


LETTER

A

ADDRESSED TO

Two GREAT MEN.

[Price One Shilling.]



LETTER

A

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Two GREAT MEN,

ON THE

PROSPECT of PEACE;


And on the TERMS neceffary to be infifted upon in the NEGOCIATION.

Mea quidem sententiâ, paci, quæ nihil habitura sit insidiarum, semper est consulendum. De Offic. Lib. 1.

There is a Tide in the Affairs of Men, Which taken at the Flood, leads on to Fortune; Omitted, all the Voyage of their Life Is bound in Shallows and in Miferies. On fuch a full Sea are we now a-float, And we muft take the Current when it ferves, Or lofe our Ventures.

SHAKESF.

L O N D O N:Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand. $\overline{M DCC LX}.$



LETTER

A

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ADDRESSED TO

Two GREAT MEN.

My LORD, and SIR,

Y OU will be furprized at an Addrefs made to you jointly in this Manner; but as I have not the Honour to be much acquainted with either of you, (though I effeem you both, at leaft while you remain connected) I hope you will forgive me for troubling you, in this public Way; and the rather, as as I think the Matters I fhall write upon, to be of very great Importance; and as you will difcover by what I am going to fuggeft to you, that I am a true Friend to Old *England*, and a fincere Lover of my Country.

I have long thought that our Ministers of State may be much affisted, in their Deliberations, by Perfons who have not the Honour of fitting at the Council-board. The wifest Measures have often B. been been pointed out, in the Course of parliamentary Debate; and Members of either House, perhaps those least confulted by Government, have frequently been earlieft in fuggefting fuch Plans of public Policy, as Government itself has been glad The Extinction of factious Oppolition, to adopt. the Unanimity of every Party, and the Acquiefcence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is proposed by his Majefty's Servants, while it hath produced infinite Advantages to the Public ; hath deprived those who direct the Cabinet, of all fuch Parliamentary Inftruction, as their Predeceffors in Power used to receive. You, my Lord, of late, fcarcely hear any Speech in the Houfe of Lords, but that of a Lawyer on a Scotch Appeal; and the hereditary Council of the Nation rarely affemble for higher Purpofes than to alter Settlements and deliberate on Bills of Divorce. And you, Sir, in the other Houfe, where fo many skillful Champions used formerly to engage, and ftruggle for Victory, remain fingle in the Field of Battle; and your Speaker takes the Chair only to vote Millions and levy Thousands, without the least Debate or Oppolition.

The Channel of Parliamentary Inftruction being thus ftopt, no other but that of the Prefs is left open, for those Heads of Advice to which it may be worth your while to attend. For this Reason it is, that I have thought of addreffing you in this Manner. Who I am, it matters not. Let it fuffice, that, unpenfioned and unemployed, I can vie, in Zeal for the Public, with those who taste the Sweets of exorbitant Salaries, and unfathomed Perquisites. Whether my Knowledge be equal to my Zeal; whether my Acquaintance with the World, and Experience in Business, have enabled me to offer any Thing that may be of real Utility, must be be determined by you, and by the Public. This I am certain of, that my Intention is honeft; and while I pleafe myfelf, I shall endeavour, at the fame time, not to offend either of you. Some Productions, in which you have, of late, been jointly taken Notice of, proceeded from a factious Disposition,. which I am unacquainted with, and deteft. For, far from withing to difunite and feparate your Interefts, I am fully perfuaded that without your perfect Harmony and Union, the great Events which have happened under your Administration, will not have those permanent good Consequences fo much to be wifhed for : And it is only from your joint Concurrence, that we can hope for any of those prudent, spirited and national Measures concerning which I propose to offer you a few Hints, in this Addrefs.

Confidering the prefent diffreffed Condition of France, fallen from its alarming Power, and Greatness, into the loweft State of Diffress and Impotence; unfortunate in its military Operations in every Quarter of the Globe; beaten all Europe over by Sea and Land; its Fleets failing, only to be deftroyed; its Armies marching, only to run away; without Trade; no Credit; ftopping Payments, protefting Bills, and to all Intents and Purpofes a Bankrupt Nation; their King, the Princes of the Blood, the Nobility, and the Clergy carrying in all their Plate to be coined, for the prefent extreme Exigency of their Affairs; difappointed and baffled in all their Schemes on the Continent, and taught to think no more of Invalians, by the Destruction of the only Fleet they had left; - I fay, confidering all these Circumstances, which I have not exaggerated, in the leaft, it is not unnatural to imagine, that a Period will foon be put to the Troubles of Eu-France, unable to carry on the War, must rope. B 2 100n

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foon be reduced to the Necessity of fuing for Peace.

We have had Bloodshed enough. God forgive those who have occasioned this terrible Destruction of the human Species, and spread Misery, and Devastation, for so long a Time, in almost every Corner of the Globe. The great Success with which the Arms of Britain have been blessed, puts it in our Power to give Peace to Europe: and it is to the Honour of his Majesty and those who direct his Councils, that the Distresses of our Enemies have only enabled him to give the World a Proof of his Moderation; and to shew that his Inclination to make Peace, keeps Pace with the Inability of France to prolong the War.

"As his Majefty entered into this War, not from Views of Ambition, fo he does not with to continue it, from Motives of Refentment. The Defire of his Majefty's Heart is, to fee a Stop put to the Effufion of Chriftian Blood."

What was declared, in the above Paragraph of his Majefty's Speech from the Throne, to our own Parliament, at the Opening of this Seffion, has fince that, been notified in Form to our Enemy. The Readinefs of England, and Prussia, to enter into a Treaty, and to give Peace to Chriftendom, which Prince Lewis of Wolfenbuttle hath been authorized to communicate to the French Minister at the Hague, will, no doubt, open the Door for a Negociation, in a Manner the most likely to be embraced by the Court of Verfailles; whofe Difgraces and Diftreffes too great to be diffembled, and too extensive to be remedied, will difpose them to listen with Attention to every propofal of Accommodation, made to them by an Enemy whofe Sword was unfheathed only to punish Perfidy; and whofe Succeffes, as appears from their making the first Advances towards towards a Treaty, have not infatuated them to prefer unneceffary and ruinous Conquest, to a reafonable and folid Peace.

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It is, therefore, to be hoped, and to be believed, that Peace is not at a great Diftance; and upon this Suppofition I fhall beg Leave to offer a few Confiderations to you, as to the Perfons on whom the Fate of this Country depends; Confiderations which are equally important as they are feafonable; and an Attention to which, before you enter upon any Negociation, may, perhaps, affift you (if I may be allowed to fuppofe you ftand in Need of any Affiftance) in directing this Negociation to fuch an Iffue, as may be equally honourable to yourfelves, and ufeful to the Public.

In this Situation of Affairs, one of the first Matters relative to the future Negociation, which, no doubt, must occur to you, will be, the Choice of those Persons who are to be trusted with the great Concerns of this Nation as *Plenipotentiaries*. And, as much will depend upon this Point, I shall beg Leave to begin with giving you my Thoughts upon it, and the other Topics on which I propose to trouble you will naturally arise from each other without observing any other Order, or Connection, besides that in which they shall prefent themselves to a Mind intent upon its Subject.

With regard then, to the Choice of *Plenipotentiaries*, I cannot but lament the Difficulties you have to encounter, before you will be able to find fuch as the Public will have Reafon to thank you for. — I am not totally unknowing in the Characters and Capacities of many among the great. But when I caft my Eyes around me, I own that I am furprized, greatly furprized, but ftill more grieved, to find fo few among us, capable of conducting the arduous Tafk of making a Peace. Whether this 4 hath arisen from Neglect in the Education of our Men of Quality; or whether the Qualifications which fit them for Statesmen, have been neglected, in Comparison of such as fit them for Arthur's or Newmarket ; or whether it be owing to the State Policy fo fystematically adopted, of late Years, of giving Places, not to the Perfons who can beft execute the Bufinefs-but to those who can best do a Tob. Whatever be the Caufe, the Fact is certain; and it is Matter of Amazement that there fhould be fo few in this Island, who have given any Proofs that they are capable of conducting with Ability, much lefs with Dexterity, this important Bufinels of a Negociation with France. Men who are versed in Treaties, knowing the Interefts, Pretenfions, and Connexions of the feveral Princes of Europe; skilled in the Principles of public Law, and capable of applying them on every particular Occasion; acquainted with the Commerce, the Colonies, the Manufactures of their own Country; Mafters of all the Inftances of Infraction of former Treaties, which occafioned the War we are now engaged in: In a Word, Men whofe Rank and Confequence amongft ourfelves, may command Respect, and procure them Authority, amongst our Enemies; and who to every other Qualification, already enumerated, can boaft of an Integrity not to be corrupted, and a Steadinefs in fupporting the Interefts of their Country, which no Difficulties can difcourage, and no Temptations can shake: ----Such are the Men, whom you must endeavour to employ, in the approaching Negociation, and fuch, I hope, ye will be able to find; though, I own, I am puzzled to guess on whom the Choice will

fall, none being, as yet, pointed out by the public Voice, nor, perhaps, fixed upon, by yourfelves. Times have been, when we might have expected,

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fee One named to fuch an important Office, meetly becaufe he was a Favourite, or a Favourite's Favourite; becaufe he was connected with this Minifter, or was a Relation of that great Man. But if we have too frequently trifled with our national Concerns, by trufting them in fuch Hands, I need not fay that there are Circumftances at prefent which give us reafonable Ground for hoping that the fame Sagacity, and Defire to ferve the Public which hath found out, and employed the propereft Perfons to conduct the Operations of the War, will be exerted to find out the propereft Perfons (few as there are to be found) to conduct the Deliberations of the Treaty.

And very deplorable indeed must be the Inabilities of the Perfons we shall employ, if their Negociations for Peace be conducted fo awkwardly as to rob us of the Advantages we have gained by the War. If we may judge from late Events, France feems as little to abound with Wifdom in the Cabinet, as it doth with Courage and Conduct in the Field. And if the Negociations at Utrecht, in which almost all the Advantages of a War equally fuccefsful with the prefent, were given up, be urged as an Instance of the superior Dexterity of French Politics, it ought to be remembered that this was more owing to our own Divisions, than to their Sagacity, and to the Inabilities of our Plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, tho' we had no great Reafon, God knows, to brag of them. What, therefore, may we not expect from a Negociation to be begun in very different Circumstances; when there exists no Faction whole Interest it may be to perplex and defeat it; and when that national Unanimity to which we, in a great Meafure, owe the Success of the War, will still continue to exert it's bleffed Effects, till it make us happy with a fafe and honourable Peace?

Peace ?—However, favourable as these Circumftances are, the Choice of fuch Plenipotentiaries as may be likely to conduct the Negociation, with Dignity, Dexterity and Integrity, becomes a Confideration which the Public will expect should be weighed with the utmost Attention. And, if fuch Perfons cannot be found amongst us (which I hope may not be the Cafe) there is a very defirable Alternative still in your Power. Fix the Scene of Negociation, where, indeed, for the Honour of our Country, I could wish to see it fixed, name no other Plenipotentiaries to conduct the Peace but those Ministers who directed the War: And a Treaty of London, in fuch Hands, will make ample Amends for our wretched Management at Utrecht.

But let Peace be never fo well made ; let Minifters plan Treaties with the greateft Sagacity, and Plenipotentiaries negociate the Articles with the utmost Skill and Dexterity, yet we know from Hiftery and Observation, that they never can be perpetual, and, most commonly, are not lasting. Princes, too frequently, feem to own no other Rule of Action, than prefent Convenience; and the Law of Nations is feldom appealed to, but to fanctify Injustice, and fave Appearances. Nor are the politive Compacts folemnly agreed upon between Nation and Nation, better observed. For how feldom do we see a Treaty religiously adhered to, by the Parties whofe Intereft it is to break it, and who think they are in fuch Circumstances as to be able to break it with Impunity?-If fuch Infidelity be too common amongft Princes in general, Experience, long Experience teaches us, that the Nation with whom we are foon to treat, excel us, at leaft, in this Part of Policy. For no Cords are ftrong enough to bind them. Gallic

Gallic Faith is become proverbial, and the Neighbours of France can reproach her with innumerable Inftances of a most profligate Difregard to the most folemn Treaties. And the Reafon feems to be obvious, without fuppoling that Nation more perfidious than others. The Power, the Populoufnefs, the Extent, the Strength of the French Monarchy, free them from those Apprehensions which bind the weaker Side to be faithful to it's Engagements; and depending upon the Inability of their Neighbours, confidered fingly, to procure to themfelves Juffice, this, too frequently, has tempted them to the most shameful and barefaced Instances of national Breach of Faith,

It well becomes us, therefore, at this Juncture, when the Diftreffes of France will oblige them to confent to Terms of Peace, unfavourable to the Interest, and disgraceful to the Glory of their Monarch, to take every Method in our Power to fecure the Obfervance of those Concessions they may make; and to infift upon their giving us fuch Proofs of their Sincerity, before any Negociation be entered upon, as may give us fome Affurance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements.

What Proof of their Sincerity, I would recommend it to you to demand, what Conceffions it will be neceffary to infift upon, I shall beg Leave to mention ; after having first fatisfied you by a Detail of fome Particulars, that fuch Demands as I would propofe cannot be looked upon as the Infolence of a Conqueror, but as the wife Forefight of a People whom dear bought Expence hath taught the proper Way of doing itfelf Juffice.

It may not, therefore, be unnecessary to place before your Eyes, some of the most remarkable Instances of French Perfidy, which have given Rife to

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to all the Troubles of Europe for above these hundred Years.

The Peace of Westphalia *, while it fecured the Liberties and Religion of Germany, alfo laid the Foundation of that Power which hath made France, ever fince, the Terror of Europe. By this Treaty ", the Upper and the Lower Alface, a Country of great Extent, and of infinite Confequence in Point of Situation, was ceded to France. In this Country there were Ten Imperial Cities, whofe Privileges and Liberties were in the most folemn Manner fecured by the fame Treaty, which exprelly fays, b that they shall preferve their Freedom, and that the King of France (ball not affume over them, any Thing more than the bare Right of Protection. How was this Article observed? The ten Imperial Cities were foon humbled to receive the French Yoke, equally with the reft of Alface, and remain, now, lafting Monuments, what others may expect from Power unreftrained by Juffice.

The Treaty + of the Pyrenees ftill enlarged the Boundaries of France, efpecially on the Side of Flanders; and the Spaniards thought themfelves fafe from farther Loffes, by the Marriage of their Infanta to Louis the XIV. who, upon that Occafion, jointly with her, made a formal Renunciation of all her Rights, to fucceed to any Part of the Spanish Poffeffions. And yet, with unparalleled Infolence, feven Years had fcarcely elapfed before Flanders was again attacked, on Pretence of those very Rights which had been fo lately renounced, and which, even tho' they had not been renounced, must have

* 1648. ^a Article 73, & feq. ^b Article 88. Le Roi de France ne l'arrogera, fur les villes de la Prefecture, que le fimple Droit de Protection, qui appartenoit a la Maison d' Autriche. † 1659.

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The Peace of Nimeguen ‡ reftored the Tranquilquillity of Europe, which the Invasion of Holland by the French had diffurbed. But scarcely was the Peace figned before it was shamefully violated. The Decrees of the Chambers of Re-union, by which Lewis the XIV. feized so many Territories, to which he has not the least Right; the Surprisal of Strasburgh, and theBlockade of Luxemburgh, thewed fuch a Wantonness of Perfidy, as no History of the most barbarous and unpolished Savages could well exceed; and justly drew upon the common Oppression, the joint Vengeance of offended Europe.

Who is ignorant of the Story of the Parition Treaty? Solemnly ratified and agreed to preferve that Tranquillity which the Treaty of Refwyck had just reftored to Europe, it was no fooner made than it was shamefully abandoned by the Court of France; and for such Reafons as will, upon every Occasion, justify every Injustice. The Letter of the Treaty, indeed, was violated, they must own; —but the Spirit of it was what ought to be attended to. And by such a Comment, worthier of a pitiful Sophister, than of a most Christian King, his Grandfon was affisted in placing himself on the Throne of Spain.

The Politics of *Lewis* the XV. have been faithfully copied from those of his Great-Grandfather; and the Behaviour of *France*, upon the Death of *Charles* the VI. is a fresh Proof, of how little Use are the most folemn Treaties, with a Power that knows no Ties but those of Interest.—The Treaty of *Vienna* had but two or three Years before *, an-

> * In 1738. C 2

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\$ 1679.

nexed to the Crown of France, the Dutchy of Lorrain; a Ceffion which was purchased, and purchased cheaply, by the Guarantee of the + Pragmatic Sanction. By this Stipulation, France was under the most folemn Engagements to support the Queen of Hungary in the Poffeffion of all her Father's Dominions. But how was the Engagement fulfilled ? Pofterity will fcarcely believe fuch bare-faced Perfidy was poffible, as our Times faw was actually avowed upon that Occasion. Germany was, instantly, covered with the Armies of France, to affift the Elector of Bavaria, in an Attempt to overturn the Pragmatic Sanction fo lately guaranteed by them, and to dethrone that Prince's whom they were bound by a Treaty, fworn to in the Name of the Holy Trinity, to protect and defend from all her Enemies.

I have brought down this Sketch of French Faith to the prefent Times; imperfect indeed; but, as far as it goes, ftrictly conformable to Hiftorical Truth .---- What Confidence then, can France expect any of it's Neighbours will put in her, after fo many and fuch flagrant Inftances of national Perjury, as the appears to be guilty of ?---- The Catalogue of her Infidelities will ftill be encreased ; and the little Reafon that our Island, in particular, has to truft Her, will still be more apparent, by reminding you of fome of the many Proofs, which Great Britain itself can appeal to, of French Ingenuity in Treaty-breaking .- I shall go no higher than the Peace of Utrecht, becaufe the Inftances in which it hath been violated by France, have produced the prefent War; and becaufe the Enumeration of them will lead me, naturally, to those Hints which I mean to throw out, as neceffary to be at-

+ Treaty of Vienny, Article 10:

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tended to in our future Negociations; and which, if neglected, will lofe to this Nation all the Fruits of those Succeffes, to gain which, we have strained every Nerve, and loaded ourselves with a Burthen under which it is a Miracle that we have not already funk.

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The War which was closed by the Peace of Utrecht had been undertaken with Views confined, altogether, to the Continent of Europe, and carried on, though at an immenfe Expence, more to gain Conquefts for our Allies than for ourfelves. However, in the Treaty of Peace, fome Advantages and Conceffions were flipulated in Favour of the Crown of Great Britain, and it's commercial Interefts.

By the 12th Article², All Nova Scotia or Acadia, with it's ancient Limits, and with all it's Dependencies, is ceded to the Crown of Great Britain.

And by the 15th Article, The Subjects of France, Inhabitants of Canada, and elsewhere, shall not disturb or molest, in any Manner whatever, the Five Indian Nations which are subject to Great Britain, nor it's other American Allies.

Let us now fee how these Articles have been obferved. The French feem to have had two Capital Views in all their American Schemes, ever fince they have thought Trade and Commerce an Object worthy of their Attention. The first was to extend themfelves from Canada, Southwards, through the Lakes, along the Back of our Colonies; by which Means they might answer a double Purpofe, of cutting off our Communication with the Indian Nations, and of opening a Communication for themfelves, between the Rivers St. Lawrence and Missifippi, and thus to join, as it were, their Colo-

a Not having, in my Poffession, an Original Copy of the Treaty of Utrecht, I have made Use of Lamberti's Translation.

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nies of *Canada* and *Louifiana*. The other Part of their Plan, equally important, and more immediately fatal to our Interefts in *North America*, was to gain a Communication with the Ocean; the only Accefs they now have to *Canada*, through the River *St. Lawrence*, being flut up half the Year.

Full of this favorite Project of American Empire, foon after the Treaty of Utrecht, they began to enlarge their Boundaries on that Continent, in direct Violation of the folemn Conceffions they had fo lately made.

As long ago as 1720, they feized and fortified the most important Pass in America, at Niagara; in that very Country of the five Indian Nations, from which the 15th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht had excluded them. The infinite Confequence of Niagara made them less forupulous, no Doubt, about Treaties. For by Means of this Ufurpation they, in a Manner, became Masters of the Lakes, and could, at Leifure, extend themfelves to the Obio, and carry their Chain of Forts and Settlements down to the Missifippi.

The Plan of Usurpation on the Back of our Colonies went on gradually and fuccefsfully from Year to Year; the Indians owned by the Peace of Utrecht to be our Subjects, were debauched from our Interest, and spirited up to massacre, and scalp the English; and in 1731, the Infolence of the French grew to fuch an Heighth, that they erected their Fort at Crown-Point, in a Country indifputably ours ; whether confidered as in the Center of the five Nations, or as actually within the Limits of New-York. And whoever cafts his Eye upon the Situation of this Fort, in the Map, will fee how greatly the Poffeffion of it facilitated the Completion of the great Object of opening a Communication with the Ocean; and, how much it exposed our

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our most valuable Colonies to Indian Massacres and French Invasions.

If it should be asked, what was our Ministry in England employed about, during fuch Inftances of French Perfidy-the Answer must be, (tho' I with I could draw a Veil over this Period) that our Affairs were then conducted by a Minister who was awake, indeed, to every Scheme of Corruption; eager to buy a Borough, or to bribe a Member; but flow to every Measure of national Importance and Utility. His first, his only Object, was to preferve himfelf in Power; and as, in Profecution of fuch interested and mercenary Views, he had actually engaged this Nation in an Alliance with France, in Europe, (to pull down the exorbitant Power of our old and natural Ally) it was no Wonder, that he heard unmoved, and fuffered with Impunity, the French Usurpations in North America.

Let us next trace the French Infidelity with Regard to Nova Scotia or Acadia. Tho' that Province had been yielded to us at Utrecht, we had taken very few Steps to fettle it effectually, till 1749, after the Peace of Aix la Chapelle. And then the French Court gave us a Specimen of Chicane worthy, indeed, of those whom no Treaty ever bound, in Opposition to their Convenience: They began to fpeak out, and to tell us, nay to infift upon it ferioully in Memorials, that the Country ceded to us under the Name of Nova Scotia, comprehended only the Peninfula, and did not extend beyond the Isthmus. Whereas the Charters of King James I. to Sir William Alexander; and Sir William's own Map as old as the Charter, demonstrate that the ancient Limits of the Country fo named included a vaft Tract of Land, befides the Peninfula, reaching along the Coaft till it joined New England; and extending up the 3 Country

Country till it was bounded by the South Side of the River St. Laurence. Of fuch an Extent of Country they had formed a Plan to rob us; hoping, no Doubt, to find the fame Supinenefs in the Britifb Administration which had overlooked their former Encroachments. With this View they defired that Commiffaries might meet to fettle the Limits, promifing not to act in America, till those Commiffaries should agree, or the Conferences break up. But how was this Promife obferved ? While the Commiffaries trifled away their Time at Paris. the Usurpations went on in America; Incursions were frequently made into the Peninfula of Acadia, the Possession of which they did not pretend to difpute with us; Forts were built by them in feveral Places, and particularly a most important One to command the Isthmus; thus deciding by the Sword, in Time of full Peace, that Controverfy which they themfelves had agreed fhould be amicably adjusted by their Commissaries; and furnishing a lasting Warning to us, that a Treaty which leaves Points of Confeguence to be determined by any after Conferences, only ferves to light up another War.

While the French Ufurpations went on fo infolently in Nova Scotia; the Plan was carrying on with equal Perfidy on the Banks of the Ohio; a Country, the Inhabitants of which had been in Alliance with the English above an hundred Years ago; an Alliance frequently renewed; to which alfo we had a Claim as being a Conqueft of the Five Nations, and from which, therefore, the French were excluded by the 15th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht above recited. But what avail Treaties when Intereft comes in Competition? The Poffeffion of the Obio was abfolutely neceffary, that the great Plan of connecting Canada with Louifteof

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Lonifiana might fucceed: And, therefore, they began their Hostilities against us, in that Country, the very Year of the Peace of Aix-la Chapelle; opposed our Plan of a New Settlement (which had been thought of by us above forty Years before) infulted our Traders, plundered and made them Prisoners; and in 1754 having defeated Washington, and destroyed our Fort, they built their Fort Du Quesne; and Troops were fent daily from France to secure the Possession of this, and of their new and important Usurpations.

No Doubt the French Ministers flattered themfelves that England, inattentive to the Interests of its Colonies for fo many Years before, and who, fo lately, had fubmitted to a Difadvantageous Peace, would not have the Spirit to oppose Force to Force, and do itself Justice by other Weapons than the Complaints of Lord Albemarle, and the Memorials of Mr. Mildmay. But the Hour of Vengeance was, at laft, come; the Interefts of the Kingdom were attended to by those in Power; the infinite Importance of our American Colonies was understood, and a Refolution taken to have Recourse to Arms. And thus England, which, for half a Century, had been engaged in every Body's Quarrels but its own; wafting its Millions, and lavishing its Blood, to obtain a Barrier in Flanders, which those for whom we conquered it could not defend, or rather did not think it worth while to keep; began the prefent War, a War truly NA-TIONAL.

If there be Merit in this fpirited Conduct, tell your Enemies, My Lord, that you, and a near Relation of yours (whole Memory always will be refpected) had then the chief Direction of public Bufinefs. And you, Sir, will pardon me for paying this Compliment to those who began the War D with Spirit; while I, at the fame Time, declare it as my Opinion that your coming into Power after it was begun, has contributed to its being carried on with a Succefs equally glorious and important to the Nation.

But before I make the Application of the above Deduction concerning * our American Complaints (which I fhall, by and bye, make Ufe of, when I come to fpeak to the Terms which it will be neceffary to infift upon at the approaching Treaty) it will be proper to mention another most important Instance of French Perfidy in Europe.

Dunkirk, by its Situation almost opposite the Mouth of the Thames, had done amazing Mischief to the Trade of England, during King William's and Queen Anne's Wars. The Demolition of Dunkirk, therefore, very naturally become a favourite Object of the Nation; the Parliament, in 1708, addreffed her Majesty to make no Peace without this Condition +; and tho' after a War so fuccessful, much more might have been obtained for England than really

* For the Particulars of the French Encroachments in America, which I have only given a Sketch of, fee the Memorials of our Commiffaries, Dr. Mitchell's Contest in America; the Doctor's and Mr. Evan's Maps, and many other Treatifes.

+ March 2d 1708. The Lords having fent down an Addrefs to the Commons for their Concurrence, relating to certain Conditions to be infifted upon, as the fine qua non, of a Treaty with France, Mr. Secretary Boyle reprefented, That the Br t/B Nation having been at a vaft Expence of Blood and Treature, for the Profecution of this neceffary War, it was but juft they fhould reap fome Benefit by the Peace: And the Town of Dunkirk being a Neft of Pyrates, that infefted the Ocean and did infinite Mifchief to Trade, He, therefore, moved that the demolifhing of its Fortifications and Harbours be infifted upon, in the enfuing Treaty of Peace, and inferted in the Addrefs, which wa unanimoully approved of, and carried back to the Lords. See Ghandler's Debates of Parliament, Vol. vii. p. 122,

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was, this Point was carefully infifted upon, and the Ninth Article of the Peace of Utrecht obtained.

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By this Article, The French King engages to demolifh all the Fortifications of the City of Dunkirk; to ruin the Harbour: to break the Dykes and Sluices— The Works towards, the Sea to be deftroyed in Two Months, and those to the Land in Three Months after; all this to be done at his own Expence; and the Fortifications, Harbour, Dykes and Sluices, never after to be reftored. Could Words be devised in all the Extent of Language to flipulate, in a ftronger Manner, the effectual and speedy Demolition of this Place? And yet all Europe faw with Amazement, and England beheld with Indignation, the Peace of Utrecht violated, with Regard to this important Condition, almost as soon as it was figned.

By the Article above-recited we fee that Dunkirk was to be demolifhed within five Months after the figning the Peace; and yet, near an Year after, I find Mr. Walpole, in our Houfe of Commons, infifting that the Peace had already been broken with Regard to Dunkirk; Since inflead of ruining the Harbour, the French were then astually repairing the Sluices, and working on a new Canal *. And tho' the pacific Inclinations of the Ministry in 1713, when Mr. Walpole pushed this Affair, overruled the Inquiry, the Facts on which it would have proceeded were certain.

The *fpirited* Remonstrances of Lord Stair at *Paris*, on the Acceffion of *George* I. concerning this Infraction of the Peace, were the last Instances of Humiliation which *Lewis* XIV. faw himfelf exposed to; and, perhaps, he would have found himfelf obliged to do us that Justice, by Necef-

* Chandler's Debates, Vol. 8. p. 69.

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fity.

fity, which the Regent, who foon after came into . Power, willingly agreed to from Views of private Interest. Tho' the Peace of Utrecht had obliged the Spanish Branch of the Bourbon Family to renounce their Right of Succeffion to the Crown of France, the Duke of Orleans, who, by this Regulation, faw only an Infant's Life between him and the Throne, knew well, that tho' the Renunciation had been folemnly fworn to, the Doctrine of its Invalidity, of its being an Act, void, ab initio, had been publickly avowed. Torcy, as appears by his * Correspondence with Lord Bolingbroke, very frankly made no Scruple of telling the Englifb before Hand, that this Expedient, which had been deviled to prevent the Union of France and Spain under one Monarch, would be of little Force, as being inconfiftent with the fundamental Laws of France; by this Declaration giving us a very remarkable Inftance of the Weakness or of the Wickedness of our then Ministers, who could build the Peace of Europe on fo fandy a Foundation, and accept of Terms which France itself was honeft enough to own were not to be kept.

However, the Regent was refolved to fupport his Claim to the Crown of France, in Exclusion

* See the Report of the fecret Committee, p. 13. The following Extract from a Letter of Monfr. *Torcy* to Mr. St. John is remarkable. "The Renunciation defired would be null and "invalid by the fundamental Laws of *France*; according to "which Laws the moft near Prince to the Crown is, of Ne-"ceffity, the Heir thereto.— This Law is looked upon, as the "Work of him who hath eltablished all Monarchies, and we "are perfuaded in *France* that God only can abolish it. No "Renunciation, therefore, can deftroy it; and if the King of *Spain* should renounce it for the Sake of Peace, and in Obetedience to the King his Grandfather, they would deceive themfelves that received it as a fufficient Expedient to prevent the Mischief we propose to avoid."

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to the Spanish Branch; and as the Support and Affiftance of England was neceffary for this Purpole, it is not to be wondered at that he should court the Friendship of a Nation from whom he had so much to expect; and, therefore, he was wife enough to do us Justice, by carrying into Execution, in some Degree, the Article relating to Dunkirk.

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The perfonal Intereft of the Regent was the only Reafon for this Compliance: But fucceeding Administrations in France not being influenced by the fame private Views to adhere to Treaties folemnly ratified, Dunkirk began gradually to rife from its Ruins; its Port again received Ships; its Trade flourished; England faw itself deprived of this favourite Advantage gained at Utrecht; and fuch was the Atcendancy of French Councils over those of this Island, at the Period I speak of, that we were actually engaged in Alliances with France, while that Nation was thus openly infulting us, and infulting us, without Obstruction, in fo effential an Article. We all remember what paffed in Parliament in 1733, relating to the Point now before us .---- Such was the tame Acquiefcence of the British Administration, that Dunkirk, by this Time, flood upon our Cuftom Houfe Books as a Port, from whence great Imports were made; and when an Inquiry concerning this was proposed in the House of Commons by a great Parliament Man *, fince dead, the then Minister hung his Head, in the Houfe, for Shame. And who could have believed it poffible, that the fame Perfon, who had been fo ready to promote a Parliamentary Inquiry into this Violation of the Peace in 1713, should obstruct fuch an Inquiry, when he

* Sir William Wyndham.

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himfelf was in Power, tho' the Reafons for it had become much ftronger ? Who could fee Him, without Indignation, fhut his Eyes to the Re-eftablifhment of *Dunkirk*, and obftruct the propofed Inquiry, by getting from Cardinal *Fleury* (who then governed *France*, and, I blufh to fay it, *England* too) a delufive, minifterial Letter, promifing what he knew would not be performed;—and obtained, perhaps, only becaufe the Cardinal was affured, that the Breach of the Promife would not be refented?

While England remained fo averfe to do itfelf Juffice, no Wonder that France improved the Opportunity. At the Time when that Minister was obliged to retire from Power, the Re-eftablishment of Dunkirk was completed. For, within a few Months after *, we find a Memorial prefented by Lord Stair to the Dutch, complaining of this Violation of the Peace of Utrecht, and urging this as a Reason for their joining us against France. And as it is for the Honour of the Administration then entering into Office, that they began with Meafures fo fpirited and national, it is equally remarkable, that the fame Perfon, who had threatened Louis XIV. in his own Palace, for his Slownefs in demolishing Dunkirk, lived to be again employed by his Country at the Diftance of near thirty Years, when the Reftoration of Dunkirk became an Object of national Refentment.

The two Nations had not, as yet, begun the late War, when we faw, in One Inftance, both a Proof that Dunkirk was again a Port, and a Port which may be made Use of, to endanger the Safety of Britain. At the Time I now speak of \dagger , we

> * The Memorial is dated July 1, 1742. + In 1743-4.

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beheld the Harbour of *Dunkirk* crowded with Transports to embark Count Saxe and the Pretender to invade us. And, if that Invasion had then taken Effect, from that very Port which was to be no Port (happily the Winds were contrary to the Fleet from Breft) the infinite Mischief which this Nation may fuffer from its Re-establishment, would have been fatally experienced.

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Though we have no great Reafon to brag of the Treaty made at the Conclusion of the laft War (which I am ashamed to call a Peace, as it fettled nothing that was before in Doubt between the two Nations) the Peace of Utrecht concerning Dunkirk, was, nevertheles in its most effential Part, reflored to its full Force. I fay, in its most Effential Part; because, though the 17th Article of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle left Dunkirk in the State it then was, with Regard to its Fortifications to the Land; the fame Article revived our Right, to the Demolition of its Port, by stipulating That ancient Treaties are to be observed in Regard to the Port, and the Works on the Sea fide.

Little or nothing was done between the Conclufion of the Peace, and the breaking out of the prefent War, towards carrying into Execution this fresh Promile. On the contrary, the enlarging of the Fortifications of Dunkirk, is mentioned in his Majefty's Declaration of War, three Years ago, as one of the fresh Heads of Injury offered to Eng-And whoever reflects upon the Transactions, land. fince that Period, will fee that Dunkirk is reftored to its original Importance. Its Privateers have done infinite Mischief to our Trade; a Squadron of his Majefty's Navy, in vain blocked up its Harbour lately, to prevent the failing of Thurst's Fleet; and, it is well known, that the long threatened Invalion of these Kingdoms, which France, in Despair, certainly meditated, would have

have been attempted from this Place, if the Deftruction of their Ships of War by Hawke, had not taught them the Abfurdity of invading us in their much celebrated flat bottom Boats, which, we may well suppose, will hardly be tried, when their Fleets, really formidable, have been destroyed in the Attempt.

The above Enumeration of French Infidelities, in general, and in particular their Behaviour to England with regard to Dunkirk, and with regard to North-America, fo naturally points out the Expediency, and Necessity of the Hints I fhall now offer, that, in proposing them, I may well hope not to have them ridiculed as the Reveries of a chimerical St. Pierre, but rather attended to, as the fober Dictates of Prudence, and of a Zeal not altogether devoid of Knowlege.

First, Then, my Lord and Sir, before you enter upon any New Treaty, or listen to any plausible Proposals whatever, insist that Justice may be done this Nation, with regard to former Treaties. Shew France the strong, the solemn Engagement she entered into at Utretcht to demolish Dunkirk; put her in Mind of the amazing Persidy with which she, from Time to Time, eluded the Performance of that Engagement; and demand immediate Justice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity in the ensuing Negociation.

Be not deceived any longer in this Matter. The French will, no doubt, affure you that the Demolition of Dunkirk fhall be an Article in the New Treaty. But let them know, you are not to be fo imposed upon. They will, to be fure, when this becomes a new Article, reckon it a new Conceffion on their Side, and expect fomething in return for it,—perhaps Guadaloupe, or fome fuch Trifle, as they will call it. But tell them with the Firmnefs of wise Conquerors, that the Demolition of Dunkirk Dunkirk is what you are initiled to by Treaties made long ago, and violated; and that it fhall not be fo much as mentioned in the infuing Negociation, but complied with, before that Negociation fhall commence.

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Or, admitting that no Conceffion fhould be required by *France* in the New Treaty, in Confideration of a New Article to demolifh *Dunkirk*, place to them, in the ftrongeft Light, the unanfwerable Reafons we have against putting any Confidence in them, that fuch an Article would be better executed, than that in the treaty of *Utrecht* has been.

If they refufe doing us this immediate Juffice, previous to the Peace; alk them how they can expect that we fhould have any Reliance on their Sincerity to fulfill the New Engagements they may enter into, when they afford us fo ftrong, fo glaring an Inftance of Infidelity, in an Article of fuch Confequence, made fo many Years ago? Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refufes this, at the very Time he is treating, affords you fuch manifeft Proof, that his Word is not to be relied upon, and that you cannot truft to the Execution of any Promife ever fo folemnly made?

Perhaps France may think it a Difgrace to them, to comply with any Thing previous to the beginning of a Negociation. Tell them, that acting honourably, and doing what Juffice requires, can never be difgraceful. But if it be a Difgrace, tell them, with the Spirit of honeft Men, that we owe it them, for the greater Difgrace they put, not long ago, upon us, by requiring us to fend two Peers of this Realm to remain in France as Hoftages, till we furrendered Louifburg; an Indignity which I cannot call to mind, without Pain; and which, I always thought was fubmitted to without Neceffity. It is now our Turn to vindicate the Honour of our Nation; and as *Dunkirk* was put into our Poffeffion before the Treaty of *Utrecht*, as a Pledge of the *French* Sincerity, and to continue in our Poffeffion, till the Demolition fhould be completed; let fome fuch Expedient be now agreed upon; with this Difference only, that inftead of *five Months after the Peace*, the Time fixed, for the Demolition, at *Utrecht*, let no Peace be figned, at prefent, till this Right acquired to us by former Treaties, and of which we have been fo perfidioufly robbed, be actually carried into full Execution.

However, if any infuperable Difficulties fhould attend the doing ourfelves Justice, on this Head, before the Peace; if, for Instance, which perhaps may be the Cafe, it should be found that it cannot be complied with, un'efs we confent to a Cellation of Arms, during the Time of Negociation ; rather than give France that Opportunity of recovering from its Diftreffes, and of being protected from the Superiority of our Arms, before we have, finally, obliged them to accept of our own Terms of Peace (which was one Caufe of the Ruin of our Negociation at Utrecht) I would wave infifting upon the Demolition of Dunkirk, before the Treaty, and think it fufficient to demand Hoftages from them, as a Security that it shall be faithfully complied with, within a limited Time after the Treaty shall be concluded. The Parifians had two English Milords to ftare at, upon the laft Peace; and I do not fee why the Curiofity of our Londoners should not be gratified, in the fame Way; and Two Ducs & Pairs of France be fent as Hoftages to England, till Dunkirk ceafe to be a Port.

I know well, that Political Opinions, concerning the Importance of any particular Object, are as frequently dictated by Whim and Fashion, as built

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on folid Reafon and Experience. Perhaps, fome may think, that this is the Cafe, with Regard to the Neceffity of demolishing Dunkirk. But, tho' it may not at prefent be fo favorite an Object of National Politics, as it was in the Queen's Time ; this has not been owing to any real Change of Circumstances; but to another Cause, to the American Difputes between the two Nations, which have been the great Object of the prefent War, and fcarcely permitted us, hitherto, to reflect, in what other Instances, the Infidelities of France must be checked at the infuing Peace.-But as this defirable Event now approaches, we cannot forget, or forgive the Behaviour of our Enemies with Regard to Dunkirk; and it will be equally necessary for the Honour and for the Interest of this Nation to make no Peace, without obtaining full Satisfaction on this Head. It will be neceffary for the Honour ot the Nation to infift upon this, if it were only, to fhew to Europe in general, and to France in particular-That we have too much Spirit not to refent Injuries; and too much Wildom not to take Care, when we have it happily in our Power, to prevent them for the future.-But the Demolition of Dunkirk, is also neceffary, if we would take Care of the Interest of the Nation. Such hath been our Success, in deftroying the Navy of France; and fo unable doth that Kingdom now appear, to carry on its ambitious Projects by Land, and to vie at the fame Time, with England, for Dominion on the Sea; that we may reafonably fuppole, there is an End of Brest and Toulon Squadrons, 10 face our Fleets ; and a future War with England, will leave the French no other Way of diffreffing us by Sea, than to lie in watch for our Merchant Ships, with numberless Privateers. In fuch a piratical War, Dunkirk, if its Harbour be not now destroyed, E 2 Will,

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will, too late, be found to be of infinite Confequence; and we thall fatally experience it again, what it was in the Queen's Time, and in the Language of her Parliament, a Neft of Pyrates, infefting the Ocean, and doing infinite Mifchief to Trade *.

For these Reasons, therefore, I am so old-fashioned as to expect that our Plenipotentiaries will have this Point properly stated to them in their Instructions, and that Delenda est Carthago, Demolish Dunkirk, will be a Preliminary Article in the ensuing Negociation.

The War having begun, principally, with a View to do ourfelves Juffice in North America, the Regulation of Matters, on that Continent, ought to be, and no Doubt, will be, the capital Article relating to England, in the coming Treaty. It will be neceffary, therefore, to give you my Sentiments, on this Head; and while I do it, with all becoming Diffidence, I fhall, at the fame Time, fupport what I may offer, with Reafons appearing fo ftrong to me, as may perhaps recommend it to your farther Confideration, though it fhould fail of producing Conviction.

Now it is with the greateft Pleafure, I would obferve, that with Regard to North America, we have nothing to afk, at the Peace, which we have not already made outfelves Mafters of, during the War We have been bleffed by Heaven, with a Succefs, in that Part of the World, fcarcely to be paralleled in Hiftory. The Rafhnefs of Braddock, the Inexperience of Shirley, the Inactivity of Loudonn, and the Ill-fuccefs of Abercrombie, feem only to have been fo many neceffary Means of producing that Unanimity in our Colonies, that Spirit in our

* See above, p. 18.

Troops;

Troops ; and that fleady Perfeverance in our Minifters, as hath not only recovered from the Enemy all his Ufurpations, but Louisburg is an English Harbour; Quebec, the Capital of Canada, is already in our Poffeffion; and the Reft of that Country will fall of Courfe. It is a Profpect still more agreeable; that by deftroying the Naval Force of France, our North American Conquests cannot be retaken ; and the Principle I would now lay down, and which I would recommend it to you to adopt, is, not to give up any of them. And I shall now endeavour to prove to you, that such a Demand may be infifted upon, without giving the Enemy any Pretence for accufing us of Infolence towards them ; and cannot be omitted without giving the Nation just Reason to complain, that we have confented to a treacherous and delusive Peace.

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It cannot, furely, ever enter the Imagination of a British Administration, to make Peace, without, at leaft, keeping in our Poffeffion, all those Places, where the French had fettled themfelves, in Violation of former Treaties, and from which we have. fortunately, driven them. Upon this Plan, then, we shall, at the Peace, be left in Possession not only of the Peninfula of Acadia, but of All Nova Scolia, according to its old Limits ; the Bay of Fundi, and the River St. John .- The important Conquests of Crown Point, and Niagara, will not be relinquished; and Fort du Quesne, and the Country near the Obio, will remain Ours .---- They are already Ours ; the French know they cannot get them back during the War, and they do not expect that we shall give them up at the Peace.

But though Care fhould be taken to keep all those Places just mentioned; fomething more must be done, or our American Colonies will tell you you have have done *Nothing*. In a Word, you must keep *Canada*, otherways you lay the Foundation of another War.

The Neceffity of this may be placed in fo ftriking a View, as to filence the *French* Plenipotentiaries, and to convince all *Europe*, of the *Justice* of our Demand.

Afk the French, what Security they can give you, if we reftore Canada to them, however reftrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence? If the Treaty of Utrecht could not keep them from Encroachments, what Reafon can we have to fuppofe the future Treaty will be better observed? If the French are left at Montreal, and the three Rive's. can we be certain they will not again crois the Champlain Lake, and attack Crown-Point ? If the River St. Lawrence be still theirs, what is to infure us against an Expedition to Niagara? Can we flatter ourfelves, that a People, who in full Peace, erected those two Fortreffes, in direct Violation of their Faith plighted at Utresht, will be reftrained, by any future Treaty, from attempting, alfo in full Peace, to recover them? After having feen the French carrying on a regular Plan of Ufurpation, in North America, for these Forty Years past, shall we be fo weak as to believe that they will now lay it alide ? No, depend upon it, if the French hink it worth their while to afk back that Part of North America, which was their own, they mean to take a proper Opportunity, of Elbowing all our Colonies round about, and of refuming the fame ambitious Views of Enlargement which the most facred Ties of former Treaties could not reftrain.

The Truth of the Matter is, they were tired of *Canada*. The Inclemency of the Climate, the difficult Accels to it; and a Trade fearcely defray-

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ing the Expence of the Colony, would long ago have induced them to abandon it, if the Plan of extending its Boundaries, at the Expence of the English; and of opening its Communication with Louifiana and with the Ocean, had not made them perfevere. --- Canada itfelf is not worth their afking; and if they do defire to have it reftored to them, it can only be with a View to repeat the fame Injuries and Infidelities, to punifh which, we engaged in the prefent War. Unlefs, therefore, we be refolved, with our Eyes open, to expose ourfelves to a Repetition of former Encroachments; unlefs we would choose to be obliged to keep great Bodies of Troops, in America, in full Peace, at an immense Expence; we can never confent to leave the French any Footing in Canada. If we do not exclude them, abfolutely and entirely from that Country ; we fhall foon find we have done nothing. Let the Treaty be drawn ever fo accurately; let the Boundaries between Canada and our Colonies, be defcribed ever fo precifely, and regulated ever fo much, in our Favour; what has happened already, ought to teach us what we may expect again; the future Treaty will be observed no better than the former have been; Ufurpation and Encroachment will gradually revive; and thus shall we have thrown away all our Succeffes; fo many Millions will have been expended to no Purpofe; and the Blood of fo many thousands of our brave Countrymen spilt, only to remind us, that though we knew how to conquer, we knew not how to improve, perhaps, the only Opportunity we shall ever have, of putting it out of the Power of France to violate its Faith.

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I take it for granted that, in the future Negociation, the Ifland of *Cape Breton* will follow the Fate of *Quebec*; I fhall only observe with Regard

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to it, that though the Harbour and Fortification of Louisbourg be of infinite Service to France ; it can be of little or no Uie to England, if Canada be left to us. It is of Confequence to France, as a Retreat to their Ships fifting on the neighbouring Banks of Newfoundland; and as a Security to the Entrance of the Gulph of St. Laurence. But the Poffeffion of Newfoundland itfelf, makes Louisbourg of no Utility to the English, in the former Respect; and Halifax, where we have a good Harbour, anfwers very nearly the latter Purpofe. Upon this View therefore, may we not hope and expect, that, the Neceffity of garrifoning Louisbourg having ended with the Conquest of Quebec, its Fate will be determined, without troubling the French Plenipotentiaries ? Without waiting for a Congress, let Orders be forthwith fent to demolifh it, fo as not to leave one Stone upon another, of the Fortifications ; to remove the Inhabitants to Nova Scotia, a better Country; and to leave the Island, a bare and barren Rock; the State it was in, before the Peace of Utrecht gave Leave to France to fortify it. If the Right given to the French by the 13th Article of the fame Peace, to Fifh in fome Parts of those Seas should be continued (and I could with to fee it continued, as the Refufal of it would be rather unreasonable) let Cape Breton unfortified, and ungarrifoned be left open to them; and a few Men of War kept at Halifax, will effectually prevent Louilbourg's being again made a Place of Strength.

If you adopt this Measure, I should be inclined to think, France will see that you know your true Interests; and that you are refolved steadily to purfue them. And it they should make any Remonstrances against it, tell them they may follow our Example and demoliss, if they please, the Fortifications of Mahon; which we see them possibles with with as great Indifference as we remember the Circumitances of its Lofs, with Shame : Which, as being of no Ufe to them they will not defire to keep, and which, having been kept, by us, at an Expence, not counterbalanced by its Utility, we fhall not be very fanguine about recovering. Or, rather tell them, that in demolifhing *Louifbourg*, before the Peace, we only copy a former Example given us by themfelves, when their Troops were employed in difmantling the Frontier Towns in *Flanders*, at the very Time that their Plenipotentiaries at *Aix la Chapelle* were confenting to give them up.

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The Plan which I have had the Honour of sketching out to you, befides being fo reafonable in itfelf, is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expressed by his Majefty, in his Speech, of not baving entered into the War with Views of Ambilion. The Poffeffion of Canada, is no View of Ambition; it is the only Security the French can give us, for their future Regard to Treaties. We have made other Conquests, of great Importance, our Management of which will give us fufficient Means of shewing our Moderation. And though I shall not prefume to give any Opinion about the future Disposal of them, I think, however, I may be allowed to hint, that " the Poffeffion of Guadaloupe," an additional fugar island, when we have fo many of our own, ought not to be infifted upon fo ftrenuoufly as to make it a neceffary Condition of the Peace. And though " Senegal and Goree" are of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own African Settlements have hitherto supplied us with Slaves, sufficient for our American Purposes : And the Trade for Gum is, perhaps, not of Confequence enough to make us Amends for the annual Mortality, which we already lament, of our brave Countrymen, to guard our African Conquests. The People People of England, therefore, will not, I believe, blame the giving them back, for a valuable Confideration, — provided Canada be left to us.

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To confiler this Affair in its proper Light, it will be neceff ry to reflect on the infinite Confequence of North America to this Country. Our Colonies there contain above a Million of Inhabitints, who are mostly supplied with the Manufactures of Great Britain; our Trade to them, by employing innumerable Ships, is one great Source of our maritime Strength; by fupporting our Sugar Iflands with their Provisions, and other Neceffaries, they pour in upon us all the Riches of the West I dies; we carry their Rice, and Tobacco, and Fifh, to all the Markets of Europe; they produce Indigo, and Iron ; and the whole Navy of England may be equipped, with the Products of English America. And if, notwithstanding our having loft feveral Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed in Europe and to the Levant, we have still more Commerce than ever ; a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vaft Increase of our fhipping; what can this be owing to, but to the Trade to our own American Colonies; a Trade which the Succeffes of this War, will render, every Day, more and more advantageous ? If this Matter, then, be confidered, in the above Light, by the fe whom I now address, they will make our North American Conquests the fine qua non of the Peace, as being the only Method of guarding our invaluable Possessions there, from Usurpations and Encro chments; and they will look upon every other Conquest, we have made, or may make, in other Parts of the World, as Inftruments put into our Hands by Providence, to enable us to fettle Affairs on the Continent of Europe, as advantageoully to our Allies, as our Gratitude could wifh, and as their Fidelity doth deferve.

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Here, then, let me change the Scene, and having fettled our Affairs in *Canada* (would to God they were fo fettled at the Peace!) permit me to finifh my Plan of Negociation, by giving my Sentiments on the Part we ought to act, to obtain a proper Settlement of Affairs in *Germany*.

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If a great Number of Allies can make themfelves formidable to a common Enemy, during the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin every Advantage they may have gained, by quarrelling amongst themselves, when they begin their Negociations for Peace. Like an Opposition, in our Parliament, carried on against an overgrown Minister, all Sorts of Parties and Connexions, all Sorts of difagreeing and contradictory Interests, join against him, at first, as a common Enemy; and tolerable Unanimity is preferved amongst them, fo long as the Fate of this Parliamentary War continues in Sufpence. But when once they have driven him to the Wall, and think themfelves fure of Victory; the Jealoufies and Sufpicions, which, while the Contest depended, had been stifled, break out; every one who shared in the Fatigue, expects to fhare in the Spoils; feparate Interests counteract each other; separate Negociations are set on Foot; till at last, by untimely and m rcenary Divifions, they lofe the Fruits of their Victory, and the Object of the common Refentment is able to make Terms for himfelf *. ---- This was exactly the Cafe, in the Contest between Lewis XIV. and the Princes of Europe united against him, before the Peace of Utrecht; and the unhappy Divisions of the Allies (Divisions too likely to have fprung up,

* The true Hiftory of the Tranfaction here alluded to, may, poffibly, fome Time or other, appear; though, as yet, we are perfuaded, the World knows very little of it.

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I have mentioned this, with a View to obferve, that the Circumftances of the prefent War on the Continent are very different; no fuch unfortunate Difunion feems possible to happen to us, though it may happen amongst the Confederates who are engaged on the fame Side with *France*, against *Hano*ver and the King of *Pruffia*.

It may be collected from more than one Hint dropt in the Course of this Letter, that I am no Friend to Continental Measures in general; especially fuch continental Meafures as engaged us during the three laft Wars, as Principals; when we feemed eager to ruin ourfelves, in Support of that Austrian Family whom we now find, with unparalleled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in close Alliance with France. ---- But the Continental Meafures now adopted by England were necessary, both with Regard to Our Honour and Our Intereft. Hanover has been attacked by France, on a Quarrel entirely English; and tho' Care was taken, by the Act of Settlement, that England should not be involved in Wars on account of Hanover; yet Gratitude, Honour, the Reputation of our Country, every Motive of Generofity, bound us, not to allow the innocent Electorate to be ruined for England's American Quarrel with France. In Regard to our Interest, no English Minister, however inflexible, in his Attachment to his native Country, could have devifed the Means of making the belt Use of our American Conquests, if the French could have treated with Hanover in their Hands. It was with

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with a View to prevent this, to oppofe the French in their Projects in Germany, the Success of which would have been to detrimental to England, that we bonestly and wisely have formed and have maintained the Army now commanded by Prince Ferdinand; and have entered into an Alliance with the King of Prussia.

But tho' this was a Meafure of Prudence, it was fcarcely poffible for the wifeft Statefmen to forefee all those great Confequences which it hath already produced. The Efforts which the French have made in Germany, and the Refistance they have there met with by the Care of the British Administration; have contributed more than perhaps we could expect, to our Success in America, and other Parts of the World. Full of the Project of conquering Hanover, France faw herfelf obliged to engage in exorbitant Expences; Armies were to be paid, and maintained in Westphalia and on the Rhine; vaft Sums were to be advanced to the Court of Vienna always as indigent as it is haughty; the ravenous Russians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not move, unless allured by Subfidies; and the Mouth of every hungry German Prince was to be ftopt, with the Louis D'ors of France. Involved in Expences thus enormous, our Enemies have been prevented from ftrengthening themfelves at Sea, where England had most Reason to dread their becoming ftrong.

The infinite Advantages which this Nation hath reaped from the German War, are indeed now fo well underftood, that we have feen the greateft Enemies of this Meafure acknowledge their Miftake. They now confess that if we had not refifted France, in her Projects of German Conquests, her best Troops had not been destroyed; her own Coasts would have been better protected; she would

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would have been able to pay more Attention, to her American Concerns; England might have been threatned, fo ferioufly, with Invafions, as to be afraid of parting with those numerous Armies which have conquered, at fuch a Diftance of Time. In a Word, that universal Bankruptcy, which hath crowned the Diftreffes of France, and gives England greater Reafon of Exultation, than any Event of the War, might have been prevented. It is entirely owing to the German Part of the War that France appears thus low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches; that fhe is found to be a finking Monarchy, nay a Monarchy already funk. And, perhaps, it might be an Inquiry worthy of another Montesquieu, to affign the Causes of the Rife and Fall of the French Monarchy; and to point out those filent Principles of Decay which have, in our Times, made so rapid a Progress, that France, in 1712, after upwards of twenty Years almost constant War, maintained against all Europe, was still more respectable, and less exhausted than it now appears to be, when the fingle Arm of Great Britain is lifted up against her, and the War has lafted no more than three or four Years.

If this then be the State of the War in Germany; if England be bound to take a Part in it, by every Motive of Honour and Intereft; and if the infinite Advantagesit hath already produced, be ftated fairly—the Inference I would draw, and which I believe the whole Nation will alfo draw, is, that we fhould continue to exert those Endeavours which hitherto have been fo effectual, in defeating the Defigns of France to get Possefilion of Hanover.

His Majefty, as Elector of Hanover, has no Views of Ambition: His Country has been attacked only because it belonged to the King of Great Britain: and nothing more is required of us, but to be true to ourselves, by neglecting no Step that may preven vent Hanover from falling again into the Hands of France, after having been to miraculoufly refcued. from the Contributions of the repacious Richlieu, and faved from the Military Defert of Belleisle .- I need not fay any Thing of the Glory acquired by that Army, which notwithstanding it's great Inferiority, hath driven the French twice from the Wefer to the Rhine. I shall only observe, that the next Campaign (if another Campaign should preceed the Peace) will, in all Probability, lofe us none of the Advantages we have gained, on that Side; if our Army, still headed by Prince Ferdinand who has already gained fo many Laurels, be rendered more formidable, as I hope it will, by fending to it some Thousands more of our national Troops ; who now, fince the Conquest of Canada, and the Defeat of the long threatned Invafion, have no other Scene of Action left, but to contribute to another Victory in Germany.

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It would be a very pleafing Prospect, if we could speak with equal Confidence, and Probability of Success, concerning the future Operations of the King of Prussia. However, when we reflect on the amazing Difficulties he has had to ftruggle with; attacked on every Side by a Number of Confederates, each of whom, fingly, one would have thought, an equal Match for his whole Strength; bearing up, at the fame Time, against the formidable Power of the House of Austria; the brutal Ferocity of the Russians; the Attacks of the Swedes; the Armies of the Empire; and, at one Time, having the additional Weight of the French Arms upon him; when, I fay, we reflect on the uncommon Difficulties this magnanimous Prince has to refift, we must rather express our Wonder, and our Satisfaction that his Situation is still fo respectable, than indulge our Fears, that it is likely to be worfe. The fevereft

eft Checks he has met with during this War, have only ferved to fhew how calm he poffeffes himfelf under Diftrefs, and how ably he can extricate himfelf. The Hour of Adverfity has called forth all his Abilities, and if he has failed fome times, from too great an Eagernefs to conquer, he has always been able to retrieve his Affairs, and like *Anteus*, gained frefh Strength from every Overthrow.

And, upon this Principle, I flatter myfelf, his Prussian Majefty will still be able to fecure to himfelf the great r Part, if not the whole of Saxony for his Winter Quarters, and to recruit his Army, no Doubt much shattered with it's Loffes and Fatigues, before the opening of another Campaign. It is to be hoped alfo, that befides the amazing Refources He has ftill left in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous and effectual Support which his Connexion with England, affords him; the Power of the Confederacy against him may be broken, by difuniting the Confederates. Hiftory fatisfies us how feldom a Confederacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a fingle Powerattacked. I have given one Inftance of thisalready, when I fpoke of the Grand Alliance against Lewis XIV. and the League of Cambray against the Venetians, in the 16th Century, is an Instance still more remarkable.

But, if contrary to our Hopes, our Wilhes, our Endeavours, this fhould fail; if his *Pruffian* Majefty, like a Lion caught in the Toils (after a Refiftance already made, which will hand him down to Pofterity as the greateft of Men) fhould at laft be unable to defend himfelf; let him not defpair while he is in Alliance with *Britain*: For I would inculcate a Doctrine, which I th nk will not be unpopular

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unpopular amongst my Countrymen, and which, therefore, I hope, will not be opposed by our Minifters, That whatever Conquests we have made, and whatever Conquests we may still make, upon the French, except North America, which must be kept all our own; should be looked upon as given back to France for a most important Consideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Pruffia from any unforeseen Distress.

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Perhaps my Notions on this Subject may feem to border on Enthusiasim; but, however, I cannot but be perfuaded, that Things are come to that Pafs in Germany, that the Ruin of the King of Prussia will be foon followed by the Ruin of the Proteftant Religion in the Empire The blind Zeal of the bigotted Austrian Family will have no Check, if the Head and Protector of the German Proteftants be deftroyed; and the War begun only to wreft Silefia from him, will, in the End, be found to be a War that will overturn the Liberties and Religion of Germany. If, therefore, the noble Perfeverance of the King of Pruffia deferves the Effeem of a generous People; if his Fidelity to his Engagements, which has contributed to fave Hanover and to ruin France, can demand our Gratitude; if the Danger of the only Protestant Sovereign in Germany, able to preferve the Privileges of his Religion from being trampled under Foot, can call forth the warm Support of this Protestant Nation; may I not hope, may I not be confident, that our Ministers will dictate, and our People approve of Terms of Peace in his Favour, tho' they fhould be purchased by relinquishing fome of our Conquests; while the Possession of Canada will be fo reafonable a Bound to the Demands we may make for ourfelves ? I Harrenne our RTVC

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I have flated this Point, upon a Supposition that the Event of the War may turn out to the Difadvantage of the King of Pruffia. But if the Fortune, the Capacity, the Perfeverance of that Great Prince, should enable him (as I think we may still hope) to extricate himself from the Dangers that furround him-it may be afked, What is to be done with the Conquefts which, befides Canada, we shall be in Possession of when we treat of a Peace ?- My Propofal is honeft, and perhaps will not be treated as chimerical: Employ them to recover out of the Hands of France those Towns of Flanders, gained for the Austrian Family by the Valour, and at the Expence of England; and which have been fo perfidioufly facrificed. A Britif Administration must tremble at the Profpect of feeing Newport and Oftend become French Property, and, therefore, fhould use their utmost Endeavours to prevent this at the Peace; tho' those Endeavours may ferve the Court of Vienna, whofe Ingratitude to Britain never will be forgotten; tho', at the fame Time, I must own we shall draw no small Advantage from it. We shall learn, for the future, to prefer our own Interest to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the Continent to the immediate Exigencies of our own Country, and never to affift a new Ally, without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what Return we have had !

I have, now, nearly executed my principal Defign, in the prefent Addrefs; which was to give my Thoughts on the important Bufinefs of the approaching Treaty. And if it be conducted with as much Ability, as the War has been carried on with Spirit and Succefs, there is great Room for flattering ourfelves, that the Voice of the Publick demands no Advantages or Ceffions, in Favour of *Eng*-

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England, which the Ministers of England are not refolved to infift upon.

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But amidft the fignal Succeffes of our Arms, which give us fo reafonable an Expectation of an honourable Peace, and have exalted our Country to the highest Pinnacle of Glory and Reputation abroad-I with it could be faid that our Constitution was not greatly in Danger of being hurt, and almost lost, at Home .- I shall beg Leave to take this Occafion of touching this equally melancholy and important Subject ; with a View, not to blame, but to lament; not to bring any railing Accufation against those who are now in Power, but to exhort and to excite them to endeavour, before it be too late, to add to the Services they have done their Country, in faving it from the open Attacks of France, the ftill more important Service of faving our Confti tution, which fome unhappy Circumstances of our prefent Situation have already greatly changed, and feem to threaten with intire Deftruction ;- Nay, I may fay, would have actually deftroyed, if it were not for the good Heart of our gracious Sovereign, who fcorns to take Advantage of them.

Confiderably above an hundred Millions of Debt, the Sum we must be obliged to fit down with, at the End of the prefent War, is a Burthen which, however immense, Experience has taught us, contrary to all Theory, we shall be able to bear without Bankruptcy. As our Expences have increased, we have found, contrary to the Predictions of gloomy Politicians, that our Abilities to bear them have increased alfo .- But tho' our Debts be not too great for the Riches of our Country, they are much too great for the Independency of its Conftitution. For, when I confider the infinite Dependance upon the Crown, created by Means of Them, throughout the Kingdom, amongst all Degrees of G 2 Men ;

Men; when I reflect on the many Thousands of Placemen, of every Denomination, who are employed in the Collection of the vaft Variety of Taxes now levied on the Public; and take a Review of a far greater Number of Servants of the Crown, both Civil and Military, for whofe Support fo confiderable a Share of the public Revenue is fet apart, too many of whom, I fear, might be tempted to affift in extending the Influence of the Prerogative to the Prejudice of public Liberty; when I confider our vast Load of Taxes, in this Point of View, I cannot help obferving the amazing Revolution in our Government which this fingle Article has brought about ; nor enough lament the unhappy Circumftances of Affairs, and the Neceffities of the War which have forced us to an annual Expence, unknown to former Times, and which will almost be incredible to Posterity. I believe I can venture to fay upon Memory, that the Expences of the War, for all King William's Reign, about 13 Years, were not, at a Medium, above 3 Millions and a half a Year; and Queen Anne's, tho' the laft Years were exorbitant, were little more than 5 Millions. What they are now I figh to think on. Twelve or Fourteen Millions are demanded without Referve; and, what is ftill more, voted without Oppolition. Nay, of fo little Confequence is it now thought, by our Reprefentatives, to deliberate on the weighty Bufinefs of raifing Money on the Subject, that fcarcely can Forty of them be got together, to hear the Eftimates for at least One bundred and four score Thousand Men, for fo many we have now in our Pay; and to borrow Eight Millions, the Sum by which our Expences exceed our Income.

These are alarming Confiderations; but another Object, no less threatening the Ruin of our Constitution, also presents itself. I am old enough to remember what Uneafinefs and Jealoufies diffurbed the Minds of all true Patriots, with regard to ftanding Armies, and military Eftablishments. Principles of Liberty in general, and, in particular, Whig Principles, excited this Uneafinefs and produced those Jealousies, which, from Time to Time, have been a fruitful Source of Parliamentary Debate. It was no longer ago than the late King's Time, that the vefting Courts Martial, in Time of Peace, with the Power of punishing Mutiny and Defertion with Death, was carriedin the Houfe of Commons by a fmall Majority *. Nay, that a Court Martial, however limited in its Jurisdiction, was inconfistent with the Liberties of a free People, in Time of Peace, was the Doctrine of Whigs in those Days ; it was the Doctrine, in particular, of Sir Robert Walpole then in Oppofition ; whofe remarkable Expression, in this great Debate, " That they who gave the Power of Blood, gave Blood," never can be forgotten. And though afterwards when he came to be a Minister, he was better reconciled to standing Armies and Mutiny Bills, in Time of Peace, seventeen thousand Men, was all the Army he durst ask; yet even that Demand produced an annual Debate; and the annual Reafon, on which he founded the Neceffity of his Demand - being the Danger from the Pretender and the Jacobites; was the ftrongeft Proof, that even in Sir R. Walpole's Opinion, the Reduction in the Army should take Place, when this Danger from Difaffection should cease. But how are Things changed ? - I own indeed that amidft the Dangers of this War, and the Threats of an Invation, the vaft Army now on our Efta-

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In 1717-18 the Numbers on the Division were 247 to 220. bliftblifhment, is neceffary: But what I lament is to fee the Sentiments of the Nation fo amazingly reconciled to the Profpect of having a far more numerous Body of regular Troops, kept up, after the Peace, than any true Lover of his Country in former Times thought, could be allowed without endangering the Conftitution. Nay, fo unaccountably fond are we become of the military Plan, that the Erection of Barracks, which, twenty Years ago, would have ruined any Minifter who fhould have ventured to propose it, may be proposed fafely by our Minifters now a-Days and, upon Trial, be found to be a favourite Measure with our Patriots, and with the Public in general.

But what I lament as the greateft Misfortune that can threaten the public Liberty, is to fee the Eagerness with which our Nobility, born to be the Guardians of the Conflitution against Prerogative, folicit the Badge of military Subjection, not merely to ferve their Country, in Times of Danger, which would be commendable, but in Expectation to be continued Soldiers, when Tranquillity shall be reflored, and to be under military Command, during Life. When I fee this ftrange, but melancholy Infatuation, fo prevalent, I almost despair of the Conflitution. If it should go on in Proportion as it has of late, I fear the Time will, at laft, come, when Independence on the Crown, will be exploded as unfashionable. Unless another Spirit poffess our Nobility; unlefs they lay afide their Military Trappings; and think they they can ferve their Country more effectually as Senators than as Soldiers, what can we expect but to fee, the Syftem of military Subordination extending itself throughout the Kingdam, univerfal Dependance upon Government nfluencing every Rank of Men, and the Spirit, nay

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nay the very Form of the Conflitution deftroyed? We have generally beaten the French, and always been foolifh enough to follow their Fafhions; I was in Hopes we fhould never have taken the Fafhion of French Government; but from our numerous Armies, and the military Turn of our Nobility, I am afraid we are running into it as faft as we can. And, unlefs fomething can be done, to bring back our Conflitution to its firft Principles, we fhall find, that we have triumphed, only to make ourfelves as wretched as our Enemy; that our Conquefts are but a poor Compenfation for the Lofs of our Liberties; in a Word, that, like Wolfe, falling in the Arms of Victory, we are most glorioufly—undone !

But though I have drawn fo melancholy a Picture, of the Dangers which threaten us with the Lofs of our Liberties, it is with no other Defign. than to exhort those who are placed at the Helm, to fet about the Repairs of our shattered Veffel, as foon as the can be brought fafe into Harbour. After the Peace is once fettled, it ought to be the great Object of our Ministers, to devise every Expedient, and to adopt every Plan, that may extricate this unhappy Conftitution from the Dangers I have defcribed. Confidering the low Ebb of France, we have fome Reafon to hope that when Peace is once reftored, upon folid Terms, it will not foon be interrupted. Much, therefore. may be done during those Years of Tranquility; if our Ministers be diligent and faithful in this great Work of reviving the Conflitution. The facred, and inviolable Application of the Sinking Fund, which the Increase of our Trade, and other Circumftances, have fo greatly augmented; and muft still augment, will operate gradually, and effectually. Universal and invariable (Economy, muft

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must be introduced into every Branch of Government; the Revenues of the Kingdom may be vaftly increased by adopting Schemes that will prevent Frauds, and leffen the Expence of Collection; innumerable unneceffary Places may be abolished, and exorbitant Perquisites, in those we leave, may be reftrained ; Attention must be had to the Morals and Principles of the Nation, and the Revival of Virtue and of Religion will go hand in hand, with the Revival of Liberty. But no Object will deferve more Attention, than our Military Encroachments on Conftitutional Independance. When this War shall be over, there will be less Reason, than ever, for numerous Armies. The Kingdom now happily being united, and Difaffection to the Royal Family at an End, we need fear no Rebellions among ourfelves; and Invafions from France are lefs likely than ever. Befides, by the Care and Perfeverance of fome Patriots, we have acquired a new internal Strength, a Militia trained up to be uleful, and confequently, we may without any Danger to the Public, reduce the Number of our Guards and Garrifons, fo low, as to deftroy great Part of the huge Fabrick of Military Influence and Dependance. But whatever you do, if you mean to reftore the Constitution, you must fecure the Dignity and Independance of Parliament. After paffing fuch Laws as may flill be neceffary to preferve the Freedom of Elections, from Influence of every Sort ; to punish Bribery both in the Electors and in the Elected; fomething, perhaps, may still be done by Way of Place-bill, to leffen mini-Iterial Influence over Parliaments, without having Recourse to an Oliverian Self-denving Ordinance; or to fo total an Exclusion of Placemen as was established, in the original Act of Settlement.

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And an Houfe of Commons thus chofen, and thus made independent, now that *Jacobitifm* is rooted out, can never be formidable but to thofe who have Reafon to tremble. Such an Houfe of Commons, will co-operate with the Administration in every Plan of publick Utility, and at the fame Time inquire carefully into the Abufes of Government; Supplies will be voted; but only in Proportion to the real Income and Abilities of the Nation; and we may expect to fee, what we have not feen above thefe forty Years, a Parliamentary Commission of Accounts erected to inquire into the Difburfement of near *Two Hundred Millions*. And unlefs we fee this, foon, I shall look upon our Conftitution, as lost, for ever.

Thefe, and many fuch Regulations, as thefe, may, under an honeft and virtuous Administration, be adopted when once Peace is reftored: And the Prospect of seeing them adopted, and steadily purfued, keeps me from despairing altogether of the Commonwealth.

To you, therefore, whole Power, most likely, will not terminate with the War; and whom I have prefumed to address, with Regard to the Terms that should be demanded, to secure us from a perfidious Foe; To you, My Lord, and Sir, let me earnessly recommend, the still more important Care, of faving us, from ourfelves; and as you have with an Unanimity, that doth you both great Honour, directed our Councils, fo as to humble France, let me intreat you to preferve your Union, till it re-invigorate the almost lost Powers of the British Constitution.

If you have any Regard to Virtue, to Liberty, to your Country; if you would live great, and die lamented; if you would fhine in Hiftory, with our H Clarendons Clarendons and Southamptons; let not this Opportunity, perhaps, this laft Opportunity of faving British Liberty, and Independence, be thrown away. You, my Lord, whofe Rank, whofe extenfive Influence, and perfonal Authority, have given vou the Preeminence, in public Affairs, as it were by Prefcription; much will depend upon you, in the carrying on this important Work. But when I direct my Address to you, Sir, you must be confcious that befides the general Expectations we have from you, as a Lover of Your Country, we have your own repeated Promifes, and Declarations, to make us flatter ourfelves that you will not ftop fhort, in your Schemes of national Reformation. Not tutored in the School of Corruption, but lifted, from your earlieft Years, under the Banner of Patriotifm ; called into Power, by popular Approbation, and ftill uniting, the uncommon Characters of Minister and Patriot; favourite of the Public, and Servant of the Crown ; be not offended, Sir. if I remind you, not to Difappoint that Confidence the Public places in your future Endeavours to prop the finking Conftitution. Nor let it ever fall from your Memory, that the Nation expects from your Virtue, your Œconomy, your Plans for Liberty, during the future Peace, as great Advantages as we have already gained, from your Spirit, your bold Councils, and vigorous Efforts, in carrying on the prefent, War.

Perhaps I grow too warm, on a favorite Subject; and, therefore, from Schemes which cannot take Effect, till the War be clofed, let me turn your Attention again, for a little while longer, to the Object immediately before our Eyes----the infuing Conferences for Peace. And, with Regard to thefe, though I fuppofe, they will *begin*, before the ŗ.,

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the Winter be over, I think there is fome Reafon, for being of Opinion that we must have another Campaign, before they can be finally clofed. France is too low, to think ferioufly of a Peace, without making fome defperate Effort. She never would have exported her Weaknefs to all Europe, by fo fhameful and fo humbling a Bankruptcy; She never would have ruined her public Credit, and melted her Plate, the last Refource, when every other has been exhaufted, only to receive Terms from England. No, the knows the is undone, for ever, if she gets no footing in Hanover; and, therefore, we may expect to fee another Attempt made for that Purpofe. But, if we are not wanting to ourfelves, another Attempt, will end, as unfortunately for her, as the former have done; and her Ruin only be more confirmed. In the mean while, I make no Doubt, the Plenipotentiaries will meet at a Congress; but the Events of the Field, mult regulate the Deliberations of the Cabinet. We, no Doubt, shall be firm in our Demands, whatever they are; and the French will endeavour to gain Time, to know whether there is any likelihood of obliging us to offer them better. In this Situation, then, France must hear with Terror, that without breaking our national Faith, without injuring private Property, without giving exorbitant Premiums, we have already provided immenfely for the Supplies of another Year (and Supplies for Years may still be had) to meet them --- not in America; there they are no more; -- not on the Ocean--the Deftruction of their Fleets leaves that Empire free to us -- but once more, on the Plains of another Minden, again to feel and to confess the Superiority of British Valour.

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I have only a Particular or two, to add, before I conclude. And I cannot help congratulating the Public, on the Wifdom of our Manner of Opening the Negociation for Peace. I mean to observe, that our Ministers have happily got rid of a Set of very useles, or very pernicious Gentlemen called Mediators, by applying directly to the Enemy himfelf. Nothing can be more ridiculous than the Figure of the Pope's Nuncio, and the Ambassador of Venice, acting the Farce of Mediation at Munster, for several Years, while the War went on, till its Events regulated the Terms of Peace. The Mediation of infignificant Powers is therefore abfurd; and the Danger of calling in a powerful Mediator, who may threaten to declare against you, if you do not submit to his partial Decifions, is too obvious to be infifted upon. You have done wifely, therefore, to keep the Negociation in your own Hands; the Nation, from. this Inftance, has a full Confidence that her Interefts, are skilfully conducted; and, therefore, I shall only add, another Particular, which however fubordinate, will, no Doubt be attended to by you; though fome late Negotiators of ours, with France, neglected it.

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The French, by taking the Lead in Europe of late, have, of Courfe, been able to introduce their Language as the common Vehicle of the Sentiments of other Nations, in all public Negociations; fo that, perhaps, the French is the only Tongue, by the Chanel of which Plenipotentiaries and Minifters of different Countries, can converfe. But when the Negociation is to be put into Writing, and to be drawn up in that Form which is to be binding upon all the Parties, and figned jointly by the treating Powers, neither the Honour, nor the Intereft of the State, ought to allow us, to accept •

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of the Original Treaty in the Native Tongue of our The Honour of the Nation forbids this; Enemies. as it would be a Confession of Superiority, to which Britain, at no Time, much less after fo glorious a War, fhould fubmit ; efpecially as we cannot fubmit to it, without giving the Enemy a real Advantage, and laying the Foundation for future Cavils .- Cardinal Mazarine, in his Letters, boafts, that by a latent Ambiguity and Nicety in the French Stile, he had been able to out-wit Don Louis de Haro, in the Conferences at the Pyrenees. And a much later Inftance, in which we ourfelves were partly concerned, should confirm us, in our Refufal to treat with the French in their own Language. -I mean the famous Capitulation of the Dutch Garrifon of Tournay in 1745; which, though only reftrained from acting, for a limited Time in any of the Barrier Towns *, as the Dutch believed, when they accepted of the Capitulation, was foon after interpreted by France, as tying them up from acting in any Part of the World; and might have been fatal to this Country, if the Rebellion in Scotland, to affift in quelling which the Dutch lent us those very Troops, had been fo fuccessful, as to oblige us to put our Foreign Allies to the Teft.

We have no great Reafon, no more than other Nations, to truft *Gallic Faith*, as appears from the many Inftances of their *unpalliated* Perfidy which I have collected above. Let us not, therefore, be

* I have not the original Capitulation before me, but I remember, pretty exactly on what the Cavil turned. The Troops were not to act, I think, for two Years, in any of the Places les plus reculées de le Barriere. The Dutch, no doubt, underflood, de la Barriere to be the Genitive Cafe, but the French faid they meant it in the Ablative.

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fo weak as to give them Room for obtruding upon us, any fallacious Interpretations of the Words, in which they plight their Faith. They are too ready to break it when the Terms are ever fo clear ; and, therefore, let us take Care not to give them that Advantage which fuperior Skill in their own Language, naturally confers, and which upon fome future Occafion, they may improve to our Detriment. Let the original and authentic Copy of the Treaty, therefore be in a dead Language, the Phrafes of which cannot vary, and whofe Meaning is equally underftood by both Parties. We had once a very learned Plenipotentiary in Queen Elizabeth's Time, who, in a Negociation with Spain, when it came to be debated in what Language the Treaty should be made, ludricoufly enough proposed to the Spaniard, who was giving himfelf Airs of Superiority, to treat in the Language of his Master's Kingdom of Jerusalem. But leaving the Hebrew, for our Divines; I would only have our Negociators treat in Latin: Which feemed, as it were by Prefcription, to have a Right to be the Language of the Public Law of Europe; till fome late Inflances have shewn that the French was beginning to be fubstituted in its Room; by the Lazinefs or Neglect of those who treated. As we are fanguine in our Hopes of a much better Peace than we had at Utrecht, with Regard to the Terms ; let it not, be worfe than that at Utrecht, which preferved the Old Cuftom of fettling the Negociation in Latin. We then had a Bishop indeed, as Plenipotentiary; but without having Recourfe to the very learned Bench, or choosing a Plenipotentiary from Cambridge (I hope in a little Time one may join the other Univerfity, without giving Offence) the Negociators at the enfuing

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fuing Peace, may be accommodated with Latin enough for the Purpole I mention, at a very moderate Expence—if their Secretary or Chaplain cannot affift them.

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But when I begin to be ludicrous on fo ferious a Subject, it is Time to have done : And my Addrefs has already fwelled to fuch a fize as furprizes myself, as much, as I fear it will tire the Reader. However, the vaft Variety of Facts, and Particulars, which naturally offered themselves to me, and which could not be omitted without hurting the Connexion, and weakening my Argument, will, perhaps, procure Indulgence for fo long a Pamphlet : And, for the fame Reafon, I flatter myfelf, that if I fhould happen to have been miftaken in any Thing I advance, to have erred in a Date, or to have mif-quoted a Treaty, fome Allowances will be made to me, as I have been obliged to truft much to my Memory, for want of a proper Opportunity of confulting many of those Books, which furnish the Materials I have made Use of. However, I believe a candid Reader, will find no capital, at least, no wilful, Mistake.

I am far from the Vanity of thinking that my Notions on the important Subject of the Peace, are a regular Plan or Syftem for the Administration to proceed upon. I throw them out, only as loofe Hints for my Superiors to improve as they may think proper. Should there be any Weight in all, or any of them, you, my Lord and Sir, will be able to work them into Utility for this Kingdom. If they are not worth your Notice; as I am an anonymous Writer, and hope never to be known, I can neither lose nor gain Reputation - by

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[36] by them. All I can fay, if they are neglected, is, Operam et oleam perdidi. tare Expence-if their Secretary or Chaplain can--ba you book : " My Lord and Sirgi it , Soldue cuels has already iwelfed to fuch a fize as furpinzed Tours, Banda in sin Yours, Banda, austria Llowever, the vall Variety of Facts, and Particular, could not be omitted without hurting the Connexion, and weakening my Argument, will, perhaps, procure Indulgence for To long a Pamphlat: And, for the fame Realon. I flatter myfelf, that if f read Tyms at Filst In oNd a Id Spected bloom Ladwinee, to have streed in a Date, of to have mil-quoted a Treaty, fome Allowances will be made to me, as I have been obliged to craft much to my Memory, for whit of a proper Opportantty of confulting many of thole Books, which for-UTER LETT If they are not worth white the de-

