denied the juſtice demanded, they drew near the ſhore, and made proper diſpoſitions for ſeizing the veſſel. But, though they, in every other circumſtance, paid all the deference requiſite towards the Spaniſh fortreſs, the Commander thereof fired upon them, as if they had been enemies, coming to attack or to beſiege him. By which one hundred and fifty Engliſh were killed and wounded. Nevertheleſs the ſailors carried their point; cut the veſſel out, and carried her off to Gibraltar. A. D. 1756.

Such treatment extorted a ſevere reprimand from Lord Tyrawley and Admiral Hawke, who, by letter to the Commandant of Algeziers, ſaid, "That his behaviour was contrary to the rules "of neutrality, decency and good neighbourhood: "That he ſhould anſwer for it before his Sove- "reign: and that whatever application or ex- "tention one might pretend to give to the neutrali- "ty of a ſtate, the protecting of pyrates againſt the "ſubjects of a nation, with whom one is linked in "friendſhip by treaties, was in no caſe allowed." Reſented by Sir Edw. Hawke and Lord Tyrawley.

The Commandant juſtified himſelf from precedents, which he urged, of captures made by the French on former occaſions, and brought into that place under the protection of the guns of the Spaniſh fortreſs; and that he had done, in this Spaniſh commander juſtifies the action.

11

A. D. 1756.

caſe, no more than his duty required him to do. He alſo diſpatched a courier to the court of Madrid, with the particulars of this tranſaction, and with his complaint of the violation of treaties and the law of nations by the Engliſh ſailors, in cuting and forcibly taking away the ſhip from under the guns of his fortreſs.

Complains to his court.

Approved of by his court.

The court of Spain took this affair up in a very high ſtrain; they approved of their commandant's conduct; ſaid it was inconſiſtent with the pacific profeſſions of the court of London; and that they would not ſuffer ſuch a violation of their rights and of the honour of their country to paſs unreſented.

Sir Benj. Keene's moderate reply.

To which our Ambaſſador, Sir Benjamin Keene, replied with ſuch moderation, as convinced them, that any ſatisfaction would be granted, rather than to proceed to an open rupture. He admitted the cuſtom of carrying Engliſh prizes, made by the French into Algeziers: but added, That the ſea-officers at Gibraltar had long obſerved it with great vexation; that this was the caſe complained of: that he waited for more preciſe informations; though what he had already received was ſufficient to prove the hoſtilities were commenced by the Spaniſh Commandant; and that, as for the reſt, the uprightneſs, with which his Britannic Majeſty was accuſtomed to behave, towards powers in friendſhip and alliance with his crown, left no room to doubt, but that he would give freſh proofs of his care and attention to preſerve the good underſtanding between the two nations.

While the nation was alarmed at this incident; and the miniſtry were perplexed, how to ſteer between the imputation of weakneſs and timidity, for not reſenting the indignity offered to the Britiſh flag, in a proper manner; and the not aſſerting our right to the Bay of Gibraltar, againſt its being made a receptacle and place of retreat for the French in time of war; and the danger of furniſhing the Spaniards with an opportunity to throw the blame of an open rupture between the two crowns, upon England; another accident happened, which, by its greater importance, ſmothered the complaints about Algeziers, and diſcovered more publickly the deſires of the Spaniſh councils to break with Great Britain. Which had, for a little while, been ſuſpended, by an alteration in the Engliſh miniſtry. A. D. 1756.

The caſe of the Antigallican privateer and her prize.

This was the caſe of the Antigallican private ſhip of war, and her prize, driven into the port of Cadiz by ſtreſs of weather or contrary winds. The Antigallican privateer, of thirty carriage and ſixteen ſwivel guns, and carrying 208 men, fitted out at the expence of 10,453 l. by private adventurers, in the port of London, and commanded by Captain William Foſter, late a lieutenant in his Majeſty's ſervice, had the fortune to diſcover [f] a French Eaſt Indiaman (named the Duke of Penthievre, commanded by Captain Villaneuve, a very large and rich ſhip of 1000 tons, and mounting fifty guns) about ſeven leagues off Ferrol, a Spa-

Her force.

Her prize where taken.

[f] On the 26th of December 1756.

A. D. 1756. niſh port in the Bay of Biſcay, early in the morning. The French aboard the Penthievre truſting in their own ſtrength, bore down, with the wind in their favour, which was then at ſouth ſouth-eaſt, and blew from the land; and about twelve at noon, being about four leagues and half from the neareſt ſhore, fired a gun to bring the Antigallican to, then ſailing under Spaniſh colours; and upon hoiſting Engliſh colours, the Penthievre fired a broad-ſide immediately, and half another, before the Antigallican fired a gun, or made any ſign of hoſtility, except diſplaying her colours; by which ſeveral on board the Antigallican were wounded and killed. The Antigallican having returned the fire, a cloſe engagement continued between both ſhips, as they went before the wind, with all the ſail they could make from the land, for about three hours; when the French captain, and twelve of his men being killed; and the ſecond captain ſhot thro' the ſhoulder, and ſeven-and-twenty more were wounded, the Penthievre ſtruck, and ſubmitted to be boarded by the Antigallicans; then diſtant about five leagues and a half from the light-houſe at Corrunna.

Why carried into Cadiz.

The captors would have carried this rich prize to Liſbon, as the beſt market for her cargo: but meeting with contrary winds, which kept them beating the ſeas, in that diſagreeable ſituation, off the mouth of the Tagus for ſeveral days; and afterwards finding it impracticable [g] to bear up againſt

[g] Captain Foſter, in his journal, relates, That upon the ſixth of January 1757, he was got within the mouth of the harbour

againſt the wind and the current into the Bay of Gibraltar, it was reſolved, with the advice of the officers, to carry the prize with them into the port of Cadiz, not doubting of protection from a neutral nation, in alliance or friendſhip with Great Britain. A. D. 1756.

When to their great ſurprize, after taking ſhelter in this port, and the officers belonging to the Indiaman had been examined upon oath, in regard to the validity of the capture, by the conſul, vice-conſul and his clerk; in which depoſitions, wrote by themſelves, and in the French language, they, amongſt other things, voluntarily declared, "That they bore down upon the Antigallican with a reſolution to take her, as they imagined ſhe was an Engliſh ſhip; and made no doubt but that ſhe would fall a very eaſy prize, becauſe ſhe was ſo much inferior in ſize and burden to the Penthievre; and that their ſhip was fairly taken, and they were lawful priſoners of war; nor did they imagine, that the legality of the prize would Stopt.

harbour for Liſbon; when a ſtrong gale coming on, ſplit the prize's main-top-ſail, and drove her out to ſea, which made it neceſſary for his ſhip to follow her out, and to ſend a boat on board her with ſmall ſails. That they, from that time, beat to windward, till the 22d, endeavouring to make Liſbon, but could not: that he then reſolved to bear away for Cadiz, it being the firſt port they could make, in their great diſtreſs, the prize not ſteering, her ſails all in pieces, both ſhips ſo leaky, that the pumps were almoſt conſtantly going, bread almoſt expended, not above ten days proviſions left; and he had advice from the St. Alban's man of war, that there were five ſail of French men of war cruizing upon the coaſt.

A. D. 1756. ever be oppoſed or conteſted; or that the neutrality of the Spaniſh crown was at all offended at this engagement;" yet orders were ſent from the court of Spain to the governor of Cadiz, to detain both ſhips, the privateer and the Duke de Penthievre, and their contents; upon a remonſtrance from the commandant-general of Galicia, and the French conſul complaining, that Captain Foſter had attacked and taken the ſaid prize, contrary to the laws of nations and neutrality, within the limits of a Spaniſh fort; and praying that his Catholic Majeſty would demand reſtitution thereof, and ſatisfaction for ſo groſs and national inſult.

Why. While the Antigallican had been beating the ſeas, this application, ſupported by the captain and pilot of the port of Corrunna, and ſuch other witneſſes, as the French faction could eaſily pick up to ſwear any thing againſt the Engliſh, was greedily eſpouſed by the Spaniſh miniſtry, who, without waiting for the lights, which were neceſſary to determine juſtly on this affair, proceeded directly againſt the capture, in a council of war, and upon the firſt advice of its lying at Cadiz, the Spaniſh miniſters, with the King's knowledge, iſſued orders to ſtop both the Antigallican and her prize, before the council had gone through the examination of the complainants, or ſo much as ſummoned the captors to make their defence.

Proteſted againſt. In purſuance of this order the governor of Cadiz, on the 19th of February, ſent for the Engliſh conſul, and told him, that he was obliged to ſend troops on board the prize to detain her. Mr.

Goldſ.

Goldſworthy, the conſul, who throughout this whole affair acted with wiſdom and firmneſs, proteſted againſt it in the ſtrongeſt manner, as contrary to treaties, and an open violation of the laws of nations. Nevertheleſs, the governor ordered all the artillery on the walls to be loaded, gunners to attend with lighted match; ſix companies of grenadiers to be ready, with nineteen rounds of ſhot; and two companies to board and take poſſeſſion of the prize, who immediately ſeized on the arms, magazines, &c. in the ſhip: he ordered two companies alſo to the forts, and two more on board the Antigallican, which by Admiral Novarro's permiſſion was refitting in the King's Dock, and laid like a hulk, with its maſts, ſails, arms, guns, &c. in the King's ware-houſe. But at laſt, conſcious of the illegality of ſuch a proceeding, which alarmed the whole city, the Governor, in the evening of the ſame day, withdrew the troops from the ſhips; who not willing to go empty-handed, broke open ſeveral cheſts, carried away every thing they could find belonging to the officers and crew, and the very beef, that was dreſſing for dinner.

A. D. 1756.

Forcibly entered.

Plundered by the ſoldiers.

At length the council of war, on the allegations of one party only, having come to this reſolution, "That the violation of his Majeſty's "territory, and the inſult offered to it by the pri- "vateer being fully and clearly proved, the pri- "vateer ought to be ſtopt, the captain puniſhed, "and the pretended prize reſtored to its lawful "owners the French;" the governor acquainted

Ordered to be delivered to the French.

A. D. 1756. our conſul, that he had orders to deliver the prize up to the French conſul. Upon which Captain Foſter offered to depoſit the prize in his, the governor's, hands, till he ſhould obtain a hearing at court in his own defence. The governor abſolutely rejected this expedient, and ſaid he would inſtantly deliver the prize to the French conſul. And the captain as reſolutely declared, that the Engliſh colours then flying on board the prize, ſhould never be ſtruck without force. Then the conſul and Captain Foſter entering their proteſts againſt all the prejudices reſulting from this arbitrary way of proceeding, obtained by perjury and a denial of juſtice from the court of Spain, which Sir Benjamin Keene ſaid, "was ſo irregular, unreaſonable, and unprecedented, that would neither bear light nor juſtification," the captain withdrew and went on board.

Reſolutions of Captain Foſter.

Governor of Cadiz uſeth force.

This reſolution ſtaggered the governor for awhile. But after conſulting the admiral, who prudently refuſed to adviſe about the execution of orders, in which he was not concerned, he demanded in the King's name the America of 60 guns, and a frigate of 36 guns, to aid and aſſiſt him in the execution of the King's orders. With theſe the Governor committed the moſt ſhameful and cruel act of hoſtility, that has been heard of among civilized nations. He ſtationed them within fifty yards of the Penthievre, and though Captain Foſter offered to receive thirty or forty Spaniſh ſoldiers on board, and ſaid he would rather die under his colours, than ſtrike them; becauſe he could

Captain Foſter's propoſal to avoid damages.

could follow no orders, but what he received from his Britannic Majeſty or the Britiſh high court of admiralty; they began to fire upon her, and ſo continued for three quarters of an hour, though they met with no manner of reſiſtance. They ſoon ſhot away the enſign flying on board the prize, and then Captain Foſter finding that it was determined to ſink him, ſent a man to ſtrike the pendant, who was killed by the Spaniards in the very act. They after this kept up their fire, half an hour longer, for their own diverſion, and fired in all 200 round, grape and double-headed ſhot, into the Penthievre, as ſhe lay expoſed to their cruelty, without firing a ſingle gun: by which one Engliſh ſubject was killed and ſeven wounded.

A. D. 1756.

Spaniards fire upon the Anti-gallican prize.

One Engliſhman killed and ſeven wounded.

When they ceaſed firing, the commodore ordered Captain Foſter on board his ſhip, told him he was no priſoner, and ſent him aſhore: and Captain Foſter, with the conſul, waited on the Governor, and aſking whether he had any commands for him, was anſwered in the negative. Yet next morning, contrary to the laws of nations, which makes a conſul's houſe a ſanctuary for protection, the governor's adjutant took Captain Foſter by violence out of the Engliſh conſul's houſe, and conducted him priſoner to the caſtle of St. Catharine. As for his men, they were treated with the greateſt injuſtice, ſome of them knocked down with the butt-end of muſkets by the ſoldiers ſent to take poſſeſſion of the Penthievre, denied the liberty to carry their own neceſſary cloaths with them, forced out of the ſhip, when a boat could ſcarce

Captain Foſter dragged out of the conſul's houſe to priſon.

The ſailors ſtripped, beaten and ſent to priſon.

A. D. 1756

ſcarce be ſuppoſed to reach the ſhore, in dangerous weather; ſtripped of their cloaths and robbed of all their money by their very guards, as ſoon as they landed, and then were conducted almoſt naked, as priſoners to the ſame caſtle of St. Catharine; where they had nothing to lie on, but the bare ſtones, in a cloſe dungeon, without air ſufficient to breathe, or ſpace to extend their bodies without lying upon one another. A priſon which, though horrible in itſelf! was rendered more miſerable to thoſe unhappy men, as they had not room for the common offices of nature, nor an allowance of any thing to eat or drink, no, not ſo much as bread and water. So that they, treated worſe than felons, muſt have inevitably periſhed, had not the Engliſh conſul ſupplied them with proviſions, till releaſed on the fifth of March by an order from Madrid. Of which tranſaction the Engliſh conſul at Cadiz informed Sir Benjamin Keene, by letter, "That he was in the greateſt "conſternation imaginable; becauſe, ſays the "conſul, I have ſeen the flag of my royal maſter "inſulted; our nation degraded, our treaties vio-"lated; the luſtre of our Sovereign's crown tar-"niſhed and deſpiſed, and my houſe invaded; "and, as there is no miniſter here of greater dig-"nity than myſelf, I conſider the affront and in-"ſult done and offered to my perſon, as an "indignity on the ſacred perſon of my royal "maſter."

Ill treatment in priſon.

The conſul's complaint.

After this conduct of the governor, cenſured by the Spaniards themſelves, who ſaw it to be unjuſt,

unjuſt, cruel and inhoſpitable, the men at court ſcrupled not to act openly with ſo much partiality, in favour of the French, and in prejudice of his Majeſty's ſubjects, as to be thought a diſgrace to all national juſtice. They made it evident, That they were fore-determined to force the prize from the captors, and to reſtore her to the French. They were reſolved to give an abſolute denial to every equitable application in behalf of his Britannic Majeſty's ſubjects; and they even, contrary to their own form of law and courſe of juſtice, refuſed to produce the documents, upon which they founded their authority. So that, notwithſtanding the great pains taken by the captors; their friends, the conſuls at Cadiz, and other places, and of our ambaſſador, Sir Benjamin Keene, to obtain a fair and equitable trial, conformable to the laws of nations, and to the method of proceeding in Spain itſelf, in ſuch caſes, this common juſtice was denied; an unlawful and unprecedented court, that refuſed the captors time, and diſcouraged the means for making their defence, and ſuborned witneſſes, even men, that had voluntarily depoſed the contrary facts, was erected, and by this unlawful and unprecedented authority the Penthievre was decreed and delivered up to the French. Of which event we meet with the following lively deſcription, in a letter from the Britiſh conſul at Madrid, to the Engliſh conſul at Cadiz, dated 5th Auguſt 1757. "Sir, ſays he, the completion "of iniquity has at laſt taken place; and our "enemies have triumphed over law, honour and "equity.

A. D. 1756.

This conduct cenſured by the Spaniſh people.

Juſtice denied, at court, to the Engliſh.

The Penthievre delivered up to the French.

A. D. 1756. "equity. The Penthievre is reſtored to the "French, without communicating that reſolution "of his Catholic Majeſty, as it ought to have "been, to his Britannic Majeſty's ambaſſador." But why ſhould we be ſurprized at any thing here related, when it is certain, from the confeſſion of the French ambaſſador at the court of Spain, "That this had not been treated as a private af- "fair, but a matter in correſpondence between "his Catholic Majeſty and the French Monarch."

Why? Who, moſt certainly laid hold of this incident to provoke the Engliſh to ſeek for ſatisfaction by way of arms, and to prevail with Spain to join with France againſt Great Britain, with promiſes of mutual ſupport and intereſt in their ſucceſs; which at this time was not doubted by our enemies; while our national affairs were, as they thought, under the management of a timid or unſettled adminiſtration.

Mr. Pitt writes to the court of Spain about this affair. However, this indignity and injuſtice did not work with the effect propoſed by the houſe of Bourbon. The Right Hon. Mr. Pitt was called by his Sovereign to the poſt of ſecretary of ſtate, about the time this capture was made; and tho' his power in the adminiſtration was ſo circumſcribed by the majority of the old miniſtry, whoſe fears too frequently got the better of their reaſon, that he could do no more than intercede with his royal maſter for permiſſion to write to the court of Spain; he performed this in ſuch ſtrong terms, to require juſtice to be done the captors, and to obtain reſtitution of their lawful prize; that this letter ſeemed to carry with

with it so much weight, at this juncture of time, that Sir Benjamin Keene thought the prize would be so easily obtained, that he sent an express to Mr. Secretary Pitt, whereby he acquainted him, "That on presenting a strong memorial to his "Catholic Majesty, he had obtained an order for "the prize to be re-delivered to his Majesty's of-"ficers; and all the hatches to be kept sealed, "under a proper guard: and that he hoped the "prize would be restored to Captain Foster in a "few days; as the depositions of the French of-"ficers were so strong, that the French could "not have any thing to say, that could prevent "her being deemed a just and lawful prize." A. D. 1756. Its effect.

But all this expectation vanished, upon the first intimation of that opposition in the British cabinet, which on the fifth of April [h] delivered the Spanish ministry from the terror, which Pitt's very name carried in all his dispatches, in the cause of justice, for the dignity of the crown and the interest of his country. And during the interval before that right honourable person was reinstated, the Antigallican captors were treated in the manner above-related, and totally deprived of their property. How altered when Mr. Pitt was turned out.

Thus stood our situation with Spain; which, under the sacred character of a mediator, and of a strict neutrality, was publickly prostituting Our situation with Spain.

[h] The day on which the Right Hon. Willam Pitt, Esq; by his Majesty's command, first resigned the seals of Secretary of State for the southern department.

justice

A. D. 1756. juſtice and the laws of nations, in favour of our enemies, inſulting the Britiſh flag, robbing Britiſh ſubjects of their property, and depriving them of their liberty in the moſt arbitrary, cruel and hoſtile manner, and with the utmoſt diligence making preparations by ſea and land for an open rupture.

The meaſures of France. France, on her part, fluſhed with the ſucceſs of every ſcheme ſhe had laid to deceive, and to diſtreſs, Great Britain, ſtrikes every nail, that ſeemed to drive, and to extend their plan of operations. The French miniſtry, convinced that the completion of their advantages, and dominion in North America, depended chiefly on meaſures, either, to diſpute the ſovereignty of the ſeas with the miſtreſs of the ocean; without which it would be impoſſible for them to ſupply their armies in the new world with effectual ſuccours, to protect their own ſettlements, and to extend their conqueſts; or, to draw Great Britain into a continental war, by which the national treaſure, that might be required for a naval and American war, ſhould be diſſipated and exhauſted; ſo as to weaken the Britiſh power by ſea, and to divert her attention from a vigorous purſuit of the principal object, for which this nation took up arms; or, to deviſe ſome improvement to their long-practiſed ſcheme to make us weary of the war, by engaging our miniſtry to maintain a prodigious navy in commiſſion and fit for ſervice, inactive and locked up in our harbours, and to pay large ſubſidies and numerous land forces in a ſituation, that

that could only ſerve to increaſe our load of taxes, and the already prodigious national debt; which would fill the people with diſcontent, and oblige them, ſooner or later, to ſubmit to an inglorious peace; their firſt care was to throw the weight of their ſtrength into their naval department; and many attempts were made to keep the ſea open, for the purpoſes of protecting their trade and iſlands from inſult; of tranſporting ſoldiers and the neceſſaries of war to North America; of interrupting our navigation and commerce; of defeating our meaſures for the ſupport of North America, and of threatning the Britiſh iſles themſelves with invaſion and conqueſt. A. D. 1756. Attention to their marine.

Their efforts by ſea were made with vigour and great propriety. A navy was preparing, with the utmoſt diligence, to contend with ours; while the court propoſed to ruin our trade, and to interrupt our navigation, by the extraordinary encouragement they gave to private ſhips of war. Their navy, and how employed.

Within a few weeks after the declaration of war at Paris, the world was preſented with the following ſtate of the French marine, publiſhed by authority.

Mr. Perrier de Salvert's ſquadron.

Ships	Captains	Guns
Le Courageux	Perrier	74
Le Prothee	———	64
L'Amphion	———	50
L'Aigle	———	50
Le Fleur de Lys	———	30
L'Emeraude	———	28

At

A. D. 1756.

At Breſt.

Ships	Captains	Guns
Le Comete	———	30
L'Amethiſte	———	30
La Blonde	———	30
Le Brune	———	30
Le Zephyr	———	30
L'Hermoine	———	26
La Valeu	———	26
La Fidele	———	26
La Friponne	———	26

M. De La Galiſſionere's fleet.

Le Foudroiant	D. L. Galiſſioniere	80
Le Temeraire	Glandeves, Chief d'Eſc.	74
La Couronne	La Clu, Chief d'Eſc.	74
Le Redoubtable	Beaumont	74
Le Guerrier	La Broſſe	74
Le Content	Sabran	64
Le Triton	Mercier	64
Le Sage	Duruen	64
Le Lion	St. Agnan	64
L'Orphee	Raimondis	64
Le Fier	D'Herville	50
L'Hipopotame	Rochemaure	50
La Junon	Beaufier	46
La Roſe	Coſtebelle	30
La Pleide	———	26
La Gracieuſe	Marquizan	24
La Nimphe	Callian	24
La Topaze	Carne	24

The Marquis de Conflans's ſquadron.

Le Soliel	The Marquis	80
Duc de Bourgogne	———	80
Le Tonnant	———	80
Le Superbe	———	74
Le Defenſeur	———	74
Le Dauphin Royal	———	70

Le

Ships	Captains	Guns	A. D. 1756.
Le Juſte	———	70	
Le Hardi	———	66	
Le Bienfaiſant	———	64	
Le Sphinx	———	64	
L'Inflexible	———	64	
L'Eveille	———	64	
Le Capricieux	———	64	
L'Arc en Ciel	———	50	
La Diana	———	30	
For carrying ſoldiers to America under Mr. Beauſſie.			
Le Heros	Beauſſier	74	
L'Illuſtre	Montelas	64	
Le Leopard	———	60	
Le Sirene	Breugnon	30	
Le Licorne	Rigaudiere	30	
La Sauvage	———	30	
La Concorde	———	30	
L'Amarante	———	12	
At Breſt and Rochfort.			
Le Formidable	———	80	
L'Entreprenant	B. R*. Salvert, Chief d'Eſc.	74	
On a cruiſe.			
La Thetis	———	24	
La Mutine	———	24	
La Pomone	———	24	
Le Cumberland	———	24	
La Galathe	———	24	
L'Heroine	———	24	
L'Anemone	———	12	
Cape Breton and Martinico. Mr. D'Aubigne.			
Le Prudent	D'Aubigne	74	
L'Aquilon	———	60	

* B. R. Breſt or Rochfort.

A. D.	Ships	Captains	Guns
1756.	L'Atalante	——	34
	Le Palmer	B. R. Keruforet	74
	Le Bizarre	B. R. Urtubi	64
	L'Opiniatre	B. R. Moelieu	64
	L'Actif	B. R. Choiſeuil	64
	Le St. Michel	B. R. Caumont	64
	L'Alcion	B. R. Jonquire	54
	L'Appollon	—— ——	50
		At Toulon.	
	Le Hector	——	74
	Le Vaillant	——	64
	L'Achille	——	64
	L'Hercule	——	64
	L'Oriflame	——	50
		Upon the Careen.	
	L'Intrepide	B. R. Rerſain	74
	Le Conquerant	——	74
	Le Magnifique	——	74
	Le Sceptre	——	74
	Le Floriſſant	——	74
	L'Algougeux	——	74
	La Floride	——	74
	Northumberland	——	68
	Le Dragon	B. R. Willeon	74
		In different docks.	
	L'Ocean, finiſhed	——	80
	Le Centaure, ditto	——	70
	Le Diademe	B. R. Raſilly	74
	Le Zodiaque	——	74
	Le Minotaure	——	74
	Le Souverain	——	74
	Le Glorieux	——	74
	Le —— (not yet named)	——	74
	Le Belliqueux	Oroillirs B. R.	64

Le

Ships	Captains	Guns	A. D. 1756.
Le Celebre	———	64	
Le Robuſte	———	64	
Le Solitaire	———	64	
Le Terrible	———	64	
Le Aigrette	———	30	
La Veſtable	———	30	
La Minerva	———	24	
L'Oiſeau	———	24	
Le Protecteur, building	———	74	
Le Fantaſque	———	64	
Le Modeſte	———	60	
La Defiance	———	30	
La Surprize	———	30	

Le Warwick, taken from the Engliſh, 1756, of 60 guns, mounting now but 50, in America, with M. D'Aubigne.

By this liſt it appears that the navy of France, in June 1756, conſiſted of one hundred and eleven ſhips of the line and frigates, and that they were ſo ſtationed and managed, as to find employment for the grand navy of England. A ſufficient number of large ſhips were kept in the ports of Breſt and Toulon, at an eaſy expence, neither manned, nor victualled, till ordered out for ſervice; with which they put us to very great expence of large ſquadrons, to watch their motions in the Bay of Biſcay and the Mediterranean; a ſervice attended with ſo many hazards, that it was with great good luck in us, that the enemy even ſuffered any loſs by it, or were ever ſo locked up, as to prevent their exports of men and ammunition for America, ſailing and reaching the places

A. D. 1756. of their deſtination. But it was attended with many great diſadvantages on our part. For, it is a greater victory to decoy the enemy into his ruin by delay, &c. than to beat him in an open fight: becauſe, thereby not only his ſtrength is deſtroyed; but his treaſure the ſinews of war, is conſumed.

In the Weſt Indies. Their next care was to threaten our ſugar iſlands with a powerful ſquadron in the Weſt Indies: which might ſerve to ſurprize and ſeize upon thoſe defenceleſs colonies, or to weaken our naval ſtrength by the neceſſity, Great Britain would be under, to keep a ſuperior naval force in thoſe ſeas, where our ſecurity muſt depend only upon the ſuperiority of our navy, againſt an enemy, that can retreat into ſtrong fortified harbours; when, in caſe of an accident, a Britiſh ſquadron, or ſhip, can find no place of ſhelter from a purſuing foe, in any of our iſlands.

Cruiſers. Their cruizers were ſo numerous, and properly ſtationed for intercepting our merchantmen homeward and outward bound; to ruin our African trade, and to favour their own convoys, to and from America; that it required more men of war to check and to defeat their proceedings, than a miniſtry, that was continually afraid of an invaſion, dared to appoint for that purpoſe. And that the King's ſhips ſhould perform, and confine themſelves, as much as poſſible, to their orders to protect their own navigation, and to employ the Engliſh navy, the French King publiſhed an edict for the encouragement of privateers to diſtreſs our commerce, and to deprive us of the grand reſource

Their encouragement of privateers.

of

of our riches, without which it could not be poſſible for us to ſupport the war. A. D. 1756.

That edict remitted the *tenth* ſhare of every prize, which was always before this war claimed by the French admiralty; and ordained that beſides the whole produce of the prizes, the captors ſhould enjoy a bounty [i] out of the royal treaſury, for every gun and man taken from a merchantman, or man of war, or privateer. The King alſo promiſed to reward ſuch captains or officers, that ſhould behave well, with commiſſions in his marine, according to the circumſtances and ſtrength of the ſhips they ſhould have engaged: and he further promiſed a premium to the owners of privateers,

[i] 100 livres per gun from four to 12 pounders, taken from merchantmen.

150 livres per gun of the ſame bore, taken from privateers.

200 livres per gun of the ſame bore, taken from men of war.

150 livres per gun 12 pounders and upwards, taken from merchantmen.

225 livres per gun of the ſaid bore, taken from privateers.

300 livres per gun of the ſaid bore, taken from men of war.

30 livres per head for every priſoner taken out of a merchantman.

40 livres per head for ditto out of a privateer,

50 livres per head for ditto, out of a man of war.

The ſame bounties to be paid for every man on board at the commencement of any engagement.

The ſaid bounties to be augmented by *one fourth* for all ſuch privateers or men of war, which ſhall be taken by boarding, and

The ſaid bounties wholly to appertain to the captain, officers, and crew; to be divided amongſt themſelves according

A. D. 1756. vateers, and to take their ſhips, under certain circumſtances, at prime coſt [k]. In regard to prizes made by ſhips fitted out upon the King's account, the officers and crew were thereby indulged with one third part of the neat produce of all merchant ſhips, or more according to circumſtances; beſides other bounties [l]. He further promiſed, that privateers

to the ſhare they are to have in the produce of the prize, and purſuant to their agreement at the time of entering on board; the money to be paid to the captain, or his repreſentative.

[k] Ships of 24 guns or upwards, that ſhall have been built for privateering, ſhall be taken by the government at the prime coſt, if they be not employed that way, or at the eſtimated price, if they have been ſo employed, when they ſhall be no longer authoriſed to cruiſe on the enemies. And alſo all ſhips of 24 guns or upwards, that ſhall be taken by privateers, and which ſhall be fit for ſervice, except the captors ſhall chuſe to make uſe of them themſelves, or ſell them along with the effects of the prizes.

In order to indemnify the owners of thoſe ſhips which ſhall take any privateers or men of war, of the damage they ſhall ſuſtain by ſuch engagements, the following premiums are to be paid them:

100 livres per gun from 4 to 12 pounders.

200 livres per gun from 12 lb. to upwards.

20 livres per head for every effective man on board at the beginning of an engagement.

[l] They ſhall have beſides, the ſame bounties as thoſe given in the 2d article in favour of the privateers, except for men of war, for which there ſhall be paid 300 livres per gun, from four to 12 pounders, 450 livres per gun from 12 pounders and upwards.

The ſaid ſums to be augmented by 1-4th, when the ſaid frigates or men of war ſhall have been taken by boarding.

privateers which ſhould ſail in company with men of war, or join them at ſea, ſhould have their ſhare both in the produce of the prizes, as well as of the bounties, of all ſhips that ſhould be taken in conjunction, in exact proportion to the guns they ſhall carry, with regard to the difference of the bore, ſize of the ſhips, or ſtrength of the crews. That privateers ſhould be exempt from all taxes or duties whatſoever on proviſions, artillery, ammunition, and all other neceſſaries for their conſtruction, victualing and armament: That the officers and volunteers on board of privateers, that have diſtinguiſhed themſelves, ſhould be diſpenſed with from the uſual time of ſervice on board the men of war, in order to their being made captains. That the officers and ſailors on board of privateers that ſhould be wounded and diſabled, ſhould be intitled to the ſea half-pay, and that the widows of thoſe killed ſhould be intitled to penſions. This edict alſo ordained that the wages of ſailors run from a ſhip of 24 guns, as well as their ſhare in prizes, ſhould belong to the owners: and finally, That captains of privateers, ſhould not on any account ranſom any ſhip, except they ſhould have already ſent in three effective prizes, ſince their laſt going out.* A. D. 1756.

* *N. B.* By theſe encouragements the ſea preſently ſwarmed with privateers, which did infinite damage to our trade and took great numbers of our merchantmen. They were even ſo audacious, that on the 4th of July, about one o'clock in the morning, a privateer from Boulogne ventured within a few yards of Dover Pier, and cut an Engliſh privateer away, moſt of her men being a-ſhore.

A. D. 1756. These preparations and armaments for the ſea were accompanied briſkly with much more extraordinary preparations for war by land. The treaty of Weſtphalia, which France had ſo often violated to pull down the Houſe of Auſtria, was now made a ſtalking horſe to carry her army without oppoſition into Germany: and the heireſs of Auſtria, who is indebted to Great Britain for the exiſtence of her family, againſt the natural enmity of France, adopted, and ſubmitted to be a cover for, the French monarch's real intentions to invade the territories of our German allies, and embroil her moſt faithful and powerful friend in a continental war, by inviting Lewis to take part in her quarrel, or rather ſecret hatred of the King of Pruſſia. For, this was the firſt pretence for the motions of the French army acroſs the Rhine; to preſerve the peace of Germany and to keep all foreign forces out of the Empire: though the French miniſters did not ſcruple to avow the reſolution of their King to invade the electoral dominions of his Britannic Majeſty: and the ſituation of his magazines, the cantonment of his troops on the frontiers of Flanders, and other diſpoſitions on the ſide of Weſtphalia, were evident tokens, that the French King's immediate view, in joining with the Empreſs Queen againſt the King of Pruſſia, was to facilitate the execution of his own deſigns upon the allies of Great Britain.

Preparations for a land war.

How favoured in Germany.

Againſt Hanover, &c.

This army alſo ſerved another purpoſe. Having nothing to fear on the part of Spain, nor from the frontiers of Upper Germany; and poſſeſſed of

Pretences of an invaſion kept

the

the ſecret, which had ſo often, on former occaſions, kept the whole ſtrength of England locked up at home; fifty or ſixty thouſand men or more, and artillery, were drawn down to the coaſt of the channel; and boats of a new conſtruction were built, and ſquadrons were appointed to convoy them over to ſome convenient place in England. Amazing how this ſoporific doſe of politics affected the heads of the nation! The name of a flat-bottomed boat terrified the children, the women and the beaux; and the French were well paid for their invention by the expence we were at to watch their motions, while we neglected, or omitted to employ our fleets and armies in vigorous and national meaſures.

A. D. 1756.

up, with flat-bottomed boats.

Having thus diſpoſed of their internal ſtrength, the French provided, in the next place, to prevent any diſagreeable and unſeaſonable diſputes, with the maritime neutral powers, about the conditions of a free navigation; and thereby endeavoured to engage neutral ſhips in their ſervice, when the circumſtances of the war might make it dangerous or impracticable to carry on a communication with their colonies, and to ſupply their naval department with ſuch neceſſaries, as could not be got in their own territories, and without which a naval war could not be ſupported. For, amongſt other things, it will appear afterwards, that the King of France aſſumed a right to licence Dutch ſhips to trade with, or to carry the produce of, their iſlands, from which, in common with other nations, they had been always excluded in times

French ſettle the terms of navigation with neutral ſtates.

A. D 1756. of peace; and the Dutch, in return for that favour, assumed a right, which they pretended to claim upon the faith of treaty, with England, to carry the goods of our enemies: though at the same time that French ordinance [m] laid them, and all other neutral nations, under the severest prohibition not to carry British property.

British measures. Great Britain, whose interest it was to take the most effectual measures to defeat the designs and schemes of France; and whose navy greatly exceeded the naval power of that nation in every circumstance; both as to number of ships, weight of mettal, men, and stores of all sorts; instead of seeking and annoying the enemy; covering our colonies, and protecting our navigation and trade; confined the naval strength of this island to the expensive and almost useless cruising in the Bay of Biscay and in the Mediterranean: and to squadrons at Antigua, the leeward islands, and at Jamaica, inferior to the French under d' Aubigny, near the former station, and to de Salvert hovering about the latter.

Its navy, and how employed.

East India neglected. There was a small squadron commanded by Admiral Watson, as related before, in the East Indies; but so much neglected as if that part of the world had been excluded from the common blessings of the administration: for, war had been declared upwards of two months, before any ship was sent to give notice of it in that region.

[m] Dated 8th July 1756.

Though

A. D. 1756.

Though the very exiſtence of our ſugar plantations, and our Tobacco colonies in North America, depended upon the ſecurity of our ſettlements in Africa; from whence they are ſupplied with labourers or ſlaves: and though the French had begun to encroach upon our rights, on the coaſt of Guinea, and there was great reaſon to apprehend, they would at length wholly execute the ſcheme, they had long laid, of getting poſſeſſion of the whole; our ignorance of our own intereſt, or our negligence, or our injudicious parſimony had almoſt given them an opportunity to complete that work: as will appear from the ſtate of our African ſettlements from the year 1730 to the year 1756 incluſive. In 1730 the African company applied to parliament for relief, and obtained 10,000 l. per annum, till the year 1746, when it was ſuſpended on account of the ruinous condition of the company's affairs, they being 130,000 l. in debt, their forts and caſtles in ruins, and their credit and reputation loſt. In 1749, the traders to and from Africa, between Cape Blanco and the Cape of Good-Hope, were incorporated, by act of parliament, but prohibited trading in their corporate capacity, and from having any transferable ſtock, or borrowing money on their common ſeal: and a majority of a committee of nine were empowered to make orders concerning the forts and factories, and to appoint governors and officers [n].

Africa neglected.

State of our African trade.

From

[n] Thus the old African company was aboliſhed, and received in compenſation from the houſe 112,142 l. 3 s. 3 d. for their

A. D. 1756. From this time the parliament revived and paid the grant of 10,000 l. per ann. and increaſed that ſum to 16,000 l. per ann. for the ſupport and repair of the forts and ſettlements. Nevertheleſs this important coaſt was ſuffered to run to decay, as appears by a true ſtate of the forts, at this time, in the note below *; and by the weakneſs of the naval power, which did now conſiſt of no more than two men of war in thoſe ſeas. So that five men of war might have driven the Engliſh quite out of Africa; to the utter ruin of our ſugar colonies.

N. American coaſt neglected. Our ſtrength on the coaſt of North America at ſuch a critical juncture (when the intercepting of the enemies troops and warlike ſtores, bound for New France, would have anſwered the end of a victory, and more effectually diſconcerted their operations on that Continent, than the completeſt

their charters, lands, forts, caſtles, ſlaves, books, papers, and all other effects. See p. 37. Vol. I.

* 1. James Fort in the river Gambia, though mounted with 36 guns is not able to reſiſt an European enemy.

2. Anamaboe Fort, not finiſhed.

3. Tantumquerry, 13 guns.
4. Winnebah Fort, 16 guns.
5. Accra Fort, 36 guns.
} Not defenceable againſt an European enemy.

6. Wydah Fort, deſerted.

7. Commenda Fort, 31 guns,
8. Succondee Fort, 29 guns,
9. Dix Cove Fort, 30 guns,
} Out of repair.

10. Cape Coaſt Caſtle, 40 guns,
11. Fort Royal, 12 guns,
12. Phipp's Tower, five guns,
13. Q. Ann's Point, five guns,
} Only in a ſtate to keep the natives in awe.

victory

victory in thoſe deſerts on the back of our plantations; and when Newfoundland was expoſed to a ſurprize from Louiſbourg), was ſo deficient for the ſervice required in thoſe parts, that we have ſeen the narrow eſcape of Holmes's ſquadron being carried into that port. A. D. 1756.

The whole attention of the miniſtry continued ſtill to turn upon domeſtic defence. The mouth of the Thames and Portſmouth, were the favourite ſtations of the capital ſhips, and of greateſt part of our navy; while the ocean was left to the care of our privateers; under very great encouragements [p]. Fleet kept at home.

Our land forces continued upon the increaſe, augmented with new regiments, and with additions to the old ones. But the only uſe to which ſuch numerous troops were put, was to aſſiſt in the diſſipation of the national treaſure, by extraordinary parades and encampments, where there was not the leaſt appearance and expectation of meeting with an enemy. The grand trains of artillery, which marched, on thoſe occaſions, from the Tower of London, ſerved only to confirm the people in the mean opinion, they entertained of a miniſtry, that could not by any provocations from the enemy, or by the remonſtrances of the nation, be induced to make a better uſe of their ſtrength in money and arms, than to exhibit raree-ſhews at an expence and with an army, that was able to attack, and ſhould have been employed in vigorous meaſures againſt the enemy. Land forces augmented. For what purpoſe.

[p] See Vol. I. page 414.

The

A. D. 1756. The ſenſe of the nation.

The ſenſe of the nation, on this occaſion, may be properly repreſented by the following deſcription of the march of the train through London to Cobham, on the 19th of July, given by a political obſerver of that tranſaction [q], "I, ſays he, and, at leaſt, 300,000 more idle ſpectators, can vouch for a good round ſum of money laid out on the train, which paſt from the Tower of London, over the bridge to the inland village of Cobham, in Surry. An expedition, that will eat up three or four ſuch ſums, as the plate and dice acts [r] can produce; and has been longer in agitation than the ſuccours for Mahon took up; under a miniſtry, which at a time they want every penny raiſed by parliament, and are diſtreſſed for ways and means for further ſupplies, to repel the common enemy, laviſhly throw away their hundreds of thouſands in a field where there is no enemy.—Many other diſagreeable ideas crowded into my thoughts.—But there was one reflection moſt predominant, occaſioned by the appearance of ſuch an immenſe croud of ſpectators, that lined the ſtreets and roads. Could London, early on a monday morning, ſpare, from the neceſſary buſineſs and callings in that metropolis, ſo many thouſands, and Britain be deſtitute of ſtrength to repel a foreign enemy? Could a raree-ſhew draw them from their occupations, and it be ſuppoſed they would remain paſſive, or flee before the invaders

[q] See Monitor, N°. 50.

[r] Part of the ways and means for raiſing the ſupplies in the laſt ſeſſion of parliament.

of

of their liberty and property? On the contrary, it was with the utmoſt pleaſure, that I obſerved all degrees, and both ſexes, young and old, wiſhing for an opportunity to give real proofs of their loyalty and courage, and that they might live to ſee the money, they paid in taxes, effectually applied, not in pageantry and mock expeditions, but in defence of our colonies and ſettlements abroad: in our commerce and dominion by ſea: and in a well regulated and diſciplined militia." A. D. 1756.

How the great ſupplies were expended.

So that, if we ſum up the whole of the ſervice done with the vaſt ſums granted by parliament in the laſt ſeſſion, it amounts to no more than keeping on foot a large body of mercenaries and foreign forces within this kingdom.—An inactive campaign in North America, which deprived us of the moſt important forts we had to cover our plantations, and to ſtem the power of France, on that continent.——A ſquadron, on that coaſt, not able to prevent ſuccours from Old France to Louiſbourg and Canada.—A total neglect of Newfoundland.—Squadrons too weak to reſiſt any attempt upon our ſugar iſlands, and upon our ſettlements on the coaſt of Africa.—A ſupine neglect of the Eaſt Indies.——A fleet in the Mediterranean, that could undertake no affair, nor find a more important object for its employ, than hunting a few Tartans, loaden with proviſions for Minorca.——And a ſtill more inactive fleet beaten to pieces in the Bay of Biſcay.——A few cruiſers to guard the channel and to watch the French ports, without any ſucceſs, except the

A. D. 1756. ſurprize of a ſmall iſland, near Guernſey, defended by about 100 men, taken by Captain How, in the Dunkirk, and three frigates; and the capture of a great number of ſhips. But with ſuch a neglect of our own trade, that, our loſs in merchant ſhips fell very little ſhort of the captures made from the French by both our privateers and men of war[s].—Our fleets had fled before our enemies;

[s] 251 ſhips were taken from the French, amongſt which there were the following remarkable ſhips:

The Arc-en-ciel, a man of war of 50 guns.

A Martinico-man valued at 250,000 dollars, taken within two leagues of Cadiz, by the Experiment.

The Fortune, from Rochfort to Miſſiſippi, 450 tons, with 140 ſoldiers and 30 women.

The Duke of Anjou with ſtores, and the Grand St. Urſin with 130 ſoldiers, for Louiſbourg.

Two ſhips from the coaſt of Africa, with 980 ſlaves.

A ſhip with proviſions for Cape Breton.

A large French Guinea-man.

One privateer of eight guns, eight ſwivels, and 86 men. Another of 20 guns, 200 men. Another of 10 guns and 90 men. Another of ſix guns, 60 men. Another of 20 guns and 195 men. Another of eight guns, 18 ſwivels, 100 men. Another drove a-ſhore on the Bahama iſlands. Another of eight guns, 10 ſwivels, 75 men. Another of four guns, ſix ſwivels, and 40 men. Another of 16 guns, 16 ſwivels, and 230 men. Three more privateers of 10 guns and 56 men. Another of 12 guns, 12 ſwivels, and 24 men.

A frigate of 36 guns with ſtores for Canada.

230 ſhips were taken within the ſame ſpace of time by the French. Amongſt which was the Warwick man of war of 60 guns, and four privateers. One ſhip with 200 ſoldiers for New York, and another with 88 people on board for Newfoundland. Which, allowing for the difference of valne between

mies; we had loſt Mahon and Minorca: our troops had been defeated, and our ſtrongeſt poſts had been taken from us, and deſtroyed in North America; and on which ſide ſoever we turned, our affairs carried a moſt diſagreeable and ruinous aſpect. A. D. 1756.

Hence we account for thoſe reflections, which were now, about this time, publiſhed concerning the ſituation of public affairs. "It will be well, ſaid a great man, if Britain's misfortunes, affecting as they are, do but ſtop with the fatal loſs and omiſſions of the paſt unhappy ſummer: for I fear the national diſſatisfaction, ſpread throughout theſe kingdoms, will produce ſuch political combats, as may reſtrain our plans of conqueſt, and greatly enfeeble the operations of war. Remarks on this conduct.

"If in times when the miniſtry were quite unembarraſſed; when every voice was exalted to ſuſtain their efforts; and every nerve was ſtrung in uniſon againſt the foe, we have experienced ſuch unexampled negligence and diſgrace, what in future periods are we to expect; but that the very ſmall attention, they have hitherto paid to hoſtile affairs, will be further impaired by ſelf-intereſt, cabal and party intrigue.—Not one thing proſpers within the ſphere of their action; and miſchief and miſery are the effects of their pernicious conduct.—Accuſations, alas! in plenty ſurround us.—Every act recognizes ſome fatal truth.

tween the Engliſh and French cargoes, ſhews that we had at this time little to boaſt of, and that our trade was much neglected.

A. D. 1756. National diſcontent.

"Let us hope to find among our ſenitors cordial duty and affection to his Majeſty; ſome at leaſt, who in the late language of Pruſſia's Monarch [t], will urge and urge again; "That the "blood, the treaſures and the intereſt of this "country, have been ſacrificed, to the ſupport "of a diſtreſſed and ungrateful court." Some, who will acquaint our amicable and honeſt King with the wholeſome, and animated advice of the French parliament to their miſguided Sovereign: "How happy (ſay they) would princes and na- "tions be, if truth alone had only the privilege "to approach the throne! perſons league toge- "ther to deceive their Monarch. They ſhew "him things in the light, which ſuits their own "views.

"The prince immured from the world, diſ- "cerns not himſelf the truth; he only knows "what they relate. Employments are given men "unworthy his preſence, and others diſmiſſed "whom he ought to retain. In ſpite of innate "integrity, in ſpite of all his precautions, the "beſt of princes is betrayed! he becomes the "ſport and the victim of men, who conceal or "adulterate truth! your parliament, Sire, owe "you this valuable truth, ſo rare, ſo much a "ſtranger in palaces: and they preſent it without "fear. How criminal would not your parlia- "ment be, if at this juncture they diſguiſed it!

[t] See the King of Pruſſia's motives for preventing the deſigns of the court of Vienna.

perhaps

" perhaps it never was more neceſſary to tell it " without reſerve. This is the object of the moſt " humble and moſt reſpectful remonſtrance, we " have the honour to bring to the foot of your " throne."—" But though the meaſures of evil is nearly full, let us yet hope that the time will ſoon arrive, in which thoſe gentlemen, by whoſe erring conduct, our calamities are brought upon us, will rather than ſee the ruin complete, have pity on the public weal, and ſave the ſinking bark. Let us require this, the leaſt of reparation, and the mildeſt of requeſts, that they will now become atoning volunteers for themſelves and their country, in withdrawing from ſcenes of buſineſs, to inactive ſolitude, that by their councils and influence, they may no longer interrupt the ſucceſs of our arms, or farther diſgrace the dignified name and annals of this once victorious land. A. D. 1756.

" Let Minorca and America, oppreſſive taxes, and a complaining people, the nation's debt, and declining credit, private intereſt, and general ſafety, the approaching ſeſſions, and the expiring year, all remind and leſſon them to obey the precept. Then may we hope to ſee victory wait upon our arms, and peace, in a little time, reach out her olive-branch, plenty diſplay her horn, and glory, honour and happineſs, adorn our iſle."

In the midſt of this national diſcontent the advices from Germany increaſed our fears. The Empreſs of Ruſſia affected to be highly diſcontented with the treaty his Britannic Majeſty lately

The Czarina diſguſted with Great Britain.

A. D. 1756. made with the King of Pruſſia, without her knowledge or her miniſters. She went ſo far as to give it for the reaſon of renouncing the late treaty [u] with Great Britain. And accordingly ſhe rejected the tender of the firſt payment of the ſtipulated ſubſidies. Not only ſo, but her Czariſh Majeſty acceded publickly to the treaty of Verſailles; and put thoſe very troops in motion to execute the ſchemes laid down by the whole confederacy againſt the King of Pruſſia, which Great Britain had agreed to take into her ſervice [w] in order to prevent foreign, eſpecially French, troops entering into Germany. And the motions of the King of Pruſſia, and his ſudden and extraordinary military diſpoſitions obliged the Empreſs Queen to aſſemble a more conſiderable body of troops, to be ready at all events againſt a ſurprize; who complained, by her miniſters at foreign courts, That her good intentions had been miſrepreſented, as if the friendly alliance lately concluded between her Majeſty the Empreſs Queen and his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, contained ſecret articles, calculated for the total ſuppreſſion of the Proteſtant religion, and to influence the election of a King of the Romans, and that, upon ſuch falſe ſuggeſtions, there had been a propoſal made for a league of the proteſtant courts againſt the houſe of Auſtria.

Renounces her treaty.

Accedes to a treaty with France.

The Empreſs Queen aſſembles her forces.

Endeavours to exculpate herſelf about her treaty with France.

Accuſes the King of England and King of Pruſſia.

This declaration from the Empreſs Queen was anſwered both by the King of Great Britain, in

[u] See page 135 and 204. [w] Ibid.

quality

quality of Elector of Hanover, and the King of Pruſſia: by their reſpective miniſters at the Diet of the Empire. A. D. 1756.

His Britannic Majeſty, in quality of Elector of Hanover or Brunſwick Lunenburg, anſwered, "That he had, with great ſurprize, heard that ſome people had affected to put a wrong conſtruction upon the object of the treaty of friendſhip, which he concluded ſome time ago * with the King of Pruſſia, and that they have even endeavoured to repreſent it, as a matter wherein the ſtate of religion was concerned; that nevertheleſs the whole Empire was ſenſible, he has always made it a rule to ſupport the rights of each, without any diſtinction of perſons; to maintain juſtice; to enforce the execution of the laws and conſtitutions of the Empire; to protect its liberties and the public peace; and to contribute to keep up in the Germanic body ſuch a ſyſtem, as appeared moſt conducive to its ſafety. That in conſequence of theſe principles, he had neglected nothing, that might moſt effectually tend to the ſupport of the houſe of Auſtria, even to the being ready to ſacrifice all that was in his power. That the differences, which had riſen between Great Britain and France, about their poſſeſſions in America, having given birth to a deſign in the latter power, to attack the Electoral dominions of the houſe of Brunſwick Lunenburg; which was ſufficiently known, by the little care they took to make a King of England's anſwer.

* See this treaty on page 256.

A. D. 1756. myſtery of ſuch a project, ſo capable of creating troubles in the Empire; his Britannic Majeſty, who addreſſed himſelf to the Empreſs Queen, requiring the ſuccours ſtipulated by treaties, was not only unable to obtain them, but at the ſame time found the court of Vienna as little inclined to grant another requeſt, altogether as reaſonable: which was to employ her good offices towards altering the diſpoſitions of ſuch of the ſtates of the Empire, as, through indifference, ſeemed to favour, in ſome meaſure, that intended invaſion. That his Britannic Majeſty thereby found himſelf under a neceſſity of concluding an alliance with the King of Pruſſia, for the ſecurity of their reſpective dominions, as alſo for preſerving peace and tranquility in the Empire; protecting the ſyſtem eſtabliſhed therein, and defending the rights and privileges of the members of the Germanic body; without any prejudice to either of the religions, exerciſed in the Empire; the contracting parties having had no views in that treaty, but ſuch as were perfectly conſiſtent with thoſe ſalutary objects.

"That while matters ſtood thus, the world was ſurpriſed with the unexpected event of the treaty of alliance, which her Majeſty, the Empreſs Queen had been pleaſed to conclude with a potentate, who, for above two centuries paſt, has diſmembered the moſt conſiderable provinces of the Empire; has attacked and invaded her Archducal houſe; has fomented troubles and diviſions in Germany; and has made ſuch means ſubſervient

vient to her own ambitious views, by uſurping whatever lay convenient for her: that the inconveniencies and dangers, which this new treaty muſt neceſſarily be productive of, will, in time, be made manifeſt; and that as the thing is not of ſuch a nature, as to require that one ſhould any longer make a myſtery of it, his Britannic Majeſty has thought proper to explain himſelf clearly on this head, in order to diſſipate the prejudices, which may have been created by falſe ideas and ſuggeſtions." A. D. 1756.

King of Pruſſia's anſwer and meaſures to prevent a war.

Soon after this declaration, made by his Britannic Majeſty, the King of Pruſſia made his alſo, beginning with "his ſurprize to hear the Empreſs Queen endeavouring to perſuade the public, that he was the aggreſſor, and given occaſion for the great military preparations making in her dominions. To diſcover the falſity of which charge, ſaid he, it will ſuffice to obſerve the points of time when the motions amongſt the forces of each party began.

"It is notorious, added that Monarch, that the court of Vienna began her armaments in Bohemia and Moravia in the beginning of June, ſoon after ſigning the treaty with France, and at a time, when neither the Empreſs Queen, nor any of her allies, had any ground to apprehend a ſurprize. That his Pruſſian Majeſty had greater reaſon to be attentive to theſe diſpoſitions, as he received advice, at the ſame time, of the march of a conſiderable body of Ruſſians towards Courland: and that thoſe diſpoſitions had determined

A. D. 1756. him to detach a few regiments into Pomerania, with orders to halt, as ſoon as he ſhould hear that the Ruſſians had marched back. That the preſent armaments could not be aſcribed, with any ſort of grace, to this motion of the Pruſſian forces; becauſe the march of a body of Pruſſians into Pomerania ought naturally to give the court of Vienna no more umbrage, than the march of ſome Auſtrian regiments towards Tuſcany, could give the King of Pruſſia.

"That while the preparations of war were carrying on with the utmoſt vigour in Bohemia and Moravia, his Pruſſian Majeſty contented himſelf with putting his fortreſſes in Sileſia into a poſture of defence, againſt a ſudden attack, and marching ſome regiments towards his provinces in Weſtphalia. That to that very day he had not ſent a ſingle regiment into Sileſia; that no garriſon had marched out to take the field; no camp had been formed, neither had there been any motion made towards the territories of the Empreſs Queen. That he could appeal for the truth of theſe facts, to the court of Vienna itſelf; which in its circular letter alledged only uncertain reports, that had been confuted by the event, for no camps have been formed, nor pitched on, upon the borders of Bohemia or Moravia, as the Empreſs Queen pretended ſhe was informed there would be.

"That notwithſtanding the King of Pruſſia's pacific conduct, the Empreſs Queen had continued her armaments, ordered troops to march from

from her moſt diſtant provinces, and aſſembled a formidable army in Bohemia and Moravia. That in ſuch a critical juncture, when the court of Vienna was ſtirring up all the powers in Europe againſt the King, calumniating his proceedings, and giving bad interpretations to his moſt innocent meaſures; when offenſive meaſures were taken againſt him; and the court of Vienna was amaſſing warlike ſtores and proviſions in Moravia and Bohemia, making powerful armaments and forming camps of 80,000 men in its dominions: when lines of Hungarians and Croatians were poſted on the frontiers of Sileſia, and camps were marking out on the King's limits: when peace reſembled war, whilſt, at the ſame time, the Pruſſian troops were quiet, and not a tent pitched on their ſide; the King of Pruſſia thought it was time for him to break ſilence; and theſe military motions obliged him to demand of the court of Vienna, by his miniſter, M. de Klinggraffe, a friendly and ſincere explanation, with regard to thoſe military preparations: whether they were deſigned againſt the King of Pruſſia? or, what were the intentions of her Imperial Majeſty? But the anſwer given to that demand being, "That in the preſent "juncture the Empreſs Queen had found it ne- "ceſſary to make armaments, as well for her own "defence, as for that of her allies, and which "did not tend to the prejudice of any body;" was ſo very ambiguous, dry and unſatisfactory, that it gave his Majeſty a ſuſpicion of a deſign formed againſt his dominions: eſpecially as the prepara- A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. preparations in Bohemia and Moravia were continued, and doubled: That, things being thus circumſtanced, it was natural for the King of Pruſſia to conſult his own intereſt and ſafety; and that he believed, no body could juſtly blame him for taking meaſures to avoid being ſurprized and cruſhed in his own territories.

"He further challenged the court of Vienna to point out any other object of the King of Pruſſia's armaments, but the defence and ſecurity of his own dominions. But that it was very eaſy to diſcover ſome other views, than ſelf-defence and ſecurity in the armaments of the Imperial court: and that he ſtill left it to the choice of the Empreſs Queen, to have peace or war.

"The King of Pruſſia, he ſaid, being diſſatisfied with the Empreſs Queen's firſt anſwer, ordered his miniſter to demand a catagorical explanation from that Princeſs; wherein he expreſſed himſelf to this effect: That if her Imperial Majeſty's pacific intentions were really as pure and ſincere, as ſhe pretended, in all places, they were, it would be eaſy for her to convince the King of Pruſſia thereof: that ſhe need only give his miniſter a clear, preciſe declaration, free from all ambiguity and equivocation, and that would reſtore the public tranquility. And further, that he was willing to believe, on the aſſurances of her Majeſty, the Empreſs Queen, that her late treaty with his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty contained no other articles, but what had been publiſhed; and that he promiſed himſelf, from the integrity of

her

her Imperial Majeſty, that ſhe would agree to no project, that might be contrary to Proteſtantiſm: But that ſhe could not be diſſatisfied to find the proteſtant princes upon their guard in ſuch a critical juncture, as the preſent, when the validity of the act of ſecurity, given by the hereditary Prince of Heſſe Caſſel, for maintaining the eſtabliſhed religion, is openly attacked, and a diſcovery has been made of the ſecret intrigues of Count Pergen, the Emperor's miniſter, and of Baron Kurtzrock, to carry off that Prince, and to take him from under the authority of the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, his father, who had publickly complained thereof, but could obtain no ſatisfaction, &c." A. D. 1756.

His Pruſſian Majeſty being ready to take the field at all events, ordered M. Klinggraffe to repreſent to the Empreſs Queen, "That after his maſter had diſſembled, as long as he thought conſiſtent with his ſafety and his glory, the bad deſigns, imputed to the Empreſs, he could not ſuffer himſelf longer to diſguiſe any thing; and that he had orders to inform her, That the King was acquainted with the offenſive projects formed, by the two courts, at Peterſburgh: that he knew they had engaged to attack him unexpectedly with their united force; the Empreſs Queen ſupplying 80,000 men, and the Czarina 120,000: and that this deſign had been deferred hitherto, for no other reaſon, than the want of recruits for the Ruſſian army, and mariners for their fleet, and the defect of corn in Livonia, neceſſary for their ſupport;

A. D. 1756. port: that the King once more made the Empreſs the offer of peace or war: that if ſhe choſe peace, he expected a clear and formal declaration, conſiſting of a poſitive aſſurance, that ſhe had no intention to attack the King either this year, or the next: and that he ſhould look upon any ambiguous anſwer, as a declaration of war.

The Empreſs Queen's reply.

The Empreſs Queen diſdaining, as ſhe ſaid, to be thus dictated to by a Prince of the Empire, returned a more haughty, and leſs ſatisfactory, anſwer to ſo juſt and equitable a demand, than the former; and in ſuch terms, as left no doubt of the bad intentions of the court of Vienna. She retorted upon the King of Pruſſia the accuſation of military preparations: "His Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, ſaid ſhe, had been already employed, for ſome time, in all kinds of the moſt conſiderable preparations of war; and the moſt diſquieting, with regard to the public tranquility; when on the twenty-ſixth of laſt month, that Prince thought fit to order explanations to be demanded of her Majeſty, the Empreſs Queen, upon the military diſpoſitions, which were making in her dominions, and which had not been reſolved upon, till after all the preparations, which his Pruſſian Majeſty had already made." She appealed for the truth of theſe facts to all Europe: and then continued and ſaid, "That her Majeſty, the Empreſs Queen, might have declined giving explanations upon objects, which did not require them; that however ſhe had been pleaſed to do it, and to declare with her own mouth, to M. Klinggraffe,

Klinggraffe, in the audience ſhe had granted to him on the 26th of July," "That the critical "ſtate of public affairs made her look upon the "meaſures, which ſhe was taking, as neceſſary for "her own ſafety, and that of her allies: and "that, in other reſpects, they did not tend to the "prejudice of any one: that her Majeſty, the "Empreſs Queen, had undoubtedly a right to "form what judgment ſhe pleaſed on the circum-"ſtances of the times: and that it belonged like-"wiſe to none but herſelf, to eſtimate her dan-"gers: That beſides, her declaration was ſo clear, "that ſhe could never have it imagined, that it "could be thought otherwiſe: That being ac-"cuſtomed to receive, as well as to practiſe, the at-"tentions, which ſovereigns owe to each other, "ſhe could not hear without aſtoniſhment, and "the juſteſt ſenſibility, the contents of the memo-"rial preſented [y] by M. Klinggraffe: That this "memorial was ſuch, both as to the matter, and "the expreſſions, that her Majeſty, the Empreſs "Queen, would find herſelf under a neceſſity to "tranſgreſs the bounds of that moderation, which "ſhe had preſcribed herſelf, were ſhe to anſwer "the whole of the contents. But nevertheleſs, "ſhe was pleaſed, in anſwer thereunto, to declare, "That the informations, given to his Pruſſian "Majeſty, of an offenſive alliance againſt him, "between her Majeſty, the Empreſs Queen, and "her Majeſty, the Empreſs of Ruſſia; as alſo, A. D. 1756.

[y] On the 20th of July.

"all

A. D. 1756. "all the circumſtances and pretended ſtipulations "of the ſaid alliance, were abſolutely falſe and "invented; and that no ſuch treaty againſt his "Pruſſian Majeſty did exiſt, or ever had exiſted: "and concluded with retorting the dreadful events "of the war upon his Pruſſian Majeſty,"

The moment his Pruſſian Majeſty was adviſed of this conduct and reſolution of the court of Vienna, he gave orders for his troops to enter Saxony; determined, if he was obliged to enter into a war, to remove the calamities thereof, as far from his own dominions, into the enemy's country, as he poſſibly could.

King of Pruſſia's troops ordered to enter Saxony.

When this vigorous ſtep had ſhewn the Empreſs Queen that he was reſolved not to be trifled with; the King of Pruſſia, hoping that his readineſs for a war, and his immediate taking the field, might bring her to a better ſenſe and diſpoſition, he once more applied by his miniſter at Vienna, with a promiſe to recall his forces; provided ſhe would ſolemnly declare that his dominions ſhould not be invaded. But this was productive of no better effect, than his former demands. He accordingly proceeded with his army.

King of Pruſſia's ultimate attempt to prevent a war.

Let us ſtop a moment, and duely weigh the anſwer given by the Empreſs Queen to the demand of the King of Pruſſia; to which that King did aſcribe the neceſſity of having recourſe to arms; and on which was kindled the flames of a long and bloody war.

Remarks on the anſwer given by the Empreſs Queen to the King of Pruſſia.

The Empreſs Queen appeals to all Europe for the truth of certain facts, to which ſhe affixes a primary

primary hoſtile intention, diſpoſition and prepara- A. D. 1756.
tion in the King of Pruſſia. Theſe facts amount to no more than the march of four regiments of Pruſſians into Pomerania, on advice that the Ruſſians were very numerous and in motion upon the frontiers of that part of his dominions, in the month of June; and his orders alſo to put the fortreſſes of that counry, into a ſtate of defence. Which is a moſt weak fact or reaſon to be aſſigned for the aſſembling 80,000 Auſtrians in Bohemia and Moravia; though it is here taken up to palliate the bad intentions of the court of Vienna. The King of Pruſſia did alſo ſend three regiments of foot from Weſtphalia to Halberſtadt, when he learned, that the Auſtrian army was aſſembled in Bohemia. But he did not order a ſingle regiment into Sileſia; keeping his troops quiet in their garriſons, without horſes and other neceſſaries for an army, which is to encamp, or preparing for an invaſion, that he might avoid every thing, that could give umbrage to the court of Vienna.

However the Auſtrians having cauſed another camp to be marked out near a town, named Hotzenplotz, on a ſpot of ground laying between the fortreſſes of Neiſſe and Coſel, and their army in Bohemia making diſpoſitions to occupy the camp of Jaromits, within four miles of Sileſia; the King of Pruſſia thought it time to take ſuch ſteps towards providing for his own ſafety and ſupporting his dignity, as in wiſdom, good policy and power he was able: whereby his Majeſty was ſo far from deſerving the imputation of any offenſive intention againſt

A. D. 1756. againſt the Houſe of Auſtria, that, it is evident, he contented himſelf with negociating, while the Empreſs Queen was diligently and vigorouſly arming againſt him; and that his military preparations were only in conſequence, and far from being equal, to thoſe of the Auſtrians. So that the appeal to facts, on which the court of Vienna laid ſo much ſtreſs, recoils with greater force againſt themſelves, and ſets their ill deſigns in a much fuller light.

Where her Imperial Majeſty aſſerts that ſhe had given the Pruſſian reſident a *clear* declaration in anſwer to his memorial, it is very evident, that it was impoſſible from thence to underſtand who were meant by her allies, threatned with war? For, it could not be thought, that the King of Pruſſia would be ſo weak, as to attack either France, or Ruſſia, with only the four regiments ſent into Pomerania. Or, is it very clear, that the Empreſs Queen would not attack Pruſſia, by ſaying, ſhe did not intend to prejudice any body. His Majeſty only deſired that he might, by name, be aſſured to reign unmoleſted by her arms: and as ſhe refuſed to give him that aſſurance, her declaration was *not* clear, and he was juſtified to take ſuch meaſures, as he was able, to defend himſelf, and to put it out of the power of his enemy to hurt him.

But the Empreſs Queen condeſcendeth to declare, That all the circumſtances and ſtipulations of the alliance with Ruſſia, pretended to be deſtructive to Pruſſia, were abſolutely falſe and invented.

vented. To be ſure this is a clear or direct accuſing the King of Pruſſia of aſſerting a falſhood, and a fiction of his own. But it is to be feared, that, notwithſtanding this accuſation or declaration comes from the mouth of an Empreſs Queen, it will be found to carry in it an equivocation or mental reſervation unbecoming the meaneſt ſubject. If we examine this clauſe upon circumſtances only, it will be found that there was certainly a concert or conſpiracy between the two Empreſſes, againſt ſome body. In the beginning of June the Ruſſian troops approached the frontiers of Pruſſia. An army of 70,000 men was formed in Livonia, at the ſame time the Auſtrians aſſembled in Bohemia, under the name of an army of obſervation: and when the Ruſſian troops received orders to return into their quarters, not being able to march forward for want of corn; the Auſtrian camps were alſo put off till next year. But his Pruſſian Majeſty had more ſubſtantial proofs of the conſpiracy formed between Auſtria, Ruſſia, and Saxony againſt his perſon and dominions; a conſpiracy, that had been forging ever ſince the year 1745[z].

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His Pruſſian Majeſty had in his own poſſeſſion moſt authentic proofs of their treaties, at that very time, he ordered his reſident at Vienna to intimate his knowledge of thoſe dangerous practices between the two Empreſſes and Saxony, for his ruin; which ſhall appear in their proper place;

[z] See Vol. I. page 262, 263, 264.

A. D. 1756. but he would have been contented to hear the court of Vienna reduced to the neceſſity of denying projects, which could do no honour to their moderation; and to ſtave off a bloody and expenſive war, with a promiſe not to be attacked either in that, or in the next year.

This requeſt, not to be moleſted for two years, by one, that had a right to claim the ſecurity of peace by the faith of treaty, he had not violated, and was deſirous to keep, was far from being impertinent or imperious; and it was the moſt eſſential article in the memorial. It was a matter of right; and a condition, without which war muſt certainly commence: yet this is the preciſe article to which no manner of anſwer was given. A ſilence, that ſufficiently diſcovers the real intentions of the court of Vienna.

Endeavours to make the King of Pruſſia the aggreſſor.

Thus, the court of Vienna, by haughty and diſdainful anſwers, endeavoured to provoke the Pruſſian monarch to ſeek for ſafety by the way of arms; in order (as we have ſeen in the conduct of France towards Great Britain) to find a pretext to throw the breach of faith upon him. And he was, in the end, obliged to act in an hoſtile character: but neither Pruſſia, nor Great Britain, can be deemed aggreſſors, where States or Potentates are detected in hoſtile practices or intrigues, under the ſecurity of the ſacred name of peace[a].

The

[a] By *aggreſſion*, is underſtood every act, which is diametrically oppoſite to the ſenſe of a treaty of peace. An offenſive league;—the ſtirring up of enemies, and prompting them to make

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King of Pruſſia demands a paſſage for his army through Saxony.

The Pruſſian army put into motion, his Majeſty's miniſter at Dreſden demanded [b] a private audience of the King of Poland Elector of Saxony, and delivered himſelf to this effect, "That his royal maſter the King of Pruſſia, finding himſelf obliged by the Empreſs Queen to attack her, and to march into Bohemia through the territories of Saxony, he accordingly in the name of the King of Pruſſia, demanded a paſſage through the electoral dominions of his Poliſh Majeſty, promiſing that they ſhould obſerve the ſtricteſt diſcipline, and take all the care of the country, that the circumſtances would permit; and that his Poliſh Majeſty and his royal family, might at the ſame time depend upon being in perfect ſafety, and of having the greateſt reſpect paid them on the part of his Pruſſian Majeſty. He then added, that there could be no room for ſurpriſe that the King of

make war upon another power;—deſigns of invading another Prince's dominions;—a ſudden irruption:—All theſe different circumſtances are ſo many *aggreſſions*; although the laſt, only, can be properly called an *hoſtility*.

Whoever prevents theſe aggreſſions, may commit *hoſtilities*; but is not the *aggreſſor*.—In the ſucceſſion-war, when the troops of Savoy were in the French army in Lombardy, the Duke of Savoy made a treaty with the Emperor againſt France:—The French diſarmed theſe troops, and carried the war into Piedmont:—It was therefore the Duke of Savoy, who was the *aggreſſor*; and the French who committed the firſt *hoſtilities*.—The league of Cambray was an *aggreſſion*:—If the Venetians had, then, prevented their enemies, they would have committed the firſt *hoſtilities*; but they would not have been the *aggreſſors*.

[b] On the 29th of Auguſt.

A. D. 1756. Pruſſia ſhould take ſuch meaſures, at the preſent conjuncture, as might prevent a return of what happened in the year 1744; and that the neceſſity, which the King his maſter was under of acting in this manner, could only be imputed to the calamity of the times, and to the behaviour of the court of Vienna."

His Poliſh Majeſty's conduct and anſwer.

His Poliſh Majeſty, conſcious of the private engagements, between himſelf and the confederate Empreſſes, againſt the King of Pruſſia, and of his own inability to diſpute the demand made by the Pruſſian miniſter, anſwered, "That, as he was at peace with all the world, and under no engagement relative to the preſent object, with any of the powers actually at war, or with any of thoſe about to enter into it, he did not expect a requiſition in the form it had been made to him, neither could he conceive the end of making ſuch a declaration; but that he ſhould give an anſwer upon this ſubject in writing, and hoped that his Pruſſian Majeſty, contenting himſelf with a quiet paſſage, would neither forget the reſpect due to a ſovereign, nor that, which all the members of the Germanic body reciprocally owe to each other."

But, dreading the conſequences of admitting the army of a doubtful friend, and of a Prince, who had thrown out ſufficient hints of the diſcoveries he had made in the negociations of the Saxon cabinet, to his prejudice, his Poliſh Majeſty collected his whole force, with all the diligence his circumſtances would permit, in order to command ſome reſpect, and, at leaſt, to make

Aſſembles his troops.

ſome

ſome ſtand againſt the worſt attempts, till his confederates might ſend him ſuch relief, as the nature of his diſtreſs and of their common cauſe required. Theſe troops already raiſed, as the King of Pruſſia had intelligence, to favour the deſigns of the high contracting powers againſt his Majeſty, were ordered to fortify themſelves in the ſtrong fortreſs of Pirna. A. D. 1756.

In the mean time his Poliſh Majeſty ordered a written anſwer to be delivered to M. de Malzahn, which declared, "That his Majeſty the King of Poland, deſiring nothing more ardently than the peace of the Roman Empire, was extremely diſpleaſed to hear of the differences between the Houſe of Auſtria and Brandenburgh, ſo as to occaſion the march of the Pruſſian troops into Bohemia: but that he did not refuſe the requiſition of a paſſage for theſe troops through his dominions, provided they did no damage in their march; and that his Poliſh Majeſty did rely for this, and that the Pruſſian troops ſhould obſerve a ſtrict diſcipline, upon the declaration of his Pruſſian Majeſty." He further ſaid, "That he expected his Pruſſian Majeſty ſhould previouſly make known at what time, through what place, and in what numbers, his troops were to paſs, in order that the King of Poland might appoint commiſſaries, and give them inſtructions how to direct the troops in their march: that he hoped his Pruſſian Majeſty, as a friend and good neighbour, would pay a regard to the bad ſituation of the country, and the ſcarcity occaſioned by the indif- Gives a written anſwer to the King of Pruſſia's demand.

A. D. 1756.

ferent harveſt, that year; that he would cauſe ready money and a market price to be paid by his troops for every thing his troops might want; and that he would let their ſtay be as ſhort as poſſible." Then his Poliſh Majeſty confeſſed his ſurprize at his Pruſſian Majeſty's obſerving in his declaration, that the reflection of what happened in the year 1744 ſhould occaſion his taking meaſures againſt the like events; the difference of the ſituation of affairs, at that time and this, being very great. For the King of Poland has the ſtrongeſt reaſons to keep ſteadfaſtly to the treaty of Dreſden; in conformity to which he had aſſiduouſly applied himſelf to cultivate the friendſhip of the neighbouring powers, and that upon this principle he flattered himſelf, that the King of Pruſſia would reſt ſatisfied of his intention *not to take any part in the differences that have ariſen between his Pruſſian Majeſty and the Empreſs Queen*; which he had already ſeveral times declared to the Pruſſian miniſter, and did confirm by theſe preſents: concluding, that ſuch ſtrong aſſurances, as theſe, ought to ſatisfy the King of Pruſſia, and prevent his requiring any thing of his Poliſh Majeſty, or his ſubjects, contrary to the liberty of a Prince of the Empire, or that ſhould oblige him to have recourſe to the Germanic body and the guarantees of the treaties of the peace, for the due execution of thoſe treaties [c]."

The

[c] This declaration was ſent to the King of Pruſſia by Lord Stormont, the Britiſh miniſter, accompanied by the Count of Salmont, one of the Saxon miniſters. His Pruſſian Majeſty

The inſincerity and fallacy of this declaration was too palpable to eſcape the diſcernment of his Pruſſian Majeſty, already in poſſeſſion of the real intentions, and inimical agreement of the court of Dreſden, with the Empreſs Queen and the Empreſs of Ruſſia: and as it was the very thing he expected in anſwer to his requiſition, his Majeſty had taken ſuch previous meaſures, as to be prepared immediately to execute the firſt part of his plan, which was to diſarm one of his moſt dangerous enemies: for, tho' Saxony could not be looked upon in a capacity to cope with the ſtrength of Pruſſia, the contiguity of the Elector's dominions with Brandenburg, and the ſituation of that Electorate was ſuch, that it would have been a continual inlet for the confederates, and a barrier againſt his Pruſſian Majeſty's attempts upon Bohemia: ſo that by ſeizing upon Saxony, his Majeſty got clear of an almoſt domeſtic foe; opened a ready way into Bohemia; and ſecured a re-

A. D. 1756

How received by the King of Pruſſia.

Reaſons for ſeizing upon Saxony.

jeſty received them very politely, heard their propoſals, and told them, "That he heartily wiſhed the King of Poland would confirm theſe ſentiments by his actions: That he deſired nothing more, than the neutrality propoſed to his Poliſh Majeſty; but that in order to render that neutrality more ſecure and leſs liable to variation, it would be proper for his Poliſh Majeſty to ſeparate his army, and to ſend the troops he had aſſembled at Pirna, back into quarters; and that, after he had given this proof of his upright intentions, he himſelf would take a pleaſure, by an equal condeſcenſion, in ſhewing an equal diſpoſition to give real marks of his friendſhip for his Poliſh Majeſty, and to concert with him, what meaſures might be proper to be taken, according to the ſituation of affairs.

A. D. 1756. treat in case of a miscarriage. Be that as it will; the fate of Saxony was determined to answer the designs of Prussia.

Resolution to disarm the Saxons. His first object, therefore, being to disarm the Saxon troops, already formed in a body, with their King at their head, he was to drive them into such a situation, as might disable them from action, or from joining either the Austrians or Russians, in case of an attempt, from either, or both of those powers, to succour and rescue the King of Poland; as he had reason to expect would be done. In this expectation the King of Poland with his two sons, Xaverius and Charles [d], retired from Dresden, as a place the least tenable, and fled before his invader to a camp between Pirna and Konigstein, entrenched and provided with a numerous train of artillery, deemed impregnable, and the only place in his electorate to make a stand against a formidable enemy, and to preserve a communication with his ally the Queen of Hungary [e]. And in this opinion the King of Prussia

[d] The Queen and the rest of the royal family remained at Dresden.

[e] The Saxon army having been raised, and this strong camp marked out and fortified, in so extraordinary a manner, when no enemy appeared, to require such an armament, gives great reason to suspect the pacific intentions of the King of Poland towards Prussia; and that finding by the demands made by the Prussian resident at Vienna, that the intrigues and agreement of Saxony to his prejudice were discovered, the King of Poland, conscious of his own guilt, had taken this measure to provide for his own safety against such a visitation.

proceeded

A Map of the Seat of War in GERMANY &c. Shewing the Places where and at what time the Battles were Fought by the King of Prussia and his Allies, during the late WAR.

K. The King in Person.



proceeded with his operations. He entered Saxony at the head of an army powerful enough to drive his Poliſh Majeſty from his capital; which, at all events, he was reſolved to get into his poſſeſſion, it being the only place to find the originals of thoſe copies he had obtained, of the confederacy againſt him; and he arranged the reſt of his troops in ſuch a manner, as to give no ſuſpicion of their real deſtination to favour his deſigns upon the fortreſs of Pirna: his chief commanders themſelves not being truſted with any more than temporary inſtructions for their motions. A. D. 1756.

Meaſures for ſecuring the paſſes towards Bohemia, &c.

Thus, while the main army was employed in the ſurpriſe of Dreſden, and reducing the open country, and the untenable places, to the Pruſſian dominion; two conſiderable armies were formed in Upper and Lower Sileſia, to occupy the paſſes communicating with the circles of Bunczlaw and Konigin-Gratz: beſides another body aſſembled at Glatz. By which means he could cover Sileſia from any attempts made by the Auſtrians; and he could advance into Bohemia, without interruption, in caſe he found it neceſſary to meet the enemy on their own territories; one of which ſeemed to be the moſt probable intention of his Pruſſian Majeſty: but this diſpoſition was no more than a piece of good generalſhip, to keep the enemy fixed upon a wrong and diſtant object, while his Majeſty gained time to carry his main deſign into execution. So that, when Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, entruſted with the command of the forces

A. D. 1756. forces upon the frontiers of Bohemia, was advanced to Gros-Kugel, and not before, he had inſtructions to turn off, and to take the rout of Leipſic: and, when he had got poſſeſſion of this city, he received further orders, to continue his march along the Elbe, to get behind Pirna, to cut off the avenues, through which the Saxon army was ſupplied with proviſions, and to attempt every thing to diſtreſs and ſhut the Saxons up, and to prevent their junction with, and their relief from the Auſtrians. All which that Prince performed in the moſt preciſe and effectual manner, for the ſervice of his royal maſter.

To cut off all communication with the Saxon camp.

King of Pruſſia's manifeſto.

When the King of Pruſſia entered the Saxon territory, he publiſhed a manifeſto, "pleading the neceſſity, to which he was driven by the equivocal conduct and dangerous views of the court of Vienna, for taking ſuch a diſagreeable reſolution to enter the hereditary dominions of his Poliſh Majeſty, Elector of Saxony, with an armed force: and at the ſame time proteſting, in the preſence of God and man, that nothing ſhould have induced him to take ſuch a ſtep againſt a Prince, for whom he had the greateſt perſonal reſpect and friendſhip, had he not been forced thereunto by the laws of war, the fatality of the preſent combinations, and the neceſſity of providing for the defence of his own dominions. He then put the Saxons in mind of his tenderneſs towards their Sovereign, in the year 1744, and remonſtrated againſt thoſe councils, which engaged him to favour the enemies of Pruſſia: adding, that it was from

from the apprehenſions of being expoſed again to their intrigues, he was compelled to purſue ſuch meaſures for his own ſafety, as prudence had dictated: but at the ſame time, he affirmed, in the moſt ſolemn manner, that he entertained no hoſtile intention againſt his Poliſh Majeſty, or any of his dominions: that his troops did not enter Saxony as enemies, being under command to obſerve the beſt order and moſt exact diſcipline: and concluded with proteſtations of his ardent wiſhes for the happy moment, in which he might reſtore the public tranquility, and his Poliſh Majeſty's hereditary dominions, which he was obliged to ſeize by way of pledge for his own ſafety." A. D. 1756.

At Leipſic Prince Ferdinand apologized for his hoſtile viſit, by another declaration or manifeſto, "which promiſed, in the name of his Pruſſian Majeſty, to conſider and defend the Saxons, as if they were his own ſubjects; and he aſſured them, That he had given preciſe orders for his troops to obſerve exact diſcipline." But the ſeverity, with which the following reſolutions of theſe viſitors, under the name of friends, were attended, ſoon convinced them, that his Pruſſian Majeſty was determined to treat that electorate in the ſame manner, as the dominions of an open enemy. Prince Ferdinand's declaration, &c. at Leipſic.

His firſt mark of friendſhip exhibited itſelf in an order for the inhabitants of Leipſic to provide his army with proviſions, at a loſing price, on pain of military execution. This was immediately followed, in the evening of the ſame day, by an order

A. D. 1756.

der for the payment of all taxes and cuſtoms to the King of Pruſſia; by ſeizing on the cuſtom-houſe and exciſe-office; and by obliging the merchants to open the magazines of corn and meal for the uſe of his army.

King of Pruſſia's conduct at Dreſden, towards the Queen.

At Dreſden, which city had been deſerted by the King of Poland, and his military power; and was entered without oppoſition by the King of Pruſſia; an officer was ordered by his Majeſty to wait upon the Queen of Poland, with the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of reſpect and ſecurity for her perſon and family; but ſoon after he returned with a peremptory demand for the keys of her huſband's royal archives, cabinets and treaſures: To which ſhe was at laſt forced to ſubmit, notwithſtanding her utmoſt endeavours to divert his Pruſſian Majeſty from ſuch a violent and unprecedented action, under the roof of her own palace. His Majeſty ordered the fortifications of Wirtemberg to be blown up; and Torgau to be fortified, at which place he eſtabliſhed the ſeat of government under a Pruſſian miniſtry [f]: for the ſame officer, who demanded the keys of her Poliſh Majeſty, acquainted the miniſters of ſtate and members of the council, that the King of Pruſſia ſhould have no occaſion for their ſervice, but would appoint proper perſons to fill, and diſcharge the duties of their places and offices. Baron Wyllech was ap-

Erects a new adminiſtration, &c.

[f] All offices for public buſineſs, belonging to the Pruſſian army, were eſtabliſhed here. The caſh and treaſure of the army was kept here, and this was the place where contributions and duties of all kinds were ordered to be paid.

pointed

pointed the Pruſſian governor of Dreſden; he made priſoners of all the Saxon officers found in that city, and obliged them to ſwear not to ſerve againſt the King his maſter, before they could be releaſed; and he tranſported down the Elbe to Magdeburgh all the artillery, arms and other military ſtores, which had been privately laid up in the arſenals and magazines of the capital. A. D. 1756. Seizes upon all Saxon officers and military implements.

The King of Pruſſia, keeping his eye ſtill principally upon the military power of Saxony, which had cooped themſelves up juſt in the ſituation he hoped to find them, fixed his head quarters at Seidlitz, about half a German league from the Saxon camp at Pirna; ſo as to be at hand to intercept all convoys of proviſions for that camp, and to favour the operations, with which he had charged Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic, who, as obſerved before, had marched along the Elbe, and formed a chain with the royal army, that extended on the right towards the frontiers of Bohemia, ſeiſed the paſſes, that lead to the circles of Satzer and Leutmeritz in that kingdom, where Prince Ferdinand took poſt without reſiſtance. His head quarters. Advantageous cantonment of his troops.

Such was the diſtreſs of the Saxons, when his Poliſh Majeſty applied, in a memorial addreſſed to all the courts in amity with Saxony, for redreſs, which was couched much in the ſame ſtile and manner, as that addreſſed to their High Mightineſſes, by the Saxon miniſter at the Hague. King of Poland, Elector of Saxony's circular memorial againſt theſe proceedings.

" To repreſent to you, high and mighty Lords, " a ſtate free, tranquil and neuter, invaded by " an enemy, who covers himſelf under the name

" of

A. D. 1756. " of friendſhip; who without alledging the leaſt " complaint, or any pretenſions whatſoever; but " governing himſelf ſolely by his *conveniency*, " makes himſelf maſter, by armed force, of all " the towns, and even of the capital; diſmantles " places, ſuch as Wirtemburgh; fortifies others, " ſuch as Torgau: this is but a feeble ſketch of " the oppreſſions under which the faithful ſub- " jects of his Majeſty groan; the burghers diſ- " armed; the magiſtrates carried off to ſerve as " hoſtages for the unjuſt and enormous contri- " butions for proviſions and forage [g]: the public " coffers ſeiſed, the revenues of the Electorate " confiſcated; the arſenals of Dreſden, of Leip- " ſic, of Weiſenfels and of Zeiſt broke open, the " artillery and the arms plundered and tranſported " to Magdeburg; yet all theſe were no more than " preliminaries to the unheard of indignity offered " to the Queen; whoſe virtues alone ought to " have commanded reſpect from her very ene- " mies. It was from the ſacred hands of that " Princeſs the archives of ſtate were forced, by " menaces and violence; notwithſtanding the ſe- " curity, which her Majeſty might promiſe to " herſelf, under the protection of all laws human " and divine; and notwithſtanding the reiterated " aſſurances given to her in the name of the King

[g] The deputies, that went from Leipſic to prince Ferdinand's head quarters, were conducted to Torgau, and there detained, as ſecurity for the obedience of the regency of Leipſic, and for the payment of the duties and contributions of that city.

" of

" of Pruſſia, that not only her perſon and reſi- A. D.
" dence ſhould be abſolutely ſafe; but that even 1756.
" the Pruſſian garriſon ſhould be under her or-
" ders."

" This auguſt and tender mother of her faith-
" ful ſubjects, who, to make a ſacrifice to the
" happineſs of the Saxons, had remained at Dreſ-
" den, expected, in the midſt of tumult, to go-
" vern in ſecurity the ſtates of her auguſt conſort,
" who, prompted by cares equally important,
" had haſted away to head his army, to defend
" his injured honour, and to give to the zeal and
" love of his people, what they had ground to
" expect from the valour and firmneſs of ſo mag-
" nanimous a Prince: But ſhe has been deceived:
" ſhe is not only deprived of the government;
" the activity of the privy-council is alſo taken
" away; and, inſtead of the legitimate govern-
" ment, an arbitrary *directory* is ſubſtituted, which
" acknowledges no other right, but its own
" will, &c."

Whatever advantages his Pruſſian Majeſty gained Its effects.
over the confederates againſt him, by this forcible puſh to diſarm Saxony, and by treating a country with the rigour of martial power, which had given him no viſible cauſe of complaint; the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, by inſiſting upon his own innocence, and the natural right he had to the protection of the laws of nations, from an invader of his dominions in time of profound peace; and by expatiating upon the perfidious and tyrannical conduct of his Pruſſian Majeſty

and

A. D. 1756. and his officers, raiſed the attention of all Europe, and furniſhed thoſe, who were moſt deſirous to break with Pruſſia, with a laudable motive to arm in defence of diſtreſſed innocence and injured Majeſty. Even thoſe, who wiſhed well to the Pruſſian hero could ſcarce reconcile his conduct, on this occaſion, with juſtice, and ſome of his beſt friends diſavowed their knowledge of this expedition, and condemned it.

In England. None were more ſurprized than his Britannic Majeſty, Elector of Hanover, Pruſſia's faithful ally. It was eaſy to foreſee the difficulties, in which this would embroil his Pruſſian Majeſty: none of which were ſo much as ſuſpected, when the treaty between Great Britain and Pruſſia was ſigned [h]. And our King, as Elector of Hanover, was ſo far from being in the ſecret of this invaſion, or of the motives which the King of Pruſſia had to ſeize upon Saxony, that he publickly diſavowed, and in ſome ſenſe proteſted againſt that irruption.

The reply of the King of Pruſſia to the Saxon memorial. Europe, in this confuſion, was immediately preſented with a circular memorial, by way of reply, in the name of his Pruſſian Majeſty; wherein it was declared, "That the imputations in the Saxon memorial were calumnies raiſed and aggravated without truth, and without decency; that nothing more than the uſual taxes had been raiſed on the ſubjects of the Electorate, and that they had been fully paid for every thing, they had furniſhed:

[h] On the 16th of Jan. 1756.

niſhed: that it was equally contrary to truth, where it was aſſerted that the reſpect due to the Queen was violated, by demanding of her certain papers, the copies of which he was already poſſeſſed of, but which it became neceſſary for him to have in the original, in order to prove unanſwerably, the plot, that was formed to ſtrip him, not only of Sileſia, which the Empreſs Queen reſerved entirely for herſelf; but likewiſe of the dutchies of Magdebourgh and Croſſen, and the circles of Zullichau, Cotbus and Schwibus, which was the portion allotted to the King of Poland." But this was only a temporary apology, to prepare the world for thoſe unanſwerable proofs, which he ſoon after cauſed to be publiſhed; and ſhewed both the wiſdom and juſtice of a conduct, ſo greatly diſapproved, at firſt, as to ſtigmatize him with the name of a public robber. A. D. 1756.

The Emperor was engaged by his Conſort to exert the utmoſt efforts of his power, to deter the Pruſſian Monarch from proceeding. As head of the Empire he iſſued a decree, admoniſhing and commanding him to withdraw his troops from Saxony, on pain of being proceeded againſt according to the laws of the Empire: He abſolved all the vaſſals of the Empire found in his ſervice from their oath of fidelity, and commanded them to leave the Pruſſian ſtandard. And by a third decree he forbade all the princes, ſtates, and other members of the Empire to ſuffer their ſubjects to enliſt themſelves in the Pruſſian ſervice, or otherwiſe to give him any kind of aſſiſtance. The Emperor's decree againſt him.

A. D. 1756. He then enumerated all the violences ſet forth in the Saxon memorial, with many aggravations; and concludes with this remarkable clauſe, "For "theſe cauſes we moſt ſeriouſly command and "enjoin your Majeſty, as Elector of Branden-"burgh, by virtue of our Imperial dignity, and "the power of ſupreme judge, to deſiſt, without "delay, from all rebellion, hoſtile invaſions, "violences and breaches of the peace, in the "Electorate of Saxony, and other ſtates of the "Empire; to withdraw immediately your troops, "and to break up and diſmiſs your army, which "is ſo dangerous to the ſtates of the Empire, "and the common tranquility; to reſtore every "thing that has been taken; to repair, without "reply or demur, all damages and coſts, and to "make, as ſoon as poſſible, your moſt humble "report of the manner, in which all this has "been executed. As for the reſt, we ſhall forth-"with proceed to what is enacted by the laws of "the Empire, in puniſhment of the grievous "crime committed by your Majeſty, as Elector "of Brandenburg, againſt us and the whole "Empire, by a rebellious enterprize, danger-"ous to the community, and at the ſame time "provide for the future ſecurity of all the Em-"pire[i]."

In the mean time the Auſtrians attempted to ſupply the Saxon army at Pirna with proviſions. But the convoy was attacked and routed by a de-

[i] Dated at Vienna, September 19, 1756.

tachment of Pruſſian huſſars, who carried off a conſiderable number of loaded waggons. This was the firſt act of hoſtility between the troops of Auſtria and Pruſſia. A. D. 1756.

The French court, as yet, made no movement with arms, but ſpit their venom in the following circular reſcript to all foreign courts; in which it is ſaid, "That his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty cannot but conſider the requiſition made by the King of Pruſſia to the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, for the paſſage of his troops through that Electorate, as nothing leſs than a declaration, that he is determined to uſurp that, to which he has neither abſolute right, nor equitable claim. The French declaration againſt the King of Pruſſia.

"That by this uſurpation, committed in a time of profound peace, againſt the Elector of Saxony, at the time when that Prince relied, with unſuſpecting ſecurity, upon the faith of the treaty of Dreſden, and the aſſurances of friendſhip, which the King of Pruſſia had given him, the King of Pruſſia had violated the public peace, the treaty of Weſtphalia, all the laws and conſtitutions of the Empire, and every tie by which the members of the Germanic body are united.

"That the eſtabliſhment of the ſyſtem formed by the King of Pruſſia, in concert with the court of Great Britain, was the moſt unjuſt, and moſt injurious, that can be imagined, and ſuch as left no room to expect, that any meaſures ſhould be kept with thoſe powers, either by land or ſea, as they had violated all laws, both human and divine.

A. D. 1756.

"That this conduct ought to exclude the King of Pruſſia from all benefit that he might receive from any defenſive alliance; and therefore his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty doubts not, that the ſtates which are now in alliance with him, will think themſelves abſolved from every obligation to afford him any ſuccours, and that they will aſſiſt his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty and his allies, in every meaſure that may be purſued for their mutual defence, the ſupport of the general intereſt of Europe, and the giving a proper ſanction to the mutual contract by which one nation is attached to another."

The declaration of the Empreſs of Ruſſia againſt him.

The court of Ruſſia was more explicit; whoſe declaration being dated September 4, 1756. at St. Peterſburg, a conſiderable time before they could hear of the invaſion of Saxony by the Pruſſian army, ſhews, that the diſcovery of the alliance againſt the King of Pruſſia was known at Peterſburg, and its conſequences apprehended; and that the Czarina was prepared to march her forces upon the firſt alarm of an attack made upon any part of the confederacy: for ſhe commanded the Ruſſian miniſters reſiding at foreign courts to declare, "That as the ſole intent of the preparations, which the Empreſs ordered to be made, laſt ſpring, was to enable her to fulfil her engagements with her allies, in caſe any of them ſhould be attacked, the preparations were ſuſpended, both by ſea and land, as ſoon as there was ground to hope that that caſe would not ſoon happen; in order that the whole world might be con-

convinced that her Imperial Czariſh Majeſty was no leſs forward to defend her allies, when threatened with an attack, than backward to throw Europe into an alarm without an extreme neceſſity. A. D. 1756.

" That the King of Pruſſia, far from doing juſtice to the Empreſs's ſentiments, on this head (though he remained quiet, whilſt preparations were making by Ruſſia, and even ſome time after they had ceaſed) had all of a ſudden begun to make ſuch powerful armaments, as gave room to apprehend that the flames of war would immediately burſt out.

" That nevertheleſs Ruſſia, to avoid the multiplying of fears, for furniſhing the King of Pruſſia with a ſpecious pretext for diſturbing the public tranquility, had made no motions; in hopes that the King of Pruſſia, in imitation of this example, would not ſtir up ſuch troubles: but that this Prince, having continued to arm with all his might, and without any interruption, and without alledging any other reaſon than the idea he had formed to himſelf of an apprehended attack, had thereby ſufficiently intimated that he ſought only a pretext to diſturb the peace of Europe.

" That, in fact, it is inconteſtible, that when the King of Pruſſia was preſſing his armaments with the greateſt vigour, thoſe of Ruſſia had long ceaſed; *and that thoſe of the Empreſs Queen did not begin, till the ſucceſſive motions of the Pruſſians and*

A. D. 1756. *the augmentation of their forces* [k] gave room to think Bohemia and Moravia were in danger; inaſmuch as it was no ſecret that the King of Pruſſia was diſguſted at the treaty of Verſailles; though this Prince, when he ſigned his treaty with England, gave himſelf no concern about what the court of Vienna might think of it.

"It is, therefore, clear to her Imperial Czariſh Majeſty, that the King of Pruſſia ought to be conſidered as the firſt author of the troubles, that are going to break out, though he has affected to publiſh, that he took all theſe meaſures only to defend himſelf againſt his enemies, who had no exiſtence, but in his own ſuppoſition: that, nevertheleſs, it is from this ſuppoſition he has thought himſelf entitled to demand of the Empreſs Queen an explanation with regard to her warlike preparations, adding, in a manner not altogether decent, that if her anſwer were not to his liking, he proteſted before God, he would not be anſwerable for the conſequences.

"That in conſideration of all theſe circumſtances the Empreſs can no longer CONCEAL her *real ſentiments*, nor forbear declaring, that as ſhe cannot behold with indifferency any [l] attack made

[k] This is a notorious miſrepreſentation of the fact, as appears from the circumſtances related in this Hiſtory, on page 52. &c. Vol. II.

[l] This ſuſpicion could ariſe from no other circumſtance, than a conſciouſneſs of the diſcovery, made by his Pruſſian Majeſty, of the partition of his dominions in the confederate treaty; for it was not poſſible to hear of what had paſſed in Germany.

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on the dominions of her allies, particularly thoſe of the Empreſs Queen of Hungary, and the Electorate of Saxony, ſhe will furniſh ſpeedy and powerful ſuccours to the party unjuſtly attacked, and will not think herſelf in any wiſe reſponſible for the conſequences, which the preſent menacing conduct of his Pruſſian Majeſty may draw after it, &c." A. D. 1756.

Whether we animadvert upon the date of this reſcript, we ſhall diſcover the inſincerity of her Czariſh Majeſty; her diſguſt with England, for entering into an alliance with Pruſſia, which ſhe had previouſly been engaged to cruſh, and that her real ſentiments were not formed upon the preſent appearances, but upon the long prepoſſeſſions ſhe had entertained in prejudice to the King of Pruſſia, at the inſtigation of the Empreſs Queen and the Saxon court, and concealed hitherto under the name of friendſhip; till neceſſity obliged the confederacy to pull off the maſk in their own defence. And whoever attends to its ſubſtance, will find a vein of contradiction and fallacy run through the whole; advancing facts, which are not conſiſtent either in point of time or truth. Remarks on this declaration.

His Pruſſian Majeſty, however, neither intimidated by the formidable alliances, which already appeared againſt him, nor deterred from his purpoſes, by the thundering decrees of the Imperial authority, which he deſpiſed with as much contempt, as our Henry VIII. did the thunder of the Vatican againſt his proceedings in the re- Reſolution and conduct of his Pruſſian Majeſty.

A. D. 1756. formation; attended ſtrictly to the accompliſhing his firſt attempt, to get full poſſeſſion of Saxony. So that, the more determined his enemies appeared to oppoſe his arms, he exerted the power in his hands to defeat their moſt ſanguine intentions. The Ruſſian reſcript, and the Auſtrian diſpoſitions for the relief of the Saxons, ſerved only to accelerate the total ruin of his Poliſh Majeſty. They convinced the King of Pruſſia, that nothing leſs than a total reduction of that party of the confederacy againſt him could do him any ſervice. And accordingly being maſter already of every other part of that electorate, he was determined to force the Saxon army at Pirna, by a ſtrong blockade, to ſurrender to his arms for want of proviſions, of which there was great ſcarcity in their camp; or to fall under his ſword, if they ſhould attempt to force their way through the lines of circumvallation.

The Empreſs Queen's efforts to reſcue the Saxon army.

By this means the fate of the Saxon army, in which reſted the laſt appearance of their country's independency, was daily reduced to worſe and worſe: and, as the Empreſs Queen could not but ſee her own danger increaſe through every advantage gained by the Pruſſian monarch over Saxony, the greateſt effort was preparing, on her part, with the utmoſt expedition, to deliver the Saxons out of their ruinous ſituation, and with their force united to her army, under the command of Count Brown, whoſe courage, ſkill and conduct were in high eſteem, to attack the Pruſſian army.

Could

Could this have been ſafely done, it, perhaps, might have had it's deſired effect. But it was ſcarce to be thought, that a Prince, who had found out the moſt ſecret intrigues of the cabinet againſt him, would be regardleſs in the moſt important criſis, about what was agitating againſt him in the field. He was as well provided with ſpies and emiſſaries about the court and camp of his enemies, as with arms to defend himſelf. There was not a motion of the enemy, that could eſcape his Majeſty's penetration. His perſonal knowledge of the corography, or face of the country, between him and the Auſtrian army, ſupplied him with the moſt minute ideas concerning every motion; of the importance of every paſs; and the danger of every defile: which, aſſiſted with early intelligence of their rout and ſtrength, furniſhed him with mighty advantages, and determined him to diſconcert their meaſures and operations, by forcing the Auſtrians to a battle, before they could reach the place of their deſtination.

A. D. 1756.

Defeated by the vigilance, &c. of the King of Pruſſia.

With this view, the Pruſſian heroe had detached, from time to time, as many troops from his army in Saxony, as could be ſpared at the blockade, to ſecure the paſſes; and to aſſemble, under the command Veldt Mareſchal Keith, who had orders to enter Bohemia, and to encamp near the ſmall town of Auſig, and not far from the army commanded by Count Brown; after he had reduced the town and palace[m] of Tetchen; which was

Reſolves to attack the Auſtrian army in Bohemia.

[m] Situate upon a rock, and belonging to Count Thun.

A. D. 1756. conſidered as a frontier fortreſs againſt Saxony; and made the garriſon of one captain, one lieutenant, four ſubalterns, and 12 ſoldiers priſoners of war.

The importance of this reſolution. Here we have in ſight an action, which by its conſequences may be looked upon to be the moſt deciſive of any during the whole war; becauſe upon its ſucceſs, on the part of Pruſſia, the fate of Saxony was determined, and a way was opened for his Pruſſian Majeſty into Bohemia: and this battle, which was to open the firſt campaign of a moſt bloody war, was fought by two generals or commanders in chief, who were originally ſubjects of the Britiſh crown.

Count Brown, the Auſtrian General. Count Brown, who was at the head of 60,000 Auſtrians, was an officer of Iriſh extraction, that had recommended himſelf to the Imperial court by his courage, vigilance and conduct, firſt in Italy, and eſpecially in their laſt war with the King of Pruſſia, and was honoured with this great command for the regard paid to his merit.

Marſhal Keith, the Pruſſian General. Veldt mareſchal, or field marſhal Keith, who commanded under the King of Pruſſia, on this occaſion, was the younger ſon of George Keith, Earl Marſhal of Scotland, born in that kingdom in 1698, and at 17 years of age he entered with his brother Lord Marſhal into the rebellion, which broke out in Scotland, in the year 1715. At the battle of Sheriffmuir he appeared in arms, in favour of the Pretender, and was wounded in the neck; but ſo ſlightly that he was not ſenſible of it, till he was undreſſed to go to bed. The defeat of his party drove this young adventurer, with many more, to

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ſeek their fortunes abroad. He followed his brother into Spain, and obtained a commiſſion in the Iriſh brigade, commanded by the Duke of Ormond, lately fled to that kingdom, under apprehenſions of being called to an account for his miſconduct towards to the Houſe of Hanover, at the latter end of Queen Anne's reign. In this ſituation the Hon. Mr. Keith continued 10 years; when tired of ſuch an inactive ſtate, where there was no proſpect of diſtinguiſhing himſelf by feats of arms, he obtained recommendations to the Empreſs of Ruſſia, then reigning, who received him with particular marks of diſtinction, and honoured him with a commiſſion of Brigadier General: and ſoon after advanced him to the rank of Lieutenant General. A. D. 1756.

The war between Ruſſia and Turkey, which broke out in that [n] reign, afforded opportunities enough to diſplay his courage and abilities in the military art. He was in all their battles, and was wounded ſo much in the heel at the taking of Ockzakow, where he was the firſt that mounted the breach, that they were obliged to carry him off the field of battle.

His eſteem at Peterſburg increaſed; and, upon the return of peace, the Czarina ſent him to the court of London, in quality of her ambaſſador extraordinary. On which occaſion overtures were made to Sir Robert Walpole, prime miniſter, to recover this veteran officer for the ſervice of Great

[n] Of Czarina Catherine I.

Britain:

A. D. 1756. Britain: but neither his own perſonal qualifications, nor the excuſes, which might be alledged in his favour, from his age and the influence he was under, at the time of his taking up arms againſt his lawful ſovereign; nor yet the applications made in his favour by ſeveral powers, that intereſted themſelves in his propoſal, could prevail. He was even obliged, when he appeared at court, to perſonate a Ruſſian both in dreſs and language: for his Majeſty would not ſuffer him to ſpeak at an audience, without an interpreter.

His embaſſy being finiſhed, General Keith returned to Peterſburg and was careſſed by the Czarina more than ever. In the war with the Swedes, he was ſent into Finland; and by an act of generalſhip, he with a body of only 5000 men, with which he attacked the Swedes in flank, gained the victory of Wilmanſtrand, when the enemy had almoſt made ſure of the day; and diſpoſſeſſed them of the iſles of Aland in the Baltic.

After the peace of Abo, in 1743, he was appointed ambaſſador extraordinary to compliment the King of Sweden, on the election of a ſucceſſor to the crown. But the ſplendor, in which he appeared on this occaſion, at Stockholm, reduced his finances ſo much, that, upon his return to Ruſſia, finding it impoſſible to maintain the dignity of a marſhal, to which poſt he was now promoted in the army, with the pay of that country, by accepted of an invitation from the King of Pruſſia, who treated him with the honour due to his birth

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and merit; gave him a penſion over and above his pay, and admitted him his companion in a private tour through Germany, Poland and Hungary, and other places, in diſguiſe. A. D. 1756.

His Pruſſian Majeſty, notwithſtanding his good opinion of the merit, and great confidence in the fidelity of M. Keith, reſolved to be preſent in a battle of ſo deciſive a nature: accordingly his Majeſty ſet out on the 28th of September from his camp at Sedlitz, and took upon himſelf the future conduct of the forces encamped at Auſſig in Bohemia, which conſiſted of no more than 25,000 men. King of Pruſſia takes the command of the army.

The King without delay put the army in motion, as ſoon as he arrived in M. Keith's camp, and reſolved to march in queſt of Count Brown. He formed a vanguard of eight battalions, ten ſquadrons of dragoons, and eight ſquadrons of huſſars: and putting himſelf at the head of this body, his Majeſty proceeded to Tournitz, with orders for the remainder of the army to follow him in two columns; one by the way of Proſcoboc; the other by the way the vanguard had marched. Being arrived at Tournitz, he marched with the vanguard to Welmina, where he arrived an hour before ſun ſet, that ſame day: and could ſee the Auſtrian army with its right wing at Lowoſchutz, and its left extended towards Egra. How he diſpoſed his troops in Bohemia.

Having learned the true ſituation and diſpoſition of the enemy, his Majeſty, that very evening, and in perſon, occupied, with ſix battalions, a hollow and ſome riſing grounds, which command- Occupies the field of battle.

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A. D. 1756. ed Lowoſchutz, and gained ſome other advantages, which he made uſe of next day, to favour his march, and his attack againſt the Auſtrians.

The army arrived at Welmina in the night, and were ordered to form into battalions and ſquadrons behind one another, and to remain in that poſition all night. His Majeſty ſpent the reſt of the night in his cloak before a little fire at the head of his troops, and at day break (on the 1ſt of October) he took his principal general officers, and ſhewed them the ground he had propoſed to occupy with his army; viz. his infantry, which formed the firſt line, were ordered to occupy two high hills and the valley between them: the ſecond line was formed with ſome battalions: and the third line conſiſted of the whole cavalry.

Reconnoitres the ground, and forms his lines.

The Auſtrians, whoſe ſecurity, founded upon a wrong ſuppoſition, that it would be impoſſible for the Pruſſians to form ſuch a deſign upon their camp, had occaſioned their neglect of thoſe heights, now prepared to diſpute thoſe poſts with their Pruſſian viſitors: ſo that notwithſtanding the King loſt no time in ſtrengthening the wings of his army upon thoſe hills; and the ſame diligence and precaution was uſed by the infantry in eſtabliſhing their poſt, at the right; yet the enemy's Pandours, Croatians, and grenadiers, gave the left ſo much trouble from the vineyards, incloſed with ſtone walls, that it was obliged to fall immediately into an engagement,

Great overſight of the Auſtrian General.

Attack the Pruſſians, as they formed.

However the Pruſſians advanced with great reſolution and as great order, as poſſible, till they came

The Pruſſians advance.

came to the declivity of the hills towards the enemy. From which ſtation they could ſee the town of Lowoſchutz filled with infantry; a large battery of 12 cannon in front, and their cavlry formed chequer-wiſe and in a line between Lowoſchutz and the village of Sauſchitz. A. D. 1756.

Not being able to make further diſcovery of the enemy's diſpoſition and ſtrength, on account of a thick fog, which intercepted their ſight, his Majeſty ſent to reconnoitre, and finding that he had judgedrightly of the enemy's diſpoſition; and that his own infantry was in poſſeſſion of the hollow in the manner he had ordered, he reſolved to begin the attack with his cavalry to drive back the enemy's horſe, which ſtood in their front. Accordingly he formed his cavalry before his firſt line of infantry, and attacked the enemy's immediately with ſuch vigour, that they were ſoon broke. But as the enemy had placed a great body of infantry in hollow places and ditches, with ſeveral pieces of cannon, behind the horſe, the Pruſſians found themſelves greatly expoſed to their fire, the further they purſued the advantage of their arms; and were obliged to return and form again under the protection of their infantry and cannon; the Auſtrian cavalry not daring to purſue them. Diſcovers the diſpoſition of the enemy. The action becomes general.

The Pruſſian horſe being formed again, they returned to the charge, with ſuch reſolution and courage, that neither ſixty pieces of cannon, nor a powerful body of infantry lodged in the hollows and ditches to ſupport the cavalry, could prevent them Pruſſian horſe rally.

A. D. 1756. them from totally defeating the whole Auſtrian cavalry, and forcing the infantry from their ſtation.

When this charge was performed, the King ordered his cavalry up to the hill again, and drew them up behind the infantry: and as ſoon as this could be effected, the cannonading ſtill continuing, and the enemy making all poſſible efforts to flank the left of the Pruſſian infantry, the King ordered the battalions of the firſt line to turn to the left: then the battalions of the ſecond line filled up the intervals; ſo that the cavalry was brought to form the ſecond line, and to ſupport the infantry. At the ſame time, by a maſterpiece of generalſhip, the whole left of the infantry, marching on gradually, wheeled about; attacked the town of Lowoſchutz in flank, in ſpite of the cannon and the prodigious infantry of the enemy; ſet fire to the ſuburbs; carried the poſt, and put the whole army to flight.

Victory declares in favour of the Pruſſians.

Marſhal Brown, finding his men were greatly diſpirited by ſuch a ſcene of blood, the number of killed and wounded amounting to 6000 and upwards, and deprived of ſeveral general officers, amongſt whom was General Radicati killed, and Prince Lobkowitz taken priſoner, he returned with his whole force to the other ſide of the Egra, and took his camp at Budin.

King of Pruſſia maintains the field of battle.

The King of Pruſſia kept the field of battle, and eſtabliſhed his head quarters at Lowoſchutz; though his whole army did not exceed 25,000 men; whereas the enemy's conſiſted of 60,000.

The

The battle continued from ſeven in the morning till three in the afternoon. The loſs of the Pruſſians was 2000 men killed and wounded: one general of infantry, two major generals of cavalry, and one colonel of the Gens d'Arms, killed: and according to the Auſtrian account ſome hundreds were made priſoners, amongſt whom were a great many officers. The loſs of the Auſtrians ſlain in battle and made priſoners, is not aſcertained by their general, but the Pruſſian account makes it between ſix and 7000 killed and wounded: 500 were taken priſoners, with five pieces of cannon and three pair of colours. A. D. 1756. The loſs of both ſides.

The loſs of a battle, with ſo great a ſuperiority in numbers; and of ſuch importance at the firſt ſtroke of a war, that, in all probability, was to determine the fate of the King of Pruſſia, or his enemies, required as good a gloſs, as poſſibly could be invented, to palliate the miſcarriage. Accordingly the court of Vienna publiſhed another account of this day's event, under the name of a relation ſent to their Imperial Majeſties by Marſhal Brown. In which the Marſhal ſets out with an erroneous account of the ſtrength of the Pruſſian army, which he makes to conſiſt of 40,000 men. He then tells them, That the battle began at ſeven o'clock on the 1ſt of October, and that the Pruſſian canonade was ſuch, that the like had never been heard: that the Pruſſians finding their efforts vain againſt the firmneſs of the imperial troops, began to throw hot balls into the village of Lowoſchutz, and ſet fire to it: and that the Im- General Brown's favourable account of this battle.

A. D. 1756.

perial infantry finding themſelves between the fire of the village and the enemy's attack, were obliged to quit the eminence on the right of the village to form themſelves in the plain: after which the fire ſlackened, and ceaſed entirely at three o'clock in the afternoon. He further affirmed, That he remained the whole night upon the field of battle, and that his Pruſſian Majeſty had retired behind it.

Remarks on theſe two accounts.

But all this art availed nothing. For, let the Auſtrians boaſt ever ſo much of their advantage in this day's action; it is certain their whole plan was defeated, as well as their army. What did Brown aſſemble that army for? Was it not to ſuccour his Poliſh Majeſty, and to relieve, and, if poſſible, to deliver the Saxons out of their confinement at Pirna? Was he in a capacity to perform that ſervice after the action of this day? What did the King of Pruſſia offer him battle for in Bohemia? Was it not to diſable him from marching to the relief of the Saxons under his blockade? Did this action anſwer that purpoſe? If the King of Pruſſia obtained his purpoſe; and Brown could not accompliſh his errand, on which he was ſent by their Imperial Majeſties; and all owing to the event of this day's action, we may ſafely admit, That however bravely the Auſtrians behaved; how equal ſoever the forces of the belligerants were, and how conſiderable ſoever the loſs of the Pruſſians might be; and whether they maintained the field of battle or not; victory declared in favour of the Pruſſian hero: and,

as

as ſuch, his Pruſſian Majeſty had a right to claim it: and he notified the ſame to all the world: of which we have the following note under his Majeſty's own hand, who diſpatched a meſſenger to the Queen mother with theſe few words: "Octo- "ber 1ſt, This morning I gave battle to the "Auſtrians. Great generalſhip was diſplayed on "both ſides; and the fate of the day was doubt- "ful for ſome hours: but at laſt it pleaſed God "to give us the victory." A. D. 1756.

There being no proſpect of ſurprizing, or of drawing the Auſtrian army to a ſecond engagement, and it being of no ſervice to leave behind him an army, without ſome view of immediate advantage; which chiefly depended upon the reduction of the Saxon forces at Pirna, his Pruſſian Majeſty ordered his victorious troops to return to Saxony, and to join that body of his forces employed in the blockade of the Saxon camp: this additional ſtrength excluded all hopes of relief, by the way of Bohemia: and, their proviſions being exhauſted, the extremity of want forced them, either to attempt an eſcape by ſtratagem, or to lay down their arms and ſurrender themſelves to the King of Pruſſia.

King of Pruſſia's return with his army to Saxony.

Saxon army's diſtreſſed condition.

An eſcape was moſt eligible, could it be contrived with any hopes of ſucceſs. A plan was propoſed for it, and approved of by Marſhal Brown. The ſucceſs depended upon ſecreſy and punctuality in all parties concerned. Marſhal Brown promiſed to favour their deſign, and to cover their flight. He in perſon undertook this

Plan concerted for their eſcape.

A. D. 1756. difficult and important ſervice: and, with a conſiderable body of horſe, he marched from the camp at Budin, to the neighbourhood of Konigſtein [o]; where he met General Nadaſti, who had arrived the day before with 6,000 irregulars; which he poſted in ſuch a manner, as to prevent eight Pruſſian battalions, encamped on that ſide the Elbe, at Lomer, from being joined by the Pruſſians, that were poſted at Schaudau.

Marſhal Brown tries to favour their eſcape.

M. Brown, on the 11th acquainted the King of Poland with his arrival at Litchtendorf near Schaudau; and deſired they would execute their part of the plan propoſed for their eſcape, by marching out the next night. Accordingly, on the 12th at night, the Saxons ſecretly threw a bridge of boats over the Elbe, near Konigſtein: and, under favour of a very dark night, having removed almoſt all their heavy artillery to Konigſtein, they ſtruck their tents, and by ſeven in the morning, the whole Saxon army had paſſed the Elbe unmoleſted and undiſcovered: and the fog was ſo thick, that it was eight before their decampment and eſcape was known at Sedlitz. But had the Auſtrian General, as he ought to have done, reconnoitred the country, through which he was to eſcort theſe fugitives, he would have found, that his Pruſſian Majeſty did not rely ſolely upon the ſtrength, nor vigilance of his blockade. Veldt Marſhal Keith had ſecured all the paſſes, and lined the defiles: ſo that, as ſoon as the Saxon

The Saxons attempt to eſcape.

[o] Upwards of 16 German miles.

advanced

advanced-guard had with much difficulty got about half way up a ſteep mountain, and the other part of them were ſhut up in a narrow plain, over againſt Konigſtein, they were convinced that it was impoſſible for them to proceed, and to force their way through the poſts occupied by the Pruſſians: who now ſurrounded them, without artillery, and without proviſions, on every ſide: and when it was too late, they were convinced that they had been permitted to march into this toil, that they might be taken with leſs hazard and difficulty. A. D. 1756. Stopt in the way.

His Poliſh Majeſty, who remained behind in his caſtle of Konigſtein, to wait the iſſue of this retreat, being informed of the deplorable ſituation of his troops, wrote the following letter to his general the Veldt Marechal Count Ratowſki: —"It is not without extreme ſorrow I under- "ſtand the deplorable ſituation, which a chain of "misfortunes has reſerved for you, the reſt of my "generals, and my whole army: but we muſt "acquieſce in the diſpenſations of providence, "and conſole ourſelves with the rectitude of our "ſentiments and intentions. They would force "me, it ſeems, as you give me to underſtand by "Major General the Baron de Dyherrn, to ſub- "mit to conditions the more ſevere, in proportion "as the circumſtances are become more neceſſi- "tous. I cannot hear them mentioned. I am a "free monarch: ſuch I will live: ſuch I will die: "and I will both live and die with honour. The "fate of my army I leave wholly to your diſcre- "tion. Let your council of war determine whe- Their King's orders for their ſurrender.

A. D. 1756. "ther you muſt ſurrender priſoners of war, fall "by the ſword, or die by famine. May your "reſolutions, if poſſible, be conducted with hu- "manity: whatever they may be, I have no "longer any ſhare in them: and I declare you "ſhall not be anſwerable for aught but one thing, "namely, not to carry arms againſt me or my "allies. I pray God may have you in his holy "keeping. Given at Konigſtein, the 14th of "October 1756. AUGUSTUS Rex."

The army reſolve to capitulate.

By this letter the Saxon general had full and diſcretionary power to ſurrender, or to take ſuch other meaſures, as he and his officers ſhould judge moſt conducive to the preſervation of the ſoldiers; and being informed, that Marſhal Brown, diſpairing of ſucceſs for their relief, and not in a capacity to uſe force, or to keep his ground, had retired towards Bohemia about noon, that ſame day, and that a Pruſſian detachment was following and harraſſing him; the Saxon general and his council of war, came to an immediate reſolution for a capitulation, of which the following is a copy in the terms requeſted by them, and ſettled by the King of Pruſſia; where we find the diſagreeable article, pointed out in the King of Poland's letter to General Rutowſki, obliging the Saxon ſoldiery to enter into the Pruſſian ſervice, to ſerve againſt his Majeſty's allies.

Article I.

THE army of the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, as poſted at the foot of Lilienſtein, ſhall ſurrender to the King of Pruſſia priſoners of war.

Anſ.

Anſ. *If the King will give me that army, 'tis needleſs to make them priſoners of war.* A. D. 1756.

II. The generals, the field-officers, the perſons employed as commiſſaries and purveyors, and all the other officers of the army, ſhall keep their baggage and effects, as well thoſe they have actually with them, as what they may have left in other places; and the ſubaltern officers and ſoldiers ſhall be allowed to keep their cloathing, arms, and knapſacks.

Anſ. *All that can be preſerved or recovered of their baggage ſhall be faithfully reſtored to them.*

III. His Pruſſian Majeſty is chiefly requeſted to cauſe the army to be furniſhed with the neceſſary proviſions and forage; and that he would be pleaſed to give proper orders for this purpoſe.

Anſ. *Granted, and rather to-day than to-morrow.*

IV. The generals, commandants, and all perſons ranking as officers, engage themſelves, in writing, not to bear arms againſt his Majeſty the King of Pruſſia till peace be reſtored; and they ſhall be left at liberty to ſtay in Saxony, or to retire whitherſoever they think proper.

Anſw. *Thoſe that intend to enter into my ſervice muſt from this very moment have liberty to do ſo.*

V. The life-guards and the grenadier-guards ſhall not be included in the firſt article; and his Pruſſian Majeſty will be pleaſed to appoint the place in the Electorate of Saxony, or in the territories depending thereon, where the ſaid two corps ſhall be diſtributed. The field-marſhal Count Rutowſki, as captain of the gre-

A. D. 1756. nadier-guards, the Chevalier de Saxe, in quality of commandant of the life-guards, and all the other officers of thoſe two corps, verbally engage, and even in writing, if deſired, not to make, under any pretext whatever, nor without the approbation of the King of Pruſſia, any change in the quarters that may be aſſigned them.

Anſw. *There is no exception to be made; becauſe it is known that the King of Poland did give orders for that part of his troops, which is in the ſaid kingdom, to join the Ruſſians, and to march for this purpoſe, to the frontiers of Sileſia; and a man muſt be a fool to let troops go, which he holds faſt, to ſee them make head againſt him a ſecond time, and to be obliged to take them priſoners again.*

VI. The general and field officers, and all the officers, ſhall keep their ſwords; but the arms, belts, and cartridges, both of the ſubalterns and ſoldiers, horſe and dragoons, &c. ſhall be carried to the caſtle of Konigſtien, together with the colours, ſtandards, and kettle-drums.

Anſ. *Kettle-drums, ſtandards, and colours, may be carried to Konigſtein; but not the arms: no more than the cannon belonging to the regiments, the warlike ſtores, and the tents. The officers, no doubt, ſhall keep their ſwords; and I hope that ſuch of them, as are of a willing mind, will make uſe of them in my ſervice.*

VII. The ſame thing ſhall take place with regard to the field-artillery and the proviſion-waggons.

Anſ. *Granted.*

VIII. His

VIII. His Pruſſian Majeſty ſhall give aſſurances that no officer or ſoldier ſhall be obliged, againſt his will, to take on in his army; and that, after peace is reſtored, they ſhall all be ſent back to the King of Poland; and, on the other hand, his Poliſh Majeſty may not refuſe diſmiſſion to the generals, and the other officers of his army, who may engage in any other ſervice. A. D. 1756.

Anſ. *Nobody need trouble his head about this. No general ſhall be forced to ſerve againſt his will: that's ſufficient.*

IX. As to what is to be furniſhed to the life-guards and grenadier-guards, if his Pruſſian Majeſty pleaſes, we ſhall agree about the manner of proceeding therein, and ſettle, at the ſame time, with that Monarch the funds, out of which the ſalaries of the generals, officers, and other perſons attendant on the army, are to be paid monthly, according to the eſtimates, that ſhall be drawn up by major-general Zeutſch, commiſſary at war.

Anſ. *It is very reaſonable I ſhould pay thoſe, who will ſerve; and this payment ſhall be made out of the cleareſt receipts of the contributions. As to the generals, they ſhall be treated like men, who have honourably ſerved; and it will be very eaſy to provide for their ſubſiſtence.*

X. His ſaid Majeſty ſhould alſo explain himſelf about the quarters and ſubſiſtence to be granted to the ſeveral regiments of cavalry and infantry, as well as to the engineers and artillery-corps.

Anſ.

A. D. 1756.

Anſ. *I take upon me the maintenance of the army; and it ſhall be paid more regularly than heretofore, on the ſame footing as my own troops.*

XI. The King of Pruſſia will be ſo good as to order when and how the generals, and the whole army, without exception, with the baggage, ſhall file off from the poſt, in which they are at preſent.

Anſw. *This point may be ſettled in a quarter of an hour. One muſt chuſe the moſt commodious road, and the places neareſt at hand for giving them ſubſiſtence.*

XII. His Pruſſian Majeſty will be pleaſed to allow the neceſſary meaſures to be taken for removing and lodging the ſick, that are incapable of following the army, and that they may be properly attended.

Anſ. *Granted.*

XIII. The generals, the field and ſubaltern officers, as alſo the ſoldiers, who have hitherto been made priſoners, or have been left behind, ſhall be included in the preſent capitulation.

Anſ. *Granted.*

Done at Ebenbert, *at the foot of* Lilienſtein. *Signed,* RUTOWSKI.

XIV. [*A ſeparate article.*] I am authoriſed to oblige the army to lay down their arms; but I have no authority to free them from the oath of allegiance they have taken, nor to oblige them to take another. As for all the reſt, it is left to his Pruſſian Majeſty's diſpoſal. Lieutenant-general

Winterfield made me hope this Monarch would have made no difficulty to grant one ſquadron more of the life-guards. His Majeſty will be ſo good as to reſolve about the fortreſs of Konigſtein, where the company of cadèts and the grenadier-guards are at preſent with his Poliſh Majeſty. A. D. 1756.

Done the 16th of Oct. 1756.

Signed, RUTOWSKI.

Anſ. *Konigſtein muſt be a neutral place during the courſe of the preſent war.*

Signed, FREDERICK.

The Saxons, convinced of the bad policy of their court, to draw upon themſelves the vengeance of ſo powerful a neighbour, by their hoſtile intrigues with Ruſſia and Auſtria; the former of which was too far diſtant to promiſe them any ſeaſonable help, and the latter had been already defeated, in their moſt vigorous attempt to ſuccour them under their late blockade, ſubmitted, with leſs objection than expected, to the propoſal of enliſting themſelves under the Pruſſian banner; and they were accordingly received into the pay of his Pruſſian Majeſty; took the oath of fidelity to the conqueror, and were incorporated amongſt the Pruſſian troops. Saxons enliſt under the King of Pruſſia.

With the loſs of his military ſtrength his Poliſh Majeſty alſo loſt that firmneſs and reſolution, ſet forth in his letter, of *dying* rather than yielding to terms unbecoming a free Monarch. From this hour, it may be ſaid, the Elector of Saxony abdicated The King of Poland and family retire from Saxony.

A. D. 1756. abdicated his throne. He and his Queen, with the royal family, content with the appearance of royalty, which the King of Pruſſia ordered they ſhould have, ſuffered themſelves to be diſmiſſed, under a proper guard, and eſcorted to Warſaw in Poland: and Saxony thereby fell under the government of the King of Pruſſia. An event which, as it was the moſt conſiderable for ſtrenthening the King of Pruſſia, could not have been obtained without the utmoſt difficulty and danger, and obliging the Pruſſian Monarch to uſe ſome further means to effect it, than might have been conſiſtent, either with his ſtrength, or ſound policy, had his Poliſh Majeſty ſtood out, and put his foe upon the neceſſity of driving him from his throne and out of his electorate by mere force. Had his army only laid down their arms; had they been diſperſed, or diſbanded by their own Sovereign's authority, it would have greatly embarraſſed the King of Pruſſia, how to compel them to enter into a foreign ſervice, unto whom he now acquired a right by capitulation and the laws of war: and the embarraſſment would have been greatly increaſed by a reſolute continuation of the Elector's adminiſtration of his own government; which the King of Pruſſia would ſcarce have forced out of his hands, when the Saxon army had been diſbanded. But the ruinous conſequences of this capitulation and abdication are ſo apparent in the progreſs of the war, that there is no need of further reflexions; and we ſhall diſmiſs the ſubject with this addition, to what has been already obſerved,

Saxony falls under the government of the King of Pruſſia.

By bad policy.

ſerved, That the French miniſtry endeavoured to caſt the whole blame of this invaſion upon the alliance newly ſigned between Great Britain and Pruſſia, and ſpared no pains to perſuade the Roman Catholic Princes, that their alliance was formed with a particular intention to deſtroy the Romiſh intereſt and religion in Germany. This countenanced the convention, which was now made with the Emperor, and which regulated the number and ſervice of forces to be ſent from France into Germany. The Pruſſian miniſter was ordered to quit Verſailles immediately [P]: and the French King declared his reſolution to maintain the public peace of Europe againſt all, that ſhould attempt to break it; and eſpecially to ſupport the pragmatic ſanction, the treaty of Weſtphalia, and the Romiſh religion.

A. D. 1756.

The uſe made of this by the French.

To propagate a religious war.

A convention with the Emperor.

At home, the repeated accounts of the vigorous efforts made by the French, to carry their point in America, and the notorious neglect or miſmanagement of our colonies; and, at laſt, the account of the loſs of Oſwego, and of its dependences and conſequences, being arrived, his moſt gracious Majeſty, convinced by the abortive enquiries into former miſcarriages and unaccountable loſſes, that it was in vain to endeavour any longer to mend his adminiſtration by ſuch palliatives, as had been recommended to him, reſolved upon ſatisfying his people by removing from his councils ſome, that had rendered themſelves moſt

Domeſtic affairs.

State of the nation.

[P] And the French miniſter withdrew privately from Berlin.

obnoxi-

A. D. 1756. obnoxious to the nation, and calling up to his ſervice and cabinet others, recommended by the unanimous voice of his ſubjects.

The diſcontent of the nation [q] cannot be better expreſſed than in the addreſſes to the King, and in the inſtructions to the repreſentatives in parliament, during their receſs [r]. It was vaſtly increaſed by our additional calamities: and appeared more and more in the uncommon difficulty, with which a ſubſcription, opened at the exchequer for the ſum of 500,000 l. was after many days filled; occaſioned by the little proſpect of having matters mended in the hands of thoſe, who had done ſo little with the immenſe ſums raiſed for the ſervice of the current year; the only ſervice done the nation having been performed by our privateers, which were fitted out with ſurprizing ſpirit, not only by merchants, but by pariſhes and private clubs or ſocieties, who ſeemed to vie with each other in the means to diſtreſs [s] the enemy; and thus turned

[q] Amongſt other tokens of this diſcontent with the miniſterial meaſures, we may rank the refuſal of quarters, in winter, to the Heſſian forces, at the breaking up of their camp; there being no law then to oblige us to quarter foreign troops.

[r] See theſe addreſſes and inſtructions on p. 418, &c. of vol. I.

[s] One remarkable inſtance of the bravery of our privateers has been already given in the affair of the Antigallican; another happened, and about the ſame time, between the Terrible and Vengeance, of which the following is the account wrote by John Withy, third lieutenant of the Terrible.

"On Thurſday, December the 23d, we ſaw a ſail at daylight in the morning, we being then in the lat. of 47° 10′ long.

turned the war, carried on at the public expence, with ſo little ſucceſs, to the advantage of individuals. A. D. 1756.

His

long. 11° 20′. weſt from the Lizard. We immediately gave chaſe to her, and ſhe made all the ſail ſhe could from us; and about twelve at noon we came within gun-ſhot of her. We fired a gun to bring her to, which ſhe returned with her ſtern-chaſe, and hoiſted French colours. She continued firing at us, and we at her, 'till almoſt two o'clock, before we could get up cloſe along ſide of her, when, we firing a broad-ſide into her, ſhe ſtruck, and we found her to be a ſhip from St. Domingo bound for Nantz, laden with ſugar, coffee and indigo. We loſt in this engagement our fourth lieutenant and three men. We put on board her our firſt lieutenant and fifteen men, and were convoying her for Plymouth: but on Monday, December 27, in lat. 48° 30′. long. 6° 30′. from the Lizard, at day-light in the morning, we ſaw two ſail bearing ſouth by eaſt from us, diſtance four leagues: we obſerved the largeſt ſhip to bring the ſmall one to, and ſpeak to her, and in about an hour after we ſaw the large ſhip bearing down for us, the wind being then at ſouth-eaſt. We then hawled up our main-ſail, and laid our mizen-top ſail aback, our prize being too far a-ſtern for her to come up with us. We then cleared ſhip, and got every thing ready for engaging; we likewiſe muſtered all hands, and found we had no more than one hundred and ſixteen, officers, men, and boys, that were able to ſtand to their quarters, the reſt being either dead, or ſick below with a diſtemper called the ſpotted fever, that raged among the ſhip's company. The enemy bore down upon us with Engliſh colours flying, 'till within piſtol-ſhot of us: then ſhe hawled up her courſes, handed her top-gallant ſails, and hoiſted French colours. We had our people at their quarters on the ſtarboard-ſide; but our prize being a heavy laden ſhip, ſhe could not keep in a line with us, but fell to leeward; which the enemy obſerving, took the opportunity to run between her and us, and fired her larboard broad-ſide into our prize, which ſhe returned.

The

A. D. 1756. His Majeſty in the firſt place, to convince his Britiſh ſubjects, that he would rely on their courage and

The enemy then ranged on our larboard quarter, and fired her ſtarboard broadſide into us, which almoſt raked us fore and aft, and killed and wounded a great many of our men. With the way that ſhe had ranged cloſe up along ſide of us, our yard arms were but juſt clear of one another: and as ſoon as we got all our guns to bear upon her, we fired a whole broadſide into her, our guns being all loaded with round and grape-ſhot, which made a very great ſlaughter among them. We both fell cloſe along-ſide of one another, and lay ſo for the ſpace of five or ſix minutes, her fore chains a-breaſt of ours; but ſhe was afraid to board us, and we had not men enough to board her. As ſoon as we had ſheered clear of one another, we exchanged our broadſides, which proved very fatal to us both, for there were a great many killed and wounded on both ſides. But what did us moſt damage in killing our men, was their ſmall arm men in their tops: they had ſixteen men in the main and fore-tops, and eight in the mizen-top, who were conſtantly killing our men, and we had not men to ſend into our tops. We loſt every man we had on the quarter-deck, either killed outright or elſe miſerably wounded, except the captain and two men more; and the captain they ſhot through the body after he had ſtruck. They likewiſe killed and wounded all that were in ſight on the main-deck, but me, and eight or nine men more; and I had a very narrow eſcape, for a muſket-ball grazed my right cheek, and gave me a ſlight wound; beſides which, I was blown up with a powder flaſk. So that in this ſhort, but bloody engagement, we had upwards of fifty men killed outright, and about forty wounded, and never an officer on board the ſhip, but myſelf, but what was killed outright, or dying of their wounds. The French uſed us very ill, ſtripping us of every thing, and ſome of our people they left almoſt naked. They turned our firſt lieutenant, and all our people, down in a cloſe confined place forward, the firſt night that we came on board, where twenty-ſeven of them were ſtifled before

and zeal for the defence of his perſon and realm, ordered his Electoral troops to embark for Germany; and admitted the expediency of a national and well-regulated militia, in caſe of danger from an invaſion: and then proceeded, as far, as he in prudence thought adviſeable, at preſent, to make ſuch alterations in his miniſtry, as might pleaſe his people. He began with a new commiſſion for executing the office of treaſurer of his Majeſty's exchequer; by which the Duke of Newcaſtle, the firſt Lord of the treaſury, was obliged to make way for his Grace William, Duke of Devonſhire [t], and the Right Hon. Henry Bilſon Legge was made chancellor of the exchequer, inſtead of Sir George Little-

A. D. 1756.

Hanoverian troops ſent away.

Change in the miniſtry begun.

before morning; and ſeveral were hawled out for dead, but the air brought them to life again; and a great many of them died of their wounds on board the Terrible, for want of care being taken of them, which was out of our doctor's power to do, the enemy having taken his inſtruments and medicines from him. Several that were wounded they heaved overboard alive. The firſt and third captains of the Frenchman were killed in the engagement, with their captain of marines and ſixty men outright, and ſeventy wounded, ſeveral of whom died of their wounds, while we were on board. The frigate is called the Vengeance, belonging to St. Malo: mounted 34 guns nine and twelve pounders, and 350 men when we engaged.

"P. S. By an account I have had from our lieutenant of marines that was in St. Malo's hoſpital, the French all died of their wounds before he came to Dinant."

[t] Nov. 16. The King appointed his Grace William, Duke of Devonſhire, the Right Hon. Henry Bilſon Legge, Robert Nugent, Eſq; the Hon. William Ponſonby, commonly called Lord Duncannon, and the Hon. James Grenville, to be commiſ-

A. D. 1756. Littleton, Bart. By another commiſſion for the marine department, the place of the Lord Anſon, firſt Lord of the admiralty, was filled by the Right Hon. Richard, Earl Temple [u]: The Right Hon. George Grenville was made treaſurer of the Navy.

Parliament meets. On the ſecond day of December his Majeſty, thus intentioned, and, in part, diſentangled from a miniſtry, to whoſe miſmanagement the preſent anxieties, diſquietudes and misfortunes were generally aſcribed, met his parliament, and, by a gracious ſpeech from the throne, in a great meaſure obviated all applications, which the repreſentatives of the people had been inſtructed to make by their conſtituents.

His Majeſty's ſpeech.

His Majeſty told his parliament, That he had called them together in a conjuncture, which highly required their deliberation, advice and aſſiſtance: and that he truſted, under the guidance of Divine Providence, that union and firmneſs in his affectionate people, would carry him, with honour, through all difficulties, and finally

commiſſioners for executing the office of treaſurer of his Majeſty's exchequer, in the room of the Duke of Newcaſtle, Sir George Littleton, Bart. Piercy Wyndham Obrien, and Henry Furneſe, Eſqrs.

[u] The King appointed the Right Hon. Richard, Earl Temple, the Hon. Edward Boſcawen, Temple Weſt, and John Pitt, Eſqrs. George Hay, doctor of laws, Thomas Orby Hunter, and Gilbert Elliot, Eſqrs. to be commiſſioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the dominions thereunto belonging.

vindi-

vindicate the dignity of his crown, and its undubitable rights, againſt the antient enemy of theſe kingdoms. He aſſured them that the ſuccour and preſervation of America could not but conſtitute a main object of his attention and ſolicitude: and that the growing dangers, to which our colonies might ſtand expoſed, from our late loſſes [w] in thoſe parts, demanded reſolutions of vigour and diſpatch. He added, That an adequate and firm defence at home, had poſſeſſed the chief place in his thoughts, and that in this view he had nothing ſo much at heart, as that no ground of diſſatisfaction might remain in his people. Therefore he recommended to the care and diligence of his parliament, the framing a national militia, planned and regulated, with equal regard to the juſt rights of his crown and people, as what in time might become one good reſource to that end, in caſe of general danger. He obſerved, That the unnatural union of councils abroad [x]; and the calamities, which in conſequence of this unhappy conjunction, might, by the irruptions of foreign armies into the Empire, ſhake its conſtitution, overturn its ſyſtem and threaten oppreſſion to the proteſtant intereſt there; and that ſuch events muſt ſenſibly affect the minds of this nation, and had already fixed the eyes of Europe on this new and dangerous criſis. He then informed them, That he had ordered his A. D. 1756.

[w] Of Oſwego, ſee page 476, &c. vol. I.

[x] In the alliance between Auſtria and France.

A. D. 1756. Electoral troops home to his German dominions; and declared, That he would with pleaſure rely on the ſpirit and zeal of his Britiſh ſubjects for the defence of his perſon and realm. He recommended more vigorous efforts in the proſecution of the war, though attended with large expence, to a leſs effectual, and therefore leſs frugal plan of war. Thus ſaid he, "I have placed before you the dangers and neceſſities of the public: it will be your care to lay the burdens you may judge unavoidable, in ſuch a manner, as will leaſt diſtreſs and exhauſt my people." And concluded with theſe remarkable words, "Unproſperous "events of war in the Mediterranean, have drawn "from my ſubjects ſignal proofs[y], how dear-"ly they tender my honour and that of my "crown; and they cannot, on my part, fail to "meet with juſt returns of unwearied care and "unceaſing endeavours, for the glory, proſperity "and happineſs of my people."

Satisfactory. This ſpeech, (though it manifeſtly ſhewed the aſcendency of ſome of the old leaven about the throne, by ſoliciting a parliamentary approbation of ſuch meaſures, as his Majeſty hereafter ſhould acquaint them would be neceſſary, to ſupport his electoral dominions, and our allies in Germany, againſt the effects of that unnatural union of councils at Vienna and Verſailles, and againſt the irruption of French, Ruſſian, or any other foreign armies into the Empire, to ſhake its conſtitution,

[y] In their addreſſes above recited. See p. 418, &c. Vol. I.

to

to overturn its ſyſtem, and to oppreſs the proteſtant intereſt) gave more public ſatisfaction than heretofore; becauſe therein were promiſed ſeveral great and national advantages; and his Majeſty ſeemed willing to throw himſelf entirely into the arms of his Britiſh ſubjects. A. D. 1756.

The Houſe of Commons addreſſed his Majeſty on this ſpeech, with more unanimity, and, indeed with more freedom of expreſſion, than had been known for ſome years. After tendering their thanks for his gracious ſpeech, they expreſſed how far they were excited by duty, and warmed with gratitude, to acknowledge from their hearts the paternal care and royal condeſcenſion of his Majeſty, in pointing out from the throne, ſuch a plan of force for our defence, as beſt tended to the ſatisfaction of the people, and in particular a well modelled national militia, as one proper ſecurity for his Majeſty's perſon and realm. They profeſſed, that in their preſent arduous circumſtances, they next after Divine Providence, relied on his Majeſty's wiſdom and magnanimity; and put him in mind of the Britiſh efforts, in times paſt, under Princes, whoſe firſt glory was to found the ſtrength of their government in the contentment and harmony of their ſubjects. They promiſed, that being thus united and thus animated, their Houſe would chearfully ſupport his Majeſty through all difficulties, and vindicate, to the utmoſt, the dignity of his crown and its undubitable rights, againſt the ancient enemy of theſe kingdoms: and they truſted that his Ma- Commons addreſs.

A. D. 1756. jeſty, thus ſtrengthened at home, would find himſelf rever'd abroad, and in a condition to ſupport that weight and conſideration in Europe, which belong to a King of Great Britain; notwithſtanding the unnatural and unhappy union of councils, which had formed, on the continent, ſo new and dangerous a criſis. They declared their concern at the ſad events of war in the Mediterranean and in America: and aſſured his Majeſty, that they would take thoſe affecting matters into their moſt ſerious conſideration, not imputing blame to any unheard: and that they would, with all confidence, alacrity and diſpatch, ſecond his Majeſty's royal care for the ſpeedy ſuccour and preſervation of America, under the growing dangers, to which thoſe invaluable poſſeſſions ſtood expoſed.

Lords addreſs. The Houſe of Peers addreſſed his Majeſty in much the ſame profeſſions, declarations, promiſes and aſſurances; but by the addition of thanks for his Majeſty's condeſcenſion to ſend away his electoral troops, there aroſe a warm oppoſition, to that clauſe only, by the Lords, who had oppoſed the bringing thoſe forces into England.

Mr. PITT made ſecretary of ſtate. This unanimity between the King and parliament was followed by another token of his Majeſty's regard for his people. On the fourth of December, the third day of the ſeſſion of parliament, the ſeals were given to the Right Hon. WILLIAM PITT, Eſq; who, the delight of the nation, ſucceeded to the office of ſecretary of ſtate, in the place of Mr. Fox.

On

The Right Hon.ble WILLIAM PITT, Esq.r

On this occaſion every advocate for their country looked with pleaſure towards the throne: every friend of liberty exulted with joy, to ſee the happy day, when, they thought Majeſty had diſcovered the cloven foot; was come to a reſolution to emancipate himſelf from thoſe, who had brought upon him diſhonour, diſquietude and misfortunes; and had been graciouſly pleaſed to ſignify his royal intention to rely upon the deliberation, advice and aſſiſtance, not of a FACTION, but of a parliament inſpired by a people, with unanimity and firmneſs, who had never failed to carry their Princes through all difficulties with honour, when Majeſty had relied on their aſſiſtance, and not forfeited their confidence by miſapplication of their money, or in purſuit of meaſures, which threatned their liberty, and debaſed their credit. A people deſcended from that race of men, which in all ages had diſtinguiſhed themſelves for their loyalty and courage: who once won the French crown in the field of battle, and brought their King to grace the triumph of our Prince: who more than once, in our own memory, reduced them to ſue for peace; and who vindicated the dignity of the Britiſh crown and its indubitable rights, againſt the ancient and natural enemy of this realm, when France was in a much better capacity for invading and conquering our territories. A. D. 1756. Remarks on this ſpeech, &c.

How conſpicuous was the diſquietude, which corroded the royal mind, at the gloomy proſpect of his American colonies? when he diſcovered the little regard paid to their ſecurity, and the ill-

A. D. 1756. concerted means of carrying thoſe faint efforts into execution; which the clamours of the people, and the neceſſity of keeping up appearances had obliged his late miniſters to make. What could he do more than declare his own intention, and point out the danger and means of defence?

How manifeſt does it appear in this ſpeech, that Majeſty had been laid under a reſtraint; and that his wiſdom, in providing an adequate and firm defence for this kingdom, had not been permitted to exert itſelf; when he takes the firſt opportunity to recommend to his parliament, the forming a national militia; notwithſtanding the unwearied labour, and the many baſe inſinuations, with which the faction, that lately ſurrounded the throne, endeavoured to diſſuade him from truſting his perſon and kingdom to the courage and fidelity of his Britiſh ſubjects.

On former occaſions this militia ſcheme had been treated in the great aſſembly of the nation, not with that regard, as its utility and importance deſerved. We now ſhall ſoon find that this countenance, given to it by his ſacred Majeſty, diſpelled that cloud of miſrepreſentations, in which it had ſeveral times miſcarried: and brought forth that natural ſtrength of our conſtitution, which, by becoming one of the greateſt ſecurities to this kingdom, diſtinguiſhed the reign of George II. and this parliament for their wiſdom and goodneſs.

It was never known that a Britiſh monarch, who endeavoured to gain the confidence of his people,

was

was deceived in his expectations of being revered at home, and enabled to support that weight and conſideration in Europe, which belong to a King of a powerful, free and independent nation: but it is the little regard ſome Princes have to their promiſes, which gains themſelves ſo little regard; ſearch the annals of all ſtates, and it will be found, That it is generally from thoſe, with whom they have contemptuouſly broken their faith, that Princes have met with the greateſt oppoſition and miſchief. A. D. 1756.

How different was our ſituation at this juncture? The people were diſatisfied with the conduct of the miniſtry: his Majeſty in a great meaſure removed that cauſe of complaint. They implored juſtice on the cauſe of their misfortunes and loſſes: his Majeſty promiſed [z], "That he "would not fail to do juſtice upon any perſon "found wanting in their duty:" They petitioned for a national militia, and the ſpeedy exportation of foreign forces out of this kingdom: his Majeſty has recommended the former to his parliament; and given orders for the return of his electoral troops to his German dominions; being convinced that the ſtability of his throne, and the ſtrength of his ſceptre, depend upon the ſpirit and zeal of his Britiſh ſubjects. Remarks on the King's conduct.

The new miniſter's elevation gave ſo general a ſatisfaction, that confiding in his abilities and integrity, the country gentlemen, in parliament, Country gentlemen join the new miniſter in parliament.

[z] See his Majeſty's anſwer to the city of London's addreſs.

who

A. D. 1756. who had been a watch and remora to the proceedings of the court under former adminiſtrations, united heartily with the Right Hon. William PITT, Eſq; in every meaſure to ſtrengthen the hands of government. By this means every motion, he made in parliament, was carried without oppoſition. In the mean time, the miniſter did every thing poſſible to confirm the opinion conceived of him. He applied diligently both to prevent any attempts upon this iſland, and to annoy the enemy, and to find them employment enough to defend their own coaſts: Scotland had always been their chief expectation to create trouble within ourſelves. This had been frequently done by ſpiriting up and aſſiſting the clans, whoſe chiefs were proſcribed for their connections with the exiled family of STUART, and whoſe connections continued, rather through neceſſity, and want of the means of reconciliation with their lawful Sovereign, than any real affection for the Pretender, as had occaſionally been proved by the fidelity of ſome of them, that ſerved under Engliſh commiſſions in the laſt war. It was therefore propoſed to his Majeſty, to admit and to invite, by proper encouragements, the ſuſpected part of the Scotch Highlanders into his pay. By this adoption his Majeſty recovered a reſpectable body of ſubjects, who for many years had withdrawn themſelves from his protection, and had been ready, upon all occaſions, to join with, or to favour the deſigns of France upon England. By this expedient the ſeeds of rebellion were improved into the ſervice

Conduct of the new miniſter.

His attention to prevent Scotch rebellions.

Advantages ariſing therefrom.

of

of our country: and thoſe very Highlanders, that uſed to be a terror on former occaſions, and required an army to be always kept in readineſs, to prevent their riſing, in favour of a foreign power, and had often defeated our beſt concerted meaſures againſt France, by their invaſion of England; were now converted into regular and national forces, and approved themſelves to be both brave and faithful, in every ſervice of Great Britain, wherever they were commanded. Thus France had nothing to hope for in Scotland, by way of diverſion to our vigorous meaſures. Where there could be found no men to favour a deſcent, it was impracticable for an enemy to invade us through the deſolate[a] highlands of North Britain: and thus England was delivered from an extraordinary expence of a northern army, and enabled to employ thoſe troops, whoſe ſervice the Highlanders (that were aforetimes our terror) ſupplied in diſtant climes, in the execution of ſuch plans, as we ſhall find ruined our enemies, and could not have been performed without ſuch an additional force. As by this means a door was opened for repentance; ſo they who had been forced to live in exile, were now engaged, by the ſtrongeſt ties of gratitude and intereſt, to ſupport the preſent family.

A. D. 1756.

Deſtroys the French intereſt in Scotland.

Having carried this important point for preſerving the peace and tranquility of the north; the miniſter joined heartily in the eſtabliſhment of

Heartily favours the eſtabliſhment of a militia.

[a] By a moderate computation there have been raiſed in this country 20,000 men for the land ſervice: and by the impreſs bills, not leſs than 10,000 able bodied ſeamen.

A. D. 1756. a regular and well-disciplined militia, and in several other bills, which passed into laws during this session of parliament, for the internal defence of the nation, the more effectual annoyance of our enemies, and for retrieving our credit in Europe, and our misfortunes in America. Our fears of an invasion were immediately dissipated: our fleets were no longer kept to guard our ports: expeditions were preparing to insult the enemy's coasts; and, instead of consuming the vast sums of money, which had been thrown away, in mock campaigns, at Cobham, Byfleet and other parts of this island, last summer, and in the importation of foreign troops; due attention was paid to the motions of France on the Continent, and to the danger of our allies and interest in Germany; so far as might be done without prejudice to the American war, which was kept always as the chief point in view by the minister; all other measures being made subservient to that great and important object.

A change of measures.

His Majesty mindful of his royal word, that justice should be done upon any person found wanting in their duty, a message was sent to the Commons concerning the imprisonment of Adm. Byng, and the proceedings against him; who otherwise, perhaps, might have endeavoured to avail himself of his privilege, as a member of parliament. In consequence of which, the House being satisfied with the proceedings of the court, the

Message to the parliament about Admiral Byng.

the admiral was brought to his trial and suffered [b]. A. D. 1756.

The parliament entred immediately upon measures to strengthen the hands of government. The land forces were augmented from 35,000 to 49,749 effective men, including 4008 invalids. The seamen were settled at 55,000 men, including 11,419 marines; with sufficient provision [c] for their maintenance. His Majesty was also enabled to perform his agreement with, and to provide for his Hessian and Hanoverian forces [d]. Besides which, they granted ample sums for garrisons: Men for the land and sea service.

[b] See p. 442 to 458, Vol. I.

[c] Viz. 2,860,000 l. for the sea service, granted on December 16: and 1,213,746 l. 3 s. 10 d. for the land service, granted 23 December 1756.

[d] For the HESSIAN Troops.

	£.	s.	d.
Dec. 23, For 6544 foot with the general and staff-officers and train of artillery, from Dec. 25, 1756, to Feb. 24 both inclusive	23,335	17	11
Feb. 24. For 6544 foot, &c. from Feb. 25, to April 26 ——— ———	22,959	10	2
April 25. For 6544 foot, &c. from April 27, to May 27, 31 days —— ——	11,667	18	11
May 10. For the German pay for 6,600 foot, &c. from May 28 to Dec. 24 ——	46,597	9	0
——For the German pay for 1,400 horse, &c. from April 27 to December 24 ——	25,078	0	0
——For the German pay for 3,300 foot, &c. from April 22 to December 24 ——	27,273	14	0
——For the German pay for 700 horse, &c. from August 23 to December 24 ——	6,119	9	6
——For the remount and levy money for 700 horse and 3,300 foot —— ——	37,296	17	6

——For

A. D. 1756. ſons: for the ordnance: for levying new regiments: for forming and maintaining an army of obſervation in Germany, and fulfilling his Majeſty's engagements with the King of Pruſſia: for the ſupport of the Britiſh forts on the coaſt of Africa: for the relief of South Carolina and Virginia; the ſupport of Nova Scotia and Georgia: for enabling the Eaſt India company to keep a military force in their ſettlements[e]: and for ſeveral other uſes and contin-

	£.	s.	d.
——For making good his Majeſty's engagement with the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſtle	60,766	1	0
——For defraying the charge of an advanced ſubſidy to ditto —— ——	26,007	5	6
——For the remaining moiety of the remount money for 1400 horſe ————	13,475	0	0
For HANOVERIAN Troops.			
Dec. 23. For 8,605 foot, with the general and ſtaff-officers, and train of artillery, from Dec. 25, 1756, to Feb. 25, 1757 —	33,025	1	6
Feb. 24. For 5,726 foot, &c. from Feb. 25, 1757, to March 26 —— —— —	9,494	3	9
March 29. For defraying the expences of the march of the Hanover troops, in pay of Great Britain, both at their coming here, and their return back to Germany — —	31,959	13	6
[e] Jan. 17, 1757. For the ordinary of the navy, including half-pay to ſea officers ——	223,939	7	7
March 7. Towards the buildings, re-buildings, and repairs of his Majeſty's navy —	200,000	0	0
March 29. Towards paying off the debt of the navy —— —— — —	200,000	0	0
Dec. 23, 1756. For forces and garriſons in the plantations and Gibraltar, and for proviſions for the garriſons in Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Gibraltar, and Providence	423,963	16	10

——For

contingencies: which ſupplies, in the whole, amounted to 8,350,325 l. 9 s. 3 d. for the payment of

A. D. 1756. Supplies granted.

	£.	s.	d.
——For the pay of the general and ſtaff-officers, and officers of the hoſpital — —	47,060	15	10
Jan. 17. For the charge of the office of ordnance for land-ſervice for 1757 ——	161,557	1	10
Jan. 20. For defraying the exceedings of ditto in 1756, not provided for — ———	228,196	4	7
Feb. 10. For defraying the charge of two Highland battalions of foot ———	46,022	5	0
March 7. For defraying the charge of four regiments of foot on the Iriſh eſtabliſhment, ſerving in North America and the Eaſt Indies, and augmenting O Farrel's regiment of foot —— —— —	48,926	2	6
——For the reduced officers of the land forces and marines —— —— —	33,000	0	0
Mar. 10. For defraying the remainder of the exceedings of the office of ordnance for land ſervice for 1756 ——— ——	47,869	2	4
April 4. For defraying the extra expences of the land forces in 1756 —— ——	111,570	19	7
Feb. 10. For defraying the charges of the civil eſtabliſhment of Georgia, and other incidental expences, from June 24, 1756, to June 24, 1757. — ——	3,557	10	0
Feb. 21. For aſſiſting his Majeſty in forming and maintaining an army for the defence of his Electoral dominions and thoſe of his allies, and to enable his Majeſty to fulfill his engagements with the King of Pruſſia	200,000	0	0
—— For ſupporting Nova Scotia for 1757, upon account ——— ——	28,789	5	1
—— For defraying the expences incurred by ſupporting that ſettlement in 1755 ——	15,381	4	0
May 19. For defraying the extraordinary expences of the war in 1757 ——	1,000,000	0	0

——For

A. D. 1756.

of which ſum there were funds eſtabliſhed to the amount of 8,689,051 l. 19 s. 7 d. which was an overplus of 338,726 l. 10 s. 4 d. to prevent any deficiency that might happen in the guinea lottery, this year, firſt attempted; or in any other branch of the ways and means.

Heſſians quartered by act of parliament.

All the neceſſary buſineſs was diſpatched with equal zeal and expedition. The Heſſian troops having been denied winter quarters by the publicans, who could not be compelled to receive them by law; and they having ſuffered extremely by the ſeverity of the winter; one of the firſt cares of the parliament was to prepare a bill to make proviſion for quartering foreign forces, which paſt without oppoſition, and was ſigned by commiſſion on the 17th of December 1756. By this act theſe foreign troops were, in every reſpect, to be treated, as the native troops of this kingdom, till their return [f].

Bills paſſed for the marine ſervice.

Two bills were at the ſame time brought into the Houſe of Commons: the one for regulating

	£.	s.	d.
——For the relief of his Majeſty's ſubjects in North and South Carolina and Virginia, in recompence for ſervices, on account —	50,000	0	0
——To the Eaſt India company to enable them to keep a military force in their ſettlements in the Eaſt Indies, in lieu of a battalion of his Majeſty's troops withdrawn from thence —— — ——	20,000	0	0
——For ſupporting the Britiſh forts, &c. on the coaſt of Africa —— ——	10,000	0	0

[f] A pardon was granted to deſerters in the land ſervice, on condition, they ſhould return before the laſt day of January 1757, by proclamation, dated December 31, 1757.

the marine forces while a-ſhore; which differed from the mutiny act only in giving the Lords of the Admiralty power to grant commiſſions for holding general courts martial, and to do every thing, and in the ſame manner, as his Majeſty is empowered to do by the uſual mutiny bill. The other was for the more ſpeedy and effectual recruiting his Majeſty's land forces and marines, whereby juſtices of the peace, commiſſioners of land tax, magiſtrates of corporations and boroughs were inveſted with a power to meet, under certain directions from the war office, in their reſpective diviſions; and at their meetings to *enliſt* volunteers for the land ſervice, on or before the 1ſt of May, with a bounty of three pounds to be paid by the receiver general or collector of the land tax; and on condition of being diſcharged at the end of three years, if the war ſhould then be ended, otherwiſe at the end of the war: and to *impreſs* into the ſaid ſervice, all able bodied idle and diſorderly perſons, who did not exerciſe and induſtriouſly follow ſome lawful occupation, or had not ſubſiſtence ſufficient to maintain themſelves: for whom they were alſo empowered to ſearch, &c.[g] And it ordained that all men thus apprehended, adjudged within the deſcription of the act, and approved by the military officer in attendance, ſhould be delivered to that officer, who ſhould pay 20s. for each unmarried man, and 40s. for a man with a wife or family, to be applied to the uſe of the

A. D. 1756.

[g] See the clauſe on p. 218. Vol. I.

A. D. 1756. pariſh; provided there was no informer, who was intitled to 10s. of the money. The act further ordained, That they ſhould not impreſs any man troubled with a rupture or any other bodily infirmity; nor a reputed papiſt, nor one under the ſize of five feet four inches tall, nor under the age of 17, nor above the age of 45, nor any one qualified to vote for a member of parliament: and that no man thus impreſſed ſhould be intitled to his diſcharge till he had ſerved five years, or till the end of the war. It was further provided, That no private ſoldier enliſted under this act, might during the time he ſhould remain in Great Britain, be diſcharged without the conſent of the colonel or field officer commanding the regiment; or, if a marine, without the conſent of the admiralty; the officer diſcharging him in any other manner, to be caſhiered.

Remarks on theſe acts. Theſe acts paſt without oppoſition; though at a time when there might not have been the like neceſſity for a powerful augmentation of our forces, nor an equal opinion of the miniſter's love for his country, the power given, at large, to the ſeveral denominations of men, in this commiſſion, without diſtinction, or regard to their abilities and private characters, to impreſs their fellow ſubjects, would have met with a ſtrenuous and reaſonable oppoſition; as it put the liberty of the ſubject, ſome times, and in ſome places, in the power of a worthleſs, over-bearing and ſelf-intereſted magiſtrate.

For preſſing.

The



GENERAL TOWNSHEND.

A. D. 1756.

For the militia.

The bill for regulating the militia, was mentioned ſo early in this ſeſſion of parliament, as on the 4th day of December, by Colonel GEORGE, (now General) TOWNSEND, eldeſt ſon of the Lord Viſcount Townſend, whoſe patriotic ſpirit could never ſhine with greater luſtre than in his unwearied and diſintereſted endeavours to plan, and to carry this conſtitutional act through the Houſe, under the auſpices and aid of the King's recommendation, againſt that natural averſion to militia forces, which ſtill ſubſiſted amongſt ſome men in power, and of great influence in both houſes of parliament; and whoſe military abilities and conduct will give us frequent occaſion to mention him with honour to his country. But the many difficulties, which the gentlemen charged with its formation had to encounter, and the competitions of intereſts they had to reconcile, drove its firſt reading off till the 26th of January: and, after mature deliberation, and ſeveral alterations to ſatisfy the moſt cinic oppoſition, this bill ſo well conſidered, and recommended from the throne itſelf, underwent diverſe material amendments, before it was fit for the royal aſſent. The moſt diſagreeable alteration was the reduction of the number of men to one half[h] propoſed by the Houſe of Commons. This occaſioned ſome warm debates in the lower houſe: but after ſeveral conferences, the patriotic members having been deprived of the aſſiſtance of Mr. PITT, who had been

[h] Viz. to 32,340 men, for England and Wales.

A. D. 1756. forced to reſign the ſeals, gave way, rather than furniſh the oppoſition with a plauſible pretence to throw the bill out. To which reſtrictions and alterations we may impute thoſe imperfections, that, in many particulars, have crampt the due execution of the militia act; which paſt the royal aſſent on the 28th of June[1].

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[1] *An abridgment of the act for better ordering the militia forces in the ſeveral counties of that part of Great Britain called England, paſſed* 28 *June* 1757.

WHereas a well ordered and well-diſciplined militia is eſſentially neceſſary to the ſafety, peace, and proſperity of this kingdom.

Be it enacted, That from the 1ſt of May 1757, the lieutenants of counties ſhall arm and array proper perſons; and the lieutenants ſhall appoint their deputy lieutenants, and give commiſſions to lieutenant colonels, majors, and other officers, whoſe names ſhall within a month, be certified to the king.

The lieutenant of every county ſhall have the chief command of the militia of that county.

In each county ſhall be appointed twenty or more deputy lieutenants, if ſo many can be found qualified, each of whom ſhall poſſeſs 400 pounds a year, in freehold, copyhold, cuſtomary eſtate for life, or an eſtate for ſome long term of years, determinable upon lives, or ſhall be heir apparent of a poſſeſſion of 800l. a year. A lieutenant colonel, or major, ſhall be poſſeſſed of 300 a year, or heir apparent to 600. A captain ſhall poſſeſs 200 a year, or be heir to 400, or to be the ſon of one who poſſeſſes, or at his death did poſſeſs 600 a year. A lieutenant ſhall poſſeſs 100 a year, or be the ſon of one who poſſeſſes or at his death did poſſeſs 200. An enſign ſhall poſſeſs 50 pounds, or be the ſon of one who poſſeſſes or at the time of his death did poſſeſs 100. One moiety of the eſtate in all theſe caſes, lying within the county.

In

A bill of ſuch conſequence to the liberty of the ſubject againſt the practices of a miniſterial power, and A. D. [1756.

In counties where twenty deputy lieutenants with proper qualifications cannot be found, it ſhall be ſufficient to appoint ſo many as can be found.

A right to the immediate reverſion of an eſtate leaſed out for lives on a reſerved rent, producing to the leſſee the clear yearly rent of 300 pounds, ſhall be conſidered as equivalent to an eſtate of 100 pounds a year, and ſo in proportion.

An enſign or lieutenant may be promoted to be a captain; and a captain or major may be promoted to be a lieutenant-colonel, on extraordinary occaſions, on account of merit.

The King may diſplace any deputy-lieutenant or officer, and the lieutenants ſhall appoint others in their ſtead.

Every deputy or officer ſhall give in his qualification to the clerk of the peace, and take the oaths to the government, within ſix months after he ſhall begin to act, on penalty of 200 l. on deputy lieutenants, and all above the degree of captain; and 100 l. on captains and thoſe under.

Peers are exempted from ſerving by themſelves or ſubſtitutes; but they and heirs apparent of peers, may be appointed deputy lieutenants, or commiſſion officers, and their qualifications need not to be left with the clerk of the peace; but on taking the oaths, &c. they may act without being otherwiſe qualified.

A commiſſion in the militia ſhall not vacate a ſeat in parliament.

At the end of every four years a number of officers ſhall be diſcharged equal to the number of thoſe, who, duly qualified, ſhall ſollicit for admiſſion.

To each regiment and adjutant ſhall be appointed, who has ſerved in the regular forces, in which he ſhall ſtill retain his rank; and to every company of the militia, ſhall be appointed two or more ſerjeants (in the proportion of one ſerjeant to twenty private men) out of the regular forces, who ſhall be intitled to the hoſpital of Chelſea. And ſerjeants appointed

A. D. 1756. and carried with ſo much reſolution, may be looked upon with ſurprize. But when we conſider the popularity

from that hoſpital ſhall be re-admitted on producing certificates of good behaviour.

No perſons ſelling liquors by retail ſhall be capable of being a ſerjeant of the militia.

The number of private men ſerving in the militia ſhall be; for

Bedfordſhire	400	Nottingham county and town	480
Berkſhire	560	Oxfordſhire	560
Bucks	560	Rutlandſhire	120
Cambridgſhire	480	Salop	640
Cheſter and Cheſter county	560	Somerſetſhire	840
Cornwall	640	Southampton county and town	960
Cumberland	320	Staffordſhire and Litchfield	560
Derbyſhire	560	Suffolk	960
Devonſhire and Exon city	1600	Surry	800
Dorſetſhire and Poole	540	Suſſex	800
Durham	400	Warwick county and Coventry	640
Eſſex	960	Weſtmoreland	240
Glouceſterſhire, Glouceſter city, and Briſtol	960	Worceſter county and city	560
Hereford	480	Wilts	800
Hertford	560	York city and Weſt Riding	1240
Huntingdon	320	York North Riding	720
Kent and Canterbury city	960	—Eaſt Riding and Hull	400
Lancaſhire	800	Angleſea	80
Leiceſterſhire	560	Brecknock	160
Lincoln county and city	1200	Cardigan	120
Tower Hamlets	1160	Caermarthen county and town	200
Middleſex, reſt of	1600	Carnarvon	80
Monmouthſhire	240		
Norfolk and Norwich	960		
Northamptonſhire	640		
Northumberland, Newcaſtle on Tyne and Berwick	560		

Denbigh

popularity of the object, and the immediate exigencies of the ſtate at this critical conjuncture, it appears A. D. 1756.

Denbigh	280	Montgomery	240
Flintſhire	120	Pembrokeſhire and Haverford-W	160
Glamorganſhire	360	Zadnorſhire	120
Merionethſhire	80		

There ſhall be no more than one captain, one lieutenant, and one enſign, to 80 private men.

Where the proportion of men directed by this act to be raiſed in any county ſhall be judged by the lieutenant to be too large, the privy-council, on application, may regulate it.

The lieutenant of each county with two deputy lieutenants, or three or more deputy lieutenants in the abſence of the lieutenant, ſhall meet on the 12th of July 1757, and on the firſt thurſday in June, in every ſubſequent year, and require the head conſtables to deliver in a liſt of all the men between the age of 18 and 50, in their ſeveral diſtricts, except peers, officers of the militia, officers of the regular forces or garriſons, members of either univerſity, clergymen, teachers of ſeparate meetings, peace and pariſh officers, articled clerks, and apprentices, and ſeamen, noting in the liſt the men labouring under any bodily infirmity.

Every deputy conſtable, or other petty officer, ſhall tranſmit to the head conſtable the liſt of his diviſion, having firſt affixed it to the door of the church or chapel for one Sunday.

On the day appointed for receiving theſe liſts, the lieutenants and deputy lieutenants ſhall ſettle the number to be taken from each hundred, or diviſion of the county. They ſhall then ſubdivide themſelves, and three or more deputies, or two deputies with one juſtice of the peace; or one deputy with two juſtices, ſhall meet within a month in every ſubdiviſion, to hear the complaint of thoſe, that think themſelves entitled to exemption; and upon any juſt cauſe ſhall correct the liſts. They ſhall then ſettle the number to be raiſed in each pariſh, and chuſe the individuals by lot; and within three weeks afterwards

A. D. 1756. appears that fear was the prevailing motive, which deterred the greateſt ſticklers and the moſt factious opponents

wards, the perſon ſo choſen ſhall appear before them; each of whom ſhall take the oaths, and enter into the militia for three years, or bring one to ſerve as his ſubſtitute, or forfeit 10l. and be liable at the end of three years to ſerve again.

Three deputies, or two deputies and a juſtice, or one deputy and two juſtices, ſhall meet in their ſeveral ſubdiviſions occaſionally at other times, and annually on the Tueſday before Michaelmas; and if any perſon 35 years old ſhall ſhew juſt cauſe for his diſcharge, it ſhall be granted, and another choſen by lot in his room; and the vacation by death ſhall be filled up in the ſame manner.

A militia man removing to another pariſh, ſhall ſerve the remainder of his time in the new pariſh.

New liſts of men qualified for ſervice ſhall be made every year.

A new body ſhall be choſen every third year, ſo that all perſons duly qualified may ſerve in their turns, each for three years.

A liſt of the perſons ſerving in each pariſh ſhall be tranſmitted to the lieutenant.

An officer neglecting to return his liſt, or making a falſe and partial liſt, ſhall be committed for a month to the common goal, or be fined not more than five pounds, or leſs than 40s.

Every private man ſerving for himſelf ſhall be exempted from ſtatute work, from ſerving peace or pariſh offices, or in the regular forces.

He that has ſerved three years ſhall not ſerve again until by rotation it comes to his turn.

Married men having perſonally ſerved in the militia, if called out in caſe of invaſion or rebellion, ſhall be entitled to the ſame privileges of ſetting up trades in any place of Great Britain or Ireland, as by act 22 Geo. II. is granted to mariners or ſoldiers.

A

opponents of the new miniſters, from treating the militia bill with the ſame ill-uſage, as on former occa- A. D. 1756.

A quaker refuſing to ſerve ſhall hire another in his ſtead; and if he neglects, a ſum ſhall be levied upon him by diſtreſs, ſufficient to hire another man.

Within one month after the return of the liſts, the lieutenant and two deputies, or without the lieutenant three deputies, ſhall form the militia of each county into regiments, conſiſting of not more than twelve, nor leſs than ſeven companies of forty men each; appointing the commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned officers to each company.

They ſhall be exerciſed thus: On the firſt Monday in the months of March, April, May, June, July, Auguſt, September, and October, they ſhall be exerciſed in half companies; and on the third Monday in the ſaid month in companies.

And once every year, on the Tueſday, Wedneſday, Thurſday and Friday of Whitſun-week, they ſhall be exerciſed in whole regiments.

No man ſhall be exerciſed in half company or company more than ſix miles from his own houſe.

Notice of the time and place of meeting ſhall be ſent by the lieutenant and two deputies, or, without the lieutenant, by three deputies, to the high conſtables, and by them to the petty conſtables, who ſhall fix them upon the door of their reſpective churches.

The lieutenant ſhall appoint at pleaſure a regimental clerk, a ſerjeant-major out of the ſerjeants, and a drum-major out of the drummers.

If it ſhould be thought inconvenient, on account of fairs or markets, to exerciſe the militia on the day ſet by this act, order may be made by three deputies, or two deputies and one juſtice, or one deputy and three juſtices, for exerciſing them on any other day, Sunday excepted.

In counties where the militia do not amount to ſeven companies, and therefore cannot make a regiment, they ſhall be formed into a battalion, under the lieutenant and one field-officer,

A. D. 1756. occaſions, and obliged them to permit a few patriots to carry a point, ſo contrary to their natural inclina-

officer, one adjutant who ſhall be a ſubaltern in the army, a ſerjeant-major, a drum-major, and a clerk ſhall be appointed them, and they ſhall be exerciſed as a complete regiment.

Where a whole company or a half company cannot be brought together, they may be exerciſed in ſmaller numbers, as the lieutenant or deputy ſhall direct.

One commiſſioned officer ſhall attend the exerciſe of the half company, and inſpect their arms and accoutrements.

The arms and cloaths of the militia ſhall be carefully kept by the captain of each company in cheſts, provided by the pariſh where they are depoſited. The muſkets ſhall be marked with an M and the name of the county.

The King's lieutenants, or the colonels, may ſeize, or remove whither they ſhall think proper, the arms, cloaths, and accoutrements, when neceſſary to the public peace.

Any perſon intruſted with the cuſtody of any arms or cloaths, delivering them out, unleſs for exerciſe, or by command of his ſuperior officer, or by the order of any juſtice of the peace, under his hand and ſeal, may, by two juſtices, be committed to the county goal, for ſix months.

No pay, arms, or cloathing, ſhall be iſſued, nor any adjutant or ſerjeant be appointed, till four-fifths of the men ſhall have been choſen, and the officers have taken out their commiſſions.

The officer, who ſuperintends the exerciſe, ſhall call over the liſt, and certify to a juſtice the names of thoſe, who are abſent from exerciſe. The juſtice ſhall examine the excuſe offered, and if it be inſufficient, ſhall puniſh the defaulter for the firſt offence by fining him 2s. or ſetting him in the ſtocks for an hour; for the ſecond he ſhall fine him 4s. or ſend him to the houſe of correction for four days; for every offence afterwards he ſhall fine him 6s. and if it be not paid, ſend him to the houſe of correction for any time not exceeding a month.

If

inclination. Beſides, they were beaten upon their own principles: they had no argument or device left, A. D. 1756

If any man ſhall be convicted upon oath, before a juſtice, of being drunk at the time of exerciſe, he ſhall forfeit 10s. or ſit an hour in the ſtocks.

He that ſhall be convicted on oath, before a juſtice, of inſolence or diſobedience to his officer, ſhall, for his firſt offence, be fined 2s. 6d. and in default of payment be ſent to the houſe of correction for four days; for the ſecond 5s. or committed for ſeven days; and for every offence afterwards be fined 40s. and committed to the houſe of correction for any time not more than a month, nor leſs than fourteen days.

If any man ſhall ſell, pawn, or loſe his arms or accoutrements, he ſhall be fined a ſum not exceeding three pounds, or in default of payment be committed to the houſe of correction for one month; and if he cannot then raiſe the ſum required, for three months.

He that ſhall neglect to return his arms in good order after exerciſe, the ſame or the next day, ſhall be fined 2s. 6d. or be ſent to the houſe of correction for ſeven days: If he neglect to return them by Monday after Whitſun-week, he ſhall forfeit 5s. or be ſent to the houſe of correction for fourteen days. And the perſon entruſted by the captain with the care of the arms and cloaths, who ſhall omit to complain of ſuch neglect, ſhall forfeit 20s.

The ſoldier or non-commiſſioned officer, that ſhall be abſent from his annual exerciſe, ſhall forfeit 10s. a day, or be committed to the houſe of correction for a month.

If any non-commiſſioned officer ſhall be convicted, upon oath, of being negligent in his duty, or diſobedient or inſolent to the adjutant, or other ſuperior officer, he ſhall be fined by a juſtice a ſum not exceeding 30s. or, in default of payment be committed to the houſe of correction for fourteen days, and may be diſcharged by the lieutenant.

Whoever ſhall unlawfully buy or receive any arms, or accoutrements belonging to the militia, ſhall incur the penalty of

A. D. 1756. left, (except they had pulled off the maſk and availed themſelves ſolely upon a ſuſpicion or jealouſy

of five pounds, and in default of payment be impriſoned for three months, or publickly whipped, at the diſcretion of the juſtice.

No man ſhall be cenſured for abſence occaſioned by attending an election.

The militia are to be ſubject in military affairs to their own officers, and in civil to the civil magiſtrate.

All pariſh officers are required to aſſiſt the lieutenants and juſtices.

In caſe of actual invaſion, or upon imminent danger thereof, and in caſe of rebellion, the King firſt notifying the occaſion to parliament, if then ſitting, or in their receſs to the privy-council, and to the people by proclamation, may direct the lieutenants, or any three deputy-lieutenants, to draw out their regiments, who ſhall march, by his Majeſty's order, to any part of the kingdom, under the command of ſuch generals, as he ſhall appoint, receiving, during the ſervice, the ſame pay with the regular regiments of foot, and the officers holding the ſame rank with the regular officers of the ſame denomination. The militia, during the time of ſervice ſhall be liable to the law martial then ſubſiſting; and any man wounded ſhall be entitled to the hoſpital of Chelſea. A militia-man not appearing, or refuſing to march on ſuch occaſion, ſhall forfeit 40l. or be committed to the county-goal for twelve months.

In caſe of actual invaſion, or upon imminent danger thereof, and in caſe of rebellion, if the parliament be not ſitting, nor its adjournment or prorogation to expire in fourteen days, the King may ſummon it to meet on any day, upon giving fourteen days notice; and they ſhall meet accordingly for the diſpatch of buſineſs.

The militia and regular troops ſhall be tried by courts-martial, each by their own officers.

The militia during their annual exerciſe ſhall be billeted as regular troops.

In

jealouſy of the people's diſcontent at their miſ- A. D.
conduct,) to reaſon away the utility and expedi- 1756.
ency

In caſe of invaſion or rebellion, juſtices, upon order from the King, or any chief commiſſion officer of the militia, ſhall iſſue warrants to the chief conſtables of hundreds to provide carriages for the arms, cloaths, accoutrements, powder, &c. which carriages ſhall be paid in ready money by the officer demanding them, after the following rates: A waggon with five horſes, or a wain with ſix oxen, or with four oxen and two horſes, 1 s. each mile; a cart with four horſes 9 d. a mile; and ſo in proportion. Perſons having ſuch carriages are required to furniſh them for one day's journey only. Any chief conſtable neglecting his duty in the premiſes, ſhall forfeit a ſum not exceeding 40 s. nor leſs than 20 s. to be levied by diſtreſs.

The militia ſhall not, on any occaſion, be compelled to go out of this kingdom.

In all cities, or towns, which are counties within themſelves, and have been accuſtomed to raiſe their own militia, the lieutenant or chief magiſtrate ſhall appoint five deputy lieutenants, who ſhall exerciſe the ſame power as the other deputies. Of theſe ſmaller counties the deputies, colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors, ſhall poſſeſs lands to the value of 300 l. a year, or a perſonal eſtate of 5000 l. captains 150 l. or two thouſand five hundred pounds perſonal eſtate; lieutenants and enſigns, 50 l. a year, or 750 l. perſonal eſtate. One half of the real eſtates of the officers of county towns muſt be in ſuch city or town, or within the county at large, to which ſuch city or town is united for the purpoſes of this act. The penalty for acting, if not qualified, is, for a deputy-lieutenant or field officer, 100 l. for all under, 50 l.

All fines and forfeitures ſhall be paid to the regimental clerk, and made a common ſtock in each ſubdiviſion; of which an account ſhall be given to three deputies, or two deputies and one juſtice, or one deputy and two juſtices, who ſhall apply it to the erection of buts, and the proviſion of gunpowder, to be

A. D. 1756.

ency of this military and conſtitutional eſtabliſhment. They could not alledge, as heretofore, That there was any danger or appearance of internal commotion, and inſurrections in favour of an exiled family. So that they were conſtrained to give their aſcent to a meaſure, which they had always dreaded, as the moſt effectual bar to miniſterial tyranny. Whereas the new miniſters, by thus arming the people for the internal defence of the nation, diſcovered their intention to execute ſome diſtant ſervice with the national troops, that required a powerful military force abroad.

How the militia act was obſtructed in its execution.

The oppoſition to this conſtitutional bill was not confined to either houſe of parliament. Every art was made uſe of by thoſe, who ſet their faces

be uſed in ſhooting at marks; and the remainder ſhall be diſtributed in prizes to the beſt markſmen, or employed in any other way for the uſe of the militia.

Perſons committed to the houſe of correction upon this act ſhall be kept to hard labour.

Proof of qualification, in all ſuits, ſhall lie on the defendant.

No order made, by virtue of this act, by a lieutenant, deputy, or juſtice, ſhall be removed by *certiorari*; nor execution be ſuperſeded thereby.

Where a pariſh extends in two counties, its militia ſhall ſerve in that county where the church ſtands.

Thoſe, who are trained and muſtered in the docks, ſhall not be obliged to ſerve in the militia.

All former acts relating to the militia are repealed by this act, except in caſes, which are herein directed to be ſubject to former acts.

The other clauſes in this act (which is to remain in force five years) contain proviſions reſpecting the privileges of particular places.

againſt

againſt it in parliament, to prevent its being carried into execution. Many lieutenants of counties would not arm and array proper perſons; and others found means to evade the law, and to excuſe themſelves. Men of property were deterred from accepting commiſſions; and ſuch a diſlike to this new ſervice was every where propagated, amongſt the lower and middling claſs of people, that in counties, whoſe lieutenants were well diſpoſed and well officered, it was with the utmoſt difficulty to raiſe the common men by ballot; and ſcarce any where could it be performed, for ſome time, without diſcontent and riot; eſpecially amongſt the farmers and landholders, who, of all men, ſhould be leaſt ſuſpected of joining in any oppoſition to a meaſure, ſo neceſſary for the ſafety of their eſtates, from foreign invaſions and domeſtic inſurrections. The maſters were frightned with an opinion, that the militia would rob them of their ſervants: and the labouring men were terrified with the ſuggeſtion, that they would be miſuſed, and ſent to fight the battles of ſome foreign prince or ſtate; or tranſported like felons to the plantations in America. Prejudices were thus formed in their minds, which could hardly be removed with the moſt ſerious and laboured repreſentations of the expediency of the act, and of the inſidious diſcourſe of thoſe, that ſet them againſt ſo ſalutary a law. Amongſt which there appeared a letter, in the name of a deputy-lieutenant of a county, addreſſed to his tenants and neighbours, and recommended to the peruſal of all

A. D. 1756.

How removed.

A. D. 1756. all the people of England, in order to obviate and remove ſuch ruinous miſrepreſentations, and ſeting forth the importance of the act, and the neceſſity of its being duly executed.

Importance and neceſſity of the militia.

"I will tell you, ſaid he, plainly what I think "neceſſary to be told you at this time, when "every miſtake may be of moſt pernicious con- "ſequence to us all. When I firſt heard of the "diſcontents and riots of ſome of the poorer "people, which are ſo greatly to their diſgrace "and diſadvantage; I could ſcarce believe it was "poſſible, that they could have ariſen from the "execution of the late act for a militia; a thing "ſo moderate in the duty, and ſo deſired by the "voice of the nation.—You may expect a full "explanation of the benefit you are likely to re- "ceive from it: and to do you juſtice, neigh- "bours, I do not know any ſet of men, more "likely to yield to reaſon, when it is honeſtly "laid before them, than the farmers of England. "—But before I ſay any thing of the abſolute "neceſſity of ſome law of this kind, I muſt ſet "you right as to ſome notions, that I find are "induſtriouſly ſpread amongſt you by the ene- "mies of our country, as though the militia-men "were to be carried out of the kingdom, and "forced to ſerve abroad. But this is a wicked "falſhood: for you may ſee, by the act itſelf, that "unleſs there be an actual invaſion, you are not "to march even out of your own counties; but "that you are never to be ſent out of the king- "dom, upon any pretence whatſoever. Our re-

" gular armies are to fight your battles abroad: A. D.
" you are only to defend yourſelves, your wives 1756.
" and children, which, no doubt, every man is
" always ready to do, at home. This is the pro-
" miſe, upon the unſhaken faith of parliament,
" which cannot be broken.—Beſides, you are
" not ſubject to the command, as men that fight
" for their pay—you receive no money at en-
" gaging: you engage only by the common duty
" of all Engliſhmen: and you are not to be of-
" ficered as others; but to be commanded by the
" gentlemen of your own county, who, if what
" you are wickedly told were the caſe, would
" think it as hard to be decoyed out of the king-
" dom, or to be laid under any unreaſonable dif-
" ficulties, as you poſſibly can."

" I ſhall proceed to lay before you the reaſon
" why you are to be armed at this time, and to
" be exerciſed with particular care: It is, becauſe
" your King and country ſtand in need of an
" army of defence, to relieve you from the ex-
" pence and danger of maintaining a too numer-
" ous ſoldiery: it is to put arms into the hands
" of a free people, who have, by various
" practices of ſtate, been deprived of the means
" to defend themſelves, upon any emergency,
" ever ſince the reſtoration: it is to convince you
" of his Majeſty's confidence in your fidelity,
" and in his opinion of your innate courage and
" bravery: and, in particular, it is becauſe dan-
" ger, at this preſent time, hovers over your

A. D. 1756. " heads from the power and malice of your con-
" federate enemies, much more to be dreaded
" than any, which have ever yet threatned us.—
" The French, who, for a hundred years paſt,
" never ceaſed a moment to contrive our ruin,
" are, after many defeats, coming forward again,
" and now aiming at us ſuch a blow, as would,
" if it took place, lay us at once on the ground.
" They are aiming to cut off our colonies at a
" ſtroke: Colonies peopled by our brethren,
" Engliſhmen, and our own fleſh and blood,
" and therefore infinitely dear to us: colo-
" nies, the main ſupport of our trade, by which
" the market for our corn, and all the produce
" of our lands is kept up. Of which the French
" King is ſo ſenſible, that he thinks, if he could
" deprive us of theſe valuable poſſeſſions, he
" might reduce us to beggary and ſlavery."

" Our Sovereign, the beſt and braveſt of
" Kings, has reſolved to defend theſe colonies
" with the utmoſt vigour, as he will every thing
" elſe that belongs to us: the French King, on
" the other hand, meeting with a vigorous re-
" ſiſtance in our colonies, does not confine his
" ſchemes to that part of the world, but ever
" ſeeks to enter into the heart of our own country;
" to deſtroy every thing with fire and ſword, and
" to bring on us every ſort of miſery, that a
" powerful and enraged enemy can contrive or
" execute. 'Tis to prevent all theſe evils, that the
" law in queſtion is provided: So that had it ten

" times

" times the hardſhips, that are complained of, A. D.
" whereas it contains no hardſhip at all in reality, 1756.
" it ought to be joyfully and thankfully accepted.
" For, ſhall we refuſe arming ourſelves, when
" not only our honour, our proſperity, and our
" ſafety, but our liberty and our very being de-
" pend on our exerting ourſelves, our natural
" and conſtitutional ſtrength manfully."

" This is not all: every one may not be aware
" of our condition, and of the power of that
" enemy we have to contend with. The French
" King's country contains many millions of peo-
" ple more than we have: and he is abſolute
" maſter of the lives of all thoſe people, and of
" every thing they have: when he pleaſes he
" drains the laſt penny from their purſes; and
" takes the laſt man from their villages and
" factories. A power, that makes him danger-
" ous enough at all times: But an affair has hap-
" pened, which makes him much more dangerous
" than ever."

" The Queen of Hungary, whom, in the laſt
" war, we ſaved from being entirely deſtroyed
" by the French, equally unmindful of juſtice
" and gratitude, has now joined all her forces
" with thoſe very French, for the ſake of oppreſ-
" ſing the King of Pruſſia, inſtead of joining us
" againſt the common enemy. The Queen of Hun-
" gary is miſtreſs of Flanders, which has always been
" looked upon as a country of great conſequence to
" us, becauſe it covers the ſtates of Holland, and
" lies directly oppoſite to our coaſt. Now ſhe

A. D. 1756. " has delivered this barrier into the hands of the " French, to pay them for the aſſiſtance they " give her in her unjuſt deſigns. From which, " three miſchiefs happen to us; firſt, they have " thoſe towns, that look directly into the mouth " of the Thames, by which they may do our " trade great prejudice. Secondly, the French " take us in on another ſide, and have ſo many " more ports from whence they can invade us: " and thirdly, as they now lie next to the Dutch, " by having Flanders given up to them, they " overawe them in ſuch a manner, that they dare " not come to our aſſiſtance. So that now our " whole dependance muſt be only upon God and " our own courage."

" I know that great reliance is juſtly had on " the defence we may juſtly expect from our " navy, and from the regular army, we have in " pay. But this army is only a handful in com- " pariſon to theirs: and what is our fleet or our " army to cover a coaſt of 15 or 1600 miles, " the circumference of the iſland of Great Britain. " If then the French could eſcape our fleet, and " enter our country in a hoſtile manner, what, in " ſuch a caſe, would you do? Think, ſpeak and " act like Engliſhmen! Is there a man amongſt " you, who would leave the defence of his wife, " his children, his king, his country, and his re- " ligion to any mercenary ſoldiers in the world? " I am perſuaded, you would yourſelves go into " the field. Had we an hundred thouſand men " in arms, you would ſtill be afraid that, in ſuch

" an

" an intereſting conjuncture, they were not half " ſufficient. Such is the ſpirit, which is, I am " confident, ſtill in my countrymen: and a noble " ſpirit it is! But let not our ſpirit hurry us away " from the conſideration of thoſe things, without " which no ſpirit can be ſerviceable. You are " called upon to fight, when all that can be dear " to you as Engliſhmen, as men, as proteſtants, " is at ſtake! You are going to fight for all this, " without knowing what you are to do againſt " men, whoſe trade it is to fight, and who have " been perpetually exerciſed in the uſe of arms." A. D. 1756.

" I know very well, that no men are naturally " more brave than you are: But in man bravery " is not enough: ſtrength is not enough: there " muſt be ſkill; there muſt be practice; or the " greateſt ſtrength and courage ſignify very little. " Suppoſe the ſtouteſt, braveſt man in the coun- " ty, who in his whole life had never handled a " cudgel: what figure, pray, could he make againſt " a little ſlight fellow, that by long practice was a " good cudgel-player? undoubtedly you will " ſay, a very poor figure. Juſt ſo is the very " ſtrongeſt braveſt man in the world to one, who " is trained up to be a ſoldier. And every man " muſt be, and ought to rejoice in being a ſol- " dier, when the real danger of his country calls " upon him; and he ought to ſpare no pains to " compaſs it."

" Therefore as your danger was well known, " and as your deſire and courage to defend your- " ſelves were likewiſe well known, the wiſdom

A. D. 1756. " of the government has thought fit to make " you capable of protecting yourſelves, by putting " arms, in an orderly manner, into your hands, " and by inſtructing you in ſuch a diſcipline, that, " when you are perfected in it, you need not, " under the protection of heaven, fear any force, " that the enemy can ſend againſt you."

" This is the deſign of the militia; and it is " nothing elſe. If you think it a reſtraint on " your liberty, to be obliged to ſerve in this " manner; I pray you to conſider, that there is " not one of you, that thinks it a hardſhip on " his child to ſpend a laborious ſervile appren- " ticeſhip of ſeven years, to learn a trade, by " which to gain a ſmall livelihood: and will you " then pretend to grudge a few days in a year to " learn a profeſſion, honourable to all, abſolutely " neceſſary to yourſelves, and the only thing " that can preſerve your lives, properties, reli- " gion and liberty, without which all the reſt is " nothing. Or will a man pretend to ſay, That " he loves his country, and values his freedom, " and refuſes to take reaſonable pains to learn " to defend that, and every thing elſe, that an " honeſt man ought to value."

" But I have ſomewhat particular to ſay to " thoſe, who refuſe, to put themſelves in a poſture " to defend their country, through cowardice or " lazineſs. If through their baſeneſs the enemy " ſhould happen to prevail, they would, after be- " ing ſtripped of that liberty, which they pre- " ſume to abuſe, and know not how to value, be

" forced

" forced to bear thoſe arms for a tyrannical op- A. D. 1756.
" preſſive maſter, which they now refuſe to em-
" ploy in their own defence. The law is the
" only protection of liberty: and, juſt ſo much
" as every man murmurs at wholeſome laws and
" regulations; ſo much as he evades them by ar-
" tifice; ſo much as he riots to deſtroy them by
" violence, exactly ſo much is he a promoter of
" arbitrary power, and ſo much is he a French-
" man in his heart. Could our forefathers look
" down upon theſe diſcontents and diſturbances,
" and were told, That you rioted, becauſe you
" are born under a King, who in his goodneſs is
" willing to put arms into your hands for ſelf-
" defence, and whoſe government is taking pains
" to inſtruct you how to uſe them againſt your
" natural enemies the French: that they were
" giving you arms and ſkill to fight, leſt you
" ſhould be conquered by thoſe, whom your fore-
" fathers had ſo often conquered; they would be
" confounded at your ignorance, ſtartle at your
" folly, upbraid you for your ingratitude, cow-
" ardice and lazineſs, and diſown you for the
" deſcendants of Engliſh heroes."

Such was the language, ſuch the arguments and perſuaſions required in the patriots, to inform the underſtandings of the people, in their reſpective neighbourhoods, and to diſſipate the fears raiſed in their minds by that leven of the old miniſtry, which now began to work powerfully again in every department; and would have deprived the nation of the advantage of that ſervice-

A. D. 1756. able militia, during the late war, had not the ſame ſpirit, which carried the bill through the legiſlature, exerted itſelf in the execution of this ſalutary law.

Meaſures taken by the new miniſtry. The hopes conceived by the new miniſters and the nation, from the effectual execution of the militia bill, put them upon ways and means to employ the ſtanding forces of the kingdom in ſervices, for the intereſt of their country and their own honour. Large draughts were deſigned for North America, and Louiſbourg was the firſt object of their operations. For this purpoſe a ſquadron of ſhips of war was ordered to be equipped, at the proper ſeaſon, to ſail under the command of Admiral Hawke, with a powerful land force under his convoy. A ſquadron was alſo diſpatched to the Eaſt Indies, under the command of Commodore Stevens, and our intereſt in the Weſt Indies was conſulted, by ſending a ſquadron to Jamaica, under the command of Admiral Coates.

A. D. 1757. About this time the public were informed, that Admiral Weſt had wrote to the ſecretary of the Admiralty, deſiring to reſign his command and to come to town, upon Admiral Byng's condemnation: and to Lord Temple, then firſt Lord of the Admiralty; to whom he further explained himſelf on the ſaid ſubject. As theſe letters convey the private ſentiments of one, who is looked upon to be the moſt material evidence on Mr. Byng's trial; who was the ſecond in command on the affair, for which Mr. Byng loſt his life, and who received

received ſuch diſtinguiſhing marks of the royal favour after his return to England, it would be concealing, or, at leaſt, not giving the whole truth, which is the duty of an hiſtorian, as much as of an evidence, ſhould we ſuppreſs, or deny them a place in this hiſtory. A. D. 1757.

While Mr. Byng was under confinement for trial, the Lords of the Admiralty manifeſted his Majeſty's approbation of Admiral Weſt's conduct, by appointing him to the command of a ſecret expedition, with orders to hold himſelf in readineſs to ſail. But on the very day ſentence of death was paſſed upon Admiral Byng, Mr. Weſt wrote to the ſecretary of the Admiralty: Admiral Weſt's letters relative to Mr. Byng's ſentence.

SIR, Magnanime, 27 Jan. 1757.

"WITHOUT entering upon the merit of Admiral Byng's behaviour, or deciding "at all upon it, one way or other; yet the ſen- "tence paſſed this day upon him (the ſubſtance "of which I have ſeen) makes it impoſſible for "me to help declining the very honourable and "diſtinguiſhed command their lordſhips have been "pleaſed to appoint me to: I muſt, therefore, "beſeech and entreat their lordſhips to confer it "on ſome perſon more worthy, ſince I can only "be anſwerable for my loyalty and fidelity to my "king, and reſolution of doing what appears to "me for his ſervice, which it ſeems *an officer may "not want, and yet be capitally convicted for his miſ- "conduct or inability of judging right:* and I am "not ſo preſumptuous, as to imagine, that my "actions To the Lords of the Admiralty.

A D. 1757. "actions can always be ſo rightly governed; nor "am I altogether certain that the *judgment of others* "*is infallible*; and as in other caſes the conſe- "quences may be fatal, I muſt therefore repeat "again my moſt earneſt requeſt, that their lord- "ſhips will be pleaſed to appoint ſome other per- "ſon to my command, and grant me their lord- "ſhips permiſſion to come to town."

By the ſame conveyance, he ſent as follows to Earl Temple:

"My Lord, Magnanime, Jan. 27, 1757.

To Lord Temple. "HOwever honourable, or however advan- "tageous the ſituation I am placed in may "be; yet I am determined and fully reſolved to "forego any thing rather than ſerve on terms, "which ſubject an officer to the treatment ſhewn "Admiral Byng, whom the court-martial have "convicted, *not for cowardice, nor for treachery*; "but for MISCONDUCT: an offence never, till now, "thought capital; and now it ſeems only made "ſo, becauſe no alternative of puniſhment was "found in that article, they bring him under.— "Strange reaſoning!—to *acquit* him of the two "points *cowardice* and *diſaffection*, to which that "article can *only* have reſpect.—Since, though "*negligence* is mentioned, yet can it be only in- "tended to refer to one or the other of thoſe two "crimes, *negligence* PROCEEDING *from diſaffection* "*or cowardice*. And I well remember this was the "opinion of the Houſe of Commons, when the "bill was before them; for which reaſon no alter-

"native

" native was left in that article, which otherwiſe A. D.
" there would have been.—Courts martial I have 1757.
" always underſtood to be courts of honour and
" conſcience; and therefore why gentlemen ſhould
" think themſelves tied by the letter, or to act
" againſt their opinion, I know not; but enough
" of this at preſent. I ſhall only make one ob-
" ſervation more, in regard to that part of their
" ſentence, wherein he is ſaid *not to have done his*
" *utmoſt to relieve St. Philip's caſtle*[b], without
" pointing

[b] Admiral Weſt in his evidence on the trial of Mr. Byng, being *aſked*, concerning the poſſibility of any ſhips of the fleet, or frigates getting cloſe to the caſtle of St. Philip on the 19th in the morning, ſaid, He believed it was not poſſible: for that the ſhips, ſent for that purpoſe, ſeemed to endeavour it as much as was in their power. And being further interrogated relative to the ſame object, whether he apprehended the enemy were maſters of Mahon harbour, he replied, " I do apprehend that the enemy were ſo far maſters of Mahon harbour, as to prevent the Engliſh fleet from making uſe of it with ſecurity to themſelves." And in regard to the propriety of throwing in the land forces, He declared it his opinion that it would have been improper and highly inexcuſeable, when the enemy was in ſight, as it would have weakened the force of the Engliſh fleet, and expoſed it to that of the enemy, which was at that time ſuperior: that had thoſe land forces been thrown into St. Philip's, the ſhips would not have been fit for action and to engage the enemy's fleet, nor ſufficient to defend the caſtle againſt the enemy, in ſuch a manner, as for them not to have ſurrendered.

Captain Amherſt declared, that all the ſhips in the fleet, when the ſignal was made for battle, bore down, and thoſe ſhips, which were in action, did engage as cloſe as they could get; amongſt which he particularly mentions the Culloden and the ſhips in her van; and as the weather was very good he apprehended, that

A. D. 1757. "pointing out, which way it could have been relieved by him, which indeed they would have found difficult enough to have done.

"As

that the rear would have engaged as near as the van did, had the French laid to, inſtead of making ſail on, preſently after Mr. Byng began to engage.

Captain Lloyd being *aſked* concerning the occaſion of the Admiral's ſhip backing, and the delay it made, *anſwered*, "That he thought the Trident's being under the Admiral's lee bow, was the occaſion of his backing, and, in courſe, ſo much time was loſt in getting down,"

Captain Philips being aſked, If each ſhip in the rear had crowded ſail in proportion to their diſtance from the enemy, they could not have got as near the rear of the enemy within the time, or a little ſpace of the time more, as the van cloſed the van of the enemy? anſwered, That he thought all the ſail they could have made would not have brought them down ſo ſoon as the van. Though they might have got down in a little time more. (*But then the French, when they ſaw that, made ſail on*, as Captain Amherſt relates.)

Captain Gardiner of the Ramillies depoſed, That the Trident being abaft the larboard beam of the Ramillies, did ſo impede the Ramillies in going down to the enemy, that the Admiral muſt have gone down without his force, which was not his intention: that the ſignal was out for the line of battle a-head at that time, and the rear diviſion went down very regular after the Trident and Princeſs Louiſa got into their ſtations. Being aſked, Whether it had not been a more ſpeedy and regular method to cloſe the enemy, to have made the ſignal for the line a-breaſt? the Captain ſaid no; becauſe it would be improper for ſhips to go down in a line a-breaſt, to attack ſhips that are laying in a line a-head, when they can go down with their bows to them; i. e. a ſlanting courſe to them: and therefore he was of opinion, That the rear did take the proper method to come down to the enemy. And being further interrogated, Whether he meant, as to the courſe ſteered

on

A. D. 1757.

" As I have taken my firm and final reſolution " to reſign the command, and have wrote very " ſtrongly

on the enemy, or the ſail carried? he anſwered, " Both: but this, ſaid he, is matter of opinion which I ſhall hereafter avoid entering into, as there are many ſuperior judges here to me."

He was alſo of opinion, That the rear would have engaged as near the enemy as the van did, had the French fleet ſtaid: " that it was Admiral Byng's intention to engage the Chief Eſcadre, the third ſhip from the enemy's rear, and not to throw away his ſhot, as the enemy did, till he came near the enemy: " that the Admiral ſtood on, till it was imagined on board the Ramillies, that every ſhip, if ſhe had gone properly down with a ſlanting courſe, could have gone down to the ſhips, they ſhould have engaged, of the enemy, with their broadſides to them: " that he recollected this particularly to have heard the Admiral ſay, when the Ramillies was a-breaſt of them, that that was his intention: " that the Admiral ordered the guns to be ſhotted with round and grape ſhot, two ſhot in the guns below, and propoſed to ſet top gallant ſails on ſeeing the French going away; and that he heard him expreſs, at that time, his unhappineſs at not having a ſufficient force to make the general ſignal to chaſe; as he thought he could materially have diſtreſſed the enemy in the ſituation they then were in, *if*, ſaid he, *I had two or three ſhips more.*"

Joſeph Belwaird, maſter of the Ramillies, ſaid, That he had orders to ſteer ſuch a courſe down on the enemy, as to cut off the third ſhip of the enemy's rear, which ſhip the Admiral expreſſed his intention to engage, and that they ſhould have gone near on the enemy, if that accident, of the Trident, had not happened.—Admiral Norris interrupted him by ſaying, That was matter of opinion.—Being aſked, whether the ſhips could have preſerved a line of battle in going down to the enemy, as well with the top gallant ſails, as without them, as the weather then was? anſwered, That as the weather then was he could have carried them; but that he left it to the judgment of the court, whether a croud of ſail is proper to preſerve the order of battle, when

A. D. 1757. "ſtrongly, on that head, to the board, I muſt "intreat your lordſhip to facilitate it; and I "am, Yours, &c."

Laſt year, at this ſeaſon, the cry was about the danger of a French invaſion. This was

The French ſcheme for the year 1757.

when ſhips are in a line a-head ſo cloſely connected together, as at the diſtance of half a cable, and at the brink of coming to action, when the enemy is waiting.

Colonel Smith being examined in reference to the priſoner's courage, ſaid, That he was near the Admiral's perſon during the whole time of action; that he perceived no backwardneſs in the Admiral during the action, nor any mark of fear or confuſion, either from his countenance or behaviour, but rather the reverſe: that he gave his orders very cooly, and without the leaſt confuſion: that he did appear ſolicitous to engage the enemy: to aſſiſt his Majeſty's ſhips, that were engaged with the enemy; and both this Colonel and others teſtified, That they never, after the day of action, heard any murmuring or diſcontent among the officers or men, on any ſuppoſition that the Admiral had not done his duty; and Mr. Lloyd, ſurgeon of the Ramillies, ſaid, that the men were quite the reverſe from any diſcontent, &c.

All which compared with the reſolutions of the court martial, which *acquit* him expreſsly of *cowardice* and *diſaffection*; and with the 25th reſolution, which ſays, that "the court were (*unanimouſly*) of opinion, that while the Ramillies was firing, in going down, the Trident and ſhips, immediately a-head of the Ramillies, proved an *impediment* to the Ramillies's continuing to go down;" may properly account for thoſe paſſages in Admiral Weſt's letters, where he ſays, "I am not altogether certain that the judgment of others is infallible," and where he is determined and fully reſolved to forego any thing rather than ſerve on terms, which ſubject an officer to the treatment ſhewn Admiral Byng.

N. B. General Fowkes has been reſtored to his rank in the army, and to a command in Ireland, by his preſent Majeſty.

thought

thought a proper ſoporific for the men in power at that time, to keep the ſtrength of the nation inactive at home. The alteration in the miniſtry, and the proceedings of the parliament, this winter, made the French alter their ſcheme. They were informed of the new miniſter's abilities and enterpriſing activity. They could not expect to frighten him into a reſolution to employ all our force, as his predeceſſors had done, to guard the coaſt of theſe kingdoms from a deſcent; and they were perfectly convinced, that the voice of the people was for an offenſive war, and that they were alſo willing to ſupport the King in a vigorous proſecution of it. Therefore, their plan for the year 1757, was to divert Great Britain from the main object of the war in America, by provoking us to become principals in the German war. A. D. 1757.

His Majeſty's meſſage about his Electoral dominions, &c.

With this view we find the French took all their meaſures. And on the 17th of February his Majeſty ſent a meſſage by the Right Hon. WILLIAM PITT, Eſq; one of the principal Secretaries of State, ſignifying, "That it was always with reluctance that his Majeſty aſked any extraordinary ſupply of his people; but that, as the united counſels and formidable preparations of France and her allies threaten, with the moſt alarming conſequences, Europe in general; and that as theſe moſt unjuſt and vindictive deſigns were particularly and immediately bent againſt his Majeſty's Electoral dominions, and thoſe of his good ally the King of Pruſſia, his Majeſty did confide on the experienced zeal and affection of his

A. D. 1757. his faithful Commons, that they would chearfully aſſiſt him in forming and maintaining an army of obſervation, for the juſt and neceſſary defence and preſervation thereof, and to enable his Majeſty to fulfil his engagements with the King of Pruſſia, for the ſecurity of the Empire, againſt the irruption of foreign armies, and for the ſupport of the common cauſe."

King of Pruſſia.

How the parliament received and honoured this meſſage, by granting all his Majeſty requeſted, has been already related [b]; but it was not done without a great outcry and clamour amongſt the people without doors; who, on this occaſion, talked very freely againſt the projected army of obſervation in Germany, which they deemed a prelude to a ruinous continental war, that, ſooner or later, might ſtarve our operations by ſea, and in America, and at the ſame time diſtreſs the nation with an accumulation of taxes, and an additional load of debts. However, the popularity of the miniſter, who, with his adherents, omitted nothing to diſcourage German meaſures; and the compaſſionate arguments urged in favour of Hanover, by the advocates for a continental war, threatened, by the enemy of our nation, on our account only, reconciled them to an acquieſcence; if it could not bring them to approve a meaſure, which leaned ſo apparently towards a re-adoption of thoſe continental meaſures; upon a bare ſuſpicion of which any other miniſtry would have totally forfeited the confidence of the people. In a word, the expediency of ſupporting Hanover and aſſiſt-

Diſagreeable to the nation.

Allowed to be expedient.

[b] See the ſupplies on p. 125, &c. Vol. II.

ing

ing the King of Pruſſia was allowed; and meaſures were taken immediately to carry the neceſſary reſolutions into execution. Two hundred thouſand pounds was granted for the relief of his Pruſſian Majeſty [c]. His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland was appointed to the chief command of the army to be raiſed in Germany, to obſerve the motions of the French: and he ſet out accordingly for Hanover, on the 9th of April, from London. The French army of 80,000 men, the choiceſt troops of France, under the command of M. de Eſtrees, having already paſſed the Rhine, ſeized upon the town of Embden and whatever belonged to the King of Pruſſia in Eaſt Frieſland, and by ſlow marches made the beſt diſpoſitions to over-run his Britannic Majeſty's Electoral dominions; and fixed upon Munſter for the Marſhal's head quarters. There was another army of 25,000 men, ſent from France, under the command of the Prince of Soubiſe, which at the ſame time was employed in the reduction of Cleves, Meurs and Guelders, &c. after which ſervice, it was ordered to join the Imperial army of execution, againſt the King of Pruſſia and his allies. A. D. 1757.

But ſuch was the equity and precaution of his Britannic Majeſty to give no real cauſe, or appearance of provocation, to any power, to invade his German dominions, that in theſe circumſtances, when a formidable French army was advanced to their frontiers, his Majeſty would not ſuffer his troops to take the field, till he had publiſhed to The equity of his Britannic Majeſty.

[c] See the note on page 127. Vol. II.

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the world the juſt motives, which compelled him to repel force by force, and to defend him againſt the invaſion of his enemies by thoſe means, Providence had put in his power.

His motives, as Elector of Hanover, for appearing in arms.

" His Britannic Majeſty, Elector of Brunſwick Lunenburg, on this occaſion declared, That he had uſed his utmoſt endeavours to prevent the war, which had riſen between him as King of Great Britain and the crown of France, and to accommodate the differences, which occaſioned it, by way of negociation: That when he found theſe endeavours to be ineffectual, he ſtill laboured to keep the war, which he could not prevent, within narrow bounds, that it might not interrupt the tranquility of his dominions in Germany, much leſs the other States of Europe, who had no concern in the quarrel: That in conſequence of this pacific diſpoſition, and becauſe in autumn, 1755, it was become more probable than ever, that France, to revenge the ſuppoſed injuries, which ſhe had received from his Britannic Majeſty, would attack his dominions in Germany, his Majeſty in the beginning of the year 1756, concluded a treaty with the King of Pruſſia, by which he had great reaſon to hope his pacific deſigns would have been rendered effectual; as by this treaty, purſuant to the deſign of it, it was probable the King of France would be diſappointed in his views [d]: and

[d] This leads us to the reaſon of our ſubſidiary treaty with Ruſſia in 1755, which by this aſſertion, appears to have been made with a view to prevent any attempt upon Hanover, by the King of Pruſſia in alliance with France. See Vol. I. p. 134, 135, 202, 203, 255, 256.

though

though a new war [e] has broken out unexpectedly [f], A. D. 1757.
ſince that time his Majeſty had carefully avoided taking any part in it. That it was impoſſible for the diſpaſſionate and impartial, after conſidering the conduct of his Britannic Majeſty on this occaſion, not to ſee the injuſtice of all the motives and pretences of France for invading the electorate of Brunſwick, which is under the protection of the Empire: That, if theſe pretences were founded upon the war, which had broke out between England and France, it would be eaſy to ſhew, that this war, both with reſpect to its cauſes, and its end, is entirely foreign to his Majeſty, as Elector of Hanover, and to his Hanoverian dominions: and that as to the ſecond war, which had been kindled in Germany, the crown of France, as guarantee of the treaty of Weſtphalia, had not the leaſt pretence on one hand, to act againſt the States before-mentioned, ſo long as his Majeſty cannot be charged with any breach of the ſaid peace; and on the other, France, as an ally and auxilliary of the Empreſs Queen, cannot juſtly act againſt a member of the Empire, who is not at war, nor has the leaſt difference with her Imperial Majeſty. But that, as France has notwithſtanding entered the Empire on the ſide of Weſtphalia, with a numerous army, which after hav-

[e] Between the King of Pruſſia and the Empreſs Queen, and her allies.

[f] As to his part: for his Britannic Majeſty declared his total ignorance of any ſuch intention of the King of Pruſſia's invading Saxony and Bohemia, till it was actually done. See p. 80.

A. D. 1757. ing garriſoned the Imperial city of Cologne, is advancing farther and farther into the Electoral States of Brunſwick; as it has already entered and raiſed contributions in the Biſhoprick of Munſter; and as his deſigns againſt the eſtates of his Britannic Majeſty in Germany, are too manifeſt to be doubted, he was compelled by indiſpenſible neceſſity, to aſſemble and march an army to avert, with the aſſiſtance of the Moſt High, all violence, injuſtice and uſurpation, upon his own eſtates and thoſe of his neighbours: That, to prevent the ill conſequence of falſe and artful inſinuations, his Majeſty thought it highly requiſite thus to declare to the whole world, that he was very far from having conceived any deſign to act offenſively againſt any of the States of the Empire, or even againſt the crown of France: and that by the armament, and the march of his troops, to which he was compelled, he had no view, nor deſire, but to repreſs by the divine aſſiſtance all invaſion, violence and hoſtilities; and, if ſuch ſhould happen, to do, as an original member of the Empire, what ſhall be juſt in the ſight of God and of man, and what is required of him by the ſtates, which the Almighty has placed under his protection: That he was confident, no perſon could miſtake or miſinterpret that conduct, into which he had been forced upon the principles of ſelf-defence: and that he particularly confided in the faith and friendſhip of his co-eſtates in the Empire, that they would not diſcountenance his views in their favour, of keeping the calamities of war at a diſtance

ſtance from their frontiers; but that they would rather facilitate and ſupport them: that being well aſſured his Majeſty's troops would obſerve the moſt exact diſcipline, he hoped, they would in return, give them proofs of their good will, particularly by furniſhing them, for ready money, with ſuch proviſions and forage, as they ſhould want: and laſtly, that they would not furniſh his enemies with theſe or any other neceſſaries, or accommodations, that might be prejudicial to his Majeſty's dominions or their own." A. D. 1757.

The army of obſervation.

This declaration was immediately followed by aſſembling the army of obſervation, which conſiſted of Hanoverians, Heſſians and ſome other leſs reſpectable States, to the amount of 40,000 men, under His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, who eſtabliſhed his head quarters at Bielfeldt, and there concerted the plan of operations with the general officers, that were to act under him. But what could be expected from ſo weak a force, and a meaſure, which by no means could be ſaid to be agreeable to the Engliſh, at whoſe expence this army was to be ſupported; and at a juncture of time, the more unfortunate for ſuch an undertaking, as it was to be carried into execution and ſupported by the old miniſtry reſtored, whoſe credit with the nation was ſo entirely ſunk, and whoſe attachment to continental meaſures, at the riſk of their national intereſt, had been ſo often proved, that every wheel of the ſtate turned heavily from the day they reſumed the management of public affairs.

Under what difficulties it laboured.

A. D. 1757.

The conduct of the new miniſters.

The diſintereſtedneſs of that part of the miniſtry, which had been called to the helm, in the late promotion, appeared on every occaſion, in the ſenate and in the cabinet. Great counſellors of ſtate (whoſe predeceſſors had made it a conſtant rule to maintain their power by conſulting the inclinations and paſſions of their ſovereign, and patronizing no meaſure either in parliament, or at the council board, but what tended to extend the prerogative, and to bring the people into a ſtate of dependency upon the crown) who were determined to ſhew, that, as they had not bargained for their places, nor ſurrendered their principles by capitulation, he is the beſt ſervant of the crown, that maintains his independency and candour in office, with the ſtricteſt regard to the intereſt of his country. Thus the firſt time, for many years, the intereſt of the nation became the touchſtone of every meaſure propoſed by the adminiſtration. Men, that could not be tempted to depart from their integrity, that kept themſelves diſembarraſſed, and ſet no further value upon their power, than it enabled them to ſerve their King and country, debated every meaſure in the preſence of their ſovereign, without fear of his diſlike and reſentment; and in parliament they remembered, that they ſate in that auguſt houſe, not as ſervants to the crown, but as repreſentatives of the people, and guardians of their liberty and property; and that it was their duty to oppoſe every deſign, which appeared prejudicial to the ſubject.

However,

However, this behaviour expoſed the patriot miniſters to great miſrepreſentations by their aſſociates out of the old miniſtry, who ſtill continued about the throne, and made their addreſs to his Majeſty by exaggerating the oppoſition to thoſe meaſures, eſpouſed moſt warmly by his Majeſty, in behalf of his Electoral dominions, and injuriouſly repreſenting the new miniſters to be lukewarm in promoting other meaſures, which the national ſervice required. So that by opportunity and importunity, and by conveying falſe ideas, injurious to the characters of Mr. PITT and his adherents, in the late promotions to the miniſtry, they obtained their peremptory diſmiſſion from their ſeveral offices; at a conjuncture of time, when wiſdom, integrity and firmneſs were more neceſſary than ever.

A. D. 1757. Mr. PITT reſigns the ſeals.

A pen cannot depict the preſent deplorable ſtate of the nation in this real diſtreſs; without anally, but who required powerful aid from us; engaged in a war with the moſt formidable enemy in Europe, and in a war hitherto unſucceſsful; without any ſyſtem in its councils for carrying on the war to effect, and with a miniſtry in whom the nation could not confide: when the military virtue of our anceſtors ſeemed to be degenerating for want of proper diſcipline and ſervice; our operations againſt the enemy at a ſtop, and the rage of faction was every where conſuming the little remains of patriotiſm.

The deplorable ſtate of the nation.

At court the enemy ſeemed to be entirely forgot. There was no attention to any thing, but who could get, and keep the beſt places. The

A. D. 1757.

enemy was permitted to execute every plan, without oppoſition: and, if it may be equitable to judge from circumſtances, that can be proved by events; there was great reaſon to ſuſpect that Mr. PITT's plan againſt Louiſbourg, was not kept with that ſecreſy, amongſt the parties entruſted with its deſtination, as becomes a cabinet-council: nor carried ſo unanimouſly in the cabinet, as to prevent any private intrigue to render it abortive. For, the equipment of this armament was by one means or other delayed till it was too late, either to attack Louiſbourg, or to favour any plan of operations by Lord Loudon and the Provincials, on the continent of North America. This fleet did not get from Cork before the 8th of May; and then, inſtead of Admiral Hawke, it ſailed under the command of Admiral Holbourne. Our attention to the ſecurity of our ſettlements in North America might be eaſily foreſeen by the French. But the plan for taking Louiſbourg, which we ſhall ſee was the principal object of the French armament at this conjuncture to prevent, could ſcarce have entered their thoughts, had it not been intimated to the enemy; and, perhaps, as ſoon as it had been reſolved upon at St. James's; or it would have been impoſſible to have provided ſo expeditiouſly for its defence.

Treachery ſuſpected.

Fleet delayed.

Attack of Louiſbourg reſolved upon.

The reſolution to attack Louiſbourg, at the ſame time the French were to be driven from the Ohio, and their other encroachments on the continent of North America, was taken ſoon after his Majeſty committed the direction of his national affairs

affairs to Mr. PITT: and the preparations were begun to carry it into execution ſoon after Chriſtmas. The French, truly ſenſible of the importance of Louiſbourg, immediately equipped, with the utmoſt expedition, three ſeveral ſquadrons to cover and defend Louiſbourg, and to ſtrengthen their forces on the continent. One, of nine ſhips, ſailed from Breſt on the 30th of Jan. 1757, with a body of troops on board, under the command of M. de Beaufremont; who ſteered for the Weſt Indies to reinforce the French garriſons in that quarter, and to wait the firſt opportunity to get into Louiſbourg after the breaking of the ice. This was followed by another ſquadron of five ſhips, which ſailed under M. du Riveſt, about the beginning of April, with a number of troops, warlike ſtores and proviſions on board, from Toulon; eſcaped Admiral Saunders ſtationed off Gibraltar, and arrived at Louiſbourg on the 4th of June. A third, conſiſting of 14 ſhips, ſailed on the 3d of May, (a week before Holbourne departed from Cork) under the command of M. du Bois de la Mothe, from Breſt, with a number of ſoldiers on board, and preſents for the Indians, and arrived at Louiſbourg on the 29th of June; whereas the Engliſh fleet did not arrive at Hallifax, the place of rendezvous, before the 9th of July; when both the ſeaſon, and the ſuperior ſtrength of the enemy, made it impracticable to carry Mr. PITT's vigorous and ſeaſonable plan into execution, with any hopes of ſucceſs.

A. D. 1757.

How prevented.

There

A. D. 1757.

There were three factions now formed amongſt the great men of the nation: Of which it will be neceſſary to obſerve, That one of them, which had the greateſt parliamentary intereſt, and the greateſt intereſt alſo with the monied people, conſiſted of ſuch as had grown into place and power under the old miniſtry; were greatly reſpected by the King, for their long and adulating ſervices and compliances; but weak in ſome material points; and not at all popular.—Another faction, whoſe parliamentary ſtrength was much inferior to the former, had the character of better abilities, and an intereſt at one court able to balance that of the old miniſtry, by means of a then powerful connection; yet they were more unpopular; and that very powerful connection made them much leſs reſpected at another court; and ſtill worſe with the generallity of the people; whoſe jealouſies had been induſtriouſly raiſed and increaſed by ſarcaſtical hints and whiſpers. A third faction formed itſelf, without the aid of parliamentary, or court influence; almoſt entirely upon the popularity of their leader, whoſe abilities recommended him to their eſteem, who had no other views than a redreſs of grievances. His eloquence and diſintereſtedneſs could not be denied by his enemies: and the nation placed their whole dependance upon his wiſdom, integrity and love for his country.

Three factions in the ſtate.

Theſe factions differed extremely in regard to power: though the two former were near agreed in the general ſcheme of their politics. They looked upon the increaſe of power in France, as

the

the greateſt of all evils: and therefore thought it abſolutely neceſſary to maintain a balance of power, or to ſeek the ſafety and liberty of Great Britain in the general ſafety and liberty of Europe. This ſyſtem had drawn them, many years, into cloſe connections with the powers on the continent, by large ſubſidies and inconſiſtent treaties, and even by fighting their battles in foreign quarrels. This furniſhed an argument for a ſtanding army: and prevailed with them to employ our navy in ſubſerviency to the continental ſyſtem. They were alſo peculiar in their notions about our conſtitutional liberty. Both parties declared againſt arbitrary power, and admitted the uſefulneſs of parliaments. They pretended to be ſtanch friends to the conſtitution; and ſtrenuous aſſertors of the legal rights of the people: But, under a miſtaken notion of government, they deviated into the very principles and practices, they publickly diſavowed. They threw the ballance of power into the crown, which our conſtitution requires to be equal in all its parts. They, for this purpoſe, extended the influence of the court by creating numerous lucrative places and employments at the diſpoſal of the crown. By the means of theſe places, they ſecured a majority in parliament; and ſo long as they could preſerve this majority, they gave themſelves no concern about the eſteem and approbation of the people. It was aſſembled to raiſe money for them, to do as they pleaſed with it; and that judicature, which ought to be a terror to bad miniſters, ſkreened them from puniſhment, A. D. 1757.

A. D. 1757. niſhment, if impeached by the nation for their miſconduct.

The third, which, for diſtinction ſake, let us call the popular party, did alſo think it neceſſary to ſet bounds to the power and influence of France, amongſt the neighbouring ſtates: But theſe differed much about the means; and were for making the operations, of which neceſſity, or ſound policy, might oblige Great Britain to take a part in, upon the continent, to be entirely ſubſervient to our naval ſtrength, as a more natural and leſs expenſive plan of politicks. They ſaid, that they could depend in the moſt hazardous and deſperate ſervice, on the naval commanders: becauſe their way of life, and natural ferocity of manners, ſecured them from that luxury and effeminacy, (which is the corruption of thoſe, who abuſe their leiſure in dreſs, gaming and female intrigues) and inſtilled into them a ſpirit of duty and glory. So that, the fleet being the natural ſtrength of this nation, their thirſt after conqueſt and fame is the ſame as the people's at home, who act upon national principles.

It was urged in defence of this ſyſtem, That our ſituation, as an iſland, preſcribes to us a conduct very different from all other nations: That our ſtrength and our ſupport is in our navy and trade; and that, as they mutually ſupport each other, they ought to go hand in hand. But that, if we abandon our natural element, we ſhould then turn our back to our real intereſts, and enter into an inextricable labyrinth of continental

poli-

politicks: if we take a ſhare in every controverſy; if we conſume our treaſure in retaining the friendſhip of petty princes and ſtates; if we laviſh Britiſh blood in German quarrels; we are ſo far from attacking France, to our advantage, that we expoſe ourſelves to ruin by our ill-judged efforts, on the ſtrong ſide of the enemy. A. D. 1757.

They further argued, That while Great Britain preſerves a ſuperiority at ſea, there can be no danger ariſe from the ſuperiority of the French on the continent: that we can always cut the ſinews of the enemy's ſtrength, by deſtroying their trade and commerce; that there can be no fear of an invaſion, from the country that has no marine to ſupport it: that a ſtanding army of mercenaries is dangerous to freedom; and might be made uſeleſs by a well-regulated militia: and that a government, like ours, connected by its very eſſence with the liberty of the ſubject, can never be in want of paliamentary influence, bribery and corruption, or any other ſupports of deſpotic power. For, where rulers govern well, the people will do their duty.

How the public eſteem increaſed for Mr. PITT.

Great as the eſteem had been for the right honourable gentleman, who was at the head of this party, before his late promotion to the important truſt of the ſteerage of the ſtate; it was moſt ſurpriſingly enhanced by his conduct, and the union of parties brought about by his wiſdom, during his ſhort adminiſtration. The healing balſams, he was continually pouring out of the abundance of love for his country, had already cured her wounds, revived

A. D. 1757. revived her ſpirits, and made her ready to face the enemy in the moſt advantageous and promiſing manner. The more benefit was received through his counſel and direction, the more odious his predeceſſors in office and truſt appeared in the opinion of the public. So that at his diſmiſſion from the direction of the national affairs, it would be difficult to affirm, whether the voice of the nation echoed more in his, and in the praiſe of his aſſociates in office and diſgrace; or in the accumulative invectives thrown out by all degrees againſt them, whom they had diſliked and complained of before, for their mal-adminiſtration, and to whom they now imputed all the misfortunes, which were expected to follow this change in the miniſtry.

Its effects on the old miniſtry.

Why Mr. PITT had been taken into the miniſtry.

It appeared now moſt evidently, That the faction, againſt whom the addreſſes to the throne had delivered themſelves ſo openly, had been compelled to take Mr. PITT and his adherents into the miniſtry, to prevent the conſequences of thoſe inſtructions, which the people had given to their repreſentatives in parliament. For, had his Majeſty been prevailed upon, by the votes or addreſſes of his parliament, to diſmiſs his timid, inactive and inglorious miniſters from all places of truſt, and from his councils and preſence, there muſt have been an entire end of their power. By this means they prevailed with the people to puſh them no farther; and by the ſame means they perſuaded his Majeſty, That they would not oppoſe his inclination to ſatisfy his ſubjects. But

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when the *old ones* had thus managed the nation, in regard to their own ſafety; their grand point was to make this change ſubſervient to their principal object; which was, to ruin their new aſſociates, in the ſtate, in the opinion of the people, and, at all events, to keep the King in a continual diſlike and jealouſy of their counſels and meaſures. When they could be thus abaſed in the opinion of the public and of the King; it would then have been moſt eaſy for theſe to reſume their power, and the adminiſtration, without any oppoſition from the deceived nation. A. D. 1757.

But how egregiouſly were theſe ſtateſmen out of their politicks in this affair, as well as in regard to the nation. The patriots ſo conducted themſelves in place, that they loſt none of their popularity. Their virtues became more conſpicuous, more admired, more univerſally known: though their ſteady oppoſition to the old ſyſtem of neglecting our natural ſtrength, and the national intereſt, to enter into, and eſpouſe the quarrels of our neighbours, where we can have no intereſt, gave their aſſociates in power a handle to ruin them in the King's eſteem; whoſe regard for his native country filled him with too great a deſire to ſupport Hanover and its dependences, at all events, and at the riſk of the Britiſh intereſt. Diſappointed.

Thus, when his Majeſty had been worked up to a pitch of diſſatisfaction, and to a reſolution to diſmiſs Mr. PITT, Mr. Legge, Lord Temple, &c. from his ſervice; the people, always grateful to their benefactors and friends, received them Honours paid to the diſgraced miniſters.

A. D. 1757. with the greateſt tokens of approbation, for their diſintereſted conduct, their firm attachment to the true intereſt of their country, and their unequalled abilities. The higheſt mark of an Engliſhman's bleſſing, above other nations, is his liberty: and the moſt generous token of the people's regard and love for theſe patriots was immediately ſignified by preſentations of their freedom, from the moſt populous, moſt opulent and reſpectable corporations; with addreſſes of thanks to Mr. PITT and Mr. Legge, for their integrity and ſervices, incloſed in gold boxes, or ſome other elegant materials, enriched with emblems, conveying the ſentiments of their approbation and gratitude [g].

Old miniſtry reſtored. In the mean time ſome of the leaders in this removal, and in the late adminiſtration, reſumed the

[g] It was moved in the common-council of the city of London, to preſent the freedom of that city to the Right Honourable William Pitt, late one of his Majeſty's principal ſecretaries of ſtate; and to the Right Honourable Henry Bilſon Legge, late chancellor of his Majeſty's exchequer, in teſtimony of the grateful ſenſe, which the city of London entertained of their loyal and diſintereſted conduct, during their truly honourable, though ſhort adminiſtration; their beginning a ſcheme of public œconomy, and at the ſame time leſſening the extent of miniſterial influence, by a reduction of a number of uſeleſs placemen: their noble efforts to ſtem the general torrent of corruption, and to revive, by their example, the almoſt extinguiſhed love of virtue, and our country: their zeal to promote a full and impartial enquiry into the real cauſes of our late loſſes in America and the Mediterranean: And, laſtly, their vigilant attention to ſupport the glory and independency of Great Britain, the honour and true intereſt of



The Right Hon.ble HENRY BILSON LEGGE.



the reins of government: But there was no ſettled miniſtry. A new board of admiralty, indeed was formed, with the Earl of Winchelſea at its head. Mr. Legge was ſucceeded in the exchequer by Lord Mansfield: but no one was appointed in the place of Mr. PITT. And the contention now grew ſo ſtrong about power, and the diſpoſal of places belonging to the crown, that the parties, who had ſo carefully guarded their royal maſter from the approaches of their rivals in the miniſtry, attended ſo induſtriouſly to their particular intereſts, that they neglected the avenues to the throne, and ſuffered the general voice of the people to plead their own cauſe of complaint, and to ſound the praiſes of the diſgraced ſervants of the crown, in the royal ear. On the contrary, the affairs of the court party became ſo deſperate, that they openly encouraged bribery and corruption; and did not ſtick at ſpeaking and writing againſt all principles of morality and virtue, and in favour of political vice; aſſerting, that the moſt baſe acts of corruption, villainy and deceit are neceſſary in the government of a ſtate or commonwealth.

A. D. 1757.

Their conduct.

The Spaniards, who had begun to conduct themſelves with more circumſpection and reſpect towards the Engliſh, under Mr. PITT's adminiſtration [h], reſumed their partial and unjuſt pro-

Behaviour of the Spaniards.

of the crown, with the juſt rights and liberties of the ſubject; thereby moſt effectually ſecuring the affections of a free people to his Majeſty and his illuſtrious family.

[h] See page 28. Vol. II.

A. D. 1757. ceedings againſt the Antigallican and her prize, as ſoon as it was underſtood at Madrid, that the old miniſtry had driven him from the ſeat of government, and that there was no longer any fear of our reſentment [i].

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[i] See page 29. Vol. II.

The Spaniards were ſo far influenced by Mr. PITT's remonſtrances, in this caſe, that an order was given by his moſt Catholic Majeſty, to re-deliver the prize to the Engliſh.

On the advice of this order from the Spaniſh court, the proprietors of the Antigallican privateer wrote the following letter to the Right Honourable Mr. PITT, though he was, at that time, diſmiſſed from the office of principal ſecretary of ſtate.

SIR,

We the managers and owners of the private ſhip of war the Antigallican, together with the laudable aſſociation of Antigallicans, eſtabliſhed at the Lebeck's-head in the Strand, muſt think ourſelves loſt to all ſenſe of honour, of gratitude, and concern for our country, were we not to take the earlieſt opportunity to return you our ſincereſt thanks, for your ſeaſonable and ready execution of his Majeſty's orders on our behalf, in regard to our ſhip and prize, which have been ſo long detained in the bay of Cadiz, by the cruel, treacherous, and partial behaviour of the governor, after killing and wounding ſeveral of the men, and impriſoning our officers and the reſt of our crew, in open violation of the moſt ſolemn treaties, notwithſtanding ſhe was before legally condemned to us.

The eaſineſs of our acceſs to you, and your generous protection in our rights, and polite treatment in your office, filled every heart with joy rather to be conceived than expreſſed, as well knowing that your undertaking this affair was more than an omen of its ſucceſs.

Your whole behaviour in the affair has been ſo noble, ſo ſteady, and uniform, that we are at a loſs where to admire you moſt, in the deſign, the proſecution, or the event.

Believe

A. D. 1757.

State of the northern powers.

The northern powers erected their creſts, and threw out ſeveral hints, no ways agreeable to the intereſt and dignity of Great Britain, under the plauſible colour of maintaining the peace of the north. The Ruſſians made no ſcruple of their reſolution to expreſs their diſlike of the Britiſh alliance with Pruſſia, and to join the confederacy againſt the King of Pruſſia, and had already entered and committed hoſtilities in that King's dominions. The Swedes were enliſted under a French ſubſidy, and had declared their readineſs to favour the deſigns in Germany, by the moſt vigorous diverſion, in their declining power, on the ſide of Pomerania. The King of Denmark only preſerved ſome appearance of a pacific and neutral temper; but was far from being depended upon, ſhould he meet with an opportunity to avail himſelf and his dominions, by taking part with

Believe us, Sir, when we ſay, that after paying our moſt profound duty to his Majeſty on this occaſion, we think ourſelves bound in gratitude to acknowledge you as the next immediate cauſe of the reſtitution of our ſhip and prize; and we do with true ſincerity of heart moſt ardently wiſh and pray, that his Majeſty may never want a miniſter like you, to hear with impartiality, to adviſe with candour and judgment, and with the moſt ſteady reſolution to procure a proper redreſs for the grievances of his Majeſty's ſubjects. We are, with the utmoſt deference and reſpect, Sir,

Lebeck's-head, 15 April, 1757.

Your moſt obliged, and Moſt obedient humble ſervants.

Compare this letter with the advice ſent from the Engliſh ambaſſador at Madrid, page 29. Vol. II. and you will find, that the expectations of the proprietors were well founded.

A. D. 1757. the grand confederates, who began to be equally offenſive to Heſſe and Hanover, as to the King of Pruſſia. And the Emperor was accelerating, as much as the nature of his office would permit, the aſſembling an army of the circles, which, under the name of an army of execution, was intended to favour and even to join the Auſtrians, French and Ruſſians [k]. The French were driving the army of obſervation before them; their arms diffuſed terror wherever they marched, and there was not a court in Europe, where their intereſt had not ſuperceded that protection and reſpect the Britiſh nation had a right to demand in neutral ports and ſtates.

Of North America. Our affairs in North America were ſtill upon the declivity of deſtruction, and by the advices received in the ſpring it appeared that they ap-

[k] The colleges of the empire acknowledge the juſtice of the complaints addreſſed to them by the Emperor and the Empreſs-Queen, concerning the King of Pruſſia's invaſion of Bohemia and Saxony. They approved the Emperor's conduct on this occaſion, as having been entirely conformable to the laws and conſtitutions of the empire, to the ordinance of execution, to the peace of Weſtphalia, and to his Imperial Majeſty's capitulation. They agreed that proper methods muſt be taken to re-inſtate the King of Poland in the poſſeſſion of his hereditary countries, and procure him a full indemnification for the prejudice he has ſuffered, and alſo to procure for the Empreſs-Queen the ſupport and ſatisfaction, which ſhe has a right to expect. At the ſame time the colleges of the empire reſolved, that all the circles of the empire ſhould treble their reſpective contingents, in order to gain theſe ends. *N. B.* The troops of the circles, by trebling the contingents, would have formed an army of above 100,000 men.

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proached nearer to the brink of ruin. For though Lord Loudon had diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his diligence and wiſdom in eſtabliſhing an harmony, to unite the provinces heartily in the common cauſe againſt the triumphing enemy; yet ſuch was the loſs of Oſwego, that the enemy were become maſters of all the lakes; and thereby poſſeſſed of every means, either to perſuade, or to compel the back Indians to deſert, and to fight againſt the Engliſh. This was followed by the loſs of the friendſhip or aſſiſtance of the Six Nations, whoſe communication was cut off by the impolitic demolition of the forts at the Great Carrying Place, and by the ſtopping up of Wood's Creek: and the delightful plantations on the German Flatts, and along the Mohawk river were immediately deſtroyed by fire and ſword. In a word, had not Fort William Henry, in which a conſiderable garriſon had been placed at the concluſion of the laſt campaign [1] been ſtrong enough to reſiſt the power of the French, who marched againſt it, early in the year, nothing could have prevented their over-running the whole continent of North America. A. D. 1757.

The garriſon of this fort was alarmed [m], and indeed ſurprized with a noiſe and a light, at a conſiderable diſtance down the lake, having kept no ſcouts, to watch the motions, nor ſpies to dive into the operations and intentions of the enemy: Fort William Henry ſtorm'd.

[1] See page 4. Vol. II.

[m] At about one o'clock in the morning of the 19th of March.

A. D. 1757. and in about two hours after, the enemy's whole army was perceived to advance regularly upon the ice towards the fort: but they were ſo warmly received with a briſk fire both of the artillery and ſmall arms of the garriſon, that the main body retreated; and, after making two fruitleſs attempts to ſet fire to a ſloop and the battoes belonging to the fort, they with-drew at day break, leaving behind them ſome ſcaling ladders and combuſtibles; though they conſiſted of near 2000 regulars, Canadians, and Indians, and were provided with 300 ſcaling ladders, and all the neceſſaries for a general aſſault.

However they ſoon after appeared again on the lake, and with parties on each ſide of it, diſpoſed in ſuch a manner as indicated a reſolution to ſurround the fort; but though they advanced with great bravery, for ſome time, through a continual fire of artillery and ſmall arms from the garriſon, they once more retreated, for that day.

On the 20th about midnight, they reſumed the attack; and it was reſolved to ſtorm the place with their whole army. But this proving alſo ineffectual, and being driven back, they, after ſetting fire to two ſloops, and burning moſt of the battoes, retreated at day-break.

Every thing appeared favourable, and about noon the French army ſeemed to take the rout to Ticonderoga. But all on a ſudden, two men were ſent back with a red flag towards the fort; from whence an officer and four men were diſpatched to meet them; and they brought in one of

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thoſe men, who had a letter from M. de Vaudreuil, commander of the French army, directed to the commanding officer of Fort William Henry, ſignifying "That he had ſent M. le Chevalier le Merceire, commander of the artillery, to acquaint them with his reſolution; and that he might give entire credit to what he ſhould ſay to him on his behalf." A. D. 1757. Summon'd to ſurrender.

M. le Mercier was the other perſon, and was now brought in blindfolded by another officer. His meſſage was, in ſubſtance, "That M. de Vaudreuil was averſe to the ſhedding of human blood, and ſhould be glad to put an end to the war: and therefore, for this good end, That, as the Engliſh, he ſaid, had been the aggreſſors, by incroaching upon his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's territories, and built forts on them, he propoſed that the ſaid forts might be delivered up in a peaceable manner: that the garriſon ſhould be allowed all the honours of war, and be permitted to carry away all their moſt valuable effects, requiring only that ſomething might be left to gratify the Indians, from whom they needed not be under any apprehenſion, as there were regulars enough to protect the garriſon from any violence that might offer: and concluded, that if theſe terms were not accepted, they would immediately make a general aſſault, which, ſhould they ſucceed, the garriſon muſt take the conſequence."

To which the commanding officer in the fort returned this anſwer to the French commander, "That his fixed reſolution was to defend his Ma- Bravely defended.

A. D 1757. jesty's garrison to the last extremity." M. le Mercier was then dismissed and conducted back blindfolded: and soon after his arrival at his own army, the French wheeled about; and every thing was made ready for a general assault. But neither the threats of the enemy, nor their superior numbers could intimidate the garrison, though at that time very sickly. The officers behaved with the greatest vigilance, care and resolution. The men were determined to die rather than yield. So that, upon the return of the enemy to the attack, they were very roughly handled, and driven back a second time with considerable loss. Nevertheless, as if this had been a service to be executed, at all events, the French commander once more returned to the assault; and in the night made a third general attack; but with no better success. He then set fire to several store-houses belonging to the provincial troops, and to all the huts of the rangers, which burnt with great fury, but did no further damage; and afterwards burnt a sloop on the stocks, and then totally disappeared with his army.

Dislike of the ministry continues. Nothing, but this gallant behaviour of a petty fort in the deserts of North America, offered to assuage the ferment of the nation. Every other circumstance served only to increase their indignation against the men, who had brought them into their ruinous condition; had got possession of the immense sums granted, last parliament, on the good opinion, the people entertained of the administration under Mr. PITT, and shewed the same

ſame diſpoſition to ſquander the public money, as they had done in the preceeding year, without due attention to the national ſtrength and intereſt. A. D. 1757.

" It is no wonder therefore that the people " cried aloud for redreſs, and vigorouſly ſup- " ported the minority, in whoſe wiſdom, and in- " tegrity they could ſafely confide. Here, ſays " a late author [n], were exhibited ſtrong proofs of " the natural ſpirit of a brave and free people, " who had been treated like ſlaves, by baſe arts " and the moſt abuſive language. It is a leſſon " that ought to be precious to princes, eſpecially " of this iſland; while ſuch men were in power, " as the people diſapproved, misfortune followed " misfortune, and the nation was divided and " diſtracted: but when ſuch men are employed, " as they do approve, unanimity, vigour and ſuc- " ceſs crown their efforts. Thus a King, acting " with his people, is all power and glory; but " without them he is nothing."

" Such was the diſconſolate face of affairs, when " the general voice of an abuſed people rouſed the " Great into fear; even thoſe who had treated the " general voice of the people, with contempt, " dreaded the rod of national vengeance; and " therefore, when the cries of injury became " louder and louder every day, from all parts of " the kingdom [and the partizans of L——r H——e made the intereſt of the family a common cauſe with that of the nation, and joined the cry of the

The national voice for Mr. PITT.

[n] See a Review of Mr. PITT's Adminiſtration, 3d edit. p. 24, 25.

people

A. D. 1757. people in the recommendation of Mr. PITT] "they thought it high time to quit their gaming "tables, and ſuffer a few honeſt, wiſe and vigilant "men, who had ſpirit enough to ſave this coun- "try from the deſtruction, into which the others "were going to tumble it, to approach the "throne." And it is very certain, that the re- ſtoration of Mr. PITT to the office of ſecretary of ſtate might have much ſooner taken place, had not that right honourable gentleman deſired to be ex- cuſed the ſervice, which, experience had taught him, was not to be performed with equal ſatisfaction to his king and to his country. Mr. PITT's aver- ſion to continental meaſures had brought him into diſgrace with his royal maſter; whoſe affections were naturally warped towards his native country. Theſe meaſures had always been the way for re- commendation to the royal favour; and yet al- ways the ruin of the national intereſt; and if, once more permitted to ſuperceed our country's cauſe, might prove the deſtruction not only of our colonies and trade; but alſo of the royal family on the throne. A foreſight, which was ſo evident to the court of the P——, that they unanimouſly, and with moſt ſolemn engagements to ſupport his meaſures and favour with the King againſt the faction, that had worked him out before, conjured Mr. PITT to reſume the ſeals; in- treating him, in the moſt prevailing manner, to ſave the family, to ſave the nation, by pre- venting the exceſs of meaſures, which the failings of the —— had made unavoidable, and by turn-

His aver- ſion to con- tinental connec- tions.

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ing, what could not be avoided in the local attachments, to ſome national advantage. A. D. 1757.

Here we find a temperament to prevent the misfortunes, that might ariſe from the two extremes, between *all* attention to the continent, and *no* attention. It was now propoſed to gratify the Prince upon the throne, not with engaging in all the buſineſs of the continent without reſerve, and ſo to plunge ourſelves into real evils out of dread of poſſible miſchiefs; but with aſſiſting our friends and allies, on the continent, in ways and means moſt agreeable to our inſular ſituation; which is, by way of diverſion with our fleets, and with ſuch land force and money, as our ſtrength and finances, our intereſt, and the importance of the quarrel, ſhall require. The temperament propoſed.

Thus we ſee when the nation was almoſt ruined by the conflict for power, Mr. PITT, quite retired from the noiſe of the world, quite diſembarraſſed, and content to enjoy the comforts of life without further honours, than the general approbation of his fellow-ſubjects, as well as the conſciouſneſs of having ſerved his King and country with wiſdom and fidelity, was ready to ſacrifice his private eaſe to the public trouble; that he might plead the cauſe of his country in the cabinet, as well as in the ſenate, and that he might give the —— the moſt convincing proof of his ſincere attachment to the intereſt of the family in poſſeſſion of the crown. And further it muſt be remarked, That Mr. PITT, by accepting of the ſeals, under theſe circumſtances, we apprehend, could not be charged

A. D. 1757. charged with any conſequences ariſing from continental meaſures, which were not in his power to prevent, in oppoſition to the King and the council; but only for thoſe meaſures, which he adviſed, or did not endeavour to make them ſubſervient to the intereſt of Great Britain.

Mr. PITT reſtored. The temperament being thus ſettled between the friends of our country and the family, with all due ſubmiſſion be it ſaid, Mr. PITT yielded to their intreaties, and a coalition was formed in the beſt manner the preſent circumſtances would permit; when it would have been impoſſible for any particular party to carry on the public buſineſs on its own ſingle bottom. A change in the adminiſtration was brought to paſs. The ſeals of ſecretary of ſtate were given to Mr. PITT [o]. The Duke of Newcaſtle was appointed firſt Lord of the treaſury. Mr. Legge chancellor of the exchequer. Lord Anſon was made firſt Lord of the admiralty. Lord Temple was appointed Lord privy-ſeal, and Mr. Fox was made paymaſter of the forces.

The commencement of his adminiſtration. Here we may date the beginning of Mr. PITT's adminiſtration: and it began with the only healing meaſure that could be purſued. The parties themſelves were ſatisfied, and ſo were their numerous friends: part of whom were put into offices of leſs importance. The miniſters condeſcended to an amicable capitulation in their ſeveral opinions, which they had violently puſhed in their ſeveral extremes; and from that moment

[o] On the 29th of June 1757.

the

the nation began to hope, the counſel to be unanimous, and ſpirit to revive amongſt the people; for, though they blamed the Lords at the head of the treaſury and admiralty board, and the paymaſter of the forces, for all their miſcarriages and misfortunes, their opinion of Mr. PITT's diligence and capacity obliterated the remembrance of paſt errors in his aſſociates, who ſeemed heretofore inflexibly oppoſite to him; and they truſted ſolely to his wiſdom, for the meaſures to humble France. A. D. 1757.

The miniſtry was not only eſtabliſhed in outward form, by this arrangement, but even in the hearts of men, as Bolinbroke ſays, by Mr. PITT being allowed to be the principal director of affairs, without his aſſuming to become a premier. The genius of England ſeemed to riſe with the adminiſtration, and a new ſoul diffuſed itſelf throughout all ranks of people; whoſe hearts burnt with reſentment to wipe out paſt diſgraces; and to reſtore the glory, honour and true character of their country [P]. Agreeable to the people.

The difficulties Mr. PITT had to encounter at his reſuming the ſeals, were greatly increaſed ſince his firſt appointment to the direction of public affairs, in December laſt. As the powers on the continent perceived ſuch diſtractions in our nation, ſuch diviſions amongſt the Great, and ſo little wiſdom and vigour in our councils; not only the Spaniards, but the petty ſtate of Malta, and the Difficulties increaſed in the adminiſtration.

[P] See review of Mr. PITT's adminiſtration page 25, 26, 27. Third edition.

Regency

A. D. 1757. Regency of Tuſcany, were ſpirited up by the gaſconades of France, and the example of Spain, in the forcible detention of the Antigallican and her prize, and thought themſelves ſafe from the reſentment of Great Britain, in their moſt partial actions towards our enemies: as appears in the caſe of the St. George private ſhip of war, Captain Fortunatus Wright, who in an Engliſh privateer was become the terror of the French in the Mediterranean [q]. One of his prizes, which he carried into Malta, was detained by that government, upon a falſe claim made by the French. And he was threatned by the Regency of Leghorn to be arreſted and his privateer to be ſeized, for doing no more than defending himſelf againſt two French privateers within the port of Ferraio: according to the account in the note below [r]. The delay of the American

[q] He had deſtroyed one privateer, diſabled another, and taken ten prizes.

[r] *Extract of a letter from Leghorn, March* 21.

"We adviſed you in our laſt of the departure of the St. George, Captain Wright, with four prizes, under convoy of the Jerſey man of war, for Cagliari and this place. We yeſterday received an expreſs from Porto Ferraio, acquainting us of the arrival there of a prize belonging to Captain Wilſon, and one of Captain Wright's, who parted with the convoy in a hard gale of wind. The inſolence of the French, tho' in neutral ports, heightens to the greateſt degree; as you'll think from the conduct of the captains of two French privateers that happened to be in Porto Ferraio on the arrival of the two afore-mentioned prizes; they immediately addreſſed the governor, requeſting him to order them for ſea, as being the captures of a pyrate; the governor's reply was, that as they

American armament, which he had ſo ſeaſonably adviſed and ſet a foot, had given the French an opportunity to counteract their intention: and at his re-appointment to the direction of public affairs, he found the enemy more powerful both in America, more formidable on the continent of Europe, and with a more reſpectable navy, than at the commencement of the war. The army A. D. 1757.

they came in under Engliſh colours, he would protect them, and ordered them, at their peril, to commit any violence; but they made light of the governor's orders, ſince by a veſſel arrived here to day we have advice of their attempt to cut out Captain Wright's prize: the two privateers got ready for ſea, with their anchors aboard, and ſent their boats to cut her cable: the captain of the prize had only time to get ſome muſkets loaded, they fired a volly at the boats, and killed one man; this alarmed the centinels, when notice was ſent to the governor, who immediately ordered the two privateers to depart, upon which they went to Porto Lungoni, in the ſame iſland: they mount 18 guns each, and there are three more privateers on the coaſt.——It is not ſurprizing that the French ſhould attempt to treat Captain Wright as a pyrate after the example ſet them by this government; and we are ſorry to acquaint you, that ſo far from obtaining any redreſs for the injuries done him here, to the amount of 300l. though we are aſſured the ſtrongeſt repreſentations have been made to the court of Vienna, Sir Horatio Mann has wrote our conſul word, that he muſt not think of coming into Leghorn, if he ſhould, they will ſeize the privateer and lay him under an arreſt. Theſe are the menaces from a neutral power to the Britiſh flag. The Malteze have detained one of Captain Wright's prizes on a falſe claim made by the French. Upon the whole, we don't know what he muſt undergo for having been ſo active againſt the enemies of his country, as to deſtroy one privateer, diſable another, and take ten prizes: ſuch is our miſerable ſituation in the Mediterranean!"

of

A. D. 1757. of obſervation, under His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland obliged to retreat before M. de Eſtrees. The Auſtrian army in Bohemia augmented to 100,000 men, under Prince Charles of Lorrain, aſſiſted by M. Brown. The Ruſſians under M. Apraxin, to the number of 60,000, and a ſtrong fleet in the Baltic, to co-operate with the army, were on the back of his Pruſſian Majeſty. Beſides the Swedes joined by 6000 Mecklenbourgers brought up the rear of thoſe great armies, which had taken the field to deſtroy, or reduce the heir of the Marquiſes of Brandenbourg, who for his great abilities had made himſelf hated by the Houſe of Auſtria.

Advantages ariſing from a treaty with Pruſſia.

The only favourable circumſtance to check the ambition and arms of France was the hopes conceived from our alliance with the King of Pruſſia; whoſe great abilities and valour filled the Engliſh with ſuch expectations from a ſtricter connection with him, ſince their own affairs teemed with diſgrace and ruin, that they naturally began to wiſh, and even to claim an extention of the treaty with Pruſſia, which hitherto was no more than a *convention of neutrality, for the defence of each others German dominions*, to a treaty of alliance with the King of Pruſſia, *whereby his arms, in conſideration of a ſubſidy, might be brought againſt France.* For, as the French had got the ſtart of us in North America, and ſeemed to be in a condition to wreſt that part of the new world entirely out of our poſſeſſion; they that were moſt ſanguine in the cauſe of our country grew more eager for an alliance with Pruſſia;

Pruſſia; that would, in their opinion, find employment for the arms of France at home, and deprive them of thoſe means, which were neceſſary to puſh their ſucceſſes in North America. A. D. 1757.

"Thus the former adminiſtration not only laid the foundation of an alliance with Pruſſia; but by the ill ſucceſs of our affairs under their direction, they ſo diſpirited the people, as to make them (even them, who have ſince declaimed againſt it) call out for an alliance with that monarch, who had been hitherto attended with ſucceſs. So that, if the alliance, which was afterwards made in conſequence of this humour, proved prejudicial to the intereſts of Great Britain; that prejudice or injury ought to be charged upon thoſe, who, by their miſmanagement, provoked the people to call for ſuch alliance, as the only hope of retrieving the ill ſtate of their affairs; and not upon the miniſter, who did all in his power to turn its advantage in favour of our American war [s]." The foundation of that treaty laid by the old miniſtry.

The King of Pruſſia in poſſeſſion of Saxony, and ſenſible of the ſtorm gathering againſt him, reſolved to make Dreſden his place of arms, and to bear the heat and burden of the war: for which purpoſe he immediately ſet about the improvement of its fortifications, under his own inſpection, and to fill the magazines and arſenals with the neceſſary ſtores and impliments of war. As to the reſt of this conquered Electorate: none were permitted to keep arms, but ſuch as actually King of Pruſſia's progreſs in Saxony.

[s] See a review of Mr. PITT's adminiſtration, page 20, 21, third edition.

A. D. 1757. took them up under the Pruſſian banner: the whole country was reduced to the greateſt ſtate of ſlavery: And as to the attempts of the Auſtrians, there were ſuch diſpoſitions made on the borders of Bohemia, that they covered his quarters and territories effectually from any inſults or ſurprize.

His motives for invading Saxony.

While every martial diſpoſition was carrying on with diligence, his Pruſſian Majeſty did not forget to publiſh his motives for invading Saxony, and attacking the Empreſs Queen. Accordingly he publiſhed a memorial, ſetting forth the conduct of the courts of Vienna and Saxony, and their dangerous deſigns againſt him, with the original documents in proof of them.

In this memorial it is declared, "That, the reaſons, which had laid the King of Pruſſia under the neceſſity of taking up arms againſt the court of Vienna, and of ſecuring the King of Poland's hereditary dominions, during the preſent war, were founded upon the ſtricteſt rules of juſtice and equity; not upon motives of ambition, or views of aggrandizement; but upon a ſeries of projects, conſpiracies and treachery, on the part of thoſe two courts, that had obliged his Majeſty to provide for his own defence and ſafety. That the diſcoveries he had made on this important ſubject, ſet this truth in a full light, and that the proofs, in his hands, amount to a demonſtration of the juſtice of his cauſe, and the wicked practices of thoſe, who have forced him to come to ſuch ſad extremities: and that his Majeſty thought it incumbent upon him to procure the originals of

thoſe proofs, copies of which had long ſince come to his knowledge; that he might put it out of the power of his enemies to deny the real exiſtence and truth of them. A. D. 1757.

His Pruſſian Majeſty begins his proofs with a treaty of *eventual* partition of his dominions between the courts of Vienna and Saxony, wherein the contracting powers, immediately after they had ſigned a treaty of peace, on 25 Dec. 1745, at Dreſden, in which the King of Pruſſia had given ſhining proofs of his love of peace, diſintereſtedneſs and moderation, combined to ſeize an opportunity to attack the King of Pruſſia and to divide his dominions [t]. He then exhibits a new treaty of

[t] 'To prove this the treaty itſelf is produced, which is in ſubſtance as follows:'—"Experience having but too well ſhewn how far the King of Pruſſia carries his evil intentions, in order to diſturb the repoſe of his neighbours; and that prince having, on the one hand, repeatedly invaded and laid waſte the dominions of her Majeſty the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia; and, on the other ſide, alarmed his Majeſty the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, by divers menaces, warlike preparations, and violently paſſing through his territories, for which it has not been poſſible to obtain due ſatisfaction for time paſt, nor ſufficient ſecurity for the future; it has been conſidered, that this double end cannot be obtained till the ſaid formidable neighbour is reduced within narrow bounds. For theſe reaſons, his Majeſty the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, as an auxiliary ally, and her Majeſty the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, as a party attacked and at war, have agreed, by the preſent ſeperate and ſecret act, to employ their joint efforts, not only to perform fully the act paſſed between their Majeſties the 6th [17th] of May 1744, and the meaſures concerted in conſequence of the engagements entered

A. D. 1757. of alliance propoſed by the court of Vienna to the court of Dreſden, in which was renewed the treaty

into by their treaty of alliance the 8th of January 1745, with the maritime powers; but likewiſe, that neither the one nor the other ſhall lay down their arms, till, beſides the conqueſt of all Sileſia and the county of Glatz, the King of Pruſſia be farther reduced.

And that they may previouſly underſtand one another, with regard to the partition of the conqueſts to be made, ſeeing the 8th article of the ſaid treaty of Warſaw only ſettled in general terms, that his Majeſty the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, is to partake of the advantages, by having ſuch territories as lie convenient for him; it has appeared neceſſary to diſtinguiſh the caſes that may hereafter happen, and come to a right underſtanding about each of them.

Suppoſe then, that beſides the recovery of all Sileſia and the county of Glatz, they ſhould conquer from the ſaid King the dutchy of Magdeburg, including therein the circle of Saal, the principality of Croſſen, with the circle of Zullichau belonging thereto, and the Fiefs of Bohemia poſſeſſed by that King, and ſituated in Luſatia; namely, Cotbus, Peits, Storckow, Beeſkau, Somerfeld, and other places and diſtricts belonging thereto. In this caſe, all Sileſia and the county of Glatz, excepting Swibus, muſt return to her Majeſty the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, who, in exchange cedes all the reſt juſt mentioned, with the diſtrict of Swibus, belonging otherwiſe to Sileſia, to his Majeſty the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony.

Suppoſing on the contrary, that beſides the recovering of all Sileſia and county of Glatz, they could conquer upon the aggreſſor no more than the circle of Saal, the principality of Croſſen, with the circle of Zullichau, and the above-mentioned Fiefs of Bohemia belonging to him in Luſatia; then his Poliſh Majeſty, Elector of Saxony, ſhall be content with this laſt partition and the diſtrict of Swibus, leaving in like manner to her Majeſty the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia,

all

treaty of Eventual Partition of the 18 May 1745. A. D. 1757.
And the court of Saxony, as he obſerves, thinking it neceſſary, in the firſt place, to give a greater conſiſtency to their plan, by grounding it upon an alliance between the courts of Ruſſia and Vienna; thoſe two powers did on May the 22d 1746 conclude a defenſive alliance at Peterſbourg: but that the oſtenſible part of it was drawn up merely with a view to conceal the ſix ſecret articles thereof from the knowledge of the public, the 4th of which was levelled ſingly at Pruſſia. In which treaty he admits that the Empreſs Queen of Hungary and Bohemia did ſet out with a pro-

all Sileſia and the county of Glatz, Swibus excepted. But ſuppoſe, in fine, that, contrary to all expectation, and in ſpite of the joint efforts above-mentioned, they could conquer, beſides the county of Glatz, and the whole of Sileſia, no more than the principality of Croſſen, with the circle of Zullichau, and the aboveſaid fiefs of Bohemia, poſſeſſed by the ſaid King in Luſatia: In this caſe, his Poliſh Majeſty ſhall have, beſides the principality, the circle and the fiefs juſt mentioned, the diſtrict of Swibus, otherwiſe belonging to Sileſia.

And her Majeſty the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, engages in the ſtrongeſt and moſt ſolemn manner, that his Majeſty the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, ſhall have preciſely the ſame ſecurities for theſe new acquiſitions, which ſhe ſhall or may have for the recovery of her antient patrimonial territories, that is to ſay, Sileſia and the county of Glatz.

To this end the Saxon troops of his Poliſh Majeſty ſhall remain in re-conquered Sileſia, till his ſtipulated ſhare be effected, at leaſt according to the laſt of the caſes above-mentioned. After which the high contracting parties ſhall reciprocally guaranty, &c.

Done at Leipſick, the 18th of May, 1745. (L. S.) AUGUSTUS R.

A. D. 1757. teſtation religiouſly to obſerve the treaty of Dreſden, but that her real way of thinking upon this point in the following words, in the ſame treaty: "If the King of Pruſſia ſhould be the "firſt to depart from this peace, by attacking "either her Majeſty the Empreſs Queen of Hun- "gary and Bohemia, or her Majeſty the Empreſs "of Ruſſia, or even the republic of Poland, in "all which caſes the rights of her Majeſty the "Empreſs Queen to Sileſia and the county of "Glatz, would again take place, and recover "their full effect; the two contracting parties ſhall "mutually aſſiſt each other with, &c. to con- "quer Sileſia, &c." extends the infraction of the treaty of Dreſden to any diſpute, that might ariſe between Pruſſia and Ruſſia, or Poland, and to be a ſufficient ground for a revival of the rights of the Houſe of Auſtria to Sileſia; though neither Ruſſia nor the republic of Poland are at all concerned in the treaty of Dreſden. But it is obvious, ſays he, that, by this article the court of Vienna has prepared three pretences for the recovery of Sileſia; and by comparing it with her conduct from that time it did viſibly appear, that ſhe thought to attain her end, either by provoking the King to commence a war againſt her, or by kindling one between his Majeſty and Ruſſia, or Poland, by her ſecret intrigues and machinations.

His Pruſſian Majeſty produces the inſtructions to the Saxon miniſters at Peterſbourg and Vienna, to prove the time when the Elector of Saxony was invited to acceed to this treaty, and the eager-

neſs

neſs with which he accepted that invitation[u]. And then makes this obſervation and inference: A. D. 1757.

as

[u] 'In theſe inſtructions, which are recited at large, are theſe remarkable particulars:' "As to the principal treaty between the two Imperial courts, the King is entirely diſpoſed to accede thereto, without any other reſtriction, than that of the number of troops, which they have reciprocally ſtipulated therein, for the ordinary caſes of giving ſuccours. But the King's acceſſion to the ſix ſeparate articles, five of which are ſecret, require much more reſtriction and adjuſtment, with regard to the King's conveniency.

As to the firſt ſecret articles, which concerns the guaranty of the Grand Duke of Ruſſia's poſſeſſions, as Duke of Holſtein-Sleſwick, and of his ducal houſe, the Empreſs of Ruſſia will be pleaſed to conſider how tenderly and cautiouſly the King muſt behave towards the court of Denmark, on account of his affinity and right of eventual ſucceſſion; and therefore the ſaid ſovereign, as well as the Empreſs Queen, and even the Emperor her conſort, will not, in return, refuſe the King and his poſterity the guaranty of the ſucceſſion to the throne of Denmark, which in time may fall to a Prince of the electoral houſe of Saxony.

And as to the fourth article, which regards eventual and ſtronger meaſures againſt a new, ſudden, and unexpected attack from the King of Pruſſia, the King acknowledges therein the prudent forecaſt of the two Empreſſes, in thinking beforehand how to concert matters together, and powerfully aſſiſt one another, if, contrary to better expectations, and notwithſtanding their ſcrupulous attention to obſerve their treaties with the ſaid Prince, the latter ſhould invade the dominions of either of them; and in this caſe the King is ready enough to concur in the ſame meaſures; but as he is the moſt expoſed to the reſentment of ſo formidable and reſtleſs a neighbour, witneſs the ſad experience his Majeſty has lately had of it; their Imperial Majeſties cannot think it ſtrange, that the King, before entering into ſuch a new, eventual, and extenſive engage-

A. D. 1757. as the court of Saxony does thus betray their readineſs to enter into all the offenſive engagements

ment, ſhould take better precautions, as well for his ſecurity and mutual defence, as for his being indemnified, and recompenſed in proportion to his efforts, and the progreſs made againſt ſuch an aggreſſor.

To this end the Count de Vicedom, and the Sieur Pezold ſhall aſk the Imperial miniſters plenipotentiaries, 1. What number of troops, in ſuch a caſe, their ſovereigns deſire of the King; and, in return, with how many will each of them aſſiſt him? And 2dly, That this ſuccour deſired of the King be not diſproportionate to the ſtrength of his army. 3. That the two Imperial courts muſt promiſe double the number to the King. 4. That the two Empreſſes muſt each engage to keep at leaſt ſuch a body of their troops, in a moveable condition, and ready to march to the aſſiſtance of his Majeſty, one upon the frontiers of Pruſſia, and the other in Bohemia. 5. That they likewiſe oblige themſelves to let the King come in for a ſhare of the priſoners, ſpoils, and conqueſts they ſhall make jointly, or ſeparately on the aggreſſor, and thereby the common enemy.

With reſpect to this laſt point, and the partition of the conqueſts to be made, the King's miniſters plenipotentiaries are to aſk the Ruſſian miniſter, what his ſovereign's offers are; and to declare, relative to the Empreſs Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, that ſuppoſing this Princeſs were attacked again by the King of Pruſſia, and ſhould recover not only Sileſia and the county of Glatz, but likewiſe ſucceed in reducing that aggreſſor within narrower bounds, the King of Poland, as Elector of Saxony, would abide by the partition ſtipulated between her and his Majeſty by the convention ſigned at Leipſic the 18th of May 1745, a copy of which the reſident Pezold received, encloſed in a letter from the miniſtry of the 14th of November following; excepting the third degree of partition defined therein, with which his Majeſty cannot be ſatisfied; ſince in caſe the Empreſs Queen ſhould be able to conquer, beſides

ments of the treaty of Peterſbourg; and as they have been ſince the peace, the revivers of the Partition treaty, made againſt the King during the laſt war; they had juſtified his Majeſty in reſenting a treaty made againſt him, notwithſtanding the general amneſty ſettled by the treaty of Dreſden; as appears from the opinion of the Saxon privy council; who upon being conſulted about this very fourth ſecret article on the 15 Aug. 1747 and the 17 Sep. 1748, gave it, as their opinion, "That the ſaid article exceeds the uſual "rules.—and if his Poliſh Majeſty ſhould approve "by his acceſſion, a principle [w] ſo repugnant to "the ordinary rules, the King of Pruſſia, ſhould "he hear of it, might charge him with a viola-"tion of the treaty of Dreſden, and their appre-"henſions from his Pruſſian Majeſty would great-"ly increaſe."

A. D. 1757.

beſides the county of Glatz and all Sileſia, no more than the principality of Croſſen, with the circle of Zullichau, and the Fiefs of Bohemia poſſeſſed by the King of Pruſſia in Luſatia, it would be neceſſary to grant eventually to the King, Elector of Saxony, a more conſiderable ſhare in thoſe conqueſts, than the ſaid principality, the circle, and the Fiefs: His Majeſty will wait for the offers of the court of Vienna on this head, and will order the Count de Loſs to negotiate thereupon; wiſhing only that the Ruſſian court would uſe its good offices to obtain, in this caſe, a better partition for the King from the Empreſs Queen, and then ſecure and guaranty to his Majeſty the acquiſition thereof.

(L. S.) AUGUSTUS R.
C. DE BR.
DE WALTHER.

Written at Dreſden, the 23d of May, 1747.

[w] That an auxiliary potentate is to be conſidered on the ſame foot as the belligerent power, &c.

A. D. 1757. He adds that Count Bruhl was ſo well apprized, and convinced of this truth, that he did all in his power, to conceal the ſix ſecret articles above-mentioned. For the proof of this he cites inſtructions to Count Loſs, the Saxon miniſter at Paris [x]. And, though continues his Majeſty the court of Saxony deferred their acceeding to the treaty, in form; they did not fail to aſſure their confederates, that they were ready to acceed to it, as ſoon as it could be done without too evident a riſk, and their ſhare of the advantages to be gained, ſhould be ſecured to them [y].

Several paſſages of letters were extracted in this memorial, one [z] from Count Flemming to Count Bruhl, in which it is ſaid, "That Count Uhiefield "had charged him to repreſent a-freſh to his "court, that they could not take too ſecure mea- "ſures againſt the ambitious views of the King "of Pruſſia, and that Saxony more eſpecially, as "being the moſt expoſed, could not be too cau- "tious in guarding againſt them; that it was of

[x] June 18, 1747.

[y] General d'Arnim, when he was going to Peterſbourg, in quality of miniſter from Saxony, was inſtructed to declare, "That (before his Poliſh Majeſty's acceſſion) the two Imperial courts ſhould promiſe him, in caſe of an hoſtile invaſion of his patrimonial dominions in Germany, a ſpeedy, ſure, and ſufficient aſſiſtance, by means of two armies to be always kept ready on the reſpective frontiers, which might be able to ſuccour him immediately, or to make a diverſion according to the exigency of the caſe; *and in fine, that the ſhare he is to have in the advantages that may be gained by good ſucceſs in war, be poſitively determined.*"

[z] Dated 28 Feb. 1753.

"the

" the higheſt importance to ſtrengthen their old " engagements, upon the footing propoſed by the " late Count Harrach in 1745, that this might be " done upon occaſion of the acceſſion to the treaty " of Peterſburg; or in any other manner, which " ſhould ſeem fitteſt for keeping it ſecret; and " that he thought the preſent ſituation of affairs " abſolutely required the allied courts to unite " cloſer than ever, ſo as, that *all ſhould anſwer for* " *each one, and each one for all.*" To which Count Bruhl anſwered [a], " That his Poliſh Majeſty was " not diſinclined to treat afterwards in the utmoſt " ſecrecy, with the court of Vienna, about ſuc- " cours, by private and confidential declarations, " relative to the 4th ſecret article of the treaty of " Peterſburg, provided reaſonable conditions and " advantages be granted him." And concludes, " That it is his previous opinion, that what was " promiſed by the Empreſs Queen's declaration [b] " of the 3d of May 1745, may ſerve for a baſis." —Another out of a diſpatch from Count Flemming to Count Bruhl, in which the former writes: " Your excellency knows the great objections, " which the court of Peterſburg made to us in the " laſt war, when we reclaimed the *caſus fœderis:* " and your excellency will alſo remember the an- " ſwer, which their miniſters gave us, when we " were preſſed to acceed to the treaty of Peterſ- " burg of 1746, and we ſhewed our willingneſs

A. D. 1757.

[a] Dated 8 March 1753.

[b] This is the very treaty of Partition, ſigned at Vienna on 3d May, and at Dreſden on the 18 May 1745.

" to

A. D. 1757. "to do it, upon condition *that we ſhould not appear* "*upon the ſtage, till after the King of Pruſſia ſhould* "*be attacked, and his forces divided*; that we might "not from the ſituation of our country hazard "our falling the firſt ſacrifice."—The following paſſage from the Sieur Funck's diſpatch of the 7 June 1753, "That having had the queſtion "put to him at Peterſburg, whether his court "would not take up arms, in caſe of a war with "Pruſſia; and having replied, That the ſituation "of Saxony did not permit it to enter the liſts, "till its powerful neighbour ſhould be beat out "of the field;" he was anſwered, "That he "judged rightly, For, *the Saxons ought to wait* "*till the knight was thrown out of the ſaddle.*"

Hence his Pruſſian Majeſty obſerved, That it is evident the court of Saxony, without having acceded to the treaty of Peterſburg in form, were not the leſs an accomplice in the dangerous deſigns, which the court of Vienna has grounded upon this treaty; and that, having been diſpenſed with by their allies, from a formal concurrence, they had only waited for the moment, when they might, without running too great a riſk, concur in effect, and ſhare the ſpoils of their neighbour.

In expectation of this period, continues the memorial, the Auſtrian and Saxon miniſters laboured in concert and privately, to prepare the means of putting their intentions into execution. And as it was laid down, as a principle in the ſecret treaty of Peterſburg, that any war whatever between the King and Ruſſia would authorize the

Empreſs

Empreſs Queen to re-enter and take Sileſia: there was nothing more to be done, than to ſpirit up ſuch a war. Therefore every art was uſed to embroil the King irreconcilably with the Empreſs of Ruſſia, and to provoke that Princeſs by all ſorts of falſe inſinuations, impoſtures and atrocious calumnies; as may be collected from ſeveral diſpatches and inſtructions to the Auſtrian and Saxon miniſters at Peterſburg.—Mr. Vicedom, the Saxon miniſter, informs, "That Baron Pretlack, mini-
"ſter from Vienna rejoiced, upon his having
"found means by confidential communications
"from his court, concerning various ſecret prac-
"tices of the King of Pruſſia to the prejudice of
"her Imperial Majeſty, to raiſe ideas in her,
"which had carried her enmity to the higheſt
"pitch; and that the two miniſters of Vienna
"and Saxony concerted together the means of
"bringing about an accommodation between the
"Empreſs Queen and France, in order that the
"former might be able to make head againſt the
"King of Pruſſia." Count Bernes [c] exaggerated the military arrangements of the King of Pruſſia: and affirmed that the court of Pruſſia was concerned in a plot hatching in Sweden againſt the perſon and life of the Czarina [d]. A. D. 1757.

He then produces vouchers from the Saxon miniſtry, who gave it as a general inſtruction [e] to keep up dextrouſly the diſtruſt and jealouſy of

[c] In a diſpatch of 6 July 1747.
[d] 12 Dec. 1749.
[e] Inſtructions to General d'Arnim in 1750.

Ruſſia

A. D. 1757. Ruſſia in regard to Pruſſia; and to applaud every arrangement made againſt the latter. So that they were conſtantly inſinuating that the King was forming deſigns upon Courland, Poliſh Pruſſia and the city of Dantzick:—that the courts of France, Pruſſia and Sweden were hatching vaſt projects, in caſe of a vacancy of the throne of Poland; and many more falſities of the ſame kind; ſo far as to affirm that he was endeavouring to ſet the Turk upon the back of Ruſſia.

He obſerves, That theſe calumnies and impoſtures did, at length ſucceed in inſnaring the Empreſs of Ruſſia's equity and good faith, and in prejudicing her againſt the King, to ſuch a degree, that by the reſult [f] of the aſſemblies of the ſenate of Ruſſia it was laid down for a fundamental maxim of the Empire, to oppoſe every further aggrandiſement of the King of Pruſſia, and to cruſh him by a ſuperior force, as ſoon as a favourable opportunity ſhould occur, and that this reſolution was renewed in a great council, in Oct. 1755, with a further reſolve, "To attack the "King of Pruſſia without any further diſcuſſion, "whether that Prince ſhould happen to attack one "of the allies of the court of Ruſſia, or one of "the allies of that court ſhould begin with him [g]." All which was received with inexpreſſible joy

[f] On the 14 and 15 May 1753.

[g] It was at the ſame time reſolved to erect magazines for 100,000 men, at Riga, Mittau, Lichau, and Windau. And they eſtabliſhed a fund of 2,500,000 rubles, and an annual fund of 1,500,000 rubles, for this ſervice.

"by

by Count Bruhl; who, in anſwer to Sieur Funck writes [h], "That the deliberations of the grand "council are ſo much the more glorious to Ruſ- "ſia, in that there can be nothing more beneficial "to the common cauſe, than previouſly to ſettle "the effectual means of deſtroying the over- "grown power of Pruſſia, and the undoubted "ambition of that court." And again [i] he explains himſelf as follows, "The reſult of the "grand council of Ruſſia has given us great ſatiſ- "faction: the confidential communication, which "Ruſſia is pleaſed to make of it, will enable all "their allies, *as well as our court*, to come to an "explanation about the arrangement, and mea- "ſures to be taken in conſequence thereof. But, "it cannot be taken amiſs, if Saxony, conſider- "ing the ſuperior power of its neighbour, pro- "ceeds with the utmoſt caution, and previouſly "expects its ſecurity from its allies, and to be "aſſiſted with the means of acting." A. D. 1757.

This memorial then ſets forth the panic, which ſeized this Saxon miniſter upon the convention of neutrality in Germany ſigned [k] between the courts of London and Berlin, which he was afraid would ſilence all his calumnies, and ſhake his iniquitous ſyſtem, and therefore redoubled his efforts in Ruſſia in order to prevent a good underſtanding between that court and the King of Pruſſia. "A

[h] Dated the 11th of November 1755.
[i] The 23d of November 1755.
[k] On the 16th of January 1756.

A. D. 1757. "reconciliation, says he [1], between the courts of "Berlin and Petersburg would be the most criti- "cal and the most dangerous event, that could "happen. It is to be hoped, that Russia would "not hearken to such odious proposals; and that "the court of Vienna will be able to thwart so "fatal a union." However, it appears from what follows, that there was no ground for Bruhl's fears. The court of Vienna had made sure of the Czarina, and imagining that the new connections, they had entered into, this year, would facilitate the recovery of Silesia, they took their measures accordingly. Russia, armed with great strength, both by land and sea, under pretence of a treaty with England, which required, at that time, no succours. Bohemia and Moravia were covered with troops, camps, magazines, &c. agreeable to a secret convention between the two Empresses; and discontinued till next year, for certain reasons. For, whoever attends to the correspondence of the Saxon ministers will find that Prussia was the real, whatever might be the apparent object of such armaments. A report was industriously propagated at Petersburg, from several parts, under the influence of the Austrian and Saxon ministers, "That the King of Prussia, under a "pretence of trade, was sending officers and en- "gineers, in disguise, into Ukraine, to recon- "noitre the country, and stir up a rebellion." Which, if believed, was, according to the treaty

[1] In his letter of the 23d of June 1756.

of

of eventual partition, a ſufficient ground for a rupture[m]. This had ſuch an effect, that the Ruſſian miniſter of ſtate aſſured ſecretary Paſſe, "That "his court would ſoon begin the war againſt the "King of Pruſſia, in order to ſet bounds to ſo "troubleſome a neighbour, and that the engage-"ments of his court with England, in regard to "the neutrality of Germany, did not concern the "Saxon league at leaſt, and that they would go "on their own way, in keeping to the ſenſe of "the ſubſidiary treaty with England[n]. That "they very much approved of the court of Vi-"enna's new connections with France; which "they wiſhed might extend ſo far, as to ſupport "the Empreſs Queen, in her attempts upon Pruſ-"ſia, and that the order for putting a ſtop to "the armaments of that Empire, was occaſioned "by the want of officers and ſeamen, magazines "and forage[o]." Count Flemming, the Saxon miniſter at Vienna, informs[p] his court of a conference he had with Count Kaunitz, concerning the armaments of Ruſſia, and the difficulty of maintaining thoſe great armies, and the dangers that might enſue a diſcovery of their real object, by that crafty and ſharp-ſighted Prince, the King of Pruſſia. In the courſe of which Flemming was made to underſtand, that thoſe armaments, whatever might be pretended in regard to en-

A. D. 1757.

[m] Sieur Praſſe's letter to Count Bruhl, 28th of April 1756.

[n] His letter of the 10th of May 1756.

[o] On the 21ſt of June.

[p] On the 12th of June 1756.

A. D. 1757. gagements with England, were made againſt Pruſſia: that money would not be wanting nor grudged, provided they knew how to make a proper uſe of it, and that, in caſe the King of Pruſſia ſhould fall ſuddenly upon his neighbours, he would meet with his match: "for that the Ruſſians were prepared at all events." But nothing could prove the inſincerity of the Auſtrian court more evidently than a letter from this ſame Count Flemming at Vienna, to Count Bruhl, the Saxon prime miniſter, dated June 9th 1756. in which it is ſaid with great aſſurance, that there was an eſtabliſhed concert between the two courts of Vienna and Ruſſia: that the latter, in order to diſguiſe the true reaſons of their armaments, made them under the pretence of being thereby in a condition to fulfil their engagements with England: and that when all the preparations ſhould be finiſhed, they were to fall unexpectedly upon the King of Pruſſia; and another letter, dated 28th of July, which ſets the ſyſtem of Vienna in a full light, at the bottom of the page [q].

This

[q] *Letter from Count Flemming to Count de Bruhl.*

SIR, Vienna, July 28, 1756.

M. Klingraffe received laſt Saturday an expreſs from his court, in conſequence of which he ſent a note the next morning to Count de Kaunitz, earneſtly entreating him to appoint an hour for a conference with him. This note was delivered to the chancellor of ſtate, juſt while he was in conference with the Marſhals Newperg and Brown, and Gen. Prince Piccolomini. And as he intended to wait upon the Empreſs Queen immediately after the conference, in order to make her a report

This letter, ſays the memorialiſt, proves, that by dictating the anſwer to his Sovereign; Count Kaunitz A. D. 1757.

port thereof, he ſent word to M. Klingraffe, that he was indeed obliged to go to Schœnbrunn, but nevertheleſs he would be obliged to him, if he would haſten to him that very inſtant; which the Pruſſian miniſter did not fail to do. Count de Kaunitz told me in confidence, at a converſation I had with him yeſterday morning, that M. Klingraffe, on his accoſting him, gave him to underſtand, with a certain embarraſſment mixed with uneaſineſs, that he had juſt received an expreſs from his court, who brought him ſome orders, the contents of which he was to lay before the Empreſs Queen in perſon, and for this purpoſe he was enjoined to demand a private audience of her Imperial Majeſty, which, he deſired, he would be pleaſed to procure for him. That he, Count Kaunitz, made anſwer, that being juſt ready to ſet out for Schœnbrunn, he willingly took upon him to demand the audience he deſired; but could not avoid letting him underſtand, that it was proper he ſhould be enabled, at leaſt in general terms, to give the Empreſs previous notice of the nature of the inſinuations he had orders to make to her Majeſty. Whereupon M. de Klingraffe told him, that he was charged to demand *amicably*, and by way of eclairciſſement, in the name of the King his maſter, what was the tendency of the armaments and military preparations making here, and whether they might not, perhaps concern him; which, however he could not imagine, as he did not know that he had given the leaſt occaſion for them. That he, Kaunitz, replied, that he could not juſt then make any anſwer to that overture; that he would not fail to make a report thereof immediately to the Empreſs, and procure him the audience he requeſted; that, nevertheleſs, he could not forbear telling him, that he was ſurpriſed at the explanation, which the King his maſter required, concerning the meaſures taken in this country, ſeeing this court had expreſſed no uneaſineſs or umbrage at the great movements and preparations, which had been previouſly obſerved in his army. This miniſter further

A. D. 1757. Kaunitz propoſed to ſhut the door againſt all means of explaining and conciliating matters; and

told me, "That having ſet out immediately after for Schœn-
"brunn, he had reflected by the way on the anſwer he ſhould
"adviſe his Sovereign to give M. Klingraffe; and having
"thought he perceived that the King of Pruſſia had two ob-
"jects in view, which this court was deſirous equally to avoid,
"viz. to come to conferences and eclairciſſements, that might,
"at firſt, cauſe a ſuſpenſion of the meaſures, which they judged
"neceſſary to be continued vigorouſly; and ſecondly, to lead
"matters further on, to other propoſitions and more eſſential
"engagements; he had therefore judged that the anſwer
"ought to be of ſuch a nature, as might entirely elude the
"King of Pruſſia's queſtion; and that, in leaving no more
"room for further explanations, it ſhould at the ſame time be
"reſolute and polite, without being ſuſceptible of any inter-
"pretation either ſiniſter or favourable. That purſuant to
"this notion, it appeared to him ſufficient, that the Empreſs
"ſhould content herſelf with ſimply anſwering, that in the
"violent general criſis Europe was now in, her duty and the
"dignity of her crown required her to take ſufficient meaſures
"for her own ſecurity, as well as for the ſafety of her friends
"and allies." That the Empreſs Queen had approved of this anſwer; and to ſhew that the King of Pruſſia's ſtep and demand did not occaſion the leaſt embarraſſment here, her Majeſty immediately ordered the hour of M. Klingraffe's audience to be fixed for the next day, which was the day before yeſterday; and after hearing that miniſter's propoſition, juſt as he had imparted it the preceding day to Count de Kaunitz, ſhe had anſwered him preciſely in the terms above-mentioned, and then ſuddenly broke off the audience with a nod, without entering into any further detail. It is certain that all Vienna, being then aſſembled in the Empreſs Queen's drawing-room, as it was a day of gala, ſaw M. Klingraffe enter, and depart in a very few minutes, with an embarraſſed countenance. I have all theſe particulars from the mouth of Count de Kaunitz, who

on

and at the ſame time, to purſue the preparations for his dangerous deſigns, in the expectation, that the A. D. 1757.

on this occaſion, has talked to me with more openneſs and confidence than he had hitherto done, and even charged me to make uſe of them in my diſpatches to your Excellency, but ſtill with the greateſt ſecrecy.

It is ſo much the leſs doubted that this anſwer, equally ſtrong and obſcure, will greatly puzzle the King of Pruſſia; and 'tis pretended here, that that Prince muſt be under a great deal of uneaſineſs, and that he has already drawn three millions of crowns out of his treaſury, for the charges of his preparations and augmentations.

It is preſumed, and not without probability, that his deſign in the demand above-mentioned was, that if he had been anſwered, that he himſelf had been the cauſe of the armaments made here, he would have endeavoured to clear himſelf of the charge, by alledging, in proof of his innocence, that for this very reaſon he did not only form the camps, which he has already traced to exerciſe his ſoldiers, but had ordered the regiments to ſeparate; perhaps imagining he ſhould lay this court under this neceſſity to follow his example by diſcontinuing likewiſe his preparations. However, I think he would find it no eaſy matter to divert it from its deſign by ſuch illuſions as theſe.

We have learned by an expreſs who arrived laſt Sunday from the Count de Puebla, that notwithſtanding the feigned diſpoſitions of the King of Pruſſia, his troops ſtill continued filing off towards Sileſia. Beſides, it is very eaſily underſtood that that Prince, by the local poſition of his army, which he can aſſemble in as many weeks as it would require months to do the ſame here, on account of the diſtance of the places where the troops are quartered, has too viſible an advantage over this court, which he can put to ſuch great expences by long and continual marches, that they would at laſt become intollerable: I ſay, it is very readily underſtood, that it is neceſſary to purſue, without interruption, the meaſures already

A. D. 1757. the King would be ſo far provoked, as to take ſome ſtep, which might ſerve to make him paſs for the aggreſſor.

He

begun, in order to put themſelves in the preſent circumſtances, upon equal terms, and in a good condition; that the King of Pruſſia may be thereby obliged, to keep up his armaments; and the augmentations made and to be made, will exceed his faculties, and waſte him gradually; "or elſe, in order to "prevent this inconvenience, to take a precipitate reſolution; "which, I think, is the very thing expected from him."

The return of M. Klingraffe's courier, which the ſaid Prince, no doubt, waits for with the utmoſt impatience, will give us more light into his diſpoſitions. There is reaſon to believe, that if he thinks himſelf menaced, he will no longer delay coming to action, and preventing thoſe, whom he dreads, in order to take advantage of the ſituation, in which this court will be 'till the end of the month of Auguſt, which is the term when all the troops are to be aſſembled. But on the other hand, if he remains quiet, he may be perſuaded that he will not be moleſted or attacked, "at leaſt not this year." However, from all the obſervations I make, I cannot but imagine, that this court muſt be very ſure of the friendſhip and attachment of Ruſſia. And this ſeems to me to be farther confirmed by a letter of the 6 D. c. from M. Swart the Dutch miniſter at Peterſburg, to M. de Burmannia, wherein he writes among other things, that the French emiſſary, the Chevalier Douglas, gained ground every day.

As this cannot fail of producing an alteration in the old ſyſtem of Ruſſia, it does not appear ſurpriſing that the high chancellor Count Beſtucheff, agreeably to what your excellency did me the honour to write to me in your laſt diſpatch, has reſolved to retire into the country, under the pretext of recovering his health, and to withdraw a-while from public buſineſs; as he may be willing to wait what turn affairs may take, and perhaps foreſees that the hour is at hand, ſince the whole ſeems to depend on the King of Pruſſia's reſolution; it

being

He then relates the meaſures, he had taken to prevent a war with the Empreſs Queen, as already ſet A. D. 1757.

being certain, that if he remains quiet, that the court of Vienna will not begin to act neither, "at leaſt this year: but "ſhe will endeavour, during that interval, to finiſh her pre- "parations, that ſhe may the next year be in a ſituation to "take a courſe ſuitable to the circumſtances and events, which "time may produce.

"This confirms me more in the opinion, which I ventured "to take the liberty to communicate to your excellency in "my former letters, that our court has no ſurer means to "profit by the preſent conjunctures, which, perhaps, never "were ſo favourable during the reign of our auguſt maſter, "than by putting itſelf in a good poſture, to the end that its "concurrence may be courted. A friend of mine, who pre- "tends to have his information from one of the clerks of the "treaſury, aſſures me, that this court has remitted a million "of florins to Ruſſia."

Count de Kaunitz has told me, that the advices, which your excellency had conveyed to him, of reports ſpread by the King of Pruſſia, concerning alliances to be made between him and us, as alſo with Ruſſia; and, moreover, that this court was taking upon her to mediate between France and England; has already been ſent to him by other hands, and conſequently deſerved the more attention, as well as to be contradicted; which the Empreſs Queen's miniſters at the courts of Europe would accordingly be ordered to do. This chancellor of ſtate further told me, there was advice, that the King of Pruſſia had had an intention to ſurprize the city of Stralſund in Swediſh Pomerania; and that if this proved true, it was likely to be in conſequence of the plot lately diſcovered at Stockholm.

If your excellency has an opportunity to make inſinuations with ſafety at the court of London, you might perhaps do it ſome ſervice by apprizing it of the danger, into which it has been led by thoſe, who now have the greateſt influence there.

A. D. 1757. set forth [r]; and the constant refusal of giving him a satisfactory answer, in regard to his own safety: a conduct, adds the memorialist, that gave the highest degree of evidence to the dangerous designs of the court of Vienna, and forced his Majesty, who could no longer entertain the least doubt about it, to take the only way, he had left him, to avert the dangers, he was threatened with, by preventing an irreconcileable enemy, who had sworn his ruin.

It will be a hard task for that court to get out of the distress, which she has plunged herself into, and if she does not detach herself from the King of Prussia, by making her peace with France on the best conditions that can be had, the latter will go on from success to success, and from one project to another, which, in the long run, may prove fatal to the house of Hanover.

I beg it as a favour of your excellency, that you would not descend to particulars with M. de Broglie about any thing I have the honour to write to your excellency, because that ambassador holds a correspondence with M. d'Aubeterre, who has told me with some surprize, that the Count de Broglie was fully persuaded, that mischief was intended against the King of Prussia, and even accused him of distrust and too much reserve concerning the designs of the court of Vienna.

The Marquis d'Aubeterre having long solicited permission to absent himself from his post for a few months, in order to attend his family affairs, which require his presence at Paris, has at last obtained his request.

General Karoli, and not General Nadasti, as was thought, has just been declared Bann of Croatia.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C. FLEMMING.

[r] On page 55 to 62. Vol. II.

He

A. D. 1757.

He then appeals to the impartial world to determine, which of the two ought to be deemed the aggreſſor; he who is preparing every means to cruſh his neighbour; or, he who, ſeeing the arm raiſed over his head, aiming the moſt dangerous blows, endeavours to ward them off, by ſtriking home upon the perſon of his enemy.

Then he obſerves, That the King's conduct towards the court of Saxony is grounded upon the ſame principle of indiſpenſible neceſſity of providing for his own ſecurity againſt the moſt dangerous deſigns. For, ſays he, from the beginning of the troubles, which have juſt broke out, Count Bruhl had acted the part, he had, long ſince, agreed to with the allies of his court, by borrowing the maſk of neutrality; but, in the mean time, and till he ſhould be at liberty to pull it off, he was not the leſs forward in entering perſonally into the late concert formed againſt his Majeſty: and that no ſtronger proof of this can be given, than by repeating here, what has been related above, that his miniſters did not ſcruple to make himſelf acceſſary in propagating the calumny, that the King wanted to ſtir up a rebellion in Ukraine.

That Count Bruhl loſt no time in ſettling his ſyſtem of neutrality, agreeably to ſuch principles; appears from his letter to Count Flemming, on the 1ſt of July, and conſequently two months before the King's army began to march; "That he "ſhould propoſe to the court of Vienna, to take "meaſures againſt the paſſage of the Pruſſian "army through Saxony, by aſſembling an army

"in

A. D. 1757. " in the circles of Bohemia, which border upon " that Electorate; *and to order Marſhal Brown to* " *concert ſecretly with Marſhal Count Rutowſki:*" and from Count Flemming's anſwer, on the 7th of July, " That Count Kaunitz had aſſured him, " that the generals would be forthwith named; " and that one would likewiſe be appointed, to " concert with Count Rutowſki: that the court " of Saxony ſhould not ſhew any trouble or un- " eaſineſs; but rather keep a good countenance, " *by preparing privately againſt every event.*" Where one may judge of this concert, by the counſel, which Count Flemming gives Count Bruhl, in his diſpatches of the 14th of July, " to grant the " paſſage to the Pruſſian troops; and, afterwards, " to take ſuch meaſures as ſhould be moſt pro- " per."

He further ſets forth, That by a letter from Count Flemming of the 18th of Auguſt, the Empreſs Queen explained herſelf to that miniſter in the following terms: " That ſhe required no- " thing, for the preſent, from the King of Po- " land, as ſhe was very ſenſible of his tickliſh " ſituation;—that, however, ſhe hoped he would, " in the mean while, put himſelf in a good " poſture, in order to be prepared at all events; " and that, in caſe any breach ſhould happen be- " tween her Majeſty and the King of Pruſſia, ſhe " would, in time, not be averſe to concur in the " neceſſary meaſures for their mutual ſecurity."

Then ſumming up the facts, the memorialiſt ſays, That from a curſory review of all the facts, which

which have been alledged above, it will be eaſy to form a juſt notion of the conduct of the court of Saxony towards the King; and to judge of the juſtice of his Majeſty's actual conduct towards that court. For it does appear, that the court of Dreſden has had a ſhare in all the dangerous deſigns, which have been formed againſt the King: —that their miniſters have been the authors, and chief promoters of them:—And though they have not, formally acceded to the treaty of Peterſburg, that they have, however, agreed with their allies to ſuſpend their concurrence therein, till ſuch time only, as the King's forces ſhould be weakened and divided, and they might pull off the maſk without danger. A. D. 1757.

That the King of Poland had adopted, as a principle, That any war between the King and one of his Poliſh Majeſty's allies, furniſhed him with a title to make conqueſts upon his Majeſty; —And that it is in conſequence of this principle, that he thought he could, in time of peace, make a partition of the dominions of his neighbour.

That the Saxon miniſters had ſounded the alarm againſt the King, all over Europe; and ſpared neither calumnies, nor falſhoods, nor ſiniſter inſinuations, in order to increaſe the number of his enemies.

And particularly that Count Bruhl had eagerly entered into the late plot of the court of Vienna, by the injurious report he undertook to propagate; —And that it has been made appear, that there

was

A. D. 1757. was a ſecret concert exiſting between the courts of Vienna and Saxony, in conſequence of which, the latter did intend to let the King's army paſs, in order to act, afterwards, according to events, either in joining his enemies, or in making a diverſion in his dominions, unprovided with troops.

Then the memorial concludes with this declaration, Such is the ſituation, the King was in, with the court of Saxony, when he reſolved to march into Bohemia, in order to avert the danger, which was prepared for him. His Majeſty could not therefore abandon himſelf to the diſcretion of a court, whoſe ill-will he was thoroughly acquainted with;—But found himſelf forced to take ſuch meaſures, as prudence and the ſecurity of his own dominions required; and which the conduct of the court of Saxony towards him, has authorized him to purſue."

The Empreſs Queen's anſwer to theſe motives.

The Empreſs Queen made an appearance to anſwer the charge brought againſt her and her allies, in theſe motives; in which he chiefly inſiſted upon the right of ſelf-preſervation, and the proofs of a confederacy by powers, with whom he was in a ſtate of peace, to attack him unprovided and defenceleſs, in order to rob him of his dominions, to which he had a juſt right by inheritance and treaty, and to divide them amongſt themſelves. But ſhe, in her anſwer, evaded thoſe two principal points; and, in general, only denied, or endeavoured to give a favourable turn to, thoſe documents and original papers, the King of Pruſſia had publiſhed, in juſtification of the violent meaſures,

he

he was obliged, through neceſſity, as he ſaid, to purſue. A. D. 1757.

To invalidate theſe motives, It is aſked in the anſwer of the court of Vienna, " Do theſe pieces of correſpondence ſo taken, and then publiſhed in the Pruſſian memorial, actually and really exiſt? And if they do; are their contents truly the ſame, as related? And ſuppoſe them to be originals, Are they not falſe and ſuppoſititious?" " For, ſays the anſwer, theſe pretended originals are communicated only by way of extracts, not duly connected; ſome paſſages being purpoſely left out, or at leaſt diſguiſed."

It juſtifies the treaty of the 18th of May 1745, upon a notion of right, which a potentate has to renew different former conventions, according to the difference of times; and upon a ſuppoſition that ſuch meaſures, propoſed to be taken in a future time of war, are not to bind, or take effect, until, according to all laws, human and divine, the parties are no more bound to peace; and the full right of ſuch treaties ſhould not before be entered upon, or avail. So that here the fact is confeſſed, though the intention is denied for carrying the fact into execution.

" But, ſays the anſwer again, the caſe of her Majeſty the Empreſs Queen was very different from that of the King of Pruſſia: the continual danger of an attack, ſhe was in, ſince the peace of Dreſden, was a real concern. The experience of repeated infractions of the peace, committed by Pruſſia, and followed within a few years, one by another, left no room to the court of Vienna

A. D. 1757. to expect another fate: becauſe the King of Pruſſia was continually arming himſelf, and augmenting his forces; though the peace was but lately concluded, and no probability of any danger; the houſe of Auſtria being engaged in another war; Ruſſia at a great diſtance, and Saxony too weak for any enterprize: but Pruſſia was ſo ſerious in its preparations, as made it hard to diſtinguiſh a time of peace and a time of actual war from each other.

It further bids the reader add, the notorious turbulent temper of the King of Pruſſia, his continual intrigues with foreign courts; his contraventions; his raiſing diſputes amongſt his neighbours; and then infers, That nothing could be expected, but that he would play his game again, the firſt opportunity, and unexpectedly interrupt the moſt ſolemn treaties of peace; and that he had only made peace, in order to prepare for another war with renewed ſtrength.

"As a further juſtification, it is ſaid, That the imperial court of Ruſſia has no leſs intereſt in the ſupport of the houſe of Auſtria, than this houſe in the undiſturbed tranquility of the Ruſſian Monarchy, and both courts in the defence of the republic of Poland, againſt the aggrandizing views of Pruſſia, and its intermeddling with the domeſtic affairs of this kingdom: and therefore, that no better method could be taken to provide for the common welfare and future ſafety, than the union of the two courts, which was effected by the treaty of 1746, obliging each other to unite their ſtrength

for

for ſetting proper bounds to the over-grown power of Pruſſia; if this King, not ſatisfied with the conſiderable acquiſitions he had made, ſhould again proceed to commit hoſtilities againſt either of the contracting parties or their ally, the republic of Poland. So that the Empreſs Queen inſiſts, that this fourth ſecret article, on which the King of Pruſſia fixes the firſt cauſe of his violent meaſures, was not offenſive, but merely a defenſive treaty of friendſhip, until it ſhould happen that the King of Pruſſia himſelf, by attacking firſt Auſtria, Ruſſia, or the republic of Poland, ſhould oblige them to unite againſt him. A. D. 1757.

As to the proceedings againſt Saxony in particular: it is granted, ſays the anſwer, that the court of Berlin could not poſſibly expect any other reſolutions from that court, conſidering the unneighbourly manner, and oppreſſions, both in regard to commerce and other provincial affairs, which Saxony has ſuffered from Pruſſia ſince the late peace: neither could it be wondered, when ſuch a conduct has grieved the Saxon miniſters to their heart, and made them to ſpeak more freely to others about it: but that it was, in no wiſe juſtifiable to make the court reſponſible for thoſe correſpondences, and to treat the country with a cruelty, that may be felt for a whole century.

It further ſays, in regard to the motives drawn from the ſentiments of the King of Poland's privy council, that theſe, and the other allegations, import no more than that the Electoral court of Saxony had reſolved to direct its meaſures accord-

A. D. 1757. ing to future events, waiting firſt a Pruſſian attack, and a ſubſequent diverſion to be made by its allies.

As to the proofs drawn from the correſpondence between the miniſters; it is alledged, that they were only miniſterial ſentiments, which can determine nothing, nor be admitted by way of evidence, concerning the intentions of their principals, in oppoſition to the plaineſt declarations given by the court itſelf, where the miniſter reſides. And as to the final anſwer demanded by the King of Pruſſia from the Empreſs Queen; the court of Vienna, ſays the anſwer, did not think proper to make a new declaration, in compliance with the Pruſſian dictates, after a ſufficient anſwer was given already to the firſt demand. Becauſe, the truce, propoſed for *two years*, ſuppoſed an actual war, and real offenſive circumſtances, or offenſive meaſures, agreed upon by the two Empreſſes; which the court of Vienna could not againſt truth, and the aſſurances already given, allow to be the caſe; and becauſe the obligation, by the peace of Dreſden, would, in conſequence of ſuch a declaration, have been void.—But that this court acknowledges, that it has always entertained a diſtruſt of the King of Pruſſia, and had been ever attentive to the continual armaments and unwarrantable violences committed on all ſides: neither was it now frightened by a Pruſſian aggreſſion, or deterred from its defenſive meaſures, by any threats and artifices: but that it had taken, ſince the late breach, the moſt effectual meaſures,

in

in order to make the author of the preſent troubles repent of his open injuſtice, violence and raſh perfidy." A. D. 1757.

How it operated on the King of Pruſſia.

Such were the evaſions; ſuch the invectives and threats of the court of Vienna; which were far from diſproving the truth of the Pruſſian Monarch's ſuſpicion; or his right to thoſe violent ſteps he had taken for his own ſecurity; and ſerved only to confirm him in his opinion of the conſpiracy againſt him, and whetted his reſolutions and activity in his future operations.

The preſent ſtate of the King of Pruſſia.

The King of Pruſſia thus circumſtanced; his conduct miſrepreſented in every court of Europe; his Electorate put under the ban of the Empire; his ſubjects abſolved by the Imperial decree from their allegiance; threatened with an angry declaration from Ruſſia, and from France, who had marched formidable armies to attack him, in conjunction with Auſtria; beſides the diverſion he expected from the Swedes and the Duke of Mecklenburg; maintained his winter quarters in Saxony, for that part of the army commanded by Mareſchal Keith; which lined the ſhore of the Elbe between Pirna and the frontier; and covered Sileſia from ſurprize with the army under M. Schewrin, who took up his quarters in the county of Glatz, till the time came for action.

Saxon troops deſert.

During this receſs a regiment of Saxon troops, which had entered into his ſervice, after their ſurrender at Pirna, and ſent by him to garriſon Berlin, deſerted and retired into Poland, being joined by ſome more in their march. However, this

A. D. 1757. did not weaken his army. For, he broke all the reſt of the Saxon regiments, incorporated the men amongſt his own troops, and obliged the Saxon magiſtrates to ſupply him ſpeedily with four thouſand freſh recruits.

Meaſures to prevent the march of the Ruſſians.

As ſoon as the ſeaſon would admit, his Majeſty, informed of the march of 130,000 Ruſſians, which had been advancing ever ſince the month of November towards Ducal Pruſſia, with proviſions only to ſupply their neceſſities, till they could reach Lithuania, reinforced Memel with three regiments of troops and a great number of matroſſes; he alſo ordered 30,000 men, under General Lehwald, to meet the enemy under M. Apraxin; and bought up all the corn and forage of the country where the Ruſſians were to enter, and they depended upon a plentiful ſupply. Which precautions had their deſired effect.

Saxony how diſpoſed.

In Saxony one regiment only was allotted for the garriſon of Dreſden, but the towns-people were diſarmed. A detachment was poſted at Konigſtein, to oblige that fortreſs to obſerve an exact neutrality. The French miniſter was ordered to with-draw: and ſeveral gentlemen and ladies about the court were laid under reſtraint[s]. And all

[s] On the 10th of April Major-general Bornſtadt ſent for the burgo-maſters and ſyndic of the city of Dreſden, and read to them the following order of his Pruſſian Majeſty. "You ſhall give notice throughout the city, that having thought fit to cut off all communication with this court; from henceforth nobody ſhall be admitted to the palace, except the domeſtics, whoſe ſervice is required there. All acceſs thereunto is interdicted

all poſſible care was taken by the Pruſſians to ſecure a retreat in caſe of neceſſity. For which purpoſe his Majeſty ordered two bridges to be thrown over the Elbe early in the year, and he obliged the Saxons to ſupply waggons with four horſes for that ſervice. A. D. 1757.

Having provided for the ſecurity of his poſſeſſion of Saxony, and ſettled all in profound quiet, his Pruſſian Majeſty went in perſon to viſit all his poſts in Sileſia, and at Neiſs he ſettled the operations for the enſuing campaign, with Mareſchal Schewrin; whoſe army, conſiſting of 50,000 men in Sileſia, he commanded to regulate its motions with the royal army, ſo as to act in concert, as circumſtances might require. He placed armies in Luſatia and Voigtland; he ordered 20,000 men, under Prince Maurice of Anhalt Deſſau, to aſſemble at Zwickaw, on the frontiers of Bohemia, towards Egra; and detached 60,000 men towards Great Zeidlitz, where their head quarters were ſettled. Preparations for opening the campaign.

The Auſtrians, convinced by the experiment already made in the autumn, that their army was not ſtrong enough to force the Pruſſians, had not only demanded the aid of their allies, but greatly augmented their own forces, and employed the winter in ſuch preparations as the nature of the war required: keeping a conſtant attention upon By the Auſtrians.

dicted to others: ſo that whoſoever ſhall preſume to act contrary to this order ſhall be taken up, and lodged in ſome fortreſs, without regard to quality or condition."

A. D. 1757. the motion and meaſures of the Pruſſians. So that while the Pruſſian troops were making their neceſſary diſpoſitions on the frontiers of Bohemia, there happened ſeveral ſkirmiſhes between them and the Auſtrians; with various ſucceſs. On the 20th of February about four in the morning, the Auſtrians, in number 6000, ſurrounded Hirſchfield, a little town in Upper Luſatia, garriſoned only by one battalion of Pruſſian foot. The attack was made on two redoubts without the gates, defended by two field pieces each. The Auſtrians, after being ſeveral times repulſed, with conſiderable loſs, made themſelves maſters of one redoubt, and carried off its two cannon. But the Pruſſians, ſallying out and harraſſing their rear, killed ſome, and took many priſoners.

Skirmiſhes.

This was improved by the Prince of Bevern; who in the beginning of March departed from Zittau with 9000 men, to beat up and deſtroy the dens or forts erected by the Auſtrians on their frontiers. In which expedition he ſeized upon the Auſtrian magazine at Friedland in Bohemia, and carried off 9000 ſacks of meal, and a great quantity of ammunition; the van of his troops, conſiſting only of 150 huſſars of Putkammar's regiment, having attacked, ſword in hand, a body of 600 croats, ſuſtained by 300 Auſtrian dragoons of Bathiani, at their firſt entering Bohemia; killed 50, took 10 dragoons priſoners, and 30 horſes, without any loſs or hurt, except two men ſlightly wounded. From Friedland the Prince of Bevern marched againſt Richenberg; which

Prince of Bevern's progreſs.

which alſo ſurrendered to his arms. From thence he returned victorious to Zittau. A. D. 1757.

The time of action ſeemed to drive on a pace, M. Brown takes the field. M. Brown viſited the fortifications of Brian and Konigſgratz; reviewed the army under the command of General Serbelloni, which had been commanded by Prince Piccolomini; and immediately upon the hearing, that the Pruſſians were in motion, he marched with the grand army, with an intention to fix his head quarters at Koſtlitz on the Elbe.

The activity of the Pruſſian hero, having nothing to fear from the Ruſſians, who could not march forward for want of proviſions and forage, would not permit the Auſtrian General to enter Saxony. It is always the beſt policy to carry war into the enemy's country, and to keep it as far as poſſible from home. Therefore, thoſe four armies, which he ſeemed to have placed upon the defenſive in Sileſia, Luſatia, Miſnia and Saxony, had orders ſuddenly to penetrate by four different and oppoſite routs into Bohemia, at one and the ſame time, and as near as poſſible. That from Saxony his Majeſty commanded in perſon, aſſiſted by M. Keith: Prince Maurice of Anhalt Deſſau was at the head of the army from Miſnia: That from Luſatia was conducted by Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick Bevern: and M. Schwerin commanded the troops from Sileſia. All which was executed with that diligence and ſecrecy, that thoſe four armies entered Bohemia almoſt without oppoſition; for the Auſtrians never ſuſpected the leaſt of ſuch

The activity of the King of Pruſſia.

His four armies.

A. D. 1757. a viſit till they were convinced of their arrival in Bohemia.

Enter Bohemia. M. Schwerin entered[t] Bohemia in five columns and by five different roads: and met with no oppoſition till they advanced to Guelder Oelſe, which defile was filled with Pandours; but they were immediately attacked by two battalions of Pruſſian grenadiers with bayonets fixt, who routed them. Prince Anhalt Deſſau paſſed[u] the frontiers of Bohemia without any reſiſtance. Being advanced with the corps under his command within a ſhort diſtance of Egra, he attacked a poſt guarded by 400 dragoons, ſuſtained by Croats and Pandours; which he entirely defeated with great loſs to the enemy: he then detached 4000 of his troops towards Holtenberg, in order to ſeize on the important paſs of Schirdinger. On the 20th of April the Prince of Bevern entered Bohemia alſo, and got poſſeſſion of Krottau and Graffenſtein, the firſt poſt, on that ſide of the kingdom, without the loſs of a man: hearing that the enemy had approached to Kratzen, he proceeded and drove them away from thence the ſame day, and continued his march to Machendorf near Reichenberg, and not far from a camp of 28,000 Auſtrians, under the command of Count Conigſeg. Putkammer's huſſars, who formed part of a body, commanded by a Colonel and Major, fell in with a party of ſome hundreds of cuiraſſiers, poſted before Colin, or Kohleg, under the command of

The battle of Reichenberg.

[t] On the 18th of April.

[u] On the 21ſt of April.

Prince

Prince Litchtenſtein; took three officers and upwards of 60 horſe priſoners, and diſperſed the reſt. Night not only prevented a purſuit; but obliged the Pruſſian army to remain in the field till morning. At break of day they marched in two columns, by Habendorf, to attack the enemy near Reichenberg: and as ſoon as they were formed in three lines of about 30 ſquadrons, they advanced towards the enemy's cavalry; the two wings being ſuſtained by the infantry, poſted amongſt felled trees, and behind entrenchments. The cavalry having a village on their right, and a wood, where they were entrenched on the left, received the canonade with reſolution. But fifteen ſquadrons of the dragoons of the ſecond line being ordered by the Prince of Bevern to advance, and at the ſame time, the wood on the right being attacked by the battalions of grenadiers of Kahlden and of Moellendorf, by the Prince of Pruſſia's regiment of dragoons; who, by getting clear over all the heaps of timber, and the entrenchments, ſecured their flanks, and entirely routed the enemy's cavalry; and Colonel Putkammer and Major Schenfeld with their huſſars, though flanked by the enemy's artillery, gave the Auſtrian horſe a very warm reception; whilſt General Leſtewitz attacked the redoubts, that covered Reichenberg, with the left wing of the Pruſſians. An action, that redounded greatly to his honour; for, though there were many defiles in the way, and the enemy was in poſſeſſion of the eminences, the regiment of Darmſtandt drove all before

A. D. 1757.

A. D. 1757. them, and with a ferocity ſcarce to be conceived, bid defiance to powder and ball, and drove the Auſtrians not only from the redoubts, but purſued them with great ſlaughter from hill to hill[w], as far as Rochlitz and Dorffell.

Its continuance and loſs. This action began at ſix in the morning, and laſted five hours; and was ſupported with great obſtinacy and bravery on both ſides, though with great diſproportion in the loſs. For the Auſtrians were obliged to leave behind them ſeveral pieces of cannon, and ſeveral ammunition waggons in their trenches, to the diſcretion of the enemy: and they had upwards of a thouſand men killed and wounded; amongſt whom were found General Porporati and Count Hobenfelds killed, and Prince Lichtenſtein and Count Mansfeld wounded: they alſo loſt three ſtandards, 20 officers, and 400 private men made priſoners. Whereas the Pruſſians had only ſeven ſubaltern officers, and a 100 rank and file killed; and General Normann, one colonel, four majors, three captains, ſeven ſubalterns, and 150 rank and file wounded.

Remarks on this event. Such a blow at the firſt of the campaign was productive of ſeveral advantages. It diffuſed vaſt ideas, in every place, of his Pruſſian Majeſty's abilities and valour; it animated his victorious troops to face every danger; it ſtruck a panic throughout the country he had invaded; it ſecured a ſafe and eaſy retreat in caſe of neceſſity; and it facilitated the execution of the whole plan of

[w] above a mile.

opera-

operations, which had been ſo glorioufly begun. The news of this eclat reached England at the time Mr. PITT was diſmiſſed, and the Engliſh bemoaned the miſmanagement and timidity of their own governors; it made them more eager and clamorous for an alliance, with a power, that was every day exhibiting proofs of foreſight and bravery. A. D. 1757. Its effects in England.

His Pruſſian Majeſty did not omit to make the beſt uſe of this victory. He himſelf publiſhed the account thereof at the head of his own guards, in a ſtile that would have done honour to an Alexander or a Cæſar, "See, my boys, ſaid he, "a moſt happy beginning. Heaven eſpouſes our "cauſe. The Prince of Bevern has defeated the "Auſtrians at Reichenberg. This promiſes us, "that, with God's aſſiſtance, we ſhall have the "like ſucceſs." Words can't expreſs the joy that diffuſed itſelf in every countenance, and the acclamations which reſounded from the whole army with huzzas, and "A long life to their incomparable ſovereign." The victory publiſhed by the King at the head of his army.

An army ſpirited up in this manner was eager to be led on to the moſt arduous enterprizes. The King ſeizes the opportunity, and prepares to ſeek the main body of the enemy, and if poſſible, to draw them to a general engagement; though they were far ſuperior to him in numbers, and encamped in a ſituation ſo fortified by every advantage of nature, and contrivance of art, as to be deemed almoſt impregnable. With this reſolution he ordered the Prince of Bevern, who was joined, Reſolution to ſeek and attack the main army.

ſoon

A. D. 1757. ſoon after the battle, by the army under M. Schwerin, to march with all expedition to meet him, at a certain place: and the ſame orders accelerated the march of the Prince of Anhalt Deſſau with his army. In their rout the Prince of Bevern made himſelf maſter of the greateſt part of the circle of Buntzlau, and diſlodged and took a conſiderable magazine from the Auſtrians.

A ſtratagem to divide the Auſtrian forces.

Every thing ſucceeded to favour the junction of the Pruſſian forces. There ſtill remained ſomething to be done in point of generalſhip, to weaken the enemy's ſtrength, without leaving all to the riſk of the ſword. His Pruſſian Majeſty, ever vigilant and penetrating, with a ſagacity, that foreſaw every thing, was readily furniſhed with a ſtratagem for this purpoſe. His Majeſty, to the ſurprize of every body, after the Prince of Anhalt Deſſau was arrived at the camp of his deſtination, near that of his ſovereign's army, decamped and advanced with his own part of the army to Budin, where he drove the Auſtrians from their advantageous camp, to Weſtram, which lies half way between Budin and Prague.

Succeeds.

This movement, added to the way by which he entered Bohemia, which was at a conſiderable diſtance from any of the corps commanded by his generals, ſo deceived the enemy, into an imagination that his Pruſſian Majeſty had undertaken ſome deſign diſtinct from the object of his other armies; that they fell into the ſnare, and detached 20,000 men from their main army to attend upon his particular motions.

But

But after his Majeſty had paſſed the Egra, and was there joined by the army under M. Schwerin, in ſuch a ſituation that they could act jointly, he made ſo ſudden and maſterly a movement to the left, as if his intention was againſt Egra, that it completed his real deſign; which cut off all communication between that detachment and the main army of the Auſtrians, ſtrongly entrenched, as above-mentioned, on the banks of the Moldau to the north of Prague; their left wing being guarded by the mountains of Ziſcka, and the right extending as far as Herboholi, under the command of Prince Charles of Lorrain, and Marſhal Brown. A. D. 1757.

Having gained this advantage to weaken the enemy's main body; it made the Auſtrians more cautious, and though they had been reinforced by an army from Moravia; by the remains of the forces defeated by the Duke of Bevern, and by ſeveral regiments drawn from the garriſon of Prague, it was reſolved not to march in queſt of the invaders, and to prevent their uniting, as in ſound policy ought to have been done; but to wait their united force in a ſtrong camp to cover the metropolis from inſult. But this caution in the enemy only ſtimulated the vivacity of the Pruſſian hero, whoſe courage was always ſharpened by difficulties. His reſolutions were not taken upon the danger, but the expediency of the action. He could not hope for ſucceſs, in his future operations, without defeating this fortified army. Therefore deſpiſing the difficulties he had

Auſtrians wait his approach.

Reaſons for attacking the Auſtrian army.

to

A. D. 1757. to encounter in the attack, orders were given for 30,000 men to paſs the Moldau, which was done, with himſelf at their head, on the 6th day of May, in the morning, on bridges of boats; having left the reſt of the army under the command of the Prince of Anhalt Deſſau, to ſecure the paſs of that river, in caſe of need. Thoſe 30,000, on their arrival a-croſs the Moldau, were immediately joined by the troops under M. Schwerin and the Prince of Bevern, according to the good diſpoſition made by his Majeſty in the general plan of this invaſion: and it was reſolved to attack the enemy with theſe united forces, on the ſame day.

Pruſſian troops joined.

Advance to the attack. In purſuance of this reſolution the King ordered his army to file off on the left by Potſchernitz, as the moſt eligible diſpoſition for executing this grand deſign, by flanking the enemy. This obliged Count Brown to wheel about to the right.

The battle near Prague. ThePruſſians however continued their march to Bichwitz; though it was a very bad way, ſo full of defiles and moraſſes, that the infantry and cavalry were forced to ſeparate. But all thoſe obſtacles could not check the ardour of the Pruſſian officers and men, who on this occaſion, vied with each other in paſſing defiles, in croſſing marſhes, in ſeizing the riſing grounds, and in clearing ditches.

A ſmall check at the firſt. However, their ardour had in the beginning of the engagement like to have ruined their cauſe. Too eager for action, the infantry began the attack ſo precipitately as to give the Auſtrians ſome advantage; which obliged them to fall back: but this

this check ſerved only to whet their courage. The infantry immediately rallied, and advanced with an impetuoſity, that was not to be reſiſted, attacked and entirely broke the enemy's right. The King was employed in taking the enemy in flank. But the whole plan of operations was almoſt diſconcerted by a marſhy ground, which unexpectedly ſtopt the advancing of M. Schwerin's army; without whoſe help, it was not poſſible to defeat the enemy. Therefore the Marſhal diſmounted, and entering the moraſs with the ſtandard of the regiment in his hand, ſo encouraged his men, with crying out, "Let all brave Pruſſians follow me;" that they, inſpired with the bravery of their heroic commander, in the 82d year of his age, and all their officers, who followed this example, preſſed forward, and never abated in their ardour, till the enemy was totally routed, though their General was unfortunately killed by the firſt fire. The Auſtrian cavalry ſtood no more than three charges, and then retired in great confuſion; the center being at the ſame time totally routed. The Pruſſian left wing filed off towards Micheley, and being there joined by the horſe, renewed their attack upon the enemy retreating haſtily towards Saſzawa; while the right wing of the Pruſſians were diverting themſelves with attacking the ſmall remains of the left wing of the Auſtrians, and making themſelves maſters of three batteries. Prince Henry of Pruſſia and the Prince of Bevern performed wonders, making themſelves maſters of two batteries: and Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick took the left

A. D. 1757. Whetted their reſolution.

A. D. 1757. wing of the Auſtrians in flank, while the King ſecured the paſſage of the Moldau with his left and a body of cavalry. However the Auſtrians at firſt received the enemy with great firmneſs and bravery; and did not give way, till they, after a long and obſtinate engagement, were obliged to yield to ſuperior abilities, and the fate of war.

Victory declares in favour of Pruſſia. After many ſignal examples of valour on both ſides, the Auſtrians were driven from the field of battle; who attributed the ill ſucceſs of the day to the advantage, which the Pruſſians had of the wind, that blew the powder into the eyes of the Auſtrians. Be that as it will: the King of Pruſſia obtained a complete victory; took 60 pieces of cannon[x], all the tents and baggage, the military cheſt, and the whole camp; ten ſtandards and upwards of 4000 priſoners[y], amongſt whom were 30 officers of rank; and they killed and wounded a very extraordinary number; amongſt whom was M. Brown, who died of his wounds and chagrin ſoon after, at Prague.

Auſtrian account of the loſs. The Auſtrians gave out that the Pruſſians had 30,000 men killed and wounded in this action. But the account publiſhed by the King of Pruſſia, admits of no more than 2500 killed, amongſt whom was M. Schwerin, the Prince of Holſtein Beck, General d'Amſtel, two Colonels and one

[x] Some accounts make them 250 pieces of cannon, which ſeems moſt probable from the ſtrength and extent of the camp, and the number of field pieces required in each regiment, in the time of action,

[y] Some accounts make them 10,000.

Lieutenant

Lieutenant Colonel: and about 3000 wounded, including ſix Generals. A. D. 1757.

The fugitive Auſtrians took ſeveral roads. About 12,000 of their horſe fled towards Benſchau, where they afterwards aſſembled under General Pretlach. About 40,000 eſcaped their purſuers, and eſcorted Prince Charles of Lorrain and M. Brown into Prague: but ſuffered greatly in their retreat from a detachment under M. Keith, who purſued them up to the very gates of that city. Auſtrian army diſperſed. Moſt of them got into Prague.

Two objects now preſented themſelves for his Pruſſian Majeſty's attention. To avail himſelf of the preſent conſternation and confuſion of his enemy's troops; and to guard againſt the Imperial army of execution; the only force that could be brought againſt him with any hopes of ſucceſs; and which was preparing to march for the relief of Prague and the Auſtrians. So that, while he took the reſolution to beſiege Prague; his Majeſty commanded Colonel Meyer, with a battalion of Pruſſian pandours and 400 huſſars, to cut off all ſubſiſtance for any army, that ſhould march to the ſuccour of the Auſtrians: which ſervice he effectually performed, by deſtroying all their magazines, eſpecially that conſiderable and valuable one erected at Pilſen. His expedition againſt Prague was ſo rapid, that he, in four days, ſurrounded the walls of that city, himſelf on one ſide, and M. Keith on the other ſide of the river, with lines and entrenchments, in ſuch a manner, as entirely cut off all communication with the country; Two objects to be conſidered. To prevent another enemy advancing. To beſiege Prague.

A. D. 1757.

country; and ſhut up Prince Charles of Lorrain, M. Brown, two Princes of Saxony, the Prince of Modena, the Duke d'Aremberg, Count Lacy, ſeveral other perſons of great diſtinction, and about 40,000 of the Auſtrian army, that had eſcaped him in the field and fled here for refuge: an army, it was then thought, ſtrong enough to diſpute their ſovereign's cauſe in the field; and by no means commendable for placing their ſafety, within the walls of a city, where nothing but ſome fortunate accident, was like to deliver them from the enemy, after they had undergone every hardſhip of famine, fire, and ſword. So that when they ſaw their communication cut off, and that the Pruſſians were continually employed in ſtrengthening the works of the blockade, they had formed, and had made themſelves maſters of Cziſcaberg, a ſtrong redoubt, on an eminence, that commands the city, without being able to recover that poſt, notwithſtanding they had ſallied out, and taken ſome other ſteps, for that purpoſe; a deſign was formed to get rid of the uſeleſs mouths, which could ſerve only to conſume the proviſions, to bring on a famine, and perhaps a plague, or oblige them to ſurrender. This was to be done by forcing the Pruſſian lines: and 12,000 men were drawn out for that ſervice; who were, with ſword in hand, to open a way through the camp of the beſiegers for thoſe that were not wanted in the city: and in caſe an impreſſion could be made on the lines, they were to be ſuſtained

Strength of the garriſon.

Blockade formed.

A powerful ſally, to clear the city of uſeleſs mouths.

tained by all the grenadiers, volunteers, pandours, and Hungarian infantry. A. D. 1757.

Every thing was prepared for this ſally with the greateſt vigour and privacy, and promiſed the deſired ſucceſs, under the cover of a very dark night. But Providence ſtept in between the King and his danger. A deſerter, about eleven that ſame night, reveals the whole deſign to the royal ear. Heaven gave the alarm: the King in leſs than a quarter of an hour had his whole army under arms, and prepared to give the aſſailants a warm reception [z]. Betrayed by a deſerter.

The Auſtrians, it ſeems, depending more on the obſcurity of the night and a profound ſilence in their motions, than upon the uſe of their arms, charged the Pruſſian advanced poſts before they were diſcovered; though the Pruſſians were forewarned of their attempt. They firſt attacked the camp of M. Keith, on the ſide of the little town, and the left wing of the Pruſſian army, that ſtretched along the Moldau; with hopes to deſtroy the batteries that were raiſing, and to gain the bridges of communication, thrown by the Pruſſians over the Moldau at Branick and Podbaba, about a quarter of a German mile above and below Prague. About two o'clock the enemy expected to ſurprize the miners: but they came a quarter of an hour after the miners had left work. However they fired a piece, which alarmed a piquet of one hundred of the Pruſſian guards ſent to ſuſtain the body that covered the works: but Fails.

[z] On the 23d of May.

A. D. 1757. the night was ſo dark, that they could not diſtinguiſh, who were friends, or foes, and ſo fell into confuſion. This was remedied by Lieutenant Jork, who being ſent with two platoons to reconnoitre the enemy, kindled a fire, the light of which diſcovered their diſpoſition to Captain Rodig, who immediately formed the deſign of falling upon them in flank; which they performed Loſs. effectually by firing in platoons, and mutually repeating the ſignal given by their commander. By which means, and keeping up a continual ſhooting, they made the Auſtrians believe them to be a numerous body; ſo that they fled with ſuch precipitation, that many of them were drowned in the river; ſeveral deſerted, and the reſt returned to Prague.

At the ſame time the miners were attacked, a regiment of horſe grenadiers, ſupported by the Hungarian infantry, attacked a Pruſſian redoubt, guarded by Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick's battalion. The Auſtrians returned thrice to the aſſault; and their muſquetry kept an inceſſant fire upon the whole front of the Pruſſians, from the convent of St. Margaret to the river: by which the battalion ſuffered extremely.

As ſoon as day began to appear, the Pruſſians quitted their camp, to ſeek and to engage the enemy. They found Pandours in poſſeſſion of a building called the Redhouſe, at the bottom of a declivity before Wellaſtowitz, well barricadoed and ſupplied with cannon. But the battalion of Pannewitz, after two hours ſevere ſervice, in the midſt of a continual fire from both cannon and muſquetry

musquetry drove them out; though they were not able to maintain the post; becauſe the artillery of the city kept a continual fire upon it, from the moment it was known to be in the power of the Pruſſians. So that this houſe fell again into the hands of the Pandours. A. D. 1757.

Thus ended the affair of this ſally, which had been ſo well contrived. The Auſtrians left many [a] dead and wounded behind them; and many deſerters and priſoners. It was alſo attended with conſiderable loſs to the Pruſſians, both in officers and private men: and Prince Ferdinand, the King's youngeſt brother narrowly eſcaped, with a ſlight wound in his face, and a horſe killed under him.

A moſt terrible bombardment.

It appeared neceſſary to find them employment in Prague; and for that purpoſe eſpecially, to haſten the approaches and to complete the batteries. The heavy artillery being arrived, four batteries began [b] to play with great execution from the banks of the Moldau. The Prince of Bevern was appointed to cover the ſiege with an army of 20,000 men. After a moſt dreadful ſtorm of rain and thunder, as if it were to diſplay how much more ruinous the malice of men may be, than the greateſt terrors of nature, a rocket was thrown into the air, as a ſignal for the batteries to begin; and they diſcharged at the rate of 288 bombs every 24 hours, which were accompanied by vaſt numbers of red hot cannon balls, and other inſtruments of deſtruction. The beſieged were not in

[a] About 1000 killed and wounded.

[b] On the 29th of May in the evening.

A. D. 1757. a condition to return the fire with equal fury. Their want of proper artillery and ammunition furniſhed his Pruſſian Majeſty with an opportunity, not to be expected, to pour deſtruction upon this unfortunate city, whoſe ſtreets and ſquares were crouded with [c] horſes, grown almoſt mad for want of forage; and whoſe houſes, at laſt, took fire on the ſide of the Moldau, which heightened the miſery of the citizens, and encouraged the beſiegers to diveſt themſelves of all humanity, and to practiſe every ſtratagem, to try every barbarous invention in the military art, to force them to ſurrender or capitulate. The bombardment never ceaſed night nor day. And the flames, at laſt got to ſuch a head, that the fire was no ſooner quenched in one part, than it broke out in another.

Bad condition of the beſieged.

City on fire.

Miſerable ſtate.

Thus, men, horſes and houſes were wrapped in flames and reduced to aſhes; and the neceſſaries of life alſo conſumed in this almoſt general conflagration; a ſtill more moving ſcene preſents itſelf. The principal magiſtrates, burghers and clergy were not ſuffered to open their mouths to the army, in the moſt ſubmiſſive terms, in favour of their city, on the point of being reduced to a heap of rubbiſh. Two ſenators, more importunate than the reſt, were hanged by order of the military power; and when the cry of the public increaſed for neceſſary ſubſiſtence, 12,000 of the moſt uſeleſs mouths were driven out to aſk bread, or to fall under the ſword, of the enemy.

12,000 citizens driven out of the city.

[c] 12,000 horſes.

Their

Their ſtarving condition had no weight in the reaſonings of an enemy, whoſe ſucceſs depended upon the increaſe of his adverſary's diſtreſs. They were driven back, which ſoon reduced the city to the neceſſity of eating horſe fleſh. The horſes which were ſtarved for want of forage, were cut up and diſtributed amongſt the garriſon; and the citizens were glad to buy it at four pence per pound. But ſo long as their corn held out, the garriſon was in no hurry to capitulate: of which there was yet no ſcarcity. Once more it was reſolved to try the iſſue of ſallys; and though they proved of no advantage otherwiſe, they harraſſed the enemy, and obliged the Pruſſians, who had not a ſufficient change to watch ſo numerous, reſolute and deſperate a garriſon, to be always upon their guard, and might in time oblige them to raiſe the ſiege.

A. D. 1757. Beat back. Eat horſe fleſh.

Such was the critical ſituation of the affairs of the Empreſs Queen. All the paſſes of her kingdom of Bohemia towards Luſatia, Voigtland, Saxony and Glatz, in the poſſeſſion of the King of Pruſſia; the flower of her armies and the chief commanders cooped up in Prague: the reſt of her troops defeated, diſpirited and diſperſed in ſmall parties, and flying to ſeek ſubſiſtence: the capital of Bohemia reduced by fire and famine to the laſt extremity: the army within on the point of ſurrendering priſoners of war: the whole kingdom without ready to ſubmit to the will of the conquerors: all aid from Saxony entirely cut off: the Ruſſians obliged to retreat: all the hereditary

Remarks on the critical ſtate.

A. D. 1757. dominions of the houſe of Auſtria open and expoſed: Vienna itſelf not ſecure from a ſiege; and the Pruſſian troops deemed invincible! when two extraordinary incidents ſtarted up to convince the world that no power upon earth is to truſt too much to his own wiſdom and ſtrength; and that there are reſources in the womb of Providence, which if properly attended to and improved, are able to deliver us out of the moſt deſperate circumſtances.

King of Pruſſia's too great courage.

The irreſiſtible ſucceſs of his arms had ſo far got the better of the King's reaſon, that he ſuffered the ſmall parties of the enemy to aſſemble in a body, in a ſituation[e] not leſs hazardous to be attacked, than the walls of Prague. He made too ſure of reducing the city: and he made too light of breaking the lines and forcing the camp at Kolin, againſt which his Majeſty, in perſon, marched on the 13th day of June, with a force very inadequate to attack an army of 60,000 men, fortified and commanded by a brave and experienced general. — A reſolution ſo fraught with difficulties, that M. Keith remonſtrated earneſtly againſt this meaſure. The Marſhal adviſed either to raiſe the ſiege and to attack the camp with the united forces of Pruſſia, or to proceed with the ſiege in the preſent manner, till the city ſhould be obliged to capitulate, or till the Auſtrians in the camp ſhould attempt to raiſe the ſiege. Becauſe, from either of theſe reſolutions there were hopes of ſucceſs. The Pruſſian united forces might more probably carry their point againſt the

Reſolves to attack the camp at Kolin.

Againſt M. Keith's opinion.

[e] At Kolin.

camp, than could be expected from the moſt re- A. D. 1757.
ſolute efforts of the inferior ſtrength of 32,000 men, which was the whole force ſet a-part by the King for that ſervice. And by continuing the ſiege in its preſent form, he ſaid, it would either oblige the Auſtrians within to ſurrender, which would leave all his Majeſty's forces at liberty to act, as circumſtances might require; or the Auſtrians without, to quit their ſtrong camp, and to attack him to their great diſadvantage: for ſo long as the Pruſſians ſhould continue within their lines before Prague, no army could attempt to raiſe the ſiege, without fighting them upon terms nearly equal.

How the King was miſled.

Sage as this counſel might be, the King's courage got the better of his judgment: elated with victory, impetuous in his valour, and depending upon the diſcipline of his ſoldiers, in which he expected to gain the ſuperiority, (againſt him greatly in numbers) he bid defiance to all oppoſition, depended ſolely on the courage and victorious arm, which had carried him through all oppoſition, and delivered him out of all difficulties, and actuated with a kind of military enthuſiaſm, he marched towards Kolin with aſſurance of ſucceſs.

To humble this ſpirit of preſumption, there ſtarted up a General, whom the neceſſities of the times recommended to a ſervice of that intereſting nature, which was no leſs than to ſave the Empreſs Queen's dominions from entire deſtruction; and to deliver her armies from the coercive power of a moſt ſurprizing adventurer; already in poſ-

A. D. 1757. The character and conduct of Count Daun.

ſeſſion of all that fertile country between the Egra and the Moldau. This was Leopold Count Daun, who had never commanded in chief before; but had acquired great experience in the moſt illuſtrious ſcenes of action, and under the moſt diſtinguiſhed Generals of this century, in various parts of Europe; and particularly the favourite of the great Kevenhuller: yet, neither his connections with thoſe great ſoldiers, nor his noble extraction, from a very ancient and great family, had ever procured him any favour from court; his promotion in the army being entirely owing to his merit. His way to preferment was a kind of index to his future conduct, in poſſeſſion of the higheſt command. It was ſlow and ſilent, reſolved to gain that by mere dint of ſuperior worth, which others ſought and puſhed for with much intrigue, hurry and buſtle, amongſt their friends at court.

This was the temper, this the character of the General, who now entered the theatre of war, to ſtem the torrent of diſgrace, and to ſave his country from utter ruin. His firmneſs, ſagacity, penetration and cautiouſneſs recommended him, at this critical juncture, like another Fabius, to check the fire and vigour of the Pruſſian monarch, who like Hannibal, ſet no bounds to his ambition and arms; and did almoſt ruin himſelf by truſting too much to his good fortune and military ſkill.

This General had been ſent from Vienna to the grand army; and did not arrive till after its defeat. The day after the battle he had got no farther than Boemiſchbrod, a few miles from Prague: where

where he met a large body of Auſtrian horſe, under General Serbeloni, which, with ſome other of the fugitive corps and broken remains of the Auſtrian army, Marſhal Daun collected with an activity, that attracted the attention of his Pruſſian Majeſty; who detached the Prince of Bevern, with 20 battalions, and 30 ſquadrons, to prevent their numbers becoming formidable. A moſt prudent ſtep: and could it have ſucceeded, the fate of Bohemia, and perhaps of the Houſe of Auſtria, would have been therewith decided. But Daun acted upon more ſure principles. He was too cautious and penetrating to ſtake the ruin of his Imperial Miſtreſs on the chance of a battle, to be fought by a few diſpirited, ſhattered troops, ſunk with diſgrace, and in great want of every thing, with an army fluſhed with victory, and well ſupplied with all the neceſſaries for a ſoldier's life and for action.

A. D. 1757.

Collects the ſcattered remains of the Auſtrian army.

Prince of Bevern ſent to attack him.

As ſoon as it was known that the Pruſſians were in motion, to attack him, Daun retreated to the Elbe, and entrenched himſelf ſtrongly, and with great advantage of ground at Kolin; where he could receive recruits, ſent daily to his camp from Moravia, and heavy artillery from the fortreſs of Olmutz; and inſpire the garriſon in Prague with hopes, that he would ſoon be in a condition to raiſe the ſiege: he was likewiſe ſo ſituated that he could harraſs the enemy by cutting off their convoys; and weaken their efforts againſt Prague, by obliging the King to employ near a moiety of his army in watching his motions.

Daun retires to Kolin.

Its advantageous ſituation.

By

A. D. 1757.

His uſe of this camp.

By keeping cloſe within this camp, he had nothing to fear from the Prince of Bevern; whom he frequently alarmed by a detachment of Hungarians and Saxons under General Nadaſti, who made ſeveral motions with advantage; and by another of huſſars under Colonel Putkammer, who paſſed the defile of Czirkwitz and ſpread an alarm through the whole camp of the enemy: and thus by degrees, he reſtored the languiſhing and almoſt deſponding ſpirits of his own troops. Beſides, he rendered his ſituation irkſome and embarraſſing to a monarch of an enterpriſing and impetuous diſpoſition: and did not doubt, but he ſhould be able, by retarding the enemy's operations, and aſſiduouſly avoiding a precipitate action, until the Pruſſian vigour ſhould be exhauſted, their ſtrength impaired by deſertion and loſſes, the fire and ardour of their genius extinguiſhed by continual fatigue and inceſſant alarms, to oblige the Pruſſians not only to raiſe the ſiege of Prague, but to evacuate the whole kingdom of Bohemia.

The event juſtified his conduct. The army at Kolin increaſed daily in number; and conſequently became more formidable to the enemy. The King of Pruſſia, who had depended upon the impoſſibility of ſuch a numerous army ſubſiſting ſo long within the walls of a city, grew daily more and more impatient, at the length of the ſiege; and he began, already, to foreſee the fatality of permitting Count Daun's army to grow ſo powerful, as in a ſhort time, it might not only be too much for the Prince of Bevern, but ſtrong enough

King of Pruſſia's reaſons for attacking Count Daun.

enough to force him to raiſe the ſiege. This decoyed him into the ſnare ſpread by the Auſtrian general; who was at the head of 60,000 men, well diſciplined and deeply entrenched; defended by a prodigious train of artillery, placed on redoubts and batteries, erected on the moſt advantageous poſts; with lines and heavy pieces of cannon at every acceſſible part of the camp, and rendered almoſt inacceſſible by difficult defiles at the foot of the hills. A. D. 1757. Strength of the camp at Kolin.

How formidable ſoever this appearance of the Auſtrian camp may be, it rather ſerved to ſharpen, than to blunt the edge of his Pruſſian Majeſty's martial genius. He joined the Prince of Bevern at Milkowitz, about ſix miles from Prague, with three battalions of infantry and one regiment of cuiraſſiers, brought from before Prague, and with five battalions and ten ſquadrons he had picked up on the road, which had been employed to guard the Saſawa. He alſo had ordered Prince Maurice of Anhalt Deſſau to follow him next day with ſix battalions and one regiment of cuiraſſiers. Which was punctually done. Thus the whole force of the Pruſſian army, after their junction, conſiſted of 32 battalions and 111 ſquadrons of horſe, dragoons and huſſars, making 32,000 men, upon the neareſt computation; and without further delay they advanced to ſeek the enemy, whom they found moſt advantageouſly poſted, and covered with a very numerous artillery, upon the high grounds between Gentitz and St. John the Baptiſt; greatly reinforced ſince the King's march

King of Pruſſia marches to attack Count Daun.

His force.

A. D. 1757. Came to action.

march from his camp before Prague, and drawn up in three lines. It was now about three in the afternoon, when the firſt onſet was made. The Auſtrians waited the approach of the enemy, as a people ſecure in their ſituation, rather than in their numbers and courage. Their artillery were placed with the utmoſt advantage for defence, and charged with chain and grapeſhot, which poured like hail upon the Pruſſians, who bid defiance to difficulties and death, and marched up the hills with a firmneſs and intrepidity, that muſt have daunted and driven back any troops, that were not determined to conquer or to die. The ſlaughter of the advancing army was moſt horrible; the Pruſſians were obliged not only to paſs through the thickeſt fire, that can be imagined, but to fight their way over heaps of their brave companions, mowed down by the cannon of the enemy. Yet inured to conquer, and ſpurning at danger, the Pruſſians drove their enemies from two eminences, fortified with heavy cannon, and from two villages defended by ſeveral battalions. For a while victory ſeemed to incline towards the Pruſſians; but, as they attacked the third eminence, their prodigious loſs of men, the obſtinacy of the enemy, and the advantage the Auſtrian cavalry gained, by their numbers and ſituation, to flank them with grape and chain-ſhot, the brave few that were left in battle, to contend for victory, were put into diſorder, and driven back. However, preferring a glorious death in the preſence of their King, to an inglorious retreat, that ſhould cancel the honour,

nour, and wither the laurels, they had brought into the field from Reichenberg and the neighbourhood of Prague, they rallied and reſumed the charge with double ardour, not only once more, but ſeven times ſucceſſively; led on by that valiant ſoldier and great general Prince Ferdinand; but not being in a condition to maintain the ground, where their cavalry could not act, and againſt the obſtinacy and numbers of an enemy, who had the advantage of ſituation, artillery and entrenchments, under the command of a general of the greateſt ſkill and conduct, they gave it up. A. D. 1757.

The King, like a man in deſpair, more willing to meet death, than to carry the cauſe of diſcontent in his breaſt, reſolves to wipe off the diſgrace, which now appeared ready to fall upon his arms, through his own raſhneſs, by a more furious effort. With this reſolution he put himſelf at the head of his cavalry, and attacks the left wing of the enemy, with the greateſt bravery, and expoſed his perſon, to animate his ſoldiers, in the moſt perilous ſituations. Yet neither valour, conduct, nor even deſperation was able to mend a loſt cauſe. So far his tutelar genius accompanied him in this diſtreſs, as to favour the retreat of the remains of the braveſt army, that ever faced an enemy. The King drew off his forces from the field of blood, for this might more properly be called a carnage, than a battle, with all his baggage and artillery, in ſight of the enemy, in good order, and without one attempt to purſue him. Deſperate reſolution of the King. Retreats.

A. D. 1757. Remarkable bravery on both ſides.

Thus ended that precipitate reſolution, taken by his Pruſſian Majeſty, contrary to the good advice of his faithful Keith, whoſe valour was tutored by experience. However, this engagement may be accounted a trial of ſkill and courage between the two powers concerned therein. For, almoſt all the officers, on each ſide, diſtinguiſhed themſelves: The Pruſſians, to recommend themſelves under the inſpection of their Sovereign, and to ſupport the applauſe already gained by their victories: the Auſtrians, to ſave their country from falling a ſacrifice to the jealouſy and reſentment of the King of Pruſſia. Both the King's brothers were in the field, and they did all that could be expected from the King of Pruſſia's brothers. Count Daun had a horſe killed under him, and received two ſlight wounds, as he emulated the conduct of his royal adverſary in every perilous ſituation. The loſſes of both armies were extraordinary in their men. The Pruſſians had upwards of eight thouſand killed and wounded: many were made priſoners [f], or deſerted. The Auſtrians had above ten thouſand killed and wounded.

Loſſes on both ſides.

King of Pruſſia blames himſelf.

The loſs of this battle the King attributed wholly to himſelf. One falſe motion frequently proves deciſive. He expoſed the infantry naked and uncovered by the cavalry, to the chain and grape-ſhot of the enemy's whole artillery; which was an error, that could not be retrieved, on

[f] Amongſt whom were the two generals Treſkow and Pannewith.

ground,

ground, where the cavalry could not be brought up to cover the infantry. The Auſtrians did actually fly before his Majeſty's victorious troops, at the beginning of the engagement: but the Pruſſians having neither horſe nor artillery to enable them to ſuſtain the ſhock of the Auſtrian fire, which made terrible havock amongſt their ranks, it was impoſſible for them to do more than they did. The ardour of the conquerors being checked they were neceſſitated to ſubmit to fate, and retreat, not from the enemy, who never dared to follow them, when ever they fell back; but from thoſe engines of deſtruction, whoſe murdering fury they had no means to reſiſt, nor numbers to ſupply. A. D. 1757.

His candour and fortitude.

However, the Pruſſian hero did not ſink under this reverſe of fortune, he ſupported himſelf with a dignity becoming a great King, who, notwithſtanding this ſevere trial of his fortitude, and the cloud, which appeared to overcaſt his glory, and to darken the way to future ſucceſs, was convinced of his error, acknowledged his fault, and did every thing that one, in his ſituation, was able to do, to extricate himſelf out of the preſent difficulty, and to continue the war with more advantage: So that whatever ſmall blemiſh his military conduct might have ſuffered, his reputation roſe higher and higher in the opinion of all judicious men, by the candid and noble manner in which he acknowledged his miſtake; by the firmneſs, with which he bore his misfortune, and by

A. D. 1757. those aſtoniſhing ſtrokes of genius and heroiſm, by which he retrieved his loſs.

His letter to Earl Marſhal. His Majeſty, in a letter to Earl Marſhal, gives the beſt narrative and proof of this affair. He firſt does juſtice to his enemy's valour. "The "imperial grenadiers, ſays he, are an admirable "corps: one hundred companies defended a riſing "ground, which my beſt infantry could not car- "ry. Ferdinand, who commanded them, re- "turned ſeven times to the charge; but to no "purpoſe. At firſt he maſtered a battery, but "could not hold it. The enemy had the advant- "age of a numerous and well-ſerved artillery. "It did honour to Lichtenſtein, who had the di- "rection." He then extols the courage of his own men. "Only the Pruſſian army can diſpute "it with him." But "my infantry were too few. "All my cavalry were preſent, and idle ſpecta- "tors, excepting a bold puſh by my houſhold "troops and ſome dragoons." He then points "out the cauſes of his defeat: "Ferdinand at- "tacked without powder; the enemy, in return, "were not ſparing of theirs. They had the ad- "vantage of a riſing ground of intrenchments, "and of a prodigious artillery. Several of my "regiments were repulſed by their muſquetry." Speaking of his brothers: "Henry, ſays he, "performed wonders, I tremble for my worthy "brothers: they are too brave." He takes the blame on himſelf. "Fortune turned her back "on me this day. I ought to have expected it. "She is a female, and I am no gallant. In fact

"I ought

" I ought to have had more infantry.—Succeſs, A. D. 1757.
" my dear Lord, often occaſions a deſtructive con-
" fidence. Twenty-four battalions were not ſuf-
" ficient to diſlodge ſixty thouſand men from an
" advantageous poſt. Another time we hope to
" do better.—I have no reaſon to complain of
" the bravery of my troops, or the experience of
" my officers. I alone was in the fault: and I
" hope to repair it;" was the generous declaration of his Pruſſian Majeſty to one of his general officers.

His ſhattered army having made a ſafe retreat from the enemy's defiles and eminences; the next and immediate care was to prevent the bad effects of this day's work, ſhould the news thereof reach Prague before he could take proper meaſures to ſecure his men, and all the matters employed in the reduction of that city. Therefore, though he had been ſo greatly fatigued by the ſervice of the day, at the head of every attack, on horſeback, he left his army at Nimberg, under the command of the Prince of Bevern, and with freſh horſes, and an eſcort of a dozen huzzars, he ſet out in perſon for his camp before Prague, and arrived there in the morning without halting. He placed double ſentinels at all the avenues and advanced poſts, to prevent intelligence arriving from Kolin; and his orders for ſending off all his artillery, ammunition and baggage, were executed with ſuch expedition, that the tents were ſtruck, and the army on their march, before the garriſon were informed of the mighty cauſe of their deli- His expedition and ſucceſs in raiſing the ſiege of Prague.

A. D. 1757.

verance. Prince Charles of Lorrain, who held the chief command alone, after the death of M. Brown, who died in Prague of his wounds received on the 6th of May, made a ſally with a large body of Auſtrians; but could do no further miſchief, than kill about two hundred of the Pruſſians in the rear of M. Keith's diviſion; the corps commanded by the Prince of Pruſſia, having marched all night, by another rout, to join the Prince of Bevern at Nimberg, was not ſo much expoſed to the enemy.

A ſally made by the garriſon.

Pruſſian army takes different routs.

M. Keith made the beſt of his way towards Saxony; and was left by the King at the head of 25,000 men to guard the paſſes. His Majeſty and Prince Henry his brother, made the beſt of their way to Pirna, with another part of the army, and encamped in that neighbourhood. The Prince of Pruſſia retreated into Luſatia, with his diviſion of the army: where he was ſoon after, in danger of being ſurrounded by the Auſtrians, who followed him, laid the town of Zittau in aſhes by a dreadful bombardment; and obliged the garriſon to ſurrender. This called for immediate relief. His Pruſſian Majeſty did not heſitate a moment to march from Pirna, with part of his army, and leaving the remainder under M. Keith, to guard the paſſes of the mountains of Bohemia, he, by forced marches, came ſuddenly upon the Auſtrians, obliged them to retire, and delivered his brother's army.

Auſtrians purſue into Luſatia.

Zittau bombarded.

King of Pruſſia marches to the relief of his brother.

The action at Kolin was not the only mortification, which his Pruſſian Majeſty met with this ſummer.

His other mortifications.

ſummer. His territories in Weſtphalia were overrun and laid under contribution, and ſeized by the French, for the uſe of the Empreſs Queen: and the army of obſervation, paid by Great Britain, and lately put in motion under his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, was not in a condition to ſtop their progreſs, or to make a ſufficient diverſion in his favour. A. D. 1757.

His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland not only wanted ſtrength to act offenſively againſt the advancing enemy; but he found himſelf obliged to conform to the Hanoverian council aſſigned him, for his conduct in the command of the army of obſervation; whoſe favourite object was to keep clear of any operations and connections, which might expoſe their Electorate to a criminal proceſs in the Imperial courts; and to act only on the defenſive, with expectation that the French would not dare to act in the hoſtile manner, as they did, againſt a German Electorate; or that, in caſe of ſuch an atrocious infrinegment of the Imperial compact, for the preſervation of all parts of the Germanic body, the Emperor would be obliged to protect them from a foreign and unprovoked invader. The army of obſervation under the Duke of Cumberland.

Such was the ſituation of his Royal Highneſs at Bielfeld [g], when the plan of operations were ſettled French army under M. d'Etrees.

[g] His army conſiſted of thirty-ſeven battalions and thirty-four ſquadrons; viz. three Pruſſian regiments, that retired from Weſel, ſix battalions and ſix ſquadrons, poſted at Bielfeld, under command of Lieutenant-General Baron de Sporcken;

A. D. 1757. settled between him and the Hanoverian generals; and the French army, conſiſting at that time of ſeventy battalions [h], forty ſquadrons [i] and fifty-two pieces of cannon; beſides a body of cavalry left at Ruremond for conveniency of forage; of which the French were greatly in want, as well as of almoſt every neceſſary of life, which want daily increaſed by the meaſures taken by the Duke to retard and to diſcourage their advancing to the Weſer: for, the nearer they approached the ſeat of the army of obſervation, the greater they found the difficulty to get proviſions. The country was not able to ſupply all their wants, and the little that could be found was not to be carried away without oppoſition, and diſadvantageous ſkirmiſhes; for the Hanoverians penetrated ſo far as the country of Paderborn, and carried off a convoy of wheat and oats, to be laid up in the Electorate of Cologne for the uſe of the French army.

In great want of proviſions, &c.

Several ſkirmiſhes.

Certainly no diſpoſitions could be made with greater propriety, to convey the moſt advantageous ideas of the martial and political abilities of a commander in chief, than thoſe, which his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland laid

Wiſe diſpoſitions made by the Duke of Cumberland.

ſix battalions at Hervorden, under Lieutenant-General de Block: ſix battalions and four ſquadrons, between Hervorden and Minden, under Major-General Ledebour; ſeven battalions and ten ſquadrons, near Hamelen, under Lieutenant-General d'Oberg; and five battalions and four ſquadrons, near Niemburg, under Major-General Hauſs.

[h] A French battalion is from five to ſix hundred men.

[i] A French ſquadron is from two hundred and fifty to three hundred horſe.

down

down, adviſed, and maintained to the utmoſt of his power; ſo far, we humbly preſume to ſay, as his ſtrength in the field, and his weight in the council, under which he was obliged to act, would enable and permit him to diſplay the military knowledge of his heroic genius. But, when he perceived that the French were under the deſperate neceſſity of fighting or ſtarving; that nevertheleſs he could not draw them to an engagement, with the advantage he had formed to himſelf, by placing his camp between Bielfeld and Hervorden; and that the enemy, by a vaſt ſuperiority of men, would be able to get between him and the Weſer, and that they were making diſpoſitions even to ſurround his ſmall army, on the ſide of Burghotte: his Royal Highneſs withdrew his poſts from Paderborn and Ritzberg, leaving nothing of ſervice behind them, and, at length, broke up his camp at Bielfeld, to a more advantageous and ſafe ſituation; as it was impoſſible on that ground to withſtand the force of the enemy.

A. D 1757.

His reaſon for retreating from Bielfield.

No troops could retire in better order: and the corps poſted at Bielfeld, to cover the retreat, with orders, upon the approach of the French, to obſerve their motions, and to regulate their own conduct, accordingly, behaved with ſo good a countenance, that they made their own retreat good after a feint reſiſtance [k]. This opened a way for the

Retreats in good order.

[k] They found nothing in this town, but the remains of a magazine in flames; to which the Germans had ſet fire. But the French account of this retreat is very different, who ſay,

A. D. 1757. the French army to get plentiful ſupplies of all neceſſaries. Which enabled them to purſue their ſucceſs.

The French advance. The allies rendezvouzed at Cofeldt, and encamped there on the 14th and 15th. The French in the mean time ſummoned the corps at Hervorden, and made a feint, as if they would attack the town, but marched off, without making any further attempt. By this time the whole French army was collected, and obliged the allies to paſs the Weſer. Which was performed with very inconſiderable loſs, and that only in the rear of the parties, as they retreated from their ſeveral poſts.

The Duke retreats beyond the Weſer. When the Duke foreſaw that there was no ſtanding againſt the ſuperior power of the enemy, and that his chief dependance was upon the defence of the Weſer; his Royal Highneſs made the beſt and moſt active diſpoſitions to ſecure the paſſes of that

That on the 13th in the evening, Colonel Fiſcher, with his corps and ſome grenadiers attacked Bielfeld, without much reſiſtance, at firſt, that the Pruſſians in the left wing of the Duke's army, threw in a reinforcement, which made a vigorous defence. That at break of day, this left wing, compoſed of Pruſſians, Heſſians, and Brunſwickians, was attacked, defeated, and driven from Bielfeld; on which the right wing, conſiſting of Hanoverians, took to flight. That immediately after the action, the French pitched their tents on the ſpot from whence the allies had been driven. That they took ten pieces of cannon, beſides ſeveral baggage-waggons; and loſt no officer of note. And that on the ſide of the vanquiſhed party, there were ſeveral officers of rank among the ſlain, particularly the generals Einſiedel and Junckheim.

river, which he paſſed, unmoleſted in the rear, with all his ammunition, artillery, baggage and troops, between Minden and Oldendorp, a camp being prepared for their reception, in a moſt advantageous ſituation, having the Weſer in front, and the right and left covered with eminences and moraſſes. A. D. 1757.

In this camp, it is very clear that the Duke was determined to diſpute the paſſage of the Weſer with the enemy. But how was the world diſappointed of their expectations, when they were informed by authority, that the beſt diſpoſition, that the beſt general in the univerſe could deviſe and make, was made to ſerve no other purpoſe than to lie upon their arms, to witneſs the uninterrupted paſſage of an enemy, who had as much power to force them to retire in the country beyond the Weſer, as on the nether ſide, when they had nothing more than an army, that could not ſtand before them in the field, to encounter. Here the weight of Hanoverian councils appeared in the ballance againſt reaſon, againſt the judgment and inclination of the commander in chief. Forbearance and non-reſiſtance were now the maxims of the Hanoverian chancery. Their own innocence, inoffenſive conduct, and the juſtice and right of protection, which an Electorate can demand under the capitulations of the Golden Bull, were inſiſted upon, as arguments for the ſecurity of Hanover and its dependences againſt France, in preference to the vigorous meaſures, provided by his Royal Highneſs for defence, by way of arms, Remarks on this ſituation.

A. D. 1757. againſt an invader, that bid defiance to all laws human and divine; and, what was more than they were willing to underſtand, acted in concert with the Lord-paramount of the Empire, to deprive the allies of Great Britain of the means to favour the deſigns of Pruſſia.

The French paſs over the Weſer. However this might be, the French were ſo little diſmayed at the Duke's well-choſen camp, that they ſeemed to be in the ſecret of the cauſe of the Hanoverian ſecurity; for, they advanced to the Weſer without delay, and paſſed that river on the 10th and 11th of July, without fear or the the loſs of a ſingle man.

Marſhal d'Etrees being informed that his magazines of proviſions were well furniſhed, his ovens eſtabliſhed, and the artillery and pontoons arrived at the deſtined places, ordered Lieutenant-General Broglio, with ten battalions, twelve ſquadrons, and ten pieces of cannon, to march to Engheren; Lieutenat-General M. de Chevert, with ſixteen battalions, three brigades of carabineers, the royal hunters, and ſix hundred huſſars, to march to Hervorden; and Lieutenant Marquis d'Armentieres, with twelve battalions and ten ſquadrons to march to Ulrickhauſen. All theſe troops being arrived in their camp on the 4th inſtant, halted the 5th. On the 6th twenty-two battalions and thirty-two ſquadrons, under the command of the Duke of Orleans, marched to Ulrickhauſen, from whence M. d'Armentieres had ſet out early in the morning, with the corps under his command, and by briſk marches got, on the 7th by eleven

at

at night, to Blanckenhove, where he found the boats which had gone from Ahrenſberg. The bridges were built, the cannon planted, and the entrenchments at the head of the bridges compleated, in the night between the 7th and 8th. The Marſhal having ſent away part of his baggage from Bielfeld on the 6th, went in perſon, on the 7th at eleven o'clock, to Horn, and the 8th to Brakel. On advice that M. d'Armentieres had thrown his bridges acroſs, without oppoſition, and was at work on his entrenchments, he went on the 9th to Blakenhove, to ſee the bridges and intrenchments, and afterwards advanced to examine the firſt poſition he intended for this army, and came down the right ſide of the Weſer to the abby of Corvey, where he forded the Weſer, with the Princes of the blood, and their attendants. The 10th in the morning he got on horſeback by four o'clock, to ſee the Duke of Orleans's diviſion file off, which arrived at Corvey at ten o'clock; as alſo that of M. d'Armentieres, which arrived at eleven; and that of M. Souvré, which arrived at noon. The Marſhal, having examined the courſe of the Weſer, cauſed the bridges of pontoons to be laid within gunſhot of the abbey, where the Viſcount de Turenne paſſed the river in 1673, and where Broglio and Chevert's diviſions paſſed it the 12th and 13th. M. de Chevert, and the Duke of Broglio being informed of what was to be done upon the Upper Weſer, made an attack upon Minden, and carried it.

A. D. 1757.

Whilſt

A. D. 1757.

Lien and Embden ſurprized by the French.

Whilſt theſe operations were carried on, the French Marſhal detached the Marquis d'Anvel, with a ſtrong party, to favour the deſigns of the Empreſs Queen, in Eaſt Frieſland, who made himſelf maſter of Lien, and then proceeded to ſurprize Embden, the only ſea port under the dominion of the King of Pruſſia, which ſurrendered by capitulation, without the leaſt oppoſition; the garriſon, which conſiſted of 400 men, having mutined againſt their officers; becauſe they did not think themſelves a ſufficient force for the defence of the town. The French publiſhed ordinances for the ſecurity of the religion and commerce of the city; and for prohibiting the exportation of corn and forage out of that principality; and obliged the inhabitants to take an oath of allegiance to the French King.

The French raiſe contributions in Hanover.

Whatever were the real motives of the Hanoverian backwardneſs to attack the invaders of their country, they certainly paid dear for their inactivity or timidity. The French proceeded immediately to raiſe heavy contributions in Hanover[1] This ſeemed to convince thoſe paſſive or puſillanimous advocates for non-reſiſtance, that it was time to embrace and follow more ſalutary advice, and no longer to imagine, that their Electoral dominions were ſo ſecured, as to have nothing to fear from a powerful and perfidious neighbour.

[1] The French General, from his camp at Stadt-Oldendorf, ſent to the regency of Hanover a requiſition, dated 21 July, demanding that deputies ſhould be ſent to his head quarters to treat about contributions.

It

It was reſolved to make a ſtand at Haſtenbeck, within a few miles of Hammelen, where it was judged, that the ground would deprive the enemy of that advantage, they ſo much depended upon, in regard to the ſuperiority of their numbers. The Duke detached 12,000 men to ſeize the important paſs of Stadt Oldendorf; but the French had got poſſeſſion of it already, and a few days after drove the Hanoverian parties from the village of Lutford. Their camp was now tranſferred to the fine plain of Stadt Oldendorff. A. D. 1757. The battle at Haſtenbeck.

Theſe were only preludes to the main deſign of the French; which was to force the allies to battle. Accordingly, as ſoon as His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland perceived the intention of the enemy was to attack him, he drew up his little army on the height between the Weſer and the woods, with his right towards the river, his left cloſe to the woods; on the point of which he erected a battery of 12 pounders and haubitzers, ſupported by the hunters and two battalions of grenadiers, poſted in the corner of the wood upon the left of the battery, under the command of Major General Schulenberg, with the village of Hoſtenbeck in his front. There was a hollow way from the left of the village to the battery, and a continual moraſs on the other ſide of Haſtenbeck to his right. In the evening of the 24th he called in all his out poſts, and kept the whole army on their arms all night; on the 25th in the morning the enemy advanced in columns, and made an appearance to attack the right

A. D. 1757. right, the left and center; but nothing more was done than a ſevere cannonade, which continued all day, from a train much ſuperior to the Duke's artillery. The next night was alſo ſpent by the allies, upon their arms: the battery at the end of the wood was repaired, and Count Sculenberg reinforced with a battalion of grenadiers and two pieces of cannon. He alſo ordered four more battalions of grenadiers, under Major General Hardenberg, to ſupport that battery; cauſed another battery to be erected of 12 and 6 pounders, behind the village of Haſtenbeck, and provided in every reſpect to give the enemy a warm reception: and then, at day light, got on horſe back to reconnoitre the poſition of the enemy. And at five next morning the French renewed the cannonade; which now was levelled particularly againſt an Hanoverian battery, ſupported by the Heſſian infantry and cavalry. The artillery was ſerved on this attack with great fury and ſkill, and the place was defended with extraordinary reſolution and incredible bravery. Between ſeven and eight the muſquetry began to play on the Hanoverian left; and the connonading continued without intermiſſion for ſix hours; when his Royal Highneſs ordered Major General Behr, with three battalions of Brunſwick, to ſuſtain the grenadiers in the woods if neceſſary. The fire of the ſmall arms increaſing, His Royal Highneſs detached three Hanoverian battalions and ſix ſquadrons round the wood by Afferde, who towards the cloſe of the day ſurprized ſeveral ſquadrons of the enemy, that

they had not time to charge, and drove them back to their army. Yet how neceſſary and wiſe ſoever thoſe diſpoſitions were made with the grenadiers in the wood, thoſe troops, as ſoon as they perceived the enemy's troops endeavouring to penetrate that way, quitted their poſts, and joined the left wing. By which miſconduct, the French got poſſeſſion of the Hanoverian battery on the left without oppoſition. It is true this afforded an opportunity for the hereditary Prince of Brunſwick, at the head of a battalion of Wolfenbuttle guards, and another of Hanoverians, to diſtinguiſh himſelf, by retaking the battery, with their bayonets fixed, from a much ſuperior force of the enemy. But the French having got poſſeſſion not only of the woods, but of a height, that flanked both the lines of infantry, and the battery of the allies, and were able to ſupport their attack under the cover of a hill, his Royal Highneſs conſidering the great ſuperiority of the enemy, both in numbers and artillery, and that it was impoſſible to diſlodge them from their poſt without expoſing his own troops to too great a hazard, ordered a retreat, and drew off his army to Hamelen in very good order. A. D. 1757.

This action may be ſaid to have continued three days; and was diſputed with great vigour and ſkill on both ſides, and with ſuch doubtful ſucceſs, that it is a doubt to this day, which of the armies had a right to claim the victory. As for the loſs, it was much leſs on the ſide of the allies. The killed, wounded and miſſing, did not exceed Remarks thereon.

A. D. 1757. 1454[m]. The French according to their own account loſt 2000 and upwards. This is certain, the French, who marched into the woods of Lauenſtein, were ſeized with ſuch a panic, that upon the bare imagination of being attacked by the Hanoverians, they fired upon one another: ſo that had the grenadiers, &c. which His Royal Highneſs had wiſely diſpoſed and ſtationed in theſe woods, kept their poſts, as they in duty ought to have done, they might have improved that conſternation; and by a well regulated attack upon that party of the enemy, their defeat might have been left undiſputed. But the fate of this day is but one example of many, that ſhews how the Hanoverian miniſtry diſapproved of the meaſures taken by their ſovereign for their defence. It is more than conjecture, that they would have been much better ſatisfied to put themſelves under the protection of France, than join the moſt powerful armies to defend their territories from a French invaſion.

In this temper continually, they had by retreating before the enemy, prevailed with the Duke to come to ſuch an iſſue, that nothing but ſuperior judgment in the military art, could have delivered his army, on this occaſion, from falling a prey to the enemy. This was a deliverance beyond all expectation: and could his Royal Highneſs have been at liberty to retire with his army to Magdeburg, the French would have felt their loſs in this

[m] 327 killed, and 1127 wounded and miſſing.

action

action very ſeverely; and ſoon have been obliged to quit the Electorate of Hanover, or to maintain an army, that would have exhauſted their finances, to cover an acquiſition, not able to pay the expence. A. D. 1757.

But the fear they now adopted for the archives, and many valuable effects, that had been carried to, and depoſited at Stade, a ſmall town near the mouth of the Elbe, prevailed with His Royal Highneſs to make all his diſpoſitions and marches after this battle, to cover Stade from a ſurprize by the enemy, in the manner we have ſeen them ſubdue Embden. Thus he left a garriſon at Hamelen and retreated to Nienburg, and then to Hoya: in whoſe neighbourhood he encamped the remains of his army, after ſending away all his magazines, ſick and wounded, in order, as he was adviſed, to cover Bremen and Verden, and to preſerve a communication with Stade. An excellent ſituation for the purpoſe, had they, that inſiſted upon the meaſure, provided him alſo with an army capable of diſputing the ground with an enemy, that was expected, and upon their march, to force the way. But could not be expected, in his circumſtances, to have been leſs ruinous, than will be ſeen below.

Reaſons for retreating towards Stade.

Sends off all his ſick, wounded, and magazines.

Upon the Duke's retreat from Hamelen, it ſoon ſubmitted to the French, by a capitulation, which did no credit to the garriſon: for they took no care of the ſick and wounded; who thereby became priſoners of war. The French diſmantled the walls, and carried off 60 braſs cannon, ſeveral mortars, 40 ovens, large quantities of proviſions and

Hamelen ſurrenders to the French.

A. D. 1757. and ammunition, and part of the equipage of the Duke's army.

M. d'Etrees ſuperceeded. Here the French halted for ſome time. Advice was arrived in the French army, that the Duke de Richelieu was appointed, and on his way to ſuperceed M. d'Eſtrees, and to take upon him the command of the French army in Lower Saxony; to which poſt he had been raiſed by court intrigue, through the means of Madam Pampadour, the King of France's female favourite. M. d'Etrees had immediately after the battle of Haſtenbeck, detached 4000 men to take poſſeſſion of the Electorate of Hanover, and to lay it under contribution. The ſame was done in the territories of the Duke of Wolfenbuttle, and in many places in the dutches of Bremen and Verden. But nothing more was done till Richelieu arrived; who two days after his arrival at Hamelen, detached the Duke de Chevreuſe, with 2000 men, to take poſſeſſion of the city of Hanover; and dubbed him governor of the firſt fruits of his promotion. A circumſtance appears in this expedition, which gives a ſhrewed ſuſpicion of too good an underſtanding between the regency of Hanover and their French invaders: for, there was not the leaſt reſiſtance on the part of the city; and the garriſon were permitted, after they had laid down their arms, to retire wherever they pleaſed. M. de Contades, who was ſent alſo with a detachment to reduce the territories of Heſſe Caſtle, was met at Warburg by the Prince of Heſſe's maſter of the horſe, more like a friend than an enemy, with

Richelieu arrives and takes the command.

Takes poſſeſſion of Hanover.

M. de Contades how received at Warburg.

aſſur-

assurances that the French should be furnished with every thing the country could afford; and the magistrates of Cassel presented him with the keys of their city. A. D. 1757.

Having thus displayed a kind of sovereignty in Lower Saxony and made all safe in the rear, Richelieu bent his thoughts towards the allied army, encamped at Hoya. His motions were watched. So that as soon as His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland was informed that Richelieu had passed the Aller, with a large body of troops, in the night of the 24th of August, he decamped, and ordered his army to march and secure the important pass and post of Rothenburg; which was done the next day; and he encamped again with his whole army behind the Wummer; a very strong and advantageous situation, between Rothenburg and Otterſburg.

Richelieu pursues the allied army.

Advantageous camp of the allied army.

This motion of the allies left Bremen and Verden to the mercy of the French, who immediately entered Verden[n], and detached a sufficient force to take possession of Bremen, which opened her gates to them on the 29th. Two principalities, for whose fate the Hanoverian ministry did not seem to be under much concern, as not being an original part of their Electoral dominions; but a purchase made by King George I[o].

Bremen and Verden seized by the French.

The French halted again, till they had seized all the posts round the Duke's army; which

[n] On the 26th of August.

[o] For the sum of 250,000 l. sterling.

A. D. 1757. putting him upon the neceſſity of making another march, to prevent his communication with Stade being cut off; which the Hanoverian miniſtry inſiſted ſhould be covered, at all events; His Royal Highneſs retreated, firſt, to Selſingen, and from thence under the cannon of Stade: where His Royal Highneſs was made to believe, That he ſhould be able to maintain his ground, between the Aller and the Elbe, and be effectually ſupported by four Engliſh men of war, &c. which at that time lay at anchor off that port, in caſe the French would venture to attack his army.

The allied army retire to Stade.

In this expectation His Royal Highneſs made his diſpoſitions, and took his meaſures for defence; and particularly he detached ſome troops with artillery to Buck-Schantz, and with orders to defend that poſt to the laſt extremity. But theſe hopes ſoon vaniſhed. The French followed him ſtep by ſtep, and having cooped the allies up in this corner, which left no more room for the retreat of an army, that was not in a condition to advance; (or, perhaps under ſuch reſtraints, that the generaliſſimo had it not in his power to riſk a battle; as all the world are ſatisfied the Duke would have done, both now and long before, who have the leaſt conception of his Royal Highneſs's valour and impetuoſity, animated by the examples of the Engliſh atchievements at Creſſy and Agincourt) they hemmed them in on every ſide, and, notwithſtanding the four men of war in the river, they got poſſeſſion of a fort at the mouth of the Zwinga, which cut off the Duke's communication with

Meaſures taken for defence.

Purſued by the French.

Gain the advantage of their ſituation.

with the Elb. Under this preſſure of the moſt hazardous circumſtances, not in a condition to fight, not in a ſituation to retreat, nor covered, as it would have been of the utmoſt ſervice at the laſt extremity, by a reſpectable ſquadron of men of war; and urged by the Hanoverian miniſtry to accept of ſuch terms of capitulation, as would ſave their men, ſave their archives and valuable effects, and by a neutrality clear their country from the misfortunes, that always afflict a ſeat of war, which, indeed, ſeemed to be the whole bent of their conduct; he was forced to accept of a mediation offered by the King of Denmark, for which his miniſter, the Count de Lynar, was already prepared, and to ſign the following convention; which it will be proper to give entire, on account of its conſequences, occaſioned by what the French call an infraction of the capitulation. A. D. 1757. Oblige them to capitulate.

"HIS Majeſty the King of Denmark, touched with the diſtreſſes of the countries of Bremen and Verden, to which he has always granted his ſpecial protection, and being deſirous, by preventing thoſe countries from being any longer the theatre of war, to ſpare alſo the effuſion of blood in the armies, which are ready to diſpute the poſſeſſion thereof, hath employed his mediation by the miniſtry of the Count de Lynar. His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, General of the army of the allies, on the one party, and his excellency the Duke de Richelieu, General

A. D. 1757. of the French forces in Germany, on the other; in conſideration of the intervention of his Daniſh Majeſty, have reſpectively engaged their word of honour to the Count de Lynar, to abide by the convention hereafter ſtipulated; and he, the Count de Lenar, correſpondently to the King his maſter's intentions, obliges himſelf to obtain the guaranty mentioned in the preſent convention; ſo that it ſhall be ſent to him, with his full powers, which there was no time to make out in the circumſtances, which hurried his departure.

Articles of capitulation. ART. I. Hoſtilities ſhall ceaſe on both ſides within 24 hours, or ſooner if poſſible. Orders for this purpoſe ſhall be immediately ſent to the detached bodies.

II. The auxiliary troops of the army of the Duke of Cumberland, namely, thoſe of Heſſe, Brunſwick, Saxe-Gotha, and even thoſe of the Count de la Lippe Buckebourg, ſhall be ſent home: and as it is neceſſary to ſettle particularly their march to their ſeveral countries, a general officer of each reſpective nation ſhall be ſent from the army of the allies, with whom ſhall be ſettled the rout of thoſe troops, the diviſions they ſhall march in, their ſubſiſtence on their march, and the paſſports to be granted them by his excellency the Duke of Richelieu, to go home to their own countries, where they ſhall be placed and diſtributed as ſhall be agreed upon between the court of France and their reſpective ſovereigns.

III. His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland obliges himſelf to paſs the Elbe with that part

part of his army, which he ſhall not be able to place in the city of Stade. That part of his forces, which ſhall enter in garriſon in the ſaid city, and which, it is ſuppoſed, may amount to between four and ſix thouſand men, ſhall remain there under the guaranty of his Majeſty the King of Denmark, without committing any act of hoſtility; and, on the other hand, they ſhall not be expoſed to any from the French troops. In conſequence thereof, commiſſaries named on each ſide ſhall agree upon the limits to be fixed round that place, for the conveniency of the garriſon; which limits ſhall not extend above half a league, or a league, from the place, according to the nature of the ground or circumſtances, which ſhall be fairly ſettled by the commiſſaries. The reſt of the Hanoverian army ſhall go to take quarters in the country beyond the Elbe; and to facilitate the march of thoſe troops, his excellency the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu ſhall concert with a general officer ſent from the Hanoverian army, the routs they ſhall take, obliging himſelf to give the neceſſary paſſports and ſecurity for the free paſſage of them and their baggage to the places of their deſtination; His Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland reſerving to himſelf the liberty of negociating between the two courts for an extenſion of thoſe quarters. As to the French troops, they ſhall remain in the reſt of the dutchies of Bremen and Verden, till the definitive treaty of the two ſovereigns. A. D. 1757.

A. D. 1757. IV. As the aforeſaid articles are to be executed as ſoon as poſſible, the Hanoverian army, and the corps, which are detached from it, particularly that which is at Buck-Schantz, and the neighbourhood, ſhall retire under Stade in the ſpace of 48 hours. The French army ſhall not paſs the river Oſte, in the dutchy of Bremen, till the limits be regulated. It ſhall, beſides, keep all the poſts and countries, of which it is in poſſeſſion; and, not to retard the regulation of the limits to be ſettled between the armies, commiſſaries ſhall be nominated, and ſent on the 10th inſtant to Bremerworden, by his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, and his Excellency the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu, to regulate, as well the limits to be aſſigned to the French army, as thoſe that are to be obſerved by the garriſon at Stade, according to article III.

V. All the aforeſaid articles ſhall be faithfully executed according to their form and tenor, and under the faith of his Majeſty the King of Denmark's guaranty, which the Count de Lynar, his miniſter, engages to procure.

Done at the camp at Cloſter-Seven, September 8, 1757.

Signed WILLIAM.

SEPERATE ARTICLES.

Upon the repreſentations made by the Count de Lynar, with a view to explain ſome diſpoſitions made by the preſent convention, the following articles have been added:

I. It

I. It is the intention of his Excellency the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu, that the allied troops of his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland ſhall be ſent back to their reſpective countries according to the form mentioned in the ſecond article; and that as to their ſeparation and diſtribution in the country, it ſhall be regulated between the two courts; thoſe troops not being conſidered as priſoners of war. A. D. 1757.

II. It having been repreſented, that the county of Lauenbourg cannot accommodate more than 15 battalions and ſix ſquadrons, and that the city of Stade cannot abſolutely contain the 6000 men allotted to it, his Excellency the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu, being preſſed by M. de Lynar, who ſupported this repreſentation by the guaranty of his Daniſh Majeſty, gives his conſent; and his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland engages, to cauſe 15 battalions and ſix ſquadrons to paſs the Elbe; and the whole body of hunters, and the remaining 10 battalions and 28 ſquadrons ſhall be placed in the town of Stade, and the places neareſt to it, that are within the line, which ſhall be marked by poſts from the mouth of the Luhe, in the Elbe, to the mouth of the Elmerbeck, in the river Oſte; provided always, that the ſaid 10 battalions and 28 ſquadrons ſhall be quartered there, as they are at the time of ſigning this convention, and ſhall not be recruited under any pretext, or augmented in any caſe; and this clauſe is particularly guarantied by the Count de Lynar, in the name of his Daniſh Majeſty.

A. D. 1757.

III. Upon the repreſentation of his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, that both the army and the detached corps cannot retire under Stade in 48 hours, agreeable to the convention, his Excellency the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu hath ſignified, that he will grant them proper time, provided the corps encamped at Buck-Schantz, as well as the army encamped at Bremer-worden, begin their march to retire in 24 hours after ſigning the convention. The time neceſſary for other arrangements, and the execution of the articles concerning the reſpective limits, ſhall be ſettled between Lieutenant General Sporcken and the Marquis de Villemur, firſt Lieutenant General of the King's army.

Done, &c.

The bad effects of this capitulation.

The immediate injury brought upon the allies of Great Britain by this convention, for whoſe common benefit and ſervice, it had been underſtood both by the parliament and people, at the time the ſupplies for an army of obſervation were ſo readily granted, this army was embodied and put in motion; was the deprivation of that aid, which the King of Pruſſia wanted, and had a right to expect, from the diverſion, the army of obſervation might have continued to make, in the field; ſo as to divide the forces of the grand alliance againſt him and the proteſtant intereſt: and the full liberty, in which the French were thereby left, to diſpoſe of their army to aſſiſt the Empreſs Queen in the ruin of the King of Pruſſia,

Had

Had the army of obſervation, if it was found inadequate to the oppoſition it met with in the field, retired to the Pruſſian garriſon at Magdeburg [P], which could have been done in leſs time, and more ſecurity; and encamped under the guns of that fortreſs, the King of Pruſſia would have been protected by the addition of 38,000 troops; the army of obſervation would have grown more formidable to the enemy, on account of its ſituation and connections, and Hanover could have had no more to fear from the French invader, than what was the neceſſary and unavoidable conſequence of ſuch a retreat, which ended in the ſhameful ſurrender of their arms, and a local reſtraint of their ſoldiers.

A. D. 1757. Remarks on this event.

The French delivered by this convention from all hoſtilities; found themſelves in a condition to keep a ſufficient force in the vicinity of Magdeburg, to over-awe the garriſon, with which the M. Duke de Richelieu remained, keeping his head quarters at Brunſwick; and to ſend a large reinforcement, under the Lieutenant General Berchini. He alſo ordered the gens d'arms and the other troops, that were in the Landgravate of Heſſe Caſſel, to file off to the army under the Prince of Soubize, which united force, joined with the Imperial army of execution, was intended to drive the Pruſſians out of Saxony, and to carry the flames of war into Sileſia and the other domi-

How advantageous to the French.

[P] Which was no more than a little above 100 miles from Haſtenbeck; whereas it is above 150 miles to Stade.

nions

A. D. 1757. nions of Pruſſia. M. Duke de Richelieu then commanded 60 battalions of foot, and the greateſt part of the cavalry to attack the Pruſſian territories, into which he, in perſon, alſo entered ſoon after, with 110 battalions and 150 ſquadrons and 100 pieces of cannon near Wolfenbuttle, in three columns; which penetrated into Halberſtadt and Brandenburg, plundering the towns, exacting contributions, and committing ſuch exceſſes, that would have diſgraced the military diſcipline of a Heathen army.

Richelieu invades the Pruſſian dominions.

Here we ſhall leave Germany and the King of Pruſſia expoſed, and actually invaded, and his ſituation grown more dangerous than ever: not only the French were let looſe upon him, and were ravaging his unguarded provinces, and pouring all their force towards Saxony; but the Ruſſians reſumed their march under Marſhal Apraxin and General Fermor, into Ducal Pruſſia: The Swedes declared againſt a King, who at this time ſeemed to be unavoidably cruſhed; and were ready to enter Pruſſian Pomerania with 22,000 men. The army of execution joined by the French under the Prince de Soubiſe undertook the recovery of Saxony: and the Auſtrians were at liberty to act with all their force in conjunction with their allies, where it ſhould appear moſt to their advantage.

The diſtreſs of Pruſſia.

Nothing could be more affecting than this ſtate of our German allies. There was no human help for them, but in Great Britain. The only queſtion was, whether it was the duty, upon the faith of treaties; or the intereſt of Great Britain, either in regard to her own ſecurity, or to her commerce,

How to be relieved.

to

to assist them in this distress; and to prevent their destruction? by a confederacy, in which our natural enemy was a principal, and the most powerful party; and how far our aid ought to have extended? We shall see how this was understood by the court and people of Great Britain, much better by their future measures, than by any reasonings or speculations. A national approbation, confirmed by the unanimous voice of the people, must carry great weight on such a subject. A. D. 1757.

Why Mr. PITT did not acquiesce in a German war.

At the entrance of Mr. PITT, a second time, into the administration, the affairs in Germany bore a very different, nay a reverse aspect. The King of Prussia had beaten down all opposition, and seemed to be in a fair way to force the Empress Queen to equitable terms of peace, and to establish the tranquillity of that continent. For, by breaking the Austrian link of the confederacy, it was natural to suppose that the other powers, in that league, would withdraw their forces, and relinquish their pretensions; and that the protection of the Germanic liberties, in any branch of the Roman Empire, would have become the interest and care of the whole body. The Swedes had not begun to stir. The Russ were at a stand. The army of the Empire was assembling with much dislike, so as to render their service very doubtful: And the French, whose operations and measures more nearly attracted the attention of the British nation, did not seem to be pursuing any object adequate to their prodigious armies beyond the Rhine; and therefore to be looked upon as a feint

A. D. 1757.

feint to draw the Britiſh councils into meaſures injurious to the American war.

The Britiſh court and parliament had done all, that was thought neceſſary and incumbent upon them, for their allies, under theſe circumſtances. The King of Pruſſia aſked for relief in Money. It was granted. Hanover required actual defence. An army of 40,000 veteran troops was hired for that ſervice, and the King of Great Britain's only ſurviving ſon was ſent to command it. Which, in the condition the King of Pruſſia was at that juncture, and, with a conduct regulated by the common intereſt of the allies, was ſufficient to cover Hanover, and to defeat any enterprize undertaken by the French, to the prejudice of Great Britain, or of any of her allies. Beſides, there was a more natural meaſure to divert them from an attempt upon Hanover, by finding their troops employment at home.

No wonder then, that Mr. PITT did not, at firſt acquieſce in the German war; when neither the faith of treaties, nor any immediate danger to the intereſt of our nation, required further aſſiſtance on the continent. However, he reſolved upon an expedition by ſea, which, by inſulting, alarming and landing on the coaſt of France, might ſerve both Germany and Great Britain. This was a ſcheme planned with the moſt promiſing hopes of ſucceſs to both Great Britain and her allies. It was the beſt method to annihilate the ſtrength of France, by annoying her coaſts and deſtroying her maritime ſtores, while her troops were embarked

Propoſes an attack of the coaſt of France.

in



A New and
Correct CHART
of the Seat of the
late WAR,
On the Coasts of
FRANCE, SPAIN
and PORTUGAL,
with the Adjacent
Coasts, and Islands.
1763.
ENGLAND
IRELAND
FLANDERS
PICARDY
NORMANDY
BRITTANY
FRANCE
PARIS
ENGLISH CHANNEL
ST. GEORGES CHAN.
IRISH SEA
BAY OF BISCAY
GUYENNE
GASCONY
POITOU
SAINTONGE
LANGUEDOC
PROVENCE
CATALONIA
VALENCIA
MURCIA
GRANADA
ANDALUSIA
GALLICIA
AUSTURIA
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
MADRID
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
AFRICA
MINORCA I.
MAJORCA I.
YVICA
Scale of 40 Liegues.
5 10 20 30 40
Meridian of London

in the quarrels of the Germans, and ſhe was marching her great armies to increaſe thoſe diſturbances. And it was the moſt effectual way to ſave Germany from the power of French armies, by cutting them out work for the defence of their maritime places at home. A. D. 1757.

The miniſter carried this plan of operations; but not without ſome feint ſtruggles by the advocates for more vigorous meaſures by land. For, though they had nothing to alledge againſt the utility, they pretended, that it was a kind of cowardly, weak and immethodical war, unbecoming a brave people. And ſome of theſe carried their diſlike ſo far, without doors, as to decline the commands offered to them in thoſe expeditions; which was thought to be the ſecret cauſe why our naval armaments againſt the coaſts of France were not always attended with adequate ſucceſs. How diſcouraged.

The firſt expedition or armament of this kind was fitted out againſt Rochefort; which was repreſented to be in a very defenceleſs condition; and, if taken or deſtroyed by our arms, would give a finiſhing blow to the naval power of France; and at all events, would oblige the court of France to recall a conſiderable part of their armies from Germany to guard their own coaſts from inſult and ruin. Expedition againſt Rochefort.

The importance of this place, which is ſituate near, and very little inferior to, Breſt in its docks, yards, magazines of naval ſtores, and in the number of King's ſhips fitted out from thence, Its importance.

was

A. D. 1757. was a ſufficient object of an expedition, And its defenceleſs ſtate was ſo well atteſted, that, it would have been deemed an overſight in a miniſter to neglect or to diſregard the information.

Why propoſed. The original deſign aroſe from the intelligence of one Captain Clerk, a worthy, intelligent and ſkilful land-officer, who, in a letter to [q] Sir John Ligonier, and by him tranſmitted to Mr. Secretary PITT, which was penned by Captain Clerk, by order, and in purſuance of ſeveral previous meetings and conferences on that ſubject, lays down the particulars, that were ſuppoſed to favour an attack or ſurprize on Rochfort.

"SIR,

Captain Clerk's account of its condition. "IN returning from Gibraltar, in 1754, I went "along part of the weſtern coaſt of France, "to ſee the condition of ſome of their fortifica- "tions of their places of importance, on purpoſe "to judge, if an attempt could be made with a "probability of ſucceſs, in caſe of a rupture, and "of the French drawing away their troops to "Flanders, Italy and Germany, in the ſame man- "ner they did in the laſt war.

"I had heard, that Rochefort, though a place "of the utmoſt importance, had been very much "neglected. I went there, and waited upon the "governor in my regimentals, told him, that I "was upon my way to England from Gibraltar; "and, that I came on purpoſe to ſee the place,

[q] Dated the 15th of July 1757.

'the

" the dock and the men of war. He was very A. D. 1757.
" polite; I was ſhewed every thing; went aboard
" ten ſhips of the line new built: and, an en-
" gineer attended me in going round the place.

" I was ſurpriſed to find, that though there
" was a good rampart with a revetement, the
" greateſt part of it was not flanked but with re-
" dans; that there was no outworks, no covert-
" way, and in many places no ditch; ſo that the
" bottom of the wall was ſeen at a diſtance:
" That in other places where the earth had been
" taken out to form the ramparts there was left
" about them a good height of ground, which
" was a diſadvantage to the place: That for above
" the length of a front there was no rampart, or
" even intrenchment; but as the ground was low
" and marſhy at that place, being next the river,
" there were ſome ſmall ditches, which were dry,
" however, at low water; yet the bottom remained
" muddy and ſlimy.

" Towards the river there was no rampart, no
" parapet, no batteries on either ſide. Towards
" the land-ſide there was ſome high ground very
" nigh the place, perhaps at the diſtance of
" about 150 or 200 yards.

" The engineer told me, that the place had
" remained in that condition for above 70 or 80
" years.

" I got no plan of the place, and put nothing
" down in writing; for I found that the whole
" town had been talking of me, and thought it

" very

A. D. 1757. "very extraordinary that I ſhould be allowed "to go about and ſee every thing.

"I burnt even ſome ſketches and remarks I "had by me, upon other places, that they might "have no hold of me, in caſe they ſearched my "baggage, and therefore could only expoſe "themſelves, as I had done nothing, but what "was open, above board, and with permiſſion.

"However, as to utility, I was as much ſa-"tisfied, as if I had got a plan: in regard of the "profil indeed, I have thought ſince, that it "would not have been amiſs if I had known for "certain the exact height of the rampart. I think "that it could not well exceed twenty-five feet. "In Martiniere's Geographical Dictionary, it is "called only twenty feet high; perhaps the para-"pet is not included.

"I told your Excellency, that I had never ſeen "any plan of the place: but as there had been "no alteration in the works for ſo many years, I "made no queſtion, but that ſome old plan of it "might be found, which would correſpond ex-"actly with what I ſaid. In the Forces de L'Eu-"rope, which I have, there is no plan of Roche-"fort, but I found one in the Duke of Argyle's "edition, which I borrowed, and ſhewed to your "Excellency. It agrees exactly with what I ſaid, "and with the ſketch I drew of it before you, "from my memory, except that a regular ditch "is repreſented every where, which is not the "caſe.

A. D. 1757.

"The river may be about 130 yards broad. "The entrance is defended by two or three ſmall "redoubts, which I did not ſee, nor could I "venture even to go down and examine the "coaſt.

"What I mentioned to your Excellency of "the method of inſulting the place, conſidering "it upon the footing of an immediate aſſault, I "have not put down; for, though it may be "reaſoned upon in a general view, *yet many things "can only be fixed and determined on the ſpot.* I "was told, that there are never any troops at "Rochefort, but the marines. There might be "about a thouſand at that time.

"By the expedition to Port L'Orient in 1746, it appeared to me, that the country people in "arms are very little better than our own; and "that an officer who poſſeſſes himſelf, might "march ſafely from one end of a province to another, with only five companies of grenadiers, "where there are no regular troops. They imagine at firſt, that they can fight, and their intentions are good till it comes to the point, "when every body gives way almoſt before the "firing of a platoon.

"In writing this I have obeyed with pleaſure, "as I have always done, your Excellency's commands.

"I am, &c.

R. CLARKE."

A. D. 1757. Laid before the council, &c.

The verbal account of this project being thus reduced into form, it was laid, by Mr. PITT, before the Lords of the cabinet; and the matter thereof afterwards made the ſubject of two nights converſation; Sir John Mordaunt and Major-General Conway examining, and almoſt croſs-examining Mr. Clerk, concerning every matter contained therein, and a great deal more that the letter led to, particularly about laying a ſhip to Fort Fouras[r]; about the proper artillery that would be neceſſary to attack Rochefort in form; and about the future deſtination of the armament againſt Port L'Orient, Bourdeaux, &c. in caſe either of ſucceſs at Rochefort and Aix, or of the impracticability of its firſt object.

The plan examined.

In theſe conferences or conſultations they not only canvaſſed Mr. Clerk's intelligence, and examined him cloſely as an engineer, that had been upon the ſpot, but they examined Joſeph Tierry, a French pilot, touching the practicability of an attempt upon Rochefort, Fouras, and the iſle of Aix; who, in the preſence of Lord Anſon, Sir Edward Hawke, Lieutenant-General Sir John Mordaunt, Major-General Conway, Lord Holderneſs, Mr. Secretary Pitt, General Ligonier, Admiral Knowles, and Captain Clarke, declared, That he was a French proteſtant, and had been a pilot twenty years, and upward, on the coaſt of France, and had ſerved as firſt pilot on

Pilot examined.

[r] See Major General Conway's evidence on the trial of Sir John Mordaunt.

board

board ſeveral of the French King's ſhips: that he had been twenty-two months on board the Magnanime, and had brought that very ſhip ſeveral times into the road of the Iſle d'Aix: that he was well acquainted how to go in and out of the ſaid road: that the channel between the iſlands of Rhée and Oleron is three leagues broad, and that he *had turned it in and out* in the Magnanime: that the ſhoals, which are to be avoided, are near the land; and that the breakers could be ſeen at a conſiderable diſtance. He further ſaid, that the ſhoal, called the Boiard, is not very dangerous; becauſe the breakers ſhew its ſituation: that the entrance into the road of Aix is not ſo difficult, as to require a pilot to bring in great ſhips; and that there is good anchorage, both within the road and out at ſea, in twelve and fourteen fathom water, quite to Bayonne. A. D. 1757.

Being interrogated particularly concerning the iſle of Aix, Tierry declared, That the iſle of Aix meaſures about ſix Engliſh miles in circumference; that there was a kind of village, conſiſting of about forty houſes or huts, with a battery of twenty-four or twenty-ſix guns, twenty-four pounders, but no fortification on the iſland: That the largeſt ſhips might come very near it; and that the Magnanime alone might deſtroy the ſaid battery in a very ſhort time.

Being examined in regard to the approaches that might be made with our ſhips and men againſt Rochefort, he anſwered, That though the river is very narrow, the largeſt ſhips could go up as far

A. D. 1757. as Vergerot, two Engliſh miles from the mouth of the river: that men might be landed to the north of a battery called de Fourras, out of ſight of the fort, on a meadow where the ground is firm and level, and within random ſhot of the ſhip guns: that from the landing place to Rochefort, is five Engliſh miles; the road dry, and not traverſed or impeded by ditches or moraſs: and that the city is almoſt ſurrounded with a rampart; but that on both ſides, in that place, which ends at the river, there is no wall, for the length of ſixty paces; the incloſure being only a bar or paliſade, and the ground, to come up to the paliſade, not interſected by any foſſe.

This pilot added many more particulars; and underwent a long and cloſe examination for two hours together; throughout which he eſtabliſhed the facts with a readineſs and preſence of mind, that few men in higher life are equal to [s].

The actual force of France.

Their next conſideration was to examine evidences, concerning the internal ſtrength, or the land force then actually in France, and where ſtationed. For this purpoſe, there was produced a memorial of the actual force of France by land, and the ſervices, on which it was employed, in the year 1757. Mr. PITT informed the generals appointed for this expedition to the coaſt of France, and met at Lord Holderneſſe's houſe, that the memorial to be conſidered did come through Lord Holderneſſe's department, and had been intro-

[s] See Sir John Mordaunt's trial, page 9, 29, &c.

duced

duced by his Lordſhip at a meeting, where Sir John Mordaunt and Major-General Conway were preſent: that it was a paper on which much reliance was had by the King's ſervants; as coming from one of their moſt conſiderable correſpondence, to which they gave much credit. A. D. 1757.

The memorial ſets forth, "That the French "army, at the beginning of the preſent troubles, "conſiſted only of 157,347 men, not including "the militia and the invalids: and that it was "compoſed in the following manner:

"French foot	98,330
"Artillery	4,100
"Foreign foot	25,589
"King's houſhold horſe	3,210
"French horſe	14,520
"Foreign horſe	960
"Dragoons	7,680
"Huſſars	800
"Light troops	2,158
	157,347

"That in the month of Auguſt 1755, an aug- "mentation was made of four companies of forty- "five men each, in every battalion of the King's "regiment; and of four companies of forty men "each, in every common battalion of French "foot, which made in all 29,620 men: and "that about the ſame time there was an augmen- "tation made in the dragoons, which made up

A. D. 1757. "every regiment four ſquadrons of 640 men, "making in all 2560 men. That in the month "of December, of the ſame year 1755, there "was alſo an augmentation made of ten men to "every company of horſe, in all 5560 men; "without reckoning the royal volunteers and "Fiſcher's corps, which were alſo augmented, ac- "cording to the beſt advices, with about 680 "men, or thereabout, the number not being ex- "actly known. So that theſe ſeveral augmenta- "tions amounted to 38,420 men; and conſe- "quently, that the French army did then amount "to 196,000 men, without reckoning the militia "and the invalids. They alſo had raiſed two new "regiments in the county of Liege; but notwith- "ſtanding that, their regular troops were under "200,000 men.

"Of which the iſlands of Minorca and Cor- "ſica, with the colonies in America, take up "25,000 men, at leaſt: Three or four thouſand "men were embarked this ſpring for differ- "ent ſervices in the two Indies. M. d'Etree's "army, if the regiments were complete, would "amount to 92,000 men; and M. Duke de Riche- "lieu's to 32,665; and 6 or 7000 men muſt be "allowed for garriſons at Toulon, Marſeilles, "Cotte, Antibes, &c. for the protection of that "part of the coaſt.

"That according to this calculation there muſt "be 160,000 regular troops employed, and no "more than about 40,000 men remain for all "the garriſons from Sedan to the frontiers of "Swiſ-

" Swiſſerland; and alſo for thoſe of Rouſillon and " Guiame, without ſpeaking of Flanders and the " coaſt. A. D. 1757.

" Then reckon about 20,000 placed from St. " Valery to Pergue, and there is all the reaſon to " believe that there can be no more than 10,000 " men ſtationed from St. Valery to Bourdeaux."

The object being fixt, after a due enquiry into the ſituation and ſtrength of the place, and of the internal weakneſs of the coaſt; the next ſtep was for the miniſter to provide a ſtrength equal to the ſervice, and to expedite the execution thereof with the greateſt ſecreſy and diſpatch. The preparations for this expedition.

The following ſhips and commanders were immediately appointed for this expedition. In ſhips.

Rates	Guns	Men	Ships	Commanders.
1ſt	100	870	Royal George	Matt. Buckle
2d	90	780	Ramillies	James Hobbs
		770	Neptune	James Galbraith
		750	Namur	Peter Dennis
	84	770	Royal Willm.	Witt. Taylor
	80	700	Barfleur	Samuel Graves
3d	80	666	Prſs. Amelia	Stephen Colby
	74	700	Magnanime	Hon. R. Howe
	74	700	Torbay	Hon. A. Keppel
		600	Dublin	Geo. B. Rodney
	70	520	Burford	James Young
	64	500	Alcide	James Douglas
	60	420	America	Hon. J^n. Byron
		420	Achilles	H.L.Barrington
		420	Medway	Hon. Ch. Proby
		420	Dunkirk	Robert Digby

A. D.	Rates	Guns	Men	Ships	Commanders.
1757.	5th	32	220	Southampton[t]	J. Gilchriſt
	6th	28	200	Coventry	Carr. Scrope
	Frigate	18	120	Cormorant	Benj. Clive
			120	Poſtillion	William Cooper
			120	Beaver	Edw. Gaſcoigne
		16	80	Pelican	James O'Hara
		14	80	Eſcort	Charles Ingliſs
	Bomb	8	60	Firedrake	Owen Edwards
			60	Infernal	Jas. M[c] Kenzie
	Fireſhip		45	Pluto	John Lindſey
			45	Proſerpine	Francis Banks
	Buſs	6	45	Canterbury	Tho. Lampriere

[t] The Southampton having taken a frigate in the way to Baſque road, was ordered to carry her prize into port, and by that means was prevented in the further executing of the orders of this expedition. The account of this engagement does honour to the Britiſh naval hiſtory, as here deſcribed by an eye witneſs. This French frigate of 26 guns and 200 picked men, being a prime ſailor, was ſent out to watch the motion of our fleet; but falling in the calm, and not having equal number of boats to tow her, the Southampton came up with her; who at firſt made a feint of ſheering off; Captain Gilchriſt was at breakfaſt, and cooly ordered his men to breakfaſt alſo, making off, gave him time to prepare, and the Frenchman crowding all his ſail, eagerly purſued; when the Southampton laying to, to receive him; never was there a more reſolute engagement for twenty minutes, the officers of the French were all killed, two of them by the ſame ſhot of a blunderbuſs, by Captain Gilchriſt's own hand; the men fought each other with handſpokes; and when the French had ſtruck, what remained were ſo able ſeamen, that they derided the mean appearance of ours, though their conquerors. The Southampton received ſo much damage in this action, that ſhe was obliged to return to England to repair.

45 Medway

Rates	Guns	Men	Ships	Commanders.	A. D.
		45	Medway	Charles Lucas	1757.
Hof. ſhip	22	100	Thetis	John Moutray	
			Hunter cutter[u]		

This moſt reſpectable fleet was committed to the care of Admiral Knowles of the red diviſion, Admiral Hawke of the blue diviſion, and Admiral Broderick of the white diviſion: in which commiſſion Admiral Hawke bore the chief command at ſea. Admirals.

The land forces were alſo appointed and ordered to rendezvous on the Iſle of Wight, and conſiſted of, Land army.

Ten battalions of 700 each complete		7000 men
Two battalions of marines, viz. Effingham's and Stewart's, 700 each		1400
One troop of Light Horſe	——	60
		8460

This army was ſupported by the following train of artillery: Artillery.

Ordnance heavy		Proportion
Braſs mounted on travelling carriages, compleated with Limbers, &c.	24 pounders ——	6
	12 —— ——	4

Ordnance light		
Braſs mounted on travelling carriages, with Limbers, ammunition boxes and elevating ſcrews.	6 pounders —	10
	3 —— —	6

[u] There was alſo the Jaſon, a 40 gun ſhip, employed as a tranſport for the Buffs, And the Cheſterfield man of war to repeat ſignals.

Howitzers

A. D. 1757.

Howitzers ——— — 5 ½ Inches — 2

Mortars on their beds — { 10 Inches —— 2 / 8 —— —— 2 / 4 ⅖ cohorns — 20

Gunpowder. Horſes.

N. B. The artillery carried 100 ton of gunpowder, and each regiment carried 1,100lb. ditto. In which ſervice there were employed 40 horſes.

Tranſports.

For the conveyance of theſe troops, &c. there were hired 55 tranſports, making in all 15,000, contracted for five months certain, viz. from 20 Auguſt 1757 to the 20th of July 1758, at the rate of 13s per ton; with an exception to their going either to America, Africa or the Eaſt Indies. Each tranſport was obliged to have 500 fathom of cable [w].

Place of rendezvous.

Every thing being thus diſpatched with the greateſt expedition, the men of war well manned and ready to ſail upon the firſt notice; the land forces rendezvous on the Iſle of Wight, and the tranſports all taken up: his Majeſty appointed

Commander in chief.

Sir John Mordaunt, Knight of the Bath, commander in chief over the land forces, to be employed in the ſecret expedition; and gave him the following INSTRUCTIONS, for his better diſcharge of that great and important truſt.

GEORGE, R.

Secret inſtructions to Sir John Mordaunt.

1ſt. YOU ſhall immediately upon the receipt of theſe inſtructions, repair to the Iſle of Wight, where we have appointed ſhips to con-

[w] It appears by the books of the admiralty that this was the fineſt fleet, with the heavieſt weight of metal and beſt ſound, that ever ſailed from the Britiſh nation.

vey

vey you, and the forces under your command, to the coaſt of France; and ſo ſoon as the ſaid forces ſhall be embarked, you ſhall accordingly proceed, without loſs of time, under convoy of a ſquadron of our ſhips of war, commanded by our truſty and well-beloved Sir Edward Hawke, Knight of the Bath, admiral of the blue ſquadron of our fleet; whom we have appointed commander in chief of our ſhips to be employed in this expedition; the ſaid admiral, or the commander in chief of our ſaid ſhips for the time being, being inſtructed to *co-operate* with you, and to be *aiding and aſſiſting* in all ſuch enterprizes, as, by theſe our inſtructions, you ſhall be directed to undertake for our ſervice. A. D. 1757.

2d. Whereas we have determined, with the bleſſing of God, to proſecute the juſt war in which we are engaged againſt the French King, with the utmoſt vigour; and it being highly expedient, and of urgent neceſſity, to make ſome expedition, that may cauſe a diverſion, and engage the enemy to employ in their own defence, a conſiderable part of their forces, deſtined to invade and oppreſs the liberty of the empire, and to ſubvert the independency of Europe; and, if poſſible, to make ſome effectual impreſſion on the enemy, which, by diſturbing and ſhaking the credit of their public loans, impairing the ſtrength and reſources of their navy, as well as diſconcerting, and, in part, fruſtrating their dangerous and extenſive operations of war, may reflect luſtre on our arms, and add life and ſtrength to the common

A. D. 1757. mon cauſe; and whereas we are perſuaded, that nothing, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, can ſo ſpeedily and effectually annoy and diſtreſs France, as a ſucceſsful enterprize againſt Rochefort; our will and pleaſure is, That you do attempt as *far as it ſhall be found practicable*, a deſcent, with the forces under your command, on the French coaſt, at or near Rochefort, in order to attack, *if practicable*, and by a vigorous impreſſion, force that place; and to burn and deſtroy, to the utmoſt of your power, all docks, magazines, arſenals, and ſhipping, that ſhall be found there, and exert ſuch other efforts, as you ſhall judge moſt proper for annoying the enemy.

3d. After the attempt on Rochefort ſhall either have ſucceeded or failed; and in caſe the circumſtances of our forces and fleet ſhall, with proſpect of ſucceſs, ſtill admit of further operations, you are next to conſider Port L'Orient and Bourdeaux, as the moſt important objects of our arms, on the coaſt of France; and our will and pleaſure is, That you do proceed ſucceſſively to an attempt on both, or either of thoſe places, as ſhall be judged practicable; or on any other place that ſhall be thought moſt adviſeable, from Bourdeaux homeward to Havre, in order to carry and ſpread, with as much rapidity as may be, a warm alarm along the maritime provinces of France.

4th. In caſe, by the bleſſing of God upon our arms, you ſhall make yourſelf maſter of any place on the coaſt of France, our will and pleaſure is, That you do not keep poſſeſſion thereof; but that,

that, after demoliſhing and deſtroying, as far as may be, all works, defences, magazines, arſenals, ſhipping, and naval ſtores, you do proceed, ſucceſſively, on the ulterior part of this expedition, according *as any of them ſhall be judged adviſeable*, and may be performed within ſuch time as ſhall be conſiſtent with your return, with the troops under your command, ſo as to be in England at, or about, or as near as may be the latter end of September, unleſs the circumſtances of our forces and fleet ſhall neceſſarily require their return ſooner; and you are to land the troops at Portſmouth, or ſuch other of our ports, as the exigency of the caſe may ſuggeſt. A. D. 1757.

5th. Whereas it is neceſſary, that, upon certain occaſions, you ſhould have the aſſiſtance of a council of war, we have thought fit to appoint ſuch a council, which ſhall conſiſt of four of our principal land officers, and of an equal number of our principal ſea commanders, including the commanders in chief of our land and ſea forces, (except in caſes happening at land, relating to the carrying on any military operations, to be performed by our land forces only, in which caſes you may call a council of war, conſiſting of ſuch officers of our land forces as you ſhall think proper) and all ſuch land and ſea officers, in the ſeveral caſes before-mentioned, are hereby reſpectively directed, from time to time, to be aiding and aſſiſting with their advice, ſo often as they ſhall be called together by you, or by the commander in chief of our ſquadron for that purpoſe; and in all ſuch councils of war, when aſſembled,

A. D. 1757. aſſembled, the majority of voices ſhall determine the reſolutions thereof; and, in caſe the voices ſhall happen to be equal, the preſident ſhall have the caſting vote.

6th. And whereas the ſucceſs of this expedition will very much depend upon an entire good underſtanding between our land and ſea officers, we do hereby ſtrictly enjoin and require you, on your part, to maintain and cultivate ſuch good underſtanding and agreement; and to order, that the ſoldiers under your command, ſhould man the ſhips where there ſhall be occaſion for them, and when they can be ſpared from the land ſervice; as the commander in chief of our ſquadron is inſtructed, on his part, to entertain and cultivate the ſame good underſtanding and agreement; and to order the ſailors and marines, and alſo the ſoldiers, ſerving as a part of the complements of our ſhips, to aſſiſt our land forces, if judged expedient, by taking poſt on ſhore, manning batteries, covering the boats, ſecuring the ſafe re-embarkation of the troops, and ſuch other ſervices at land as may be conſiſtent with the ſafety of our fleet: and in order to eſtabliſh the ſtricteſt union that may be between you, and the commander in chief of our ſhips, you are hereby required to communicate theſe inſtructions to him; and he will be directed to communicate thoſe, he ſhall receive, to you.

7th. You ſhall, from time to time, and as you ſhall have opportunity, ſend conſtant accounts of your proceedings, in the execution of theſe our

inſtructions, to one of our principal ſecretaries of ſtate, from whom you will receive ſuch further orders and directions as we may think proper to give you. A. D. 1757.

G. R.

But, though both the ſovereign and the miniſter did all in their power to carry this ſalutary meaſure into execution, with the utmoſt activity, and the whole nation fed their expectations with the hopes of ſucceſs, it was obſerved that a certain ſet of men, not famous for their extenſive knowledge, did even long before the ſquadron ſailed, declare publicly, and offer any wager, that whereſoever was its deſtination, nothing would be done by it. Mankind were aſtoniſhed at the boldneſs with which this was pronounced. They proceeded ſo far as to draw from this boldneſs, a very ill omen of the ſucceſs. The perſons who thus pronounced with ſo much boldneſs, were the ſame, who by their private intrigues and cabals, had, a few months before, thrown the affairs of the King and kingdom into ſo much confuſion. For, as an ingenious writer and obſerver of thoſe times, remarks, "The envy of ſome, who oppoſe the "preſent miniſter's riſe to power, are likely to be "carried to ſuch lengths as ſecretly to thwart and "countermine his operations [x], and blaſt the ex-"pedition." Its miſcarriage foretold.

[x] See the expedition againſt Rochefort fully ſtated and conſidered, &c. p. 6, 7.

The

A. D. 1757. Obſtacles by the tranſports.

The firſt notorious appearance of countermining the operations, and blaſting this expedition, was the delay of the tranſports; of which Sir John Mordaunt, in a letter[y] to Mr. Secretary PITT, complains.—On my arrival here, ſays Sir John, laſt monday, I was diſappointed in finding none of the tranſports were come round, and more ſo, in that I had not yet been able to hear any poſitive account of them. By another letter[z] the commander in chief opens ſuch a light into this cauſe of delay, in the tranſport ſervice, as impeaches the underſtanding or bad intention of thoſe, that made or were entruſted to make the contract for the ſhipping to tranſport the army: for he had found, "That the tranſports were not "ſufficient for the number of troops[a]." The Lords of the Admiralty were made acquainted with this grievance by letters from Sir John Mordaunt, to Thomas Orby Hunter and Gilbert Elliot, Eſqrs. Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, then at Portſmouth, and from Sir Edward Hawke to the navy board.

This, with ſome other accidental delays, that happened, for a fortnight, and afterwards the winds falling contrary, the tranſports did not get round to Cowes on the Iſle of Wight, till the 4th of

[y] Dated 11 Auguſt 1757.

[z] From Sir John Mordaunt, to Mr. Secretary PITT, dated 20 Auguſt, Newport in the Iſle of Wight.

"[a] Mr. Thames, who has long been and now is agent for "the tranſports, came here the 7th from Portſmouth, on "purpoſe to inform me, The number of tranſports were not "ſufficient for the number of troops." But this was only waſting time; for Mr. Thames was miſtaken.

September;

September; which ſeaſon was too far advanced to promiſe any great matters from almoſt any expedition by ſea. Such an armament alarmed all Europe; but more eſpecially the French at its firſt appointment, and its deſtination was rumoured to be againſt their Weſt Indian colonies, or to the South of France, and againſt their Mediterranean conqueſt. But the knowledge of the exception mentioned in the tranſport contract, and the time, for which they were hired, being got abroad; the French very rationally concluded that ſome part of their ſhore, in the Channel or in the Bay, muſt be the object of this expedition; and the procraſtination of ſix weeks, which were ſpent by the troops encamped in the Iſle of Wight, confirmed that opinion more and more, and gave them time, had they embraced it, to prepare for a vigorous defence againſt an invaſion. A. D. 1757.

On the 5th of Sept. Mr. PITT wrote to Sir John Mordaunt and to Sir Edward Hawke, putting them in mind, "That the wind had been fair for the tranſports ever ſince friday morning, and informing them, That his Majeſty expected with impatience, to hear that the troops were embarked: and, if by any delay, the embarkation ſhould not be completed, on the receipt of his letter, that it was the King's pleaſure, that the moſt particular diligence might be employed in getting the troops on board, and proceeding without the loſs of a moment, to the execution of their orders and inſtructions with regard to the expedition under their care."

A. D. 1757. In embarkation.

The embarkation alſo took up ſome extraordinary time, on account, as Sir John writes [b] to Mr. PITT, "That they were obliged to march the troops and baggage five miles to the place of embarkation, and that they were then forced to put the men in ſmall boats, in which they were rowed above a mile, before they could embark in the tranſports."—But why the embarkation was obliged to be put under theſe unfavourable circumſtances does not appear: yet it is certain that it was not owing to any neglect or inactivity of the miniſter.

Sir John Mordaunt's doubts.

Sir John Mordaunt, during his ſtay at the Iſle of Wight, ſtarted a doubt relative to the ſervice he was going upon, which in ſome meaſure ſeems to account for the failure of this expedition—"Having, ſays Sir John, ſince my arrival here "converſed with Sir Edward Hawke and Vice "Admiral Knowles, who both ſeem to be of "opinion, that it is poſſible, from the nature of "the navigation to Rochefort, the fleet may be "detained even in ſight of the coaſt of France, "for a week or ten days, without being able to "get into the road, or off the Iſle of Aix, dur-"ing which time an alarm will neceſſarily be given "in thoſe parts; this conjuncture and ſituation, "if it ſhould happen, appears to me ſo very de-"licate, and equally to the other officers on the "expedition, who may, by accident be the firſt "in command, come to be under the ſame diffi-

[b] On the 6th of September 1757.

"culty

"culty (the ſucceſs of our undertaking depending, A. D. 1757.
"as I apprehend, on the ſuddenneſs of its execu-
"tion) that I ſhould be glad, if it is thought
"proper, to have a direction, how I am to act
"in that caſe."—

The ſtarting of ſuch an opinion at this juncture Anſwered.
and diſtance of time, after every point had been well debated by, or in the preſence of, this General and the other officers, at ſeveral conferences and councils held on this ſubject by the miniſters of ſtate, conveyed no advantageous idea of future ſucceſs; or rather it indicated a fertility of invention how to exculpate a miſcarriage, and to find out ſome incident, on which it might be thrown, in caſe of a failure.

Mr. PITT, in anſwer to this caſe, as ſtated by Sir John, ſays no more, but that, "I am "commanded thereupon, by the King, to ſignify "to you his Majeſty's pleaſure, that you or ſuch "other officer, on whom the command may de-"volve, do, in conformity to the latitude given "by his Majeſty's inſtructions, judge of the prac-"ticability of the ſervice, on the ſpot, according "as contingent events, and particular circum-"ſtances may require: the King judging it highly "prejudicial to the good of his ſervice to give "particular orders and directions with regard to "poſſible contingent caſes, that may ariſe." By which it pretty plainly appears, that his Majeſty was not very well pleaſed with ſuch after-doubts, that ſeemed to be raiſed by way of diſcouragement, and to prepare him for a failure,

A. D. 1757. that did happen, and was juſtified chiefly upon the poſture of defence, into which the enemy might put themſelves from the time the Engliſh fleet appeared on their coaſt.

Beſides; this doubt or opinion had been effectually reſolved by Sir John Ligonier, in his obſervations or hints, read at a cabinet council and delivered to Sir John Mordaunt, at his own deſire. For that brave, experienced general and commander in chief of all his Majeſty's forces in Great Britain, willing to remove all doubts and to clear up all difficulties in the execution of his Majeſty's inſtructions for the land ſervice, obſerved—"That there is a chance in the beſt concerted "military enterprizes, which every man of long "ſervice muſt have experienced; what ſhare then "muſt be left to fortune in an expedition, where "neither the country, nor the number of troops, "you are to act againſt, is known with any pre-"ciſion.

Sir John Ligonier's letter, explaining the inſtructions.

"The capacity of the generals may ſupply the "want of intelligence: but to give them any "poſitive plan, or rule of action under ſuch cir-"cumſtances, I apprehend would be abſurd.

"If I am rightly informed, the great point his "Majeſty has in view, by this expedition, and "the alarming the coaſts of France, is the hopes "of making a powerful diverſion in favour of "his Royal Highneſs the Duke, as well as the "King of Pruſſia, who deſires and preſſes much "this very meaſure.

"In

LORD VISCOUNT LIGONIER.

" In the execution of this general plan, a pro- A. D.
" ject of giving a mortal blow to the naval power 1757.
" of France is in his Majeſty's thoughts, by at-
" tacking and deſtroying, if poſſible, the dock,
" ſhipping, and naval ſtores at Rochefort.

" A plan of that place given by one of his
" Majeſty's engineers, who was there in 1754,
" ſeems to encourage the attempt; and it muſt
" be owned, that without ſuch authority it could
" hardly be believed, that a place of that great
" importance could be left in ſo defenceleſs a con-
" dition.

" In all doubtful dangerous military attempts,
" the advantages, that may accrue from ſucceſs,
" ought to be weighed againſt the damage and
" misfortunes, that may be the conſequences of
" a repulſe, and that well conſidered, may in pru-
" dence determine the choice.

" If an attempt is to be made upon Rochefort,
" it will be the part of the admiral to know the
" coaſts, to bring the troops to the neareſt place,
" to cover their landing by the diſpoſition of his
" ſhips, and to deſtroy any barbet batteries, which
" the enemy may have upon the ſhore; ſtill re-
" membring, that if the troops are landed at too
" great a diſtance from the place, the deſign will
" become dangerous, and probably impracticable.

" Suppoſing the troops landed, it muſt be left
" to the conſideration of the generals, whether
" they ſhould not march with the proper precau-
" tions, directly to Rochefort, to prevent any
" ſuccours being thrown into the place, at the

A. D. 1757.

" ſame time, that the marines ſhould be employed " in making a good entrenchment for the ſecurity " of the ſtores to be landed from time to time, as " well as of a retreat in caſe of neceſſity.

" We are told, the country in the neighbour- " hood is low and marſhy; that circumſtance " might be of great advantage in this undertak- " ing, becauſe in that caſe troops cannot march " by *overtures dans la campagne*, but muſt follow " the dykes, or cawſeys, which may be eaſily de- " fended by coupures, or redoubts.

" A ſafe and well ſecured communication be- " tween the camp and the ſea, from whence you " are to receive your ſupplies of all kinds, is ab- " ſolutely neceſſary; the whole depends upon it: " —But this being done, I ſhould not be much " in pain for the ſafety of the troops, an inferior " number dares not approach you, and one ſupe- " rior will not be eaſily aſſembled without your " knowing it; and, at all events, you have ſe- " cured a retreat to the ſhips.

" I would adviſe to procure guides upon the ſpot, " and paying them greatly when faithful; there " are numbers of proteſtants in that province, " that wiſh you well, and would be glad to go on " board with you.

" As for a *coup de main*, it may, perhaps, ſuc- " ceed beſt at your coming up, as the enemy may " be in great hurry, ſurprize, and conſternation " at ſuch an unexpected viſit, and not having had " time to make his diſpoſitions; but if that is not " thought proper, it may ſucceed as well after

" the

"the place has been thoroughly reconnoitred, A. D. 1757.
"and you have fixed the ſpots, where you deſign
"to direct your greateſt efforts, and if the enemy
"ſee any preparations for a regular attack, they
"will leſs ſuſpect a *coup de main*.

"Bergen-op-Zoom was taken by a *coup de main*,
"after a long ſiege.

"St. Philip's was taken by ſcaling ladders and
"a *coup de main*, though the garriſon was 3000
"ſtrong, after a ſiege of fifty-ſix days.

"The neceſſity of dividing a ſmall garriſon in
"a place of ſuch circumference, as Rochefort,
"may facilitate the ſucceſs of a bold attempt."

Thus provided and inſtructed, the expedition Expedition fleet ſails.
fleet ſailed from Portſmouth [b], being firſt joined by the tranſports. A letter was delivered by the agent of thoſe ſhips, to each of their maſters, with rendezvous at Torbay, not to be opened in caſe of ſeparation till they came to weſtward of Scilly Iſlands: and ſuch care was taken by the admiral, before night came on, that ſloops, tenders and men of war, were ſtationed on each ſide, almoſt in form of an octagon, with the admiral and tranſports in the centre, as crouding under his wings for protection, againſt any danger or hazard of the enemy. The care taken by the admiral.

The advanced ſeaſon was, before this fleet could put to ſea, not the only diſadvantage; its courſe to the place of its deſtination was greatly delayed with contrary winds, fogs and calms: It was the How delayed in the voyage

[b] On the 8th of September 1757.

A. D. 1757. and arrives on the French coaſt.

20th day of September, about one o'clock, when they arrived on the coaſt near the Iſle of Oleron [c].

In their paſſage Captain Proby ſpoke with a Dutchman from Nannes to Dort, who told him "that the French expected to be attacked at Ro-"chelle, or St. Martin's, by the Engliſh, and "that an embargo was laid on all the ſhipping in "France."

How conducted on the French coaſt.

On the 21ſt, at ſeven o'clock, Admiral Knowles, who had the command of the firſt diviſion, made towards the land, with full ſail. At eleven a gun was fired by Admiral Hawke, and anſwered by Admiral Knowles, who ſoon after tacked and bore down, as if to ſpeak with Admiral Hawke. The captain of the admiral's ſhip hoiſted the bloody flag, or flag of defiance, on the fore-top-maſt

[c] After the tranſports had been taken up, and the troops aſſembled near two months, we ſailed, ſays Sir John Mordaunt, *in his Defence*, the 8th of September, and the alarm was given on the 20th, in the neighbourhood of Rochefort, by the arrival of our long expected fleet (for Captain Clevland, on the 17th of Auguſt, had ſpoke with a Dutch convoy from Rochelle, and was informed by the firſt lieutenant of a man of war, that came on board of him, that the French expected the Engliſh at Rochelle) and, continues he, from the 20th it muſt have been at leaſt *eight days* before we could have come to Rochefort, nor could it be ſuppoſed, but that after ſo long notice of an enemy's approach, the town would be put in a good condition of defence.

N. B. At four o'clock, P. M. they eſpied land a-head eaſt ſouth-eaſt ſeven leagues: And at eight at night they ſaw a light houſe and guns fire from the French coaſt; 225 between flaſh and report, or about three leagues diſtant.

head,

head, at half an hour paſt eleven: Then Admiral Knowles ſeemed to wear, as if going into the road. But Admiral Hawke ſhortned ſail about two o'clock, keeping no more than his top-ſails, and fore-ſtay-ſails cloſe in wind, and ſhortly after lay too. Admiral Knowles, making full ſail, all the land officers expected to land that night at eight o'clock, the ſoldiers proviſion, arms and ammunition being put up ready; but he, about ſeven P. M. making a tack, and firing again, the tranſports came to anchor near the Iſle of Rhée. A. D. 1757.

On the 22d, at ſeven in the morning, ſignal to weigh anchor, and the men of war had their hammocks up, and ſails crouded, ready to engage. The fleet ſailed into a fine bay, called *Rade de Paſque*, between the iſlands of Rhée and Oleron. Every one was in expectation, that the firſt diviſion would preſently have cleared all obſtacles, and that an attempt to land would certainly be made, that night. But the fleet was no ſooner come into the centre of that fine bay, where 500 ſhips might ride ſafely, than a ſignal was given to anchor at nine o'clock in the morning: and ſo continued all the reſt of the day, and the next night. Arrives in Baſque Road.

Thus it was the 23d of September before they came to action; which delay, as it gave great anxiety to the men on board, and has been related with ſeveral aggravating circumſtances aſhore, the reader would do well to ſuſpend his judgment, till he has conſidered the evidence given by Admiral

A. D. 1757. miral Knowles, on this particular charge againſt Sir John Mordaunt [d].

In

[d] *Queſtion*, What occaſioned the fleet not coming into the road ſooner than the 23d, ſeeing they made the coaſt on the 20th?

Anſwer, He will give you the beſt account he can, without his log-book and journal; but, for want of them, cannot be particular as to the hours.—In the morning of the 20th, Sir Edward Hawke gave him the following orders, viz.

"By Sir Edward Hawke, Knight of the Bath, Admiral of the blue ſquadron of his Majeſty's fleet, &c.

"If in ſtanding in between the iſles of Rhé and Oleron, I "ſhall find the winds and weather will permit of proceeding "to Baſque road, and attacking the iſle of Aix, I will hoiſt a "red flag on the flag-ſtaff, at the foretop-gallantmaſt-head, "and fire three guns; then you are hereby required and di- "rected, without loſs of time, to ſtand in as near to the ſaid "Iſle of Aix, as the pilots will carry you, with all, or as many "of the ſhips of your diviſion, as you ſhall think ſufficient for "that ſervice, and batter it, till ſuch time, as the garriſon "ſhall either ſurrender, or abandon it. In either caſe you "are to land a number of men ſufficient to demoliſh it with "all poſſible diſpatch, ſending me the earlieſt intelligence of "your proceedings. For which this ſhall be your order.

"Given under my hand on board his Majeſty's ſhip Ra- "milies at ſea this 20th of Sept. 1757.

ED. HAWKE.

"To Charles Knowles, Eſq; Vice-Admiral of the red ſquadron of his Majeſty's fleet.

"By command of the admiral. J. HAY."

The ſignal being given, the deponent, about noon, took his leave of Sir Edward Hawke, and made ſail with his diviſion.

In the morning of the 23d, it being a calm, and at anchor in ſight of the iſle of Aix, and ſo near ſion. The Medway, which was a-head by Sir Edward's order to look out for the land, about two or three o'clock, as near as he can remember, made a ſignal for ſeeing the land; very ſoon after, the deponent ſaw it himſelf: As his own ſhip, and thoſe of his diviſion, were ordered to prepare for the attack, the lieutenant, or the captain, came to acquaint him, the ſhip was clear and ready for action; this was about four o'clock, the wind at that time, and to the beſt of his remembrance the whole day, was about north-eaſt. As he looked upon a ſhip cleared, and in order for battle, to be a very entertaining ſight, he deſired Major-General Conway to go down to ſee his ſhip between decks: While they were viewing her, one of his lieutenants came down, ſent by the captain, to acquaint him, Captain Keppel hailed the ſhip, and told them, there was a French man of war ſtanding in for the fleet; for ſome ſhort ſpace of time the deponent took no notice of it, thinking it impoſſible, the fleet ſhould not ſee her; a ſecond meſſage was ſent him down to the ſame purpoſe, he then immediately went upon deck with General Conway, and was ſhewn her by his captain, when with their glaſſes they plainly diſcovered her to be a two-decked ſhip; ſhe ſoon made a private ſignal, by hoiſting a jack at her mizen-topmaſt-head; the deponent was in doubt, whether to make a ſignal to any of his diviſion to chace, being ordered on a different ſervice, which he took notice of to Major-General Conway, and to his captain; he judges, he was then at leaſt five miles a-head of Sir Edward Hawke, and the enemy's ſhip much nearer to him, and his diviſion, than they were to Sir Edward Hawke and the reſt of the fleet; and he plainly ſaw, if ſome of his diviſion did not chaſe her, none of the others could poſſibly ſee her, ſo as to chaſe her, when night came on. The Magnanime was then about two miles to leeward of them, on which he threw out her ſignal to chace, and hailed Captain Keppel in the Torbay, and directed him to chace alſo; obſerving, at the ſame time,

A. D. 1757.

The conqueſt of the Iſle of Aix.

A. D. 1757. near to the French coaſt, that they could ſee the French colours hoiſted on the caſtle, and every body

time, to Major General Conway and his captain, that if Sir Edward Hawke did not approve of what he had done, he would certainly call them in again; but, inſtead of that, Sir Edward threw out their ſignals to chace, by way of confirming what he had done; and in addition, made the Royal William's ſignal alſo, belonging to his diviſion; two more ſignals for ſhips in the reſt of the fleet were thrown out afterwards, and very ſoon recalled. Early the next day in the morning, Sir Edward Hawke ſent the deponent the following order, to take under his command three other ſhips in the room of thoſe three ſhips that were detached to chace, viz.

" By Sir Edward Hawke, Knight of the
" Bath, Admiral of the blue ſquadron
" of his Majeſty's fleet.

" You are hereby required and directed to
" take under your command the ſhips named
" Dublin, " in the margin; the captains of which have
" Burford, " my orders to follow your directions; and
" Achilles, " proceed, without a moment's loſs of time,
" to put in execution the orders you received
" from me yeſterday. For which this ſhall be
" your order.

" Given under my hand on board his Majeſty's ſhip Ra-
" milies, at ſea, this 21ſt of Sept. 1757.

ED. HAWKE.

" To Charles Knowles, Eſq; Vice-
" Admiral of the Red Squadron
" of his Majeſty's fleet.

" By command of the admiral. J. HAY."

In obedience to that order, the deponent proceeded with his diviſion with all the ſail they could carry, to get in, and make,

body in a hurry preparing for defence, and boats carrying men into the garriſon of Aix from the coaſt; A. D. 1757.

make, what land it was; he judges it was about nine o'clock, when they were got within about two miles of the land, in eleven fathoms water, very hazy thick weather, ſo as his pilot deſired, the ſhip might be tacked and laid with the head off till it cleared, ſo as he could ſee his marks. Whilſt he was laying to, he made a ſignal for the captains of his diviſion, and ordered them to ſend for their pilots, no two of whom agreed, what land it was; their ſeveral examinations he took down, and immediately ſent them to Sir Edward Hawke, who, by that time, was advanced nearer to him by two or three miles than he was before, as he the deponent laid with his head off ſhore. In his letter to Sir Edward he acquainted him, that not one of the pilots would even take charge to lead in with a twenty gun ſhip; if they would, his diviſion ſhould have followed her. Soon after his boat went away, he made a ſignal for ſpeaking with the admiral, ſeeing he continued under ſail, and did not ſtop to take up the boat. At the ſame time he made ſail with his diviſion towards him, and by about twelve joined him; when the deponent got on board him, he was ſurprized to ſee Mr. Keppel on board, and alſo to find the Magnanime and Royal William had joined him again, which the thick weather had prevented the deponent's knowing. Sir Edward Hawke, upon the deponent's acquainting him with what had happened, (for he thinks he got on board, before his letter) immediately ſent for the pilot of the Magnanime, at the ſame time telling the deponent, he judged, what was the matter when he ſaw him bring to, for his pilot had refuſed carrying his ſhip in: When the pilot of the Magnanime came on board, he immediately told them, what land it was; and after offering to carry the fleet in, returned on board his own ſhip, and led the deponent's diviſion in, the admiral and the reſt of the fleet following. The wind was pretty freſh all this day, till towards the evening, when about ſix o'clock the tide of flood being ſpent, the Magnanime made

A. D. 1757. coaſt [c]; about ten o'clock Admiral Knowles, in the Neptune of 90 guns, and his whole diviſion, viz. Magnanime 74, Barfleur 80, America 64, Alcide 74, Burford 74, Royal William 90, weighed and made full ſail towards the front of the garriſon. Captain Howe led on the ſtarboard tack, and the America the larboard. Many guns fired from the Iſle of Oleron, at two of our ſmall veſſels ſeeming to reconnoitre that ſhore.

Ships ordered on the ſervice.

The fort begins the fire.

Half an hour paſt twelve, the firſt gun fired from the garriſon at our ſhips, a ſmall battery alſo at the weſt corner of the iſland fired at the Jaſon, who had the regiment of buffs in boats ready to land, but the balls fell ſhort of them;—vaſt crouds of people appear on the French coaſts.

made the ſignal to anchor; they were then in the mouth of the Pertuis of Antioche: about eight o'clock Sir Edward Hawke made the ſignal for the fleet to anchor, and they continued working in, and anchored, as they came into proper births all night.—Early in the morning of the 22d the Magnanime made the ſignal, when the deponent weighed with his diviſion, and Sir Edward Hawke and the reſt of the fleet weighed alſo: About eleven o'clock it falling calm, the ſignal was again made to anchor; about two or three a ſmall breeze ſpringing up weſterly, the Magnanime made the ſignal and weighed again, and the deponent ran in with his diviſion, till between nine and ten o'clock at night, Sir Edward Hawke and the fleet of tranſports all following, when the deponent's diviſion came to anchor.

[c] An iſland not above a mile long and about half a mile over, almoſt in an oval form, the ſoil barren, gravelly and ſandy, and yet one continued vineyard.

A. D. 1757.

The line of battle ſhips kept under ſail, and the Jaſon tacked about and made up to them, not being able to land her men at the intended corner, both for the ſhallowneſs of the water, and alſo the fierce fire of the battery.

The Magnanime returns the fire.

One o'clock the Magnanime only ſtood directly into the fort, and began a moſt heavy fire, like a continual thunder, rendering the very ſhip to appear as one cloud of ſmoke. The battery alſo fired very briſkly, and the Barfleur at a great diſtance, fired ſome few guns. Before the attack began, Captain Howe received the fire of the garriſon with great intrepidity, ordered all his men to lay down upon the decks, turned all his live cattle, fowls, and unneceſſaries over board; himſelf only, with his ſpeaking trumpet in hand, the pilot and the man at the helm, appearing upon deck, till he came within ſixty yards of the baſtions of the garriſon, when he began ſo furious a fire, that the Monſieurs ſaid, Something more than man muſt be on board that ſhip; the men in the garriſon were ſo much terrified, that moſt of them clapped themſelves down under the works of the garriſon, and in the ditches, nor could be prevailed on to ſtand to their guns, which obliged the governor to ſtrike the colours; and this was no ſooner done, than they all jumped up, taking ſnuff, dancing and rejoicing, as if they had gained a victory.

Captain Howe's bravery and conduct.

Colours of the fort ſtruck.

The garriſon ceaſing fire, ſome ſailors and mariners firſt landed, and the Jaſon, with the battalions of the buffs in boats, took poſſeſſion of the iſland.

A. D. 1757. Losses on both sides.

island. There being only two marines and one sailor killed on board the Magnanime, and one man killed in the garrison, by a ball glancing off obliquely on his breast, where it remained fixed, without force to penetrate through his body.

The governor, on our men taking possession, surprised them with saying to this effect, "Messieurs,"—"we expected you ere now; we had "account of your sailing from St. Helen's the "7th, which made us remove all our valuable "effects, so that you will now find but a poor "island."

Description of the fort.

This fort, had it been compleated according to old Vauban's plan of military architecture, laid out and almost finished—might have given great trouble. The parapets were raised to their proper height, but embrazures were not yet fixed, else perhaps the French for—pusillanimity would not have been blamed; in the fort were five hundred soldiers and two hundred sailors, yet no discharge of musquetry; which, as the Magnanime was so near, might have greatly annoyed our marines on board; in the garrison were found twenty guns, eighteen pounders, eight mortars, but few bombs were thrown, all which were either taken away or rendered useless. There was a great quantity of powder, ball, and ammunition in the magazine.

Strength of the garrison.

The shore of the continent explored.

While this conquest was in hand, Sir Edward Hawke had resolved to reconnoitre, and to sound that part of the coast, which appeared by the letter of his instructions to be the next object

ject of the expedition. The parties employed on this ſervice were Rear-Admiral Thomas Broderick, and the Captains James Douglas, Peter Dennis, and Matthew Buckle Eſqrs; They were ſent out out, on the 23d in the afternoon, and continued upon that ſervice, all night, till three or four o'clock the afternoon following, when they returned [f] and made the following report to Sir Edward Hawke. A. D. 1757.

[f] On the 24th in the morning, the day after the attack of the Iſle of Aix, ſignal was out on board Sir Edward Hawke, for Admiral Knowles to come on board of him; on which Major-General Conway and he went immediately; Sir Edward Hawke, on their coming on board, told the admiral, Admiral Broderick and three captains were gone reconnoitring for a landing-place, and he wiſhed for their ſpeedy return. As that ſignal, which was out on board Sir Edward, was for the rear-admiral as well as the vice-admiral, being a ſtandard at the enſign-ſtaff, and the veſſels, which Admiral Broderick had with him, were not in ſight, he begged of Sir Edward to make the ſignal for all land and ſea general officers, which is the ſtandard at the mizen top-maſt head, that being moſt diſcernible at a diſtance, and to repeat firing a gun every hour, which he did: Before four, Admiral Broderick and the captains returned, very much fatigued, and drew up their report. After taking a morſel of dinner they all got into their boats and went away to the Iſle of Aix (excepting Admiral Broderick) in order to collect what intelligence they could from the priſoners taken in the fort; a number of the priſoners were ſent on board the vice admiral's ſhip, and examined, one by one, by General Conway, he ſpeaking French, till near eleven o'clock at night, when Sir Edward Hawke and Sir John Mordaunt went away; and the admiral declared his intention of holding a council of war on board the Neptune ſhip the next morning, which was accordingly done.

A. D. 1757. Order of Sir Edward Hawke for ſounding, &c. the coaſt.

"WE the under-written went and ſounded the French ſhore from Rochelle to Fort Fouras, and find as follows.

"From the ſouth point of the entrance of Rochelle, (on which point there are twenty-ſeven guns mounted on barbet) to the point of the Angolin, we find it a rocky ſhore, and ſteep clifts, with ſhoals near two miles off; from Angolin to Chatelaillon, we find a fair, hard, ſandy beach, with a flat lying off near two miles, having but three fathom at high water at that diſtance, but clear ground, along which beach are ſand hills about fifty yards from the top of high water. On the point of Chatelaillon are two guns on barbet, which can no ways annoy the landing of the troops in the bays of either ſide of it; and off which point runs a riff of rocks weſt two miles, which are dry at low water; and round the ſaid point, about half a mile to the eaſtward, there is a ſmall ſandy bay near half a mile long, and the land over the ſaid bay riſes with an eaſy aſcent, about a quarter of a mile, to a church or convent, with a few houſes near it; from the ſandy bay, along to a ſquare fort on the ſouth part of the bay, lies a long flat mud, which is dry near two miles at low water.

"It is our general opinion, the tranſports cannot come nearer to either of the aforeſaid bays (in order to land troops) than a mile and an half, as we found three fathoms only at that diſtance at high water.

"The

A. D. 1757.

"The ſquare fort on the ſouth ſide of the bay "we could only ſee two ſides of; the face to the "north-weſt had nine embrazures, and that to "the north-eaſt only two.

"Given under our hands, on board his Ma- "jeſty's ſhip Ramilies in Baſque road, "this 24th of September, 1757.

"*Thomas Broderick.*
"*James Douglas.*
"*Peter Dennis.*
"*Matthew Buckle.*"

Nothing was done towards landing the army, next day, further than what was neceſſary to deſtroy the fortifications of Aix[g]. However, Colonel James Wolfe, employed as quartermaſter-general on the expedition, zealous in the ſervice, upon which he was ſent, and diſdaining to be idle, while others were venturing their lives, obtained leave of Sir John Mordaunt to reconnoitre the ſhore. He ſet off about one o'clock on the 23d, during the attack of the Iſle of Aix, and went to the fort ſoon after it had ſurrendered.

Colonel Wolfe's report of the enemy's ſhore.

He landed, and got upon the ramparts, and from thence viewed Fouras and the land about it; he ſtayed as little while as he could, and then re-

[g] Miners were appointed to blow up the fortification, governor's houſe and the barracks, which work took them up till the 30th. In which ſervice we loſt two ſailors and two ſoldiers blown up, and a ſerjeant had both his thighs broke by a ſtone, that fell upon him.

A. D. 1757. turned immediately to the Ramilies, which was anchored at a conſiderable diſtance from the Iſle of Aix, and made a ſort of a report, of what he had obſerved, to Sir Edward Hawke and Sir John Mordaunt. He mentioned the ſituation of Fouras, as it appeared to him, and took notice of what he thought to be the ſtrength of it, to the admiral and the general: which he was induced to do, as nobody elſe within his knowledge had done it, and took the liberty of ſaying to Sir Edward Hawke, that he believed, if the depth of water would allow of coming near enough, a ſhip would batter it down very eaſily, or at leaſt would ſo far take the fire of the fort upon the ſhip, that the troops might very ſafely land round about it;—what he ſpoke of the land on the other ſide of the fort was from conjecture only. Sir Edward Hawke at that time ſeemed to embrace the propoſal with a great deal of warmth, and Sir John Mordaunt approved of it. He ſaid to Sir Edward Hawke, that, as he ſuppoſed, the pilot of the Magnanime could very well inform him of the depth of water; and as the admirals and generals did not appear to diſapprove of his ſpeaking upon that point, he juſt hinted to Sir Edward Hawke, that it might not be amiſs to cauſe ſome diverſion on the ſide of Rochelle, to divide the enemy's attention, which he apprehended might be done by means of the bomb-ketches. Sir Edward ſo far agreed to it, that he ſent both for the pilot and the bomb-ketches up from the Iſle of Aix that night, he having ſuggeſted

geſted to him his opinion, that there was not a moment's time to be loſt. The pilot ſeemed clearly to underſtand his notion of the attack, and of landing at the ſame time on both ſides the fort, and ſaid, that he could, or believed he could, take the Magnanime up to batter the fort; as alſo, that the landing between Fouras and la Pointe was very practicable, ſuppoſing the fort to be attacked, as propoſed, at the ſame time. A. D. 1757.

Yet we ſhall ſee, that notwithſtanding ſo great an officer's opinion of the practicability of the landing, and the concurrence of Sir John Mordaunt, who acknowledged upon his trial, that he did embrace Colonel Wolfe's plan or propoſition of an attack upon Fouras cheerfully, and that Sir Edward Hawke gave him room to expect, that he would next morning ſend up a ſhip to batter Fouras; it was laid aſide by a council of war, on the 25th of September, on board his Majeſty's ſhip the Neptune, at anchor off the iſle of Aix[h], for the following reaſons: Remarks on the practicability of landing. Laid aſide by a council of war.

"The

[h] "Preſent,

"Sir *Edward Hawke*, { Knight of the Bath, Admiral and commander in chief of his Majeſty's ſhips employed on the preſent expedition.

"Sir *John Mordaunt*, { Knight of the Bath, Lieutenant General of his Majeſty's forces, and General and commander in chief of the troops on the preſent expedition.

"*Charles Knowles*, Eſq; Vice Admiral of the Red.

"The Right Hon. Major General *Henry Seymore Conway*.

"*Thomas Broderick*, Eſq; Rear Admiral of the White.

A. D. 1757. Reſolutions at the council of war.

" The fortifications and iſland of Aix, belonging to the French King, having ſurrendered to his Majeſty's arms, the council proceeded to take into conſideration the farther ſteps proper to be taken, in execution of his Majeſty's ſecret inſtructions to Sir Edward Hawke and Sir John Mordaunt, commanders in chief of his Majeſty's forces on the preſent expedition; and the firſt object being to determine, Whether a proper place could be found for landing the troops, Sir Edward Hawke produced a report by Rear Admiral Broderick, and the Captains Douglas, Dennis, and Buckle, whom he had ſent to ſound and reconnoitre the coaſt from La Rochelle to the point of Fouras, near the embouchure of the river Charente, which report is hereunto annexed.

" The council having taken the ſaid report into conſideration, and examined the pilots, it appears, that there are but two landing places; and that the troops could not be reimbarked from either of them in bad weather, the ſwell of the ſea making ſo great a ſurf on the ſhore, that no boats could be able to approach it to take the troops off; the ableſt pilot having informed the council, that he had been at anchor ſeven weeks in this road, and not a boat been able to paſs or repaſs: and it likewiſe appears to the council, that in caſe the troops ſhould be

" Hon. Major General *Edward Cornwallis.*
" Captain *George Bridges Rodney.*
" Colonel *George Howard.*"

" over-

" overpowered by ſuperior numbers of the ene- A. D.
" my, they could have no protection from the 1757.
" cannon of the fleet, the ſhoal water preventing
" their coming within gun-ſhot.

" The probability of ſucceſs in the attempt
" againſt Rochefort, in caſe the landing was af-
" fected, being then taken into conſideration,
" Lieutenant Colonel Clerk, chief engineer, was
" called in, and being aſked his opinion, declared,
" That when he ſaw the place in the year 1754,
" he thought no place was more capable of being
" taken by aſſault; what alteration may have been
" made in the place ſince, he has not ſufficient
" information to judge; that he does not imagine
" any regular attack was intended againſt that or
" any other place, the ſmall quantity of artillery
" we have, not being ſent upon that plan. Being
" aſked, if the ditch were flowed with water,
" whether he ſhould then think it practicable to
" take the place by eſcalade; ſaid, he thought
" not; but that when he ſaw the ditch, it did not
" appear to him capable of being flowed.

" Monſieur de Bonneville, volunteer, being
" aſked what he knew of Rochefort, ſaid, that
" he was there about nine years ago; that
" the ramparts were of earth, and that there are
" ſluices there, by which they can flow the ditch,
" and that it was full of water all round, when he
" was there.

" The pilot of the Neptune being called in,
" ſaid, That he had been very frequently at
" Rochefort; that he commanded a ſmall veſſel

A. D. 1757. "there many years; that they have ſluices near "the hoſpital, by which they can fill the ditch "with water; that they raiſe them ſometimes to "cleanſe the ditch, and that he has ſeen water in "it quite round the town.

"The informations of ſome French priſoners "were then produced confirming the ſame, as alſo "that they had been working on the fortifications "there for ſome time paſt.

"The intelligence received from ſeveral neutral "veſſels ſpoke with on the paſſage was alſo pro- "duced, declaring, That the French had been "for ſome time in expectation of a deſcent from "the Engliſh in thoſe parts[i]. All which being "taken into conſideration, together with the long "detention of the troops in the Iſle of Wight, "and our meeting with contrary winds, fogs and "calms upon our paſſage, the ſeveral informations

[i] Here alſo were we informed of ſixteen battalions and 30,000 militia, beſides the invalids and workmen at the dock of Rochefort, all which could in ſix hours time be aſſembled, to oppoſe our attack; that the ditch was then full of water, and by opening the ſluices the country could be laid under water for five miles round. Should our infantry land at Chatelaillon,—a deep moraſs and rivulet would retard their march, ſo that the artillery could not get up without going 20 miles round into the heart of the country; that all men of war built at Rochefort, for want of water, were forced to tide it down the river at ſpring tides only, without guns or rigging, and be compelled with jury maſts or tow, to go round to Breſt to take in their guns and rigging, and that but one ſixty gun ſhip had ever been built at Rochefort, but only 40 guns—in general, and that therefore our ſhips of the line, &c. could be of no uſe in ſuch an attempt. See the Secret Expedition impartially diſcloſed, p. 44, 45,

"received



Sir PIERCY BRETT Kt.



" received of troops aſſembled in the neighbour- A. D.
" hood, and the great improbability of finding 1757.
" the place unprovided, or of ſurpriſing it, or
" conſequently ſucceeding in an enterprize found-
" ed on the plan of an aſſault or eſcalade merely;
" and the uncertainty of a ſecure retreat for the
" troops, if landed; the council are unanimouſly
" of opinion, that ſuch an attempt is neither ad-
" viſeable, nor practicable.

" *Edward Hawke*,
" *John Mordaunt*,
" *Charles Knowles*,
" *H. Seymour Conway*,
" *Thomas Broderick*,
" *Edward Cornwallis*,
" *G. B. Rodney*,
" *G. Howard*."

Proceedings after the council for a landing.

However notwithſtanding the council had been of opinion, that it was neither adviſeable nor practicable to land the troops on that coaſt, we find that there were cutters and ſmall veſſels ſent out next night and all next day to ſound up the river Charente, leading to Rochefort, Sir Edward Hawke did alſo direct Vice Admiral Knowles to carry in two bomb-ketches to try to bombard the fort; which order was immediately executed under the conduct of the Magnanime. But the Infernal bomb, which went firſt, run a-ground, and in that ſituation would have been attacked by two row galleys, had they not been beaten off by all the boats manned and armed, under the protection

By bomb-veſſels.

of

A. D. 1757. of the Coventry, which, in attempting to get to the Infernal, ran a-ground five different times; neither could the bombs of the Infernal reach from that dangerous ſituation to the fort.

By orders to the ſoldiers. There ſtill remained a buſſing report, That ſomething would be attempted; and on the 26th at night orders were ſent to the tranſports for the ſoldiers to hold themſelves in readineſs, if they ſhould be called upon to land next morning. But next day produced no further order, than to expedite the demolition of the fortifications, and for forty ſoldiers with ball and bayonets fixed to keep guard on deck every night, and hail every boat or veſſel that paſſed, and to fire in upon them, if they did not give an anſwer in Engliſh, nor the word, after being hail'd thrice. A caution taken on a report, that the French intended to ſend out ſome galeaſhes, or ſmall fire ſhips, in dark nights to annoy the fleet at anchor.

The ſpirit of the men, both of the army and fleet, was ſo bent upon a deſcent, to retalliate the French for the frequent attempts upon this iſland of Great Britain, that it appears, by this conduct, after the reſolution of the late council of war, that they thought it hazardous to inform them with its contents, and rather waited ſome accident to favour the return of the fleet. For our ſmall cutters were employed ſtill in ſounding the coaſt and the Charente; and Sir John Mordaunt deſired another council of war to be aſſembled, "To "take under conſideration, whether it was adviſe- "able to land the troops to attack the forts lead-

By ſounding the coaſt.

"ing

" ing to, and upon the mouth of the river Cha- A. D. 1757.
" rente :" which council after mature deliberation were unanimouſly of opinion, " That it was ad-
" viſeable to land the troops for that purpoſe with
" all poſſible diſpatch [k]." And in purſuance to this laſt reſolution, orders were ſent, at 11 o'clock that ſame night, " for all the troops to debark
" from the tranſports on board the boats, and
" land ſilently."

In obedience to theſe orders Colonel K——y with Lieutenant Colonel Sir William Boothby, and Major Farquahar, who were to march at the head of the grenadiers, took boat before twelve, though about two leagues from ſhore, and a freſh gale full againſt them, which would have endangered many of the boats loaded with men, ſo crouded that they could only ſtand erect; they were tumbled in the ſwell till two o'clock, none coming to conduct them to the place of rendezvous; at laſt a cutter came down and ſaid, " You

[k] Preſent,

Sir *Edward Hawke*, Knight of the Bath, Admiral and Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's ſhips employed on the preſent expedition.

Sir *John Mordaunt*, Knight of the Bath, Lieutenant General of his Majeſty's forces, and Commander in Chief of the troops employed on the preſent expedition.

Charles Knowles, Eſq: Vice Admiral of the Red.

The Right Hon. Major General *Henry Seymour Conway*.

Thomas Broderick, Eſq; Rear Admiral of the White.

Hon. Major General *Edward Cornwallis*.

Captain *George Bridges Rodney*.

Colonel *George Howard*.

A. D. 1757. "are ordered to ſhip again, for that the other re-"giments cannot be ready theſe two hours," Colonel K———y ſaid, "I can hardly believe it; "ſhew me your orders," on which was ſhewn a written order; at which all the ſoldiers made a *humming noiſe*; and they all went to their reſpective tranſports, the boats remaining ſtill ready.

Reaſons for not landing.

The reaſon given by Sir John [1] for putting off the landing this time, when it had been reſolved to be an adviſeable meaſure; was that a ſtrong wind blowing from the ſhore, the officers of the navy, appointed to conduct the landing, repreſented, that it was with difficulty the long boats, which were to be towed on ſhore, could make way, and conſequently the troops would be a long time expoſed to the fire of the enemy; that the tranſport-boats, which were rowed by ſoldiers, would be ſtill ſlower, and more expoſed; that it would be day, before the firſt embarkation could get on ſhore, and that it would be ſix hours more before the troops, firſt landed, could be ſupported by a ſecond embarkation: the generals judging the landing under theſe circumſtances not to be expedient, agreed not to attempt it that night.

But the meſſage ſent on this occaſion to Admiral Hawke, by Admiral Broderick was, "That "having prepared all the boats, with proper "officers to land the troops, he was now to ac-"quaint him, That the Generals were come to "a reſolution not to land to night, but to wait

[1] In his defence, p. 58. of his trial.

"till

" till day light, when they can have a full view of " the ground whereon they are to land." A. D. 1757.

When Sir Edward Hawke ſaw the inſtability of the orders iſſued out to the land forces in purſuance of the laſt council of war; and conſidering that every delay was adding ſtrength to the enemy, and daily increaſing the hazards and dangers of the ſhips in that boiſterous ſea, at that ſeaſon, which he very juſtly underſtood to be the purport and real meaning of a letter he had lately received from Mr. Secretary PITT, to continue on that coaſt ſo long as there were any operations going on, agreeable to his ſecret inſtructions, and no longer [m]; he

[m] *A true copy of a letter from Mr. Secretary Pitt, to Sir John Mordaunt, dated Whitehall, 15th September 1757, (the like being at the ſame time wrote to Sir Edward Hawke,* mutatis mutandis. Mr. PITT's letter to Sir John Mordaunt.

" SIR,

" HIS Majeſty, by his ſecret inſtructions, dated the 25th " day of Auguſt laſt, having directed the return of the " troops under your command, together with the fleet, ' ſo as " to be in England at, or about, as near as may be, the end " of September, unleſs the circumſtances of the forces and " ſhips ſhall neceſſarily require their return ſooner,' I am now " to ſignify to you the King's pleaſure, That you do not con- " ſider the above-mentioned time, limited for your return, as " intended, in any manner, to affect or interfere with the full " execution of the firſt and principal object of the expedition, " namely, ' attempting, as far as ſhall be found practicable, " a deſcent on the French coaſt, at or near Rochefort, in order " to attack, if practicable, and, by a vigorous impreſſion, " force that place, and to burn and deſtroy, to the utmoſt of " your power, all ſhipping, docks, magazines, and arſenals,

" that

A. D. 1757. he on the 29th of September, writes to Sir John Mordaunt, as follows:

"SIR,

Sir Edward Hawke's letter to Sir John Mordaunt.

"SHould the general officers of the troops have no further military operations to propoſe, conſiderable enough to authorize my detaining the ſquadron under my command longer here, I beg leave to acquaint you, that I intend to proceed with it for England without loſs of time,

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient

Moſt humble ſervant,

EDWARD HAWKE."

Sir John in his defence, ſays, he wrote, in anſwer, that he would ſummon the general officers

"that ſhall be found there, and exert ſuch other efforts, as "ſhall be judged moſt proper for annoying the enemy.' And "with regard to any other particular attempt, which, agree-"ably to your orders, you ſhall have commenced, and in the "execution whereof you ſhall be actually engaged, it is alſo "his Majeſty's pleaſure, that you do not deſiſt from, or break "up the ſame, merely and ſolely on account of the time limit-"ed for your return by the inſtructions above-mentioned;— "but that, notwithſtanding the ſame, you do continue with "the troops during ſuch a farther number of days, as may "afford a competent time for the completion of any operation "under the above circumſtances; after which you are to take "care to return with the forces under your command, and the "fleet, in the manner directed by your former inſtructions."

to

to consider of Sir Edward's letter, and desired him to signify his intention in writing: which he did in a letter to him, the same day. He then applied to Sir Edward for a council of war: who declined it, and said, that seamen were no judges of land operations, which were to be performed by troops on shore. In consequence of this Sir John summoned all the land officers, who had been of the council of war, and laid Sir Edward Hawke's letter before them. And being assembled, says he, "We considered the uncertainty "of landing, if the wind should blow as it had "done the night before, and the account we had "that day received from the Captain of the Viper "sloop, who had informed Colonel Howard, that "he had seen a considerable body of troops near "the landing place, whose numbers he did not "exactly know, but he had observed five pair of "colours; that he saw them in camp; that the "next morning the view of the camp was interrupted, so that he could not see them again, "which he attributed to the enemy having thrown "up some ground on the beach, and that he saw "the sand hills on the beach considerably higher "than they were on Sunday, when he came there. "Colonel Howard, in his return from reconnoitring, reported this to me. A. D. 1757.

"It farther appeared to us, that the attempt "upon those forts at this time, could not justify "the ill consequences of detaining the fleet in that "bay, at a time when, from what we had learnt "from the conversation of the sea officers, two

"great

A. D. 1757.

" great French fleets were expected home; that " at this ſeaſon of the year, ſo near the equinox, " ſuch weſterly winds were to be apprehended, as " might detain the fleet there many weeks; that " the foundation, upon which the reſolution of " the council of war upon the 28th was taken, " was, that it might be done during the neceſſary " detention of the fleet in the demolition of the " fort of Aix, and thereupon was directed to be " done with all poſſible diſpatch: that the demo- " lition of the works of the Iſle of Aix was com- " pleated that very day, and that the wind was " then fair for the fleet to return; add to this, " that the time limited by his Majeſty's inſtruc- " tions was now expired, and that the time was " not prolonged by Mr. PITT's letter, which al- " lowed us only to compleat ſuch operations, as " we had already begun.

" Upon all theſe conſiderations, not thinking " it a meaſure either adviſeable or juſtifiable in " us to take upon ourſelves the conſequences of " detaining the fleet any longer in thoſe parts, we " came unanimouſly into the Admiral's propoſal " of returning to England."

Diſpoſitions made by Sir Edward Hawke for returning home.

In the mean time[n] Sir Edward Hawke ordered the agent for the tranſports to direct them to follow

[n] When Sir Edward Hawke had received an anſwer from the land officers, " That they were all agreed to return directly to England," he ſent a letter to Mr. PITT, which concludes with—" It was the *daily* expectation of their undertaking ſomething, which induced me to ſtay here ſo long: As I have got their final reſolution, I ſhall ſail for England to-morrow morning."

his

his ſignal, and that no troops ſhould diſembark without further orders. And all the ſhips of Vice Admiral Knowles's diviſion came down from before Aix into the open road. On the 30th the fort of Aix was blown up and in flames [o]: and on the 1ſt of October the whole fleet got under ſail and returned to England, *without making any attempt to land on the coaſt of France* [p]. A. D. 1757.

Words

[o] Eight mortars of 14 inch. and 30 pieces of cannon were found in the fort, i. e. 16 eighteen pounders, and 14 fourteen pounders.

[p] The London Gazette, of the 8th of October, has this particular article in the account of the expedition,—"On the 29th "of September the reſolution was taken to return to England "the troops, *no attempt having been made to land on the coaſt of* "*France.*" And Admiral Hawke's letter of advice concerning this ſervice in Baſque road, and his reſolution to return home relates, That having maturely conſidered the report of the officers he had ſent to reconnoitre and ſound the coaſt, he was of opinion they might land: that Sir John Mordaunt deſired a council of war to conſider of it, that then it was granted by every body, that the landing could be effected: that in confidence of their judgment, and knowledge of their own profeſſion, the ſea officers aſſented to their reaſons for not proceeding to attempt taking Rochefort by eſcalade.—It was, ſays he, the daily expectation of their undertaking ſomething, that induced me to ſtay here ſo long. Though before I came here, this place was repreſented, as very difficult of acceſs, and ſo narrow, that ſhips could not lie in ſafety from the forts; nay the pilots made many baulks, ſays he, before we came in: yet I find it a ſafe, ſpacious road, in which all the navy of England, merchant ſhips included, may ride without the leaſt annoyance; and that a ſquadron may, at any time, by laying here, prevent any armament from Rochefort, and ruin all the French trade to Rhee, Oleron, or the continent, within theſe

A D 1757. Discontent at home.

Words can't express the murmurings of the nation, when they heard that a fleet and army, which had cost them in this expedition, almost a million of money, and had thrown the French ministry, as well as their coast, into the utmost confusion, was returned without making one actual attempt towards executing the King's orders, except in that hour's work, in the reduction of the little island of Aix and its fortification.

The country exclaimed against the commanders, and cried aloud for justice on the delinquents. The officers in defence endeavoured to throw the blame upon the ministry, or at least upon the injudiciousness of the plan given them to execute; and upon the variety of incidents, that concurred towars their disappointment. And each of these accusations and allegations being supported by strong presumptions or undoubted facts, his Majesty, to prevent any applications to him from his subjects in their incorporate capacities, or otherwise by way of address, did nominate and appoint, His Grace Charles, Duke of Marlborough, Lieutenant General, Lord George Sackville and John Waldegrave, Major Generals, to examine and enquire, and to make their report concerning the

Enquiry appointed.

islands. And then concludes,—I beg leave to assure you, Sir, I have discharged my duty to my King and country with fidelity, diligence, and integrity, and wish more could have been done for the good of the service. The pilot of the Magnanime has behaved like a man of bravery and skill, and as such I beg leave to recommend him to you.

causes

causes of the failure in the expedition againſt Rochefort [q]. A. D. 1757.

The board met on the 12th of November 1757, and having ordered the papers containing all the orders and inſtructions, which appeared to have been ſignified to the commanders of the late expedition, to be read, they examined witneſſes in regard to their authenticity and contents; under which examination there came out a very particular circumſtance relating to the minutes of the council of war, on board the Ramillies, in Baſque road, on the 28th of September. For, General Mordaunt begged leave to obſerve, that the minutes there produced were taken down without the knowledge of the perſons, who compoſed the ſaid council of war, and never ſeen by the gentlemen, who had ſubſcribed them. Vice Admiral Knowles went farther, and diſavowed theſe minutes entirely; and ſaid he never ſaw them till they were ſhewn to him after his arrival in London, and that he did recollect, that there was a poſitive determination, that no minutes ſhould be taken, but that the informations only of the perſons examined ſhould be noted down: which examinations he never heard read. This was confirmed almoſt literally by Major General Conway, Major General Edward Cornwallis and Colonel Geo. Howard. But Rear Admiral Broderick, ſaid, The board meets.

[q] This commiſſion of enquiry was ſigned on 1ſt November 1757, and directed to Thomas Morgan, Eſq; Judge Advocate, General of his Majeſty's forces, or to his deputy.

A. D. 1757. that he did obſerve minutes taken, that he did object to it, and that he never ſaw thoſe minutes [r].

The

[r] *Theſe are the minutes of this council, tranſmitted by Sir Edward Hawke to the proper office.*

THE council in order to determine whether the forts leading to, and up to the mouth of the river Charante were open and capable of being attacked by land, proceeded and examined

1. Lieutenant Colonel Wolfe, who declared, that he was of opinion, that fort Fouras was not a ſtrong place, ſeemingly principally fortified towards the ſea: that he had ſeen people at work on the land ſide: that the taking of the barbette battery near it, would be of great uſe in taking the fort, provided there was proper ammunition for that purpoſe; and that Fouras muſt be taken by artillery or eſcalade.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Clarke, ſaid, he could make no kind of judgment of fort Fouras, on the land ſide, by the help of a teleſcope; the only method he had ever heard of obſerving it.

3. A French priſoner ſaid, Fort Fouras is a circular fort: no ditch on the back of it towards the land, when he ſaw it three years ago: that it mounted 24 pieces of cannon towards the ſea, and had embraſſures for guns towards the land: that Fort la Pointe is like Fouras circular, and mounts 22 pieces of cannon, and has a wall on the eaſt ſide towards the land, like that of Fouras: that the landing in the bay of Chatelaillon is the beſt landing of any place here; and that when landed, and you get upon the Rochefort road, it is a fine open country: that on friday morning, the 23d Inſt. he was in Fort Fouras, that there were but 22 or 24 guns in it, and not above 50 men of all kinds. That there are much about the ſame number of guns in Fort la Pointe, and that both forts are incloſed by a wall, in much the ſame manner towards the land.

The council having conſidered the evidence, Sir John Mordaunt declared his opinion, that ſomething further ſhould be attempted, and that he would give his orders accordingly that moment,

The papers being gone through, and no body offering to give the commiſſioners any information touching the cauſes of the failure of the expedition, A. D. 1757.

moment, if any, meaning the general officers of the troops, would ſay it was adviſeable.

Vice Admiral Knowles declared, he had received great light from the perſons examined, and therefore thought ſomething ought to be attempted.

Major General Conway, declared for the attempt merely from his own opinion, without regard to evidence.

Sir Edward Hawke, appealing to every member of the council for the truth of what he ſaid, declared that he was now of the ſame opinion, which he had given both before and at the council of war of the 25th, *That the landing could be effected:* That the troops ought to be landed for ſome farther attempt, which was alone matter of conſideration with the general officers of the troops, he, not taking upon him to be a judge of land operations, but would from a confidence in their abilities, and ſkill in their own profeſſion, readily aſſent to any reſolution they ſhould come to, and aſſiſt them to the utmoſt of his power. This being ſettled, after ſome debate, Sir John Mordaunt, Vice Admiral Knowles, Rear Admiral Broderick and Captain Rodney withdrew.

The council of war being re-aſſembled, and the queſtion put, whether it was adviſeable to land the troops, to attack the forts leading to and upon the mouth of the river Charante?

Yes.	No.
Howard	Cornwallis, but he afterwards
Rodney	acquieſced with the majority,
Broderick	
Conway	
Knowles	
Mordaunt	
Hawke.	

N. B. This is the council of war, of which it was afterwards ſaid, that it had been agreed to take no minutes.

A. D. 1757. Sir John Mordaunt, as commander in chief of the land forces was called upon to ſhew the reaſons, which prevented him from carrying his Majeſty's inſtructions and orders into execution. To which he replied by delivering a narrative of his whole conduct from beginning to end. Which was in ſubſtance, what has been already related.

Sir J. Mordaunt's reaſons for not fulfilling his inſtructions.

In the examination of Sir John's narrative the commiſſioners hit upon a paſſage, which aſſigns this as a reaſon why the troops were not landed in the night of the 28th of September, "Becauſe "it would be day, before the firſt embarkation "could get a-ſhore;" whereas in Rear-Admiral Broderick's letter to Sir Edward Hawke it is ſaid, "That the generals were come to a reſolution not "to land to-night, but to wait till day-light, "when they can have a full view of the ground, "where they are to land." Which ſeeming contradiction occaſioned a deal of altercation. However Admiral Broderick perſiſted in the truth of the letter; that he did give the letter to Sir John, and that Sir John did read it, and approve of it, before it was ſent in his name to Edward Hawke. But Major-General Conway endeavoured to reconcile the paſſages, by ſaying, that he conceived Sir John's meaning was, that he would have the ground viewed in the morning, in order to embark next night; and then, after aſking many queſtions concerning Aix, Fort Fouras, the practicability of landing, the ſtrength of Rochefort and the informations received from priſoners concerning that town, they declined all further proceedings.

A contradiction in his defence.

How reconciled.

When

When the examination was finiſhed, Sir John Mordaunt addreſſed himſelf to the board, as follows, A. D. 1757.

I AM conſcious of having done my utmoſt, to the beſt of my judgment, for his Majeſty's ſervice, in the conduct of this expedition: and I have ſubmitted myſelf voluntarily and readily to this examination. I deſire no favour or partiality, and I know I ſhall have the moſt exact juſtice in the report this honourable board will make. Sir J. Mordaunt's addreſs to the board.

I apprehend that an enquiry into the whole conduct of an expedition, without any accuſation formed, or any charge laid, is a proceeding not quite common; and however free from guilt a man may feel himſelf, there are few, who can ſtand ſo ſtrict an examination.

There is nothing but the high opinion I have both of the juſtice and candour of this board, could make me eaſy in ſuch a ſituation.

I therefore hope you will be indulgent to my errors; but I deſire no mercy for guilt or known diſobedience, and with theſe ſentiments I ſubmit myſelf to the court.

The board did then report to his Majeſty, That it appeared to them, as one cauſe of the expedition having failed, "the not attacking Fort Fouras by ſea, at the ſame time that it would have been attacked by land—That "another cauſe was conceived by them to have been; that inſtead of attempting to land, when the report was re- The report made to his Majeſty by the board of enquiry.

A. D. 1757. ceived on the 24th of September from Rear-Admiral Broderick, and the captains ſent with him, to ſound and reconnoitre, a council of war was held on the 25th; in which it was unanimouſly reſolved *not to land*, as the attempt upon Rochefort was neither adviſeable, nor practicable: becauſe it did not appear to the board; that there were then, or at any time afterwards, either a body of troops or batteries on the ſhore ſufficient to have prevented the attempting a deſcent, in purſuance of the inſtructions ſigned by his Majeſty. Neither did it appear to them that there were any ſufficient reaſons to induce the council of war to believe, that Rochefort was ſo far changed in reſpect of its ſtrength, or poſture of defence, ſince the expedition was firſt reſolved on in England, as to prevent *all attempts of an attack* upon the place, in order to burn and deſtroy the docks, magazines, arſenals and ſhipping, in obedience to his Majeſty's commands. That they thought themſelves obliged to remark upon the council of war of the 28th of September, that *no reaſon* could have exiſted ſufficient to prevent the attempt of landing the troops previous to that day, as the council then unanimouſly reſolved to land with all poſſible diſpatch: and that they further obſerved, that after it had been unanimouſly reſolved to land, in the council of war of the 28th, the reſolution was taken of returning to England, without any regular or general meeting of the ſaid council; and that they looked upon the expedition to have failed from the time the great ob-

ject of it was laid aside in the council of war on the 25th. A. D. 1757.

This enquiry, however well intended by his Majesty, did not answer the intention either of acquitting the general, or of appeasing the nation: but was productive of more public altercations. Some of which endeavoured to justify the impracticability of the expedition-plan, and to throw the whole blame of its failure upon the Right Honourable Gentleman then at the head of the ministry. Others as strenuously insisted upon its practicability, and without fixing the blame on any particular person or persons, advanced shrewd reasons to suspect a secret cause for the failure of this secret expedition. Does not quiet the minds of the people.

A right honourable author [a] deigned to enter the lists amongst the first class; and, with promises not to deceive, and that he would write nothing, but the most exact truth, begins with a sneer at the strength and secresy of this expedition, and at the expectations of those, who placed any hopes of advantage in its effects,—"An expedition, as "he expresses it, prepared with so much osten-"tation of force, whilst its destination was kept "so profound a secret, and on which the perhaps "over-raised expectation of many seemed to rest "the very issue of the war." To back this he insinuates, that it was pretty clear, long enough before hand, that it was intended against the western Writers in defence of the land officers.

[a] Candid reflections on the report (as published by authority) of the general officers, &c.

coast

A. D. 1757. coaſt of France, and, conſequently, that France could not be ſuppoſed ſo neglectful, as to leave Rochefort entirely out of their general plan of defence upon that coaſt, conſidering its importance.

He then collects the various opinions paſt by the public, on the diſgraceful return of ſo powerful an armament, without effecting any thing anſwerable to the hopes or deſigns of its outſet.

Attempt to caſt the blame on Mr. PITT. The greater part of the nation vented their reſentment on the commanders in this unſucceſsful expedition, as the readieſt objects. Another, by far leſs numerous part, did juſtice to the good intention, but queſtioned whether the projectors had ſufficient ground of knowledge or information to warrant the undertaking. Some, merely guided by private attachments, or prejudices in favour of the projectors, or, at leaſt, of the principal promoter of this attempt, extolled it to the ſkies, admired the activity of the new miniſter, that made ſo glorious a contraſt for him to the paſt indolence and inaction of his predeceſſors; not without throwing out ſhrewd hints of the envy of ſome, who had oppoſed his riſe to power, having been carried to ſuch treaſonable lengths, as ſecretly to have thwarted and countermined his operations. On the other hand, others, perhaps influenced by conſiderations of the like private nature by pique, prejudice, or even that envy, of which they were accuſed, treated, or affected to treat, the whole plan as chimerical, crude and indigeſted, both in the projection and appointment of the

execu-

execution, from which no better, nor other ſucceſs could be expected than what befel it. Some over-refined politicians pretended to diſcover in the combination a tenderneſs for Hanover, or at leaſt a connexion with the convention of Stade. But all ranks united in a general diſſatisfaction at this enterpriſe, having either been ſo weakly projected, as not to ſuffer even an attempt to execute it; or at the defect of the execution itſelf. A. D. 1757.

It is plain the fault was ſomewhere; and to diſcover where, the enquiry was appointed under ſuch officers, as were at the head of the military profeſſion. However this royal commiſſion, and the characters of the officers, that filled the board, could not eſcape the cenſure of the advocates for the commander in chief; who commended him for thinking himſelf at liberty to call it *a proceeding not quite common*, and laying him under ſeveral diſadvantages in caſe he ſhould be brought to trial. Remarks on the board of enquiry.

The impracticability of this expedition was ſupported by an attempt to prejudice Colonel William Clerk in the opinion of the people, as capable of giving a partial evidence in favour of the information he had given, upon which the plan was originally formed; or to create a belief that the ſtate of Rochefort was greatly changed ſince he had made his obſervations on that town, fortifications, &c. For this purpoſe the French King's regular forces, which, by the memorial laid before the cabinet, did not amount to 200,000, were mounted up to 300,000 regulars in The information of Captain Clarke queſtioned.

A. D. 1757. in pay: The thirty thouſand men ſtationed to guard the coaſt from Calais to Bayonne incluſive, were augmented with 100,000 militia-men, kept up in conſtant training, within that compaſs: the ſtrength of Rochefort was magnified ſo much as to bid defiance to a ſudden inſult; as if it could be readily ſupplied from neighbouring garriſons with a numerous militia; and might be put in a condition of laughing at almoſt any number of troops, that ſhould appear before it; eſpecially unprovided with ſtores and materials for a regular aſſault, and ſituate up a river unnavigable for veſſels of burden.

Impracticability affirmed. It was further urged, that Fort Fouras muſt have been firſt taken, before the reduction of Rochefort could be attempted: But that Fouras is unexpugnable by our ſhipping, that the coaſt in Chatelaillon-Bay was covered with ſoldiers concealed behind ſand-banks: that the information of the firſt ſuggeſters of the undertaking was defective: that none but the French could have wiſhed that our armament had proceeded further in the execution of its miſſion: that not a ſoul on board knew half the requiſites to be known before any execution could be proceeded to, or even rightly planned; and at the ſame time, that it was no fault of *theirs* (the commanders) that they did not know them. And therefore that it might be lamented that ſo gallant a fleet had not been fitted out earlier againſt Cape Breton; as the infinite importance of America, and the actual ſituation

tion of things there loudly called for ſuch a deciſive meaſure. A. D. 1757.

Hence it was ſaid, that the commanders had been acquitted with ſo much honour by the Board of Enquiry, That there was not a word in their report, but what they might ever glory in avowing and ſubſcribing to: that the not attacking Fouras by ſea, at the ſame time that it ſhould be attacked by land, was to be laid to the charge of Thierri the pilot: at leaſt, that in this the commanders were in no fault; nor in their reſolution of the 25th, not to land; becauſe the nature of the errand they were ſent upon, and the impoſſibility of its execution were already plain enough, and though they might not ſee any troops, nor batteries on ſhore, it could not be ſuppoſed that there were not both, and ſufficient to cut off our men, as they landed, diviſion by diviſion. And that from the premiſes it was eaſy to diſcern, whether the failure was imputable to the original ſin of inſufficiency in the project itſelf, or to the perſons commiſſioned to carry it into execution;—whether all the requiſites of knowledge were duly obtained before the diſpatch in the armament, or whether a ſet of gentlemen, of unattainted characters, and truſted with the arms of their country, could be ſo groſly wanting to its honour, and to their own, as to return back with ſo bad a grace, if a better knowledge, and a perſonal view of things had not forced them to it, with a regret they rendered but too apparent by perſiſting in it ſo much beyond the bounds of

Commanders commended for not attempting to land.

their

A. D. 1757.

their duty, that one would have thought them willing to prefer the bare opinion of others at a diſtance, to their own actual and palpable recognition on the ſpot.

Anſwer to this defence.

To this juſtification it was replied [t], That the unpromiſing prognoſtications of this expedition, and the ſuſpicions and inſinuations about a tenderneſs for Hanover were made and ſpread by a ſet of men, as obſerved before [u], not famous for their extenſive knowledge, and who, by their private intrigues and cabals, had, a few months ago, thrown the affairs of the King and kingdom into ſo much confuſion; hoping, by the ſame influence, by which they had put a ſtop to all public buſineſs, at that time, to blaſt the expedition alſo. That a plan, (whoever projected it) approved, on the utmoſt deliberation, by his Majeſty, and unanimouſly approved on by his cabinet-council; undertaken on a full examination of facts by the generals to be employed, without proteſt or remonſtrance; approved and deſired by the King of Pruſſia [w], and prepared under the immediate inſpection of Sir John Ligonier, commander in chief of the King's forces, could not be a project ſo totally repugnant to common ſenſe, and impracticable, as the advocates for the commanders therein choſe to repreſent it. As to the inſinua-

To whom the cauſe of the miſcarriage to be imputed.

Obſervations on the plan.

[t] In the expedition againſt Rochefort fully ſtated and conſidered, &c. by a country gentleman, the late ingenious Thomas Potter, Eſq;

[u] On page 303.

[w] As appears in the Enquiry, p. 20,

tion

tion about the illegality or uncommonneſs of the proceeding againſt Sir John, by way of enquiry, it was obſerved, That this was not the firſt inſtitution of a board of general officers, for the purpoſe of inquiry into the conduct of a commander: that it took place under the auſpices of his Royal Highneſs William, Duke of Cumberland, at that time commander in chief of the Britiſh forces: and that an officer was judged, condemned, and ruined by ſuch a board of enquiry, without any other trial. But that, if ever ſuch an enquiry was right and proper, it was ſo in the preſent caſe, where the parties had combined in an agreement upon a total ſuppreſſion of evidence. For, in the very council of war, which unanimouſly reſolved to do nothing, far from a deſire to ſtate the evidence, on which they proceeded, and their reſpective opinions upon that evidence, (which one ſhould think natural to every one, who is ſolicitous for his honour and juſtification,) the firſt thing reſolved upon was, to take *no minutes of opinions*; and that even the informations of the perſons examined ſhould not ſtand part of the minutes, ſo as to be tranſmitted to any perſon [x].

A. D. 1757.

On the board of enquiry.

It having been inſinuated ironically, that the great officers, who were appointed for this enquiry, were not the beſt qualified for ſuch an important ſervice, it was retorted, that they could not be of Mr. PITT's recommendation, conſidering the known and declared friendſhips, con-

Officers not recommended by Mr. PITT.

[x] See Enquiry, page 10. and the note on page 340.

nections

A. D. 1757. nections and attachments of the majority of them; who moſt certainly had no partiality in favour of the projectors, and againſt thoſe, who ought to have executed the plan of the expedition.

As to the multiplying of the military forces on the coaſt of France; they were ſo far from amounting to about 100,000 regulars, beſides 100,000 militia, that there were actually but 4000 regulars, at the time our fleet came upon the coaſt, for the defence of all the garriſons and out-works in and near port l'Orient, la Rochelle and Rochefort; and the ſmaller diviſion of theſe was at Rochefort. It is true there was a marſhal of France to command this petty corps. But it is alſo as true (in the accounts given by the French themſelves) that the old marſhal conſidered all as loſt, the moment the attack was pointed at Rochefort: and he was ſo far from making diſpoſitions to diſpute the landing of our troops, that he ſpent his hours in tears, and in writing expreſſes to his court.

Only 4000 regulars at Rochefort and on that coaſt.

It was obſerved, That the commanders could not take any refuge under the definition of a *coup de main*: which does not only mean a ſurpriſe, and that the whole proſpect of ſucceſs muſt be given up, where the opportunity of a ſurpriſe ſhall be loſt: but that it includes every other way of attack, except by open trenches and erecting batteries; as properly explained in the advice delivered by Sir John Ligonier to Sir John Mordaunt[y]; "It may perhaps, ſays he, ſucceed *beſt*

Coup de main explained.

[y] See Enquiry, p. 22.

"at

" at your coming up, as the enemy may be in a " great hurry, ſurpriſe and conſternation, at ſuch " an unexpected viſit, and not have time to make " his diſpoſitions. But if that is not thought " proper, it (the *coup de main)* may *ſucceed as well* " *after the place has been thoroughly reconnoitred*, " and you have fixed the ſpots, where you de- " ſign to make the greateſt efforts: and if the " enemy ſee any preparations for a regular attack, " they will leſs expect a *coup de main*, &c." A. D. 1757.

From hence it was inferred, That, if Sir John Mordaunt really thought Sir John Ligonier to be a man of that experience in the art of war, which he deſcribes him to be: if he really meant to guide himſelf by the whole of his advice in the execution of the plan, and not to excuſe himſelf, only by ſelecting certain parts of it from others, which were explanatory, and with which they were connected, how came he ſo totally to have forgot this part of it, which, if any doubt had ſubſiſted, would have explained what was intended by a *coup de main*; and to have remembered only the recommendation to ſecure a communication for a retreat: not ſhewing the neceſſity of Fort Fouras being taken *before the troops were landed*, in order to ſecure a retreat; but ſuch a retreat, as could be ſecured after they were landed:—" Suppoſing, " ſays Sir John Ligonier, the *troops landed*, it " muſt be left to the conſideration of the generals, " whether they ſhould not march, with proper " precautions, *directly* to Rochefort, to prevent " any ſuccours being thrown into the place, at Remarks on Sir John Ligonier's letter.

A. D. 1757. "the same time that the marines should be employed for making a good *intrenchment* for the "security of the stores to be landed from time "to time, as well as of a retreat in case of ne- "cessity."

Impropriety of admitting parties in evidence.

It was thought a very insufficient means, to wipe off any imputations, to attempt to invalidate the evidence and opinion of Colonel Clarke; because it was upon his representation that the expedition against Rochefort was thought of; as if he was bound in honour to support his own plan; and when the very officers, of whom the council of war was composed, were admitted to give testimony in the cause, in which they were the very parties to be tried, in case of a general misconduct.

Fort Fouras might be attacked by sea.

As to the practicability of taking Fort Fouras, the argument ran high in opposition to those, who voted against the attempt in the council of war.—It was taken for granted that the French, in matters of defence would conduct themselves on principles similar to those, which are adopted by the rest of mankind: and that, of the building a fort, it is built either to defend or offend. Thus Fouras was weak to the land, it stood at the water's edge, to guard the channel; it stood even on a bank, which ran into the water with twenty-four embrasures to the water-side[z]. Therefore its use was to guard not a sand-bank, over which scarce a Thames wherry could pass, if some accounts should be admitted; but a channel fit for

[z] See Enquiry, page 30.

large

large ſhips. If it had ſo many guns, what could be their uſe, if a ſhip could not come up within gun-ſhot? So that according to Admiral K——s there was no channel at all; or it lay out of gun-ſhot of the fort. It was further obſerved, That though the vice-admiral's maſter found no more than ſix feet water at high water, and a bomb-ketch, which drew but eleven feet water, went aground, at near three miles diſtance; the Coventry frigate did the ſame farther out, and the Barfleur at a ſtill greater diſtance; yet *after* all this delay and hazard to the ſhips, that admiral thought fit to ſound and try the depth of water at a diſtance from the fort, where no cannon could reach; and there is not one ſingle proof given of an attempt to find the depth of water near the ſhore, and within gun-ſhot of the fort. A. D. 1757.

That there was a narrow channel, near the ſhore is, therefore, inconteſtible from the circumſtance of the caſe: and it is demonſtrable from the evidence of the French fiſherman Bonneau, who knew it well, navigated it, and was examined by General Conway, &c. [a] who vouched four fathom (viz. twenty-four feet) water at half cannon ſhot from Fort Fouras; ſufficient water for a ſixty gun ſhip. Beſides, when the public were acquainted not only with the teſtimony of the pilot Thierry, confirmed by Bonneau, but with Captain Colby's offer to carry the Princeſs Amelia [b] up to Fouras, they could not help thinking that

[a] See Enquiry, p. 53. [b] Ibid. p. 30.

A. D. 1757.

there was a myſtery, which might be eaſier gueſt, than explained.

Court martial appointed.

Theſe and many more diſadvantageous reflexions were made on the conduct of thoſe, who were entruſted with the execution of this ſecret expedition againſt Rochefort, and demanded a more ſatisfactory proceeding to come at the cauſe of this extraordinary diſappointment to the nation in general. Nothing but a public trial could ſatisfy the people. And it is thought that Sir John Mordaunt was no leſs ſolicitous for a court-martial, as the only method to eſtabliſh his own reputation with his countrymen. Accordingly his Majeſty iſſued his warrant for that purpoſe on the third of December [c]; in which court he, Sir John, was charged with diſobedience to his Ma-

[c] This court conſiſted of nine lieutenant generals, nine major generals and three colonels: viz. Lieut. Gen. James, Lord Tyrawly, preſident.—Lieut. Gen. Charles Lord Cadogan—Lieut. Gen. John Guiſe—Lieut. Gen. Richard Onſlow—Lieut. Gen. Henry Pulteney—Lieut. Gen. Sir Charles Howard—Lieut. Gen. John Huſke—Lieut. Gen. John Lord Delaware—Lieut. Gen. James Cholmondeley—Major Gen. Maurice Bockland—Major Gen. William Earl of Panmure—Major Gen. William Earl of Ancram—Major Gen. William Earl of Harrington—Major Gen. George Earl of Albemarle—Major Gen. Henry Holmes—Major Gen. Alexander Dury—Major Gen. John Moſtyn—Major Gen. Edward Carr—Colonel William Kingſley—Colonel Alexander Duroure—Colonel Bennet Noel—Charles Gould, Deputy Judge Advocate General.

Who aſſembled in the council chamber at Whitehall, on the 14th of December, and continued by ſeveral adjournments, to the 20th of December 1757.

jeſty's

jeſty's orders and inſtructions. But there being no other Evidences heard on this trial, than had been admitted at the board of enquiry, except Admiral Hawke's depoſition; and they all by members of the council of war, under whoſe reſolutions Sir John pleaded authority or advice for his conduct, he was acquitted, after a defence, that differed in no eſſential point from the former. A. D. 1757.

The court unanimouſly found him not guilty of the charge exhibited againſt him, and did therefore acquit him. Acquits Sir John Mordaunt.

But the opinion of the public remained unaltered; who, on this occaſion, could not forbear throwing out ſome bitter ſpeeches againſt the contraſt, which they pretended to diſcover between the lenity of this ſentence and the rigour of that paſſed upon the unfortunate admiral, who was ſo ſeverely treated by the populace, and condemned and executed for not doing all that was in his power to do; or for not attempting to relieve Fort St. Philip, and for not fighting the French, who had got the heels of him, and would not ſtay and give him the opportunity to do all in his power to do on that occaſion: and they could not even help ſuſpecting ſome ſecret cauſe for the failure of this expedition, from the unprecedented meaſures taken by ſome of the courtiers, to prevent a parliamentary enquiry, which was the intention of the new miniſtry, to ſift out the true cauſe. When the city of London was preparing to addreſs his Majeſty for this purpoſe, they were ſtopt by a meſſage from the King, ſent to the Lord Mayor, by William

How received by the public.

Parliamentary enquiry how ſtopt.

A. D. 1757. liam Blair, Esq; one of the clerks of the privy council, to acquaint him that he had given proper directions for an enquiry to be forthwith made into the behaviour of the commanding officers of the said expedition, or to that effect, which caused the motion for an address not to go on.

The nation acquit the minister.

But, though the discontent of the nation did not appear in the least to be appeased, they were far from ascribing any blame to the minister. They were satisfied, that the secret expedition had been intended, and that it was well calculated, to annoy the enemy; to make him susceptive of wounds upon his own coasts; to strike terror and dismay throughout all his subjects; to enervate and dispirit his arms, and to strike at the root of his maritime power, without which France could not possibly maintain a war, to the prejudice of England; and further they pleased themselves with the hopes, that it would conduce greatly to wipe off the disgrace of our late misconduct and miscarriages, and stimulate the British nation to exert their natural strength, and retrieve their antient glory.

What effects this expedition had on the powers of Europe.

These motives and expectations were certainly frustrated in some measure. Yet the powers of Europe interested in the sea, could discover by this specimen of the new minister's abilities, his spirit, and penetrate into the designs of his measures. They, from this moment, began to look upon the British councils with more care and circumspection; when they saw a man placed at the

head of, and giving directions to, a warlike people, who admitted no other rule for his operations againſt their enemy, than conveniency. His new ſyſtem, reſolution and activity convinced them, that he would not be diſcouraged by the failure in his firſt attempt, however it had happened. Sweden and Denmark thought it time to arm in defence of their commerce in the Baltic, and joined their maritime force for that purpoſe, to guard againſt a ſurprize in the north. We ſaw the Italian ports taking the beſt meaſures in their power for their own ſecurity. The very Dutch could not look upon theſe proceedings without a dread, that made them propoſe an augmentation of their navy. As for France, our natural enemy, ſhe was not prepared to contend with a power, that braved every danger, had totally changed its ſyſtem, and was in a condition, and reſolved to attack her with full vigour. What ſtruck our enemies with the greateſt conſternation and dread; they perceived that no failure in the execution was able to prejudice the nation againſt this miniſter; and, for the firſt time, ſaw a Britiſh miniſter unanimouſly applauded for a meaſure, that had miſcarried. Diviſion, the grand engine of the French ſyſtem of politicks, by which they had ſo often diſgraced us abroad and diſtracted us at home, was healed. Popularity and the adminiſtration were now united: a bulwark more impregnable than our arms, and ſo eſſential in a country like England, that a miniſter, unleſs he has the power and addreſs to gain it, can never

A. D. 1757.

On France in particular.

A. D. 1757. act with the ſtrength of the whole nation, nor invigorate a true ſpirit in the people. This ſhewed the enemy that the ſpirit of the nation was rouzed from that ſtupid lethargy, in which it had continued for ſome years, and aſſured the Engliſh that their confidence was not miſplaced, in a man of experience, integrity, and uninfluenced by lucrative and ambitious views; ſteadily purſuing their intereſts and happineſs, and eagerly ſnatching at every opportunity to complete their wiſhes, and to preſerve unanimity, as the only ſupport againſt an inſidious powerful enemy, and to execute the meaſures neceſſary to humble him with ſucceſs.

On Great Britain. Therefore, though the nation lamented the cauſe of their late diſcontent; they rejoiced in the adminiſtration of *one*, who had already made ſo great a change in the face of their affairs, and had alarmed all Europe with a ſample of thoſe great things, we are able to do with our natural ſtrength. They had, with too much reaſon, run away with a deſpicable opinion of our degenerate ſtrength, both in the cabinet and in the field: and now they perceived the antient ſpirit and military virtue of the people revive, to be once more the terror of the French.

The accounts from other parts, about this time, confirmed this opinion. Mr. PITT, in the month of February, had intereſt enough to forward a ſquadron to Jamaica, to cover our iſlands and trade in thoſe ſeas from the injuries and danger that threatened them daily, by a ſuperiority of the French men of war in America. Admiral Coates,



Cap.t ARTHUR FORREST.

Coates [d], who commanded this ſquadron, detached Captain Forreſt, with three frigates to cruiſe off cape Francois, which was the beſt ſtation to intercept the French trade to Europe, and to watch their naval deſigns. At that time M. Kerſaint, who had ſcoured the Engliſh ſettlements on the coaſt of Guinea, in November laſt, was then returned, and lay in that harbour with four men of war: and upon the firſt notice of Captain Forreſt's appearance, the French commander ſtrengthened his ſhips with an addition of ſailors and ſoldiers, and put to ſea, to attack the Engliſh frigates. Captain Forreſt having deſcried the enemy, called his two captains on board his own ſhip, and ſaid, "Gentlemen, you know your own "ſtrength; and ſee that of the enemy: ſhall we "give them battle?" They, not regarding the vaſt ſuperiority of the French, anſwered in the affirmative. "Then, ſaid he, fight them we will, "there is no time to be loſt: return to your ſhips, "and get them ready for engaging." It was done with the greateſt alertneſs. They did not wait the attack in their ſtation, but bore down upon the enemy with uncommon ſpirit, engaged them with the utmoſt fury for two hours and a half, in ſight of the Cape, and obliged them to run back faſter than they had advanced, and to ſeek protection in their fortified harbour, where the ſmall ſquadron, under Captain Forreſt, was forced to let them reſt, being obliged to return

A. D. 1757.

Captain Forreſt's gallant action in the Weſt Indies.

[d] See page 152, Vol. II.

to

A. D. 1757. to Jamaica to repair his ships. Which done, they immediately sailed for the coast of Hispaniola; where he made up for their trouble and disappointment on the last occasion, by taking a fleet of nine Domingo men richly laden, with a single ship. This was the first effect of Mr. PITT's *first* administration, felt in the West Indies.

East Indian affairs. About the same time that Coates was sent to Jamaica, Commodore Stevens was dispatched with another squadron to the East Indies; as related before [e]. But it is not time to expect any account of the effects of that reinforcement, ordered to join the fleet under Admiral Watson. Nevertheless this year furnisheth a variety of actions both by sea and land beyond the line.

Captain Chaillaud's relief of Trichinopoly. The French began very early in 1757, with an attempt to surprise Trichinopoli. M. d'Autueil was charged with this service; who invested the place with nine hundred men in battalion, three or four thousand Sepoys, about one hundred Europeans and Huffars, and a much greater number of country horse. Trichinopoly, at this juncture, was not in a condition of defence against such a force, the greatest part of the garrison having marched under the command of Captain Chaillaud, who was then before Madura, a place about 100 miles from Trichinopoly, and of great consequence to the affairs of the company and their allies. However, matters were not conducted so privately by the French, but Captain Chaillaud

[e] On page 152. Vol. II.

was

was informed of their deſign, and by forced marches with all his Europeans, and one thouſand of the beſt Sepoys, and four days proviſions in their knapſacks, he was fully reſolved to ſave the town at all events, knowing that it muſt be loſt without his aſſiſtance. On the other hand it was the intereſt of the French to be as watchful and reſolute to prevent his entrance into the town. A. D. 1757.

For this purpoſe the French formed themſelves in four diviſions; which formed a chain quite a-croſs the plain, over which it was expected Captain Chaillaud would be obliged to attempt a paſſage: in the front of which their cavalry was advanced, and divided into ſmall parties, to poſſeſs the roads and poſts all round; except the plantation grounds, which extended about nine miles to the weſtward of the town, and was ſo ſloughy [f], that it was impoſſible to march over it without being above the knee in mud at each ſtep: and therefore deemed impaſſable for an army, and left unguarded. Diſpoſition of the French army.

Captain Chaillaud, informed by his ſpies, of the enemy's diſpoſition, reſolved to take his rout by this neglected and difficult way; but with ſuch precaution as to give no ſuſpicion of his intentions. He, to put it out of the power of ſpies or deſerters to betray his march, kept forward in the common great road, without the leaſt March of the Engliſh forces.

[f] Occaſioned by the overflowing of the waters, which is a neceſſary part of agriculture in theſe regions, and without which the rice will not grow.

appear-

A. D. 1757. appearance of his deſign, till the cloſe of the evening, when he commanded his little army to wheel off towards the rice fields. They arrived on the plantations about ten that night; and after ſeven hours moſt fatiguing march, they got, unnoticed by the enemy, within cannon-ſhot of the fort, and were admitted undiſcovered; the enemy's attention being drawn from that quarter, not only by its difficult acceſs, but by a detachment of two companys of Sepoys, whom the captain had ordered to march in the common road, and to alarm the enemy on the other ſide: which ſervice they effectually performed, and made their own retreat good through the woods, till they found an opportunity, next night, to get into the town. When the enemy were convinced of this reinforcement's ſafe arrival in the town, they were too well convinced of the impoſſibility of their being able to take it; and of the danger they ran in continuing expoſed in the field, to the enterpriſing genius of the brave commander, that was now in a condition to attack their camp.

Colonel Forde's unſucceſsful attempt on Velloure.

M. D'Auteuil therefore reſolved to return with his army to Pondicherry. Colonel Forde, who was ordered by the government of Madraſs to reduce the fort of Velloure [g], which, as apprehended, its governor Nazeabulla Cawn had, or

[g] This town is twice as large as Madraſs. It has five gates, two large and three ſmall, ſurrounded by a mud wall, very broad at the bottom, and about three feet thick on the top of the rampart; and by a dry ditch, except on the north ſide, which in rainy ſeaſons has water in it.

intended to make over, with other places and ports, to the French, did not ſucceed ſo well. The colonel battered that fort three days, and on the 5th of May, he made a practicable breach, and began the aſſault at the break of day. Fifty Caffrees, led up by Enſign Elliot at their head, marched with great reſolution to the foot of the breach, They were followed very cloſe by three companies (300) of Sepoys, till they came within ſixty yards of the breach; where they laid themſelves down in a ditch, and could not be prevailed upon to advance a ſtep further: ſo that the Europeans, that did not exceed 100, were obliged to march over them to the breach. This was executed with great intrepidity; and having joined the Caffrees, they advanced to the top of the breach; where they were received by the people in the fort ſo warmly, with pikes, fire-locks, clubs and ſtones, that it was impoſſible for ſuch a handful to force their way over; though they maintained the aſſault three quarters of an hour. Then the colonel, convinced that there could be nothing done with his force againſt ſo gallant a defence, deſerted alſo by the Sepoys, ordered a retreat; which was conducted with ſuch good order, that not a man was hurt after they had left the attack. But in the action there were about forty Europeans killed and wounded, and about fifty Caffrees and Sepoys. They that were wounded, were rendered unfit for preſent ſervice: and there was ſcarce any one in the breach, that eſcaped bruiſes and contuſions.

A. D. 1757.

Several

A. D. 1757

Various other actions.

Several other actions happened, with various ſucceſs. Our forces under Captain Polier, ſent from Madraſs, reduced Outremulour, a fort poſſeſſed by the French; which he entered without reſiſtance: the French garriſon conſiſted only of Sepoys, who abandoned the fort, upon the firſt notice of Captain Polier's march. But this conqueſt was of a very ſhort duration. For, Captain Polier leaving no more than forty Sepoys in garriſon, it was obliged ſoon after to ſubmit to a detachment of one hundred Europeans and Topaſſes and 300 Sepoys, which marched againſt this fort from Allamparva. However, the ſituation of Outremalour gave the government of Madraſs ſo much uneaſineſs, that Colonel Adlercron was immediately ordered to attempt its final reduction, and to deſtroy its fortifications: which he faithfully performed. From hence the colonel marched to inveſt Wandewaſh, a fortreſs of great importance, in the intereſt of France. But was deterred from making any attempt upon the place, by advice that the French army, which had been employed againſt Trichinopoly, was marching to its relief.

Captain Polier.

Captain Adlercron.

Conjeveram plundered.

The retreat of Colonel Adlercron encouraged the enemy to follow him cloſe, as far as Conjeveram, which they plundered; but were repulſed in their attack of the Pagoda or Fort, with the loſs of an officer and ſix Europeans killed, and about ten wounded; though the garriſon conſiſted of no more than a ſerjeant and two companies of Sepoys.

Colo-

Colonel Lawrence marched againſt the French at Wandewaſh. They were encamped and ſtrongly entrenched about a mile from the town. The colonel took poſt on the 10th of June, about four miles from them, and tried every method to draw them out of their entrenchments, his men being full of ſpirits, and eager for engagement; but without effect—So that, as they could not be brought out into the open plain, and, they had a great ſuperiority in numbers, and their entrenchments were defended by ſeveral batteries, it was thought proper to withdraw an army, that was obliged to remain inactive, and at an uſeleſs expence. A. D. 1757.

As for the French army it remained about Wandewaſh, till the 20th of September, when they marched againſt Chetteput with eighteen hundred Europeans. The place was defended by Nizar Mahomed Cawn, the governor, aſſiſted by a ſerjeant and ſixteen men from Fort St. George: who defended themſelves to the laſt extremity, and killed a great number of the enemy. The governor being driven out of the fort, renewed the fight in the ſtreets, and diſputed every inch of ground, till a muſket-ball deprived him of his life. On the report of his death, his family immediately deſtroyed themſelves; and a vaſt ſlaughter of his troops enſued. The deſperate defence of Chetteput.

Captain Chaillaud having delivered Trichinopoly from the French, returned with the utmoſt diligence to his ſmall corps, left to blockade Madura, and took ſuch part of the garriſon with him, The ſiege of Madura.

as

A. D. 1757. as could be ſpared, without expoſing that town to a ſurprize from the enemy; making in all ninety military and four hundred Sepoys, ſupported by two twenty-four pounders. Having joined the troops under Lieutenant Rumbold, who had maintained his ſtation before Madura, and erected a battery, he began to play his cannon from thence on the 9th of July; made a breach before noon, and without delay, to prevent new works being thrown up in the night, he formed the attack, and advanced to the breach by two o'clock of the ſame day. But the beſieged gave them ſo brave a reception, that the beſt of his men fell in the attempt, or were ſo wounded, that it was not poſſible for him to perſiſt in the aſſault. For the remainder retreated: nor was it in his power to ſpirit them up to a ſecond attack, having loſt between thirty and forty Europeans and Caffrees and a hundred Sepoys. However this brave and ſkilful officer did not deſpair of ſucceſs, either by compelling the town to capitulate by famine, or to accept of reaſonable terms to deliver up that fortreſs; ſo neceſſary for the ſecurity of the company's affairs, into his hands. He made the proper diſpoſitions to reduce the place by famine. But, as this method might take up ſo much time, as to prolong his ſtay till the arrival of the French fleet, and all the ſtrength, that could be collected, was neceſſary for the defence of their garriſons, againſt that event, he had orders to break up the blockade, and return to his command at Trichinopoly. Therefore he tried what could be done

Bravely defended.

Loſs of the Engliſh.

How reduced.

by

by negociation; and at length prevailed with Mauphus Cawn's people to give Madura[h] up to the company for the ſum of 170,000 roupees: and it was accordingly delivered into his power juſt at the time the French fleet arrived. Having ſecured this requiſition, with a large garriſon of Sepoys, under the command of Iſouf Cawn, the Captain marched with the utmoſt expedition to Trichinopoly. A. D. 1757.

This was all that could be done by the Engliſh company in this quarter. The delay their reinforcements met with in Europe, which ſeemed to act in concert with the late inactive miniſtry; and the conſiderable part of their forces ſent to the relief of Bengal, had reduced their whole ſtrength to 1618 men[i]: whereas the French had at this time very near 3500 European military; 1000 of which were ſent from Europe this year. A ſuperiority of ſtrength, which increaſed their power, in proportion as it overawed the natives from aſſiſting them, that were not in a condition to defend themſelves, and increaſed the number and aid of their allies. The weakneſs of the Engliſh forces. The ſuperiority of the French.

Affairs took a much better turn in the kingdom of Bengal. The deſtruction carried on with the utmoſt barbarity, which threatned a total loſs of the commerce and ſettlements on the Ganges, Remarks on the deſperate ſtate of Calcutta.

[h] Which had been obtained by treachery. See page 370. Vol. I.

[i] 1300 of the company's troops, 334 enliſted from Colonel Adlercron's regiment, ordered home; and 84 ſoldiers ſent this year from Europe in the China ſhips.

A. D. 1757. and its dependencies, required the moſt vigorous and expeditious relief[k]. The caſe was deſperate. There was no waiting for ſuccours from Europe. The only hopes of recovery was in expedition and vigour: and there was no other dependance for the diſtreſſed ſufferers, than in the aid of the handful of men[l] ſent from Fort St. George, under the command of Captain Clive; and in the uncertain navigation of the fleet, which had lately reduced Angria[m], and delivered thoſe ſeas from a piratical ſtate, that had for many years interrupted the commerce of the European powers, frequenting the coaſt of Coromandel.

Admiral Watſon and Colonel Clive ſail for Bengal.

Admiral Watſon having no more to do at Bombay, ſailed from thence on the 30th of April for Madraſs; but touched at Fort St. David's, where he anchored on the 29th of May 1756, and continued there till July 20th; when he ſailed for Madraſs, and came to anchor in Madraſs road on the 21ſt. Here he received the account of the hard fate of Calcutta and its dependencies, took Captain Clive and the military on board, and ſailed in perſon on the 16th of October, with all the ſquadron and the Walpole and Marlborough Indiamen for Bengal.

Arrive at Balaſore.

It was the 5th of December before this armament reached Balaſore road, detained by calms and contrary winds. They croſſed the Braces on the 8th, proceeded up the river and anchored at

[k] See 359 to 368. Vol. I. [l] See p. 368. Vol. I.
[m] See p. 354, &c. Vol. I.

Fulta



ROBERT LORD CLIVE.

Fulta on the 15th, where Governor Drake and the gentlemen of the council waited for their arrival, on board of ſuch ſhips and veſſels, as had the fortune to eſcape the Moors. It was the 28th before the fleet could ſtir from hence, (the pilots abſolutely refuſing to take charge of ſuch large ſhips till the ſprings were over) when he ſailed with the following ſhips: the Kent, Tyger, Saliſbury, Bridgwater, and King's Fiſher ſloop. The next afternoon Colonel Clive was landed, in order to march and attack Buſbudgia fort by land, at the ſame time that the ſquadron appeared before the place, which anchored and began to cannonade about eight o'clock in the morning on the 30th; and, at half paſt eight, the King's troops were landed to ſupport Colonel Clive. The ſhips ſoon ſilenced the enemy's fire; and, at ſeven in the evening, 100 ſeamen were landed under the command of Captain King. At half paſt eight, the body of the fort was on fire; and, immediately after, the place was deſerted by the garriſon; which being but few, eſcaped into the country. One of the company's captains was killed, and four ſoldiers wounded. This fort was extremely well ſituated for defence, having a wet ditch round it; but badly provided with cannon; only 18 guns, from 24 pounders and downwards, and about 40 barrels of powder, with ball in proportion, being found in it.

A. D. 1757.

Buſbudgia fort attacked.

Taken.

Situation and ſtrength.

On the 1ſt of January the Kent and Tyger anchored between Tanna fort and a battery oppoſite to it, both which the enemy abandoned, as the

Tanna fort deſerted.

A. D. 1757. ſhips approached. About 40 guns, ſome 24 pounders, and all mounted on good carriages, with ſome powder and ball, were found in this fort and battery; and the Admiral left the Saliſbury as a guard-ſhip to prevent the enemy from regaining them.

Enemy's ſhipsburnt. In the night the Admiral ſent the boats, manned and armed, up the river, to burn a ſhip and ſome veſſels ſaid to be filled with combuſtibles, which was executed without oppoſition.

March to Calcutta. The next morning, early, the company's troops were landed, and immediately began their march to Calcutta. The Kent and Tyger ſoon after proceeded up the river, together with the 20 gun ſhip

The Moors begin the fire. and ſloop. At 40 minutes after nine, the enemy began to fire upon the Tyger, from their batteries below Calcutta, which they abandoned, as the ſhips

Returned. approached. At 20 minutes paſt ten, the Tyger and Kent made a very warm fire, inſomuch that the enemy were ſoon driven from their guns, and

Fort deſerted. preſently after ran out of the fort, which Captain Coote, with the King's troops, and an officer from the Kent, entered a little before eleven. Four mortars, 91 guns of different ſizes, and a conſiderable quantity of all kinds of ammunition, were found in the fort. The ſhips ſuffered very little in their maſts, yards, and rigging, and only loſt nine ſeamen and three ſoldiers killed, and 26 ſeamen and five ſoldiers wounded.

An expedition was then propoſed againſt Hughley, to be executed by the 20 gun ſhip and ſloop, the boats of the ſquadron manned and armed, aſſiſted

assisted by all the King's troops, amounting to 170, the company's grenadiers and 200 sepoys, which were to be landed under the command of Captain Kilpatrick. Every thing being prepared; they sailed under the command of Captain Smith, of the Bridgwater, on the 5th of January 1757, and attacked this city with so much spirit, as they had done the other forts, that indicated a revenge for the barbarous treatment of their countrymen, that it was also reduced without any considerable resistance. The garrison fled; and left behind them 20 guns, 24 pounders downwards, and a considerable quantity of ammunition. Nor could this satisfy the revengeful conquerors, who burnt and destroyed the city, and the granaries and store-houses of salt petre, situate on each side of the river: by which the Nabob's army was greatly distressed for subsistance in that part of the country. A. D. 1757.

The Nabob takes the field.

These atchievements of British valour rouzed the Moorish Prince, and convinced him of the necessity for him to provide a more respectable force to stem the progress of their arms, than the feeble garrisons of unexperienced Indians. He therefore, assisted with French officers, engineers, and gunners, resolved to take the field, with 10,000 horse and about 15,000 foot. His army took the rout of Calcutta, and on the 2d of Feb. 1757 it marched past the English camp, at the distance of about a mile, and pitched their tents on a convenient spot of ground, near the town.

His force.

A. D. 1757. Is attacked by Colonel Clive.

Colonel Clive, who had already begun to re-eſtabliſh the military honour of the Engliſh, which was ſinking there, as it had done in other places, did not heſitate a moment about what was to be done, notwithſtanding the enemy's prodigious ſuperiority in the field. He truſted to his faithful and brave fellows, whoſe valour he had ſo often tried and proved. He only requeſted ſuch an addition of ſeamen, to manage his artillery, as could be conveniently ſpared. Accordingly Captain Warwick received orders on the 4th to take upon him the command of a detachment of 600 ſailors, draughted from the ſeveral ſhips, to join Colonel Clive, in order to force and to drive the Nabob out of his camp.

On the 5th at one in the morning, Captain Warwick landed his men a little above Kelſal's octagon; about two he joined the Colonel, whoſe troops were under arms, and at three the whole army, in three columns, marched, the ſailors attending the train, which conſiſted of ſix field pieces, and one haubitzer. About five, the troops in the van were charged by the enemy's horſe in their camp; and by the time our rear guard were entered, the engagement became general from hedges and buſhes; on which they played our artillery, defending the right and left of our army all the way through the camp, and driving the enemy before them, with great rapidity, 'till they lodged themſelves in a tope, near Meter's garden, behind the hedges: from hence they detached a large body of horſe, with two cannon, to the croſs road of the

the Bunglo, which our men ſoon diſlodged, and from thence marched into the fort. In this action were killed 12 ſeamen, two captains of the company's troops, 17 private men, and 10 ſepoys. The number wounded were about 15 ſeamen, and 50 ſoldiers and ſepoys. Lieutenant Ludwidge of the Saliſbury, the only officer mortally wounded. Of the enemy 1300 were killed and wounded, beſides horſes, draught bullocks, and three or four elephants. This attack, though not attended with all the wiſhed for ſucceſs, yet it was ſufficient to make the Nabob very ſolicitous to haſten a peace, which was concluded on, and conſiſted of the following articles.

A. D. 1757.

Loſs on our ſide.

Loſs of the enemy.

Articles acceded to, and ſigned by the Nabob of Bengal, February 9, 1757.

I. WHatever rights and privileges the King has granted the Engliſh company in their Phirmaund, and the Huſbulhoorums ſent from Delly, ſhall not be diſputed or taken from them, and the immunities therein mentioned be acknowledged and ſtand good. Whatever villages are given the company by the Phirmaund ſhall likewiſe be granted, notwithſtanding they have been denied by former Subahs. The Zemindars of thoſe villages not to be hurt or diſplaced without cauſe.

Articles of capitulation.

Signed by the Nabob in his own hand,

I agree to the terms of the Phirmaund.

II. All goods paſſing and repaſſing through the country by land or water, with Engliſh duſtricks,

A. D. 1757. shall be exempt from any tax, fee, or imposition, whatever.

I agree to this.

III. All the company's factories, seized by the Nabob, shall be returned. All monies, goods and effects belonging to the company, their servants and tenants, and which have been seized and taken by the Nabob, shall be restored. What has been plundered and pillaged by his people, made good by the payment of such a sum of money, as his justice shall think reasonable.

I agree to restore whatever has been seized and taken by my orders, and accounted for in my sincany.

IV. That we have permission to fortify Calcutta in such manner as we may think proper, without interruption.

I consent to this.

V. That we shall have liberty to coin siccas both gold and silver, of equal weight and fineness to those of Muxadavad, which shall pass in the provinces.

I consent to the English company's coining their own imports of bullion and gold into siccas.

VI. That a treaty shall be ratified, by signing and sealing, and swearing to abide by the articles therein contained, not only by the Nabob, but his principal officers and ministers.

I have sealed and signed the articles before the presence of God.

VII. That Admiral Watson, and Colonel Clive, on the part and behalf of the English nation, and of the company, do agree to live in a good under-

underſtanding with the Nabob; to put an end to theſe troubles, and to be in friendſhip with him while theſe articles are performed and obſerved by the Nabob. A. D. 1757.

I have ſealed and ſigned the foregoing articles upon theſe terms; that if the governor and council will ſign and ſeal them with the company's ſeal, and will ſwear to the performance on their part, I then conſent and agree to them.

Reſolution to attack the French at Chandenagore.

The Nabob humbled, his hands tied from acting againſt us; and the company in poſſeſſion of all their ſettlements and forts, it was reſolved, by the commanders in chief, together with the governor and council of Calcutta, to turn their arms againſt the French, in thoſe parts, and to begin with Chandenagore, a place of conſiderable ſtrength, and the principal ſettlement of the French in that part of India; ſituate a little higher than Calcutta, upon the ſame river. Colonel Clive undertook the land ſervice, and with 300 of the Bombay troops, 400 more Europeans and 1600 Blacks, he immediately marched to Chandenagore, before the French could expect ſuch a viſit. His firſt ſtep was to make himſelf maſter of all the French outpoſts, which he ſoon accompliſhed; except one redoubt, ſituate between the river ſide and the walls of the fort, mounting eight pieces of cannon of 24 pounders, four of which pointed down the river. So that it was neceſſary to wait the arrival of the men of war. Admiral Watſon undertook the attack by ſea; and on the 18th came

The ſtrength of our army.

to

A. D. 1757. to an anchor with the Kent, Tyger and Saliſbury, about two miles below Chandenagore; where he found the paſſage of the river obſtructed by ſinking two ſhips, a ketch, a bulk, a ſnow, and a veſſel without any maſts, all directly in the channel, within gun ſhot of the fort, and by laying two bombs moored with chains acroſs the river,

Ships. River obſtructed.

How removed. This obſtruction cauſed a conſiderable delay. But as ſoon as the bombs were cut adrift, the Admiral, by ſounding, found out another channel, with ſufficient water for his ſhips to paſs through. He was joined on this occaſion by Admiral Pocock, who hoiſted his flag on board the Tyger. So that on the 24th, at ſix in the morning, this petty ſquadron weighed and ſailed up in the following order, the Tyger, Kent, and Saliſbury. At ten minutes after ſix the enemy began firing from the redoubt, which was abandoned as ſoon as the leading ſhip got a-breaſt of it. At three quarters after ſix the ſhips were placed, when the ſignal was made for engaging, which continued very briſk on both ſides till a quarter paſt nine. The enemy then waved over the walls a flag of truce, and deſired to capitulate; and the articles being agreed upon and ſigned, Captain Latham, of the Tyger, was ſent a-ſhore to receive the keys, and take poſſeſſion of the fort. Colonel Clive marched in, with the King's troops, about five in the afternoon.

Attack begun.

Strength. They had in the fort 1200 men, of which 500 Europeans and 700 Blacks; 183 pieces of cannon from 24 pounders downwards, three ſmall mortars, and

and a conſiderable quantity of ammunition. Beſides the ſhips and veſſels ſunk below, to ſtop up the channel, they ſunk and run a-ſhore five large ſhips above the fort. Four ſloops and a ſnow were taken in the harbour. The enemy had killed in the fort 40 men, and 70 wounded. The Kent had 19 men killed, and 50 wounded. A. D. 1757. Loſs.

All the officers and men in general, agreeable to their uſual bravery, behaved with great ſpirit and reſolution on this occaſion; as did alſo the land forces, who kept a good and conſtant fire, the whole time, from two batteries of four and two guns, which they had raiſed near the fort.

Articles of capitulation propoſed by the Director and Council for the French Eaſt India company's affairs at Chandenagore to Vice Admiral Watſon, with his anſwers, March 23d 1757.

Art. I. THE lives of the deſerters ſhall be ſaved, Capitulation.

Anſ. *The deſerters ſhall be abſolutely given up.*

II. All the officers of this garriſon ſhall be priſoners on their parole of honour; that they ſhall have liberty to carry with them all their effects, and go where they pleaſe, on promiſing they will not ſerve againſt his Britannic Majeſty during the preſent war.

The admiral agrees to this.

III. The ſoldiers of the garriſon ſhall be priſoners of war, ſo long as the preſent war continues: and when peace is made between the King of

A. D. 1757. of France and the King of England, they ſhall be ſent to Pondicherry, and till then be entertained at the expence of the Engliſh company.

The admiral likewiſe agrees, with this difference only, that inſtead of ſending the ſoldiers to Pondicherry, they ſhall be ſent to Madraſs or to England, as the admiral ſhall hereafter think proper; and that ſuch foreigners, who are not of the French nation, and chuſe voluntarily to enter into the Engliſh ſervice, ſhall have liberty.

IV. The Sepoys of the garriſon ſhall not be priſoners of war, they ſhall have leave, on the contrary, to return on the coaſt in their country.

The admiral agrees to this.

V. The officers and men of the company's European ſhip St. Conteſt, ſhall be ſent to Pondicherry in the firſt Engliſh ſhip, which goes to the coaſt.

The officers and men of the European ſhip ſhall be upon the ſame footing as the ſoldiers, and to be ſent to Madraſs or to England as ſoon as poſſible.

VI. The French jeſuit fathers ſhall have liberty to exerciſe the functions of their religion in the houſe, which has been aſſigned them ſince the demoliſhing of their church: the ſilver ornaments, and every thing that belongs to the church, ſhall be given them, and alſo their effects.

The admiral cannot agree to any Europeans reſiding here, but that the French jeſuits may go to Pondicherry, with all the ornaments of their church, or wherever they pleaſe.

VII. All

VII. All the inhabitants, of what nation or quality ſoever, as Europeans, Muſtees, Chriſtians, Blacks, Gentils, Moors, and others, ſhall be put in poſſeſſion of their houſes, and all in general as ſhall be found belonging to them, either in the fort, or on their eſtates. A. D. 1757.

In regard to this article, to be left to the admiral, who will do juſtice.

VIII. The factories of Caſſembuzar, Dacca, Patna, Jeuda, and of Bellaſore, ſhall remain at the command of the chiefs, who direct them.

To be ſettled between the Nabob and the admiral.

IX. The director, councellors, and thoſe employed under them, ſhall have leave to go where they pleaſe, with their cloaths and linnen.

The admiral agrees to this.

The admiral expects an anſwer by three o'clock this afternoon, and that the Britiſh forces may take poſſeſſion of the fort by four.

The above-mentioned propoſitions have been accepted of by the council; in conſequence of which we have delivered up the fortreſs of Chandenagore to Admiral Watſon.

Chandenagore the 23d of March 1757.

P. Renault, Laportiere, M. Fournier, F. Nicolas, A. Caillott, Sugues.

Ulterior proceedings in regard to the Nabob.

Having thus made uſe of the opportunity to cruſh the French power, when the Nabob was not in a condition to give them any aſſiſtance; they now ſeriouſly turn their thoughts upon the conduct of the Viceroy, ſince his laſt ſolemn engagements with

A. D. 1757. with the Engliſh; and finding that his dilatory performance of his obligations by treaty, and his frequent prevarications and tokens of diſlike, from the very moment of his ſigning that treaty, indicated his intention to be bad, they thought it a proper and neceſſary meaſure to renew hoſtilities with the Indians: the Viceroy having given them ſufficient reaſons to do themſelves juſtice by way of arms.

Remarks thereon. How a war in theſe circumſtances would have been juſtified, which was to be undertaken, and muſt have been in a great meaſure depending upon the ſucceſs of the army by land; an army that did not exceed 2300 men, including 1600 Blacks, againſt the whole ſtrength of the kingdom of Bengal and its allies, is not conceivable. But here we may properly apply the old proverb, *Audaces fortuna juvat.* The brave are fortunate. A lucky, unforeſeen, unexpected accident helps out the little army of conquerors in their deſires. It was decreed that they ſhould be the ſcourge of that tyrant, that inhuman barbarian, who, a few months before, took a pleaſure in the tragedy of Calcutta.

Favoured by the treaſon of the Nabob's Great men. While, therefore, the commanders, &c. were conſulting about the expediency and practicability of ſo great and hazardous an undertaking, which, with ſucceſs, would deliver the company from the difficulties, under which they were often obliged to yield to the caprice and impoſitions of the Nabob and his officers; and, in a manner, make them maſters of the whole trade of the kingdom of Bengal:

Bengal: and on the contrary, which, if they should fail in the attempt, might be attended with the total extirpation of their nation from the Ganges, and with a prohibition of all commerce with the Engliſh for the future; Nabob Suraja Doula behaved in ſo tyrannical a manner to his own ſubjects, and eſpecially to his great men and generals, whom he treated with indignity and contempt, for remonſtrating againſt the meaſures, he was adopting and executing upon the advice of his favourites and ſycophants, that there aroſe a general diſcontent; and a conſpiracy was formed, to depoſe him, by ſome of his principal officers; provided they could engage the Engliſh to favour the revolution. A. D. 1757. How they were diſguſted.

The deſign was communicated from the conſpirators by Jaffier Ali Cawn, his prime miniſter, a nobleman of great authority and influence, and at the head of the conſpiracy, to Mr. Watts ſecond in council at Calcutta. An affair of this delicate nature, and propoſed by a prime miniſter, required great conſideration and penetration to guard againſt that deception and cunning, for which the Eaſterns are ſo remarkable in all their dealings. It was well known that the Nabob treated his ſubjects with a tyrannical ſpirit; but it was alſo known, that they were accuſtomed to ſlavery, and that they carried the yoke, as a matter of duty. The Nabob's haughtineſs towards his great men, and his attachment to favourites of violent and perfidious principles, were no ſecrets: but it was running the utmoſt hazard to truſt the deliberations Their conſpiracy communicated to the Engliſh.

A. D. 1757.

tions of the conferences at Calcutta to the prime miniſter of the power, they were calculated to deſtroy. In this dilemma Mr. Watts managed the intercourſe, he had with the prime miniſter, ſo prudently, that he drew from him ſufficient conviction of his ſincerity; and of the manner how the conſpirators were to act their part, when matters ſhould be brought to an open rupture between the Engliſh and the Nabob, before he would conſent to lay the propoſal before the council; not ſeeming too forward; but making a merit of, and the prime miniſter accountable for, every ſtep the Engliſh ſhould take, by this requiſition, in a rupture, which, he had the addreſs to ſay, was to deliver the natives from tyranny and oppreſſion.

How managed by Mr. Watts.

A treaty being ſettled between the council and officers of the fleet and army at Calcutta, and the conſpirators; the company were to renew hoſtilities to oblige the Viceroy to fulfil the ſtipulations of the late treaty. Jaffier, on his part, promiſed to deſert his maſter with the beſt troops in his army, on the field of battle. Accordingly Colonel Clive took the field [n] with all the force he could muſter, which did not exceed 1000 Europeans, and 2000 Blacks; beſides 50 ſeamen, under the command of a lieutenant and ſeven midſhipmen, to manage eight pieces of cannon, the whole of their artillery, though he drew out the garriſon from Chandenagore, which the Ad-

[n] On the 13th of June 1757, the army marched from Chandenagore to Muxadavat, the capital of the province.

miral

miral engaged to replace with ſeamen. This was the whole ſtrength in this undertaking, except a 20 gun ſhip ſtationed above Hugly, to preſerve a communication between the fleet and army. On the 18th they took Catwa by ſtorm; and without much reſiſtance or any loſs. This was a neceſſary precaution, in order to ſecure a retreat, in caſe of a miſcarriage; this town and fort being ſituated advantageouſly on that branch of the river, which forms the iſland Caſſimbuzzar. Here alſo intelligence was expected from the conſpirators, for their future conduct. But it does not appear that Jaffier dared yet to truſt to his intereſt in the Nabob's army; which was aſſembling with all diligence about the capital, at the firſt news of the motion of the Engliſh army towards Muxadavat. A. D. 1757. Catwa taken by ſtorm.

Colonel Clive continued at Catwa three days, and on the 22d croſſed the river, and advanced immediately to attack the Nabob's army [b], which conſiſted of 20,000 men, well provided with artillery; excluſive of two diviſions under the command of the conſpirators. Their 24 pounders, under the direction of French gunners, began to play about ſeven in the morning, long before our field pieces were able to do any execution. But what carried the moſt diſagreeable aſpect in this day's ſervice, was the behaviour of the conſpirators; who, during the engagement, remained inactive ſpectators, leaving the whole work to be done Strength of the Nabob's army.

[b] Encamped on the plains of Plaiſſey.

A. D. 1757. between the Nabob's diviſion and the Engliſh; as if they were determined to cloſe in, and ſhare with, the conquerors, in the triumphs of victory, on which ſide ſoever it might declare; or, if the Engliſh army had been cut off and utterly deſtroyed, to fall upon the Nabob's troops fatigued and waſted with the ſervice of the day, and ſo work their deliverance from both the Nabob and the Engliſh.

Doubtful conduct of the conſpirators.

Providential aid.

In this doubtful ſituation, Providence ſupplied the deficiency of numbers. It was deſperate to march up to the mouths of ſo numerous an artillery. A ſmart ſhower of rain removed this difficulty and danger. The enemy drew their cannon out of the rain into the camp under cover. Colonel Clive availed himſelf of this capital error, by a well placed detachment, which prevented their being brought again into action; and with a preſence of mind, reſolution and conduct, peculiar to himſelf, having hitherto covered his men from the enemy's cannon, by a favourable diſpoſition under a mud wall, that encompaſſed a grove in the midſt of the plain, he reſolved to attack the Nabob's trenches, about four in the afternoon. The grenadiers under the command of Major Kelpatrick were ordered to advance, with two pieces of cannon: which they performed with extraordinary reſolution and bravery, doing great execution with their field pieces, in their firſt onſet. They then made a ſecond attack upon another quarter; and, in about half an hour, a third againſt a third poſt, the Sepoys keeping a continual fire, the whole time, into the enemy's trenches,

Captain Clive's good conduct, &c.

Forms the attack.

trenches, killed ſeveral perſons of the beſt diſtinction. This diſpirited the Nabob's forces: the right and center fled, abandoning their camp and artillery; which threw the whole Indian army into confuſion: this was no ſooner perceived than orders were given to ſtorm the trenches; and thoſe orders were executed with ſo much firmneſs and chearfulneſs, that the enemy was entirely routed, leaving behind them 42 pieces of large cannon. The Nabob had 400 men killed and 600 wounded: whereas there were not above 20 killed and 50 wounded, the greateſt part of whom were Sepoys, on our part. A. D. 1757. The enemy routed. Loſs on both ſides.

The unfortunate Nabob convinced of the treaſon of his principal officers, and not daring to truſt himſelf with troops, that would not defend a fortified camp againſt ſuch a handful of men, fled alſo with the few that continued faithful to him. Jaffier Ali Cawn and Roy Dolab, the next in command in the army, now declaring openly againſt their defeated ſovereign, haſted away to ſecure the capital, and, by their own deſire, were followed by the victorious army, to place Jaffier Ali Cawn, according to treaty, on the ancient throne of the Nabobs of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa. The Nabob flies for his own ſafety. The conſpirators declare themſelves.

Colonel Clive marched to Muxadavat, and was received into the city, with every token of joy and gratitude for the ſervice he had done, in delivering that country from tyranny and oppreſſion: Jaffier Ali Cawn was proclaimed Nabob; and a few days after the Nabob Suraja Doula was traced, ſeized Colonel Clive's entry into Muxadavat. Ali Cawn made Nabob.

A. D. 1757. and privately put to death, in the 25th year of his age.

Old Nabob murdered.

Thus, in about thirteen days, this extraordinary revolution, in defiance of the moſt powerful Nabob in the eaſt, whoſe dominions were not inferior to moſt kingdoms in Europe; in extent, in inhabitants, and in the richneſs of its commerce; and whoſe military ſtrength was very reſpectable, both as to numbers, artillery and diſcipline, was accompliſhed, with leſs force and trouble than often is required to take a petty fortreſs in Germany or Flanders.

Remarkable revolution.

Ali Cawn ratifies his treaty.

The rejoicings at Muxadavat did not delay buſineſs. They that placed Ali Cawn on the ſeat of dominion, immediately exacted a ratification of the treaty he had previouſly ſigned with the company; and it was executed as far as the circumſtances of the times would permit. By that treaty the former act of pacification, ſigned on the 9th of February 1757, by the Nabob ſince depoſed, was ratified and explained. A ſum of 2,212,500 pounds was agreed to be paid in two moieties, in ſatisfaction of the third article of that treaty, of which one moiety was paid ſoon after the acceſſion of Ali Cawn; and he aſſigned funds for the payment of the other moiety. The French were for ever prohibited from ſettling in the three provinces. The company's territories were enlarged with a very great extent. Their privileges confirmed. The Nabob diveſted himſelf and ſucceſſors of all right of building new fortifications below Hugley, near the Ganges. He granted

The ſubſtance of the treaty.

the

the company a leaſe of the Salt Petre of Patna, which had been a perpetual bone of contention between them and the Dutch; and he rewarded the army and the fleet with a preſent of 625,000 l. ſterling; beſides immenſe riches in jewels, &c. beſtowed on the officers, amongſt which was a turbant valued at 18,000 l.—It was this action that merited the public title of the *heaven born general*, which all the world can't take from the commander in chief, then Colonel, now Lord Clive, who, untutored in the art of war, performed heroic and more advantageous actions in the field than any of his cotemporaries, whoſe atchievements are recorded with the blood of hundreds of thouſands left in the field of battle, at the vaſt expence of many millions of money, and with the diſſatisfactory accumulation of heavy taxes. Colonel Clive returned to his native country full of glory and riches, to reap the favours of a grateful nation. His Majeſty created him a Lord.—The company ſettled a large penſion upon him. But Admiral Watſon, after eſtabliſhing a great and laſting reputation for his wiſdom, his courage, and his humanity, was cut off by the unwholſomeneſs of the climate, very ſoon[P] after the days of rejoicing for this ſignal victory were over. By whoſe death the chief command in thoſe ſeas devolved on Admiral Pocock.

A. D. 1757.

The heaven born general.

Admiral Watſon's death.

Admiral Pocock commander in chief.

Great as theſe advantages ſeem to be, they were conſidered only colateral to the grand object of

Importance of this revolution to Great Britain.

[P] On the 16th of Auguſt 1757.

A. D. 1757. the war, in a national light. They enriched individuals engaged in the ſervice: they increaſed the riches and power of the united Engliſh Eaſt India company: they annoyed the enemy, and ruined their trade and intereſts, and thereby cut off the reſources, they otherwiſe would have drawn from thoſe diſtant climes, to maintain the war in Europe and America.

Affairs of North America. But the advices from North America continued ſo unfavourable, that the nation received but little joy in theſe victorious accounts from the Eaſt. A ſquadron of ſhips had been ſent[q] under Admiral Holborne, but to no purpoſe. The French, it is true, were driven off from Fort William Henry[r]. But this was no more than a ſhort reſpite, till the enemy could return with a more effectual force. — No part of our arms felt the effects of the adminiſtration after Mr. PITT was turned out, more than in North America. Every thing ſeemed to devolve into the old channel of diſcord and inactivity. Lord Loudon, on whoſe confidence with the American provinces depended all that part of his commiſſion, which could not be executed without harmony and concord, loſt all his popularity by laying an embargo[s] on all the ſhips in North American ports, in order that the enemy might not receive any intelligence of his deſigns; without conſidering that the enemy received their intelligence chiefly, if not altogether, by land, upon that continent; and alſo to make proviſions

How declined at Mr. PITT's diſmiſſion.

Bad effects of an embargo.

[q] See page 168. Vol. II. [r] See p. 181, &c. Vol. II.
[s] On the 3d of March.

plenty

plenty and cheap for the army and navy; whereas he ſhould have known, that the exports can never exhauſt the great quantities of proviſions which the Britiſh colonies in general produce, but more eſpecially in this year, when the crops of corn were extraordinary. So that by this embargo the merchant, the planter and labourer all ſuffered, while the contractors put immenſe ſums into their pockets: and corn became a drug in America, while England, that year, was in dread of a famine, and deprived of relief from her colonies by an ill-judged and ill-timed embargo. A. D. 1757.

The ſecret intended to be covered by this embargo was, a projected expedition againſt Louiſbourg, in conjunction with a naval force expected at Hallifax. But how was this managed. As for the naval force you have already ſeen how it was delayed (page 168, 169). And as for the land army: Lord Loudon drew the troops from the northern frontier of the Britiſh ſettlements adjoining to Canada, and from other parts, till he had collected a body of 6000 men, with which his Lordſhip embarked at New York, on the 19th of June, under the convoy of three frigates only, it muſt be owned, with great intrepidity, but with manifeſt danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, whoſe ſuperiority in thoſe ſeas, at that time, proved a ſufficient argument to ſet the expedition againſt Louiſbourg aſide, after the arrival of the ſquadron under Admiral Holbourn; though it was then found, that the army amounted to 12,000

Its inutility for the end propoſed.

Lord Loudon and army ſail for Hallifax.

Whole force when joined with Admiral Holbourn.

A. D. 1757. 12,000 effective men, and the fleet consisted of 15 sail of the line and 18 frigates, &c.

Lord Loudon arrived with his troops at Hallifax on the 29th of June, Admiral Holbourn did not make that rendezvous before the 9th of July: yet, as if delay had been an essential part of their instructions, near a month was consumed at Hallifax in exercising the troops; and by feints, accustoming them to divers sorts of attacks and defence. These steps were condemned, by some, as,—"keeping the courage of his Majesty's soldiers at bay, and expending the nation's wealth "in making sham fights and planting cabbages [u], "when they ought to have been fighting the "enemies of their king and country in reality."

Delay at Hallifax.

It was the first of August before these troops embarked, to proceed against Louisbourg. But there was still a fatal remora. A packet, supposed to be a stratagem to intimidate the British commanders, with an exaggerated account of the garrison and others bearing arms in that fortification, threw itself in the way of this fine fleet; was taken and brought in, with all her dispatches, though chased many hours, which was sufficient to suspect the contrivance; for, real packets always throw their dispatches overboard. By the letters found on board this pretended packet, the naval

Why the expedition was put off.

[u] Alluding to a hasty expression of Lord Charles Hay, who was a Major General in this armament, and one of the bravest and best officers in this service; but was put under an arrest for some public reflexions on the conduct of affairs in America,

strength

ſtrength at Louiſbourg was fixed at ſeventeen ſhips of the line and three frigates, which might not be much exaggerated; but there was certainly a very grand augmentation in the military ſtrength, which, upon paper, amounted to 6000 Europeans, 3000 natives and 300 Indians: with this gaſconade, that the place was well ſupplied with military ſtores, and the people deſiring nothing more than to be attacked. A. D. 1757. The pretended ſtrength of Louiſbourg.

This intelligence produced a council of war; and it was therein reſolved, upon the credit of this advice, to lay aſide the intended expedition; a reſolution that had been ſeveral times before attempted, but had been as often defeated by thoſe, who rather choſe to encounter all dangers, than to do nothing. Reſolution of the council of war.

Lord Loudon made his diſpoſitions [w] immediately for returning to New York, where he arrived on the 30th of Auguſt. Admiral Holbourn continued, for ſome time, cruiſing off Cape Breton [x], in expectation of an opportunity to attack the French ſquadron in its return to Old France, and to carry ſome of them to England. But his hopes Lord Loudon returns.

[w] He garriſoned Hallifax with three battalions, and ſent two more up the Bay of Fundy.

[x] On the 20th he appeared off Louiſbourg, ſo near as within two miles, and to ſee the French admiral make the ſignal for his ſhips to unmoor. At which ſight the Engliſh admiral retreated, and made the beſt of his way to Hallifax. Where, being reinforced with four ſhips of the line, he returned to Louiſbourg: But could not draw the French out to an equal engagement.

24th

A. D. 1757. were rendered abortive by a violent ſtorm [y] on the 24th of September, which diſperſed [z] and ſhattered his fleet terribly [a]. So that being forced off his ſtation, and ſome of his ſhips greatly diſtreſſed, he was obliged to ſteer away with all ſpeed for England; but left eight men of war under Lord Colville, to protect the trade, watch Louiſbourg, and to annoy the enemy.

This was not the only misfortune, that befel Great Britain this ſummer, in her American war. By Lord Loudon's draughting off the military from the frontiers of the northern provinces, for the expedition againſt Louiſbourg, his Lordſhip left them more and more expoſed to the activity and watchfulneſs of Montcalm, who, as ſoon as it was known, that the troops were embarked in

[y] It laſted fourteen hours: when it began the fleet was about forty leagues from Louiſbourg, and towards the end of it, the ſhips were within two miles of the rocks and breakers: ſo that, had not the wind ſuddenly ſhifted from ſouth-eaſt to ſouth-weſt, they would, in all probability, have been drove a-ſhore and totally loſt.

[z] The Grafton of 70 guns, the Tilbury of 60, the Centurion of 50 guns, and the Ferret ſloop. The Tilbury was loſt, the crew were taken up by the French, and civilly treated; except Captain Barnſley; Mr. Dennis, captain of the marines; Mr. Crockſon, captain of the grenadiers; Mr. Plunket, maſter; Mr. Jones, ſurgeon; Mr. Walker, purſer; Mr. Smith, chaplain; Mr. Mackintoſh, gunner; Mr. Truſcot, midſhip-man, ſome private men to the ſoldiers and ſailors, who all periſhed.

[a] Twelve ſhips were almoſt diſmaſted, and others very much damaged.

their

their way to Hallifax, prepared to take advantage of their abſence [b]. A. D. 1757.

Fort William Henry, which in the ſpring of the year, had been ſtormed by the troops under M. Montcalm [c], and then eſcaped only by the vigilance of Major Ayres, the commander at that time, and through the want of many neceſſaries in the French army, who came provided only for a *coup de main*, to take it by ſurprize, or by eſcalade; became the firſt object of that general's operations. The garriſon conſiſted of 2,500 men, and General Webb was encamped with 4000 men not far off, to cover the fort from ſurprize. Fort William Henry attacked.

M. Montcalm aſſembled an army of 10,000 men, including Cannadians and Indians [d] drawn from Crown-Point, Ticonderoga, and the adjacent poſts; but not with that ſecrecy, as to prevent an early account of his deſign and force reaching General Webb. Who, if he had given due attention to this advice, confirmed by Colonel Parker's loſs [e], and raiſed the militia in time to join his regular forces, might have obliged the French Mar- By 10,000 troops. Genral Webb's inattention.

[b] A peace was concluded, about this time, with the Delawares, the Ten Tribes or Nations and the Five Nations.

[c] See page 181, &c. Vol. II.

[d] Some of theſe were ſo remote that they had not learned the uſe of fire-arms, but uſed bows and arrows, and were reſerved to fall upon advanced parties.

[e] On the 21ſt of July Colonel Parker, with five companies or 350 men, made an excurſion on Lake George, to reconnoitre the enemy; next day they fell into an ambuſh of the French, who were marching againſt Fort William Henry; 150 were taken priſoners, and about 90 were killed.

quis

A. D. 1757. quis once more to retire from before this fort. But the Engliſh general could not be perſuaded of the reality of the French intentions. He could not believe that they had a force ſufficient to diſpute the poſſeſſion of the fort with him and the garriſon. However, Montcalm ſoon convinced Webb of his error. For on the 2d of Auguſt they appeared on the lake: which ſtruck Webb with ſuch a pannic, that he reſolved to retire to Fort Edward that ſame night; but with much perſuaſions was prevailed upon to ſtay till next morning: when he marched off early, with a ſtrong artillery, leaving the defence of the fort to Colonel Monro and Colonel Young with 2,300 men.

General Webb retires.

Strength of the garriſon.

While the trenches were forming M. Montcalm, adviſed of the retreat of General Webb, ſent the following letter, by way of ſummons to Colonel Monro.

SIR, Auguſt 3, 1757.

M. Montcalm's letter to Col. Monro, by way of ſummons.

I Have this morning inveſted your place with a numerous army, a ſuperior artillery, and all the ſavages from the higher parts of the country; the cruelty of whom a detachment of your garriſon have lately too much experienced. I am obliged in humanity to deſire you to ſurrender your fort. I have it yet in my power to reſtrain the ſavages, and to oblige them to obſerve a capitulation, as hitherto none of them are killed, which will not be in my power in other circumſtances; and your inſiſting on your defending your fort, can

can only retard the loſs of it a few days, and muſt of neceſſity expoſe an unhappy garriſon, who can receive no ſuccours, conſidering the precautions I have taken. I demand a deciſive anſwer immediately, for which purpoſe I have ſent you the Sieur Funtbrune, one of my aid-de-camps. You may credit what he will inform you as from me, I am, with reſpect, Sir, A. D. 1757.

Your moſt humble, and

moſt obedient ſervant,

MONTCALM.

To which the gallant commander replied, with a dignity that became one in his ſtation.

The ſiege was regularly formed on the 3d with all the force, and a train of artillery. The Indians ſurrounding the breaſt-works of the Engliſh, whilſt the French hove up trenches. The garriſon behaved with courage and ſkill, ſo as to retard the enemy's works four days; during which time they had the misfortune to burſt all their cannon and mortars, except two nine pounders, one four pounder and a hawitzer. Had the militia come in time to their aid, or had General Webb taken proper meaſures of defence upon the advice he received, it is very probable their enterprize would have been defeated: but delay, that bane of theſe inactive times, interpoſed to the ruin of the fort. For after a hot cannonading and bombarding on both ſides, till the 9th, the garriſon being Siege formed.

A. D. 1757. being informed by a letter [f] from General Webb, intercepted and ſent to the commanding officer in

[f] *General Webb's letter, which contributed not a little to the ſurrender of Fort William Henry, was as follows:*

SIR, Fort Edward, Aug. 4. 12 at Noon.

I am directed, by General Webb, to acknowledge the receipt of three of your letters; two bearing date nine o'clock yeſterday morning, and one about ſix in the evening, by two rangers, which are the only men that have got in here, except two yeſterday morning with your firſt, acquainting him that the enemy were in ſight. He has ordered me to acquaint you, he does not think it prudent, (as you know his ſtrength at this place) to attempt a junction, or to aſſiſt you, till reinforced by the militia of the colonies, for the immediate march of which repeated expreſſes have been ſent. One of our ſcouts brought in a Canadian priſoner laſt night, from the inveſting party, which is very large, and have poſſeſſed all the grounds five miles on this ſide Fort William Henry. The number of the enemy is very conſiderable, the priſoners ſay, eleven thouſand, and have a large train of artillery, with mortars, and were to open their batteries this day. The general thought proper to ſend you this intelligence, that in caſe he ſhould be ſo unfortunate, from the delays of the militia, not to have it in his power to give you timely aſſiſtance, you might be able to make the beſt terms left in your power. The bearer is a ſerjeant of the Connecticut forces, and if he is happy enough to get in will bring advices from you. We keep continual ſcouts going, to endeavour to get in, or bring intelligence from you. I am, Sir, with the heartieſt and moſt anxious wiſhes for your welfare,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

G. BARTMAN, Aid-de-Camp.

To Colonel Monro, or officer commandng at Fort William Henry.

the

the fort, by M. Montcalm, they ſubmitted to capitulate, and obtained the following conditions. A. D. 1757.

Capitulation granted to Lieutenant Colonel Monro, for his Britannic Majeſty's garriſon of Fort William Henry, the retrenched camp adjoining, and all their dependencies. Articles of capitulation.

Art. I. THAT the garriſon of Fort William Henry, and the troops, which are in the retrenched camp, being joined, ſhall march out with their arms, and the uſual honours of war.

II. The gate of the fort ſhall be delivered up to the troops of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and the retrenched camp, immediately on the departure of the Britiſh troops.

III. All the artillery, warlike ſtores, proviſion, and in general, every thing except the effects of the officers and ſoldiers, ſhall, upon honour, be delivered to the troops of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty. Provided always, that this article ſhall extend to the fort, retrenchments, and dependencies.

IV. The garriſon of the fort, troops in the retrenchment and dependencies, ſhall not ſerve for the ſpace of eighteen months, neither againſt his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, or his allies.

V. All the officers and ſoldiers, Canadians, women, and ſavages, which have been made priſoners by land ſince the commencement of the war in North America, ſhall be delivered in the

ſpace

A. D. 1757. ſpace of three months, at Carillon; and according to the receipt which ſhall be given by the French commanding officers, to whom they ſhall be delivered, an equal number of the garriſon of Fort William Henry ſhall be capacitated to ſerve, agreeable to the return given in by the Engliſh officer of the priſoners he has delivered.

VI. An officer ſhall be given as an hoſtage till the detachment returns, which ſhall be given for an eſcort to his Britannic Majeſty's troops.

VII. All the ſick and wounded, that are not in a condition to be tranſported to Fort Edward, ſhall remain under the protection of the Marquis de Montcalm, who will take proper care of them, and return them as ſoon as recovered.

VIII. Proviſion for the ſubſiſtence of the Britiſh troops, ſhall be iſſued for this day and tomorrow only.

IX. The Marquis de Montcalm, being willing to ſhew Colonel Monro, and the garriſon under his command, marks of his eſteem, on account of their honourable defence, gives them one piece of cannon a ſix pounder.

Done in the trenches before Fort William Henry, the 9th of Auguſt, 1757.

GEORGE MONRO.

Agreed to in the name of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, agreeable to the power inveſted in me by the Marquis de Vaudrueill, his governor-general and lieutenant-general of New France.

MONTCALM.

Notwith-

Notwithſtanding this capitulation, the Indian chief inſiſted upon a previous agreement with M. Montcalm; who had promiſed him the plunder of the Engliſh, and that his men ſhould have their agreement. Accordingly the French, generally in defiance of the faith of the capitulation and of humanity, perfidiouſly and inhumanly gave way to the Indian demand, and permitted the ſavage blood-hounds to fall upon the diſarmed garriſon, and all, except 300, who with their colonels Monro and Young, ſurrendered themſelves to the French, and 600 who fled and eſcaped to Fort Edward, were ſtripped, killed and ſkalpt[g]. They murdered all the Engliſh Indians and Negroes found in the garriſon, or made them ſlaves. They cut the throats of moſt of the women, ript open their bellies, tore out their bowels and threw them in the faces of the expiring ſufferers: and taking the children by the heels, they beat their brains out againſt trees or ſtones, ſo that not one was ſaved.

A. D. 1757.

French ſuffer the Indians to break the capitulation.

Horrid barbarities.

The French general found proviſions in this fort ſufficient to maintain 5000 men for ſix months; which he carried off, as well as the artillery, ammunition and warlike ſtores, baggage, arms, &c. and 100 live oxen, beſides horſes, &c. But he deſtroyed all the boats, which were not wanted to

Loſs on our ſide.

[g] There did not ſurvive this maſſacre more than 1000 men, including the 900 above mentioned. So that they murdered, after the capitulation, 1300 men, beſides women, children and other attendants.

A. D. 1757. transport the plunder; and entirely demolished the fort and the works.

Miserable state of the colonies.

This dreadful stroke, at a time there was no army to face the enemy, filled every mind with fear for the common safety. Nothing but the hopes of success against Louisbourg, appeared to keep up the spirits of the English. But when, upon the back of this loss, they were informed, that the attempt against Louisbourg was dropt, and that the troops, which had been drawn from our northern frontiers, and thereby left the country open, for the French to execute what plans they pleased against our forts and settlements, had been employed in nothing more than sham-fights, &c. at Hallifax; while the enemy were demolishing our forts, and murdering our garrisons; it extorted these melancholly reflexions,—"God only knows where this will end—the French "execute almost every thing they attempt: we "neither execute nor attempt any thing but noise, "and a prohibition to the printers to tell the "world what they will, and do know without "their information [h]."

Remarks on this campaign.

Such was the inglorious campaign of the year 1757, in North America. A campaign, which, by the preparations made for it, promised a total ruin of the enemy. But which, by procrastination in England, and mismanagement in America, left the security of our provinces, and the interest of our allies in a much worse situation,

[h] In a letter from New York, dated August 4, 1757.

than

than they were in the foregoing year. Mr. PITT, during his ſhort adminiſtration, we have ſeen, formed the plan, and put it into action with a vaſt increaſe of forces, which gave us the ſuperiority both by ſea and land, to attack the French in their ſtrongeſt holds, and to cut them out work to defend their own ſettlements. But when that adminiſtration was determined, the enemy was ſuffered to get the ſtart of our armaments, and to put Louiſbourg into ſuch a poſture of defence, as to defeat that well-concerted and appointed expedition. Our troops, which amounted to 20,000 regulars, and almoſt as many provincials, were ſo badly managed, that the places of greateſt danger and importance, were left almoſt naked, or ſo garriſoned, as to fall a ſure prey to the enemy. Our allies were deſerted, and our people expoſed to murder and every act of barbarity, even in ſight of our troops. Our prodigious fleet ſailed only to become the ridicule of our enemies: And a vaſt tract of valuable territory followed the fate of the conqueſt made by M. Montcalm, at Fort William Henry. Misfortunes to be accounted for no otherwiſe than upon that certain maxim; where confuſion and ſtrife is there will be diſcord and every evil work. The political conteſt about power at home, the inſtability of the adminiſtration, and the frequent revolutions in the councils of the mother country, was the original and permanent cauſe of that languor, which obſtructed all our military operations. When officers can keep their poſts, and preſerve their intereſt at A. D. 1757.

A. D. 1757. court, without running into dangerous actions, they seldom will be forward to seek an enemy. And when a ministry is so changeable, that it is uncertain whether a service will be rewarded or condemned, a commander can have little encouragement to try the fortune of war. Besides, should the command be trusted in the hands of men subservient to the will of those, whose principles are averse to vigorous measures, there can be no expectations from the most powerful fleets and armies. Where this bane of all national virtue gets the ascendant, neither honour, nor courage, nor love of our country, will ever be able to prevail with a court-dependent to do his duty.

Affairs in Germany. How unlike were these transactions to the progress made by our allies in Germany. The distress of Prussia has been already described [i]. Let us survey the Prussian dominions, and measure the remains of those possessions under that crown in April last, and which have been torn from it by the Austrians, Swedes, French and Russians, in the short space of seven months. Than which nothing can give a stronger idea of the dangerous and ruinous situation of his Prussian Majesty; deprived of the means of raising both men and money. The duchy of Guelders, the duchy of Cleves, the principality of Moers, the counties of Linger and Lipstad, the principalities of Minden, East-Friesland and Embden, part of the archbishoprick of Magdebourg, some other parts of the

Comparative view of King of Prussia's affairs.

[i] See page 258 and 282. Vol. II.

Marche,

Marche, ducal Pomerania, a great part of Sileſia, and even of the kingdom of Pruſſia, including Berlin the capital; in a word, almoſt all his dominions were either taken from him, or laid under contributions and poſſeſſed by enemies, who collected the public revenues, fattened on the contributions, and with the money, they drew from the electorate of Hanover, and other conqueſts. Where was he to get recruits for his army, or the neceſſaries for their ſubſiſtence? Beſides, he had to contend with an army of Ruſſians, another of Auſtrians, another of French, another of Imperialiſts and another of Swedes. A. D. 1757.

How his Pruſſian Majeſty conducted himſelf under his misfortunes.

Yet how much ſoever theſe prognoſticated his total ruin; his Majeſty met with effectual reſources in the wiſdom of his councils; in the fidelity and bravery of his troops, and in the protection of a good providence. He ſaw no alternative but to ſubmit to inglorious terms of peace. He was not only thus beſet and threatened, but he had loſt the aſſiſtance of the army of obſervation, which had laid down their arms under a capitulation, that diſabled them to aſſiſt him. He ſummoned all his courage, all his policy; with the former he marched to meet his enemies, and beat them: with the latter he repaired the injury, which was levelled againſt him by the diſarming of the army at Stade.

Ruſſia was the firſt object of his arms. He was reſolved, if poſſible, to check their intruſion into the quarrels of Germany. His firſt eſſay was to try the force of ſound reaſon, and that mode-

A. D. 1757. ration, which becomes a great King, renowned for his wiſdom and arms. He cauſed the following declaration of his ſentiments to preceed his army.

The King of Pruſſia's declaration againſt Ruſſia.

"IT is ſufficiently known, that the King of Pruſſia, after the example of his glorious anceſtors, has, ever ſince his acceſſion to the crown, laid it down as a maxim, to ſeek the friendſhip of the imperial court of Ruſſia, and cultivate it by every method. His Pruſſian Majeſty hath had the ſatisfaction to live, for ſeveral ſucceſſive years, in the ſtricteſt harmony with the reigning Empreſs; and this happy union would be ſtill ſubſiſting, if evil-minded potentates had not broke it by their ſecret machinations, and carried things to ſuch a height, that the miniſters on both ſides have been recalled, and the correſpondence broken off.

"However melancholy theſe circumſtances might be for the King, his Majeſty was nevertheleſs moſt attentive to prevent any thing that might increaſe the alienation of the Ruſſian court. He hath been particularly careful, during the diſturbances of the war that now unhappily rages, to avoid whatever might involve him in a difference with that court, notwithſtanding the great grievances he hath to alledge againſt it, and that it was publickly known, the court of Vienna had at laſt drawn that of Ruſſia into its deſtructive views, and made it ſerve, as an inſtrument for favouring the ſchemes of Auſtria.

" His Majeſty hath given [h] the whole world inconteſtible proofs, that he was under an indiſpenſable neceſſity of having recourſe to the meaſures he hath taken againſt the courts of Vienna and Saxony, who forced him by their conduct to take up arms for his defence. Yet, even ſince things have been brought to this extremity, the King hath offered to lay down his arms if proper ſecurities ſhould be granted to him. A. D. 1757.

" His Majeſty hath not neglected to expoſe the artifices by which the imperial court of Ruſſia hath been drawn into meaſures ſo oppoſite to the Empreſs's ſentiments, and which would excite the utmoſt indignation of that great princeſs, if the truth could be placed before her, without diſguiſe. The King did more. He ſuggeſted to her Imperial Majeſty ſufficient means either to excuſe her taking no part in the preſent war, or to avoid, upon the juſteſt grounds, the execution of thoſe engagements, which the court of Vienna claimed by a manifeſt abuſe of obligations, which they employed to palliate their unlawful views.

" It wholly depended upon the Empreſs of Ruſſia to extinguiſh the flames of the war, without unſheathing the ſword, by purſuing the meaſures ſuggeſted by the King. This conduct would have immortaliſed her reign throughout all Europe. It would have gained her more laſting glory, than can be acquired by the greateſt triumphs.

The King finds with regret, that all his precaution and care to maintain peace with the Ruſ-

[h] See page 194. Vol. II.

A. D. 1757. sian Empire are fruitless, and that the intrigues of his enemies have prevailed. His Majesty sees all the considerations of friendship and good neighbourhood set aside by the Imperial court of Russia, as well as the observance of its engagements, with his Majesty. He sees that court marching its troops through the territories [i] of a foreign power, against the inclination of that power, and contrary to the tenor of treaties, in order to attack the King in his dominions, and thus taking part in a war, in which his enemies have involved the Russian Empire.

"In such circumstances, the King hath no other part to take, but to employ the power, which God hath entrusted to him, in defending himself, protecting his subjects, and repelling every unjust attack.

"His Majesty will never lose sight of the rules, which are observed, even in the midst of war, among civilized nations. But if, contrary to all hope and expectation, these rules should be violated by the troops of Russia, if they commit in the King's territories, disorders and excesses disallowed by the laws of arms, his Majesty must not be blamed if he makes reprisals in Saxony, and if, instead of that good order and rigorous discipline, which have hitherto been observed by his army, avoiding all sorts of violence, he finds himself forced, contrary to his inclination, to suffer the provinces and subjects of Saxony to be

[i] Poland.

treated

treated in the ſame manner, as his own territories ſhall be treated. A. D. 1757.

"As to the reſt, the King will ſoon publiſh to the whole world the futility of the reaſons alledged by the Imperial court of Ruſſia to juſtify its aggreſſion: And as his Majeſty is forced upon making his defence, he has room to hope with confidence, that the Lord of Hoſts will bleſs his righteous arms, that he will diſappoint the unjuſt enterpriſes of his enemies, and grant him his powerful aſſiſtance to enable him to make head againſt them."

His Pruſſian Majeſty ſupported this declaration with an army of 30,000 men, who, after they had heard of the horrid barbarities committed by the Ruſſian detachments, ſent by their general over moſt parts of Pruſſia, beſides burning and deſtroying every place and thing in their way, marched with a full determination to attack their main army, in its entrenchments, though it conſiſted of 80,000 regular forces; and well fortified in a camp, on an advantageous ſituation near Norkitten. M. Lehwald was provoked to this reſolution by the diſtreſſes [k] of a country, he was not able to protect or

Detaches 30,000 men againſt them.

[k] *A letter from the Pruſſian army under Marſhal Lehwald, written before the battle, and publiſhed by authority at Berlin.*

The enemy, notwithſtanding their ſuperiority, are entrenching themſelves, and ſtudy only to ruin the country in the moſt barbarous manner. The farmers have ſown none of their lands this ſeaſon, and the enemy forage all without diſtinction.

A. D. 1757. or deliver from the cruel invader by any other means. The Ruſſian army was formed in four lines: each line defended by a numerous artillery, and with batteries erected on all the eminences, containing in all 200 pieces of cannon. However, the mean opinion of their diſcipline and uſe of arms, added to the deſire of revenge for the enemy's inhuman behaviour, ſo encouraged the Pruſſian general, who had his Majeſty's expreſs orders to riſque every thing rather than remain inactive, and ſuffer theſe ſavages to penetrate any farther into his dominions, that he attacked this fortified camp

Strength of the Ruſſians encamped.

ſtinction. General Fermer's army has maintained pretty good diſcipline; and if it has plundered, it has not maſſacred or maimed. But nothing can equal the diſorders and cruelties which mark the rout of the grand army. They cut off the noſes and ears of the country people, becauſe they had nothing more to give, and their cattle were drove away, and ſold to the army for eight groſs a head. The Coſſacks, they ſaid, muſt have ſubſiſtance and get money. The diſorders they have committed ſtrike horror. Many of the inhabitants of Pruſſia have been hanged, others have had their legs cut off, or been ript up alive and their hearts tore out. Children have been carried off from their parents; and in ſhort ſuch atrocious cruelties are exerciſed as ſhock human nature, and will fix eternal infamy on an enemy, who call themſelves Chriſtians, and who promiſe nothing, but moderation and good diſcipline, in the memorials they have publiſhed. The inhabitants of the country, driven to deſpair, take arms wherever they can get them, and endeavour to defend their lives and the few effects they have carried off to their places of retreat.—The maſter of a veſſel from Riga, adds this ſhocking account, that above 100 women had choſen rather to throw themſelves into the ſea at Memel, than ſubmit to the brutalities offered them by theſe monſters.

at

at five in the morning on the 30th of Auguſt, with ſuch vehemency, that they entirely broke the whole firſt line of the enemy, and forced all their batteries. The Ruſſian cavalry were routed, and a regiment of grenadiers were cut to pieces, by a regiment of Pruſſian dragoons, led on the ſervice by the Prince of Holſtein Gottorp, brother to the King of Sweden. But this action was of that ſevere kind, as made it neceſſary for the Pruſſian general to deſiſt from any further attempt. For, he loſt in this attack 3000 men (the Ruſſian account ſays 10,000 killed and wounded). So that when he came up to the ſecond entrenchment, which was ſtronger than the firſt, he prudently retired rather than expoſe his whole army. Which reſolution he performed with excellent order, and without one attempt of the enemy to diſturb his rear, only being obliged to leave behind him the artillery [1], he had taken from the firſt line, and eleven pieces of his own cannon, for want of proper carriages.

A. D. 1757. Attacked by Count Lehwald. Loſs of the Pruſſians.

This obliged the Ruſſians to be more cautious how they traverſed the diſtant parts of the country, in parties; and gave General Apraxin ſuch a ſample of the ſervice he was to expect, ſhould he proceed to favour the operations of Count Daun, as his inſtructions directed, that Lehwald's retreat, in a great meaſure, anſwered the purpoſes of a victory in favour of Pruſſia.

Inactivity of the Ruſſians.

The Ruſſians loſt in this engagement 10,000, others ſay 14,000 men killed; but the account

Their loſs.

[1] Eighty pieces of cannon.

publiſhed

A. D. 1757 publiſhed by M. Apraxin reduces them to 7000, amongſt whom were three generals. Their wounded were very conſiderable [m], amongſt theſe was General Lapuchin and a colonel of artillery, who with many more were made priſoners. No officer of diſtinction fell amongſt the Pruſſians: nor was there any one but Count Dohna wounded.

M. Lehwald having muſtered his army after this ſevere ſervice in his camp, to which he returned back at Velau, changed their poſition for one more advantageous at Peterſwald, that he might more effectually retard the further motions and progreſs of the enemy, in caſe they ſhould make any further movements. But on the thirteenth of the next month, after the Ruſſians had remained totally inactive from the time of this action near Norkitten, M. Apraxin broke up his ſtrong camp, and in a ſudden and ſurpriſing manner retreated out of Pruſſia, with ſuch precipitation, that he left between 15 and 16000 ſick and wounded, eighty pieces of cannon, and a conſiderable part of his military ſtores, behind him.

Their flight.

This flight was made in two columns, and by two [n] routs, and was managed with ſo much art, by

[m] As appears by the number mentioned below.

[n] One proceeded towards Memel: the other took the neareſt way to their own country, through the bailiwic of Abſternen or through Lithuania.

It does not, to this time appear, what could be the real cauſe; but as the Czarina was about that time ſeized with an apoplectic fit, it was given out, that the army was ordered home

by advancing the irregulars towards the Pruſſian army to cover the deſign, that it was not diſcovered till the third day. M. Lehwald upon the firſt notice detached Prince George of Holſtein with 10,000 horſe to purſue the run-aways: but they had made ſuch forced marches, that they eſcaped, except a few, which the Prince made priſoners, and ſome ſtragglers, who were killed by the country people on the road to Tilſit. A. D. 1757.

Both columns burnt every village in their way without diſtinction. And committed ſuch other acts of barbarity, that they left the roads behind them ſtrewed with dead bodies of men and horſes. And thus the Ruſſians entirely evacuted the Pruſſian dominions, except Memel. Cruelty.

For this turn his Pruſſian Majeſty was again delivered from the powerful diverſion made to his arms by the Ruſſians in favour of Auſtria. He had no troops to ſpare for the defence of his territories invaded by the French, and to give them battle. Wherefore the French marſhal revelled with impunity in the open country, meeting with no oppoſition, and after a long blockade reduced Guelders to ſurrender by famine°, on the 24th of Auguſt. The whole country was now left expoſed to the enemy, as far as Magdeburg, and Guelders capitulates.

home to ſupport the regulations ſhe had made about a ſucceſſor, in caſe of a vacancy on the throne. It is moſt probable that they wanted ſubſiſtence.

° By capitulation, which permitted the garriſon to march out with honours of war, and to be eſcorted to Berlin. But moſt of them deſerted before they arrived at Cologn.

the

A. D. 1757. the revenues were appointed for and received by the Empreſs Queen [p]. He watched the Auſtrians and Imperialiſts, and commanded M. Lehwald to chaſtiſe the Swedes, who had penetrated into Pruſſian Pomerania, juſt before the retreat of the Ruſſians, and had laid the neighbouring country under contribution.

Swedes invade Pomerania.

The Swediſh general publiſhed a manifeſto to juſtify this unexpected and extraordinary meaſure, in the name of the King of Sweden, ſetting forth,

Manifeſto. "That his Majeſty in quality of guarantee of the "treaty of Weſtphalia could not excuſe himſelf "from cauſing his troops to enter the Pruſſian "dominions and diviſion of the Duchy of the "Anterior Pomerania, being by ſuch guarantee "obliged to be vigilant in the ſupport of the "conſtitutions of the Empire, at that time in- "ſulted, to obtain ſuch ſatisfaction as the ſtates "of the Empire, which had ſuffered injury, had "a juſt right to expect, and to reſtore them the "peace, which had been infringed by the viola- "tion of the ſaid treaty of Weſtphalia."

Anſwered by the King of Pruſſia. To which his Pruſſian Majeſty replied [q], and proved in a moſt convincing manner, "That the crown of Sweden could not upon any legal foundation, lay any thing to his charge, to make it appear that he had really diſturbed the peace of Weſtphalia: and enjoined his vaſſals, magiſtrates,

[p] She immediately received 200,000 crowns from Cleves and la Marcke.

[q] By his General Manteuffel, who had a command of 12,000 men in Pomerania, to cover Stetin from any ſurprize.

and

and ſubjects, in the Anterior Pomerania not to pay any regard to the Swediſh declaration, but to preſerve their fidelity and allegiance to him their lawful Sovereign, upon the penalty of incurring his moſt rigorous indignation. A. D. 1757.

The Swediſh army conſiſted of 22,000 men, under Count Hamilton; but as ſoon as M. Lehwald found himſelf at liberty, he detached 16,000 men, under Prince George of Holſtein Gottorp, into Pomerania, and ſoon after followed with the reſt of his army. He not only recovered the country they had ſeized on, but ſwept them away and added to his maſter's dominions all Swediſh Pomerania, except the fortified town of Stralſund[r]; and with heavy contributions made the Duke of Mecklenburg repent of his alliance againſt his Pruſſian Majeſty. Thus ended the Swediſh campaign, who without one battle, loſt half their men by ſickneſs, deſertion, &c. Strength of their army.

How to repair the ruinous ſtate of his territories in Weſtphalia was more than he could foreſee, could there be found no way to prevent a neutrality for Hanover, and to prevail with the allies, that had been diſarmed at Cloſter Seven, to reenter the field. With thoſe views his Pruſſian Majeſty, as ſoon as he was apprized of a conven-

[r] The Swedes did expect to be joined by 15,000 French and 6000 Mecklenburgers: but M. Lehwald ſtriking the blow in time prevented this junction, and reduced the Swedes to ſuch ſtraits, that their General was afraid of being reduced to the neceſſity of the garriſon of Pirna; as appears from his diſpatches to his court.

tion

A. D. 1757. tion with the French Marſhal, wrote the following manly and pathetic letter, with his own hand, to his Britannic Majeſty.

King of Pruſſia's letter to the King of Great Britain on the convention.

"I Juſt now hear that the buſineſs of a neutrality for the E——e of H———r, is not yet dropped. Can your Majeſty have ſo little conſtancy and firmneſs as to ſink under a few croſs events? Are affairs in ſuch a bad plight that they cannot be retrieved? Conſider the ſtep which your Majeſty purpoſes to take, and that which you have made me take. You are the cauſe of all the misfortunes that are ready to fall upon me. I never would have broken my alliance with France, but for your fair promiſes. I repent not of my treaty with your Majeſty; but do not ſhamefully abandon me to the mercy of my enemies, after having brought upon me all the powers of Europe. I expect that your Majeſty will remember your engagements, renewed the 26th paſt, and that you will not liſten to any engagement in which I am not comprehended."

His Britannic Majeſty, in anſwer to this letter, ordered the following declaration to be communicated to all foreign miniſters reſiding at the Britiſh court, on the 16th of September.

THE King having ordered an account to be given him of the repreſentations of M. Michell, in relation to ſome overtures made by his Majeſty's electoral miniſters concerning the checks

checks received in Germany, hath commanded, A. D. 1757. that anſwer be given to the King of Pruſſia's miniſter, That it never was his Majeſty's intention, that the ſaid overtures, made without the participation of the Britiſh council, ſhould have the leaſt influence on his Majeſty's conduct, as King. His Majeſty ſees, in the ſame light as before, the pernicious effects of the union between the courts of Vienna and Verſailles, which threaten a ſubverſion of the whole ſyſtem of public liberty, and of the independence of the European powers. He conſiders, as a fatal conſequence of this dangerous connection, the ceſſion made by the court of Vienna of the ports of the Netherlands to France, contrary to the faith of the moſt ſolemn treaties; and, in ſuch a critical ſituation, whatever may be the ſucceſs of arms, his Majeſty is determined to act in conſtant concert with the King of Pruſſia, in employing the moſt efficacious means to fruſtrate the unjuſt and oppreſſive deſigns of their common enemies; and the King of Pruſſia may aſſure himſelf that the Britiſh crown will continue to fulfil, with the greateſt punctuality, its engagements with his Pruſſian Majeſty, and to ſupport him with firmneſs and vigour.

Whitehall, Sep. 16. HOLDERNESSE.

His Britannic Majeſty, in quality of Elector of Hanover, did alſo apply, by the following remarkable memorial, to the Diet of the Empire, for relief and redreſs in the diſtreſſed condition of

A. D. 1757. his Electoral dominions invaded and ſeized by the French.

Elector of Hanover's memorial to the Dyet of the Empire.

"THE differences, ſays the memorialiſt, ariſen between the crowns of England and France had ſcarce been followed by ſome hoſtilities, when the latter loudly threatned to be revenged for the ſame on the Electoral dominions of his Britannic Majeſty; and the preparations then made on the Rhine and the Moſelle, together with the various motions of the French, were more than ſufficient to prove the reality of that potentate's deſigns.

"While matters ſtood thus (*i. e.* towards the autumn of the year 1755) the King of Great Britain had no Electoral miniſter at the court of Vienna: however, his Majeſty amicably expreſſed his ſentiments to that court by the mouth of Mr. Keith, the Britiſh miniſter; repreſented to her the danger to which his German dominions and the whole Empire were expoſed, and demanded the ſuccours ſtipulated by the treaties of alliance and guaranty that ſubſiſted between the two courts.

"They could not miſtake at Vienna the greatneſs and reality of the danger, nor diſown that it would be unjuſt, to involve, in the war, the ſtates of the Germannic body that had no intereſt in the differences above-mentioned, and to moleſt or trouble ſeveral other conſiderable provinces of Germany by the march of armies; but theſe repreſentations were fruitleſs. Far from ſeeing the performance of the promiſes of a real ſuccour, and

and the guaranty of his Britannic Majeſty's Electoral dominions, he could not even obtain from the Empire dehortatory reſcripts to the adjacent circles, in order to prevent their favouring the deſigns of France, and giving her aſſiſtance. A. D. 1757.

"In the mean while the danger greatly increaſed: France ſent to Berlin an envoy extraordinary, charged, no doubt, to induce, if poſſible, the King of Pruſſia to diſturb on his part the Electorate of Hanover: at the ſame time ſhe went on with her preparations, and continued her menaces; and it was but too plainly perceived, the approaching winter was the only cauſe that prevented her carrying them into execution. This is a true account of the ſituation of affairs at that time.

"In the month of February 1756, the King of Great Britain, after a ſhort negociation, concluded a treaty with the King of Pruſſia, the drift of which was only to maintain the general tranquillity of Europe; to ſecure, in particular, the repoſe of Germany, notwithſtanding the differences ſubſiſting between the courts of London and Verſailles; to uſe the utmoſt endeavours on both ſides, towards hindering their reſpective allies from undertaking any thing againſt the dominions of either of the contracting powers; in ſhort, "To join their forces, in order to preſerve the "tranquillity of the Empire, and to oppoſe the "paſſage of foreign troops, in caſe any power, "under any pretext whatſoever ſhould march an "army into Germany, to diſturb its repoſe."

A. D. 1757. "This treaty, ſuch as it is here repreſented, "moreover provided for the ſafety of all the do- "minions which her Imperial and Royal Majeſty "poſſeſſes in the Empire, and thoſe which belong "thereto;" nay, the Auſtrian Netherlands had even been expreſsly named therein, had not his Pruſſian Majeſty grounded the exception of thoſe provinces upon an unanſwerable argument, namely, "That in all the treaties which he himſelf had "concluded with the Empreſs Queen, he never "guaranteed the Netherlands;" ſo that in treating with a third power, he could not farther extend his engagements in favour of the Empreſs Queen.

"The more the King flattered himſelf that the Emperor, as head of the Empire, would applaud this treaty, which aimed at nothing but to ſecure the Empire committed to his care, from a danger whoſe conſequences might be eaſily foreſeen, the more did he hope that the Empreſs Queen would acknowledge the ſervice he rendered to the territories, which that Princeſs poſſeſſes in Germany: at leaſt, his Britannic Majeſty might reckon that the Germannic body would think themſelves under ſome obligations to him, for the care he took to hinder Germany from becoming again the theatre of war, and to ſecure its tranquillity, as that of his own dominions.

"Nevertheleſs, this treaty was ſcarcely publiſhed, with that frankneſs and candour, which always accompany upright, innocent, and ſalutary acts, than ſome people began to put ſiniſter

conſtructions upon it, and to give out, that it teemed with ſecret deſigns reſpecting religion and other matters. A. D. 1757.

"His Majeſty's patriotic ſentimenes ought to have been better known: ſentiments which never ſuffered him to indulge any partial views, either in political or religious affairs: they could not but know, that on all occaſions he has had an eye to the maintenance of the Germannic ſyſtem and conſtitutions, and that he has given reiterated and inconteſtible proofs thereof. They could not therefore, without injuſtice, ſuſpect his Majeſty of having deſigns, or being inclined to take ſteps, that might create troubles in the heart of the Empire, of which he is himſelf one of the principal members, and whoſe intereſts have ever been ſo dear to him, that ſome years ago he ſpared neither his treaſures, nor his troops, nor even his ſacred perſon, to deliver it from the invaſion of its enemies. His Britannic Majeſty nevertheleſs did not heſitate to inform the head and the members of the Empire of the full contents of the treaty he had recently concluded, adding to this information, ſuch declarations, as were fit to remove every the leaſt idea of ſuſpicion and diſtruſt.

"All the world knows, that ſoon after, *i. e.* May 1, 1756, the Empreſs Queen notwithſtanding, concluded not only a neutrality convention, but alſo a treaty of union and friendſhip *pretendedly* defenſive, with the very crown with which his Majeſty, as King of Great Britain, was in open war, and which threatned to carry fire and ſword

A. D. 1757. into his Electoral dominions. To appearance, this treaty had been long before meditated, and had already been a conſiderable time on the anvil.

" 'Tis likewiſe well known, that as ſoon as this treaty was concluded, jealouſies began to break out between the Empreſs Queen and the King of Pruſſia, and that they at laſt ended in an open war, which occaſioned his Pruſſian Majeſty to enter the Electorate of Saxony and Bohemia.

" It is moreover publicly known, that the King was abſolutely ignorant of the King of Pruſſia's entering Saxony; that his Britannic Majeſty did not hear of it till after the event; that he deteſted the hoſtilities that broke out; that he adviſed the contrary; that he took no part, nor would be concerned in it; and that he would employ all his force, and bend his care to keep foreign troops at a diſtance from his country and the territories adjacent, and to ſecure his German dominions from the threatned danger.

" In this ſtrain did his Majeſty ſpeak by his miniſters at Vienna, Ratiſbon, and every were elſe: this was the ſole end of his deliberations, and of the meaſures he took, without concerning himſelf with what was doing in Saxony and Bohemia. It was in conſequence of the ſame motive, that the King voted for the mediation of the Empire, and for reſtoring the tranquillity of Germany, when the affair was laid before the Dyet; becauſe his Majeſty was convinced, that this meaſure was the eaſieſt and the fitteſt to bring about the reſtitution of Saxony, and the countries depending on it,

it, and perhaps indemnifications too; whereas the other means that prevailed have produced nothing (as dire experience has ſhewn) but a horrible effuſion of blood, with the devaſtation and ruin of many ſtates and innocent ſubjects; nor can we yet foreſee when there will be an end of theſe dreadful calamities. A. D. 1757.

"It is true, that a NEUTRALITY was propoſed to the King, partly immediately from the court of Vienna, and partly by the mediation of Denmark; but ſuch conditions were tacked to THIS neutrality, as rendered the acceptance impoſſible. They would have had his Majeſty give the French a free paſſage through his dominions; to furniſh thoſe troops with proviſions, forage, and waggons, for almoſt nothing; and this at a time when his Majeſty could ſcarce guard his ſubjects againſt a famine. They inſiſted upon his putting Hamelen into their hands; they wanted him to confine his troops within a narrow circle in his own dominions; they inſiſted, that they ſhould be kept there almoſt like priſoners of war: in ſhort, they would have deprived him of the liberty of marching a ſingle man from one place to another, without the conſent of France.

"During the negociation relative to this neutrality, France not only marched the ſuccour of 24,000 men, ſtipulated by her treaty with the Empreſs Queen, but alſo ſent directly into Weſtphalia an army of 80,000 men.

"The King's army remained till the end of April in quarters of cantonment along the We-

A. D. 1757. ſer; but the French, by exorbitant demands of proviſions and waggons, which far exceeded the faculties of the country, having ruined the county of Bentheim, pitched upon the city of Munſter for a place of arms, marched from all parts towards that city, and thereby evinced their deſign upon his Majeſty's Electoral dominions; he then cauſed the army of obſervation under the Duke of Cumberland to croſs the Weſer, and to advance as far as Rittberg, Bielefeld, and Hervoerden: nevertheleſs, the King cauſed the moſt ſolemn declarations to be given every where, that he was very far from intending to act offenſively againſt any of his co-eſtates of the Empire, or even againſt France; and that he had no other views than to ſecure from invaſion, with the help of the Almighty, his own dominions, and the territories of the neighbouring Princes.

"The events that followed are too well known to need a recital here.

"The principality of Eaſt Frizeland, about which his Majeſty has a ſuit depending in the Aulic Council againſt the King of Pruſſia, has been attacked and conquered, and its inhabitants obliged to ſwear allegiance to the Empreſs Queen.

"The countries of Heſſe Caſſel have been invaded by a body of 15 or 20,000 men, and wreſted from their lawful maſter, who hath been conſtrained to take refuge at Hamburgh.

"At the ſame time another body of French troops made an irruption on the Upper Weſer, took Munden, Gottingen, Nordheim, Hardegſen,

ſen, Hedemunden, Uſſar, and Eimbeck, cauſed allegiance to be ſworn every where to the King of France, lodged their ſick in the beſt churches, extorted immenſe quantities of proviſions and waggons, on the leaſt delay plundered whole villages, mal-treated the magiſtrates, and (to give a ſketch of French military execution) reduced other villages to aſhes, waſted or burnt the fields, and thereby deprived the wretched inhabitants of the very hope of the rich crop the land promiſed. A. D. 1757.

"In the mean time, the main body of the French army paſſed the Weſer in ſeveral places, re-aſſembled again, and then drew near the King's army of obſervation, which, on account of ſuperiority in numbers, was obliged to retire into the countries of Bremen and Verden.

"The town of Hamelen fell into the enemy's hand, and Hanover ſhared the ſame fate; ſince which time the French army arbitrarily exact contributions, proviſions, forage, waggons, &c. with a high hand; they ſeize upon all the revenues, and all the public money; in a word, they diſpoſe of the whole country, juſt as they pleaſe.

"The territories of Wolfenbuttel have in like manner been invaded and occupied, and they have left the Duke's family nothing but the caſtle of Blankenburg to reſide in.

"It is clear from this narration, which may be authentically proved, that the King did not aſſemble his troops, nor thoſe of his allies, with a view to act *offenſively* againſt any power whatever; but that his Majeſty's ſole aim was, to ſecure, as far

A. D. 1757. far as poſſible, his dominions and thoſe of his allies, from violence and unjuſt pretenſions. And though divine Providence has not been pleaſed to ſecond ſuch juſt and equitable views, the King has yet the conſolation of being perſuaded, that the ſteps he has been obliged to take, will be approved by every impartial man.

"His Majeſty flatters himſelf, that his co-eſtates of the Empire, and the powers that have at heart the reſtoration of the Germannic tranquillity, and the ſupport of the ſyſtem of the Empire, will think of applying the ſpeedieſt remedies to proceedings equally harſh and undeſerved, and putting an end to an oppoſition, which menaces Germany and all Europe with the moſt diſmal conſequences; and that they will endeavour to procure the King ſatisfaction adequate to the damages he has ſuſtained."

M. D. de Richelieu pays no regard to the terms of the convention.

In the mean time M. de Richelieu was enriching himſelf with exceſſive contributions, and the plunder of the countries, which laid expoſed to his arms; repairing his fortune conſumed in vices at court, by the moſt cruel and barbarous means. He paid no regard to the conditions of the convention: but practiſed every art, and tried every expedient, though ever ſo unjuſt and barbarous, to fill his coffers. In which he was but too much encouraged by the diſlike ſhewn in the French court at the articles of the convention; who expected that an army, penned up, as that at Stade was, ſhould have ſurrendered at diſcretion, at

Encouraged therein by his court.

leaſt on condition not to ſerve during the war againſt France and her allies, and inſiſted on diſarming the auxiliary troops upon returning into their own country; and therefore ſeemed more willing to provoke the allied army to reſume their arms, that the infringment of the convention might be thrown upon them, than to comply with the terms of the ſtipulated convention. On the other ſide, the Hanoverians were diſappointed in their expectations. By laying down their arms it was their opinion, that his Majeſty's Electoral dominions would have been delivered by a formal treaty, from the French invaders, and have obtained the advantages of a neutral ſtate. But their hoſtile viſitors took every ſtep to ſecure their abode. They continued to extend their conqueſts. They enlarged their demands. They changed the very form of government[s]: and they, in defiance of the A. D. 1757.

[s] *The authentic documents of the French adminiſtration, in his Majeſty's German dominions.*

One Gautier, a farmer from Paris, having arrived at Hanover ſome days before Chriſtmas, and there fixed his office, a decree of council of the King of France, appeared, dated the 18th of October 1757, the tenor of which is as follows:

"The King having charged Jean Faidy, citizen of Paris, to take upon him the receipt, and adminiſtration, of all the duties and revenues, belonging to his Majeſty in the Electorate of Hanover, conquered from the King of England, Elector of Hanover, and bring to account all ſuch perſons as have had the receipt, and adminiſtration of them, ſince the conqueſt of the Electorate of Hanover; and all perſons, who, before the Electorate of Hanover and the other conquered countries paſſed

A. D. 1757. the late capitulation, were enforcing every means to diſarm and enſlave both the army and the people.

It

ed under his Majeſty's dominion, were employed in the direction and receipt of the revenues of the country, for all the ſums they ſhall have received, and to receive of them the ſums due for the value of their farms: and the King does hereby order, that till letters patent, ſealed and regiſtered, ſhall be iſſued forth, the ſaid Faidy be put into poſſeſſion of the direction, receipt, and adminiſtration, of all the revenues and duties in the Electorate of Hanover, conquered from the King of England, Elector of Hanover, from the time they have been ſubjected to his Majeſty: it is his Majeſty's will, that the receipt, direction, and adminiſtration, of all the revenues whatſoever, be in the hands of the ſaid Jean Faidy, or others appointed by him; and, for that purpoſe, that all the papers, relating to the receipt, direction, and maintainance of the ſaid duties and revenues, be delivered to him by thoſe, in whoſe cuſtody ſoever they ſhall be found. It is his Majeſty's will and order, that all thoſe, who have been employed in the receipt and direction of the ſaid revenues, under what title ſoever, be obliged to deliver to the ſaid Jean Faidy, or his attornies, upon their giving receipts, the accounts they have given in, their regiſters, land-rools, and other deeds, by virtue whereof they have received and collected the duties and revenues of the preceeding ſovereign, and that the ſaid receivers ſhall account for what they have received, and ſhall pay the ſums ſtill remaining due from them, under pain of being obliged thereto by the ordinary methods uſed in the King's revenues and affairs: his Majeſty empowers the ſaid Jean Faidy to remove the receivers, and all other perſons, who ſhall have been employed in any part of the direction, receipt, and adminiſtration, of the ſaid duties and revenues, and to place others in their room, his Majeſty reſerving to himſelf the power of ordering the vouchers of thoſe in employment who may be removed, to be produced, and to provide

It was in this critical conjuncture, that the court of London took up the point in debate. Hanover A. D. 1757.

vide for the reimburſing them the money they ſhall prove to have paid, in the manner he ſhall judge proper: his Majeſty orders, that all perſons, who have been entruſted under the preceeding government with papers, relative to the revenues of the Electorate of Hanover, or thoſe that may hereafter be ſo, to communicate the ſame to the ſaid Jean Faidy, and to deliver authentic copies of all the papers he ſhall deſire to have, without exemption, under pain of diſobedience: his Majeſty in like manner orders, under the ſame penalties, that the magiſtrates of the towns, diſtricts and commonalities, &c. ſhall deliver, upon the firſt requiſition of the ſaid Jean Faidy, eſtimates, certified by them, of the produce of ſix years, reckoning from the 1ſt of January 1751, to the laſt of December 1756, of the duties and revenues which the ſaid towns, diſtricts, commonalities, and ſtates are in poſſeſſion of; that they likewiſe deliver to the ſaid Jean Faidy, eſtimates of the ſums they ſhall have paid to the preceding Sovereign during the ſaid ſix years, and of the charges neceſſarily incurred during the ſaid term, independant of the ſums they have paid: it is his Majeſty's intention and will, that the ſaid Jean Faidy be put into the poſſeſſion of the houſes, offices, and utenſils, hitherto made uſe of in the management of the revenues, with the direction whereof he is charged, payment being made to the proprietors for rent upon the footing he and they ſhall agree: his Majeſty likewiſe orders, that all thoſe who are actually employed in the management of the revenues of the Electorate of Hanover, after having been authoriſed by the ſaid Jean Faidy, ſhall continue to act without being obliged to take any new oaths, and that thoſe, who ſhall come in upon a freſh eſtabliſhment, ſhall be admitted without any charges to take the oath, and diſcharge the duty of the employments, to which they ſhall be named, upon the ſimple preſentation of the ſaid Jean Faidy: his Majeſty orders, that all thoſe, who ſhall be accountable and indebted to the duties and revenues,

A. D. 1757. over convinced, when it was too late, that there could be no ſafety for her, but in a vigorous exertion

revenues, of what nature ſoever they be, comprehended in the direction and adminiſtration, with which the ſaid Jean Faidy is charged, ſhall be acquitted and diſcharged towards his Majeſty and all others, of whatſoever they ſhall be found to owe, by producing receipts from the ſaid Jean Faidy, his attornies, &c. of the accounts they ſhall have given in at the time they ſhall be balanced and acquitted: it is his Majeſty's will, that any diſputes, that ſhall ariſe with regard to the general adminiſtration of all the duties and revenues, of the Electorate of Hanover, wherewith the ſaid Jean Faidy is charged, be brought before the intendant and commiſſary, who has the department of the *conquered country*: and adjudged by him, ſaving an appeal to his Majeſty's council only: his Majeſty enjoins the ſaid intendant and commiſſary of the ſaid department, to ſupport the execution of the preſent decree, which ſhall be executed, notwithſtanding all oppoſition and hindrances, of which, if any ſhould happen, his Majeſty reſerves to himſelf and his council the cognizance, and forbids the ſame to all courts and judges.

Done at the King's council of ſtate, held at Verſailles, the 18th of October, 1757.

Signed EYNARD.

Remarks. It appears from the date and purport of this decree, that the council of Verſailles was employed in framing it immediately after the convention of Bremeworde; and the ſaid decree implies, that it was determined to change the government of the Electorate of Hanover, notwithſtanding what was expreſsly promiſed by the capitulation made the 9th of Auguſt 1757, upon the ſurrender of the capital, and that the adminiſtration herein mentioned, with which the ſaid Jean Faidy is charged, was to extend itſelf to the countries, *which might hereafter be conquered.*

If

tion of her ſtrength againſt an enemy, that never quits poſſeſſion of their acquiſitions, whether made by force or fraud; throws herſelf and her cauſe, entirely upon Great Britain; when ſhe had found there were no hopes left of a neutrality, nor of relief from the Dyet of the Empire. A. D. 1757.

They very juſtly charged Great Britain with the cauſe of their misfortunes: and applied to his Britannic Majeſty for aid and protection. "Is it reaſonable, ſaid they, that a country, which parted with thoſe advantages and comforts, that are enjoyed by the influence of a court, whoſe Sovereign reſides in the heart of his native dominions, and is not embarraſſed by the contending or contrary intereſts of an adventitious kingdom, ſhould be ruined becauſe it has condeſcended to part with thoſe bleſſings? Did not Hanover, that very Electorate ſeized in a hoſtile manner by the enemies of Great Britain, give a King to Great Britain, to maintain her laws, liberty and religion, when they were endangered by a diſputable ſucceſſion? And is Hanover to be thus rewarded, for the refuge granted to Great Britain in her diſtreſs, as to be compelled to pour forth her

If ſo, this confeſſion, made by the crown of France itſelf, cannot but be conſidered as an undeniable proof, that the ſaid crown had a premeditated deſign of making an ill uſe of the ceſſation of arms, in order to proceed in taking poſſeſſion of the provinces they had not yet ſeized upon, when the ceſſation of arms was concluded, and bring to utter deſtruction the Electorate of Hanover, without leaving the ſovereign thereof any method of preſerving it.

blood

A. D. 1757. blood and treaſure in the quarrels of England? Is ſhe to be abandoned by the only power ſhe has a juſt right to apply to for help; when denied the protection of the Germannic Body, in a conſpiracy with France? His Majeſty by being the common father of both people, ought equally to hear the voice of diſtreſs from an Hanoverian, as from a Briton. And he has given a proof of this by leaving his Germannic counſellors to act, as they thought moſt conducive to their country's intereſt, at the late convention [t], though it has not, and cannot have their deſired effect, ſo long as it is the intereſt of France to maintain war againſt his Britannic Majeſty. The framers of the act of ſettlement knew that their future Sovereign was to be, and to remain Elector of Hanover: that his being ſo was one of their main inducements: and that the liberties of England depended upon thoſe of the proteſtant intereſt in Europe. When was there a time to be more watchful for the proteſtant intereſt of Europe, than at a time when the natural antipathy and the oppoſite intereſts of Burbon and Auſtria have united, and the Aulic Council countenanceth their meaſures, and approves of their hoſtilities? Can the warmeſt anti-continental patriot in Great Britain affirm, that the intereſts of Hanover had immediately any concern in lighting up the preſent war? Had the Hanoverians any concern in the American diſputes? Were

[t] See his Majeſty's declaration in anſwer to the King of Pruſſia's letter, above on page 416, ſigned *Holderneſſe*.

the

the Hanoverians the primary objects of Auſtrian ambition, or French invaſion. We tried what could be done by a neutrality, and by a convention, both have failed us. The terms of the former would have been diſhonourable. The latter expedient have conſigned Hanover to ſufferings, that could be inflicted upon no other plea, than that the Elector is King of Great Britain. For, it cannot be thought, that France would have marched 80,000 men acroſs ſuch an extent of comfortleſs territory, to attack an Electorate, that is guaranteed to the houſe of Brunſwick by all the ſolemn acts, ties and treaties, that can render poſſeſſion ſecure. But while the enemies of Great Britain will not diſtinguiſh between the intereſts of the King of England and the Elector of Hanover, as ſeparate and independant, Hanover will always be the ſufferer, though ſhe gives not the leaſt provocation.

A. D. 1757.

Why the Hanoverians demand aid from Great Britain.

Therefore in this diſtreſſed ſituation, into which they had been brought ſolely by their connections with England, (as well as upon the faith of treaties) the regency of Hanover demanded immediate ſuccours from the Britiſh nation. The court of London did not pretend to controvert the juſtice of the Hanoverian plea: they did not demur at their demand. But it was neceſſary, and it employed our councils for ſome time, ſo to aid, ſupport and deliver Hanover in its preſent diſtreſs, as not to diſable Great Britain from purſuing her own national intereſt, and from preſerving that power, without which not only her allies, but herſelf

Remarks on the conduct of the Britiſh court in regard to Hanover.

A. D. 1757. must become a prey to the ambition of France It was therefore first tried what might be effected by pacific measures. The court of London proposed to extend the convention of Stade or Closter-Seven to a general armistice, and to found thereon a negociation for a general peace. But this could not be brought about. The French had got possion, and they were determined to keep the favourite of his Britannic Majesty in hand, to more advantage; while the success of their arms in North America promised them more adequate conditions from the continuation of the war, than could be expected by a precipitate peace. The next recourse was to arms. In which the Hanoverians were justified by the breach of the convention, in so many particulars, by the French: and the British nation was obliged to succour them upon the faith of treaties, and a principle of gratitude for the sufferings they bore on the account of their connection with Great Britain: a connection not of their own seeking; but sollicited and made by British councils. (See page 432.)

Their resolutions. From these considerations it was resolved, That the Hanoverian army, who had been denied the stipulations, which they had a right to claim under the convention of Closter-Seven, should hold themselves released from all obligation, on their part; according to the example shewn them by the French; and should immediately assemble, resume their arms, and stand in the defence of their country against all invaders. And it was farther resolved, to put in motion, maintain and keep together the army



His Serene Highneſs **FERDINAND**
Duke of Brunſwick and Lunenburgh.

army of obſervation, and to recommend a vigorous execution of this meaſure to the enſuing parliament. A. D. 1757.

His Britannic Majeſty immediately nominated and appointed Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, (brother to the Duke of Brunſwick, and well recommended for his military ſkill by the King of Pruſſia) commander in chief of this army, in the place and ſtead of his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, who declined a command, in which he had not met with that ſatisfaction, which is expected by an active, vigorous and vigilant commander; nor with a reception due to his abilities, and well-meaning endeavours. A circumſtance regretted by all the ſenſible part of the nation, who have always found him a ſteady and uncorrupted friend to the intereſt of England, poſſeſſed of the entire affection of the troops, and known to have been a brave officer. Prince Ferdinand inveſted with the chief command.

This promotion was followed with a declaration of his Majeſty's motives for breaking the convention of Cloſter-Seven on his part, as Elector of Hanover. In which was ſet forth the naked facts in the following words and order.

IN September 1757, a convention was agreed upon between the Duke of Cumberland and the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu; but France was no ſooner informed of it, than ſhe plainly manifeſted, that ſhe would not acknowledge the validity of the ſaid convention, but, on condition that the Hanoverian troops ſhould engage not to His Britannic Majeſty's motives for breaking the convention.

A. D. 1757. ſerve during the preſent war againſt France and her allies. And ſhe alſo inſiſted on diſarming the auxiliary troops, upon returning into their own country.

The Duke of Cumberland, who had, on his part, fulfilled all the conditions of the convention, and cauſed part of the troops, deſtined on their return for the country of Lawenbourg, to begin their march, could not conſider this new demand otherwiſe than as a manifeſt breach of the convention; the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu having engaged not only to let the auxiliary troops depart freely, but the convention alſo ſetting forth in expreſs terms, that they ſhould not be regarded as priſoners of war, under which quality alone the condition of laying down their arms could take place. Upon this, his Royal Highneſs ſent orders to the ſaid troops to halt.

To reconcile this difference, expedients were propoſed, which left no ſhadow of pretext to the oppoſite party. But all in vain. The troops, pent up in a narrow diſtrict, were expoſed to the rigour of the ſeaſon, and cut off from all neceſſaries and conveniences of every kind.

The French at preſent pretend to treat the convention as a mere military ſcheme; and indeed it was at firſt nothing more: but on account of the above declaration of the court of France, which expreſsly ſuſpended its validity, and in conſequence of the negociation for diſarming the auxiliaries, to which the French general would give no anſwer categorically, without waiting for inſtructions

ſtructions from Verſailles, the nature of that act was totally changed; and that which was then an act between general and general, is now become a court affair. A. D. 1757.

Hard as the conditions of the convention were, for the troops of his Britannic Majeſty, Elector of Hanover, the King would have acquieſced in them, if the French had not diſcovered their deſign of totally ruining his army and his dominions; and, by the moſt evident infractions and outrageous conduct, have ſet the King free from every obligation, under which he was laid by the convention.

The great end of the conventional act (and end in itſelf of the very nature and eſſence of a proviſional armiſtice) was to enter directly on negociations of peace, in order to prevent the total ruin of the Electorate of Brunſwic-Lunenbourg, and to procure an accommodation for his Majeſty's allies. But the court of France has not only declared, time after time, that ſhe would not lend a hand towards a definitive pacification with his Majeſty, in quality of Elector, but has ſhewn plainly, by her continual violences, exceſſes, and inſupportable exactions, ſince the ſigning the convention, that her reſolution is, abſolutely to deſtroy the King's Electoral eſtates, as well as thoſe of his allies.

In the midſt of a truce, the moſt open hoſtilities have been committed. The caſtle of Schartzfels has been forcibly ſeized, and the garriſon made priſoners of war. The priſoners made by

A. D. 1757. the French before the convention have not been reſtored, though this was a point expreſsly ſtipulated between the delegated generals, and was exactly ſatisfied on our part, by the immediate releaſe of the French priſoners. The bailiffs of the reſerved diſtricts, into which the French troops were on no pretence to enter, have been ſummoned, under pain of military execution, to appear before the French commiſſary, with deſign of compelling them to deliver the domainal receipts of the public revenue, of which they are the adminiſtrators. They have appropriated to themſelves part of thoſe magazines, which by expreſs agreement were to remain with the Electoral troops; and they ſtill go on with ſeizing the houſes, revenues, and corn belonging to his Majeſty in the city of Bremen, in ſpight of the reciprocal engagement, whereby they are held to regard that city as a place abſolutely free and neutral. And, laſtly, they have proceeded to menaces, unheard of among a civilized people, of burning, ſacking and deſtroying all before them without remorſe.

All theſe violent and unjuſt proceedings are inconteſtible proofs, that the French will not admit the convention as obligatory, any farther than as it may prove ruinous to his Britannic Majeſty. They deny that they are tied down to any thing, and aſſert a power of acting at will. To ſo inſupportable a degree of inſolence have they carried matters, that the King holds himſelf not only at liberty, but even neceſſitated, without further regard

gard to the convention, ſo often and ſo openly violated by the French, to have recourſe to arms, as the means, which the Almighty has put into his hands, for delivering his faithful ſubjects and allies from the oppreſſions, with which they groan. A. D. 1757.

As his Majeſty has never thought of arming offenſively againſt any power whatever, but ſolely with a view of defending himſelf and his allies, he repoſes his confidence in God, and hopes for his benediction on the juſtice of his enterprizes.

As ſoon as it was confirmed that the Hanoverians were in motion, and repairing to the command of Prince Ferdinand, M. Duke de Richelieu wrote him this letter, as commander in chief of the Hanoverian army.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH for ſome days paſt I have perceived the Hanoverian troops in motion, in order to form themſelves into a body, I could not imagine the object of theſe movements was to break the convention of neutrality, ſigned the 8th and 10th of September, between his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland and me. The good faith, which I naturally ſuppoſed on the part of the King of England Elector of Hanover, and of his ſon, who ſigned the ſaid convention, blinded me ſo far as to make me believe that the aſſembling of theſe troops had no other deſign than to go into the winter-quarters that had been aſſigned them. The repeated advices, Duke de Richelieu's letter to Prince Ferdinand.

A. D. 1757. which came to me from every quarter, of the bad intentions of the Hanoverians, at length opened my eyes; and, at preſent, one may ſee very clearly that there is a plan formed to break the articles of a convention, which ought to be ſacred and inviolable.—The King my maſter having been informed of theſe dangerous movements, and of the infidelity of the Hanoverians, is ſtill willing to give freſh proofs of his moderation, and of his deſire to ſpare the effuſion of human blood. It is with this view that I have the honour to declare to your Serene Highneſs, in the name of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, that I perſiſt in my reſolution of fulfilling exactly all the points of the convention, provided the Hanoverian army, on its part, does the ſame: but I cannot conceal from your Serene Highneſs, that, if, contrary to all expectation, it ſhould take any equivocal ſtep, and ſtill more, if it ſhould commit any act of hoſtility, I ſhall then puſh matters to the laſt extremity, looking upon myſelf as authoriſed ſo to do by the laws of war; I ſhall ſet fire to all the palaces, royal houſes, and gardens; I ſhall ſack all the towns and villages, without ſparing the ſmalleſt cabin; in ſhort, this country ſhall feel all the horrors of war. I adviſe your Serene Highneſs to reflect on all this, and not to lay me under the neceſſity of taking ſteps ſo contrary to the natural humanity of the French nation, and alſo to my perſonal character.

RICHELIEU.

P. S.

P. S. M. Le Comte de Lynar, ambaſſador of the King of Denmark, who was mediator for the convention, has been ſo kind as to take upon him to ſay every thing in his power to your Serene Highneſs, in order to prevent the fatal conſequences with which this country is threatned. A. D. 1757.

To this letter the Hanoverian general returned a very laconic and reſolute anſwer, becoming a good general and a juſt cauſe; importing that he was determined to abide by the conſequences, and would decide the diſputes, which had been unjuſtly ſtarted by the French, in perſon at the head of his army [u]. Prince Ferdinand's anſwer.

Matters began to ripen apace for action, notwithſtanding the advanced ſeaſon. Both armies re-enter the field. The Hanoverians, ſpirited up with reſentment for the baſe uſage they had received, were eager for an opportunity to wipe off the diſgrace of their ſummer's campaign, and to deliver their country from the unheard-of oppreſſions and cruelties exerciſed by their French invaders. They rendeſvouzed at Stade: and Prince Ferdinand marched with all expedition to ſeek the enemy, and to drive them out of the Both armies take the field.

[u] Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick iſſued the following orders. "All officers, magiſtrates, and other regents of his "Britannic Majeſty's German dominions, are enjoined, by "theſe preſents, not to execute any orders from the generality "or intendency of the French; but to ſend them to me im- "mediately, and to ſecure the bearers as ſpies, that they may "be treated in a manner ſuitable to their demerits."

FERDINAND.

Electorate.

A. D. 1757. Electorate. They presently came to blows. One division under General Count Schuylenburg, came up with 2000 of the enemy's rear at Ebstorff, as they were marching to Zell, and defeated them entirely. General Zastrow, with another division, defeated another considerable body of the French, near the Aller. These skirmishes and advantages animated the Hanoverian army, already spirited up with revenge, and struck such a panic into the enemy, that they met with but small resistance. Harbourg, at first setting out, gave them the most trouble, by the obstinacy of the French commander, who retired into the castle, and would not surrender by capitulation, till all the fortifications were demolished. This delayed the march of the Hanoverians, and gave the French time to collect their distant parties.

Hostilities commence.

Harbourg besieged.

The French army retreats.

M. Duke de Richelieu retired to Zell with as much precipitation before the Hanoverian army, as the Hanoverian army, in the summer, had retired before the French to Stade; and left in that city a most horrid example of the reality of his barbarous intentions threatned in his letter to Prince Ferdinand. Here it was thought M. Richelieu had resolved to make a stand. Here he called in his advanced parties, abandoned several magazines, burnt and destroyed the farm-houses and sheep-walks belonging to his Britannic Majesty, in defiance of the representations made on that head by Prince Ferdinand. And he gave so great a sway to his passion, that, after unmanning himself, and delivering up the city to be plundered by his troops, against

Their cruelty at Zell.

againſt all the rules of war, he ordered the ſuburbs to be burnt to aſhes, and not to ſpare the orphan-houſe of helpleſs children, who periſhed in the fire; the inhuman French marſhal glutting his eyes, like another Nero, with a city in flames. Within this ruined city Richelieu entrenched his army; and by their natural ſituation and weight of artillery, they guarded the river ſo effectually, that Prince Ferdinand could not paſs the Aller. The ſeverity of the ſeaſon, which ſet in with hard weather, forced him to retreat to Ultzen and Lunenburg for quarters, and to leave the French in poſſeſſion of Hanover, in whoſe capital M. Duke de Richelieu fixed his head quarters; though there continued to be frequent ſkirmiſhes with various ſucceſs between the out parties. A. D. 1757. Retire into winter quarters.

Before M. Duke de Richelieu left Zell, he publiſhed the following ordinance for collecting the public revenues of the Electorate of Hanover.

Lewis Fra. Armand du Pleſſis, D. de Richelieu, General of the French army in Germany.

THE breaking of the capitulation of Cloſter-Seven, in ſpite of the moſt ſolemn treaty, and the word of honour given by the generals, renders void the treaty made with the country of Hanover, when the King's army entered it; and this infraction of good faith requires the greateſt rigour toward the Hanoverian army, now actually in hoſtilities. Ordinance to collect the revenues.

Where-

A. D. 1757. Wherefore we order, that all the goods, and all other effects of what nature ſoever, belonging to all the officers or others actually with the ſaid Hanoverian army, be confiſcated to the King's uſe, and that the adminiſtrator in general of the conquered countries take poſſeſſion thereof, in order to collect the revenues ariſing therefrom, which are to be added to the contributions; and to make uſe of them in the moſt advantageous manner for his Majeſty, in whatever places of the conquered countries they may be ſituated.

We ſtrictly require Monſ. le Duc de Randan, commander in the country of Hanover, and all other commanders, to enforce the execution of theſe preſents, and to ſupport the ſame as far as it may concern them.

Done at Zell, December 22, 1757.

(Signed) The Marſhal Duc de Richelieu.

And underneath Le Lurez.

Remarks thereon. After ſuch notorious proofs of French perfidy as are here laid before the public, it is aſtoniſhing to hear theſe tyrants and murderers of mankind complain of the Pruſſians appropriating to themſelves, without any declaration of war, without either reaſon or juſtice, the revenues of the duchy of Mecklenburg, whoſe ſovereign had actually entered into a treaty to join his forces with theirs, and had marched to the aſſiſtance of the Swedes, who were at that time engaged in the conqueſt of Pruſſian Pomerania. Yet ſuch is their way of reaſoning, that it is lawful for them to invade, upon the moſt

moſt frivolous pretences, countries in peace with all the world; but other Princes muſt make no attack upon their known enemies, till the mortal blow has been ſtruck; by which they are deprived of the power to make repriſals. The city of Mecklin has undoubtedly been ſeverely dealt with, the Duke driven from his palace, and the whole country ravaged. And the calamities of the Electorate of Saxony are not to be expreſſed: fathers murdered for concealing their fugitive ſons; merchants plundered for not producing greater ſums of money than they are worth; the real and perſonal eſtates of deſerters, of whatever quality, confiſcated; and the caſtles and palaces of the antient nobility plundered and levelled with the ground; their plantations razed, and their gardens and pleaſure-houſes defaced and trodden under foot by horſes. Theſe are the mildeſt calamities that the poor inhabitants ſuffer, in the countries in ſubjection to the conquerors in the preſent war. Where the French, the Auſtrians, or the Ruſſians have gained the aſcendancy, the moſt horrible barbarities are and have been committed. A. D. 1757.

Some people ſay, that the convention of Cloſter-Seven furniſhed a fine opportunity for breaking the chain, which bound Great Britain to a continental war, and they, with the ſame breath, blame the miniſtry for conſenting to the Hanoverians reſuming their arms. But thoſe people ſhould know, That it was not in the miniſtry's power to hinder the Hanoverians reſuming their arms,

A. D. 1757. arms, his Majeſty, as Elector of Hanover, was not obliged to act by conſent of a Britiſh privy-council, relative to the affairs of Hanover: they had no authority over his electoral ſubjects: he is a father to them as well as to us: and he, in that capacity, is without controul. So that, if he choſe to order his Hanoverian ſubjects to take up arms, 'twas not in the power of a Britiſh miniſtry to prevent it. But the fact is this. The Engliſh approved of the meaſure: they humanely conſidered the Hanoverians, as ſufferers on their account: the French had entered the Electorate merely becauſe of the war with England, and every one pitied the unhappy calamity, which fell in a particular manner heavy on them, who were innocent ſufferers in another's cauſe, and who had given no room for offence. The people of England, with a ſpirit of true benevolence, diſpaſſionately reflected on the whole ſtate and hardſhip of their unhappy condition, and on the cauſe, which brought upon them the worſt of all miſeries, that of their country being made the ſcene of war; and were as much rejoiced at the Hanoverians reſuming their arms, as the Hanoverians could be themſelves; inſomuch that the parliament voted 100,000l. for their immediate ſupport.

Affairs of Pruſſia. His Pruſſian Majeſty being made eaſy, on the part of Hanover; which found ſufficient employment for the French grand army, ready on the firſt occaſion to pour down their whole force upon him, he had only the Imperialiſts and Auſtrians to guard againſt.

Various

Various skirmishes, and some disadvantageous actions, had followed his loss at Kolin. Gabel, an important pass, and well garrisoned with four battalions, under the command of Major-General Putkammer, situate between Bœnish Leypa and Zittau, was surprised and taken by a strong detachment under the command of the Duke d'Aremberg and M. Macguire [w]. It was with some difficulty that Prince Henry, the King's brother, ordered with a detachment to watch their motions, escaped their superior force [x], which was afterwards vented with circumstances of most horrid cruelty against Zittau, a trading town in Upper Saxony, garrisoned by six battalions. Here were several large magazines also. They, determined to carry this place, before the King of Prussia could march to its relief, attacked it with uncommon fury. They began to bombard and cannonade it on the 23d of July, without any regard to the Saxon inhabitants; and it continued with such rage, that all the garrison, except about 300 under Colonel Diricke, judged it most proper to retreat, with as much of the magazines, as they could carry off. Colonel Diricke had orders to maintain that post as long as possible. Which he would not give up till the whole place was destroyed. The cannonading began at eleven o'clock at noon, and continued no longer than till five in the evening. But such was the quantity and kind

A. D 1757.

Gabel surprised.

Zittau burnt.

Garrison escape.

[w] On the 18th of June 1757.

[x] See page 258, Vol. II.

of

A. D. 1757.

of thoſe inſtruments of death and deſtruction, that ſix hundred houſes and upwards, almoſt all the public buildings, the Cathedrals of St. John and St. James, the orphan-houſe, eight parſonage-houſes, eight ſchools, the town-houſe, the public weigh-houſe, the priſon, were ſet on fire or beaten down by 4000 balls, many of them red hot, which ſet fire to the houſes in ſeveral places; in which conflagration were conſumed, the records in the town-houſe, the archives and all other documents of the town council, the pictures, ſtatues, plate and other things of value, preſented to the town by Emperors, &c. And what was moſt deplorable, upwards of 400 citizens were killed. What eſcaped the flames was plundered and carried off by the Auſtrians, Pandours, and Sclavonians, as ſoon as they could force their way into the town, during the confuſion of the conflagration. For, inſtead of aſſiſting the inhabitants to extinguiſh the fire, they fell to plunder what was to be found, making no diſtinction between Pruſſians and the inhabitants of Zittau; though this town belonged to the King of Poland, their friend and ally.

The great deſtruction made.

M. Keith harraſſed.

Marſhal Keith was now ordered to quit the mountains of Bohemia, and to join the King's army: In his march his rear was much harraſſed by the enemy's irregulars, who carried off ſome of his baggage and proviſions. He met the King's army between Bautzen and Gorlitz: and the united force of theſe armies amounted to 60,000 men, beſides twelve battalions and ten ſquadrons, which were ſtationed at Pirna, under the

Joins the King's army.

the Prince of Anhault Deſſau, to prevent any ſurpriſe upon Dreſden, to ſecure the paſſes of the mountains, and to check the incurſions of the Auſtrian irregulars: with whom there happened daily ſkirmiſhes with various ſucceſs. But theſe actions did not weaken the Pruſſian armies ſo much, as deſertion; a misfortune that will happen to every Prince, whoſe army is compoſed of foreigners, who only ſerve for pay, without any regard for the intereſt of the king or country, in whoſe cauſe they are enliſted. A. D. 1757. Daily ſkirmiſhes.

A large body of Auſtrians entered Sileſia, and penetrated as far as Breſlau; but were not in a condition to beſiege it, in ſight of the Prince of Bevern's army, encamped near that city. From whence they turned to Schweidnitz, an important fortreſs, and the key of that duchy, which was the cauſe of the war. They beſieged this fortreſs in form[y]; which took them up to the 12th of November; when a garriſon of 4000 ſurrendered themſelves priſoners of war. Schweidnitz beſieged.

While the Auſtrians were thus employed, his Pruſſian Majeſty endeavoured to draw their grand army into ſuch circumſtances, as might enable him to fight them with advantage. For this purpoſe he quitted his camp at Bautzen, and took the rout of Gorlitz; and after ſeveral other motions, he took poſt at Budin on the 15th of Auguſt. Here, being rightly informed of the deſigns of the Imperial army, in conjunction His Pruſſian Majeſty's diſpoſitions to attack the enemy.

[y] Opened the trenches on the 27th of October.

A. D. 1757. with the French under the Prince de Soubiſe, againſt Saxony, he ſaw it was neceſſary to accelerate his own motions, and to force the Auſtrians to a battle, if poſſible, before the Imperial army, which was advancing very faſt, could arrive at the place of their deſtination. But all his art and ſtratagem could not bring it to bear. He drew up his army in ſight of the Auſtrians, to bid them defiance. He even detached 16000 men, under General Winterfeldt, on the other ſide the Nieſe, to take them in flank. As this would not do, no time was to be loſt. He reſolves to meet the Imperialiſts, and to bring them to an engagement; leaving 30,000 men near Gorlitz under the Prince of Bevern, Prince Ferdinand and General Winterfeldt, to obſerve the motions of the Auſtrian army; who immediately came out of their camp, when it was known, that his Pruſſian Majeſty had left it; and 5000 of them attacked two battalions in General Winterfeldt's diviſion, which they cut to pieces. But what was accounted the greateſt misfortune on this occaſion was the loſs of the general himſelf, who received a wound of which he afterwards died.

Dares the Auſtrians to battle.

Marches againſt the army of the Empire.

General Winterfeld attacked.

His Majeſty being informed that the army of the empire, and the forces of the Prince de Soubiſe were aſſembled at Erfurth, with a view to penetrate into Saxony, to make themſelves maſters of the Elbe, he ordered part of his army to march to Naumbourg. The light-horſe, in their march, had a ſkirmiſh with the enemy, greatly to the advantage of the Pruſſians. The army paſſed the

Sala

Sala at Naumbourg, and proceeded to Buttelſtedt. Here he received advice of the convention being ſigned at Cloſter-Seven; and of the invaſion of Halberſtadt by the Duke de Richelieu; againſt whom he detached Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, who ſcoured the country and beat up the quarters of the French at Egelen, and made twenty officers and four hundred ſoldiers priſoners: but when the grand army of France advanced againſt him, he took up ſuch quarters at Wanſleben, that he could hinder their receiving proviſions. A. D. 1757. Prince Ferdinand ſent againſt the Duke de Richelieu.

The King having collected his forces, advanced to Erfurth. On which the Imperialiſts retired, and were driven as far as the hills of Eiſenach. Nothing more could be done at this time, except ſtretching an advanced poſt of huſſars and dragoons, as far as Gotha, which maintained its ground againſt a large body, under Prince Hildbourghauſen, ſent to diſlodge it. King of Pruſſia at Erfurth.

In this ſituation the armies remained till about the laſt week in October, when a body of Hungarians penetrated through Luſatia into Brandenbourg, under General Haddick, up to the gates of Berlin; which city he laid under contribution: a part of which was ſaved by the ſeaſonable approach of the Prince of Anhault Deſſau. In the mean time the other part of the army retired to Leipſick, under General Keith. The time was now haſtening forward for action. The Imperialiſts thought it moſt adviſeable and ſafe, to ſeize the preſent opportunity, when the Pruſſian forces were thus divided and ſeperated at ſuch a diſtance. General Haddick penetrates to Berlin. The Imperialiſts reſolve to attack General Keith.

A. D. 1757. Therefore they advanced by cantonments through Naumbourg, Zeets and Weiſſenfels, imagining that they could make themſelves maſters of the courſe of the Sala, of Leipſic and of the Pruſſian magazines at Torgau.

Pruſſian army aſſemble at Leipſic. Upon this advice, and that the Prince of Saxe-Hilburghauſen and the Prince of Soubiſe were in full march, to attack M. Keith, the King ordered his army to aſſemble at Leipſic. Which was performed with ſuch expedition, that the troops from Luſatia, and from the county of Magdebourg, arrived on the 26th of October. Every neceſſary diſpoſition was made to give the enemy battle.

The Imperialiſts retire. But they were ſtill baſhful; though the plains of Lutzen afforded a moſt ſpacious field of battle. On the 30th the King advanced nearer, and on the 31ſt he drew up his army to fall upon the enemy in their quarters; and made 500 priſoners in paſſing through Weiſſenfels and Merſeburg; but could reach no further than Lutzen. Next day, upon advice that the enemy were retiring on all ſides, the King marched with the vanguard to Weiſſenfels, and attacked that city with ſuch vigour, that the Bavarian troops, and the troops of the circles, were forced to abandon the poſt, and to retreat, having loſt 300 men, who were made priſoners. The enemy, to cover their retreat, burnt the bridge [z] on the Sala; and the poſition of the Imperialiſts on the oppoſite ſide of that river, facing Weiſſenfels, behind encloſures of vineyards

Five hundred priſoners.

Three hundred priſoners.

[z] Which had coſt above 100,000 crowns building.

and

and in huts, to prevent the repairs of the bridge, indicated their intention to diſpute the paſſage of the Sala with the Pruſſians. M. Keith, who had advanced with the main body of the army to Merſebourg, where fourteen French battalions were poſted, found the bridge at that place burnt; and continuing his march to Hall, he found that the ſame precaution had been taken by another detachment of French troops at that bridge. But M. Keith preſently repaired it, and forced the enemy to evacuate all the poſts they had on that river, and retire to Micheles. Being now in poſſeſſion of Hall, Merſebourg, and Weiſſenfels, and their bridges repaired, the whole Pruſſian army croſſed the river Sala, in three columns; and they joined the ſame day at the village of Roſbach, facing the enemy's camp. A. D. 1757. Driven from all their poſts on the Elbe.

The King went immediately to reconnoitre the enemy's ſituation and ſtrength; and finding that it might be attacked on the right, he propoſed to do it next day. But though every diſpoſition was made to carry this reſolution into execution; and the cavalry was put in motion in the van, it was countermanded; becauſe, upon arriving at the eminences, from whence the enemy had been reconnoitred the day before, it was found, that they had changed the poſition of their camp. It now not only faced the Pruſſian army, but it was covered in front by a large hollow way. Its right was upon an eminence in a wood, fortified with three redoubts, beſides barricades of trees. Which made it unadviſeable to proceed to the intended King of Pruſſia prepares to attack their camp. Its ſituation and ſtrength.

A. D. 1757.

attack. Therefore the infantry encamped, and the cavalry did ſo likewiſe [a]. As the reaſons were not known to the enemy for this ſudden alteration in the motions of the Pruſſian army, they, perhaps, attributed their re-encampment to a diffidence in their own ſtrength, and upon this preſumption, detached ſeveral parties to harraſs them in caſe of a retreat.

The attack dropt.

Encouraged the Imperialiſts to force him to a battle.

This procraſtination of the Pruſſian army, which till now, had given the greateſt ſigns of an intention to force the Imperialiſts to an action, operated ſo effectually on the enemy, that it brought them to a reſolution [b] not only to wait for them, to which

[a] With the loſs of nine men killed by the enemy's cannon, which did no other execution, though continued the whole day.

[b] It is hardly poſſible to account for the conduct of the Imperialiſts and French, retreating ſo often before an enemy ſo much inferior to them in numbers; and whom, it was commonly thought they were ſent to cruſh, in purſuance of the ban of the Empire. But the following letter from an officer of the combined army, dated Nov. 12, will help to ſet us right as to the intentions of the officers in the Imperial army, and give light in ſome other particulars relative to the enſuing battle.——"The Prince de Soubiſe having received orders from his court, not to lead the army of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty beyond the Sala, but at the ſame time not to omit any occaſion that might offer of fighting the King of Pruſſia on this ſide that river, it was judged proper, that the combined army ſhould provide themſelves with a good camp, and there reſolutely wait for the enemy. In conſequence of which reſolution, they occupied that of Micheles, the 2d of Nov, where they were poſted ſo as to have a wood on the right, wherein the 15 battalions of the troops of the Empire (the reſt

which his Pruſſian Majeſty had ſo long in vain attempted to provoke them; but to attack them in A. D. 1757.

reſt having been detached, by order of the Margrave of Baden-Durlach, along the Sala, for the ſecurity of the interior circles) had orders to continue and cover themſelves by felling trees, and this place was fortified beſides with ſome redoubts, being the only one againſt which the enemy could form its attack, and the intervals were guarded by ſeveral pieces of artillery. The Imperial cavalry and that of the Empire, occupied a very advantageous ſpot near this wood, and extremely proper for their purpoſe. The French troops, whoſe left wing was defended by an impracticable ravin, joined them; beſides all which there was a corps of reſerve, of eight battalions and 16 ſquadrons, of the ſame auxiliary troops, to be employed as occaſion might require.

In this poſture nothing could be more deſirable than to be attacked. On the 3d the enemy appeared, and reconnoitred the camp from the eminences, but diſcovered no tokens or diſpoſition to riſque an action with the combined army ſo advantageouſly poſted, but encamped near the village of Roſbach, where it was equally inacceſſible both in front and flanks. This camp was on a ravin and a ſmall eminence. A brook, no ways conſiderable but for its ſteep banks, perfectly covered either army from the other; and the troops poſted in the manner of an amphitheatre, formed two lines of infantry on the hanging of the hill, and the third of cavalry, in the plain behind the two former.

It was three in the afternoon before they quitted their camp, and made a ſhew of retreating to Merſebourg: but taking advantage of an eminence, which intercepted them and their motions from our view, they ranged their cavalry behind it. A perſon of credit and diſtinction came in the interim, and aſſured the Duke of Saxe Hildbourghauſen, general of the combined army, that there was ſcarce a handful of the enemy behind the ſaid eminence. But bye and bye we ſaw them ad-

A. D. 1757. in their camp. For, on the 5th, about nine in the morning, their infantry, which had drawn nearer, upon the riſing grounds, towards the Pruſſian camp, filed off to the right, and the whole army was put in motion; a large body of cavalry at

vancing on a full gallop towards our flank. The Duke, however, gained time ſufficient for forming the two Imperial regiments of cavalry on the firſt line, and thoſe of the Empire on the ſecond, by diſpoſing the flank in front. Himſelf in perſon led on the two former regiments to the charge, and attacked the enemy with ſo much bravery, that we could ſee the two parties, for a conſiderable time, engaging hand in hand. At length the Imperial cavalry began to penetrate through them; but the enemy's cavalry, much ſuperior in number to ours, found means to ſurround them; however, they recovered their order, and, in conjunction with the French cavalry, repulſed the enemy four times. The Marquis de Caſtrees ſignalized himſelf on this occaſion, and received two wounds on the head from a ſword.

The Prince of Saxony, in the mean while, put himſelf at the head of the infantry, and the officers of the French army having propoſed to him to attack that of the enemy in columns, with bayonets fixt, his Serene Highneſs expreſſed his ſatisfaction at ſo vigorous a reſolution, and conducted in perſon the regiment of Piedmont within 30 or 40 paces of the enemy; but the terrible fire which they made at once of their artillery and muſquetry, obliged that brave regiment to retreat; and inſtantly ſuch an univerſal panic poſſeſſed all the troops, that it was impoſſible to ſtop one ſingle battalion or ſquadron. Our general in chief, as well as the Prince de Soubiſe, the French commandant, took all imaginable pains to rally the troops, but to no purpoſe; they were all quite overwhelmed with terror. It was therefore concluded, to contrive how to ſecure a retreat. The night favouring us, the combined army profited of that circumſtance, and retired to Freibourg, and afterwards over the Unſtrut."

the

the ſame time marched towards the left, directing their march all along to the riſing grounds, with which the Pruſſian camp, that lay in the bottom between the villages of Bederow and Roſbach, was ſurrounded, and within the reach of large cannon. About noon the head of the columns was perceived to riſe upon the extremity of the left of the Pruſſian army. But it was two o'clock before any certain judgment could be formed of the intention of all theſe movements: when it being manifeſt, that they by endeavouring to double the left of the Pruſſians, and directing their march towards Merſeburg, to cut off a retreat in caſe of a defeat, intended to attack the King's army, and that all their diſpoſitions were calculated with a proſpect to ſurround them, and to open the action by an attack in the rear; his Pruſſian Majeſty ſeized the critical moment, defied their art, caught them in their own imaginations, drew up his army in order of battle, and, by a half turn to the left, marched parallel with the enemy. A. D. 1757. King of Pruſſia ſtands his ground.

In this poſition the King made the following ſpeech to his army: —— "My dear friends, the "hour is now come, in which, all that is, and all "that ought to be dear to us, depends upon the "ſwords, which are now drawn for the battle; "time permits me to ſay but little, nor is there "occaſion to ſay much. You know that there is "no labour, no hunger nor cold, no watching, "and no danger that I have not ſhared with you "hitherto; and you ſee me ready to lay down my "life His ſpeech to his ſoldiers.

A. D. 1757. "life with you, and for you. All I ask is the "same pledge of fidelity and affection that I give; "and let me add, not as an incitement to your "courage, but as a testimony of my own grati- "tude, that, from this hour, till we go into quar- "ters, your pay shall be double.—Acquit your- "selves like men, and put your confidence in "God."——The effect of this speech was such, as can neither be described nor conceived; the

Its effect. general emotion burst into an universal shout, and the looks and demeanour of the men, were animated to a degree little short of phrensy; and of this disposition, the victory may perhaps be considered as a natural effect, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy.

Disposition of his army. His Majesty had determined to make the attack with one wing only, and the disposition of the enemy made it necessary that it should be the left wing. But the very instant the battle was going to begin, his Majesty ordered the general, who commanded the right wing, to decline it; to take a proper position in consequence thereof, and especially, to prevent their being surrounded. Nevertheless, all the cavalry of the right wing, except two or three squadrons, had already marched to the left, in full gallop; and formed, according to their orders, over against the enemy. The Prussians by these motions gained the rising grounds,

The battle begun. of which their cavalry made very good use. They attacked the enemy's cavalry in flank. The charge was very fierce: and several regiments of the French came on with great resolution. But they

they were driven back after a few diſcharges; and purſued with great ſpirit for a conſiderable time, till they found an opportunity of rallying upon an eminence; where they made a ſtand, but were ſo ſeverely handled by the victorious purſuers that they betook themſelves to flight in the greateſt diſorder, at about four in the afternoon. A. D. 1757.

Whilſt the cavalry performed wonders, the infantry opened themſelves. The enemy cannonaded them briſkly during this interval, and did ſome execution; but not with impunity, the Pruſſian artillery returning the loſs with advantage. This prelude of cannonade having continued without intermiſſion for a quarter of an hour, the fire of the infantry began with ſuch activity that the enemy could not ſtand it, nor reſiſt the valour of the foot, who marched up gallantly to the enemy's batteries, and carried them with an uncommon bravery, one after another, till the enemy was forced to give way in great confuſion. As the left wing advanced, the right changed its poſition, and having ſoon met with a ſmall riſing ground, they availed themſelves of its ſituation, by planting it with 16 pieces of heavy cannon. From hence they were enabled to fire upon the enemy's right, which increaſed their diſorder, and exceſſively galled their left wing in front.

At five victory declared in favour of the Pruſſians. The cannon ceaſed. The enemy fled on all ſides. Only ſix battalions of the Pruſſian left were engaged. The purſuit was eager: but night coming on very faſt favoured the runaways, and prevented

The Pruſſians victorious.

The Imperialiſts fly.

A. D. 1757. prevented the conquerors reaping the fruits of their victory. So that, it may be ſaid, the night alone was the preſervation of that army, which was ſo formidable in the morning of the ſame day. They took the benefit of the darkneſs to hurry forwards to Freybourg, and there to paſs the Unſtrut, which they effected next morning after a whole night's march [c].

The

[c] This narrative of the battle and victory at Roſbach, has never been contradicted; but may be explained in ſeveral particulars by the following account, given in a letter from an officer in the army of the empire, preſent in this battle.

At one in the morning of the 30th paſt, we left our quarters at Stoſſen, and received orders to repair to Weiſſenfelds: the regiment of Varell marched through the city, and over the bridge, and was cantoned at Petra; two regiments, viz. thoſe of Naſſau and Deux Ponts, and Rechman's of Bavaria, with two companies of French grenadiers remained at Weiſſenfelds.

On the 31ſt, at five in the morning, the Pruſſians came and attacked the city: upon this, the whole army was ordered to aſſemble; but Prince Hildburghauſen's quarters being at half a league's diſtance from the city, Prince George of d'Armſtadt commanded in his abſence, and took every poſſible method to make reſiſtance; but it was too late: they were obliged to retire, and that noble bridge, which had coſt above 100,000 crowns, was burnt to ſecure our retreat. The Pruſſian artillery made a terrible fire, whilſt the two regiments were paſſing the bridge. The regiment of Deux Ponts loſt four officers and 100 private men, upon this occaſion; the captains Muncherode and Dames, with two lieutenants were among the former. The loſs of Rechman's regiment amounted to 200 men, of whom ſix were officers. The whole army continued before the town, and the Felt Marſhal in his quarters at Bugerau. In the night 300 of the Wartzburg Imperial regiment were detached

The King ſet out early on the 6th in the morning, with all his cavalry, ſupported by four battalions A. D. 1757. Purſued.

detached to the place where the bridge had been, in order to obſerve the enemy.

During the whole night, a noiſe was heard in the city, occaſioned by the ſtrokes of mallets; but it was not diſcovered till break of day, that two houſes had been turned into batteries. As they were not yet finiſhed, we eaſily diſmounted them with our ſix pieces of cannon, which were ſent thither; and killed them four ſoldiers and one workman.

The firſt of Nov. the fire from the artillery continued on both ſides till 10 o'clock, when we began to march towards Merſebourg; the baggage having gone before as far as Camburg, we were forced to lie on the ground without wood or ſtraw. In the mean while the French were reinforced by 20 battalions and 18 ſquadrons, commanded by the Duc de Broglio.

The 3d of Nov. we put ourſelves in a poſture to wait the enemy; at one in the afternoon we retreated a league towards Freybourg, where we halted; at five we were drawn up in order of battle; and thus we advanced ſlowly, towards the enemy, all night. We were poſted in a wood on the right, where we covered ourſelves by felling trees; and batteries were placed by the French on the two eminences at each end of the wood. On the 4th we were in preſence of the enemy, and cannonaded each other. The enemy's cavalry advanced, but were repulſed by ours, ſuſtained by the fire of our artillery. The enemy's infantry then moved forwards in three columns, but were alſo repulſed. On the 5th the cannonading began very early in the morning on both ſides. The left wing of the enemy extended as far as Legen, and their right to Schorta; and our army was poſted in the wood at Waneroda. At noon, our army, as well as the French, had orders to form the line of battle, and to march out of the entrenchments which we had made. We advanced towards the enemy, keeping a little, however, to the left. The enemy made a feint of retiring, on which we redoubled our pace, but we ſoon found what kind of

A. D. 1757. talions of grenadiers, in purſuit of the fugitives; with orders for his whole infantry to follow him in two columns. But, as ſaid above, the enemy had paſſed the Unſtrut; and the Pruſſians being obliged to repair the bridge at Freybourg, which the enemy had burnt, it was five in the evening before the cavalry could come up with the enemy, drawn up in an advantageous manner upon the hills of Eckerſberg, which obliged his Majeſty to wait the iſſue of another day. He cantoned his

of retreat they were making. In order to deceive us the more effectually, they had ſent ſome ſquadrons towards Merſeburg; but the reſt of their army was drawn up behind an eminence, which concealed them from us. It muſt be confeſſed, that we fell compleatly into the ſnare. The firſt line of the French and our cavalry continued advancing; when all on a ſudden our right wing received a terrible fire from the enemy, which we returned briſkly, but as we had been obliged to advance in ſome hurry, our ranks were a little diſordered, which made the enemy's fire fall the more heavily upon us. Our cavalry fled the firſt upon full gallop, but our artillery ſupported us ſome time longer: at laſt the French fled likewiſe; and being then no longer able to reſiſt the enemy, the rout became general. We have loſt all our baggage and artillery, and at leaſt 10,000 men. We marched the whole night, and paſſing the river Freyberg arrived at Eckerſberg at ſix o'clock in the morning. At two o'clock in the afternoon the Felt Marſhal and Prince George joined us. They had hardly ſet down to dinner, but we perceived the enemy at our heels, who cannonaded us briſkly; and as our army was not got together, nothing was left for us but to retreat. Having again marched all night, we arrived at laſt at Erfurth, where we now are in want of every thing, though we are rather better off than before. It is now eight days ſince our men have had bread; they have lived upon turnips and radiſhes, which they dug out of the earth.

army

army in the neareſt villages; and the enemy having fled in the night, he contented himſelf with the ſucceſs of his huſſars, who took near 300 baggage waggons with their contents; though there were ſome of the irregulars, that puſhed after them as far as Erfurth. A. D. 1757.

This glorious victory, glorious both in the action and in its conſequences, was obtained with very inconſiderable loſs of the Pruſſians, which did not exceed 300 men killed and wounded; amongſt whom was Colonel Prignitz, killed; and Prince Henry, General Seidlitz, and General Meinecke, wounded ſlightly. But their enemy loſt upwards of 3000 men killed upon the field of battle, and above 6000 made priſoners, amongſt whom were eight French generals, beſides ſeveral German generals, and 250 officers of different ranks: 63 pieces of cannon, 15 ſtandards, two pair of kettle drums, and ſeven pair of colours, fell alſo into the hands of the Pruſſians, at the ſame time [d]. Loſs on both ſides.

If we ſeriouſly attend to the premiſes, and conſider the ſtrength of both armies, either in regard to their ſituation or numbers, it muſt be ac- Remarks on this battle.

[d] Some accounts raiſe the number of priſoners to 10,000, and the pieces of cannon to 164; 300 waggon load of wounded French and Swiſs, were ſent with the reſt of the priſoners to Leipſick. General Revel, brother to the Duke de Broglio, died of his wounds the day after the battle at Merſeburg. *N. B.* It was ſaid, that this egregious misfortune was owing to the injudicious diſpoſitions of the two commanders; and in part to the diſcontent amongſt the men, who were not only badly paid, but in great want of bread, &c.

A. D. 1757. knowledged that the battle was not to the ſtrong; but that the hand of heaven appeared viſibly in defence of Pruſſia. The enemy boaſted that they were 70,000 ſtrong. But admit that there were no more than 50,000 effective combatants on the field of battle; it was a vaſt ſuperiority. For, after the King had left five battalions for the garriſon of Leipſick, a battalion at Halle, another at Merſeburg, and another at Weiſſenfelds; and had ſtationed the regiment of Winterfield to cover the baggage during the battle, his whole force ſcarcely amounted to 18,000 effective men: upon whom the whole weight of the action fell.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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